Wash. Rev. Code § 34.05.570

Section 34.05.570’s standards of review do not apply to agency proceedings begun before July 1, 1989.

Forsman v. Employment Security Department · filed 1990-08-27

The claimants argue that the standards of review set forth in RCW 34.05.570 apply. However, RCW 34.05.902 provides that RCW 34.05.001 through 34.05.902 took effect on July 1, 1989, and those sections apply to agency proceedings after that date. All proceedings begun before the effective date are to be completed as if the new sections had not been enacted and as if the old sections had not been repealed. This proceeding began in 1986.

Section 34.05.570(3) permits relief when an agency imposes a severe sanction based on suspected misconduct after finding the charge unsubstantiated.

Olmstead v. Department of Health · filed 1991-08-29(3)

The Board then issued a severe order which would have been entirely appropriate if it had determined that Dr. Olmstead had lapsed into renewed illegal usage of morphine. Such order, on these findings, was arbitrary and capricious. If the Board believed the evidence of renewed drug use, the Board had the responsibility to so find. When it rejected that evidence, it was not at liberty to find that the evidence nevertheless raised "concerns" and proceed to enter the order it did.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits reversal of an arbitrary or capricious agency order, but harsh sanctions alone do not meet that standard.

Heinmiller v. Department of Health · filed 1995-10-05(3)(i)

A court can reverse an agency order if "[t]he order is arbitrary or capricious." RCW 34.05.570(3)(i). Heinmiller submits that the sanctions imposed upon her by the Department are rendered arbitrary and capricious by their harshness. Harshness, however, is not the test for arbitrary and capricious action.

An agency’s consistent statewide use of a reasonable reimbursement methodology is not arbitrary or capricious under subsection (3)(i).

Seatoma Convalescent Center v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1996-04-12(3)(i)

In addition, there is no dispute that DSHS applied these methods to all facilities in the state, adopting the result most favorable to each facility. ... Additionally, DSHS’s choice of methodology was not arbitrary or capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3) permits reversal of an agency order for legal error or arbitrary or capricious action; a reasonable methodology applied consistently is not arbitrary or capricious.

Seatoma Convalescent Center v. DSHS · filed 1996-07-19(3)

Pursuant to RCW 34.05.570(3), a reviewing court may reverse an agency order when "(d) [t]he agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;.... or (i)[t]he order is arbitrary or capricious." ... While other methods are possible, DSHS chose a reasonable methodology and has consistently applied it to facilities state-wide. This is not arbitrary or capricious.

Courts reviewing agency inaction for arbitrariness or capriciousness must consider the funds the Legislature appropriated for the agency’s work.

Hillis v. State, Dept. of Ecology · filed 1997-03-06(4)(c)(iii)

We must decide whether agency action is arbitrary or capricious under the APA in light of the funds which the Legislature has appropriated for a given purpose.

Courts assess whether agency inaction is arbitrary or capricious in light of the funds the Legislature appropriated for the task.

Hillis v. Department of Ecology · filed 1997-03-06(4)(c)(iii)

We must decide whether agency action is arbitrary or capricious under the APA in light of the funds which the Legislature has appropriated for a given purpose.

An appellant challenging an agency’s discretionary ruling must show that it was arbitrary or capricious and caused substantial prejudice to obtain reversal.

Deatherage v. Examining Board of Psychology · filed 1997-03-18(3)(i)

Pursuant to RCW 34.05, an appellant’s challenge to a discretionary ruling made by an administrative body sitting in an adjudicative capacity is grounds for reversal only if the appellant establishes it was arbitrary or capricious and prejudicial. RCW 34.05.570(3)(i), (l)(d). Dr. Deatherage has not shown how any of the referenced Board conduct operated to his substantial prejudice.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits reversal of an agency sanction for arbitrary or capricious action; a penalty reached through reasoned consideration of the facts does not meet that standard.

Brown v. Department of Health · filed 1998-12-17(3)(i)

The length and extent of the penalty here is not the result of willful or unreasoning action and it is not therefore arbitrary or capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits reversal of an arbitrary or capricious agency sanction; a sanction reached after considering the facts is not arbitrary or capricious merely because of its length or severity.

Brown v. STATE DENTAL DISCIPLINARY BD. · filed 1999-02-18(3)(i)

The length and extent of the penalty here is not the result of willful or unreasoning action and it is not therefore arbitrary or capricious.

Section 34.05.570(4)(c)(iii) subjects agency action to arbitrary and capricious review; action is arbitrary and capricious when it is willful, unreasoning, and taken in disregard of the facts and circumstances.

NATIONAL ELEC. CONTRACTORS v. Riveland · filed 1999-06-03(4)(c)(iii)

Agency action is scrutinized under an arbitrary and capricious standard. RCW 34.05.570(4)(c)(iii). In general, agency action is deemed arbitrary and capricious if it is willful and unreasoning, and taken without consideration and in disregard of the facts and circumstances.

Section 34.05.570(4)(c) permits review of formal agency action and relief when that action is arbitrary and capricious.

Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Fitzsimmons · filed 1999-08-20(4)(c)

In DOE’s own words, this letter constituted “formal agency action”; thus, we review this action under RCW 34.05.570(4)(c). ... We hold that where DOE explicitly acknowledged that its decision was inconsistent with state law, that decision was arbitrary and capricious.

An agency’s refusal to initiate rulemaking may be arbitrary or capricious when it disregards relevant evidence; fiscal constraints and competing priorities do not automatically justify inaction.

Rios v. Department of Labor & Industries · filed 2002-02-07(4)(c)(iii)

We review the Department’s 1997 denial of the pesticide handlers’ request under the standards set forth in RCW 34.05.570(4)(c). ... This case presents an extraordinary circumstance: even though we recognize the Department’s wide discretion in choosing and scheduling its rulemaking efforts, we conclude that the Department’s denial of the pesticide handlers’ 1997 request was arbitrary.

For other agency action, the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow, and the person challenging the action bears a heavy burden.

Washington Independent Telephone Ass'n v. Washington Utilities & Transportation Commission · filed 2002-03-08(4)(c)(iii)

This case involves “other agency action” under Washington’s APA. ... The arbitrary and capricious standard is very narrow, and the one asserting it carries a heavy burden.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) treats a Board order as arbitrary or capricious when it is willful, unreasoning, and made without considering the surrounding facts and circumstances.

Manke Lumber Co. v. CENT. PUGET SOUND GROWTH MANAGEMENT HEARINGS BOARD · filed 2002-05-17(3)(i)

A Board's order is arbitrary or capricious under RCW 34.05.570(3)(i) if it is willful, unreasoning, and issued without regard to or consideration of the surrounding facts and circumstances.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) does not permit a court to set aside agency action as arbitrary or capricious when the evidence leaves room for two opinions, even if the court believes the agency reached the wrong conclusion.

Floating Homes Ass'n v. Department of Fish & Wildlife · filed 2003-01-17(3)(i)

Agency action is not arbitrary or capricious if the evidence on which the agency based its decision leaves room for two opinions, even though one may believe an erroneous conclusion has been reached.

Section 34.05.570(2)(c) applies the ordinary arbitrary and capricious standard to agency rules: action is arbitrary and capricious if it is willful, unreasoning, and taken without regard to the attending facts or circumstances.

Washington Indep. Tel. Ass'n v. Utilities and Transportation Commission · filed 2003-03-06(2)(c)

We conclude that the arbitrary and capricious standard, as set forth in Rios and Hillis, should be applied. [15] To repeat, agency action is arbitrary and capricious if it is willful and unreasoning and taken without regard to the attending facts or circumstances.

Section 34.05.570(4)(c)(iii) does not treat the WUTC’s decision to let utilities recover taxes as arbitrary or capricious when the taxes are not clearly invalid.

Willman v. Washington Utilities & Transportation Commission · filed 2004-07-01(4)(c)(iii)

The WUTC does not act arbitrarily or capriciously by permitting utilities to recover taxes unless they are clearly invalid.

Under RCW 34.05.570(3)(i), an agency action is arbitrary and capricious when it is willful and unreasoning; an action taken after due consideration is not arbitrary and capricious merely because a reviewing court disagrees.

Wean v. Island County · filed 2004-06-07(3)(i)

As used in RCW 34.05.570(3)(i), "arbitrary and capricious" means "willful and unreasoning action, taken without regard to or consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the action. Where there is room for two opinions, an action taken after due consideration is not arbitrary and capricious even though a reviewing court may believe it to be erroneous."

An agency’s choice among competing evidence is not, by itself, arbitrary or capricious.

Whidbey Environmental Action Network v. Island County · filed 2004-06-07(3)(i)

The Board was free to choose from among competing evidence, and doing so was not arbitrary or capricious.

Section 34.05.570(4)(c) permits a challenge to agency action that is arbitrary or capricious, meaning willful and unreasoning action taken without regard to the attending facts or circumstances.

Willman v. Washington Utilities & Transportation Commission · filed 2005-08-11(4)(c)

A petitioner may challenge an agency’s decision only if such a decision is (1) unconstitutional, (2) outside the statutory or legal authority of the agency, (3) arbitrary or capricious, or (4) taken by persons not authorized to take the action. RCW 34.05.570(4)(c). ... This court has found that an action is arbitrary or capricious only if it “is willful and unreasoning and taken without regard to the attending facts or circumstances.”

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits relief from an agency order in an adjudicative proceeding if the order is arbitrary or capricious.

Regan v. State Dept. of Licensing · filed 2005-10-25(3)(i)

We will grant relief from an agency order in an adjudicative proceeding if (1) the order, or the statute or rule on which the order is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; (2) the agency engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or failed to follow a prescribed procedure; (3) the agency erroneously interpreted or applied the law; (4) when viewed in light of the whole record, substantial evidence does not support the order; or (5) the order is arbitrary or capricious. RCW 34.05.570(3)(a),(c)-(e),(i). ... There is no showing that he acted arbitrarily or capriciously or that the sanction was excessive.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits relief when an agency decision is arbitrary or capricious, including when substantial evidence does not support its conclusion.

Western Wash. Engineers v. Apprenticeship and Training Council · filed 2005-11-22(3)(i)

We may grant relief to the petitioner if an agency erroneously interpreted the law or if an agency's decision is arbitrary or capricious. ... Because substantial evidence does not support the Council's conclusion that CITC's apprenticeship standards are reasonably consistent with existing programs, its decision was arbitrary or capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits reversal of an arbitrary or capricious agency order; a harsh sanction alone does not meet that standard.

Johnson v. Department of Health · filed 2006-05-01(3)(i)

This court can reverse an arbitrary or capricious agency order. RCW 34.05.570(3)(i). The “harshness” of the sanction is not the test for arbitrary and capricious action.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits reversal of an arbitrary or capricious agency order; the harshness of a sanction alone does not meet that standard.

Johnson v. WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH · filed 2006-06-06(3)(i)

This court can reverse an arbitrary or capricious agency order. RCW 34.05.570(3)(i). The "harshness" of the sanction is not the test for arbitrary and capricious action. Heinmiller, 127 Wash.2d at 609, 903 P.2d 433. Arbitrary and capricious action is willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of facts and circumstances.

Section 34.05.570(3) permits reversal of arbitrary and capricious agency action; differing staff views before a considered final decision do not alone establish arbitrariness.

Friends of the Columbia Gorge, Inc. v. Forest Practices Appeals Board · filed 2005-08-09(3)

We reverse an agency action where the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law, the agency’s order is not supported by substantial evidence, or the agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious. ... Friends have not shown that DNR acted without consideration of relevant facts or circumstances when its approval of Ostroski’s permit differed from the action some of its employees proposed. That DNR employees expressed divergent views before DNR made a final decision demonstrates, not arbitrariness, but rather that DNR gave the matter due consideration.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits a court to reverse an agency order if it is arbitrary or capricious; disciplinary sanctions based on consideration of the evidence and public risk do not meet that standard.

Lang v. Dental Quality Assurance Commission · filed 2007-04-26(3)(i)

A court is authorized to reverse an agency order if the order is arbitrary or capricious. RCW 34.05.570(3)(i). An arbitrary or capricious action is a willful and unreasoning action made without consideration and without regard to the facts and circumstances. ... Given the serious risk to the public in having unlicensed persons start IVs and administer anesthetic, the sanctions were conservative and not arbitrary or capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) allows relief from an agency order that is arbitrary or capricious; the party seeking relief must show that the order meets that standard.

Donahue v. CENTRAL WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY · filed 2007-08-07(3)(i)

(i) The order is arbitrary or capricious. RCW 34.05.570(3). ... Here, Dr. Donahue fails to show the Board's order was arbitrary or capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits relief when an agency order is arbitrary or capricious, meaning it was willful and unreasoning and disregarded the attending facts or circumstances.

Donahue v. Central Washington University · filed 2007-08-07(3)(i)

An order is arbitrary or capricious if it “ ‘is willful and unreasoning and taken without regard to the attending facts or circumstances.’ ” ... Given the faculty code and our facts, it cannot be said the Board’s order affirming CWU’s reassigning Dr. Donahue was unreasonable or taken without regard to the facts and circumstances.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits relief when an agency order is arbitrary or capricious; substituting historical data for missing survey data did not meet that standard here.

Odyssey Healthcare Operating Blp v. State, Dept. of Health · filed 2008-06-17(3)(i)

The Washington Administrative Procedures Act allows a reviewing court to grant relief from an agency action where the court "determines that . . . (d) The agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; [or] . . . (i) The order is arbitrary or capricious." RCW 34.05.570(3). ... We hold that Odyssey fails to show that the Department acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when, in calculating statewide hospice usage, it substituted historical data in place of survey data missing from some non-responding counties.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) does not provide relief for arbitrary and capricious agency action when the challenger fails to show that the agency’s substitution of historical data for missing survey data was willful or unreasoned.

Odyssey Healthcare Operating B, LP v. Department of Health · filed 2008-06-17(3)(i)

The Washington Administrative Procedure Act allows a reviewing court to grant relief from an agency action where the court “determines that . . . (d) The agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; [or] (i) The order is arbitrary or capricious.” RCW 34.05.570(3). ... We hold that Odyssey fails to show that the Department acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when, in calculating statewide hospice usage, it substituted historical data in place of survey data missing from some nonresponding counties.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) does not make an agency action arbitrary or capricious merely because its sanction is harsh.

Yow v. Department of Health Unlicensed Practice Program · filed 2008-10-13(3)(i)

Harshness is not the test for arbitrary and capricious action.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits reversal for arbitrary or capricious agency action, but an action taken after a fair hearing and due consideration is not arbitrary or capricious merely because the result is harsh.

WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH v. Yow · filed 2008-12-30(3)(i)

Action taken after giving a party ample opportunity to be heard, exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed an erroneous decision has been reached, is not arbitrary or capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3) permits relief when an agency order is arbitrary and capricious.

Lenca v. Employment Security Department · filed 2009-02-03(3)

We may grant relief from an agency action only in nine enumerated circumstances, including if the order is arbitrary and capricious, the circumstance at issue here. RCW 34.05.570(3). ... Accordingly, the Commissioner acted arbitrarily and capriciously by disregarding these facts and circumstances when he refused to order the ALJ to admit Lenca’s pay stubs as evidence and to reconsider her decision.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits reversal of an agency order for arbitrary or capricious action; an order based on applicable law and facts does not meet that standard.

A.W.R. Construction, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries · filed 2009-07-23(3)(i)

A court is authorized to reverse an agency order if the order is arbitrary and capricious. RCW 34.05.570(3)(i). ... The Department’s infraction was not arbitrary or capricious. The Department based its decision on the applicable statutes and the facts of this case. The decision was also not willful or unreasonable.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits relief from an arbitrary or capricious agency order; the harshness of a sanction alone does not establish that standard.

Fraternity v. Washington State University · filed 2009-09-17(3)(i)

RCW 34.05.570(3)(i) states that a court may grant relief from an agency order if the order is “arbitrary or capricious.” ... Significantly here, the harshness of the sanctions imposed is not the test for arbitrary or capricious action.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) authorizes a court to reverse an agency order that is arbitrary or capricious.

Awr Const. v. Washington Dept. of Labor · filed 2009-10-06(3)(i)

A court is authorized to reverse an agency order if the order is arbitrary and capricious. RCW 34.05.570(3)(i). ... The Department's infraction was not arbitrary or capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits relief from an arbitrary or capricious agency order; a sanction based on due consideration of the facts does not meet that standard.

Hickethier v. STATE DEPT. OF LICENSING · filed 2011-01-04(3)(i)

The sanction is not, then, arbitrary or capricious; it is instead based on due consideration of the facts.

An agency sanction is not arbitrary or capricious when the agency considers the facts and bases the sanction on the violations it finds.

Hickethier v. Department of Licensing · filed 2011-01-04(3)(i)

The director considered the facts and circumstances in deciding Ms. Hickethier’s sanction. She based her decision on only those charges that Ms. Hickethier was ultimately held responsible for. The sanction is not, then, arbitrary or capricious; it is instead based on due consideration of the facts.

Section 34.05.570(3) permits relief from an arbitrary or capricious agency order; a disqualification based on an applicant’s licensing history and background check does not meet that standard.

Stewart v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 2011-06-07(3)

In reviewing an agency order, we may grant relief from the order if we determine ... (9) the order is arbitrary or capricious. RCW 34.05.570(3). ... Thus, the Department’s disqualification of Ms. Stewart was not arbitrary and capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits reversal of an arbitrary or capricious agency order; an agency’s change in interpreting its rules does not by itself make its decision arbitrary or capricious.

Nix v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 2011-08-03(3)(i)

A court is authorized to reverse an agency order if the order is arbitrary and capricious. RCW 34.05.570(3)(i). ... Additionally, the Department is not precluded from changing its interpretation of its own rule. ... Based on this, Nix has not shown an arbitrary and capricious Department decision here.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits a court to overturn an agency order when the agency acts in willful and unreasoning disregard of the facts and circumstances.

Probst v. STATE DEPT. OF RETIREMENT SYSTEMS · filed 2012-03-13(3)(i)

Although RCW 34.05.570(3) provides nine bases for overturning an agency order in an adjudicative proceeding, we address only two: whether the DRS erroneously interpreted or applied the law or acted arbitrarily or capriciously. RCW 34.05.570(3)(d), (i). ... An agency's decision is arbitrary and capricious if it results from willful and unreasoning disregard of the facts and circumstances. ... The decision to continue using the quarterly interest calculation method was therefore undertaken in willful and unreasoning disregard of the facts and circumstances, making it arbitrary and capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits reversal of an agency decision made in willful and unreasoning disregard of the facts and circumstances.

Probst ex rel. Class of Similarly Situated Individuals v. Department of Retirement Systems · filed 2012-03-13(3)(i)

An agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious if it results from willful and unreasoning disregard of the facts and circumstances. ... The decision to continue using the quarterly interest calculation method was therefore undertaken in willful and unreasoning disregard of the facts and circumstances, making it arbitrary and capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits relief for arbitrary or capricious agency action, but an action is not arbitrary or capricious when more than one reasonable opinion is possible and the agency considered the circumstances.

Clark County v. Rosemere Neighborhood Ass'n · filed 2012-09-25(3)(i)

An agency action is not arbitrary and capricious where more than one reasonable opinion is possible and the agency acted with due consideration to the circumstances.

Section 34.05.570(4)(c) permits relief from agency action on specified grounds, including that the action was arbitrary or capricious.

Squaxin Island Tribe v. Department of Ecology · filed 2013-11-13(4)(c)

We will grant relief only if we determine that the agency action is unconstitutional, outside the agency’s authority, arbitrary or capricious, or taken by unauthorized persons. RCW 34.05.570(4)(c). ... Ecology’s decision to deny the Tribe’s petition is not arbitrary and capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(h)(i) permits relief when an agency's choice of remedy is arbitrary or capricious, even if evidence supports the underlying violations.

In Re Mariana Gligor Dba Evergreen Seasons Afh, Res. v. State Of Wa., Dshs, App. · filed 2014-10-20(3)(h)(i)

Relief will also be granted where the "order is arbitrary or capricious." RCW 34.05.570(3)(h)(i). ... Here, even if DSHS proved each and every allegation, the remedy of license revocation under these circumstances was arbitrary and capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) requires a court to grant relief from an agency order if the order is arbitrary and capricious.

In Re Pathfinder House, V Wa State Dshs · filed 2014-11-24(3)(i)

Under RCW 34.05.570(3)(i), the court shall grant relief from an agency order if the order is arbitrary and capricious.

Section 34.05.570(4)(c)(iii) permits relief from other agency action that is arbitrary or capricious; an agency's decision is not arbitrary or capricious when it reasonably accounts for the facts and circumstances known at the time.

State Dept Revenue, V Kissner · filed 2015-08-04(4)(c)(iii)

Accordingly, we hold that, based on the facts and circumstances known to DOR at the time, it was reasonable not to issue a refund to Peste or a release to Davis after Bracken was decided and while a legislative fix was pending. Therefore, the Estates have not met their burden to demonstrate that DOR' s other agency actions were arbitrary and capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) requires relief from an agency order that is arbitrary and capricious.

Shantanu Neravetla, M.d. v. State Of Wa, Dept. Of Health · filed 2017-04-11(3)(i)

Under RCW 34.05.570(3)(i), we shall grant relief from an agency order if the order is arbitrary and capricious. ... Therefore, we conclude that the decision was not arbitrary and capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits relief from an agency order that is arbitrary or capricious; the court examines whether the agency considered the relevant facts and circumstances.

Honeywell v. Washington State Department Of Ecology · filed 2017-10-16(3)(i)

We conclude that the SHB did not act arbitrarily or capriciously because it considered the facts and circumstances of the Honeywells' case before affirming the DOE's penalty matrix.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits a court to reverse a final agency order that is arbitrary and capricious.

Macmillan-piper, Inc. v. Department Of Employment Security · filed 2017-12-26(3)(i)

Courts may reverse a final order that is arbitrary and capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits relief when an agency decision is arbitrary or capricious; the court applies the statute’s disjunctive wording.

Courtney v. Washington Util. and Transp. Comm'n · filed 2018-04-03(3)(i)

RCW 34.05.570(3)(i) permits a court to grant relief if the agency decision is “arbitrary or capricious.” Appellate decisions, perhaps using a prior standard, often speak of “arbitrary and capricious.” We will use the statutory standard in our analysis.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits a challenge to an agency order as arbitrary or capricious; an agency does not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it applies the governing statutes to the facts.

Hon. Kelli Linville, Res. v. State Of Wa. Dept. Of Retirement Systems, App. · filed 2019-12-02(3)(i)

Pursuant to RCW 34.05.570(3)(i), a petitioner may challenge an agency’s order on the ground that the order is arbitrary or capricious. ... DRS did not act arbitrarily or capriciously but, rather, applied the statutes by which it is bound to the facts of Linville’s application.

Section 34.05.570(3) permits relief from an agency adjudicative order that lacks substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious.

The Greenhouse Group, Llc v. Washington State Liquor And Cannabis Board · filed 2020-11-02(3)

Though Greenhouse views the facts and comes to a different conclusion, the LCB decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not arbitrary and capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits relief for arbitrary and capricious agency action; a reasoned decision to defer claims to arbitration does not meet that standard.

American Federation Of Teachers, V. Public Employment Relations · filed 2021-08-23(3)(i)

Here, the Commission’s decision to defer was not arbitrary and capricious. Its decision was reasonable because the College asserted a colorable waiver-by-contract defense that may control resolution of the Union’s statutory claims.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) does not provide relief for an arbitrary or capricious agency order when the agency reasonably rejects an untimely petition for lack of good cause.

Justin Carlson, V. Wa State Dept Of Social & Health Services · filed 2022-07-18(3)(i)

Because Carlson filed an untimely petition for review, he had to establish good cause before the BOA could consider his petition. As discussed above, the BOA did not err in finding no good cause for the late petition. So it rejected the petition and the ALJ’s initial decision became the final administrative decision in the matter. The BOA’s final order is not arbitrary or capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits relief from an adjudicative agency order that is arbitrary or capricious, including an unreasoning dismissal based on a misapplied rule.

Kenmore MHP LLC v. City Of Kenmore · filed 2023-05-04(3)(i)

We hold that the Board order of dismissal is unreasoning, and thus arbitrary and capricious, because it failed to correctly apply the test adopted in Your Snoqualmie Valley on which it purported to rely.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits relief for arbitrary or capricious agency action when the agency acts willfully or unreasoningly without regard to the facts or circumstances.

Application Software Products, Inc., V. State Liquor And Cannabis · filed 2024-03-04(3)(i)

Application Software fails to establish that the board acted in a willful or unreasoning manner such that the arbitrary or capricious standard is met under RCW 34.05.570(3)(i).

Under § 34.05.570(3)(i), the harshness of an agency sanction or its difference from sanctions in other cases does not alone make it arbitrary and capricious.

Yi Sweeney, V. Wa State Office Of The Insurance Commissioner · filed 2023-07-03(3)(i)

In short, neither the harshness, nor the similarity of a sanction to that issued in another case, are grounds to find a penalty arbitrary and capricious.

Discretionary agency permit decisions are reviewed for arbitrariness and capriciousness.

Puget Soundkeeper Alliance, V. Wa State Dept. Of Ecology · filed 2023-09-05(3)(i)

Because Ecology enjoys this discretion, its actions must be analyzed not de novo, as Soundkeeper argues, but through an arbitrary and capricious lens.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) provides relief when an agency order is arbitrary or capricious; an order is not arbitrary merely because the permit allows minor unmonitored discharges when the record supports its monitoring requirements.

Weyerhaeuser Nr Co. V. Wa State Dept Of Ecology & Pollution Control Hearings Board · filed 2024-12-30(3)(i)

Relevant here, this court shall grant relief if it determines that: (1) the PCHB has erroneously interpreted or applied the law or (2) the order is arbitrary and capricious, RCW 34.05.570(3)(d), (i). ... Weyerhaeuser fails to show that the PCHB acted unreasonably or without regard to the attending circumstances when it decided that monitoring requirements in the 2019 NORPAC permit were adequate to ensure stormwater discharge did not cause or contribute to violations of water quality standards in CDID Ditch #3.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) provides relief when an agency order is arbitrary or capricious.

Akberet Tekle, V. Washington Department Of Social And Health Services · filed 2025-02-18(3)(i)

Under RCW 34.05.570(3)(i), a court must grant relief from an agency order “if it determines that . . . [t]he order is arbitrary or capricious.” ... We conclude the Board’s final order was not arbitrary or capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) does not authorize relief for an arbitrary or capricious order when the agency explains its application of relevant rules to the facts, even if reasonable minds could differ on the result.

Janet Lane, V. Health Care Authority · filed 2026-02-10(3)(i)

Here, the Board considered the relevant WACs and made a reasoned decision applying those WACs to the established facts of this case. The Board amply explained its reasoning and its decisions in a lengthy, 18-page order. Even if reasonable minds could differ on whether Lane was entitled to benefits, Lane fails to show that the Board’s order was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, Lane has failed to show that the Board’s final order is invalid under RCW 34.05.570(3)(i).

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits relief for an arbitrary or capricious agency order; an order based on consideration of the relevant facts is not arbitrary or capricious.

Dr. John Stamatoyannopoulos, V. University Of Washington · filed 2026-02-23(3)(i)

Because the record shows the hearing panel considered the “attending facts and circumstances” and its decision is not “willful and unreasoning,” we reject Stamatoyannopoulos’ argument that the decision is arbitrary or capricious under RCW 34.05.570(3)(i).

An agency’s denial of a petition is arbitrary and capricious when it fails to consider the authority on which the petition relies.

Tanggote v. State Department of Social and Health Services · filed 2025-05-20(4)(c)(iii)

We conclude that DSHS’s decision to deny Tanggote’s petition was arbitrary and capricious because it was unreasoned as to its section 0180 removal authority.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits reversal for arbitrary or capricious agency action; a decision that follows logically from its factual findings does not meet that standard.

Department Of Employment Security v. Corporate Security, Llc · filed 2018-10-22(3)(i)

The Commissioner's decision is well- reasoned and follows logically from its findings of fact. ... Therefore, we conclude the Commissioner's decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Section 34.05.570(3)(i) permits relief from an agency order if the order is arbitrary or capricious.

The Spot On Evergreen Iii, Inc., Res. v. Wa State Liquor And Cannabis Board, App. · filed 2020-04-13(3)(i)

As relevant here, a court may grant relief if it determines that “[t]he agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law” or that “[t]he order is ... arbitrary or capricious.” RCW 34.05.570(3)(d), (i). ... For these reasons, the Board’s determination was not arbitrary or capricious.

Subsection (3)(e) permits relief when an agency order is not supported by substantial evidence.

Becker v. Employment Security Department · filed 1991-12-31(3)(e)

The Commissioner correctly concluded that instances of inefficiency, unsatisfactory performance, errors in judgment or ordinary negligence do not constitute misconduct, but erred in finding the conduct at issue was disqualifying misconduct. That conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency findings of fact for substantial evidence.

Nghiem v. State · filed 1994-02-18(3)(e)

We review findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). ... We hold that the Board’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires agency factual findings to be reviewed under a substantial evidence standard.

Jefferson County v. Seattle Yacht Club · filed 1994-04-04(3)(e)

An agency’s factual findings are reviewed under a substantial evidence standard.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts reviewing agency factual findings to consider all the evidence; substantial evidence is enough to persuade a fair-minded person that the finding is true.

Dana's Housekeeping, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries · filed 1995-01-17(3)(e)

Appellate review of factual findings under the former and current APA requires weighing the findings against all evidence presented. ... A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed based on the entire record; substantial evidence, similarly, is evidence in sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared premises.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires an agency head’s substituted findings to be supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Northwest Steelhead & Salmon Council of Trout Unlimited v. Department of Fisheries · filed 1995-05-01(3)(e)

The only requirement is that the agency head’s substituted findings be supported by substantial evidence in the record. See RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency fact findings for substantial evidence in light of the whole record.

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Easter · filed 1995-05-11(3)(e)

In addition, the court decides whether the Board’s findings of fact are "supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court”. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). ... We find substantial evidence in the record which supports the Board’s decision.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) permits relief from an agency order in an adjudicative proceeding when the order lacks substantial evidence in the whole record.

Valentine v. Department of Licensing · filed 1995-05-31(3)(e)

We will grant relief from an agency order in an adjudicative proceeding only if "[t]he order is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court”. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires a court to uphold an agency fact finding when substantial evidence in the whole record supports it.

William Dickson Co. v. Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency · filed 1996-04-19(3)(e)

Agency findings of fact will be upheld if supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency factual findings for substantial evidence in the whole record.

Penick v. Employment Security Department · filed 1996-04-19(3)(e)

We review the factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. Lawter v. Employment Sec. Dep’t, 73 Wn. App. 327, 331, 869 P.2d 102, review denied, 124 Wn.2d 1019 (1994); RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). ... Having reviewed the entire record, we are satisfied that the Commissioner’s findings are substantially supported by the evidence in the record.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) provides for substantial evidence review of agency factual findings; evidence is substantial when it would persuade a reasonable person that the finding is true.

Penick v. Employment SEC. Dept. · filed 1996-05-31(3)(e)

We review the factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. Lawter v. Employment Sec. Dept., 73 Wash.App. 327, 331, 869 P.2d 102, review denied 124 Wash.2d 1019, 881 P.2d 254 (1994); RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). To constitute substantial evidence, there must be a sufficient quantum of evidence in the record to persuade a reasonable person that the declared premise is true. Lawter, 73 Wash.App. at 332, 869 P.2d 102. On review, we give great deference to the Commissioner's findings. Having reviewed the entire record, we are satisfied that the Commissioner's findings are substantially supported by the evidence in the record.

Under subsection (3)(e), an agency decision is supported by substantial evidence if any fair-minded person could reach it after considering all the evidence.

Callecod v. Washington State Patrol · filed 1997-01-21(3)(e)

But it does not matter that a reviewing court would likely have ruled differently had it been the trier of fact. The question, instead, is whether any fair-minded person could have ruled as the Board and the Chief did after considering all of the evidence.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires relief when an agency order is unsupported by substantial evidence.

Clausing v. State · filed 1998-03-23(3)(e)

Relief must be granted if the order violates the constitution, exceeds statutory authority, is the result of faulty procedure, involves an error in interpreting or applying the law, is not supported by substantial evidence, omits issues requiring resolution, involves improper rulings on disqualification issues, is inconsistent with an agency rule, or is arbitrary or capricious. ... Therefore, we find the Board’s final order is supported by substantial evidence.

Conflicting evidence does not require overturning an agency decision when substantial evidence supports its findings.

Stoops v. Department of Retirement Systems · filed 1998-03-30(3)(e)

Although based on conflicting evidence and testimony, there is substantial evidence to support the Director’s findings.

Section 34.05.570(3) requires relief from an agency order that is not supported by substantial evidence.

Clausing v. State · filed 1998-04-27(3)

Relief must be granted if the order violates the constitution, exceeds statutory authority, is the result of faulty procedure, involves an error in interpreting or applying the law, is not supported by substantial evidence, omits issues requiring resolution, involves improper rulings on disqualification issues, is inconsistent with an agency rule, or is arbitrary or capricious. See RCW 34.05.570(3)(a)-(i). ... Therefore, we find the Board's final order is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires a court to uphold agency factual findings supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record.

RD Merrill Co. v. Pollution Control Bd. · filed 1999-01-07(3)(e)

We uphold the Board's determination because substantial evidence supports its factual determinations which support its conclusion that the right was never perfected. The superior court improperly substituted its own factual determinations in reaching its opposite conclusion. On appeal from a decision of the Board, the superior court must uphold agency findings unless "[t]he order is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court...." RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires a reviewing court to uphold agency factual findings supported by substantial evidence in the whole record.

R.D. Merrill Co. v. Pollution Control Hearings Board · filed 1999-01-07(3)(e)

On appeal from a decision of the Board, the superior court must uphold agency findings unless “[t]he order is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court . . . .” RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires a reviewing court to uphold agency fact findings supported by substantial evidence in the agency record.

Blue Mountain Memorial Gardens v. Department of Licensing · filed 1999-02-04(3)(e)

We must uphold the agency’s findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record that was before the board.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) permits relief from an agency order that lacks substantial evidence.

Towle v. STATE DEPT. OF FISH AND WILDLIFE · filed 1999-02-19(3)(e)

We may grant relief from an agency order if: ... (3) the agency's order is not supported by substantial evidence, RCW 34.05.570(3)(e); Hamel v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 93 Wash.App. 140, 966 P.2d 1282, 1285 (1998). ... Because substantial evidence does not exist to support the Deputy Director's changes to the ALJ's order, we reinstate the ALJ's order.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency findings of fact for substantial evidence.

Farina v. Department of Health · filed 1999-03-02(3)(e)

We review findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency findings of fact for substantial evidence.

In Re Farina · filed 1999-04-13(3)(e)

We review findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to assess whether substantial evidence supports an agency decision in light of the whole record.

Honesty in Environmental Analysis & Legislation (HEAL) v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board · filed 1999-06-21(3)(e)

We must determine whether an agency decision is supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.

Subsection (3)(e) permits relief when an agency order lacks substantial evidence, meaning evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the factual finding.

Nguyen v. Department of Health · filed 1999-11-29(3)(e)

Substantial evidence under RCW 34.05-.570(3)(e) is that which is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the factual finding.

Subsection (3)(e) treats evidence as substantial when it is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person that an agency's factual finding is true.

Nguyen v. STATE, DEPT. OF HEALTH · filed 2000-01-11(3)(e)

Substantial evidence under RCW 34.05.570(3)(e) is that which is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the factual finding.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires a reviewing court to determine whether substantial evidence supports an agency’s findings of fact.

Morgan v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 2000-02-04(3)(e)

Findings of fact are reviewed to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence, RCW 34.05.570(3)(e), and conclusions of law are reviewed de novo to determine if the reviewing judge correctly applied the law, Franklin County Sheriff’s Office v. Sellers, 97 Wn.2d 317, 325, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) permits a court to overturn an agency order when substantial evidence in the whole record does not support it.

Plum Creek Timber Co., L.P. v. Washington State Forest Practices Appeals Board · filed 2000-02-14(3)(e)

A reviewing court may overturn the FPAB’s decision regarding no significant environmental impact if the order “is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.” RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires agency fact findings to be reviewed for substantial evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person.

Sonners, Inc. v. Department of Labor · filed 2000-06-30(3)(e)

The Board's findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the declared premise. ... Although Barrett had a limited amount of control over these workers, the record reflects that substantial evidence supports the Board's determination that Barrett did not have the right to control the workers' physical conduct in the performance of their duties as required in Novenson.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) calls for review of agency findings for substantial evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person.

Scott R. Sonners, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries · filed 2000-06-30(3)(e)

The Board’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the declared premise.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to consider the entire administrative record when deciding whether an agency finding is supported by substantial evidence.

Maplewood Estates, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries · filed 2000-12-01(3)(e)

In determining whether there is substantial evidence, we must consider the entire | administrative record. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) treats evidence as substantial when it is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness of the agency order.

Bowers v. Pollution Control Hearings Board · filed 2000-12-04(3)(e)

In reviewing challenged findings under RCW 34.05.570(3)(e), substantial evidence is a sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness of the order.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires substantial evidence to support an agency's factual findings, meaning enough evidence to persuade a fair-minded person of their correctness.

King County v. Central Puget Sound · filed 2000-12-14(3)(e)

In reviewing the agency's findings of fact under RCW 34.05.570(3)(e), the test of substantial evidence is "a sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness of the order." Callecod v. Wash. State Patrol, 84 Wash.App. 663, 673, 929 P.2d 510 (1997).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency findings of fact for substantial evidence.

United & Informed Citizen Advocates Network v. Washington Utilities & Transportation Commission · filed 2001-06-04(3)(e)

The Commission’s findings of fact are reviewed under a substantial evidence standard.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires agency factual findings to be supported by substantial evidence in the whole record.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS v. City of Vancouver · filed 2001-08-03(3)(e)

We review challenges to PERC's factual findings for substantial evidence in light of the whole record, i.e., evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of their truth. ... Looking at the totality of the circumstances in this case, we hold that substantial evidence does not support PERC's finding that a reasonable employee would perceive that the employer was interfering with his or her collective bargaining rights.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) permits relief when an agency finding lacks substantial evidence.

City of Vancouver v. Public Employment Relations Commission · filed 2001-08-03(3)(e)

Looking at the totality of the circumstances in this case, we hold that substantial evidence does not support PERC’s finding that a reasonable employee would perceive that the employer was interfering with his or her collective bargaining rights.

Section 34.05.570(3) permits reversal of an administrative decision for legal error, lack of substantial evidence, or arbitrary or capricious action.

Tassoni v. Department of Retirement Systems · filed 2001-08-24(3)

We reverse an administrative decision that is (1) based on an error of law; (2) not based on substantial evidence; or (3) is arbitrary or capricious. RCW 34.05.570(3); Tapper, 122 Wash.2d at 402, 858 P.2d 494. ... Thus, substantial evidence does not support DRS's finding that it properly mailed the notice as required by statute.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires a court reviewing challenged agency findings to determine whether sufficient evidence would persuade a fairminded person that the findings are correct.

The Cooper Point Ass'n v. Thurston County · filed 2001-09-14(3)(e)

In reviewing challenged findings under RCW 34.05.570(3)(e), we look to see whether there is a sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fairminded person of the truth or correctness of the order.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires a reviewing court to uphold challenged agency findings when sufficient evidence would persuade a fair-minded person that the findings are correct.

Thurston County v. Cooper Point Ass'n · filed 2001-09-14(3)(e)

In reviewing challenged findings under RCW 34.05.570(3)(e), we look to see whether there is a sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness of the order.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) allows remand for reconsideration of a sanction when agency findings lack substantial evidence.

Eidson v. Department of Licensing · filed 2001-10-15(3)(e)

Because we find that some of the Director’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence, we remand this matter for the Director’s reconsideration of the sanction imposed in light of our decision.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) calls for affirming agency factual findings supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record.

National Electrical Contractors Ass'n v. Employment Security Department · filed 2001-11-19(3)(e)

Otherwise, an agency’s factual findings should be affirmed if they are “supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.”

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) permits relief from an agency order when a finding lacks substantial evidence in the whole record.

Eidson v. State, Dept. of Licensing · filed 2001-11-21(3)(e)

We may grant relief from an agency's order if "[t]he order is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court". [26] ... We conclude, therefore, that this portion of finding 44 is not supported by substantial evidence.

Under subsection (3)(e), substantial evidence is enough to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness of an agency order.

Brighton v. Department of Transportation · filed 2001-12-03(3)(e)

In reviewing challenged findings under RCW 34-.05.570(3)(e), “substantial evidence is a sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness of the order.” ... We hold that the 2000 Finding and Order is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) treats an agency finding as supported by substantial evidence when the evidence is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of its truth or correctness.

Brighton v. STATE DEPT. OF TRANSP. · filed 2001-12-21(3)(e)

In reviewing challenged findings under RCW 34.05.570(3)(e), substantial evidence is a sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness of the order.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires a court reviewing an agency finding for substantial evidence to consider the entire agency record.

Campbell v. VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTERS · filed 2002-04-29(3)(e)

The reference to the "whole" record means that when a party contends an agency decision is not supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court reviews the entire record before the agency.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency findings of fact for substantial evidence in light of the whole record.

Superior Asphalt & Concrete Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries · filed 2002-06-21(3)(e)

We review findings of fact for substantial evidence in light of the whole record. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). Substantial evidence is evidence that is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness of the matter.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) allows relief from an agency order when substantial evidence does not support it.

Ferry County v. Concerned Friends of Ferry County · filed 2004-05-18(3)(e)

Under the APA, we may provide relief from an agency decision in nine specific instances. RCW 34.05.570(3). ... Here, substantial evidence supports the Board's finding and conclusion that the County did not base its species listing on a reasoned process and that it erred in failing to do so.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency factual findings for substantial evidence in the whole record.

Broschart v. Employment Security Department · filed 2004-06-22(3)(e)

We review factual findings under the “substantial evidence” standard as described in RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). ... Substantial evidence supported the commissioner’s decision and, thus, the superior court erred in reversing it.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency factual findings for substantial evidence in the whole record.

Broschart v. EMPLOYMENT SEC. DEPT. OF STATE · filed 2004-08-03(3)(e)

We review factual findings under the "substantial evidence" standard as described in RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). ... Substantial evidence supported the commissioner's decision and thus, the superior court erred in reversing it.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) calls for substantial evidence review of an agency order; evidence is substantial if it could persuade a fair-minded person that the order is correct.

J.L. Storedahl & Sons, Inc. v. Cowlitz County · filed 2004-08-10(3)(e)

Like the superior court, we review the agency’s orders for substantial evidence. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). Evidence is substantial when it is of a sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness of the order.

Agency findings of fact are reviewed for substantial supporting evidence in the record.

Stephens v. Employment Security Department · filed 2004-10-19(3)(e)

We review an agency’s findings of fact for substantial supporting evidence in the record.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires review of the entire agency record when a party challenges an agency decision for lack of substantial evidence.

ACI v. Department of Employment SEC. · filed 2004-11-23(3)(e)

When a party contends an agency decision is not supported by substantial evidence, we review the entire agency record. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Under subsection (3)(e), a substantial-evidence challenge requires review of the entire agency record.

Affordable Cabs, Inc. v. Employment Security Department · filed 2004-11-23(3)(e)

When a party contends an agency decision is not supported by substantial evidence, we review the entire agency record. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review an agency's factual findings for substantial evidence.

Ongom v. STATE, DEPT. OF HEALTH · filed 2005-01-03(3)(e)

An agency's findings of fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard of RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires substantial evidence review of agency factual findings, including deference to the factfinder’s credibility determinations.

Ongom v. Department of Health · filed 2005-01-03(3)(e)

An agency’s findings of fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard of RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). ... But the administrative law judge concluded otherwise, and it is not for us to judge the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given conflicting evidence.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires review of agency factual findings for substantial evidence in light of the whole record.

Department of Labor & Industries v. Davison · filed 2005-04-05(3)(e)

We review findings of fact for substantial evidence in light of the whole record. Former RCW 34.05.570(3)(e) (1995). Substantial evidence is evidence that is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness of the matter.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency findings of fact for substantial evidence, with deference to the administrative fact finder.

Motley-Motley, Inc. v. State · filed 2005-04-19(3)(e)

The PCHB's findings of fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). This standard is highly deferential to the administrative fact finder.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency findings of fact for substantial evidence, giving deference to the agency fact finder.

Motley-Motley, Inc. v. Pollution Control Hearings Board · filed 2005-04-19(3)(e)

The PCHB’s findings of fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). This standard is highly deferential to the administrative fact finder. ... PCHB’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review challenged agency factual findings for substantial evidence.

Point Allen Service Area v. WASH. STATE DOH · filed 2005-07-07(3)(e)

In any event, we review challenged factual findings to determine if substantial evidence supports them. Former RCW 34.05.570(3)(e); King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 142 Wash.2d 543, 553, 14 P.3d 133 (2000). Here, substantial evidence supports the challenged findings, which deal with DOH's actions from 1993 to 2001.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) directs courts to review challenged agency factual findings for substantial evidence.

Garrison First Family Ltd. Partnership v. Department of Health · filed 2005-07-07(3)(e)

In any event, we review challenged factual findings to determine if substantial evidence supports them.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) permits relief from an agency order in an adjudicative proceeding when substantial evidence does not support it.

Attorney General's Office v. Utilities & Transportation Commission · filed 2005-08-03(3)(e)

We grant relief from an agency order in an adjudicative proceeding only where substantial evidence does not support it. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) directs courts to grant relief when a board’s order lacks substantial evidence.

Ferry County v. Concerned Friends · filed 2005-11-17(3)(e)

The relevant provision here is RCW 34-.05.570(3)(e), directing us to grant relief when the Board’s order is not supported by substantial evidence.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) allows a challenge to agency fact findings that lack substantial evidence in the whole record; substantial evidence is enough to persuade a fair-minded person that a finding is true.

Pappas v. Employment Security Department · filed 2006-10-02(3)(e)

Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the assertion.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency factual findings for substantial evidence in light of the whole record.

Mid Mountain Contractors, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries · filed 2006-10-16(3)(e)

In a WISHA appeal, the BIIA’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) permits a court to set aside agency fact findings that lack substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record.

Pappas v. STATE, EMPLOYMENT SEC. DEPT. · filed 2006-11-08(3)(e)

Under the WAPA standards, the appellate court may sustain a challenge to findings of fact when those findings are not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in the light of the whole record before the court.

The BIIA’s findings of fact are conclusive in a WISHA appeal if substantial evidence supports them in light of the whole record.

MID MOUNTAIN CONTRACTORS v. Dept. of Labor · filed 2006-11-15(3)(e)

In a WISHA appeal, the BIIA's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.

Under subsection (3)(e), the reviewing court determines the law independently and applies it to the facts found by the Board.

Arlington v. GROWTH MANAGEMENT HEARINGS BD. · filed 2007-03-26(3)(e)

Errors alleged under subsection (e) are mixed questions of law and fact, where the reviewing court determines the law independently, then applies it to the facts as found by the Board.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to assess whether agency findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record.

JE Dunn Northwest, Inc. v. DEPT. OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES · filed 2007-04-16(3)(e)

The BIIA's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the record as a whole. RCW 49.17.150(1); RCW 34.05.570(3)(e); Mid Mountain Contractors, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 136 Wash. App. 1, 4, 146 P.3d 1212 (2006).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) makes agency findings of fact conclusive when substantial evidence supports them in light of the whole record.

J.E. Dunn Northwest, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries · filed 2007-04-16(3)(e)

The BIIA’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the record as a whole.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) calls for substantial evidence review of agency findings; appellate courts assess whether the evidence met the burden of proof below without reweighing it.

Ancier v. STATE, DEPT. OF HEALTH · filed 2007-09-04(3)(e)

Appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence, but are limited to assessing whether that evidence was adequate to satisfy the applicable burden of proof below.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) calls for substantial evidence review of agency findings; appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence.

Ancier v. Department of Health · filed 2007-09-04(3)(e)

We review the Commission’s findings for substantial evidence, as provided by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), chapter 34.05 RCW.

Section 34.05.570(3) permits reversal of an agency decision when its findings lack substantial evidence.

Galvis v. State, Dept. of Transp. · filed 2007-09-11(3)

Under the APA, we reverse an administrative decision that (1) violates a constitutional provision on its face or as applied, (2) lies outside the agency's lawful authority or jurisdiction, (3) arises from an illegal procedure, (4) results from an erroneous interpretation or application of the law, (5) lacks substantial evidence, or (6) is arbitrary or capricious. ... Accordingly, we hold that substantial evidence supports the Reviewing Officer's findings regarding reasonable access to the Galvis and Masewicz properties, and we reverse the superior court's order overruling the findings and entering judgment on behalf of the property owners.

Section 34.05.570(3) permits a court to reverse an agency decision that lacks substantial evidence.

Galvis v. Department of Transportation · filed 2007-09-11(3)

Under the APA, we reverse an administrative decision that (1) violates a constitutional provision on its face or as applied, (2) lies outside the agency’s lawful authority or jurisdiction, (3) arises from an illegal procedure, (4) results from an erroneous interpretation or application of the law, (5) lacks substantial evidence, or (6) is arbitrary or capricious. RCW 34.05.570(3); see also Tapper v. Employment Sec. Dep’t, 122 Wn.2d 397, 402, 858 P.2d 494 (1993). ... Accordingly, we hold that substantial evidence supports the reviewing officer’s findings regarding reasonable access to the Galvis and Masewicz properties, and we reverse the superior court’s order overruling the findings and entering judgment on behalf of the property owners.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency factual findings for substantial evidence in the whole record.

Roos v. Snohomish Regional Drug Task Force · filed 2007-09-17(3)(e)

While it is true that former RCW 34.04.130(6)(e) provided that a court might reverse an agency’s order if it was “clearly erroneous in view of the entire record,” the current statutory authority, RCW 34.05.570(3)(e), provides that a court may grant relief from an agency order when the order “is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.” As numerous cases have held, the recodified statute clearly iterates a substantial evidence standard of review for agency factual findings, rather than the clearly erroneous standard of review that applied to factual findings under the former statute.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency factual findings for substantial evidence, rather than clear error.

In Re Forfeiture of One 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle · filed 2007-09-17(3)(e)

While it is true that former RCW 34.04.130(6)(e) provided that a court might reverse an agency's order if it was "clearly erroneous in view of the entire record," the current statutory authority, RCW 34.05.570(3)(e), provides that a court may grant relief from an agency order when the order "is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." As numerous cases have held, the recodified statute clearly iterates a substantial evidence standard of review for agency factual findings rather than the clearly erroneous standard of review that applied to factual findings under the former statute.

Under subsection (3)(e), a court reviewing an agency order for substantial evidence considers the entire administrative record.

Futurewise v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board · filed 2007-10-16(3)(e)

Instead, our proper role is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s order. In doing this, we view the administrative record in its entirety. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e); Manke, 91 Wn. App. 793.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts to review agency findings of fact for substantial supporting evidence.

Lee's Drywall Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries · filed 2007-11-27(3)(e)

We review findings of fact for substantial supporting evidence. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). Substantial evidence is evidence that would persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness of the matter.

Section 34.05.570 governs judicial review of agency decisions, including review of factual findings for substantial evidence.

Kraft v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 2008-07-08

Our review is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). RCW 34.05.570. ... “We will uphold a board’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence.”

Subsection (3)(e) calls for substantial evidence review of an agency's factual findings, with the challenger bearing the burden of showing error.

University of Wash. Med. Ctr. v. Dept. of Health · filed 2008-07-10(3)(e)

Next, we must determine whether substantial evidence supporting the department's decision can be found in the record. See RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). ... We cannot say that the health law judge's decision was clearly erroneous or that substantial evidence does not support her conclusion.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) places the burden of challenging agency factual findings on the challenger and requires review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed before the factfinder.

University of Washington Medical Center v. Department of Health · filed 2008-07-10(3)(e)

Next, we must determine whether substantial evidence supporting the department’s decision can be found in the record. See RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). The UWMC bears the burden of establishing that the agency’s factual findings are erroneous, and the court will review the evidence in the light most favorable to “ ‘the party who prevailed in the highest forum that exercised factfinding authority,’ ” in this case, Swedish and the department.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) permits relief when substantial evidence does not support an agency decision.

Stevens County v. LOON LAKE PROPERTY OWNERS ASS'N · filed 2008-07-22(3)(e)

We may grant relief from a GMHB decision if it is not supported by substantial evidence. Clallam County, 130 Wash.App. at 133, 121 P.3d 764 (citing RCW 34.05.570(3)(e)). ... Therefore, substantial evidence does not exist to support GMHB's continued finding that the County received nominations.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) requires courts reviewing the evidence supporting an agency order to determine whether substantial evidence supports it.

Yakima County v. Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board · filed 2008-09-11(3)(e)

Challenges to the evidence supporting the agency's order are reviewed for substantial evidence. Substantial evidence exists when a sufficient quantity of evidence exists to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or correctness of the agency's order.

Subsection (3) permits reversal of an agency decision that lacks substantial evidence or is arbitrary and capricious.

Hong v. STATE DEPT. OF SOC. & HEALTH SERV. · filed 2008-09-15(3)

A reviewing court may reverse an administrative decision when the decision is not based on substantial evidence or is arbitrary and capricious. RCW 34.05.570(3). ... We conclude it was not arbitrary for the department to rely on testimony by Solis. Her testimony, along with the rest of the evidence, adequately supports the decision to revoke Hong's license.

Section 34.05.570(3)(e) calls for review of agency fact findings for substantial evidence in light of the whole record.

State, Dept. of Ecology v. Douma · filed 2008-10-14(3)(e)

We review the PCHB's findings of fact for substantial evidence in light of the whole record. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Courts review agency findings of fact for substantial evidence in light of the whole record.

Department of Ecology v. Douma · filed 2008-10-14(3)(e)

We review the PCHB’s findings of fact for substantial evidence in light of the whole record. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e).

Section 34.05.570(3)(e)'s substantial evidence standard applies only to agency findings of fact.

City of Union Gap v. STATE DEPT. OF ECOLOGY · filed 2008-11-13(3)(e)

Ahtanum and Union Gap also argue that the Hearings Board's summary judgment is not supported by substantial evidence. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). But the substantial evidence standard applies only to an agency's findings of facts. Lee's Drywall Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 141 Wash.App. 859, 864, 173 P.3d 934 (2007). The Hearings Board's order here did not include findings.