Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.170

Section 26.09.170 addresses support of a minor child and does not extend the court's jurisdiction over custody or protection of the child's welfare.

Dickson v. Dickson · filed 1974-12-03

We recognize that under the new dissolution act, RCW 26.09.010-.290, a court's jurisdiction in some instances may not terminate when the children of the marriage reach majority. In re Marriage of Melville, 11 Wn. App. 879, 526 P.2d (1974); RCW 26.09.100; RCW 26.09.170. However, In re Marriage of Melville and these sections of the act deal only with the support of a minor child, and not with custody or protection of a minor child's welfare.

Section 26.09.170 permits a maintenance order to be modified upon a proper showing of a substantial change in circumstances.

In Re the Marriage of Nicholson · filed 1977-03-14

Maintenance provisions under the present act are still subject to modification upon a proper showing of a substantial change in circumstances, RCW 26.09.170, and that is a factor which we have considered in reviewing the discretion which the trial court exercised in fixing the term of the maintenance award.

Section 26.09.170 permits a court modifying maintenance to retain jurisdiction for a limited period to review the effectiveness of its ruling.

In Re the Marriage of Ochsner · filed 1987-04-29

The case at bar is distinguishable. It arose in the context of a motion for modification, not a dissolution proceeding, and the court did not defer its decision, but rather, retained jurisdiction for a limited period of time in order to review and determine the efficacy of its ruling. Nothing in the modification statute, RCW 26.09.170, precludes this sort of procedure.

Section 26.09.170 permits a party to seek modification of a support award when circumstances underlying the original support decree change.

In Re the Marriage of Mahalingam · filed 1978-08-31

The award does not impugn the efficacy of the latter statute since petitioner may at any time seek modification of the support award should a change occur in the circumstances which the court relied upon for the original decree of support.

Section 26.09.170 provides a remedy allowing a maintenance award to be modified when circumstances change.

In the Matter of the Marriage of: Cynthia Leaver & Brian Leaver · filed 2021-11-30

To the extent the trial court and Cynthia are concerned that Brian’s circumstances will improve for the better or that Cynthia’s will fare for the worse, the law provides the option of modification. RCW 26.09.170. Maintenance should not be awarded in a way that is so open-ended it deprives the litigants of finality. See In re Marriage of Valente, 179 Wn. App. 817, 827, 320 P.3d 115 (2014). Instead the court should issue an award based on the evidence produced at trial, keeping in mind the law provides a remedy for changed circumstances.

Section 26.09.170 terminates child-support provisions when the child is emancipated, including upon attaining age 18, unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree or a later modification.

In re the Marriage of Gimlett · filed 1980-05-19

We hold that, unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree (or any subsequent modification thereof), provisions for child support terminate when the child is emancipated by attaining age 18 or is otherwise emancipated prior thereto.

Section 26.09.170 terminates child-support provisions when the child reaches the age of majority or becomes emancipated in fact, whichever occurs first, unless continued support is expressly provided in the decree or otherwise agreed in writing.

In Re the Marriage of Gimlett · filed 1981-06-11

In light of the foregoing we hold that, as used in RCW 26.09.170, "emancipation" occurs upon reaching the age of majority or emancipation in fact whichever event first occurs.

Section 26.09.170 ends a parent's child-support duty at emancipation unless the parties agree in writing or the decree expressly requires support beyond emancipation; support past majority for college requires an express provision.

In Re the Marriage of Main · filed 1984-07-26

RCW 26.09.170 provides in part: Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child or by the death of the parent obligated to support the child. As used in this statute, emancipation occurs upon reaching the age of majority or emancipation in fact, whichever event first occurs. ... The issue, then, is whether the divorce decree expressly provided for child support beyond emancipation. It did not. ... The divorce decree in this case does not unambiguously provide for child support beyond emancipation. ... Therefore, the occurrence of any one of the events terminates Roger's obligation to support the child. ... Emancipation was an event triggering the end of support payments and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. ... The case simply held that, consistent with RCW 26.09.170, a trial court has authority to order a parent to pay child support beyond the age of majority while a college education is pursued. However, the decree must "expressly provide" for support beyond emancipation. RCW 26.09.170. Unlike Childers, the decree in the case at bar does not expressly provide for child support beyond emancipation.

Section 26.09.170 does not terminate child-support provisions at emancipation when the decree expressly provides for support beyond emancipation, so that postmajority support order remains subject to modification.

In Re the Marriage of Crossland · filed 1987-12-10

RCW 26.09.170 provides in part: "Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child or by the death of the parent obligated to support the child."

Section 26.09.170(3) permits child-support provisions to continue after emancipation when a written agreement, including a DCS administrative order, extends the support obligation.

Samantha Snodderly, V. Shockey · filed 2025-09-22(3)

The trial court believed “the administrative order on its own is not an order for purposes of [RCW] 26.09.170.” But this interpretation treats children whose support is ordered through the administrative process differently than children whose support is established by a dissolution decree, parentage action, or by filing a petition for child support and a parenting plan. And it does not align with the intent of RCW 26.26A.105 to prevent discrimination based on the marital status of parents: “A parent-child relationship extends equally to every child and parent, regardless of the marital status of the parent.” RCW 26.09.170(3) does not make this distinction—it encompasses both decrees and agreements in writing (i.e., administrative orders). The agreed settlement Snodderly and Shockey entered into is precisely the type of written agreement considered by RCW 26.09.170(3).

Section 26.09.170 permits modification of alimony only upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances.

Wagner v. Wagner · filed 1980-12-31

RCW 26.09.170, which superseded RCW 26.08.110 in 1973, incorporated the judicial overlay allowing modification “only upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances".

Section 26.09.170 generally requires a substantial change of circumstances before support provisions in a decree may be modified.

In the Matter of Marriage of Belsby · filed 1988-06-07

A showing of substantial change in circumstances is required before the support provisions in a decree can be modified. ... We hold the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering post-high school support for Brian based on a showing of substantial uncontemplated change of circumstances.

A decree may be modified only when a substantial change in circumstances not contemplated when it was entered supports the modification.

In the Matter of Marriage of Jarvis · filed 1990-06-07

The court's conclusion Julie was required to "successfully complete" a full-time course load to retain payments was an unwarranted, retroactive modification of the decree under RCW 26.09-.170.

Section 26.09.170 permits maintenance to be modified only for a substantial change in circumstances that was not contemplated when the decree was entered, unless the parties agreed otherwise.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 1982-06-07

Unless there is an agreement to the contrary, the court may only modify maintenance upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances that was not within the contemplation of the parties at the time the decree was entered.

Section 26.09.170(3) terminates child-support provisions when a child is emancipated unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, but it does not limit the superior court's subject-matter jurisdiction.

In Re the Marriage of Major & Major · filed 1993-10-25(3)

In the realm of postmajority support awards, a superior court's subject matter jurisdiction is not explicitly limited. Provisions for the support of a child are terminated "by emancipation of the child" "[ujnless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree". RCW 26.09.170(3). RCW 26.09.100(1) allows for the imposition of child support on parents "owing a duty of support to any child of the marriage dependent upon either or both spouses...". Most importantly, postsecondary education support awards up to age 23 are specifically provided for in RCW 26.19.090 (effective July 1,1990). None of these three statutes nor any other statute cited by the parties limit, or even address in any manner, the superior court's subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 26.09.170(3) terminates child-support provisions when the child is emancipated unless the parties agree in writing otherwise or the decree expressly provides for continued support.

Rains v. STATE, DEPT. OF SHS, DCS · filed 1999-12-02(3)

RCW 26.09.170(3) provides that "[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child[.]" Emancipation occurs when the child reaches the age of majority or is emancipated in fact, whichever occurs first.

Unless the parties agree otherwise in writing or the decree expressly says otherwise, child-support provisions end when the child is emancipated.

Rains v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 1999-12-02(3)

RCW 26.09.170(3) provides that “[ujnless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the ehild[.]” Emancipation occurs when the child reaches the age of majority or is emancipated in fact, whichever occurs first.

Section 26.09.170(3) terminates a parent's child-support obligation upon the child's emancipation unless the parties agree otherwise in writing or the decree expressly provides otherwise.

Sagner v. Sagner · filed 2011-01-31(3)

However, under RCW 26.09.170(3), a parent's obligation to pay child support ends when a child reaches the age of 18 unless the order of child support expressly states otherwise. RCW 26.09.170(3) provides: Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child or by the death of the parent obligated to support the child.

Section 26.09.170(3) terminates child support at emancipation unless a written agreement or decree provides otherwise, and permits modification of post-majority support before the support obligation terminates.

In Re The Parentage Of A.d. · filed 2019-10-08(3)

RCW 26.09.170(3) provides, “Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation[13] of the child or by the death of the parent obligated to support the child.” ... If post-majority support is provided for, a court may modify such support as long as the movant files a motion to modify before the “termination of support.” ... Because there was an agreement in writing to extend the child support obligation beyond emancipation, whether there was an actual “decree” is irrelevant.

Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, child-support provisions terminate when the child is emancipated or the obligated parent dies.

In Re The Estate Of: Gary M. Rusing, Laurene Rusing, App v. Christopher Rusing, Resp · filed 2021-03-29(3)

In addition, “[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child or by the death of the parent obligated to support the child.” RCW 26.09.170(3). ... This language makes clear that Gary agreed and was obligated to provide a trust in the amount of 50 percent of his net estate, upon his death, for the benefit of his two minor children with Laurene who were extant at the time of the agreement. The language “upon his demise” makes obvious that Gary’s obligation was intended to continue beyond his death. Accordingly, the trial court’s conclusion that the obligation terminated upon Gary’s death was erroneous.

Section 26.09.170(3) terminates child-support provisions upon the child's emancipation or the support obligor's death unless a written agreement or the decree expressly provides otherwise.

In Re The Marriage Of Jennifer Schorsch, And Keith Schorsch · filed 2024-09-30(3)

Keith also asserts the trial court’s child support order erroneously “provides [Keith’s] obligation to support his children survives death.” This argument fails because RCW 26.09.170(3) provides, “Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child or by the death of the person required to pay support for the child.” (Emphasis added). Here, in accordance with RCW 26.09.170(3), the child support order expressly provides that the parties’ child support obligations “will remain an obligation of the party and will be a charge against either party’s estate to the extent not covered by insurance or Social Security benefits.”

Section 26.09.170(3) permits child-support obligations to continue after the payer’s death when the decree expressly provides for that result or the parties agree in writing.

In Re The Marriage Of Jennifer Schorsch, And Keith Schorsch · filed 2024-12-04(3)

Keith also asserts the trial court’s child support order erroneously “provides [Keith’s] obligation to support his children survives death.” This argument fails because RCW 26.09.170(3) provides, “Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child or by the death of the person required to pay support for the child.” (Emphasis added). Here, in accordance with RCW 26.09.170(3), the child support order expressly provides that the parties’ child support obligations “will remain an obligation of the party and will be a charge against either party’s estate to the extent not covered by insurance or Social Security benefits.” In support of his contrary argument, Keith cites to Cissna v. Beaton, 2 Wn.2d 491, 98 P.2d 651 (1940), and Riser v. Riser, 7 Wn. App. 647, 501 P.2d 1069 (1972), and claims he “has a right to make testamentary disposition of property and his duty of support terminates upon his death.” But Keith’s reliance on these cases is misplaced because both cases predate the enactment of RCW 26.09.170(3).

Section 26.09.170 governs the termination of child support, not the definition of who is entitled to it.

Childers v. Childers · filed 1976-07-12

The Melville case relies upon RCW 26.09.170 which has to do with the termination, not the definition, of child support.

Section 26.09.170 requires a dissolution decree to specifically state that the recipient's remarriage affects the maintenance obligation and how it affects it; merely calling the award "permanent alimony/maintenance" is insufficient.

In Re the Marriage of Mason · filed 1985-04-29

Guided by our Supreme Court's use of the term "permanent alimony" and the high level of certainty required in the decree of dissolution, we hold that RCW 26.09.170 requires the decree of dissolution to mention specifically (1) the event of remarriage of the party receiving alimony/ maintenance (or the death of either party), and (2) the effect that event would have on the alimony/maintenance obligation. Merely awarding "permanent alimony/maintenance" is insufficient to fulfill the requirement of specific or manifestly clear and unmistakable language.

Section 26.09.170(2) presumes that maintenance ends when the recipient remarries unless the parties agreed otherwise in writing or the decree expressly provides otherwise; overcoming that presumption requires specific decretal language mentioning remarriage.

In Re the Marriage of Williams · filed 1990-09-10(2)

The policy of the statute is to create a presumption that remarriage terminates alimony, as the Court of Appeals recognized. ... Accordingly, we hold that the dissolution decree lacked the specific language necessary to overcome the statutory presumption. In the hopes of discouraging dubious interpretation of questionable decretal language, we hold further that the decree must specifically mention remarriage in order to overcome the presumption.

Section 26.09.170(2) presumes that spousal maintenance ends when the recipient remarries unless the parties agree otherwise in writing or the decree expressly provides otherwise.

In Re the Marriage of Allen · filed 1995-07-25(2)

We hold that failure to mark the "termination upon death or remarriage” option in the decree form does not satisfy the test for clear and unmistakable language required to overcome the statutory presumption that maintenance is terminated upon the remarriage of the party receiving it.

Section 26.09.170(2) terminates future maintenance when the recipient remarries unless the parties agree otherwise in writing or the decree expressly provides otherwise.

In Re The Marriage Of: Saeed Kaley v. Kaley · filed 2019-12-30(2)

RCW 26.09.170(2) states that “[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree,” the “obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated” upon the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance. ... However, parties can expressly agree to modify the maintenance. ... The promissory note creates an independent contractual obligation to pay Nancy spousal maintenance.

Unless the parties agree otherwise in writing or the decree expressly provides otherwise, a future maintenance obligation ends when either party dies.

In Re The Marriage Of: Peter Merriam, V. The Estate Of Tamela Merriam · filed 2022-03-21(2)

Peter’s maintenance obligations have been terminated. See RCW 26.09.170(2) (“Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party.”).

Section 26.09.170(2) presumes that spousal maintenance ends when the recipient remarries, but the court may expressly provide that it does not terminate.

Christina Bandaragoda Norton, Resp V. Sanjaya Sriyanga Bandaragoda, App · filed 2026-06-15(2)

But the order expressly states that Bandaragoda’s six-year maintenance obligation “does not terminate,” so no inconsistency exists. RCW 26.09.170(2). And “[a]lthough RCW 26.09.170(2) establishes a presumption that maintenance will terminate upon remarriage, it does not require that result.”

Section 26.09.170 ends an obligation to pay future maintenance when the recipient remarries unless the decree expressly provides for its continuation.

In Re Marriage of Melville · filed 1974-10-04

Since the trial court did not specifically order the alimony to continue beyond the remarriage of Mrs. Melville, that portion of the decree is controlled by the second paragraph of RCW 26.09.170 which states: ... There being no express provision for the continuation of alimony after the remarriage of Mrs. Melville, Mr. Melville’s obligation terminates upon the former’s remarriage.

Section 26.09.170 terminates future maintenance upon the recipient’s remarriage unless a written agreement or the decree provides otherwise; the court applies the same rule to maintenance pending appeal.

In Re the Marriage of Harshman · filed 1977-07-18

Although this statute applies to decrees of dissolution, the rationale of the rule is applicable to provisions for maintenance pending appeal. In the absence of a clear expression otherwise, maintenance ordered pending appeal should end upon the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance.

A decree must expressly mention remarriage to keep spousal maintenance payable after the receiving spouse remarries.

Matter of Marriage of Roth · filed 1994-01-18(2)

In smn, RCW 26.09.170(2) and Williams mean just what they say: "express provision" means use of the word "remarriage". Here, neither the dissolution agreement nor any other agreement provides that maintenance is to continue past remarriage; remarriage therefore terminated the obligation.

Section 26.09.170 does not apply retroactively to a pre-1973 divorce decree, so it cannot authorize a post-majority support modification in such a case.

Lang v. Lang · filed 1985-05-28

The 1973 dissolution of marriage act should not be given retroactive effect. ... The language from Gimlett relied upon is found at page 704: In compelling situations where post-majority support was not originally granted, courts have the power to modify the decree upon a showing of a substantial change of conditions. RCW 26.09.170; ... [3, 4] The quoted language is not dispositive for two reasons. First, Gimlett involved a 1974 decree. Therefore, the 1973 dissolution act applied. ... It follows that the trial court had no authority to impose upon Mr. Lang the obligation to pay child support beyond the age of majority.

Section 26.09.170 makes custody, child support, and visitation orders subject to future modification upon a substantial change in circumstances.

In re the Marriage of Pippins · filed 1987-02-12

Custody, support and visitation are always subject to future modification upon showing a substantial change of circumstances. RCW 26.09.170 (enacted by Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 157, § 17).

Section 26.09.170 permits a custodial former spouse to obtain child support from a noncustodial former spouse even when the dissolution decree ordered no child support.

State ex rel. California v. Benjamin · filed 1988-01-08

A custodial former spouse can obtain child support from a noncustodial former spouse even when no child support was ordered in the dissolution decree.

Section 26.09.170 bars retroactive modification of accrued support installments, but it does not preclude an equitable credit for direct child-support expenditures when allowing the credit would not cause injustice.

Schafer v. Schafer · filed 1980-12-31

[T]he provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion for modification and only upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances.

Section 26.09.170(1) bars retroactive modification of maintenance installments after they have accrued and become due.

In the Matter of Marriage of Sanborn · filed 1989-08-07(1)

Accrued installments are not subject to retroactive modification.

Section 26.09.170(2) creates a presumption that maintenance will terminate upon the recipient's remarriage, but it does not require termination.

In the Matter of Marriage of Tower · filed 1989-10-16(2)

Although RCW 26.09.170(2) establishes a presumption that maintenance will terminate upon remarriage, it does not require that result.

Section 26.09.170 requires an express provision in the decree or a separate written property agreement if maintenance is to continue after the recipient's remarriage.

In Re the Marriage of Thach · filed 1981-06-25

In order for the continuation of maintenance under the statute, there must be an express provision as to the effect of remarriage, either in the decree or in a separate written property agreement.

Section 26.09.170(2) automatically terminates future maintenance when the recipient remarries unless the parties agree otherwise in writing or the decree expressly provides otherwise.

Rufener v. Rufener · filed 1988-11-29(2)

Upon remarriage, the maintenance obligation terminates automatically by operation of law.

Section 26.09.170(3) provides that child support obligations do not survive a parent's death unless special provisions obligate the estate.

Pessein v. Pessein · filed 1993-03-08(3)

In Washington, child support obligations do not survive death absent special provisions obligating the estate. RCW 26.09.170(3).

Section 26.09.170(1) permits modification of child-support obligations only for installments accruing after the petition for modification, so a court may not create a retroactive support obligation by vacating one order and reinstating another.

In Re Marriage of Shoemaker · filed 1995-11-09(1)

Turning to the statute, we find no authority for the court's action in vacating the modification. RCW 26.09.170 sets forth the conditions for modifying a child support order. In relevant part, it provides: Except as otherwise provided ... the provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified: (a) Only as to installments accruing subsequent to the petition for modification.... RCW 26.09.170(1). This section, enacted in 1973, reflects long-settled law in this state that a modification of child support may not operate retroactively. See Wilburn v. Wilburn, 59 Wash.2d 799, 801-02, 370 P.2d 968 (1962); Koon v. Koon, 50 Wash.2d 577, 579, 313 P.2d 369 (1957); Sanges v. Sanges, 44 Wash.2d 35, 38-39, 265 P.2d 278 (1953); McGrath v. Davis, 39 Wash.2d 487, 489, 236 P.2d 765 (1951); Kinne v. Kinne, 137 Wash. 284, 242 P. 388 (1926); Beers v. Beers, 74 Wash. 458, 133 P. 605 (1913). When the trial court vacated the child support order in this case, it reinstated the applicable terms of the original divorce decree. Those terms called for a payment of $165 per child per month by Shoemaker to Rushing. Applying these terms over the previous 5 years instantly created a $13,800 back support obligation on the part of Shoemaker, despite the fact he had always been in compliance with then existing court support orders. Although here the court "vacated" one order and "reinstated" another, the effect was a retrospective modification and thus legally prohibited.

Section 26.09.170 generally permits support modification only for installments accruing after the petition or motion, with a limited exception for motions to compel court-ordered adjustments, and generally requires a substantial change of circumstances.

In Re Marriage of Cummings · filed 2000-06-06(1)(a), (1)(b)

Under RCW 26.09.170, a retroactive child support modification is highly disfavored except in certain unusual instances, none present here.

Section 26.09.170(l)(a) permits modification of child-support installments only after the petition or motion, except that a motion to compel a court-ordered adjustment is effective from the decree's specified implementation date.

In re the Marriage of Barber · filed 2001-05-25(l)(a)

The provisions of any child support decree may be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to the petition for modification or motion for adjustment except motions to compel court-ordered adjustments, which shall be effective as of the first date specified in the decree for implementing the adjustment. RCW 26.09.170(l)(a). Sally filed her petition for support modification on October 6, 1999. The court had authority to modify only those installments accruing after that date.

Section 26.09.170 generally permits child-support modification only for installments accruing after the petition or motion, so retroactive modification is highly disfavored absent an applicable exception.

In re the Marriage of Cummings · filed 2000-05-01(1)(a)

Under RCW 26.09.170, a retroactive child support modification is highly disfavored except in certain unusual instances, none present here.

Section 26.09.170 requires a trial court to consider a parent’s request to modify child support even when a bond or other security for support payments is in place.

In re the Marriage of Olson · filed 2000-05-30(1)(a)

A trial court must consider a parent’s request for child support modification under RCW 26.09.170 even if a bond or other security to ensure support payments is in place under RCW 26.18.150; the existence of the security does not render the parent’s modification request moot.

Section 26.09.170(1)(a) generally permits child support modification only for installments accruing after the petition or motion, except for motions to compel court-ordered adjustments.

Robert Gustaveson, App. v. Amina Babayev, Resp. · filed 2013-04-29(1)(a)

The applicable statute explicitly provides that a child support order may be modified "[o]nly as to installments accruing subsequent to the petition for modification or motion for adjustment except motions to compel court-ordered adjustments." RCW 26.09.170(1 )(a) (emphasis added). Because Gustaveson filed a petition for modification—not a motion to compel a court-ordered adjustment—the statutory exception does not apply.

Section 26.09.170(1)(a) permits modified child support to be made retroactive only for payments due after modification proceedings begin.

Cynthia L. Selley v.. Jason S. Selley · filed 2018-09-25(1)(a)

A court may order that modified child support payments be retroactive, but only for those payments due after the commencement of modification proceedings.

Section 26.09.170 generally permits modification of support only for installments accruing after the modification petition, so accrued child support cannot ordinarily be modified retroactively.

In Re The Marriage Of Jonathan J. Arras, Res. And Laura G. Arras (now Mccabe), App. · filed 2019-07-15(1), (1)(a)

RCW 26.09.170(1) prohibits retroactive modification of accumulated child support payments. ... Thus, an order modifying a child support obligation applies only to installments accruing subsequent to the petition for modification. ROW 26.09.170(1); Chase v. Chase, 74 Wn.2d 253, 259, 444 P.2d 145 (1968), overruled on other grounds by Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wn.2d 652, 659, 689 P.2d 46 (1984).

Section 26.09.170(1) generally permits modification of maintenance or support only for installments accruing after the petition for modification or motion for adjustment, so a child-support modification ordinarily may not operate retroactively.

Marriage Of Heidi Kay Knowles v. Knowles · filed 2020-02-19(1)

“Except as otherwise provided in RCW 26.09.070(7), the provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified . . . [o]nly as to installments accruing subsequent to the petition for modification or motion for adjustment.” RCW 26.09.170(1). RCW 26.09.170(1) “reflects long-settled law in this state that a modification of child support may not operate retroactively.”

Section 26.09.170(4)(d) permits a child-support order to be modified one year or more after entry, without a substantial-change showing, to add an automatic adjustment provision consistent with RCW 26.09.100.

In the Matter of Marriage of Lee · filed 1990-03-19(4)(d)

Similarly, the allegation that an automatic adjustment should be added would appear to be prima facie meritorious. Pursuant to RCW 26.09.170(4)(d), an order may be modified to add a provision for an automatic adjustment of support consistent with RCW 26.09.100. That statute, as of the date of the modification hearing, allowed such an adjustment based on the current child support schedule. ... Since the appellant alleged a change in the party's income and the child support schedule had changed, the modification may have been warranted. ... The trial court has discretion to modify child support orders if one of the statutory grounds for modification is supported by affidavits. RCW 26.09.170.

Section 26.09.170 treats an adjustment as a narrower form of child-support modification: a full modification requires a substantial change of circumstances, while an adjustment may be sought every 24 months based on changed parental income without that showing.

In Re Marriage of Scanlon and Witrak · filed 2001-11-19(1), (8)(a)

RCW 26.09.170(1) envelopes an adjustment action within the purview of a modification, making an adjustment a form of modification. But the statute makes plain by the qualifying circumstances and procedural requirements of each that an adjustment action is more limited in scope.

Section 26.09.170(9) permits periodic adjustment of support orders when the statute or child-support standards themselves change, so the orders remain compliant with current law.

Marriage of Burch · filed 1996-05-20(9)

Furthermore, the Final Bill Report reveals that the Legislature meant for RCW 26.09.170(9) to allow adjustment based on changes in the statute itself, so that support orders may maintain compliance with current law.

Section 26.09.170(1)(a) permits enforcement of a previously ordered automatic child-support adjustment retroactive to the date specified in the decree, even when the parents' combined income exceeds $7,000.

In Re Marriage of Ayyad · filed 2002-03-19(1)(a)

Although child support adjustments and modifications usually are not retroactive, there is an exception for motions to compel court-ordered adjustments. RCW 26.09.170(1)(a). Court-ordered adjustments are effective on the date specified in the decree. RCW 26.09.170(1)(a). Here, the original decree mandates adjustments annually on August 1. We consider Ayyad's motion for adjustment equivalent to a motion to compel the automatic adjustment clause. [3] Contrary to Rashid's assertion, RCW 26.09.170(1)(a) enforces automatic adjustments even when the parents' combined income exceeds $7,000. Consequently, we reject Rashid's proposed alternate basis for affirming the 1998 order, and affirm only the transfer payment for the same reasons as the 1999 order.

Section 26.09.170(l)(a) permits a court to enforce a previously ordered automatic child-support adjustment effective on the date specified in the decree, including when the parents’ combined income exceeds $7,000.

In re the Marriage of Ayyad · filed 2002-01-28(l)(a)

RCW 26.09.170(l)(a) allows a court to enforce its previously ordered automatic adjustments effective the date specified in the decree.

Section 26.09.170 permits, but does not require, a court to adjust child support; the decision is discretionary even after qualifying income changes.

Katelynn Skylar Roberts, V. Roberts · filed 2021-07-19(7)(a)

Katelynn has the better argument. The adjustment provision states that “the order may be adjusted,” indicating that the decision of whether or not to change the amount of child support due is discretionary rather than automatic. Former RCW 26.09.170(7)(a) (emphasis added). “Where the obligor has other means of paying his or her child support obligation, the trial court has the discretion to enforce the obligation even in the face of a total lack of income.” In re Marriage of Blickenstaff, 71 Wn. App. 489, 498, 859 P.2d 646 (1993). Here, it appears from the record that the court considered all relevant factors, including the fact that the child support award was the result of an agreed order, the financial support provided by Chad’s partner, and the reduction in the spousal maintenance obligation, and reasonably determined that the amount of child support should not decrease despite the change in Chad’s circumstances. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in making this determination.

Section 26.09.170 does not permit automatic child support increases based solely on a cost of living index.

In re the Marriage of Ortiz · filed 1986-10-13

The increases in child support called for by the Ortiz automatic escalation clause are neither tied to changes in the obligor spouse's income or the needs of the child, nor are they limited by a maximum dollar amount as required under Edwards.

Section 26.09.170 permits a decree to continue child-support provisions after emancipation when the decree expressly provides for continued support.

Childers v. Childers · filed 1978-02-02

The italicized language evidences a legislative intent that the trial court have jurisdiction to enter a decree of support for children past age 18.

A court may modify a child support decree before emancipation to provide post-majority support when compelling circumstances and a substantial change of conditions are shown.

In Re the Marriage of Studebaker · filed 1984-03-05

Taken together, Childers, Gimlett, and RCW 26.09-.170 mean that, in compelling circumstances arising before emancipation, the trial court may modify a decree to provide for a child's post-majority support upon a showing of a substantial change of conditions.

Section 26.09.170(l)(b) places the burden on a party seeking to modify child support to prove substantially changed circumstances.

Matter of Marriage of Bucklin · filed 1993-08-05(l)(b)

To prevail on a petition to modify child support, except for circumstances not relevant in this case, the petitioner bears the burden of showing substantially changed circumstances. RCW 26.09.170(l)(b). Since Mr. Bucklin initiated the petition to modify the child support decree, he had the burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances.

Section 26.09.170(6) does not treat an obligor's voluntary unemployment or underemployment, by itself, as a substantial change in circumstances; an incarcerated parent is not voluntarily unemployed unless imprisoned for nonsupport or civil contempt for failing to pay support.

In Re the Marriage of Blickenstaff & Blickenstaff · filed 1993-10-19(6)

We hold, therefore, that an incarcerated parent is not "voluntarily unemployed" within the meaning of the child support statutes unless the parent was imprisoned for a crime of nonsupport or for civil contempt for failure to pay support. Because Wasir was not imprisoned for a crime of nonsupport or for civil contempt for failure to pay support, Wasir was not "voluntarily unemployed". The trial court erred in finding otherwise and in imputing income to him.

Either party may seek modification of a child-support obligation upon a substantial change of circumstances; the court recalculates the standard obligation based on that change while retaining discretion over any deviation.

Matter of Marriage of Trichak · filed 1993-12-13(l)(b)

Once the child support obligation has been set, either party may subsequently petition the court for a modification upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances. RCW 26.09.170(l)(b). The court must set the standard calculation in light of the basis for modification, but it has discretion to decide the extent of any deviation.

Section 26.09.170 requires a party seeking to modify child support to show a substantial change in circumstances since the dissolution decree.

Matter of Marriage of Arvey · filed 1995-08-04

To succeed on a motion to modify child support, the moving party must show a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the dissolution decree. RCW 26.09.170.

Section 26.09.170(1)(b) permits maintenance modification only upon a substantial change in circumstances, measured by the obligor’s ability to pay relative to the recipient’s needs; a voluntary income reduction lacking substantial good faith is insufficient.

Fox v. Fox · filed 1997-09-08(1)(b)

A decree respecting maintenance may be modified only upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances. RCW 26.09.170(1)(b). The phrase "change of circumstances” refers to the financial ability of the obligor to pay vis-a-vis the needs of the recipient. ... Where there is no substantial showing of good faith, a voluntary reduction of income does not constitute such a change of circumstances as to warrant modification of a maintenance obligation.

Section 26.09.170 places on the party seeking child-support modification the burden of showing a substantial change in circumstances since the dissolution decree.

Leslie v. Verhey · filed 1998-04-13

In child support modification proceedings, the moving party bears the burden of showing a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the dissolution decree. See RCW 26.09.170; Lambert v. Lambert, 66 Wash.2d 503, 508, 403 P.2d 664 (1965) (citing Corson v. Corson, 46 Wash.2d 611, 283 P.2d 673 (1955)).

Section 26.09.170 requires a party seeking child-support modification to show a substantial change in circumstances since entry of the dissolution decree, subject to exceptions not applicable here.

In Re Marriage of Barone · filed 2000-04-10

Also, in proceedings for the modification of child support under RCW 26.09.170 (with exceptions not here applicable) the moving party bears the burden of showing a "substantial... change in circumstances" since the entry of the dissolution decree.

Subsection (1) requires the party seeking to modify a child support order to show a substantial change of circumstances.

Clarke v. Clarke · filed 2002-06-28(1)

RCW 26.09.170(1) requires the moving party seeking a modification of a child support order to show a substantial change of circumstances. Here, Wendy satisfied that burden when she petitioned and proved that the couple's oldest child was age 12.

Section 26.09.170 requires a party seeking child-support modification to show a substantial change of circumstances; once the proceeding is opened, the court may examine all aspects of the support order.

Rusch v. Rusch · filed 2004-10-15

To succeed on a motion to modify child support, the moving party must show a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the dissolution decree. [18] Once the trial court concludes that there has been a substantial change and opens a modification proceeding, the court may look to all aspects of the support order.

Section 26.09.170(1) permits spousal-maintenance modification only for a substantial, unanticipated change in the parties’ financial circumstances, and bankruptcy qualifies only if it substantially changes those circumstances.

Rene D Miller v. Miller · filed 2015-05-12(1)

Under RCW 26.09 .170( 1), the spousal maintenance provisions of the MillerNercoe decree may be modified "only upon a showing of substantial change of circumstances." The change must have been one "that was not within the contemplation of the parties at the time the decree was entered." ... "The phrase 'change in circumstances' refers to the financial ability of the obligor spouse to pay vis-a-vis the necessities of the other spouse." ... "If the evidence does not establish that a material change of circumstances has occurred, the court must deny the request for modification." ... So too here: bankruptcy could be a factor, if and to the extent that it substantially changes the financial circumstances of the parties.

Section 26.09.170(1)(b) permits modification of spousal maintenance when the moving party proves a substantial change in circumstances not contemplated when maintenance was ordered.

In Re The Marriage Of Jill S. Calabrese v. Calabrese · filed 2016-03-07(1)(b)

Modification of spousal maintenance is appropriate where the moving party presents evidence establishing that there has been a substantial change in circumstances not within the parties' contemplation at the time the maintenance was ordered. RCW 26.09.170(1 )(b); Waaner v. Wagner, 95 Wn.2d 94, 98, 621 P.2d 1279 (1980); In re Marriage of Ochsner. 47 Wn. App. 520, 524, 736 P.2d 292 (1987). ... In light of the evidence and both parties' situations, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that Jack's reduction in income was involuntary and constituted a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification.

Section 26.09.170(1)(b) permits modification of a maintenance decree only when there has been a substantial change in circumstances.

In Re: Marriage Of Jose Ocasio-santiago, App/cross-resp And Kimberley Ocasio, Resp/cross-app · filed 2017-03-28(1)(b)

A decree respecting maintenance may be modified only upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances. RCW 26.09.170(1)(b).

Section 26.09.170 requires a substantial change in circumstances for child-support modification and recognizes an involuntary, unpredicted, significant income reduction as a potentially cognizable change.

In re the Marriage of: Kert A. Carlson and Rebecca M. Carlson · filed 2019-01-10(1)(b), (5)(b)

Unless otherwise permitted by statute, a child support obligation may be modified only on a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. RCW 26.09.170(1)(b), (5)(a). ... An involuntary, unpredicted, significant reduction in a parent’s monthly income may constitute a cognizable change prerequisite to a modification. RCW 26.09.170(5)(b). ... The evidence supported the trial court’s determination that Mr. Carlson had failed to show a substantial change in income.

Section 26.09.170(1)(b) permits modification of maintenance when the recipient, acting in good faith and through no fault of her own, has failed to become self-supporting as contemplated by the prior award; that failure constitutes a substantial change in circumstances.

In the Matter of the Marriage of: Barbara Dannenbring & Scott D. Dannenbring · filed 2019-04-02(1)(b)

It is law of the case. The fact that she did not achieve the goal is a substantial change in circumstances authorizing a further modification of maintenance. For someone in their 50s who has been out of the workplace for decades, predicting when they are likely (if at all) to become self-supporting is fraught with uncertainty. As long as the party needing maintenance has acted in good faith and failed to become self-supporting through no fault of her own, it does not matter whether, at the time of the earlier maintenance award, the parties and the court felt sure about the recipient’s prospect for success, or recognized a real possibility of failure. What matters is that the duration of the prior maintenance award was in fact predicated (confidently or with caution) on the ability of the party to become self-supporting during the period of that award.

(1)(b) permits modification of spousal maintenance only when the moving party shows a substantial change in circumstances, including an unknown or unanticipated fact arising after the decree.

In Re Steven Ray Holloway V Toni Justice · filed 2019-05-07(1)(b)

RCW 26.09.170(1) governs the modification of spousal maintenance. Under RCW 26.09.170(1)(b), the superior court may modify maintenance only when the moving party has shown a “substantial change of circumstances.” A substantial change in circumstances includes a fact that is unknown to the trial court or an unanticipated fact that arises after entry of the decree.

Section 26.09.170(5)(a) permits modification of a child support order when the moving party proves a substantial change in circumstances that the parties did not contemplate when the order was entered.

Meika Nowak, V. Magee · filed 2023-03-13(5)(a)

A court may modify a child support order when the moving party shows a substantial change in circumstances that the parties did not contemplate at the time the order was entered. In re Marriage of Leslie, 90 Wn. App. 796, 802, 954 P.2d 330 (1998); RCW 26.09.170(5)(a). The burden to prove a substantial change in circumstances lies with the party requesting modification. ... If the grounds raised for modification were or could have been presented prior to the entry of the order, they are not new and do not constitute a substantial change in circumstances. ... We agree that none of these claims can serve as a proper basis for modification as they were “clearly within the contemplation of the trial judge” who entered the December 2019 order.

Section 26.09.170(5)(a) generally requires a substantial change of circumstances before a court modifies a child-support order, but that showing is not required when the order arose from an uncontested proceeding unless a party rebuts the presumption that the court did not independently assess the evidence.

Marycruz Villegas, V. Ada · filed 2023-06-20(5)(a)

As a general rule, a court must find a substantial change of circumstances before modifying a support order. RCW 26.09.170(5)(a); Pippins v. Jankelson, 110 Wn.2d 475, 480, 754 P.2d 105 (1988). But, as the mother points out, this rule presumes that the court which imposed the existing support obligation independently examined the evidence after a contested hearing. Id. at 480-81. When, as appears to be the case here, the support order arises from an uncontested proceeding, we presume the court did not independently assess the evidence, and a substantial change of circumstances need not be shown unless a party rebuts the presumption. Id. at 481-82; Schumacher, 100 Wn. App. at 213.

Section 26.09.170 permits certain child-support modifications without proof of a substantial change in circumstances, but it does not preserve jurisdiction after a decree ends support at emancipation, and a modification reaches only installments accruing after the petition.

Matter of Marriage of Gillespie · filed 1995-03-28(4)(c), (1)(a), (3)

The language of this statute suggests, and its legislative history confirms, an intention not to extend jurisdiction in the face of a decree unequivocally terminating a support obligation as of an 18th birthday. The purpose of the statute was rather to eliminate the necessity of establishing a substantial change in circumstances for certain enumerated modification requests. ... RCW 26.09.170(l)(a) provides that: "Except as otherwise provided . . . the provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified . . . [o]nly as to installments accruing subsequent to the petition for modification . . .". (Italics ours.) Here, all installments had been made prior to the petition for modification. RCW 26.09.170(3) provides that "[ujnless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child . . .". As used in the statute, emancipation occurs when the child reaches the age of majority or is emancipated in fact, whichever occurs first. ... The court therefore lost authority to modify the decree of dissolution when Eric turned 18, satisfying one of the conditions in the decree.

Section 26.09.170(4)(a) permits a child support order to be modified one year after entry without a substantial change in circumstances only if the order causes severe economic hardship to a party or the child.

In Re the Marriage of Sievers · filed 1995-07-03(4)(a)

Eisenberg challenges the trial court’s award of $3,000 per month for ongoing support of the parties’ minor children. He does not challenge that sum for the 2½-year period between the arbitrator’s subsequently vacated award and the time of trial, but only for the period after the trial pending any request for modification pursuant to RCW 26.09.170(4)(a) (An order of child support may be modified 1 year or more after it has been entered without showing a substantial change of circumstances if the order in practice works a severe economic hardship on either party or the child). ... This argument presupposes that Eisenberg showed that the order in practice worked a severe economic hardship on him. This he failed to do. ... The trial court did not err in refusing to reduce the future child support from the amount deemed to be appropriate for the period October 1990 to the date of trial in November-December 1992.

Section 26.09.170(1)(a) permits modification only of child support installments accruing after the modification petition, with the effective date left to the trial court’s discretion within that period.

In Re the Marriage of Pollard · filed 2000-01-27(l)(a)

RCW 26.09.170(l)(a) provides that modifications may be made only to those child support installments that accrue “subsequent to the petition for modification[.]” The trial court has discretion to make the modification effective upon the fifing of the petition, upon the date of the order of modification, or any time in between.

Section 26.09.170(1) permits child-support modifications only prospectively, for installments accruing after the petition, and does not authorize retroactive modification.

In re the Marriage of Shoemaker · filed 1995-11-09(1)

This section, enacted in 1973, reflects long-settled law in this state that a modification of child support may not operate retroactively. ... Although here the court "vacated” one order and "reinstated” another, the effect was a retrospective modification and thus legally prohibited.

Section 26.09.170 generally allows modification of a superior-court support order only for installments accruing after the modification petition, even if the changed circumstances began earlier.

Matter of Marriage of Aldrich · filed 1993-12-21

A superior court child support order is binding and effective until modified, regardless of any change in the parties' circumstances.

Section 26.09.170 places on the party seeking child-support modification the burden of showing that the party's financial condition justifies a reduced obligation.

In Re Marriage of Dodd · filed 2004-03-16

As the party seeking child support modification, Mr. Dodd bore the burden of showing his financial condition justified a reduced obligation. RCW 26.09.170; Lambert, 66 Wash.2d at 508, 403 P.2d 664; Leslie, 90 Wash.App. at 802, 954 P.2d 330.

Section 26.09.170 places on the party seeking child-support modification the burden of showing that the party’s financial condition justifies a reduced obligation.

In re the Marriage of Dodd · filed 2004-03-16

As the party seeking child support modification, Mr. Dodd bore the burden of showing his financial condition justified a reduced obligation. RCW 26.09.170; Lambert, 66 Wn.2d at 508; Leslie, 90 Wn. App. at 802.

Sections 26.09.170 through .175 provide procedures for modifying court-ordered child support but do not authorize an administrative agency to modify a court-ordered child support obligation.

Kauzlarich v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 2006-05-16

RCW 26.09.170 through .175 outline the procedures for modifying court-ordered child support. The provisions do not authorize an administrative agency to modify a court-ordered child support obligation.

Subsection (3) treats an administrative child-support order as a written agreement that can continue support beyond the child’s age of majority.

Samantha Snodderly, V. Shockey · filed 2025-07-21(3)

RCW 26.09.170(3) does not make this distinction—it encompasses both decrees and agreements in writing (i.e., administrative orders). The agreed settlement Snodderly and Shockey entered into is precisely the type of written agreement considered by RCW 26.09.170(3).

Former RCW 26.09.170 permits child support beyond emancipation when the decree expressly provides for support while the child remains dependent.

In Re the Marriage of Anderson · filed 1987-12-10

The wording in this decree was sufficiently broad to allow the court to postpone determining the continued existence of a need for Traci's support beyond age 18. At the same time it was express and specific enough to evidence an intention that an event other than emancipation would terminate Mr. Anderson's support obligation, as required by RCW 26.09-.170 and Gimlett.

Section 26.09.170(1) makes maintenance awards modifiable for future installments only upon a substantial change in circumstances, subject to the separation-contract exception.

In Re the Marriage of Short · filed 1995-05-10(1)

RCW 26.09.170(1) provides that, except as otherwise allowed by RCW 26.09.070(7), a maintenance award shall be modifiable, but only as to installments accruing subsequent to the petition for modification and only upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances. RCW 26.09.070(7) provides that a nonmodifiable maintenance award is permissible if such a provision was included in a separation contract entered into by the parties. Because Patricia and Robert did not enter into a separation contract, the Superior Court should not have included a nonmodifiable maintenance award provision in the decree of dissolution.

Section 26.09.170(1) permits prospective modification of spousal maintenance upon a petition and a substantial change in circumstances; reconciliation may be considered in that inquiry but does not by itself invalidate the decree.

In Re Marriage of Moody · filed 1999-05-27(1)

The spousal maintenance provisions of the decree may generally be modified prospectively upon a showing of substantial change in circumstances. RCW 26.09.170(1). ... Reconciliation of the parties would be a factor to consider in determining whether there has been a change in circumstances justifying a modification of spousal maintenance, or in any action to enforce the maintenance award. It also may be a factor to consider in determining whether a motion to vacate a maintenance order is brought within a reasonable time. However, a reconciliation of the parties, on its own, does not invalidate a decree of legal separation in Washington.

Section 26.09.170 permits modification of a maintenance award when the moving party shows a substantial change in circumstances that the parties did not contemplate at dissolution.

In re the Marriage of Spreen · filed 2001-07-20(1)

A court may modify a maintenance award when the moving party shows a substantial change in circumstances that the parties did not contemplate at the time of the dissolution decree. ... Thus, Marie is free to petition again for modification if she wishes, as long as she can demonstrate a change in circumstances as RCW 26.09.170 requires.

Section 26.09.170(1) allows modification of spousal-maintenance awards as to installments accruing after a modification petition, and an acceleration or prepayment clause cannot defeat that right absent an express agreement by the parties.

In Re the Marriage of Short & Short · filed 1993-10-11(1)

It is clear from RCW 26.09.070(7) and .170(1) that the Legislature did not intend to empower the trial courts to limit or preclude the modification of a spousal maintenance award in the absence of an express and written agreement to that effect, freely and voluntarily entered into by the parties.

Section 26.09.170(1) permits a court to modify a maintenance obligation by suspending future payments when substantial changed circumstances warrant it, but does not permit retroactive extinguishment of arrearages.

In re the Marriage of Drlik · filed 2004-04-06(1), (1)(a)

In light of the foregoing authorities, RCW 26.09.170 grants the trial court broad discretion to modify a maintenance provision in an appropriate manner when warranted by the circumstances of the case, including suspending payment of obligations. But the trial court’s authority to suspend maintenance is limited because modification applies “[o]nly as to installments accruing subsequent to the petition for modification or motion for adjustment except motions to compel court-ordered adjustments, which shall be effective as of the first date specified in the decree for implementing the adjustment.” RCW 26.09.170(l)(a).

Section 26.09.170(1) generally allows maintenance awards to be modified prospectively after a petition upon a substantial change in circumstances, except when RCW 26.09.070(7) permits the parties to make maintenance nonmodifiable.

In Re Marriage of Hulscher · filed 2008-04-01(1)

RCW 26.09.170(1) provides that, except as otherwise allowed by RCW 26.09.070(7), a maintenance award shall be modifiable, but only as to installments accruing subsequent to the petition for modification and only upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances. ... And because the separation contract included an agreed, nonmodifiable spousal maintenance provision that the trial court approved and embodied in the decree, our courts have no authority to modify it.

Subsection (1) permits a maintenance award to be modified only when there has been a substantial change in circumstances that was not contemplated when the dissolution decree was entered.

In re the Marriage of: Barbara Dannenbring & Scott D. Dannenbring · filed 2015-02-19(1)

Maintenance awards can only be modified upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances not within the parties' contemplation at the time of the dissolution decree. Id. at 347; see also RCW 26.09.170(1).

Section 26.09.170(1) generally allows maintenance awards to be modified prospectively upon a substantial change in circumstances, subject to the separation-agreement exception recognized through RCW 26.09.070(7).

In re the Marriage of Sandra J. Gravelle and Thomas L. Gravelle · filed 2016-07-07(1)

As to maintenance provisions, RCW 26.09.170(1) provides that maintenance awards are generally modifiable, but only as to installments accruing subsequent to the petition for modification and only upon a showing of substantial change of circumstances. The sole exception is where permanent maintenance is "otherwise allowed by RCW 26.09.070(7)," dealing with separation agreements. A nonmodifiable maintenance award is permissible if such a provision was included in a separation contract entered into by the parties. RCW 26.09.070(7); Hulscher, 143 Wn. App. at 714 (citing Short, 125 Wn.2d at 876).

Section 26.09.170(1) permits maintenance awards to be modified only upon a substantial change in circumstances that was not contemplated when the dissolution decree was entered.

In the Matter of the Marriage of: Phillip Eugene Jones & Sharon Lee Hoke Jones · filed 2019-04-02(1)

Maintenance awards can only be modified upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances not within the parties’ contemplation at the time of the dissolution decree. In re Marriage of Spreen, 107 Wn. App. 341, 346, 28 P.3d 769 (2001); see also RCW 26.09.170(1). ... We find no abuse of discretion in the commissioner's determination that Sharon failed to show a substantial change of circumstances. Its order is affirmed.

Section 26.09.170(8)(b) permits a divorced parent to petition for child-support modification, and a timely petition remains effective when the child turns eighteen.

In Re the Marriage of Kelly · filed 1997-04-21(8)(b)

While the dissolution of marriage act is silent regarding the proper party to seek a modification of support for an adult child, there is no compelling reason to require the child’s presence in the dispute. The Legislature has provided that a "party” may petition the court for child support modification. RCW 26.09.170(8)(b). We construe the word "party” to mean the individuals who divorced. Nowhere does the dissolution of marriage act preclude parents from seeking modifications when their children turn eighteen after the petition has been timely filed.

Section 26.09.170(1) permits modification of the property-distribution portion of a dissolution decree only when conditions justify reopening the judgment under Washington law.

Wagers v. Goodwin · filed 1998-10-16(1)

This ruling is consistent with RCW 26.09.170(1), which provides that property distribution portions of a decree may be modified only if “the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.”

Section 26.09.170(1) describes when a court with subject matter jurisdiction may revoke or modify property-division provisions of a dissolution decree; it does not limit the superior court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

In Re the Marriage of Thurston · filed 1998-09-28(1)

Rather, the plain words of the statute describe the circumstances under which a court that has subject matter jurisdiction may revoke or modify the property division provisions of a dissolution decree.

Section 26.09.170 permits modification of a decree respecting maintenance or support, while property-disposition provisions may be modified only when conditions justify reopening the judgment under state law.

In Re Marriage of Michael · filed 2008-07-15

Under former RCW 26.09.170 (1973), the trial court may modify any decree "respecting maintenance or support," but provisions as to property dispositions "may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state."

Section 26.09.170(1) generally bars modification of property-distribution provisions in a dissolution decree unless conditions exist that justify reopening the judgment under state law.

In Re The Marriage Of: Homeira Bakhtiari, And Masoud Edalatie · filed 2018-06-04(1)

As a general rule, property distribution provisions in a dissolution decree may not be modified "unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state." RCW 26.09.170(1); see Guardado v. Guardado, 200 Wn. App. 237, 242, 402 P.3d 357(2017)(CR 60 provides a means for reopening the property disposition in a dissolution decree).

Section 26.09.170(1)(b) bars modification of a property and debt allocation, including an assigned mortgage obligation, unless conditions justify reopening the judgment.

In the Matter of the Marriage of: Kriss Carpenter & Julianne Carpenter · filed 2025-10-14(1)(b)

As the commissioner properly recognized, RCW 26.09.170(1)(b) states that “[t]he provisions as to property disposition may not be revoked or modified, ... unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.” ... Under the plain language of the Agreement, Kriss’ obligation to pay Julianne’s mortgage is a non-modifiable property and debt distribution.

Section 26.09.170(1) gives the trial court continuing jurisdiction to consider modification of spousal maintenance, representing a departure from the common-law res judicata rule.

Arazbal v. Arzabal · filed 2017-01-23(1)

Kimberly contends that she was entitled to relief because Christopher's May 6, 2015 motion to modify was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, but the trial court has broad authority to consider such a motion. See RCW 26.09.170(1) (trial court has continuing jurisdiction to consider modification of spousal maintenance); In re Marriage of Cook, 28 Wn. App. 518, 521, 624 P.2d 743 (1981) ("The statutory provision allowing for modification of a divorce decree represents a departure from the common law res judicata rule.").

Section 26.09.170(1) allows a court to modify a maintenance award when the moving party shows a substantial change in circumstances that the parties did not contemplate at the time of the dissolution decree.

In re the Marriage of: Roger L. Aldrich and Mary Beth Aldrich · filed 2017-05-09(1)

The statute permitting modification of a maintenance award is RCW 26.09.170(1). This provision allows a court to "modify a maintenance award when the moving party shows a substantial change in circumstances that the parties did not contemplate at the time of the dissolution decree."

Section 26.09.170(1) permits modification of spousal maintenance only for installments accruing after the modification petition is filed and upon a substantial change in circumstances, but does not specify how to compensate an obligor for interim overpayments.

In re the Marriage of: Roger L. Aldrich & Mary Beth Aldrich · filed 2018-12-20(1)

RCW 26.09.170(1) authorizes a court to modify spousal maintenance only as to installments accruing after the petition to modify is filed and only upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. The statute does not direct a trial court how to compensate an obligor for overpayments made between the filing of the petition and the court’s modification order.

Section 26.09.170(2) presumes that spousal maintenance ends when the recipient remarries unless the support order provides otherwise.

Ronald Brett, V State Of Washington · filed 2019-05-20(2)

In Washington, courts are not bound to terminate the requirement of spousal support upon the recipient's remarriage; it is simply the presumption when no language to the contrary provides otherwise.

Section 26.09.170(2) presumes that maintenance ends upon the recipient’s remarriage unless the parties agree in writing or the decree expressly provides otherwise, while subsection (1) permits modification upon a substantial change in circumstances.

Jessa Tyner, V. Tyner · filed 2022-06-01(2), (1)

The parties must affirmatively provide their own language below this statement to override the statutory presumption and satisfy RCW 26.09.170(2)’s provision that the presumption is overridden when “agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree.” The parties here did just that. ... The spousal maintenance provision clearly states that the spousal maintenance ends on March 5, 2028, instead of ending upon remarriage or death. That statement is a “clear manifestation of intent” to waive the statutory presumption that spousal maintenance ends upon remarriage. See Briscoe, 134 Wn.2d at 348. Therefore, the default statutory presumption no longer applies by the parties’ express agreement in the dissolution decree. See id. ... RCW 26.09.170(1) states that the provisions of a dissolution decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances. ... The trial court abused its discretion by not exercising its discretion in determining whether Blackhurst’s current spouse’s higher income was a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of spousal maintenance. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Tyner’s petition to modify spousal maintenance and remand for the trial court to determine whether the amount of Blackhurst’s current spouse’s income is a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of spousal maintenance.

Section 26.09.170(1) allows a spousal-maintenance decree to be modified only when the requesting party shows a substantial change in circumstances, understood as a change in the obligor's ability to pay relative to the recipient's needs.

In Re The Marriage Of Erik Elzinga, V. Hines-elzinga · filed 2023-01-23(1)

RCW 26.09.170(1) provides that provisions of a decree of dissolution concerning spousal maintenance are modifiable “only upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances.” “The phrase ‘change of circumstances’ refers to the financial ability of the obligor to pay vis-a-vis the needs of the recipient.”

Section 26.09.170(1)(b) permits modification of spousal maintenance only when the moving party shows a substantial change of circumstances, and the statute imposes no special service requirement for a maintenance-modification petition.

In the Matter of the Marriage of: Veronica J. Butler & Gregory W. Butler · filed 2026-05-07(1)(b)

However, RCW 26.09.170, regulating the modification of spousal maintenance, contains no such service requirement. ... Under RCW 26.09.170(1)(b), the court may modify maintenance only when the moving party has shown a “substantial change of circumstances.” A substantial change of circumstances includes a fact that is unknown to the trial court or an unanticipated fact that arises after entry of the decree.

Subsection (1) permits modification of maintenance or support decrees only as to installments accruing after the petition for modification, subject to statutory exceptions.

In re the Marriage of Brandon Munn & Amanda Munn · filed 2014-09-25(1)

RCW 26.09 .170( 1) establishes ... the conditions for modifying a child support order and states, in relevant part, that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided ... the provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified: (a) Only as to installments accruing subsequent to the petition for modification."

Section 26.09.170 permits a court to modify a dissolution decree concerning maintenance or support and to alter a property provision only when state law permits reopening the judgment.

In Re Marriage of Jennings · filed 1999-07-29

In reviewing the order signed by the trial court on June 5, 1996 and the findings of fact and conclusions of law signed on July 29, 1996, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in clarifying the original decree of dissolution under RCW 26.09.170 and the trial court could reasonably conclude the drastic change in the status and amount of the monthly military retirement payments to Respondent constituted an "extraordinary circumstance" under CR60(b)(11).

Section 26.09.170(1) bars a trial court from modifying its own dissolution decree unless conditions justify reopening the judgment, although it may clarify an ambiguity without modifying the decree.

In Re the Marriage of Thompson · filed 1999-11-22(1)

A trial court does not have the authority to modify even its own decree in the absence of conditions justifying the reopening of the judgment. RCW 26.09.170(1); Kern v. Kern, 28 Wash.2d 617, 619, 183 P.2d 811 (1947). An ambiguous decree may be clarified, but not modified. RCW 26.09.170(1); In re Marriage of Greenlee, 65 Wash.App. 703, 710, 829 P.2d 1120, review denied, 120 Wash.2d 1002, 838 P.2d 1143 (1992). ... This was a modification of the decree. The original provision unambiguously awarded Gina a promissory note for $47,572 plus interest for up to three years. By reducing the amount to $41,518 and reducing the interest term to 45 days, the court exceeded its authority.

Section 26.09.170(1) restricts modification of dissolution-decree provisions when the conditions for reopening the judgment are absent, but it does not bar interpreting the decree.

Stokes v. Polley · filed 2001-12-27(1)

Furthermore we are simply asked to interpret the decree, not to modify its terms. See RCW 26.09.170(1) (stating no modification of provisions unless conditions justify reopening judgment); Thompson, 97 Wash.App. at 878, 988 P.2d 499 (finding interpretation does not amount to modification and is permissible).

Section 26.09.170(1) permits modification of a decree only when conditions justify reopening the judgment, while an ambiguous decree may be clarified but not substantively modified.

Helm v. Helm · filed 2024-08-06(1)

A trial court cannot modify its own decree unless there are conditions justifying the reopening of the judgment, such as the substantial change of circumstances required to modify a child support order. RCW 26.09.170(1); see also Thompson, 97 Wn. App. at 878. An ambiguous decree cannot be modified, but may be clarified. RCW 26.09.170(1); see also Thompson, 97 Wn. App. at 878.

Section 26.09.170(1) bars modification of a dissolution decree unless conditions justify reopening the judgment.

Katherine Dawn Brown, V. Thomas · filed 2025-06-23(1)

RCW 26.09.170(1) prohibits modification of a dissolution decree in the absence of conditions that justify reopening of the judgment. ... Therefore, the order on enforcement determining that Brown was the owner of the disputed items did not extend or reduce the scope of the property award to the parties and, thus, did not modify the decree. Rather, the order merely enforced the property division unambiguously reflected in the decree.

Section 26.09.170(1) bars a trial court from modifying its dissolution decree absent conditions justifying reopening the judgment, but permits clarification of an ambiguous decree when the clarification merely defines rights already granted.

William Vogel, Appellant/cross-respondent V. Alice Vogel, Respondent/cross-appellant · filed 2022-03-21(1)

A trial court does not have the authority to modify even its own decree in the absence of conditions justifying the reopening of the judgment. ... The trial court did not err when it clarified the decree as to the right to gains. This determination was not a modification.

Section 26.09.170 permits clarification of an ambiguous property distribution decree when it fails to address future changes in pension pay.

In the Matter of Marriage of Haugh · filed 1990-05-22

RCW 26.09.170 provides in pertinent part: ... The original decree failed to make provision for future increases or decreases in the retirement pay. To this extent, the decree was ambiguous, and failed to dispose of all the parties' property. It was subject to clarification under Byrne.

Section 26.09.170 does not preclude a trial court from retaining jurisdiction for a limited period to review the efficacy of a modified parenting plan.

In re the Marriage of True · filed 2000-11-06

After having the parties before it in a contentious parenting plan hearing, back and forth from mediation, and after entering the order modifying the parenting plan, a trial court may retain jurisdiction over the matter for a limited period of time in order to review the efficacy of its decision and to maintain judicial economy following its order. ... Nothing in the modification statute, RCW 26.09.170, pre-l eludes this sort of procedure.

Section 26.09.170 requires a motion or petition for a child-support adjustment or modification and generally makes any increase or decrease effective only for installments accruing after filing, except when a motion enforces an adjustment previously ordered by the court.

In re the Marriage of Abercrombie · filed 2001-01-29(8)(a), (1)

The court action necessary to change child support is an order following motion (for adjustment) or a petition (for modification). RCW 26.09.170(8)(a), .175(1). Except where a motion is filed to compel an adjustment previously ordered by the court, any increase or decrease applies only to installments accruing after a petition or motion is filed. RCW 26.09.170(1).

After 24 months from entry of a child support order, it may be adjusted without proving substantially changed circumstances based on changes in the parties' income or in the economic table or standards in chapter 26.19 RCW.

Remick v. Remick · filed 2013-04-22(7)(a)

The time period established in RCW 26.09.170 on which Tami relies is RCW 26.09.170(7)(a), which provides that if 24 months have passed from the date of entry of the child support order, the order may be adjusted without a showing of substantially changed circumstances based upon changes in the income of the parties or changes in the economic table or standards in chapter 26.19 RCW. ... Neither this nor any other language in the child support order purports to limit either party's ability to pursue adjustment or modification of child support if circumstances warrant it under RCW 26.09.170.

Section 26.09.170 requires court action to change child support and generally makes increases or decreases effective only for installments accruing after a petition or motion is filed, except a motion compelling a previously ordered adjustment.

Abercrombie v. Abercrombie · filed 2001-03-15(8)(a), (1)

The court action necessary to change child support is an order following motion (for adjustment) or a petition (for modification). RCW 26.09.170(8)(a), .175(1). Except where a motion is filed to compel an adjustment previously ordered by the court, any increase or decrease applies only to installments accruing after a petition or motion is filed. RCW 26.09.170(1).

Section 26.09.170(6) provides that an obligor's voluntary unemployment or voluntary underemployment, by itself, is not a substantial change of circumstances supporting modification of child support.

In Re the Marriage of Mattson · filed 1999-05-07(6)

A parent may file a motion to modify child support payments based on a substantial change of circumstances, under RCW 26.09.170. But subsection. (6) of the statute provides: “An obligor’s voluntary unemployment or voluntary underemployment, by itself, is not a substantial change of circumstances.”

Section 26.09.170(5) generally requires a substantial change in circumstances before a court may modify a child-support order, and subsection (5)(b) excludes voluntary unemployment or underemployment by itself from that showing.

Clark v. Clark · filed 2020-01-13(5)(b)

As a general rule, courts must find a substantial change of circumstances before modifying a support order. RCW 26.09.170(5); Pi~ins, 110 Wn.2d 475. ... Payne is distinguishable because, unlike the case here, the change in income was not associated with probable voluntary reduced work hours, but a change in location and employer due to the other parent’s relocation. ~ RCW 26.09.170(5)(b) (“An obligor’s voluntary unemployment or voluntary underemployment, by itself, is not a substantial change of circumstances.”)

Section 26.09.170(1) bars revoking or modifying a dissolution decree's property provisions unless conditions justify reopening the judgment under state law.

In Re Marriage of Knutson · filed 2003-01-09(1)

The provisions of a dissolution decree "as to property disposition may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state." ... In light of the foregoing, the trial court abused its discretion in granting Mr. Knutson's motion to vacate and reopening the decree for modification.

Section 26.09.170(1) bars revocation or modification of a property disposition unless conditions exist that justify reopening the judgment under Washington law.

In Re Marriage of Bobbitt · filed 2006-07-25(1)

Esser's motion to allow her to sell the Yakima property and retain the net proceeds to satisfy her judgments against Bobbitt effected an improper modification of the 2002 property division. RCW 26.09.170(1) states in relevant part: "The provisions as to property disposition may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state."

Section 26.09.170(1) bars revoking or modifying property-disposition provisions in a dissolution decree unless conditions justify reopening the judgment under state law.

Marriage Of: Laura Seymour, V. Green · filed 2022-03-28(1)

Generally, the provisions in a dissolution decree as to property disposition “may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.” RCW 26.09.170(1). ... It was error for the trial court to modify the decree by terminating this misnamed, but clearly intended, property division.

Section 26.09.170(1) bars revoking or modifying property-disposition provisions in a dissolution decree unless conditions justify reopening the judgment.

Laurie Jean Gudnason, V. Gudnason · filed 2023-10-16(1)

“The provisions as to property disposition may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment.”

Section 26.09.170(1) bars revoking or modifying a property disposition unless the court finds conditions warranting reopening the judgment under state law.

In Re The Marriage Of: Kathy Jo Rohrs, V. Rohrs · filed 2024-01-22(1)

RCW 26.09.170(1) sets forth, in pertinent part, that “[t]he provisions as to property disposition may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.” Contrary to Kathy’s assertion, this provision is inapplicable here. As discussed herein, the court did not substantially modify the parties’ property division but, rather, corrected a clerical error in its own judgment record so that it correctly conveyed the court’s intention. The court’s correction of its judgment record did not change the parties’ original marital property division agreement as incorporated into the court’s judgment.

Section 26.09.170 permits modification of maintenance or support, but a property disposition may be changed only when conditions justify reopening the judgment.

In re the Marriage of Jennings · filed 1999-07-29

Under RCW 26.09.170 the court may modify any decree “respecting maintenance or support,” but provisions as to property dispositions “may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.”

Section 26.09.170(1) permits modification of a dissolution decree’s property disposition only when conditions justify reopening the judgment; adding a mortgage obligation absent from the decree is a modification.

Traci Sammeth, V. Ervin · filed 2025-09-29(1)

But a trial court may not modify a dissolution decree, including revoking or modifying any property disposition ... therein, “unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.” RCW 26.09.170(1). ... We conclude Ervin’s request to remove his name was essentially a motion to modify the dissolution decree, since it had not reached the issue of whose name could permissibly remain on the Cle Elum mortgage.

Section 26.09.170(1) bars revoking or modifying a property disposition unless conditions justify reopening the judgment.

Douglas Niemi, V. Niemi · filed 2021-10-04(1)

Finally, judicially imposed visitation rights for pets would run contrary to the current statutory directive that marital property distributions should be final.9 ... See RCW 26.09.170(1) (“The provisions as to property disposition may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.”).

Section 26.09.170(1)(a) requires child-support modifications to proceed by petition or motion and bars unilateral modification, so periodic adjustments take effect only upon court order.

In re the Marriage of Kahle · filed 2006-07-24(1)(a)

This statute sets forth the procedural mechanism by which child support obligations of “any decree” may be modified. That mechanism is either by petition or motion. In the latter case, the motion would include a motion for adjustment or motion to compel court-ordered adjustment. Nothing in this statute either expressly or impliedly permits a child support obligation imposed by a decree or other order to be unilaterally modified by either party with a duty of support. We shall not rewrite the statute to permit such a result. ... Accordingly, when we read the provisions of RCW 26.09.100(2) together with those of RCW 26.09.170(l)(a), we conclude that periodic adjustments are only effective upon order of a court.

Section 26.09.170(1)(a) makes decree-based periodic child-support adjustments effective only through a court order, with a motion to compel an adjustment effective from the decree’s specified date.

In Re Marriage of Kahle · filed 2006-07-24(1)(a)

Accordingly, when we read the provisions of RCW 26.09.100(2) together with those of RCW 26.09.170(1)(a), we conclude that periodic adjustments are only effective upon order of a court.

Section 26.09.170(5)(a) permits a party to petition the trial court to modify a child support order at any time upon a showing of substantially changed circumstances.

In Re The Marriage Of: Masood Abawi v. Gutierrez · filed 2013-11-12(5)(a)

To the extent Abawi's motion to supplement the record is intended as an effort to modify the child support order, he chose the wrong procedure. The law permits Abawi to petition the trial court to modify the child support order at any time based upon a showing of substantially changed circumstances. See RCW 26.09.170(5)(a).

Section 26.09.170(7)(a)(i) permits either party to request a child-support adjustment based on changed parental income only after two years have passed since the order or last adjustment or modification.

In Re Marriage Of: Julie Davis, Resp/cross-app. v. Paul Davis, App/cross-resp. · filed 2014-11-10(7)(a)(i)

Moreover, in August 2013, Julie was not entitled to an adjustment under RCW 26.09.170(7)(a)(i) based on changes in the parties' incomes because two years had not yet passed since the June 1, 2013 adjustment based on S.D.'s change to the greater age category.

Section 26.09.170(1) permits a party to seek modification of a maintenance obligation when circumstances arising after trial establish a substantial change in circumstances.

In Re The Marriage Of: Marjorie A. Wortz, Res. And Kirk E. Buhne, App. · filed 2015-11-16(1)

Finally, Buhne claims that a future determination by the Canadian court will require recalculation of the maintenance. If he decides that the Canadian court's final decision establishes a substantial change of circumstances, RCW 26.09.170 provides Buhne's remedy, a request to modify maintenance.

Section 26.09.170(5) supports enforcing a child support order according to its terms absent changed circumstances justifying modification.

In re Marriage of Zandi · filed 2017-02-23(5)

Generally, absent a showing of changed circumstances to justify modification, a child support order must be enforced according to its terms. See RCW 26.09.170(5)-(7).

Section 26.09.170(5)(a) permits a party to seek child-support modification at any time upon showing substantially changed circumstances, including a substantial change that was uncontemplated when the original support order was entered.

Wickstrom v. Wickstrom · filed 2019-06-04(5)(a)

“A party to an order of child support may petition for a modification based upon a showing of substantially changed circumstances at any time.” RCW 26.09.170(5)(a). ... Changes in circumstances justifying a modification of child support “must have been uncontemplated at the time the [dissolution] decree was entered.” ... Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that an uncontemplated substantial change in circumstances existed.

Section 26.09.170(5)(a) permits modification of a child-support order upon substantially changed circumstances, and subsection (7)(a) permits adjustment after two years without that showing when specified income or guideline changes occur.

In Re The Marriage Of: Stephen A. Burns, App. And Hiromi F. Burns (n/k/a/ Fujiki), Res. · filed 2020-11-23(5)(a), (7)(a)

A party to a child support order may petition for a modification based on a showing of substantially changed circumstances at any time. RCW 26.09.170(5)(a). If two years have passed from the order’s entry or last modification, the order may be adjusted without a showing of substantially changed circumstances based on changes in the parents’ income or changes in the economic table or standards in chapter 26.19 RCW. RCW 26.09.170(7)(a).

Section 26.09.170 permits modification of a child support order when bad faith or unreasonable conduct constitutes changed circumstances.

In re the Marriage of: Jeffrey K. Newgard And Pennelopy Ann Newgard · filed 2017-07-18(5)-(7)

A trial court presented with evidence of bad faith could, for example, reasonably conclude that a party acting in bad faith constitutes changed circumstances. ... Id. at 930 n.2 (citing RCW 26.09.170(5)-(7)). ... Zandi permits a finding of bad faith or unreasonable conduct to modify a child support order.

Section 26.09.170(1) makes maintenance awards prospectively modifiable upon a substantial change in circumstances unless a valid agreement or statutory exception precludes or limits modification.

Eggert v. Eggert · filed 2014-06-12(1)

RCW 26.09.170(1) provides that, except as otherwise allowed by RCW 26.09.070(7), a maintenance award shall be prospectively modifiable upon a showing of substantial change of circumstances. The exception created by RCW 26.09.070(7) is for separation contracts under which the parties agree that "the decree may expressly preclude or limit modification of any provision for maintenance set forth in the decree." The parties' written agreement that maintenance is not modifiable need not be denominated a "separation contract," and can be reflected in the decree itself. But it must provide that the maintenance provision is nonmodifiable.

Section 26.09.170 permits the department of social and health services to seek modification of a child-support order when public assistance is paid to or for the child's benefit, even when the parents share residential placement.

In re the Custody of: A.L. · filed 2014-12-23(9)

RCW 26.09.170 and .175 allow the State of Washington to request to modify an order of child support whenever public assistance is paid to benefit the child.

Section 26.09.170(9) permits the Department of Social and Health Services to seek modification of a child-support order whenever public assistance is paid to or for the child's benefit, including when parents share residential placement.

State v. Zasso · filed 2014-12-23(9)

RCW 26.09.170 and .175 allow the State of Washington to request to modify an order of child support whenever public assistance is paid to benefit the child. We may admit that under WAC 388-14A-1020, Leticia Lopez, the TANF recipient, is not the custodial parent, or at least not the sole custodial parent, because of shared placement of A.L. Nevertheless, Washington statutes do not limit the State’s authority to file a modification to instances when the sole custodial parent is the recipient of the assistance.

Section 26.09.170(1)(a) generally bars retroactive modification of child-support installments, but courts may use traditional equitable principles to reduce back child support when doing so would not create an injustice to the residential parent or children.

Sanchez v. Sanchez · filed 2016-02-02(1)(a)

Despite RCW 26.09. 170(1)(a), Washington courts will apply traditional equitable principles to mitigate the harshness of claims for back child support if it will not work an injustice to the residential parent or the children.