Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030

Section 9.94A.030’s criminal history and offender score definitions do not count prior arrests or misdemeanor convictions.

State v. Nelson · filed 1986-05-29(6), (8)

In the eyes of the sentencing reform act, an offender with no prior arrests would have the same criminal history as one with a string of arrests and misdemeanor convictions, but no felonies.

Section 9.94A.030(6) defines a conviction as an adjudication of guilt, which can occur when a defendant pleads guilty before sentencing.

State v. Huntley · filed 1986-10-13(6)

A conviction is defined in RCW 9.94A.030(6) as an "adjudication of guilt pursuant to Titles 10 or 13 RCW". RCW 10.01.060 provides that a person may be convicted of a criminal offense by his plea of guilty, his confession in open court or verdict of the jury. Walmsley's convictions on the five theft and two possession of stolen property offenses occurred in one session of the court on April 22, 1985.

For offender scoring, whether a conviction is juvenile depends on the offender's age at conviction, even if the case was tried in adult court.

State v. Knowles · filed 1986-12-31(6)

"Conviction" is defined as an adjudication of guilt pursuant to RCW Titles 10 (Criminal Procedure) or 13 (Juvenile Courts and Juvenile Offenders). RCW 9.94A.030(6). ... Rules of statutory construction favor defining "juvenile conviction" in terms of the age of the offender at the time of his conviction. ... Thus, the trial court properly scored Knowles' DWI conviction.

Section 9.94A.030(8)(b) allows qualifying juvenile offenses committed before the SRA took effect to count in criminal history when sentencing a later adult felony without imposing new punishment for the juvenile offenses.

State v. Randle · filed 1987-03-18(8)(b)

In summary, because Randle was punished only for conduct occurring after the SRA's effective date, it cannot be said that the act changes the legal consequences or underlying nature of the prior juvenile offenses. The SRA is therefore not retrospective as applied to Randle and there is no ex post facto violation.

Section 9.94A.030(8)(b) excludes misdemeanors from a future offender score.

State v. Cook · filed 1988-09-14(8)(b)

The negotiated plea was not illusory and defendant's criminal history would be unaltered since his alleged crimes were misdemeanors and would not be counted in a future offender score. RCW 9.94A.030(8)(b).

Military convictions may count as criminal history, but a conviction does not count when the record fails to establish an element of the comparable Washington offense.

State v. Duke · filed 1995-04-18(12)(a)

The record in Mr. Duke’s court-martial gives no indication the court found he intended the crime to have been committed. While some offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice may properly be included in determining a defendant’s criminal history, Mr. Duke’s court-martial conviction should not have been included.

A conviction obtained in adult court after juvenile declination counts as an adult conviction in criminal history, even if the offender was 17.

State v. Larkin · filed 1993-05-03(10)(b)

Larkin was tried as an adult on this conviction and thus it was an adult conviction. ... Because the trial court erroneously failed to include Larkin's second degree rape conviction in his offender score calculation, we remand for resentencing.

Section 9.94A.030(9) defines conviction to include acceptance of a guilty plea for double jeopardy purposes.

State v. Crisler · filed 1994-03-03(9)

In this case, there is a statute which specifically makes a plea of guilty constitute a conviction. RCW 9.94A.030(9) provides: ... Consequently, the court’s acceptance of a guilty plea is a conviction for double jeopardy purposes.

A prior conviction counts in the offender score if it exists at sentencing, regardless of when the underlying offense occurred or how the convictions and sentences are ordered.

State v. Shilling · filed 1995-03-06(9)

The offender score includes all prior convictions (as defined by RCW 9.94A.030(9)) existing at the time of that particular sentencing, without regard to when the underlying incidents occurred, the chronological relationship among the convictions, or the sentencing or resentencing chronology.

The definition of criminal history includes general court-martial convictions as convictions from elsewhere.

State v. Morley · filed 1998-03-12(12)(a)

We hold courts-martial are included in the SRA's reference to out-of-state convictions and convictions elsewhere. Courts-martial, as convictions from elsewhere, are included in a defendant's criminal history.

Section 9.94A.030(12)(a)’s definition of criminal history includes a prior military court-martial conviction that is not constitutionally invalid on its face.

State v. Aronson · filed 1996-07-23(12)(a)

A defendant’s offender score is determined in part by his "criminal history,” which is "the list of a defendant’s prior convictions, whether in this state, in federal court, or elsewhere.” RCW 9.94A.030(12)(a). ... The court did not err in including the offense in Mr. Aronson’s criminal history.

A comparable out-of-state conviction counts as a prior most serious offense; when the foreign statute is broader than Washington’s, the sentencing court may examine the defendant’s conduct as shown by the charging document.

State v. Mutch · filed 1997-08-25(23)(u)

Convictions from other jurisdictions which are comparable to Washington’s most serious offenses are counted as prior convictions. RCW 9.94A.030(23)(u). ... If they are not, or the foreign statute is broader than Washington’s, the sentencing court may look at the defendant’s conduct, as evidenced by the indictment or information, to determine whether the conduct would have violated the comparable Washington statute. ... We hold that sentencing courts should apply the same analysis to determine whether a foreign conviction is counted in the offender score, whether or not the defendant is a persistent offender.

Section 9.94A.030(9) defines a conviction to include acceptance of a guilty plea.

State v. Ford · filed 1997-09-02(9)

A "conviction” includes the acceptance of a guilty plea. RCW 9.94A.030(9). Ford therefore acknowledged the prior California convictions.

A conviction that exists at resentencing counts as a prior conviction for the offender score, even if it arose after the original offense.

State v. Worl · filed 1998-05-05(9)

We hold the trial court did not err when recalculating the offender score because resentencing courts may consider subsequent convictions when determining an offender score at resentencing.

Former § 9.94A.030 did not provide for removal of juvenile adjudications from criminal history or a permanent right to exclude or vacate them after a defendant reached a certain age.

State v. McRae · filed 1999-07-16

The defendants in the instant cases do not argue that they had vested rights to clear their juvenile records under former RCW 9.94A.030 and 9.94A.360. Moreover, neither statute provided that juvenile adjudications would be removed from a defendant’s criminal history or extended the right to permanently exclude or vacate juvenile adjudications after the defendant reached a certain age.

Criminal history must identify the specific offense underlying a prior drug conviction, including whether it was for possession or delivery.

State v. Wilson · filed 2000-08-21(12)

As Wilson’s case demonstrates, a defendant’s criminal history must include the type of VUCSA conviction because prior convictions for possession, delivery, or manufacture have varying impacts upon the defendant’s offender score, and thus the standard sentence range.

Criminal history must identify the type of a prior drug conviction because possession, delivery, and manufacture convictions affect the offender score differently.

State v. Wilson · filed 2000-09-21(12)

As Wilson's case demonstrates, a defendant's criminal history must include the type of VUCSA conviction because prior convictions for possession, delivery, or manufacture have varying impacts upon the defendant's offender score, and thus the standard sentence range.

A stayed out-of-state conviction remains a conviction for persistent-offender sentencing if it has not been dismissed or vacated.

State v. Berry · filed 2000-07-06(9)

Washington's comparability analysis, however, focuses on the conviction and the elements of the offense and not on the sentencing or postjudgment remedies which do not result in either a dismissal or vacation. ... Therefore, we find that the assault convictions remain valid "convictions" as that term is defined by the POAA. See RCW 9.94A.030(9).

The definition of “conviction” includes juvenile adjudications and applies throughout chapter 9.94A, including DOSA eligibility.

State v. Smathers · filed 2001-12-21(10)

This definition of "conviction" applies throughout chapter 9.94A RCW, including DOSA. [8] Thus, under DOSA, Smathers' juvenile adjudication for indecent liberties [9] is a "prior conviction [ ] for a sex offense."

The 1997 amendment includes prior juvenile convictions in an offender score when they had not washed out before the amendment took effect.

State v. Perry · filed 2002-03-14(12)(b)

But Mr. Perry was only 21 years old when the 1997 amendment went into effect. So, unlike the Smith defendants, there was never a time when Mr. Perry could have been sentenced for an adult felony without his prior juvenile convictions counting. He could not therefore "vest" in any right to be scored under the old rules, even if we were to accept his vesting argument.

A conviction includes acceptance of a guilty plea.

State v. Sanchez · filed 2002-05-09(10)

Although other statutes address the plea agreement process, the sentencing hearing authorized by former RCW 9.94A.110 necessarily requires a conviction and former RCW 9.94A.030(10) (2000) defines “conviction” as “an adjudication of guilt pursuant to Titles 10 or 13 RCW and includes a verdict of guilty, a finding of guilty, and acceptance of a plea of guilty” (emphasis added).

Juvenile adjudications that had not washed out before the 1997 change to the definition of criminal history remain countable in an offender score.

State v. Cunningham · filed 2003-01-28(12)(b), (13)

As of July 1, 1997, the statute was changed and criminal history was defined as “the list of a defendant’s prior convictions and juvenile adjudications, whether in this state, in federal court, or elsewhere.” Former RCW 9.94A.030(13) (1999). ... The State correctly argues that because Mr. Cunningham was only 20 years old when the law was changed in 1997, the prior juvenile offenses did not wash out.

Juvenile adjudications had not washed out under the former criminal history definition when the defendant was still under 23 when the 1997 amendment took effect.

State v. Cunningham · filed 2003-03-18(12)(b)

Because the facts of this case are nearly identical to those in Perry, we determine Mr. Cunningham's juvenile offenses do not wash out under the prior version of the SRA.

Section 9.94A.030(12)(b) includes Title 13 juvenile adjudications in an adult offender's criminal history.

State v. Johnson · filed 2003-09-08(12)(b)

The SRA unambiguously includes juvenile adjudications under Title 13 in the definition of criminal history, so the rule of lenity cannot apply.

Section 9.94A.030 defines a conviction to include a jury verdict of guilty, a bench finding of guilty, or a court's acceptance of a guilty plea.

State v. Ehli · filed 2003-02-11(10)

A conviction may be obtained by means of (a) a jury verdict of guilty, (b) a bench finding of guilty, or (c) the acceptance by the court of a guilty plea.

The 2002 definition of criminal history includes previously washed out convictions that were omitted from offender scores under earlier versions of the sentencing law.

State v. Varga · filed 2004-03-18(13)(c)

Unlike previous versions of the SRA in Cruz and Smith, this definition of "criminal history" explicitly includes previously "washed out" convictions.

Under former RCW 9.94A.030(12)(b), offenses committed before age 15 ceased to be part of a person's criminal history at age 18.

State v. Moore · filed 2004-06-03(12)(b)

Shortly after that first statement, he properly stated that because the predicate offenses were committed before he was 15, they would not remain part of his criminal history once he turned 18.

For current offenses committed before the 2002 amendment, juvenile offenses committed before age 15 that were excluded from criminal history cannot be counted in an offender score.

In RE LaHAPELLE · filed 2004-11-18(12)(b)(ii)

Prior to the 1997 SRA amendment, juvenile offenses committed before the age of 15 were not included as prior offenses in the calculation of offender scores for current offenses. Former RCW 9.94A.030(12)(b)(ii) (1996); Smith, 144 Wash.2d at 671, 30 P.3d 1245. ... Consequently, LaChapelle and Westfall's juvenile convictions committed before the age of 15 are not to be counted in calculating their offender scores for these offenses.

The pre-1997 definition of criminal history excludes juvenile offenses committed before age 15, and those offenses cannot be counted for current offenses committed before the 2002 amendment.

In re the Personal Restraint of LaChapelle · filed 2004-11-18(12)(b)(ii)

Consequently, LaChapelle’s and Westfall’s juvenile convictions committed before the age of 15 are not to be counted in calculating their offender scores for these offenses.

A conviction entered before resentencing counts as a prior conviction in the offender score, regardless of when the underlying offense occurred or the conviction’s relationship to the original sentencing.

State v. Clark · filed 2004-06-08(9)

As Division One recently stated in Shilling, “[t]he offender score includes all prior convictions (as defined by [former] RCW 9.94A.030(9)) existing at the time of that particular sentencing, without regard to when the underlying incidents occurred, the chronological relationship among the convictions, or the sentencing or resentencing chronology.” Shilling, 77 Wn. App. at 175. Accordingly, the trial court properly included Clark’s Skagit County convictions when it determined his offender score at his resen-tencing.

Prior convictions existing at resentencing count toward the offender score, regardless of when the underlying offenses occurred or the convictions were entered.

State v. Clark · filed 2004-07-20(9)

As Division One recently stated in Shilling, "[t]he offender score includes all prior convictions (as defined by [former] RCW 9.94A.030(9)) existing at the time of that particular sentencing, without regard to when the underlying incidents occurred, the chronological relationship among the convictions, or the sentencing or resentencing chronology." Shilling, 77 Wash.App. at 175, 889 P.2d 948. Accordingly, the trial court properly included Clark's Skagit County convictions when it determined his offender score at his resentencing.

Under the former washout rule, a juvenile felony could be excluded from an offender score without being expunged or losing its effect as a predicate firearm offense.

State v. Sweeney · filed 2005-01-04(12)(b)

Unlike the sealing and expunging process provided in RCW 13.50.050, the wash out provisions of the SRA have never expunged a convicted felon's record. Mr. Sweeney has not had his juvenile record expunged by court order pursuant to RCW 13.50.050. His adjudication for second degree burglary still exists for the purposes of the unlawful possession of a firearm statute.

Former § 9.94A.030(12)(b) did not exclude juvenile convictions sentenced on the same day from criminal history.

State v. Swecker · filed 2005-07-14(12)(b)

Former RCW 9.94A.030(12)(b) made no exception from the definition of criminal history for prior juvenile convictions sentenced on the same day.

For offenses committed after the 2002 amendment, criminal history includes juvenile adjudications that occurred before age 15.

State v. McDougall · filed 2006-04-25(13)

And his juvenile adjudications are then part of his "criminal history" and count toward his offender score.

Criminal history is a list of prior convictions and juvenile adjudications; the definition does not limit who may supply that list.

State v. Weaver · filed 2007-08-27(14)

Further, criminal history is defined by statute as "the list of a defendant's prior convictions and juvenile adjudications, whether in this state, in federal court, or elsewhere." [21] Nothing in that definition or in the acknowledgment statute suggests that the only source of a criminal history is DOC.

The 1997 amendment to the definition of criminal history does not retroactively revive juvenile adjudications that had already washed out.

State v. Smith · filed 2009-02-07(12)

Therefore, we look to the language of RCW 9.94A.030 alone to determine whether the 1997 amendment applies retroactively to revive appellants' previously washed out juvenile adjudications. ... Because the SRA contains no explicit legislative intent for retroactivity, and the 1997 amendment is neither curative nor remedial, we hold the 1997 amendment cannot be applied retroactively.

Section 9.94A.030(10) defines conviction to include both juvenile adjudications and adult convictions.

State v. Monson · filed 2009-04-20(10)

First, the Sentencing Reform Act defines "conviction" as "an adjudication of guilt pursuant to Titles 10 or 13 RCW and includes a verdict of guilty, a finding of guilty, and acceptance of a plea of guilty." [10] This encompasses both juvenile and adult convictions.

The definition of “conviction” does not require courts to disregard a later order vacating the conviction.

State v. Smith · filed 2010-09-07(9)

But this definition of “conviction” does not show that the legislature intended courts to disregard the effect of a subsequent vacation order or the policy emphasized in Breazeale.

Section 9.94A.030(9) defines a conviction to include a guilty verdict, a guilty finding, or acceptance of a guilty plea. Those are events, so proving a conviction does not require the original judgment under the best evidence rule.

In Re Adolph · filed 2010-11-18(9)

A "`[c]onviction'" is defined as "an adjudication of guilt pursuant to Titles 10 or 13 RCW and includes a verdict of guilty, a finding of guilty, and acceptance of a plea of guilty." RCW 9.94A.030(9). A verdict, a finding, and an acceptance are all events, not writings. Because proving the existence of an event is different than proving the contents of a writing, the best evidence rule does not apply to proving the existence of a conviction.

The definition of conviction includes an adjudication of guilt or acceptance of a guilty plea, but does not require courts to disregard a later vacation order.

State v. Smith · filed 2010-12-02(9)

Under RCW 9.94A.030(9), a "conviction" means "an adjudication of guilt pursuant to Title 10 or 13 RCW and includes a verdict of guilty, a finding of guilty, and acceptance of a plea of guilty." Smith does not dispute that he pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor offense and was convicted in 1995. But this definition of "conviction" does not show that the legislature intended courts to disregard the effect of a subsequent vacation order or the policy emphasized in Breazeale.

An accepted guilty plea is a conviction for offender score purposes even when adjudication of guilt is deferred.

State v. Cooper · filed 2011-10-18(9)

This plain language of RCW 9.94A.030(9) expressly provides that acceptance of a guilty plea is sufficient to establish a prior "conviction" for offender score and sentencing purposes.

Under former RCW 9.94A.030(13)(b), a conviction dismissed under the pre-2003 version of RCW 9.95.240 is excluded from criminal history as effectively vacated and cannot count as a POAA strike.

In Re the Personal Restraint of Carrier · filed 2012-02-23(13)(b)

A conviction dismissed under former RCW 9.95.240 remains a "conviction" under the SRA. But the conviction is excluded from Carrier's criminal history because dismissing a conviction pursuant to former RCW 9.95.240 has the same effect as vacating a conviction under the SRA.

A Florida no contest plea followed by a withheld adjudication can qualify as a conviction under Washington’s sentencing definition.

State v. Heath · filed 2012-06-25(9)

We conclude, similar to Morley, that the statutory definition of the term “conviction” should not be blindly applied to exclude a Florida no contest plea followed by a withheld adjudication.

A guilty plea accepted in a foreign deferred sentencing proceeding can qualify as a conviction when calculating a Washington offender score.

State v. Cooper · filed 2013-02-14(9)

But the plain language of RCW 9.94A.030(9) includes acceptance of a guilty plea as a “conviction” for offender score and sentencing purposes.

A finding of guilt following an Alford plea counts as a conviction for persistent offender sentencing.

State of Washington v. Tinajero · filed 2013-06-13(12)

Mr. Tinajero was adjudicated guilty of the 1994 predicate crime by virtue of the finding ofguilt following entry of his Alford plea.

Criminal history includes prior juvenile adjudications unless they have been vacated.

State of Washington v. Richards · filed 2014-01-30(14)

A defendant's criminal history lists both prior convictions and juvenile adjudications. Former RCW 9.94A.030(14) (2008). ... Since its amendment in 2002, the SRA has provided that all prior juvenile adjudications are included in a defendant's criminal history unless they have been vacated. Former RCW 9.94A.030(l3) (2002).

Prior convictions for an offender score include convictions existing at the time of resentencing, even if they occurred after the original sentencing.

State Of Washington, Resp. v. Rodney L. Garrott, App. · filed 2014-04-21(9)

In Schilling, this court held that an "offender score includes all prior convictions (as defined by RCW 9.94A.030(9)) existing at the time of that particular sentencing, without regard to when the underlying incidents occurred, the chronological relationship among the convictions, or the sentencing or resentencing chronology."12 ... Because Collicott and Shilling both support the inclusion of Garrott's Illinois convictions and subsequent convictions in his offender score at resentencing, the trial court did not err.

For crimes committed after the 2002 amendment, criminal history includes prior juvenile convictions even if earlier sentencing rules excluded them from an offender score.

State Of Washington v. Barnes · filed 2014-11-24(11)(c)

For crimes committed after the effective date of the 2002 amendment, the former rules for the "wash out" of juvenile convictions no longer apply.

Section 9.94A.030 keeps a prior juvenile conviction in criminal history even if an earlier version of the Sentencing Reform Act excluded it from an offender score; the former juvenile washout rules do not apply to crimes committed after the 2002 amendment.

State Of Washington v. Bettys · filed 2015-01-20(11)(c)

For crimes committed after the effective date of the 2002 amendment, the former rules for the "wash out" of juvenile convictions no longer apply.

The amendment to RCW 9.94A.030 allowing offenses committed before age 15 to count toward an offender score does not apply to offenses committed before the amendment.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Brandon Joseph Gerner · filed 2016-03-21

Included in the offender score was a January 1997 conviction for robbery in the second degree, committed when Gerner was 13 years old, and before the amendment to RCW 9.94A.030 which allowed juvenile offenses committed before the age of 15 to be counted for purposes of calculating ... a defendant's offender score. Therefore, the 1997 robbery conviction should have been excluded for purposes of calculating Gerner's offender score.

Former § 9.94A.030(12)(b) excludes juvenile offenses committed before age 15 from a later offender score when they are neither sex nor serious violent offenses and the offender turned 15 before July 1, 1997.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Thomas J D Channon · filed 2016-11-22(12)(b)

The statutory provision in effect at the time Channon committed his current offenses, former RCW 9.94A.030(12) (1998), provided that criminal history included both prior convictions and juvenile adjudications. ... Accordingly, under Smith, the sentencing court improperly included those juvenile adjudications when calculating Channon’s offender score.

Former RCW 9.94A.030(8)(b) excludes juvenile offenses committed before age 15 from an adult offender score.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Troy Dean Stubbs · filed 2018-03-05(8)(b)

Because he was younger than 15 when he committed his juvenile offenses, those crimes should not have been included in his offender score in 1985.

A guilty verdict is a conviction under subsection (9) even before sentencing.

State of Washington v. Small · filed 2019-03-14(9)

A conviction is defined as a verdict of guilty, a finding of guilty, or an acceptance of plea of guilty. RCW 9.94A.030(9). Because the Bauer case resulted in a guilty verdict, these counts constitute convictions even though Mr. Small had not yet been sentenced.

Under former subsection (12)(b), a juvenile conviction for a crime committed before age 15 washed out and should not be included in the offender score.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Prasoeuth Chantha · filed 2019-04-30(12)(b)

The State concedes that under former RCW 9.94A.030(12)(b) (1996) and State v. Smith, 144 Wn.2d 665, 674, 30 P.3d 1245, 39 P.3d 294 (2001), Chantha’s first juvenile conviction had washed out because he committed the crime before he turned 15 and should not have been included in his offender score. We accept the State’s concession.

A washed-out conviction remains part of a defendant’s criminal history unless it is vacated.

Personal Restraint Petition Of James Richard Painter · filed 2019-10-28(11)

A washed-out conviction remains part of a defendant’s criminal history unless it is vacated.

Section 9.94A.030(11)(b) excludes a conviction from criminal history only if it is vacated under a listed statute or by a governor’s pardon; dismissal under RCW 3.66.067 does not suffice.

State v. Haggard · filed 2020-04-23(11)(b)

RCW 9.94A.030(11)(b) specifically lists vacation under RCW 9.96.060 as the “only” means of removing a conviction from criminal history. The provision does not mention dismissal under RCW 3.66.067. Thus, the omission of RCW 3.66.067 is deemed an exclusion.

A finding of guilt in a deferred juvenile felony disposition is a conviction under RCW 9.94A.030(9).

State of Washington v. M.Y.G. · filed 2020-12-01(9)

This constitutes a “conviction” within the meaning of RCW 9.94A.030(9).

Criminal history includes prior convictions and juvenile adjudications; a prior conviction counts in an ordinary offender score unless the defendant shows it was unconstitutionally obtained or constitutionally invalid on its face.

State Of Washington, V. Macias · filed 2025-05-05(11)

“‘Criminal history’ means the list of a defendant’s prior convictions and juvenile adjudications, whether in this state, in federal court, or elsewhere.” RCW 9.94A.030(11). ... Here, like Inocencio, Macias was not sentenced under the POAA; thus, Macias has the burden of demonstrating the invalidity of the prior conviction, by showing either that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained or constitutionally invalid on its face. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d at 188. He has not done so. Therefore, the resentencing court correctly determined that the 2008 robbery conviction counted in the offender score calculation of Macias’ current sentence.

Criminal history includes foreign convictions even when those convictions do not count in the offender score.

State v. Lewis · filed 2025-07-17(11)(c)

However, “[t]he determination of a defendant’s criminal history is distinct from the determination of an offender score.” RCW 9.94A.030(11)(c). Criminal history is expansive and includes “prior convictions and juvenile adjudications, whether in this state, in federal court, or elsewhere, and any issued certificates of restoration of opportunity pursuant to RCW 9.97.020,” regardless whether those convictions and adjudications would be scored.

Section 9.94A.030(12) allows a person with multiple felony convictions to qualify as a first time offender if the person is a proper candidate for rehabilitation and otherwise meets the definition.

State v. Welty · filed 1986-07-08(12)

In sum, the sentencing reform act permits judges to treat multiple offenders as first time offenders if they are proper candidates for rehabilitation and otherwise meet the criteria of RCW 9.94A.030(12).

A prior felony conviction bars first offender status even when the defendant received a deferred sentence and the charge was later dismissed after probation.

State v. Partida · filed 1988-07-29(12)

This reasoning is controlling as Mr. Partida pleaded guilty to the grand larceny charge and served probation. The order of dismissal after fulfilling the terms of his probation is of no moment.

Section 9.94A.030(17)(a) defines first-time offender status by the type of felony, prior felony convictions, and participation in deferred felony prosecution.

State v. McDougal · filed 1992-12-10(17)(a)

At the time of Respondent McDougal's sentence on February 22, 1990, RCW 9.94A.030(17)(a) defined a "first-time offender" as follows: ... The record indicates that when the judgment and sentence was entered on December 3, 1987, Respondent Mc-Dougal had no prior felony convictions. There is nothing in the record to indicate that he had participated in a program of deferred prosecution for a felony offense.

A person convicted of a violent offense does not qualify as a first-time offender.

State v. Freitag · filed 1994-05-09(20)(a)(i)

Any person convicted of a violent offense is, by definition, not a "first-time offender".

The exclusion of people convicted of manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to manufacture or deliver schedule I or II narcotic drugs from first-time offender status survives intermediate scrutiny under equal protection and the state privileges and immunities clause.

State v. Clark · filed 1994-11-07(20)(a)

We hold that under the intermediate scrutiny test, the FTOW provisions do not violate the federal equal protection clause because they further a substantial interest of the State. Consequently, the FTOW provisions are also valid under our State’s privileges and immunities clause.

Section 9.94A.030 treats vehicular assault as a violent offense and excludes violent offenses from the first-time offender option.

State v. Freitag · filed 1995-11-14(20)(a)(i), (36)(a)

Nevertheless, the Legislature specifically excluded violent offenses, which include vehicular assault, from the first-time offender option. RCW 9.94A.030(20)(a)(i); RCW 9.94A.030(36)(a).

The definition of first-time offender excludes a person convicted of selling a Schedule I controlled substance for profit.

State v. Vanoli · filed 1997-06-09(22)(a)

RCW 9.94A.030(22)(a) specifically excludes from the definition of "first-time offender” anyone convicted of "selling for profit . . . any controlled substance . . . classified in schedule I, RCW 69.50.204.”

First-degree robbery is a violent offense that disqualifies a defendant from the first-time offender waiver.

State v. Ha'Mim · filed 1997-07-24(22)(a)(i), (38)(a)

The SRA excludes those who commit violent offenses from the first-time offender waiver provision, and robbery in the first degree is defined as a violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030(22)(a)(i); RCW 9.94A.030(38)(a); RCW 9A.56.200. Therefore, under the SRA, Defendant Ha'mim was ineligible for a first-time offender waiver.

A juvenile tried in juvenile court is not an offender under the Sentencing Reform Act, and a juvenile adjudication does not count as a strike under the persistent offender definition.

State v. JH · filed 1999-06-21(25)

Under this definition, a juvenile who is tried as a juvenile and not as an adult is not included in the definition of offender under the SRA, and therefore a juvenile offender is never eligible to be treated as a persistent offender, and juvenile adjudications do not qualify as "strikes."

The definition of a first-time offender does not exclude someone solely because the current convictions involve two felonies.

State v. Johnson · filed 1999-11-05(23)

As a preliminary matter, we hold that Johnson qualifies as a first-time offender: His conviction was not for a violent offense, a sex offense, or a drug offense, and he had no prior record of felony conviction or deferred felony prosecution. RCW 9.94A.030(23). That his current convictions were for two felonies did not preclude a first-time offender sentence.

For purposes of chapter 9.94A RCW, an “offender” is a person who has committed a felony, so the chapter’s 60-day sanctions do not apply to misdemeanor probation violations.

Hungerford v. Department of Corrections · filed 2006-08-08(23)

But these 60-day sanctions are for felony violations under former RCW 9.94A.200(2)(b) (1994), ... not for misdemeanors. ... For the purposes of chapter 9.94A RCW, “offender” is defined as “a person who has committed a felony as established by state law.” Former RCW 9.94A.030(23) (1994), currently codified at RCW 9.94A.030(31).

Section 9.94A.030(34) includes a gross misdemeanant probationer supervised by the Department of Corrections in the definition of “offender” for community custody requirements.

State Of Washington, Resp. v. Robert Rachels, App. · filed 2014-04-21(34)

Thus, the SRA explicitly makes gross misdemeanant probationers under DOC supervision—as Rachels is here—subject to the SRA's provisions for purposes of community custody requirements.

Section 9.94A.030(34) defines “offender” and treats “offender” and “defendant” as interchangeable throughout the Sentencing Reform Act.

State v. Allen · filed 2015-01-15(34)

Nevertheless, "offender" is defined as "a person who has committed a felony established by state law and is eighteen years of age or older" and "the terms 'offender' and 'defendant' are used interchangeably" throughout the SRA. RCW 9.94A.030(34). Thus, "offender" as used in the present case refers to Allen, not Clemmons.

The definition of “offender” does not require the State to prove that a defendant met that definition at the time of every prior conviction counted in an offender score.

State of Washington v. Inocencio · filed 2015-05-21(34)

While it is true that the term "offender" is used throughout the SRA, and that the SRA contemplates that persons convicted will all fall within the definition of "offender," that does not mean that every time a defendant challenges his prior status as an offender it will have to be proved by the State. Mr. Inocencio has not drawn our attention to any provision requiring that the State prove at the time of sentencing that a defendant was an "offender" at the time of each conviction that counts toward his or her offender score. Saenz does not apply.

Defining an offender as someone 18 or older does not prevent a sentencing court from considering whether a young adult’s youth diminished culpability.

State v. O'Dell · filed 2015-08-13(34)

Thus, we decline to hold that the legislature necessarily considered the relationship between age and culpability when it made the SRA applicable to all defendants 18 and older.

Under former subsection (31), a qualifying gross misdemeanor probationer could be an “offender” for community custody purposes.

State Of Washington, V Tewee · filed 2016-11-15(31)

Thus, at the time Tewee committed the current offense, he met the statutory definition of an “offender” because he was on probation for committing the two gross misdemeanors.

The 2002 definition of “offender” covered only people convicted of felony offenses; it did not include misdemeanor probationers.

Myles v. Department Of Corrections · filed 2018-07-24(30)

Former RCW 9.94A.545 (2003) applied only to “offenders,” which at that time included those convicted of only felony offenses. Former RCW 9.94A.030(30) (2002). The definition of “offender” was not amended to include misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor probationers until 2009.

Section 9.94A.030 defines community supervision and excludes affirmative participation in rehabilitation from crime-related prohibitions, so inpatient treatment cannot be a standard community supervision condition for a repeat offender.

State v. Bernhard · filed 1987-07-30(4), (7)

We disagree. While the 1984 amendments provided greater discretion for sentences of 1 year or less, the Legislature did not alter the definition of "community supervision", which means "crime-related prohibitions and other sentence conditions imposed pursuant to this chapter by a court." RCW 9.94A.030(4). Crime-related prohibitions "shall not be construed to mean orders directing an offender affirmatively to participate in rehabilitative programs or to otherwise perform affirmative conduct." RCW 9.94A.030(7). "Other conditions" may include inpatient treatment programs, but only for first-time offenders pursuant to RCW 9.94A.120(5). In addition, the Legislature did not include inpatient treatment as an alternative to confinement under RCW 9.94A.380. Consequently, because Bernhard is a repeat offender, the trial court could not include time at an inpatient treatment facility as a condition of a standard community supervision sentence.

Section 9.94A.030(7) does not authorize a sentencing court to require rehabilitative participation through a crime-related prohibition.

State v. Ward · filed 1987-10-12(7)

On the contrary, RCW 9.94A.030(7) specifically states that the sentencing court's authority to order crime-related prohibitions "shall not be construed to mean orders directing an offender affirmatively to participate in rehabilitative programs or to otherwise perform affirmative conduct."

For repeat offenders, section 9.94A.030(7) limits community supervision prohibitions to conduct directly related to the crime of conviction.

State v. Barclay · filed 1988-05-12(7)

Since Mr. Barclay was not a first-time offender, the only prohibitions which may be ordered are those which "directly relate" to the crime for which he was convicted.

Section 9.94A.030(7)'s bar on requiring affirmative conduct does not prohibit urinalysis to monitor drug use during community supervision.

State v. Parramore · filed 1989-02-27(7)

Although "affirmative conduct" is not defined in the statute, the context in which it is used suggests active involvement in pursuit of a goal. Submission to urinalysis is merely passive, uncommitted conduct.

Section 9.94A.030 supplies the definitions used to determine eligibility for community supervision, which is authorized for first-time offenders or sentences of one year or less.

In the Matter of Sentence of Chatman · filed 1990-09-17(4), (7)

Second, the trial court lacked authority to order community supervision. Community supervision is authorized only for first-time offenders and for sentences of 1 year or less. RCW 9.94A.030(4), (7); RCW 9.94A.383. Here, Chatman was not a first-time offender and was not sentenced to confinement of 1 year or less.

Section 9.94A.030(11) does not permit courts to require rehabilitative treatment or other affirmative conduct from offenders sentenced outside the first-time offender and sex offender provisions.

State v. McDougal · filed 1991-07-11(11)

An offender who has not been sentenced under the first-time offender or sex offender provisions cannot be forced to participate in rehabilitative programs, or to otherwise perform affirmative conduct. RCW 9.94A.030(11). ... Failure to take advantage of proffered rehabilitative assistance is irrelevant absent a first-time offender or sex offender option; it does not justify exceptional sanctions.

A supervision term scheduled to begin after total confinement is community placement under the section's definitions.

State v. Guerin · filed 1991-09-26(4), (6), (12)

We consider this to be community placement rather than community supervision because it is scheduled to begin after each defendant completes his term of total confinement, which is a characteristic unique to community placement.

The definition of community supervision includes other sentence conditions that may require affirmative conduct.

State v. Peterson · filed 1993-03-18(7)

Although a "prohibition" cannot, by definition, require affirmative conduct, "other sentence conditions" can.

A crime-related prohibition must directly relate to the offense; restrictions on computer possession and contact with hackers qualify for computer trespass.

State v. Riley · filed 1993-03-04(11)

He argues that these conditions are not directly crime related, in violation of RCW 9.94A. 120(5) and RCW 9.94A.030(7), (11). We disagree and hold that all the conditions the trial court imposed are reasonably related to Riley's convictions of two counts of computer trespass against Telco.

Section 9.94A.030 defines community supervision and excludes rehabilitative requirements from crime-related prohibitions for repeat offenders, so drug treatment cannot be imposed as a standard community supervision condition for them.

State v. Gaines · filed 1993-10-07(7), (11)

The definition of "community supervision" is provided by RCW 9.94A.030(7): "Community supervision" means a period of time during which a convicted offender is subject to crime-related prohibitions and other sentence conditions imposed by a court pursuant to this chapter or RCW 46.61.524. ... Option (1) is inapplicable because a "[c]rime-related prohibition" is defined to exclude rehabilitative requirements except for first-time offenders, which Gaines is not. RCW 9.94A.030(11). ... Consequently, the trial court lacks the authority to require drug treatment as a standard condition of community supervision for a repeat offender such as Gaines.

Community placement begins after confinement or upon transfer to community custody and is excluded from the presumptive range for total confinement.

Matter of Personal Restraint of Caudle · filed 1993-11-18(4)

Community placement refers to a period which begins "either upon completion of the term of confinement (postrelease supervision) or at such time as the offender is transferred to community custody in lieu of earned early release." Former RCW 9.94A.030(4). [2] Thus, the presumptive sentence ranges for total confinement do not include periods of community placement.

Community supervision is the modern equivalent of probation for purposes of the Evidence Rules governing violation hearings.

State v. Anderson · filed 1997-10-24(7)

Community supervision is the modern equivalent of probation. RCW 9.94A.030(7).

A crime-related prohibition cannot require affirmative rehabilitative conduct, but a separate treatment condition may require an offender to participate in treatment.

State v. Eaton · filed 1996-08-13(11)

Holland does not apply in this case because here the court ordered Eaton to participate in crime-related treatment rather than imposing a crime-related prohibition. The trial court’s authority to order crime-related treatment is not restricted to requiring non-affirmative conduct.

Section 9.94A.030(11)’s definition of a crime-related prohibition does not bar polygraph and plethysmograph testing used to monitor compliance with community placement conditions.

State v. Riles · filed 1997-04-28(11)

We hold that requiring polygraph and plethysmograph testing is not an order to perform affirmative conduct under RCW 9.94A.030(11).

An “obey all laws” community supervision condition is improper for a repeat offender under subsection (7).

State v. Prado · filed 1997-06-03(7)

The trial court properly amended the judgment and sentence to strike the "obey all laws” provision because of Mr. Prado’s repeat offender status.

Community supervision is the period during which a convicted offender is subject to crime-related prohibitions and other sentence conditions imposed by a court.

State v. Beer · filed 1999-02-12(7)

"Community supervision" is defined as "a period of time during which a convicted offender is subject to crime-related prohibitions and other sentence conditions imposed by a court.... For first-time offenders, the supervision may include crime-related prohibitions and other conditions imposed pursuant to RCW 9.94A.120(5)." See former RCW 9.94A.030(7) (1994). ... Thus, the statute authorizes revocation of the suspended sentence at any time in the course of the offender's time period in which he is subject to crime-related and other prohibitions.

Section 9.94A.030(5) defines community placement, in this context, as the period during which an offender is subject to postrelease supervision.

State v. Acrey · filed 1999-11-01(5)

In this context, “community placement” means the period during which the offender is subject to postrelease supervision.

Community placement begins when an offender completes confinement or transfers to community custody and continues during a local jail sanction for violating supervision conditions.

In Re the Detention of Albrecht · filed 1999-12-16(5)

Mr. Albrecht’s period of “community placement” began when he completed his term of confinement or, alternatively, when he was transferred to community custody in lieu of earned early release. Former RCW 9.94A.030(5). ... In other words, he was not sentenced to a term of “total confinement to the custody of the department of corrections.” Rather, Mr. Albrecht’s community placement was continued and was in effect on the day that the sexual predator petition was filed.

Subsections (4) and (5) define community custody and community placement as supervised portions of a sentence served in lieu of earned early release.

In Re Crowder · filed 1999-10-11(4) and (5)

Community custody and community placement, as defined by RCW 9.94A.030(4) and (5) and Policy Number 350.200 of the DOC, is that portion of an inmate's sentence of confinement granted in lieu of earned early release time in which the offender is subject to the conditions of community custody and/or post release supervision.

Under former subsection (15), “department” means the Department of Corrections.

State v. Pineda-Guzman · filed 2000-12-19(15)

"Secretary" is not defined in chapter 9.94A RCW. However, the statute only applies to offenders in the custody of the department, and department refers to the department of corrections. Former RCW 9.94A.030(15) (1998).

The definition of community custody does not authorize DOC to impose a special condition that the sentencing court declined to impose.

In Re Capello · filed 2001-06-04(4)

While the definition of "community custody" acknowledges that an offender is subject to DOC control during that period, it would be inconsistent with RCW 9.94A.120 to interpret this as a grant of independent authority to impose a special condition which the trial court specifically declined to impose.

Community placement includes time spent under the conditions of community custody, including community custody imposed in a DOSA sentence.

State v. Reed · filed 2003-03-13(7)

We determine Ms. Reed was under community placement at the time of the current offense because she was subject to the conditions of the community custody ordered in her ... DOSA sentence.

Community placement includes community custody, including the community custody portion of a DOSA sentence.

State v. Reed · filed 2003-04-10(7)

Community placement may consist of entirely community custody, entirely postrelease supervision, or a combination of the two. Former RCW 9.94A.030(7) (emphasis added). We determine Ms. Reed was under community placement at the time of the current offense because she was subject to the conditions of the community custody ordered in her DOSA sentence.

Community placement includes community custody.

State v. Crandall · filed 2003-07-01(7)

Community placement may consist of entirely community custody, entirely postrelease supervision, or a combination of the two. RCW 9.94A.030(7). Thus, community custody is a subset of community placement.

Community placement begins after confinement and may consist of community custody, postrelease supervision, or both.

State v. Jones · filed 2005-02-28(7)

"Community placement" is defined by RCW 9.94A.030(7) as that period during which the offender is subject to the conditions of community custody and/or postrelease supervision, which begins either upon completion of the term of confinement (postrelease supervision) or at such time as the offender is transferred to community custody in lieu of earned release. Community placement may consist of entirely community custody, entirely postrelease supervision, or a combination of the two. ... The plain words of these statutes make clear that community placement begins after confinement.

The definitions of community custody and community placement use “in lieu of earned early release” to describe when community custody begins, not to reduce the incarceration term by the length of community custody.

State v. Bader · filed 2005-02-01(4), (5)

The provision that the community custody begins upon release from prison or upon transfer to community custody "in lieu of" earned early release refers to the commencement of the community custody term upon the earlier release date rather than at the end of the aggregate incarceration term ordered. As the State points out, it is to prevent unsupervised lag time between the offender's early release and the commencement of the community custody term. The same is true for the term "in lieu of earned early release" as used in the statutory definitions for "community custody" [2] and "community placement." [3] See former RCW 9.94A.030(4), (5) (LAWS OF 1997, ch. 365, § 1).

Subsection (5)’s definition of community custody does not prevent the department from enforcing custody conditions while an offender is confined.

In Re Personal Restraint of Dalluge · filed 2008-01-17(5)

While the plain language of RCW 9.94A.030(5) and RCW 9.94A.625(3) arguably supports either party's interpretations, looking at the sentencing scheme as a whole, we agree with the department. ... Based on all these statutes, we conclude that the legislature intended the department to retain supervisory power and responsibility while offenders on community supervision are confined.

Former RCW 9.94A.030(4) defines community custody as time served in the community, so excess time in prison does not count toward that term.

State v. Jones · filed 2009-07-07(4)

The Knippling court's conclusion that an offender's community custody term may begin before the offender is released into the community conflicts with the statute's definition of "community custody." Former RCW 9.94A.030(4) (1997) defines "[c]ommunity custody" as "that portion of an inmate's sentence of confinement ... served in the community subject to controls placed on the inmate's movement and activities by the department of corrections."

Community placement in the form of postrelease supervision begins when incarceration ends, even if the offender is released to the SCC; confinement there qualifies as total confinement.

State v. Donaghe · filed 2011-06-30

Under the plain language of former RCW 9.94A.030(4) and (21), community placement in the form of postrelease supervision begins simply upon completion of the term of confinement. Release may be from incarceration to the SCC. ... Donaghe's confinement at the SCC falls within the plain and unambiguous statutory definition of "`[t]otal confinement'" under former RCW 9.94A.030(27). Thus, under former RCW 9.94A.030(7), Donaghe was in confinement while civilly committed as an SVP at the SCC.

Section 9.94A.030(5) defines community custody as part of a sentence under Washington's Sentencing Reform Act; supervision imposed for an Oregon conviction does not qualify.

State v. King · filed 2011-06-14(5)

The underscored language of the above-quoted definitions emphasizes that community custody and community supervision are terms of art referring to SRA sentences.

Community custody must be served in the community, so excess time spent incarcerated does not count toward a community custody sentence.

State v. Jones · filed 2011-06-30(4)

Having been incarcerated during the excess time served on his sentence of incarceration, Jones necessarily was not in the community and thus cannot be deemed to have served his sentence of community custody. Accordingly, excess time Jones spent incarcerated does not meet the definition of "community custody," and granting credit toward his sentence of community custody would contravene the plain and unambiguous language of the statute defining "community custody."

Community custody is served in the community, so an offender confined in jail is not under community custody during that time.

State v. Crawford · filed 2011-09-19(5)

The nature of community custody is such that an offender cannot be simultaneously incarcerated and “under community custody.”

Section 9.94A.030(5) excludes time spent incarcerated from community custody because community custody must be served in the community.

State v. Crawford · filed 2011-11-07(5)

A term of community custody is tolled when an offender is in confinement because the offender is not then serving a portion of his sentence "in the community." Thus, time spent incarcerated does not meet the definition of "community custody."

Section 9.94A.030(3) defines community corrections officers as responsible for monitoring sentence conditions, supporting their authority to use monitoring tools to enforce those conditions.

State Of Washington, Resp. v. Sallyea Mcclinton, App. · filed 2015-04-06(3)

Our conclusion that pre-1995 statutes authorized the Department to require McClinton to submit to monitoring tools is further supported by a statute that explicitly assigns the responsibility of "monitoring" sentence conditions to the Department's community corrections officers: "Community corrections officer" means an employee of the department who is responsible for carrying out specific duties in supervision of sentenced offenders and monitoring of sentence conditions.

The offense definitions in former § 9.94A.030(45) and (54)(a) do not authorize community custody conditions for eluding a pursuing police vehicle or unlawful possession of a firearm.

State Of Washington v. Vanelsloo · filed 2015-11-16(45), (54)(a)

The court did not have the authority to impose community custody conditions for eluding a pursuing police vehicle or unlawful possession of a firearm. See RCW 9.94A.701; RCW 9.94A.441(2); former RCW 9.94A.030(45), (54)(a) (2012).

Section 9.94A.030(5) excludes supervision for a misdemeanor from SRA community custody unless it is shown to be in lieu of earned release time.

State Of Washington v. Pedro Godinez, Jr. · filed 2015-12-15(5)

“Community custody” is defined as “that portion of an offender’s sentence of confinement in lieu of earned release time or imposed as part of a sentence under this chapter.” RCW 9.94A.030(5) (emphasis added). “This chapter” refers to the SRA and the SRA permits sentencing courts to impose punishment, including community custody, on defendants convicted of only felonies. ... Because fourth degree assault is a misdemeanor and community custody could not have been ordered for that conviction under the SRA, the trial court improperly added one point to Godinez’s offender score because he was on community custody.

Community placement remains distinct from community supervision when a court includes conditions that automatically apply to community placement.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Ronald L Brown · filed 2017-04-17(5), (7)

The trial courts' inclusion of terms that attach automatically to Brown's community placement unless waived does not convert his community placement into community supervision.

Former RCW 9.94A.030(10) permits community custody conditions that monitor compliance with other valid conditions, including testing for alcohol and controlled substance use.

State Of Washington, V Rameiko Terrell Graves · filed 2017-06-06(10)

A trial court is authorized to impose community custody conditions that monitor an offender’s compliance with other valid conditions. State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 342-43, 957 P.2d 655 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010); former RCW 9.94A.030(10) (2012). Here, the condition requiring Graves to submit to alcohol and breath testing was appropriate to monitor his compliance with the valid conditions prohibiting his use of alcohol or controlled substances.

Community custody is the portion of a confinement sentence served in the community under Department of Corrections controls; participation in an alternative to confinement program does not qualify.

State Of Washington v. Ellison · filed 2017-11-07(5)

RCW 9.94A.030(5) defines community custody as “that portion of an offender’s sentence of confinement in lieu of earned release time or imposed as part of a sentence under this chapter and served in the community subject to controls placed on the offender’s movement and activities by the [Department of Corrections].” ... The State concedes that Ellison was not on community custody at the time he committed first degree escape. We agree, and we hold that the trial court erred in adding a point to Ellison’s offender score based on the incorrect finding that he was on community custody.

Community custody under subsection (5) is served in the community; time spent in confinement does not satisfy it.

Durrett v. Sinclair · filed 2019-07-29(5)

On the other hand, the SRA defines “community custody” as “that portion of an offender’s sentence of confinement in lieu of earned release time or imposed as part of a sentence under this chapter and served in the community ... subject to controls placed on the offender’s movement and activities by the department.” RCW 9.94A.030(5) (emphasis added). ... Allowing Durrett to serve the community custody portion of his sentence in confinement would defeat the legislature’s intent with respect to these provisions.

Section 9.94A.030(5) defines community custody as part of an offender’s sentence.

State Of Washington, V. Jarvis Leighton French · filed 2022-05-02(5)

Under the SRA, a term of community custody amounts to a penalty that may or must be imposed by a sentencing court.

Section 9.94A.030(5) defines community custody as part of an offender’s sentence; a community custody term imposed under a void conviction cannot support an offender-score point.

State Of Washington, V. Ohms · filed 2022-05-02(5)

Additionally, the statutory definition of community custody clarifies that a term of community custody amounts to a portion or part of the sentence imposed upon an offender: “Community custody” means that portion of an offender’s sentence of confinement in lieu of earned release time or imposed as part of a sentence under this chapter and served in the community subject to controls placed on the offender’s movement and activities by the department.

Juvenile probation does not qualify as community placement under former RCW 9.94A.030(7).

State Of Washington, V. Campbell · filed 2024-09-04(7)

Here, Campbell’s juvenile probation did not qualify as community placement under former RCW 9.94A.030(7). Thus, the trial court erred by adding one point to Campbell’s offender score calculation and Campbell is entitled to a remedy.

Section 9.94A.030(5)'s definition of community custody does not exclude other forms of supervision that count as community custody when calculating an offender score.

State v. Roberts · filed 2025-07-31(5)

But the SRA recognizes that community custody includes more than just subsection .030(5)’s definition. RCW 9.94A.525(19) also states that “community custody includes community placement or postrelease supervision, as defined in chapter 9.94B RCW.”

Section 9.94A.030(20)(a) classifies reckless driving as a serious traffic offense.

State v. Whitaker · filed 1988-06-13(20)(a)

The SRA also requires "serious traffic offenses" of which reckless driving is one, RCW 9.94A.030(20)(a), to be taken into account in computing the offender score relative to a felony traffic offense.

Section 9.94A.030(23)(a) classifies DWI and actual physical control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated as serious traffic offenses.

State v. Dunivan · filed 1990-03-21(23)(a)

DWI and actual physical control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated are "serious traffic offenses." RCW 9.94A.030(23)(a).

Section 9.94A.030(26) lists DWI as a serious traffic offense and does not distinguish repeat DWI as a felony.

State v. Elgin · filed 1992-03-05(26)

Instead, the offense of DWI is listed in RCW 9.94A.030(26) as a "serious traffic offense". The other "serious traffic offenses" listed in RCW 9.94A.030(26), actual physical control while intoxicated (RCW 46.61.504), reckless driving (RCW 46.61.500), and hit and run of an attended vehicle (RCW 46.52.020(5)), are all nonfelony offenses. RCW 9.94A.030(26) contains no provision that would distinguish DWI as the unique felony within the list of "serious traffic offenses".

Section 9.94A.030(23) classifies robbery as a most serious offense.

State v. Rivers · filed 1996-08-08(23)

The offense committed by Defendant Rivers is a "most serious offense" under the statute. RCW 9.94A.030(23). The nature of the crime of robbery includes the threat of violence against another person.

Subsection (23) includes first-degree robbery and first-degree kidnapping as most serious offenses.

State v. Thorne · filed 1996-08-08(23)

The offenses committed by the Defendant in this case (robbery in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree) are defined as most serious offenses under the statute. RCW 9.94A.030(23).

Section 9.94A.030(36) defines serious traffic offenses to include DUI, having actual control while under the influence, reckless driving, and hit-and-run of an attended vehicle.

State v. Teitzel · filed 2002-01-11(36)

This is simply not true. A serious traffic offense includes DUI, having actual control, reckless driving, and hit-and-run. RCW 9.94A.030(36).

Section 9.94A.030(44) defines serious traffic offenses to include nonfelony DUI and physical-control offenses.

State v. Morales · filed 2012-05-29(44)

All of these prior convictions qualify as “serious traffic offenses” under the statutory definition.

Prior DUI convictions qualify as serious traffic offenses under the section's definition.

State Of Washington v. Sandholm · filed 2014-02-18(44)(a)

None of these offenses, which are qualifying "serious traffic offenses" under RCW 9.94A.030(44)(a) (2008), are separated by a five-year period between the entry of judgment and sentence on one DUI and commission of the next.

Section 9.94A.030(26) classifies felony hit-and-run injury accidents as felony traffic offenses.

Personal Restraint Petition Of Samuel Raymundo · filed 2018-11-13(26)

Felony hit»and»run is a felony traffic offense.

Vehicular assault and hit and run involving bodily injury are felony traffic offenses under this definition.

State of Washington v. Harness · filed 2018-12-04(26)(a)

Both charges are classified as “felony traffic offenses” under RCW 9.94A.030(26)(a).

A successful deferred prosecution is not a serious traffic offense under § 9.94A.030(45).

State of Washington v. Lester · filed 2019-06-13(45)

Although a successful deferred prosecution may elevate an offense, it does not fall within the definition of a “serious traffic offense.” RCW 9.94A.030(45).

Section 9.94A.030(44)(a) includes nonfelony DUIs in the definition of serious traffic offenses.

State Of Washington v. Olson · filed 2019-07-29(44)(a)

“Serious traffic offense[s]” include nonfelony DUls.

Section 9.94A.030(45)(a) treats reckless driving and misdemeanor DUI as serious traffic offenses, but not reckless endangerment.

State Of Washington v. Person · filed 2021-02-09(45)(a)

Reckless endangerment is neither a felony nor a serious traffic offense, while reckless driving and misdemeanor DUI are both serious traffic offenses. RCW 9.94A.030(45)(a).

Former § 9.94A.030(25) includes as a victim anyone whose injuries are proximately caused by the conduct forming the basis of the charged crime.

State v. Davis · filed 1989-01-23(25)

Accordingly, the proper construction of former RCW 9.94A.030(25) is that a "victim" is one whose injuries are proximately caused by conduct forming the basis of the crime charged.

Section 9.94A.030(31) defines a victim as someone who sustained physical or financial injury as a direct result of the charged crime; uninjured people do not count as multiple victims for an exceptional sentence.

State v. Kidd · filed 1990-02-26(31)

This argument fails, as it overlooks the SRA's definition of victim as "any person who has sustained physical or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged." RCW 9.94A.030(31); see Davis, 53 Wn. App. at 310. Here, there is no evidence that either officer or the eyewitness suffered physical or financial injury resulting from Kidd's assault.

Section 9.94A.030(28) includes a city that paid an assault victim's wages within the definition of “victim,” even though the city was not the immediate victim of the assault.

State v. Davison · filed 1991-05-16(28)

The relevant statute broadly defines "victim" as "any person who has sustained physical or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged." ... Although the City is not the immediate victim of the assault, the City is within the statutory definition.

Section 9.94A.030(32) treats spouses as separate victims when their stolen credit cards represent separate accounts.

State v. Vermillion · filed 1992-07-07(32)

However, 11 different credit cards were involved; none represented one account in two names. Each spouse was a victim as that term is defined in RCW 9.94A.030(32).

Under former subsection (32), a child depicted in photographs is a victim only if evidence shows injury directly resulting from the charged crime; age and depiction alone do not establish victim status.

State v. Hicks · filed 1995-02-16(32)

A "victim” is defined in former RCW 9.94A.030(32) as "any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.” In most instances, a child who is photographed in a state of undress and whose picture is then disseminated for viewing pleasure is a victim. Here, however, there is no factual basis in the record to evaluate this particular individual’s injury.

A victim under § 9.94A.030(35) must have suffered injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime; an insurer’s investigative expenses do not qualify.

State v. Martinez · filed 1995-08-02(35)

RCW 9.94A .030(35) defines "victim” as "any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.” Universal has not suffered any injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.