Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080

Section 4.16.080 requires an action on a contract not in writing to be brought within three years.

Mayer v. Herrin · filed 1952-06-12

The trial court was correct in applying the statute of limitations as provided in RCW 4.16.080 [cf. Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 159], which provides that an action upon a contract, not in writing, must be brought within three years. This is determinative of the outcome of this action.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitation on actions based on a contract or liability that is not in writing and does not arise from a written instrument, including a quasi-contract claim to recover an overpayment made under a written contract.

Halver v. Welle · filed 1954-02-19(3)

However, unfortunately for appellants, such an action in this case is barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

Subsection (3) does not govern an action where compensation is fixed by written contracts, and subsection (6) does not govern when the action is based on those written agreements rather than on a statutory penalty or forfeiture.

McDonald v. Wockner · filed 1954-02-19(3) and (6)

Since the action is based upon the written contracts, the six-year statute must be held to apply.

Section 4.16.080(3) requires actions on unwritten express or implied contracts or liabilities to be commenced within three years after accrual, and the court applied that period to unjust-enrichment claims.

Dam v. General Electric Co. · filed 1956-08-27(3)

RCW 4.16.080, subd. (3), provides that, “An action upon a contract or liability express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any written instrument” must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued. The statute by its express terms applies to plaintiffs’ first cause of action. The second cause of action presents a claim for recovery for unjust enrichment of the defendant. Although an action based on such a claim is equitable in its nature,6 the Washington State Supreme Court has squarely and unequivocally held in two recent cases that the three-year statute of limitations mentioned above is applicable to an action for unjust enrichment.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitation on actions based on contracts or liabilities that are not in writing and do not arise from a written instrument.

Evans v. YAKIMA ETC. ASS'N. · filed 1958-07-24(3)

The action is predicated upon appellant's obligation to pay its liability under the oral contract, which is governed by the three-year statute.

Subsection (3) imposes a three-year limitation period on actions based on express or implied contracts or liabilities that are not in writing and do not arise from a written instrument.

Evans v. Yakima Valley, Grape Growers Ass'n · filed 1958-07-24(3)

The action is predicated upon appellant’s obligation to pay its liability under the oral contract, which is governed by the three-year statute.

Section 4.16.080(3)'s three-year period applies to contract or liability claims not in writing, so claims founded on written contracts fall outside it.

Lybecker v. United Pacific Insurance · filed 1965-09-30(3)

“As a matter of law, the trial court concluded that all four transactions were governed by the 3-year statute of limitations. ... The claims of plaintiffs Lybecker and Corydon against McDonnell are based upon written contracts. ... Being based on written contracts, both claims are governed by the 6-year statute of limitations.”

Section 4.16.080(3) provides a three-year limitation period for actions based on an express or implied contract or liability that is not in writing.

Universal Underwriters Insurance v. Security Industries, Inc. · filed 1974-09-13(3)

For these reasons, this court is persuaded that Gaffner v. Johnson is not, and would not today be considered, authority for application of the two year statute of limitations to actions for indemnity. Therefore, this court finds and holds that the statute of limitations applicable to this action is the three year statute for implied contract not in writing, RCW 4.16.080(3).

Section 4.16.080 provides a three-year limitations period for an attorney-fee claim arising from an unwritten fee agreement.

Hart v. Day · filed 1977-04-25

Where there is no written fee agreement, the controlling statute of limitations is the 3-year statute, RCW 4.16.080. Wright v. Johanson, supra at 695. This action having been commenced within 3 years of May 1972, the trial court was correct when it concluded, in effect, that the appellant, Mrs. Day, had not sustained the burden of proving her affirmative defense that the statute of limitations had run on her obligation to pay attorneys' fees and costs.

Subsection (3) imposes a three-year limitations period when a contract is partly oral, and a defendant invoking the statute for only part of a claim must prove which damages fall within the limitations period.

Fulle v. Boulevard Excavating, Inc. · filed 1978-07-24(3)

If resort to parol evidence is necessary to establish any material element of the agreement, the contract is partly oral and the 3-year statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.080(3), applies. ... He argues alternatively that even if the 3-year statute of limitations is applicable, where part of his demand is barred by the statute and part is not, Boulevard on pleading the statute has the burden of showing the specific amount which falls within its protection. We agree. ... It follows, therefore, that when the defense is partial only, i.e., barring only a part of the damage, the defendant has the burden of proving what part occurred prior to the limitation period.

Section 4.16.080(3) gives contract actions based on agreements that are not in writing a three-year limitations period; if parol evidence is needed to establish a material contract term, the contract is partly oral and the three-year period applies.

Cahn v. Foster & Marshall, Inc. · filed 1983-02-01(3)

A written agreement for purposes of the 6-year statute of limitations must contain all the essential elements of the contract, and if resort to parol evidence is necessary to establish any material element, then the contract is partly oral and the 3-year statute of limitations applies. ... Thus, under the holdings in Ingalls and National Bank of Commerce, the 3-year statute of limitations for contracts not in writing, RCW 4.16.080(3), applies.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on an action based on a contract or liability that is not in writing and does not arise from a written instrument.

Campbell v. King County · filed 1984-08-06(3)

The trial court did not err by applying the 3-year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitation period on actions based on unwritten express or implied contracts or liabilities.

Malnar v. Carlson · filed 1996-02-01(3)

The statute of limitation for an action on a contract or liability, express or implied, which is not in writing and does not arise out of any written instrument is three years. RCW 4.16.080(3). The parties here do not dispute that the three-year statute of limitation applies to this action involving an oral contract to form a partnership. The dispute involves when this statute of limitation period began to run. ... Since a material dispute of fact exists on when the statute of limitation time period began to run, the factual issue must be decided by the finder of fact on remand.

Section 4.16.080(3)'s three-year limitations period does not apply when the liability arises out of an established written contract, even if parol evidence is needed to establish the liable partners' relationship.

Barnes v. McLendon · filed 1996-02-08(3)

Kaiser and Douglass assert that because they did not sign the promissory note that McLendon gave to Barnes, their contractual obligation, if any, was partly oral and that Barnes’s action was properly barred as an "action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any written instrument” which is required to be brought within three years. RCW 4.16.080(3). ... Similarly, the liability of Kaiser and Douglass, if any, arises out of the contract executed by one partner and by virtue of the alleged partnership agreement between them and McLendon and is imposed as a matter of law. ... It follows that once a written contract is established, and here there is no dispute about the fact that a written instrument exists, it is a separate factual inquiry as to whether or not the contract benefited the partnership or was executed within the ordinary course of partnership business, thereby binding the partnership. Because an action on a written instrument remains viable for six years, Barnes’s action was, therefore, commenced within the applicable period for contract actions.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims based on oral contracts, rather than the six-year period for written contracts.

Retired Public Employees Council v. State · filed 2001-01-05(3)

Noah and Bowles control here, and the statute of limitations is three years.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitation period on a nonwritten contract-based action when the writings do not establish a contract with the defendant.

Bogle & Gates, P.L.L.C. v. Holly Mountain Resources · filed 2001-09-24(3)

For this reason, we conclude that RCW 4.16.080(3) applies to bar the action against Holly Mountain, and we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal on this basis.

Section 4.16.080(3) provides a three-year limitations period for actions arising from unwritten contracts.

Harberd v. City of Kettle Falls · filed 2004-01-15(3)

Consequently, Mr. Harberd asserts a breach of contract claim subject to the three-year statute of limitations for actions arising from unwritten contracts. RCW 4.16.080(3). ... Given the constructive notice, and the lack of credible evidence of any adverse City decisions after that time, Mr. Harberd’s March 16, 2001 breach of contract claim has to be time barred.

Section 4.16.080(3) requires contract-based actions on non-written contracts to be commenced within three years.

Bogle & Gates, PLLC v. Zapel · filed 2004-05-03(3)

Thus, the letter and Standard Terms of Representation did not satisfy the writing requirement, and the six-year statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.040(1) did not apply. We conclude that the three-year limitations period in RCW 4.16.080(3) applied to bar the law firm's contract claim.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitation on actions for breach of an unwritten contract, and a general ongoing professional relationship does not toll that period under the continuous representation rule.

Burns v. McClinton · filed 2006-09-25(3)

The three-year statute of limitations applies to an action upon a contract which is not in writing. RCW 4.16.080(3). ... This case thus does not resemble those cases in which the continuous representation rule has been held to apply. There is no distinct accounting matter that justifies applying the rule. The trial court's decision to toll the statute of limitations based on the continuous representation rule must be reversed. ... We conclude the trial court erred in tolling the statute of limitations on the claims arising out of the fee overcharges. The judgment for damages on those claims should have been limited to the overcharges that occurred within the three years before Burns filed suit. We remand to the trial court for the calculation of those damages.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitation on unwritten contract claims, except for actions upon account receivables covered by § 4.16.040(2).

Tingey v. Haisch · filed 2007-02-15(3)

The exception does not swallow the rule, however, because oral contracts between two private parties are still governed by the three-year limitation of RCW 4.16.080(3). Moreover, it is clear that the legislature considered the impact of the “account receivable” provision on the oral contract limitation because it amended that provision of former RCW 4.16.080(3) when it amended RCW 4.16.040(2).

Section 4.16.080(3) supplies a three-year limitations period for an action based on an unwritten contract.

Governors Point Development Co., App./cr-res. v. City Of Bellingham, Res./cr-app. · filed 2013-06-03(3)

We apply the three-year statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.080(3), as GPDC did not plead a cause ofaction for breach ofan express contract.

Section 4.16.080 provides a three-year limitations period for oral agreements or agreements requiring resort to parol evidence to establish essential contract elements.

Hahn v. Strasser · filed 2012-06-13

An oral agreement or one that requires a resort to parol evidence to establish essential elements of a contract is governed by the three-year statute.

Section 4.16.080(3) gives oral-contract claims a three-year limitations period and bars a claim filed after that period has run.

Unifund Ccr, Llc v. Elyse · filed 2016-07-18(3)

To the extent the record suggests a claim in the nature of an oral agreement between Elyse and Citibank, the Washington three-year statute of limitations on oral contracts had run when Unifund sued Elyse in 2013.19 Any such claim is time barred.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions involving contracts not in writing.

In the Matter of the Marriage of: Mary Alice Carlson & Hugh David Carlson · filed 2019-05-30(3)

The trial court held the three-year statute of limitations barred HMD’s debt collection or breach of contract claim against South 80 Orchards. We agree. A suit on a written contract generally must be commenced within six years. RCW 4.16.040(1). A three-year limitation period applies to a contract not in writing. RCW 4.16.080(3). When a claimant must rely on parol evidence to establish any material element of a contract, the law deems the contract an oral agreement and subject to the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(3) supplies a three-year limitations period for claims on contracts not in writing.

Kim v. Western-Blossom Hill Investors · filed 2019-08-12(3)

There is no allegation that Defendants signed a promise to pay this debt, making this at most an oral contract. The Court notes that this oral contract would likely be barred by the applicable statute of limitations—RCW 4.16.080(3).

Section 4.16.080(3)'s three-year limitations period applies to contracts or liabilities that are not in writing; a loan agreement containing all essential elements is written and instead receives the six-year limitations period.

Milosavljevic v. Curtis · filed 2019-10-14(3)

If the loan agreement contains all essential elements, then it constitutes a written agreement subject to a six-year statute of limitations. ... At the stage of the motion for reconsideration and summary judgment, Milosavljevic failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the loan agreement was a contract in writing. Thus, the trial court did not err in concluding that a six-year limitations period applied to the loan agreement.

Subsection (3) gives express and implied contract claims a three-year limitations period; subsection (4) gives fraud claims a three-year period that begins when the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered.

Cebert v. Patrick Kennedy, et ux · filed 2020-06-30(3) and (4)

RCW 4.16.080(3) provides a three year statute of limitations for claims based on express or implied contracts. ... RCW 4.16.080(4) provides for a three year statute of ... limitations for claims based on fraud; the period does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, or should have been discovered.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions based on an unwritten contract or liability.

Hunter v. Legacy Health · filed 2024-03-18(3)

Here, in his well-reasoned F&R, Judge Armistead properly determined that the proposed FAC alleged Washington claims that continued after 2015 and were "not clearly outside the statute of limitations."

Section 4.16.080(3) requires a breach-of-oral-contract claim to be brought within three years.

Stehrenberger v. Erik E. Highberg, et ux · filed 2024-04-23(3)

A plaintiff alleging breach of written contract must bring their claim within six years, whereas a plaintiff alleging breach of oral contract must bring their claim within three years. RCW 4.16.040(1), .080(3).

Section 4.16.080(3) requires an action on an unwritten express or implied contract to be brought within three years after accrual, which occurs at breach rather than discovery of the breach.

Charles Oliver, V. Garrett · filed 2025-06-30(3)

An action upon a contract, express or implied, which is not in writing must be brought within three years of accrual. RCW 4.16.080(3). A claim arising out of a contract accrues on breach of the contract, and not on discovery of the breach.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims arising from contracts that are not in writing.

Jaswant Singh, V. Kang · filed 2025-08-25(3)

For contracts not in writing, the statute of limitations is three years. RCW 4.16.080(3).

Section 4.16.080(3)'s three-year limitations period for oral contracts applies to a § 301 action against an employer when the action depends substantially on separate oral employment contracts.

Christianson v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., Division of Lone Star Industries, Inc. · filed 1982-06-28(3)

We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the action depended to a great extent on the existence of oral contracts of employment and that the Washington three-year statute of limitations for oral contracts should be followed. ... The district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs’ claim against their employer was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for oral contracts.

Section 4.16.080(3)'s three-year limit does not apply to an action on a written instrument that has been lost or destroyed.

Lutz v. Gatlin · filed 1979-01-16(3)

Contrary to the contentions of Mr. Gatlin, the record shows that this is not a case involving an oral contract, but rather a written contract which was subsequently lost or destroyed. ... In addition, since this action concerns a written instrument, the 6-year statute of limitations applies.

Section 4.16.080’s three-year limitation does not apply to claims founded on a written contract, even when the defendant characterizes them as arising from oral agreements or negligence.

Sandvik v. Alaska Packers Association, a Corporation · filed 1979-12-17

We reject the contention of APA that a three-year statute of limitations is applicable, Wash.Rev.Code § 4.16.-080. ... The action is clearly upon the written charter or liability express or implied arising out of the written charter, which is governed by the six-year statute of limitations.

The three-year limitations periods in subsections (1) and (3) do not govern this nuisance action; the court applied a two-year limitations period instead.

Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co. · filed 1952-10-02(1) and (3)

4. Is the two-year statute of limitations, Rem. Rev. Stat., § 165, RCW 4.16.130, or the three-year statute of limitations, Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), §§ 159(1) and 159(3), RCW 4.16.080 (1) and (3), applicable? ... Furthermore, we believe that the cement company is not estopped to assert a statute of limitations defense, and that the two-year statute of limitations, Rem. Rev. Stat., § 165, supra, is applicable.

Section 4.16.080 does not govern the limitations period for support obligations in a paternity action under chapter 26.26 RCW.

State Ex Rel. O'Brien v. Cooperrider · filed 1994-12-14

Finally, Mr. Cooperrider’s reliance on RCW 4.16.080 is foreclosed by RCW 4.16.360 which provides "[t]his chapter does not limit the time in which an action for determination of paternity may be brought under chapter 26.26 RCW.” Since fixing support obligations is an integral part of a paternity determination (RCW 26.26.130(3)), it follows that RCW 4.16.080 does not control RCW 26.26.134.

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for wrongful-death actions, including an action for a child's death caused by medical malpractice.

Fast v. Kennewick Public Hospital District · filed 2015-06-02(2)

Instead, actions for wrongful death have long been held to be subject to the three-year limitations period provided by RCW 4.16.080(2) for “injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated.” ... A wrongful death claim, whether under RCW 4.20.010, the wrongful death provision applicable in Wills, or RCW 4.24.010, the provision that applies here, is not one to recover for physical injury to a plaintiff but to recover for a different type of loss. ... We agree with Division Two’s interpretation of the 1976 legislation as more narrowly focused. ... The trial court correctly applied the general tort statute of limitations to the Fasts’ claim under RCW 4.24.010.

For negligence actions, Washington law imposes a three-year statute of limitations, and continuing injuries may support recovery for injuries caused within the last three years.

City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co. · filed 2019-05-03

Seattle also argues that Monsanto has failed to plausibly allege that its injuries were caused by the City's activities. The statute of limitations for negligence actions is three years, RCW 4.16.080, but Monsanto began incurring its costs prior to that.19 See Ex. I, Dkt. #94-1 at 153 (Monsanto admitted that all the response costs it seeks to recover were incurred after December 20, 2000); see Ex. A, Dkt. 94-1 at 2 (the EPA Notice to Monsanto was issued on March 25, 2008). Seattle argues that it is implausible that Monsanto's injuries were caused by Seattle's activities if those injuries began accruing prior to the conduct complained of. Id. at 26-27; see Dkt. #95-1 at 38. However, Monsanto has alleged that its injuries are continuing. Countercl. at ¶¶ 220-21. It is therefore plausible that some of those injuries were caused by Seattle's conduct in the last three years. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

Section 4.16.080(1) requires actions alleging trespass on real property to be commenced within three years.

Darin And Lisa Chestnut, Respondent/cr-appellants V. Andrew Ko, Appellant/cr-respondent · filed 2025-05-19(1)

Under RCW 4.16.080(1), an action alleging trespass on real property “shall be commenced within three years.” ... Ko’s trespass claims are timely.

Section 4.16.080 provides three-year limitation periods for specified claims, including waste or trespass upon real property and injury to personal property, but does not include nuisance claims.

3pak LLC v. City of Seattle · filed 2026-05-05

Section 4.16.080 provides for a three-year statute of limitations for “waste or trespass upon real property,” “an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property,” “an action upon a contract or liability,” “an action for relief upon the ground of fraud,” “an action against a sheriff, coroner, or constable,” and “an action against an officer [for] failure to properly account for public funds.” The statute does not mention nuisance. The Businesses seek application of Section 4.16.080 by likening the nuisance at issue here to intentional trespass. That argument is unavailing.

Subsection (3)'s three-year period for an unwritten contract or liability claim begins on a resulting-trust claim when the trustee repudiates the trust and the beneficiary receives notice; subsection (4)'s three-year fraud period begins when the beneficiary discovers or should have discovered the fraudulent withholding.

Arneman v. Arneman · filed 1953-12-03(3), (4)

We believe that the applicable statute is RCW 4.16.080(3) [cf. Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), §159(3)], setting up a three-year .limitation for an action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any written instrument. ... But the statute of limitations begins to run on a resulting trust, not when such trust comes into being, but when the trustee repudiates the trust and notice of such repudiation is brought home to the beneficiary. ... We think that the three-year statute of limitations pertaining to actions for relief upon the ground of fraud (RCW 4.16.080(4), Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 159(4)) applies under the facts of this case. This statute would not begin to run until Herbert discovered, or should have discovered, that Arthur had received full compensation and was therefore fraudulently withholding the property. ... We therefore conclude that the cause of action based upon a constructive trust with regard to the tract in question is not barred by the statute of limitations.

For a tort claim based on aggravation of an existing disease by employment, the three-year limitations period begins on the last day of employment that caused the aggravation.

Riste v. General Electric Co. · filed 1955-11-03

The company contends that the applicable three-year statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.080 [cf. Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 159], has run against the cause of action, because the last X ray taken of appellant by the company, was on August 8, 1950. ... The dates of the X rays have no significance other than their bearing upon the company’s knowledge of-the existence of the tuberculosis. The physical exertion of appellant’s work caused the aggravation of his tuberculosis for which he is suing. The statute of limitations began to run upon the last day of his employment, which was well within three years of the filing of the original complaint. See Grant v. Fisher Flouring Mills Co., 181 Wash. 576, 44 P. (2d) 193.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year period for actions involving the taking, detention, or injury of personal property, and for a constructive trust the period does not begin until the trustee's repudiation is brought to the beneficiary's notice.

Brougham v. Swarva · filed 1983-02-22(2)

The second issue is whether Swarva's counterclaim is barred by the 3-year limitation period of RCW 4.16.080(2). ... The parties further agree that since the Broughams were constructive trustees of Swarva's silver coins, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the Broughams' conduct put her on notice that the trust had been repudiated. ... Thus, the trial court did not err by determining that Swarva's counterclaim was not barred by the 3-year statute of limitation period of RCW 4.16.080(2).

For an action based on an express or constructive trust, the three-year limitations period begins when the beneficiary discovers or should have discovered that the trustee terminated or repudiated the trust.

Goodman v. Goodman · filed 1995-12-21

The statute of limitations on an express trust action begins to run when the beneficiary of the trust discovers or should have discovered the trust has been terminated or repudiated by the trustee.

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period measured from accrual; civil-outrage and negligence claims accrue when the plaintiff knows the underlying misconduct, while malicious-prosecution claims accrue only after required post-conviction relief.

Simmers v. King County · filed 2022-08-22(2)

The R&R correctly explained that, since neither civil outrage nor negligence require Plaintiff to demonstrate post-conviction relief ... those claims accrued when Plaintiff became aware of the alleged police misconduct underlying them. ... As such, this Court adopts the R&R’s finding that the statute of limitation on those claims ran long before he filed suit in 2021.

The three-year limitation applies to actions for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for its specific recovery, and begins when the plaintiff first has the right to immediate possession or to sue.

Jones v. Jacobson · filed 1954-09-02(2)

“Within three years: ... (2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof . . . ” RCW 4.16.080. ... “When it came to rest on the land which is now owned by respondent, title of the true owner was reduced to a right of immediate possession or, as we previously pointed out, to a cause of action in the event immediate possession was denied. It was at that time that the cause of action accrued. Since the logging donkey was out of the possession of the true owner, he then became entitled to reduce it to possession or to sue for its recovery or value. This right accrued to him without any action upon the part of the landowner. The record supports the conclusion that the cause of action, upon which appellant sues, came into existence more than three years prior to the commencement of this action. It was not error for the trial court to dismiss the action for this reason.”

For a municipality's permanent damage to private property in the exercise of eminent-domain power, the three-year limitations period applies and runs from the first substantial damage.

Cheskov v. Port of Seattle · filed 1960-01-14

We need not consider the merits of this contention inasmuch as the court correctly found that the plaintiffs’ cause of action, if such cause ever existed, was barred by the three-year statute of limitations, the first substantial damage having occurred more than three years prior to the institution of this action. ... The three-year statute (RCW 4.16.080) was therefore held to be applicable. ... We conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs’ action against the Port of Seattle inasmuch as their cause of action, as revealed by the findings, is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(3) supplies a three-year statute of limitations that bars claims for property damage when the property was not actually appropriated but was merely damaged.

Ackerman v. Port of Seattle · filed 1960-01-14(3)

Admittedly, we have indicated that where property is not actually appropriated, but is merely damaged, the three-year statute of limitations (RCW 4.16.080(3)) might well be applicable. Papac v. Montesano (1956), 49 Wn. (2d) 484, 303 P. (2d) 654; Gillam v. Centralia (1942), 14 Wn. (2d) 523, 128 P. (2d) 661; Marshall v. Whatcom County (1927), 143 Wash. 506, 255 Pac. 654; Jacobs v. Seattle (1918), 100 Wash. 524, 171 Pac. 662. This court has never recognized the doctrine of acquisition of a prescriptive right to commit damage to property in the absence of an actual physical invasion of the property. Therefore, to prevent stale claims, a reasonable statute of limitations may be applied as to even a constitutional right, as was suggested in Kincaid v. Seattle (1913), 74 Wash. 617, 134 Pac. 504, 135 Pac. 820. The three-year statute of limitations suggested in the above-cited cases seems to us reasonable. Thus, we hold that, with respect to the appellants’ allegations of incidental damaging caused by airplanes warming up on the airport runways, the three-year statute of limitations constitutes a bar, accord Cheskov v. Port of Seattle (1960), infra, 416, 348 P. (2d) 673.

Section 4.16.080's three-year limitations period did not bar the claim because the actionable injury arose from the county's 1958–59 diversion project and the action was filed on December 22, 1959.

Buxel v. King County · filed 1962-08-23

The injury about which respondent complains occurred when the acts of the county caused the flow of waters across her property to increase to the extent that substantial damage resulted. Assuming that the three-year limitation period of RCW 4.16.080 is controlling (see ... Ackerman v. Port of Seattle ... (1960), 55 Wn. (2d) 400, 348 P. (2d) 664, 77 A. L. R. (2d) 1344; and ... Cheskov v. Port of Seattle ... (1960), 55 Wn. (2d) 416, 348 P. (2d) 673), the respondent, by commencing her action on December 22, 1959, has easily satisfied the most stringent limitation period arguably applicable. The trial court correctly determined that respondent’s claim was not barred by the statute of limitations.

The three-year fraud limitation applies only when fraud is the substantive cause of action, and it does not apply to an unfair-competition action seeking an injunction against future wrongful conduct when past damages are not sought.

Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grand Lodge v. Most Worshipful Universal Grand Lodge · filed 1963-04-25(4)

This court has been called upon to apply this statute many times, and we have consistently held that this subdivision embraces only “. . . suits by parties to contracts who are asking to be relieved from contracts that they were fraudulently induced to make, as where a deed has been fraudulently obtained, and suits of that character where fraud is the substantive cause of the action. ...” ... “The basis of this suit is unfair competition. The above quoted provision of RCW 4.16.080 (relating to the limitation of fraud actions) is not applicable. Furthermore, these actions are to enjoin further wrongful conduct, and damages for past injuries are not sought by respondents.”

Section 4.16.080(1) applies its three-year limitation period to an action for trespass involving an actual invasion of property, even when the damages also result from removal of lateral support.

Free Methodist Church Corp. v. Brown · filed 1965-04-29(1)

The contention is without merit. ... On the basis of the trial court’s findings, to which no error has been assigned, the trial court correctly applied the 3-year statute of limitations applicable to an action for trespass.

Section 4.16.080(1) requires an action for waste or trespass upon real property to be commenced within three years.

Zimmer v. Stephenson · filed 1965-06-17(1)

Under this test, plaintiff alleged an action for negligent trespass upon real property. ... For the reasons stated, we conclude this action should be governed by the 3-year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for a malpractice claim treated as negligence, running from the negligent breach rather than its later discovery or resulting damage.

Busk v. Flanders · filed 1970-04-27(2)

Regardless of whether the basis for the claimed malpractice is a breach of a contractual relationship so that the applicable statute of limitations is RCW 4.16.080 (3) as was determined by the trial court, or that the wrong complained of is negligence so that the statute to be applied is RCW 4.16.080(2), the cause of action is governed by a 3-year statute of limitations.

The three-year limitation period for a personal-injury action begins when the injury occurs and bars the action unless the defendant is estopped from asserting the limitation.

Gould v. Bird & Sons, Inc. · filed 1971-06-01

By the rule of the common law, appellant’s action for personal injury accrued when the plane crashed. ... The statute of limitations was properly applied as a bar in the second case, unless respondent is prevented from asserting it.

Section 4.16.080(3) gives three years to bring an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, and the period cannot begin without such conduct.

In Re Estate of Patton · filed 1972-02-28(3)

Appellants also contend that respondent’s challenge to the attempted gift of the Safeway stock is barred by the 3-year statute of limitations contained in RCW 4.16.080. In view of our holding that there was no completed gift either by creation of a joint tenancy or otherwise, this contention is without merit inasmuch as there was never any “taking, detaining, or injuring” of personal property from which the statute of limitations could run.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitation period on an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property or for another injury to a person's rights, and the court applied it to the action seeking recovery of the retained real-estate commission.

Philbrick v. Steve · filed 1954-09-28(2)

The action is governed by RCW 4.16.080, Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 159, which reads: ... “(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated; ...”

The three-year limitations period for injury to personal property or another's rights begins when the cause of action accrues, which occurs when the claimant knew or should have known of the right to sue.

Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co. · filed 1975-01-10(2)

Gazija’s cause of action did not accrue until he knew or should have known that he had a right to sue.

Section 4.16.080 gives a litigant three years to bring a tort action, running from the date of injury.

Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Company · filed 1975-06-26

The Washington statute, RCW 4.16.080, gives a litigant three years in which to prosecute his tort action, commencing on the date of injury.

Section 4.16.080(2) requires a personal-injury action to be brought within three years after the cause of action accrues, and the discovery rule does not extend that period for an intentional tort claim based on a memory repressed throughout the limitations period.

Tyson v. Tyson · filed 1986-10-30(2)

RCW 4.16.080(2) provides that, in general, an action for personal injury must be brought within 3 years of the time the cause of action accrued. ... Under a literal reading of the limitation statutes, the cause of action accrues when the alleged wrongful act occurs. ... We, therefore, hold that the discovery rule does not apply to an intentional tort claim where the plaintiff has blocked the incident from her conscious memory during the period of the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitation period on conversion and eloignment actions.

Michel v. Melgren · filed 1993-06-22

The claims of Michel and Solbrack against Rooses are based on conversion and eloignment. Both actions are subject to a 3-year limitation period. RCW 4.16.080. Since it is undisputed that the lawsuit against Rooses was commenced in December 1989, and Rooses purchased the hay between March 9, 1988, and November 9, 1988, these actions were timely commenced.

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitation period on an action for injury to a person or another's rights, and a later substitution of a defendant does not toll that period absent compliance with relation-back requirements.

Iwai v. State · filed 1994-12-06

Although decided before Sidis, Kiehn concluded the statute was not tolled in circumstances in which a named party was later substituted for a fictitious one. Instead, the plaintiff had to comply with the requirements of CR 15(c) for relation back of amendments. We hold the trial court correctly ruled WAM was added after expiration of the 3-year limitation period.

Section 4.16.080(2) requires a personal-injury action to be commenced within three years, including when the claim is brought against an insured decedent’s estate.

Young v. Estate of Snell · filed 1997-12-24(2)

In sum, we conclude that the Legislature, by making claims “subject to applicable statutes of limitation” intended that the three-year statute of limitation set forth in RCW 4.16.080(2) would apply in cases such as the instant.

Section 4.16.080(2)'s three-year limitation for personal-injury actions applies to claims against an insured tortfeasor's estate when the tortfeasor dies before the limitation period expires.

Young v. Estate of Snell · filed 1998-01-30(2)

In sum, we conclude that the Legislature, by making claims "subject to applicable statutes of limitation" intended that the three-year statute of limitation set forth in RCW 4.16.080(2) would apply in cases such as the instant.

Section 4.16.080(2) gives a plaintiff three years from the date of a personal injury to commence the action, including an action limited to recovery from a decedent’s liability insurance.

Wagg v. Estate of Dunham · filed 2001-04-24(2)

In a claim for personal injuries, a plaintiff has three years from the date of the alleged injury in which to commence the action. RCW 4.16.080(2). ... All of this had to be accomplished prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations on personal injury claims. Former RCW 11.40.011 (1989); Young v. Estate of Snell, 134 Wn.2d 267, 277-82, 948 P.2d 1291 (1997). ... It is undisputed that Mr. Wagg’s personal injury lawsuit was timely commenced. So long as that lawsuit is limited to damages covered by Mr. Dunham’s liability insurance, Mr. Wagg’s service of the creditor’s claim after filing the lawsuit in superior court does not bar litigation of the personal injury claim.

Section 4.16.080(2) gives a plaintiff three years from the alleged injury to commence a personal-injury action, and the court treated Wagg's action as timely under that period.

Wagg v. Estate of Dunham · filed 2001-06-26(2)

In a claim for personal injuries, a plaintiff has three years from the date of the alleged injury in which to commence the action. RCW 4.16.080(2). ... Here, Mr. Wagg filed his personal injury claim against Mr. Dunham's estate within the three years provided by RCW 4.16.080(2), and he effectuated service of the summons and complaint within the additional 90 days allowed by RCW 4.16.170. ... It is undisputed that Mr. Wagg's personal injury lawsuit was timely commenced. So long as that lawsuit is limited to damages covered by Mr. Dunham's liability insurance, Mr. Wagg's service of the creditor's claim after filing the lawsuit in superior court does not bar litigation of the personal injury claim.

Subsection (2) makes personal injury claims subject to a three-year statute of limitations, which the court applied to an action seeking recovery solely from liability insurance proceeds.

Wagg v. Estate of Dunham · filed 2002-03-28(2)

RCW 4.16.080(2) specifies that personal injury claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... Wagg filed his complaint within three years of the accident, tolling the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(2) gives personal-injury actions a three-year limitations period, measured for an adult from when the claimant knew or should have known the factual basis of the claim.

Petcu v. State · filed 2004-03-30(2)

Personal injury actions are governed by a three year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(2). Thus, a claim for negligent investigation must be brought within three years of the date the action accrues. For an adult, a cause of action accrues from the date a claimant knew or should have known the factual basis for the elements of the claim, including duty, breach, causation, and damages.[7]Allen v. State, 118 Wash.2d 753, 757-58, 826 P.2d 200 (1992).

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitation period on personal injury actions, running from when the factual basis of the claim arose.

Gausvik v. Abbey · filed 2005-01-25(2)

RCW 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitation period for personal injury actions. ... Thus, the factual basis for Gausvik’s claim arose in 1995, and the statute of limitations began to run at that time. Gausvik did not file his claim until May 2001. The three-year statute of limitations clearly bars his claim.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period, which had expired before Teller added APM Terminals as a defendant.

Teller v. APM Terminals Pacific, Ltd. · filed 2006-08-22(2)

He did not file his original complaint until three to four weeks before the three-year statute of limitations expired. See RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(2)'s three-year limitations period for challenging an execution protocol runs based on the protocol's current form, so amendments in 2007, 2008, and 2010 did not bar the 2008 challenge.

Brown v. Vail · filed 2010-07-29(2)

Washington law imposes a catch-all, three-year statute of limitations for “injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated.” RCW 4.16.080(2). ... The trial court properly rejected the Department’s argument. The Appellants’ challenge to the method of execution used in Washington State turns mainly on whether the Department’s lethal injection protocol satisfies state and federal statutory and common law requirements. To make such a determination, the protocol itself must be analyzed in its most current form. The three-year statute of limitations to file a claim challenging an execution protocol amended in 2007, again in 2008, and again in 2010, did not run by the time the Appellants filed this lawsuit in 2008. ... We hold that the Appellants’ challenge to the protocol is not time barred.

Section 4.16.080(2) requires discrimination claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination to be brought within three years as personal injury actions.

Loeffelholz v. University of Washington · filed 2011-06-27(2)

The WLAD does not contain its own limitations period. Rather, discrimination claims must be brought within three years under the general three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(2) gives discrimination claims without their own limitations period a three-year limitations period as personal injury actions.

Loefpelholz v. University of Washington · filed 2011-06-27(2)

The WLAD does not contain its own limitations period. Rather, discrimination claims must be brought within three years under the general three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(2) gives plaintiffs three years to commence a personal injury action, and claims based on events before the limitations period began are barred.

Davis v. Clark County · filed 2013-08-20(2)

Under RCW 4.16.080(2), Plaintiffs have three years to “commence” a personal injury action such as this one. ... Plaintiffs were sentenced in 1993 and did not bring this case until August 25, 2012. Dkt. 1. The statute of limitations bars all claims based on events occurring before August 25, 2009.

Subsection (2) imposes a three-year limitations period on personal injury actions.

Deggs v. Asbestos Corporation Limited · filed 2015-06-22(2)

The statute of limitations for a personal injury action in Washington is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2). ... To the extent there were any remaining causes of action Sundberg could have brought against ACL, like any potential personal injury claims against AstenJohnson, Ingersoll-Rand, and CBS, they would have been barred by the three year statute of limitations. See RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(2) requires an action for conversion to be commenced within three years.

Mww Pllc v. Smith · filed 2013-03-18(2)

Under RCW 4.16.080(2), the statute of limitations to bring a suit for conversion is three years.

Section 4.16.080(2) sets a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

English v. State Of Washington, Dept Of Corrections · filed 2017-06-06(2)

The statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Washington is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2). ... English served Buss with the summons and complaint nearly four years and four months after English sustained injury. And because English failed to meet the requirements under CR 15(c) for his amended complaint to relate back to the original complaint, English’s claim against Buss was outside the statute of limitations period. Accordingly Judge Murphy’s grant of summary judgment on the basis that the statute of limitations barred English’s claim was appropriate.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Mora v. Green River College · filed 2017-06-12(2)

The analogous state law is an action for personal injury. Id. The Washington statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(2) requires WLAD claims to be brought within three years under the general statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Tanya Nozawa, V State Of Wa Dept Of Corrections · filed 2017-07-11(2)

WLAD claims must be brought within three years under the general statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Antonius, 153 Wn.2d at 261-62; RCW 4.16.080(2). Nozawa filed her original complaint on June 27, 2014.20 The requirement to file a tort claim before filing a complaint against a state agency tolls, and therefore extends, the three-year statute of limitations by 60 days. Former RCW 4.92.110 (2009); Castro v. Stanwood Sch. Dist. No. 401, 151 Wn.2d 221, 225-26, 86 P.2d 1166 (2004). Thus, the trial court properly dismissed any claims based on acts that occurred before April 28, 2011.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions for taking or injuring personal property.

Kayongo v. Dv Properties · filed 2015-09-14(2)

To the extent that Kayongo was asserting that DV Properties breached an implied contract or seized her personal property, the statute of limitations for these claims is three years.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitation period on negligence and trespass to personal property claims.

State Of Washington v. Lynch · filed 2018-06-25(2)

The statutory limitation period applicable to both an action for negligence and an action for trespass upon personal property is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2); Woods View II, LLC v. Kitsap County, 188 Wn. App. 1,20, 352 P.3d 807(2015)(negligence); Hudson v. Condon, 101 Wn. App. 866, 872-73,6 P.3d 615(2000)(conversion).

Section 4.16.080 requires personal-injury plaintiffs to commence their actions within three years after the injury.

Sisley v. Kipp · filed 2019-03-11

The statute of limitations requires plaintiffs to commence personal injury actions within three years from the date of injury. RCW 4.16.080. ... Here, Sisley filed the complaint on July 10, 2017. He needed to properly serve Kipp by October 8, 2017 for commencement to be complete. ... We conclude that the trial court properly dismissed Sisley's claim because he did not properly serve Kipp within the statute of limitations.

The three-year personal-property limitations period in subsection (2) does not govern a statutory security-deposit claim when the specific two-year statute applies.

Silver v. Rudeen Management Co. · filed 2019-10-01(2) (3)

We agree with the trial court that the two-year period applied.

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims by incorporating Washington’s limitations period for personal-injury actions.

LaGroue v. State of Washington · filed 2020-03-18(2)

Federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations governing personal injury actions to claims brought under § 1983. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279–80 (1985). Thus, the applicable limitations period for Plaintiff’s claims is three years. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2). ... These events occurred over 26 years ago. (Id.) Thus, it is clear that these claims are well beyond the applicable three-year statute of limitations period. See Wash. Rev. Code. § 4.16.080(2). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Section 4.16.080(2) gives negligence actions for personal injuries a three-year limitation period.

Williams v. Mccandlis · filed 2020-06-08(2)

Moreover, it was not Williams’s failure to serve McCandlis within the statute of limitations that necessitates dismissal of her complaint—it was her failure to serve process within the applicable statutory limitation period, as provided in RCW 4.16.080(2), and the applicable 90-day tolling period, as provided in RCW 4.16.170.

Section 4.16.080(2) gives a three-year limitations period for actions to take, detain, or injure personal property, including replevin, running from the wrongful detention rather than a loan default.

Gravity Segregation, Llc v. Reeves · filed 2021-02-23(2)

The statute of limitations for “an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated” is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2). This includes replevin. ... But in a replevin action, the act that begins the tolling of the statute of limitations is the wrongful detainment of the property by someone who is not the legal owner of the property. ... Thus, the wrongful detainment of the November 2006 Note occurred in 2016. Gravity moved to amend the complaint to add the claim of replevin two years later in 2018. Under these circumstances, the three-year statute of limitations had not expired, and Reeves’ statute of limitations claim lacks merit.

Section 4.16.080(1) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Carter v. University of Washington School of Dentistry · filed 2021-03-26(1)

Because Title II does not specify a time limit for bringing an action, courts look to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3; see also Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 871 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not specify a statute of limitations, courts borrow the statute of limitations for state-law personal injury claims). Washington’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims is three years. See RCW 4.16.080(1). Here, the actions that form the basis of Mr. Carter’s claims date from March and November 2017—more than three years before the March 24, 2021 filing date of his complaint. (See Compl. at 1, 3.) As a result, Mr. Carter’s Title II claims based on Defendants’ 2017 conduct are barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on a tenant’s action to recover a security deposit as personal property.

Silver v. Rudeen Mgmt. Co., Inc. · filed 2021-04-22(2)

We hold that a tenant’s action under RCW 59.18.280 is an action to recover the tenant’s personal property—the security deposit—and is subject to the three-year statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.080(2). Therefore, the tenant’s complaint was timely, and the trial court erred in dismissing it.

Section 4.16.080 supplies a three-year limitations period for Washington personal-injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims and can bar a claim accruing more than three years before filing.

Schnitzer West, Llc & Puyallup 5th Ave, Llc, V. City Of Puyallup · filed 2021-10-12

Because there is no statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, the appropriate limitation period for a § 1983 action is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Southwick v. Seattle Police Officer John Doe #s 1-5, 145 Wn. App. 292, 297, 186 P.3d 1089 (2008). The statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Washington is three years. Id.; RCW 4.16.080. ... We conclude that Schnitzer’s § 1983/equal protection cause of action accrued in May 2014 when the city council enacted Ordinance 3069. ... Schnitzer’s § 1983 claim was filed in April 2020, long after the statute of limitations had expired. Therefore, we hold that the statute of limitations bars Schnitzer’s § 1983 claim.

Section 4.16.080 provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, and the court applied that period to claims against defendants added after it expired when tolling and relation back did not apply.

Engelstein v. United States Department of Agriculture · filed 2022-01-10

Both parties assert that Washington’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies. ... Here, the Court concludes as a matter of law that the statute of limitations was not tolled because Engelstein has not met the second Powers prong. ... Since Engelstein amended his complaint to name Active and Oldcastle as defendants after the three-year statute of limitations had expired, and because neither tolling nor relation back apply, the Court GRANTS Active’s Motion for Summary Judgment, docket no. 54, and Oldcastle’s Response and Joinder, docket no. 60.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims in Washington.

Zayas v. Walton · filed 2022-05-10(2)

All of Plaintiff’s claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. First, while 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, the Court looks to the limitations period for an analogous state cause of action. See Cty. Of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State, 470 U.S. 226, 240 (1985). Here, the Court looks to the statute of limitations period for personal injury cases, which in Washington is three years. Joshua v. Newell, 871 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing RCW 4.16.080(2)); Milligan v. Thompson, 90 Wn. App. 586, 591–92 (1998).

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitation period on personal-injury actions, running from the date of injury or damage.

Beatriz Houlihan, V. Monroe · filed 2022-07-19(2)

The three-year statute of limitations applies to Houlihan’s personal injury action. RCW 4.16.080(2). The statute of limitations began to run on the date Houlihan suffered the injury or damage; in this instance, February 26, 2018, the date of the accident.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for injuries to personal property or to a person or another’s rights, including negligence and malicious prosecution, and serves as the borrowed three-year period for § 1983 claims.

Chang v. Vanderwielen · filed 2022-12-12(2)

Plaintiff’s state law claims are subject to two- or three-year statutes of limitations. See RCW 4.16.100(1) (two-year limitations period for assault, assault and battery, or false imprisonment); Heckart v. City of Yakima, 42 Wn.App 38, 39, 708 P.2d 407 (1985) (RCW 4.16.100(1) applies to false arrest); and RCW 4.16.080(2) (three-year limitations period for injury to personal property or any other injury to the person or rights of another, which would include negligence and malicious prosecution). Her § 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations to § 1983 claims); RCW § 4.16.080(2); RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 4.16.080(2) requires a personal injury action to be commenced within three years.

Michael Wall, V. Grover · filed 2023-04-24(2)

In Washington, personal injury actions must be commenced within three years. RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(2) provides the three-year Washington limitation period applied to § 1982 and § 1983 claims.

King v. State of Washington · filed 2024-01-19(2)

For § 1983 claims, federal courts will apply the forum state’s limitation period for tort actions. ... Under Washington law, this period is three years. ... Section 1982 follows a similar three-year statute of limitation structure based on RCW 4.16.080(2). ... Plaintiff’s §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983 claims are dismissed as time-barred and the §§ 1981 and 1983 claims are also non-justiciable under the Eleventh Amendment against both the State of Washington and the Washington State Department of Licensing.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, which Washington courts apply to § 1983 claims.

Ferguson v. Thompson · filed 2024-05-17(2)

First, Plaintiffs allege a Section 1983 claim against the City of Marysville, J. Thompson, and the “Doe” officers, but the statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is three years. Dunn v. City of Seattle, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (“Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, the court applies Washington’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions . . . to [Plaintiff’s] Section 1983 claims”) (citing RCW 4.16.080(2) (three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims). Thus, Plaintiffs’ 1983 claim was filed two and a half months too late.

Section 4.16.080(2) requires an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property to be commenced within three years.

Hudson v. King County Housing Authority · filed 2025-01-10(2)

As to the statute of limitations relevant to this claim, in Washington, “[a]n action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property” must be commenced “within three years.” RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on conversion claims under Washington law.

Castro v. Talcott Resolution Life Insurance Company · filed 2025-05-09(2)

Conversion claims under Washington law, however, are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Crisman v. Crisman, 931 P.2d 163, 165 (1997) (citing RCW 4.16.080(2)). As a result, Mr. Castro’s conversion claim against Ms. Ktistakis is time-barred as a matter of law.

Subsection (2) provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, which applies in Washington to § 1983 claims.

Shields v. Neah Bay Tribal Police · filed 2025-07-15(2)

Washington’s statute of limitations for personal injury suits is three years. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2). Therefore, in Washington, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the appropriate statute of limitations in a § 1983 action is the three-year limitation of Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2).” ... Here, Plaintiff filed his first proposed complaint over four years after the incidents at issue occurred. ... However, Plaintiff waited until February 12, 2025, to file his lawsuit alleging civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As Plaintiff clearly knew about the alleged violations in 2021 when they occurred, his complaint is untimely and barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080 requires personal-injury actions to be commenced within three years.

Johnson v. Snohomish County · filed 2025-07-28

Personal injury claims in Washington are subject to a three year statute of limitations. See RCW 4.16.080 (requiring personal injury actions to be “commenced within three years”).

Section 4.16.080(2) requires actions to recover personal property to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Liao Hua, V. Gang Yuan · filed 2026-06-08(2)

But actions for the recovery of personal property must be commenced within three years of the time the cause of action accrued. RCW 4.16.080(2); Mohandessi v. Urban Venture LLC, 13 Wn. App. 2d 691, 692, 468 P.3d 622 (2020).

Subsection (2) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 and Bivens claims arising in Washington, accruing when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury.

Hughes Anderson Bagley, Jr. v. Cmc Real Estate Corporation, AKA Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Donald E. Mitchell Norman W. Prins · filed 1991-01-22(2)

We have held that the appropriate statute of limitations in a § 1983 action is the three-year limitation of Wash.Rev.Code § 4.16.080(2). ... In view of all of this precedent, we make explicit the implicit ruling of Young, and hold that Bagley’s § 1983 and Bivens actions accrued for statute of limitations purposes when he first learned of the injury giving rise to his claims, and not at the completion of his habeas corpus proceeding.

Section 4.16.080(2) establishes a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Howland v. Sgt. Wallingford Tana Wood Carol Noonan Custody Unit Supervisor Snively · filed 1996-08-19(2)

Washington Revised Code § 4.16.080(2) sets the statute of limitations for personal injury actions at three years. ... After a de novo review, see Harding v. Galceran, 889 F.2d 906, 907 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1082 (1991), we conclude that the district court did not err by finding that Howland's allegations concerning excessive noise in unit seven of the prison were barred by Washington's statute of limitations because Howland filed his complaint more than three years after the alleged civil rights violation, see Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091 (1992).

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for section 1983 claims because it is Washington's general personal-injury statute of limitations.

Cloud By and Through Cloud v. Summers · filed 1997-03-27(2)

The statute of limitations applicable to an actions filed under Section 1983 is the general personal injury statute of limitations in the state in which the claims are brought, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985)--in this case, the three-year statute of limitations established in Wash.Rev.Code § 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitation period on negligence and personal-injury causes of action.

Gausvik v. Perez · filed 2004-11-18(2)

Gausvik’s causes of action for false arrest and false imprisonment are time barred, Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.100(1) (two-year limitation period), as are his causes of action for negligence and personal injury, Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080(2) (three-year limitation period).

The three-year limitations in § 4.16.080(1) and (2) do not apply to these consequential fluorine-damage claims; the two-year residual limitation in § 4.16.130 applies instead.

Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Company · filed 1954-10-19(1) and (2)

By appropriate motion prior to settlement of the pretrial orders, the applicable period of limitation of action under Washington law was presented, argued at length and determined by informal memorandum decision. The Washington statute RCW 4.16.080 provides a three-year limitation for: ... RCW 4.16.130 provides a two-year limitation for actions not otherwise covered in specific statutes of limitation. ... “When RCW 4.16.080 (Rem. § 159) and RCW 4.16.130 (Rem. § 165) are considered in the light of the long settled and frequentlj^applied interpretation thereof by the Washington State Supreme Court there is no room for doubt that neither subsection (1) nor subsection (2) of RCW 4.16.080 (Rem. § 159) is applicable to the above cases. I am fully satisfied that under the allegations in the pleadings of the above cases the two-year limitation provided for under RCW 4.16.130 (Rem. § 165) must be applied to the claims for damages both to real and personal property.”

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitations period for property-damage claims, accruing when the plaintiff knows or should know all essential elements of the cause of action.

Haymaker v. United States · filed 1992-10-23

We affirm the order dismissing each of the Haymakers' claims as time-barred because we conclude, after construing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, that their action accrued more than two years prior to the Haymakers' filing a claim with the Bureau of Reclamation on July 18, 1988, and more than three years prior to their filing an action against the SCBID and FCCD on August 17, 1989. ... The standard for accrual is similar under Washington law. Under the applicable Washington statutes, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows, or with the exercise of due diligence, should know all of the essential elements of a cause of action, including duty, breach, and causation. ... See RCW 4.16.080 (imposing a three-year statute of limitations for property damage claims.)

Section 4.16.080(1) applies retrospectively to a continuing-trespass claim, allowing recovery for damages sustained within three years before filing and through trial, but not prospective damages.

Woldson v. Woodhead · filed 2006-12-21(1)

With respect to the tort of continuing trespass, we hold: first, the statute of limitations does not run from the date the tort begins; it is applied retrospectively to allow recovery for damages sustained within three years of filing. Second, damages are recoverable from three years before filing until the trespass is abated or, if not abated, until the time of trial. Third, prospective damages are not allowed; if the trespass continues past trial, successive suits may be brought to remedy such injuries until the trespass ceases.

Section 4.16.080(2) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions and actions for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property.

Walls v. Pierce County Sheriff'S Dept. · filed 2009-07-30(2)

The district court properly entered summary judgment because Walls filed his complaint more than three years after his claims accrued. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-80, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (holding that the limitations period for section 1983 claims is determined by the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Wash. Rev.Code § 4.16.080(2) (setting at three years the statute of limitations for personal injury actions and actions for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property).

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitations period on a cause of action for a tortious invasion of property, and a claim based on the invasion is barred when brought after that period.

Papac v. City of Montesano · filed 1956-11-15

Whether the placing of the fill be regarded as a tortious invasion (in which case the three-year statute would apply, under the provisions of Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 159 [cf. RCW 4.16.080]) or a taking or damaging under the power of eminent domain, any cause of action based thereon is long since barred.

Section 4.16.080's three-year limitations period applies to an action to recover pension amounts unlawfully withheld when the pension board is acting as statutory city officials rather than as an express trustee.

Martin v. City of Spokane · filed 1959-11-12

An examination of these two sections makes it clear that the duties of the board of trustees are strictly statutory, acting in the capacity of officials of the city to carry out their duties as directed by the statute, in behalf of the city, with no relation of trust to the fund. The city has absolute control over the fund to the extent of using the surplus for general city purposes, not inconsistent with the interests of the members of the police department. Therefore, we hold that no express trust relationship exists, as contended by the appellant, and the three-year statute of limitations must apply.

Section 4.16.080 gives negligence actions a three-year limitations period, and adding or substituting a defendant after that period does not relate the claim back to the original filing.

Hill v. Withers · filed 1960-01-14

This being a negligence action, the three-year statute of limitations applies. RCW 4.16.080. ... The substitution of one defendant for another does not relate back to the commencement of the action. ... The joining of Orin Withers as an additional defendant by the amended complaint, on February 14, 1958, does not change the result. The same rule applies to both the substitution and the addition of parties defendant. ... In conclusion, we hold that, as to Ida Mae Withers, an action was commenced within the time allowed by law because the original complaint charging her with the commission of tortious acts was filed within three years from the date of her alleged negligence, and she was personally served with summons and complaint within ninety days after such filing. As to Orin W. Withers, no such complaint was timely filed or service had.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for an action based on a direct injury to another person's rights, including deprivation of a statutory preferential right to employment.

State Ex Rel. Bond v. State · filed 1962-02-01(2)

When a legally protected interest or right is invaded or violated such action constitutes an injury thereto within the purview of RCW 4.16.080(2), the three-year statute of limitations hereinbefore quoted.

Section 4.16.080(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on an action seeking relief based on fraud or constructive trust.

Peste v. Peste · filed 1969-09-23(4)

It is our view that whether the relief here sought was grounded upon fraud or constructive trust, it would be subject to the 3-year statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080's three-year limitations period bars an alienation-of-affection action when the parent knew of the injury more than three years before filing.

Strode v. Gleason · filed 1973-05-21

The alienation of the affections of one family member for another may be a gradual process, and it cannot be said to have occurred until some overt act takes place which shows a want of affection. An action for alienation of affection accrues when the loss of affection is sustained. ... In our opinion, the right of action in a cause of this nature should accrue when the parent is aware that the hurt is suffered ... Here, in either event, the period has run. This action was filed on May 26, 1969, 3 years alter juvenile court authorities filed a petition regarding the child. Prior to May 26, 1966, the overt acts of the alienated boy evidenced alienation of his affection for his mother. She was aware of the erosion of the affection of her son for her by his many belligerent acts which occurred over 3 years prior to the initiation of this action. ... See RCW 4.16.080. The period preceding the cutoff date, 3 years before the filing of the action, was replete with acts which put the plaintiff on notice of her harm. The action was barred by the statute of limitations.

The three-year limitations period under subsections (2) and (3) is subject to the discovery rule for stockbroker malpractice and may be tolled by a continuing relationship until termination.

Hermann v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. · filed 1977-05-23(2) and (3)

We see no sound reason for excluding a stockbroker or account executive from the application of the discovery rule in the same manner in which the rule has been applied as a matter of judicial policy to other actions for professional malpractice. It was therefore error to grant defendants' pretrial motion in limine, excluding proof of all alleged wrongdoing prior to September 5, 1970. The determination of the exact date that the plaintiffs discovered the defendants' wrongdoing, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered such wrongdoing, is a factual question for determination by the jury and, likewise, if there is evidence to support plaintiffs' claim that the relationship was a continuing one so that the statute is tolled until the relationship is terminated, is also a factual question to be submitted to the jury on proper instructions.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for actions involving a direct invasion of a legally protected personal or property right, including a discrimination claim under RCW 49.60.

Lewis v. Lockheed Shipbuilding & Construction Co. · filed 1984-01-30(2)

RCW 4.16.080(2) applies only to certain direct invasions of a plaintiffs person or property rights. ... But where the defendant directly invades a legally protected interest of the plaintiff, the 3-year statute applies. ... Assuming arguendo that Lockheed violated RCW 49.60 in firing Lewis, it can hardly be maintained that its action was not a direct invasion of a valuable right or privilege enjoyed by Lewis. ... Thus, even if the arguments favoring application of the 2- and 3-year statutes were otherwise fairly equal, applying the 3-year statute better supports the liberal policies underlying the Law Against Discrimination.

Subsection (2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for employment discrimination actions brought under Washington state statutes.

de Lisle v. FMC Corp. · filed 1985-08-26(2)

This determination was incorrect; the 3-year statute of limitations (RCW 4.16.080(2)) applies to employment discrimination actions brought under the state statutes.

Section 4.16.080(2) requires an action for injury to a person or another’s rights to be filed within three years.

Del Guzzi Constr. Co. v. Global Northwest Ltd., Inc. · filed 1986-05-22(2)

Global was required by RCW 4.16.080(2) to have filed its complaint by December 1979, 3 years from the date of discovery. However, Global filed its complaint on April 23, 1980, well beyond the 3-year statute of limitation.

Section 4.16.080's three-year limitations period governs public-pension-rights claims when the pension statute does not qualify as a written contract subject to the six-year limitations period.

Noah v. State · filed 1989-06-22

At issue is which statute of limitations applies to plaintiffs' claims for alleged breach of their state employee pension rights. Plaintiffs contend that the 6-year statute, RCW 4.16.040(1), controls; the trial court dismissed the action as barred by the 3-year statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.080. We affirm. ... We hold that RCW 41.40 is not a contract in writing, and the 6-year statute of limitations applicable to contracts in writing, RCW 4.16.040(1), does not apply to plaintiffs' claims that their public pension rights were breached by enactment of SSB 5007. ... The trial court correctly dismissed this case as time-barred.

Section 4.16.080(3) requires an attorney-malpractice action to be commenced within three years, and the period begins when an adverse trial judgment puts the client on notice of possible malpractice.

Richardson v. Denend · filed 1990-08-27(3)

Pursuant to RCW 4.16.080(3), an action for attorney malpractice must be commenced within 3 years. ... We adopt the reasoning of the above courts and hold, as a matter of law, that upon entry of an adverse judgment at trial a client is charged with knowledge, or at least is put on notice, that his or her attorney may have committed malpractice in connection with the representation.

Section 4.16.080(2) imposes a three-year limitations period for injury to a person or another’s rights, and pursuing contractual grievance remedies does not toll that period for an independent discrimination claim.

Morales v. Westinghouse Hanford Co. · filed 1994-03-15(2)

Mr. Morales contends the trial court erred in concluding his claim of racial discrimination under RCW 49.60 was barred by the statute of limitations. He asserts the triggering date for the 3-year limitation period imposed by RCW 4.16.080 is the date Westinghouse denied his grievance. ... We agree with the trial court that Mr. Morales was not required to exhaust his CBA remedies before proceeding with this suit, and the statute of limitations was therefore not tolled while he did so.

Section 4.16.080 requires tort actions to be commenced within three years after accrual and limits claims for damages outside that period, but it does not bar evidence of earlier acts that caused damages within the limitations period.

Pepper v. J.J. Welcome Construction Co. · filed 1994-05-06

An action in tort must be commenced within 3 years of the accrual of the cause of action. RCW 4.16.080. ... The 3-year, statute of limitations limits the filing of claims, not the introduction of evidence of acts giving rise to those claims. RCW 4.16.080. Thus, where the claim is not barred by the statute of limitations, it is proper for a court to admit evidence of acts which caused damage.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for common-law torts not specifically covered by another limitations statute.

City of Seattle v. Blume · filed 1997-11-13(2)

Section 4.16.080(2) of the Revised Code of Washington establishes the limitations period for common law torts not specifically enumerated in other limitations sections. See Stenberg, 104 Wash.2d 710, 709 P.2d 793. Intentional interference with a business expectancy is such a common law tort, see Calbom v. Knudtzon, 65 Wash.2d 157, 161, 396 P.2d 148 (1964), and it is not specifically addressed by any other limitations section. As such, the limitations period for a cause of action for tortious interference is three years, as specified in RCW 4.16.080(2), and the Blumes' claim was filed within the allowable time period.

Subsection (2) provides a three-year limitations period for Washington Law Against Discrimination and personal-injury claims, and the period is not tolled while a plaintiff pursues administrative remedies.

Milligan v. Thompson · filed 1998-03-27(2)

The statute of limitations for actions arising under Washington’s Law Against Discrimination, allegations I and II, is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2).

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitations period on oral-contract and fraud actions, including when extrinsic evidence is needed to establish a material term of a partly oral contract.

Browning v. Howerton · filed 1998-09-18(3), (4)

A three-year limitation period applies to oral contracts. RCW 4.16.080(3). ... If resort to parol evidence is necessary to establish any material element, the contract is partly oral and the three-year statute of limitations applies. ... Because parol evidence becomes less reliable with the passage of time, where a party seeks to use extrinsic evidence to establish a material term, the shorter three-year statute of limitations applies. ... A three-year statute of limitations also applies to actions grounded in fraud. RCW 4.16.080(4).

Section 4.16.080(1) imposes a three-year limitations period for property-damage claims, measured from accrual, while a continuing trespass permits recovery for damages occurring within the three years before suit.

Fradkin v. Northshore Utility District · filed 1999-06-14(1)

Under RCW 4.16.080(1), Fradkin was required to bring his permissive waste claim within three years of the date of accrual. ... A claim for trespass must be brought within three years of the injury. ... In a case of continuing trespass, “suit for damages may be brought for any damages not recovered previously and occurring within the 3-year period preceding suit.” ... If the jury finds a continuing trespass, Fradkin is not time-barred from recovering damages occurring after May 12, 1994.

Section 4.16.080(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions based on an unwritten implied contract or liability, while subsection (2) does not govern WMWA claims.

Seattle Professional Engineering Employees Ass'n v. Boeing Co. · filed 2000-01-27(2) and (3)

We hold the three-year statute of limitations of RCW 4.16.080(3) applies to WMWA claims and take this occasion to overrule Cannon. Cannon not only failed to address the rights vindication language of RCW 4.16.080(2), it also failed to address the rationale we articulate here. Boeing did not contract with the employees to pay for orientation; therefore, the six-year statute of limitations set forth in RCW 4.16.040(1) for written contracts does not apply. Moreover, RCW 4.16.080(2), the statute the employees contend applies, has generally been applied to torts and tort-like claims, not labor and employment claims.

Claims under Washington's Minimum Wage Act are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Hisle v. Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp. · filed 2002-09-16(3)

This action seeks recovery under the MWA, and is, therefore, subject to the three-year statute of limitations provided under RCW 4.16.080(3). Seattle Professional Engineering, 139 Wash.2d at 837, 991 P.2d 1126 (overruling Cannon v. Miller, 22 Wash.2d 227, 155 P.2d 500 (1945), which had held that such claims are subject to the two-year statute of limitations).

Section 4.16.080(1) imposes a three-year limitations period on trespass claims, limiting recovery for a continuing trespass to damages incurred within the three years before suit.

City of Moses Lake v. United States · filed 2006-05-04(1)

Under Washington law, Moses Lake’s recovery for a continuing trespass is limited to damages incurred within three years preceding the filing of suit. ... Thus, in this case, the limitations period for any continuing trespass by Boeing and Lockheed is from October 18, 2001 to October 18, 2004.

RCW 4.16.080(3) provides a three-year limitations period for oral contracts; in a latent-defect construction case, the discovery rule may delay accrual, so the claim may be discovered more than three years but less than six years after substantial completion.

1000 Virginia Ltd. Partnership v. Vertecs Corp. · filed 2006-11-15(3)

It may be that most construction contracts are written contracts with a six-year statute of limitations, see RCW 4.16.040(1), but parties can enter an oral contract for new construction, remodel, or repair. If they do so, the discovery rule may apply because the statute of limitations for an oral contract is three years. RCW 4.16.080(3). A latent defect could be discovered more than three years but less than six years after substantial completion.

Section 4.16.080 provides a three-year limitations period for trespass, negligence, conversion, tortious interference, nuisance, and related property-injury claims.

Indian v. Tacoma Public Utilities · filed 2005-06-03

The statutes of limitations for trespass, negligence, conversion, tortious interference, nuisance and actions under Washington Revised Code section 4.24.630 are three years.

Subsection (2) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions filed in Washington.

John Corrigan, Sr. v. D. Dale · filed 2010-10-27(2)

The district court properly dismissed Corrigan’s claims because his action was filed after the applicable three-year statute of limitations had expired. See Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action filed in Washington “is the three-year limitation of Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2)”).

Subsection (4) provides a three-year limitations period for fraud-based misrepresentation claims, accruing when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the misrepresentation, subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances.

Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc. · filed 2011-11-08(4)

In addition, causes of action for misrepresentation must be brought within three years and accrue when the aggrieved party has discovered the facts constituting misrepresentation. See RCW 4.16.080(4) (three-year statute of limitations for fraud); Young v. Savidge, 155 WashApp. 806, 230 P.3d 222, 230 (Wash.Ct.App.2010) (applying statute of limitations from RCW 4.16.080(4) to claims for misrepresentation).

Subsection (2) gives wrongful-discharge tort claims a three-year limitations period, accruing for constructive discharge when the employee gives notice of resignation or on the last day actually worked.

Barnett v. Sequim Valley Ranch, LLC · filed 2013-03-05(2)

A cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is a tort claim and is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... Last, the Douchette court itself indicates that the statute of limitations for a constructive discharge should begin accruing either (1) on the date the employee gives notice to her employer of her resignation or (2) on the last day the employee actually works. ... Whether we look to the day the employees gave notice of their termination (September 20, 2004) or their last day of work (September 18, 2004), the employees clearly filed their wrongful discharge claim on September 17, 2007, within three years of the statute of limitations.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for actions for injury to the person.

Rahman v. The Boeing Company · filed 2013-03-11(2)

WLAD does not contain its own limitation period; discrimination claims must be brought within three years under the general statute of limitations for personal injury actions. RCW 4.16.080(2); Antonius v. King County, 153 Wn.2d 256, 261-62, 103 P.3d 729 (2004).

For negligence and tortious interference, the three-year limitations period begins when every element of the claim, including actual loss or damage, is susceptible of proof.

Woods View II, LLC v. Kitsap County · filed 2015-04-14(2)

The statute of limitations for negligence and tortious interference is three years. RCW 4.16.080(2). The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has a right to seek recovery in the courts. Malnar v. Carlson, 128 Wn.2d 521, 529, 910 P.2d 455 (1996). That is, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until every element of an action is susceptible of proof, including the occurrence of actual loss or damage. Haslund v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn.2d 607, 619, 547 P.2d 1221 (1976); Mayer v. City of Seattle, 102 Wn. App. 66, 76, 10 P.3d 408 (2000), review denied, 142 Wn.2d 1029 (2001).

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for claims governed by the personal-property limitations provision.

Thorn v. Cromer · filed 2017-05-25(2)

The statute of limitations for bringing a CIR claim is the three year statute governing personal property. RCW 4.16.080(2). A party must establish that a CIR existed within three years of bringing suit.

Section 4.16.080 imposes a three-year limitations period on conversion, fiduciary-duty, fraud, and misrepresentation claims.

Rose v. Zimmerman Jr. · filed 2016-06-28(2)

A three-year statute of limitations applies to Sharon’s claims for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and misrepresentation. RCW 4.16.080.

Subsection (4) imposes a three-year limitations period on a fraud-based action to set aside a deed.

Mary Ho-mong Bach, App./cross-resp. v. Anh-duong Thi Ho, Resps./cross-apps. · filed 2018-09-04(4)

Bach contends that this is an action for fraud, which is subject to a three-year statute of limitation. ... We agree with Bach that the gravamen of the claim is fraud. Thus, the three-year statute of limitations applies.

Subsection (2) imposes a three-year limitations period on conversion and fraud claims, with accrual potentially governed by the discovery rule when the plaintiff reasonably should discover the essential facts.

David v. Smith · filed 2019-08-15(2)

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations, which is three years for both conversion and fraud. RCW 4.16.080(2), (4); Hudson v. Condon, 101 Wn. App. 866, 873 (2000). In many instances an action accrues “immediately when the wrongful act occurs, but in some circumstances where the plaintiff is unaware of harm sustained, a ‘literal application of the statute of limitations’ could ‘result in grave injustice.’” 1000 Virginia Ltd. P’ship v. Vertecs Corp., 158 Wn. 2d 566, 575 (2006), as corrected (Nov. 15, 2006) (quoting Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wn.2d 215, 220 (1975)). To avoid this injustice, courts have applied a discovery rule of accrual, under which the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or in the reasonable exercise of diligence should discover, the elements of the cause of action. Vertecs Corp., 158 Wn. 2d at 575-76. This does not mean that the action accrues when the plaintiff learns that he or she has a legal cause of action; rather, the action accrues when the plaintiff discovers the salient facts underlying the elements of the cause of action. Id. at 576.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for trade-name infringement claims and serves as the analogous period for Lanham Act trademark claims, but it does not govern CPA equitable-relief claims.

Clean Crawl, Inc. v. Crawl Space Cleaning Pros, Inc. · filed 2019-11-05(2)

The parties do not dispute and the Court agrees that the most analogous state statute of limitations for the trademark infringement claims is Washington’s three-year statute of limitations on claims for trade name infringement. ... The Court finds that though Lanham Act claims and trademark-based unfair competition claims are subject to congruous substantive analysis, the CPA’s own statute of limitations is the most appropriate statute of limitations to guide a laches analysis for equitable relief under the CPA.

Section 4.16.080(3) gives breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims a three-year limitations period, subject to the discovery and continuous-representation rules.

Connie Potter v. Gaffney · filed 2017-09-18(3)

The statute of limitations for a breach of fiduciary duty claim is three years.

Subsections (2) and (4) provide three-year limitations periods for conversion and fraud claims, with fraud accrual governed by discovery.

Sharon and Judy Hartzell v. Thomas · filed 2018-12-11(2) (4)

Conversion claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Subsection (2) requires abuse-of-process and negligence claims to be filed within three years after accrual.

Corrigan Sr. v. Grant County · filed 2019-11-26(2)

A plaintiff asserting abuse of process or negligence must bring suit within three years of when the cause of action accrued.

Section 4.16.080(2) is Washington’s catch-all three-year limitations period for causes of action not specifically covered by another limitations statute, and it applies to a parent’s claim for general injuries to a child.

Curtin v. City of East Wenatchee · filed 2020-02-06(2)

Washington’s statutory code contains a catch-all limitations provision. RCW 4.16.080(2). That provision applies when a cause of action is not specifically covered by another limitations statute. ... Given this statutory landscape, it is apparent the usual three-year statute of limitations period applies to a parent’s claim for general injuries to a child. Requiring parents, but not minor children, to abide by the general limitations period of RCW 4.16.080(2) is consistent with the objectives of the statutory limitations scheme.

Section 4.16.080(2) requires actions for injury to a person or another’s rights to be commenced within three years, generally running from when the cause of action accrues and the claimant has the right to seek judicial relief.

Shamim Mohandessi And Joseph Grace, Apps/cross-res. v. Urban Venture, Llc, Res/cross-apps. · filed 2020-06-29(2)

RCW 4.16.080(2) states that “an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated” shall be commenced within three years. The determination of whether the statute of limitations bars a plaintiff’s claim depends on when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued. ... As such, any challenge to the common expense liability allocation accrued at the time the residential units were sold in 2006. ... Because the statute of limitations accrued in 2006 with the recording of the master declaration and exhibit B, the trial court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims against the MA, Vulcan, and Urban Ventures arising out of the master declaration.

Section 4.16.080(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Washington because federal courts borrow the state’s general or residual personal-injury limitations period.

Salahud-Din v. Roberts · filed 2020-07-07(2)

Federal courts borrow statutes of limitation for § 1983 claims from state law, specifically the state’s “general or residual statute for personal injury actions.” Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989). In the state of Washington, RCW 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period. Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991). Because Plaintiff’s complaint raises claims regarding a 2008 judgment and sentence, the Court finds Plaintiff’s action should be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.

Subsection (2) provides a three-year limitations period for specified injuries to property, persons, or rights, and subsection (3) provides a three-year period for unwritten contract or liability claims; the court applied those periods to the privacy, emotional-distress, and unjust-enrichment claims.

Roush v. Akal Security Inc · filed 2020-10-09(2) (3)

The applicable statute of limitations for an invasion of privacy by appropriation claim is no longer than three years. See Emeson, 194 Wn. App. 617 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016); see also RCW § 4.16.080(2) (providing a three-year limitations period for actions “for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property . . . or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated”). ... A three-year statute of limitations applies to the claim under RCW § 4.16.080(2). Cox v. Oasis Physical Therapy, PLLC, 153 Wn. App. 176, 193 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). ... A three-year statute of limitations applies to an unjust enrichment claim. RCW § 4.16.080(3).

Subsection (2) imposes a three-year limitations period on specified noncontractual claims, and claims filed after that period are barred.

Abrego v. Garden City Group LLC · filed 2020-11-04(2)

Plaintiff’s remaining claims also suffer from the same fault; they all have statutes of limitations not exceeding three years. RCW 4.16.080(2); ... Schraum v. Riviera Cmty. Club, 104 Wash. App. 1043 at 7 (2001) (unpublished) (statute of limitations for negligent supervision is three years). Plaintiff was terminated May 2, 2017. She was required to bring suit no later than May 2, 2020.2 Because Plaintiff did not file suit in this matter until June 5, 2020, those claims are also barred.

Section 4.16.080(2) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in Washington because it is the state’s general or residual statute for personal injury actions.

Krier v. State of Washington · filed 2021-06-30(2)

While 42 U.S.C. §1983 contains no statute of limitations, federal (and state for that matter) courts instead “borrow “§1983 limitations periods from analogous state law, specifically, the state’s “general or residual statute for personal injury actions.” Owens v Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989). In Washington, that statute is RCW 4.16.080(2), which is a three-year limitations period. Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991). Therefore, in this District, the limitations period for a § 1983 claim is three years.