Statute Annotations › Texas › Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001

Termination of the parent-child relationship: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Texas
Case notes
3,826
Cited in passing
943
Citing cases indexed
10,838
Case dates
1995–2026
Screened through
2026-06-24
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-19
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

4,769 citing cases reviewed of 10,838 in the citation index: 3,826 interpreted the section (annotated below), 943 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-24 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Imprisonment and care arrangements

The evidence supported a finding that the father would remain imprisoned and unable to care for the child for two years from the petition’s filing.

in Re A.R., a Minor Child · filed 2015-01-19(1)(Q)

Reading the record in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably reach a firm belief or conviction that Father would be imprisoned and unable to care for Abby for two years from the original filing date in August 2013.
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The evidence met subsection (1)(Q)’s requirements by clear and convincing evidence.

in the Interest of J.J.C., A.C., Je.J.C., Children · filed 2015-01-28(1)(Q)

The record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the requirements of section 161.001(1)(Q) were met by clear and convincing evidence.
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Under subsection (1)(Q), a parent imprisoned for the required period may offer arrangements for the child’s care, but those arrangements must satisfy the parent’s duty to the child.

in the Interest of L.M.D.M., a Child · filed 2015-03-11(1)(Q)

If the parent meets this burden of production, then the Department has the burden of persuasion to show that the arrangements would not satisfy the parent’s duty to the child. ... The trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Thomas’s mother was unable to satisfy Thomas’s duty to care for L.M.D.M. while he was imprisoned.
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The court upheld a termination finding under subsection (1)(Q) after reviewing the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence.

in the Interest of J.L.C. · filed 2015-02-12(1)(Q)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the subsection 161.001(1)(Q) finding.
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The two-year confinement requirement of subsection (1)(Q) was not met when the parent’s scheduled release was two months short of that period.

in the Interest of D.N., Jr., a Child · filed 2015-05-13(1)(Q)

Her release date from SAFPF is in May 2015, two months short of the two year period contemplated by paragraph (Q). The evidence is insufficient to support termination of Appellant’s parental rights under (Q).
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Under subsection (1)(Q), once the required period of imprisonment is established, the parent must produce some evidence of how the child will be cared for during incarceration.

in the Interest of S.R., T.R., and R.R., Children · filed 2015-06-11(1)(Q)

But when the party seeking termination has established that the incarcerated parent will remain in confinement for the requisite period, the parent must then produce some evidence as to how he would provide or arrange to provide care for the child during his incarceration.
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) requires proof that a parent knowingly engaged in the conduct leading to conviction; a DWI conviction alone does not establish that element.

in the Interest of A.R., a Child · filed 2015-11-09(b)(1)(Q)

Thus, the holding in C.D.E. is applicable here, and the Department could not establish that J.M. knowingly engaged in the conduct that resulted in his conviction of the offense of DWI, third or more, by merely introducing evidence of the conviction. See C.D.E., 391 S.W.3d at 299. Instead, the Department was required to present proof of the facts surrounding the conviction to show that the father knowingly engaged in the conduct resulting in that conviction.
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in conviction and imprisonment that leaves the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years from the petition’s filing.

In the Interest of H.B.C. · filed 2016-01-06(b)(1)(Q)

Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding of termination, we conclude that a reasonable fact-finder could have formed a firm belief that Lisa knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in her imprisonment ... for a conviction of an offense and her inability to care for Heather until June 24, 2017. Accordingly, we find the evidence legally sufficient to support the statutory ground for termination of Lisa’s parental rights.
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly engaged in criminal conduct resulting in a conviction, imprisonment for at least two years after the petition was filed, and inability to care for the child during that period.

in the Interest of A.R., L.R. and R.Q. Jr. · filed 2016-04-14(b)(1)(Q)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(Q), we conclude that the trial court reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the Father knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction, imprisonment, and inability to care for his children for not less than two years from the date of the Department’s filing of the petition seeking termination.
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Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in conviction and imprisonment, and the parent cannot care for the child for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

in the Interest of I.W. AKA A.A.W. and I.W. AKA J.A.W., Children · filed 2016-04-14(1)(Q)

In sum, the trial court’s finding under subsection 161.001(1)(Q) is not challenged by appellant, and in any event is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. This single finding is sufficient to support a decree of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the children’s best interest.
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Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent's criminal conduct results in a conviction and imprisonment that leaves the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed.

in the Interest of K.M.S., C.L.J.,III and K.B.J., Children · filed 2016-04-21(1)(Q)

We find that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Clinton was convicted of an offense that resulted in his imprisonment and inability to care for the children for not less than two years from the date of filing the petition. Because we find that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of a predicate act pursuant to Section 161.001(1) (Q), we need not discuss the other predicate grounds for termination.
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) requires proof that a parent’s criminal conduct resulted in imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years after the termination petition was filed.

in the Interest of S.P.R., a Child · filed 2016-10-04(b)(1)(Q)

The Department produced clear and convincing evidence from which the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief that Appellant had knowingly engaged in criminal conduct, that he was duly convicted and imprisoned for that conduct, and that his imprisonment and inability to care for S.P.R. would continue for more than two years after the date that the petition was filed. Furthermore, Appellant’s suggested placement of S.P.R. with H.N.R. was not a viable alternative because the Department had investigated that possibility and disapproved.
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Subsection (b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in conviction, imprisonment, and inability to care for the child for at least two years after the petition; the court may treat possible early parole as speculative.

in the Interest of A.S., a Child · filed 2016-10-18(b)(1)(Q)

While it was possible, therefore, for the trial court to take into account the existent possibility that Smith might be paroled within the statutory two-year period, it was also free to count that evidence as mere speculation. ... We find that the evidence was factually and legally sufficient to support the trial court’s findings pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q).
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Subsection (b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in conviction and imprisonment that leaves the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed; a speculative possibility of parole does not defeat that finding.

in the Interest of H.N.B., a Child · filed 2017-02-15(b)(1)(Q)

Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support termination of C.L.B.’s parental rights under Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q).
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent's criminal conduct results in conviction and imprisonment, leaving the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed.

In re B.D.A. · filed 2018-02-08(b)(1)(Q)

Thus, we conclude that there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support termination of Father's parental rights to all three children under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(Q), if there is likewise evidence that termination is in the children's best interest.
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in conviction and imprisonment, leaving the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

in the Interest of Y.R., a Child · filed 2018-02-15(b)(1)(Q)

Further, the evidence considered by the trial court legally and factually supported its findings that (1) Father’s actions satisfied at least one ground listed in section 161.001(b)(1) and alleged in the petition for termination and (2) terminating Father’s parental rights was in Y.R.’s best interests under section 161.001(b)(2).
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Subsection (b)(1)(Q) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent’s knowing criminal conduct led to conviction, confinement, and inability to care for the child for at least two years after the petition was filed.

in the Interest of A.I.F., a Minor Child · filed 2018-05-17(b)(1)(Q)

Subsection (Q) provides a trial court may terminate a parent-child relationship on a finding by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in the parent’s conviction for an offense and confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for the child for not less than two years from the date the petition was filed. ... We agree with appellant’s concession that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s predicate ground finding under subsection (Q).
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An incarcerated parent may arrange for relatives to care for the children; termination requires clear and convincing evidence that the arrangement will not satisfy the parent’s duty to them.

in the Interest of I.G. Jr. and O.I.G., Children · filed 2018-06-21(b)(1)(Q)

Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that Father’s proposed arrangement would not satisfy his obligation to care for the children.
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in confinement and inability to care for the child for at least two years from the filing of the termination petition.

in the Interest of H. O., a Child · filed 2018-06-21(b)(1)(Q)

We conclude that, considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father’s knowing criminal conduct resulted in “confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for the child for not less than two years from the date” DFPS filed its termination petition.
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Subsection (b)(1)(Q) requires criminal conduct resulting in conviction and confinement that leaves the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years from the petition’s filing; possible parole does not preclude that finding.

in the Interest of J.B., a Child · filed 2018-07-05(b)(1)(Q)

But parole is inherently speculative, and its possibility does not prevent a finding that the parent will remain incarcerated for not less than two years from the date the Department filed its petition—here, July 2016.
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent knowingly engages in criminal conduct resulting in conviction, confinement, and inability to care for the child for at least two years from the petition’s filing.

in the Interest of X.G., A.A., M.A., and A.A., Children · filed 2018-08-22(b)(1)(Q)

In particular, it is clear C.A. knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement and inability to care for the children for not less than two years from the date the Department filed its petition in April 2017.
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s imprisonment leaves the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

in the Interest of E.R.N. · filed 2018-07-12(b)(1)(Q)

We conclude that the Department established, by clear and convincing evidence, that D.N. committed the predicate act enumerated in section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) and that termination of D.N.’s parental rights is in the best interest of E.R.N.
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in conviction and imprisonment, leaving the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed.

in the Interest of S.K.J.J.F. AKA S.F., a Child · filed 2018-08-28(b)(1)(Q)

Accordingly, termination of J.F.’s parental rights under subsection (Q) was proper and his first issue is overruled.
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent knowingly engages in criminal conduct resulting in conviction, imprisonment, and inability to care for the child for at least two years from the filing of the petition.

v. A. C. v. J. L. W. · filed 2018-08-28(b)(1)(Q)

Viewing the evidence under the applicable standards of review, we conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the predicate statutory ground in section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) of the Texas Family Code to terminate V.A.C.’s parental rights.
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Subsection (b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent will be imprisoned for at least two years after the petition is filed and has not arranged for someone to assume the parent’s duties to the child during imprisonment.

in the Interest of D.L.A. Jr., D.L.A.R., B.B.R., B.L.A.R., and J.R. · filed 2018-09-18(b)(1)(Q)

The Department established by clear and convincing evidence that Dan will be imprisoned for far more than two years after the date the petition was filed. The record also establishes that Dan did not make arrangements for someone else to assume his parental obligations to D.L.A. Jr. while he was in prison. We conclude the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of grounds to terminate Dan’s parental rights under subsection 161.001(1)(Q).
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A parent’s incarceration supports termination under subsection (Q) when the parent will be unable to care for the child for at least two years from the petition’s filing.

in the Interest of J.B.O., a Child · filed 2018-09-20(b)(1)(Q)

The trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that, due to his incarceration, Appellant would be unable to care for J.B.O. for at least two years from the date of the petition. Thus, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under subsection (Q).
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Subsection (b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in a conviction and prospective imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years; a possibility of parole does not by itself defeat that finding.

in the Interest of D.J.C. and J.R.C., Children · filed 2018-10-12(b)(1)(Q)

Because we find the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s Ground Q finding, we overrule Elsa’s point of error.
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent knowingly commits an offense and the resulting confinement leaves the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed.

in the Interest of C.A.N. · filed 2019-01-31(b)(1)(Q)

We conclude that the Department established, by clear and convincing evidence, that J.A. committed the predicate act enumerated in section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) and that termination of J.A.’s parental rights is in the best interest of C.A.N. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(Q), (2); In the Interest of A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362.
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A parent’s conviction and imprisonment for at least two years after the termination petition support a finding under subsection (b)(1)(Q) when the parent cannot care for the child personally or through a viable substitute caregiver.

in the Interest of A.T., a Child · filed 2019-05-23(b)(1)(Q)

Based on the evidence presented at trial, the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that none of the proposed substitute caregivers was a viable option that was able and willing to care for A.T. on the father’s behalf during his incarceration. We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under subsection (Q).
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) allows an incarcerated parent to arrange care through someone else, but a proposed caregiver must be a viable option.

in the Interest of D.L.B., a Child · filed 2019-07-18(b)(1)(Q)

The “care” contemplated by subsection (Q) encompasses arranging for care to be provided by the incarcerated parent’s family or someone else who has agreed to assume the incarcerated parent’s obligation to care for the child.
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Subsection (b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in at least two years of imprisonment after the termination petition is filed and the parent cannot care for the child during that period.

in the Interest of K.K.B., a Child · filed 2019-07-30(b)(1)(Q)

Considered in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that termination of Father’s parental rights was justified under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(Q).
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Subsection (b)(1)(Q) requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent will be incarcerated and unable to care for the child for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

in the Interest of C.L.E.E.G., a Child · filed 2021-02-04(b)(1)(Q)

Without evidence showing that G.G. would not be eligible for parole within two years of the Department’s petition, there is nothing for the trial court to weigh regarding whether the Department met its burden under subsection Q.
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An incarcerated parent may arrange for relatives to care for a child; termination under these subsections requires clear and convincing evidence that the arrangement cannot meet the parent’s duty of care, including providing a safe environment.

in the Interest of M. F. R. G., a Child · filed 2021-05-27(b)(1)(N), (Q)

Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that Father’s proposed arrangement would not satisfy his obligation to care for M.F.R.G., including providing a safe environment.
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Subsection (b)(1)(Q) allows termination when clear and convincing evidence shows a parent will remain imprisoned and unable to care for the child for at least two years; the mere possibility of parole does not defeat that showing.

in the Interest of C.L.E.E.G., a Child · filed 2022-02-04(b)(1)(Q)

And by essentially requiring the Department to show Father had “zero chance of early release,” the court of appeals erred by “impermissibly elevat[ing] the burden of proof from clear and convincing to beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Neither H.R.M. nor subsection (Q)’s clear language requires such a showing.
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An incarcerated parent relying on another caregiver to avoid termination must show that the caregiver is providing care on the parent’s behalf, rather than from a personal obligation or desire.

in the Interest of I.N.B. · filed 2023-02-02(b)(1)(Q)

While there was some evidence that T.D., K.D. and D.D. would care for I.N.B., Father must establish that they are doing so on behalf of Father, not out of their own personal obligations to or desires for the child.
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Court ordered reunification steps

Law changed since H.B. 116 repealed former subsection (b)(1)(O) effective September 1, 2025; its service-plan ground and related subsection (d) defense apply only under the Act’s transition rule to older suits no longer pending in a trial court on that date.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(O)’s court-order requirement is satisfied when temporary orders direct a parent to comply with service plans and specify the actions necessary for the child’s return.

in the Interest of E.M., a Child · filed 2022-03-24(b)(1)(O)

Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to satisfy Subsection (O)’s court-order requirement, 17 and we thus conclude and hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s Subsection (O) finding.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to complete court-ordered steps for a child’s return after the child has spent at least nine months in Department conservatorship following removal for abuse or neglect.

in the Interest of A.C., J.L.M., and M.M., Minor Children · filed 2005-09-30(1)(O)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, a reasonable fact finder could have concluded that Shelley completely failed to maintain safe, appropriate housing for six to twelve months, obtain gainful employment, participate in individual counseling, participate in a psychological evaluation, cooperate with the Department, complete parenting classes, and submit to all requested urinalyses.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order specifying the actions needed to regain a child who has been in Department conservatorship for at least nine months following removal for abuse or neglect.

In the Interest of T.T., A.T., D.D., A.D. and A.D. · filed 2007-05-17(1)(O)

Paragraph (0) of subsection 161.001(1) provides that one basis for establishing the parental-conduct prong required for termination of parental rights is that a parent “failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the [Department] for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child.” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(O) (Vernon Supp.2006).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to complete court-ordered steps to regain a child who has been in Department custody for at least nine months after removal for abuse or neglect; substantial compliance is insufficient.

in the Interest of I.G. and R.C. Jr., Children · filed 2015-11-25(1)(O)

We conclude the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under section 161.001(1)(O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires a parent to comply with a court order specifying the actions necessary to regain the children; ability to pay ordered child support does not excuse noncompliance.

in the Interest of A.Y., A.Y., B.R., A.R. and D.R., Minor Children · filed 2001-06-06(1)(O)

However, ability to pay is a factor under subsection (F). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(F) (Vernon Supp. 2001). Subsection (O) only requires that a parent violate a court order specifying the actions necessary to obtain the return of their children.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) makes failure to comply with a court order specifying the steps needed to regain a child a ground for termination of parental rights.

In Re MCM · filed 2001-10-21(1)(O)

We begin by noting that the challenged ground for termination, i.e., violation of a court order that specifies the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child, is specifically provided for in the termination statute. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(O) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order specifying the steps needed to obtain the child’s return; termination on that ground is remedial rather than criminal punishment.

In the Interest of M.C.M. · filed 2001-06-21(1)(O)

We disagree. Violation of the trial court’s temporary orders in this case may be a ground for criminal contempt, but it is also a ground for termination of appellants’ parental rights.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order specifying the steps for a child's return after the child has spent at least nine months in Department conservatorship following removal for abuse or neglect.

Donald Perrett and Sharon Perrett v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2002-06-21(1)(O)

We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the court's finding that Donald and Sharon's parental rights were terminated based on section 161.001(1)(O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order specifying the actions necessary to regain a child in the department’s custody.

Wilson v. State · filed 2003-10-07(1)(O)

We conclude again that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm conviction or belief that Wilson failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of her child, who had been in the temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Protective and Regulatory Services.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination for failure to comply with court-ordered steps for a child's return; a parent who knows those steps may be found noncompliant even without receiving a copy of the service plan.

in the Interest of M.B., a Child · filed 2004-12-14(1)(O)

While Donald may not have received a copy of the service plan, the record shows he was fully aware of what was expected of him under both the service plan and the temporary orders. ... In short, the evidence was factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding under section 161.001(1)(O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order specifying the steps required to regain a child removed for abuse or neglect and held in DPRS conservatorship for at least nine months.

in the Interest of J. A., a Child · filed 2005-07-13(1)(O)

On appeal, DPRS relies primarily on the fourth ground as the one for which there is factually sufficient evidence to support the decree. ... Giving appropriate deference to the court’s findings, we hold that the evidence is “such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.” ... Thus, the evidence is factually sufficient.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) provides a termination ground when a parent fails to follow a court order setting the steps to regain a child removed for abuse or neglect and kept in Department conservatorship for at least nine months.

in the Interest of M. B., a Child · filed 2005-11-30(1)(O)

Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Ron and Christina failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for them to obtain the return of a child who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires removal for abuse or neglect; removal based only on risk from a parent's history does not satisfy that requirement.

In Re SAP · filed 2005-06-22(1)(O)

At trial Noble unequivocally testified that S.A.P. was not removed for abuse or neglect by Scott or Rebecca, that S.A.P. was not abused or neglected by Scott or Rebecca, and that S.A.P. was removed only because of the risk because of Scott's and Rebecca's prior history. There is thus no evidence to support the application of subsection 161.001(1)(O) to this case, much less the jury's affirmative finding.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O)'s statutory period measures how long the children have been in the Department's conservatorship, rather than how long the parent has had to comply with a court order.

In the Interest of A.D. · filed 2006-06-29(1)(O)

Moreover, the statutory period under paragraph (O) relates to the amount of time the children have been in permanent or temporary managing conser-vatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services, and not to the amount of time required for compliance with a court ordered provision.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent failed to comply with a court order specifying the steps needed to regain a child from the Department’s conservatorship.

in the Interest of S.A.C, a Child · filed 2006-08-03(1)(O)

Further, the record contains clear and convincing evidence that Christina failed to comply with her court-ordered service plan by not attending counseling regularly, not maintaining regular employment so that she could provide for S.A.C.’s needs, failing to pay child support, (footnote: 15) and failing to attend numerous Narcotics Anonymous meetings. This evidence is sufficient to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegation that Christina failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that established the actions necessary for her to obtain S.A.C.’s return from the Department’s conservatorship. (footnote: 16) Accordingly, the evidence is factually sufficient to establish this ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and to support the trial court’s termination order.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) provides no excuse exception for a parent's failure to comply with a court order specifying the actions necessary to regain a child.

In Re TNF · filed 2006-08-30(1)(O)

Brandon presents no authority for his novel excuse argument, and the statute itself does not make a provision for excuses. See TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(O) (Vernon Supp.2006) (providing as termination ground parent's failure to comply with court order). We thus agree with the Department that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the finding that Brandon failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of the child.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) makes failure to comply with a court order specifying the steps for a child’s return a termination ground and provides no exception for excuses.

In the Interest of T.N.F. · filed 2006-08-30(1)(O)

Brandon presents no authority for his novel excuse argument, and the statute itself does not make a provision for excuses.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with court-ordered requirements for the child's return, despite recent efforts to comply.

Shaw v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2006-08-31(1)(O)

Based on this record, there was both legally and factually sufficient evidence on which the trial court could find that, despite her recent efforts, Shaw had failed to comply with the court orders that established requirements for C.O.'s return by failing to complete the anger management or protective parenting classes and by failing to submit to Department-ordered drug testing.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) provides a ground for termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order specifying the steps needed to regain children removed for abuse or neglect.

in the Interest of V.A., V.A., and V.A., Minor Children · filed 2007-02-01(1)(O)

Thus, the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court's findings that appellant committed acts enumerated in section 161.001(1)(O) of the family code.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order specifying the actions required to regain children removed for abuse or neglect and held in Department conservatorship for at least nine months.

In Re CDB · filed 2007-03-23(1)(O)

Considering the evidence in favor of the judgment, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support termination under section 161.001(1)(O). It is undisputed Mother failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the children, who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of their removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order specifying the steps to regain children removed for abuse or neglect and placed in Department conservatorship for at least nine months.

In the Interest of C.D.B. · filed 2007-03-23(1)(O)

Considering the evidence in favor of the judgment, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support termination under section 161.001(1X0). It is undisputed Mother failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the children, who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of their removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) allows termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order setting out the steps for a child's return after at least nine months in state care following removal for abuse or neglect.

in the Interest of G.C.F., a Child · filed 2007-04-05(1)(O)

Question 7 asked whether there was clear and convincing evidence that Fabian failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the return of G.C.F., who had been in the managing conservatorship of TDFPS for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from the parent for abuse or neglect. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(O). ... In light of this testimony, we hold that there was legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict on this question and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by submitting this question to the jury.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (1)(O) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent failed to comply with a court order specifying the actions needed to regain the child.

Ian Mikowski and Toni English v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2007-10-18(1)(O)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the section 161.001(1)(O) finding.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires the child to have been in the Department’s conservatorship for at least nine months before parental rights may be terminated on that ground.

in the Interest of A.R., Children · filed 2007-11-28(1)(O)

To terminate Rodriguez's parental rights under section 161.001(1)(O), the Department was required to establish that the child in question had been in the Department's conservatorship for not less than nine months.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under subsection (1)(O), evidence of an immediate danger to a child’s physical health or safety can support a finding that the child was removed for abuse or neglect.

in the Interest of M.L.J., a Child · filed 2008-05-01(1)(O)

Considering the appropriate standards of review, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s section 161.001(1)(O) termination finding.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order specifying the steps required for a child's return; transportation and scheduling difficulties do not excuse noncompliance.

In Re CR · filed 2008-05-07(1)(O)

However, section 161.001(1)(O) does not "make a provision for excuses" for Davis's failure to comply with the trial court's order. ... Applying the appropriate standards of review, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding Davis's parental rights should be terminated under section 161.001(1)(O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Termination under subsection (1)(O) requires clear and convincing evidence that the child was removed under Chapter 262 for abuse or neglect.

In the Interest of A.A.A. · filed 2008-06-26(1)(O)

Thus, in our sufficiency review of the trial court’s finding that Hurst engaged in conduct pursuant to subsection 161.001(l)(O), we must consider whether DFPS proved by clear and convincing evidence that A.A.A. was removed under Chapter 262 for Hurst’s abuse or neglect.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection 161.001(1)(O) requires clear and convincing evidence that the child was removed under Chapter 262 for the parent's abuse or neglect.

In Re AAA · filed 2008-08-19(1)(O)

Thus, in our sufficiency review of the trial court's finding that Hurst engaged in conduct pursuant to subsection 161.001(1)( O ), we must consider whether DFPS proved by clear and convincing evidence that A.A.A. was removed under Chapter 262 for Hurst's abuse or neglect.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires a court order specifying the actions a parent must take to obtain the child’s return before noncompliance can support termination.

in the Interest of B.L.R.P., a Child · filed 2008-10-16(1)(O)

Because there are no court orders specifically establishing the actions necessary for W.B. to obtain the return of the child, written or otherwise, the Department failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence any grounds enumerated under subsection (1) of § 161.001 to support termination of W.B.’s parental rights to B.L.R.P.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires a court order specifying the actions a parent must take to regain the child before failure to comply can support termination.

In Re BLRP · filed 2008-10-16(1)(O)

Because there are no court orders specifically establishing the actions necessary for W.B. to obtain the return of the child, written or otherwise, the Department failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence any grounds enumerated under subsection (1) of § 161.001 to support termination of W.B.'s parental rights to B.L.R.P.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent’s failure to complete a court-ordered service plan materially violates the order.

Liu v. Department of Family & Protective Services · filed 2008-11-26(1)(O)

In light of these facts, we hold that Sally’s failure to successfully complete the terms of her service plan, constitutes a material violation of the court’s order sufficient to support a finding for termination under subsection (O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court-ordered plan for the child's return.

In Re CMC · filed 2008-12-18(O)

In light of the entire record, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the court's finding under section 161.001(O) because a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Latanya failed to comply with the provisions of the court-ordered plan.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires proof that the child was removed from the parent for abuse or neglect; failure to comply with a court order alone does not support termination.

Department of Family and Protective Services v. Silva · filed 2009-02-05(1)(O)

In sum, there is no evidence that DFPS had removed the child from Silva under Chapter 262 based on any alleged neglect of the child by Silva. ... Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting Silva's directed verdict as to the termination of his parental rights under section 161.001(1)(O) of the Texas Family Code.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) does not require the parent who failed to comply with a court order to be the parent whose abuse or neglect caused the child's removal.

In Re SN · filed 2009-03-05(1)(O)

With the foregoing principles in mind, we conclude that subsection (O) does not require that the parent who failed to comply with a court order be the same parent whose abuse or neglect of the child warranted the child's removal.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) does not require the parent who failed to comply with a court order to be the parent whose abuse or neglect caused the child’s removal.

in the Interest of S.N., S.M.N., and D.A.N., Children · filed 2009-03-05(1)(O)

With the foregoing principles in mind, we conclude that subsection (0) does not require that the parent who failed to comply with a court order be the same parent whose abuse or neglect of the child warranted the child’s removal.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with court-ordered reunification requirements, even if the parent completes other parts of the service plan or offers excuses.

In Re JS · filed 2009-06-11(1)(O)

Section 161.001(1)(O) simply provides that a parent's rights may be terminated if the parent "failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child." It does not quantify any particular number of provisions of the family service plan that a parent must not achieve in order for the parental rights to be terminated or the degree of a parent's conduct that will be deemed to be a failure to achieve a particular requirement of the plan. The provision also does not encompass an evaluation of a parent's partial achievement of plan requirements to determine whether or not the parent failed to comply with the plan. Lastly, Section 161.001(1)(O) does not "make a provision for excuses" for the parent's failure to comply with the family service plan.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination for failure to meet court-ordered service plan requirements even when the parent meets other requirements or offers excuses.

in the Interest of J.S. and A.S., Children · filed 2009-06-11(1)(O)

It does not quantify any particular number of provisions of the family service plan that a parent must not achieve in order for the parental rights to be terminated or the degree of a parent’s conduct that will be deemed to be a failure to achieve a particular requirement of the plan. The provision also does not encompass an evaluation of a parent’s partial achievement of plan requirements to determine whether or not the parent failed to comply with the plan. Lastly, Section 161.001(l)(O) does not “make a provision for excuses” for the parent’s failure to comply with the family service plan.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order requiring compliance with a service plan, even though the plan itself is not a court order.

In Re ESC · filed 2009-06-15(1)(O)

Although the service plan is not itself a court order, the trial court's temporary order established that compliance with the requirements of the service plan was an action necessary to obtain return of the children. We conclude the temporary order complied with section 161.001(1)(O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order requiring compliance with a service plan, even though the plan itself is not a court order.

In the Interest of E.S.C. · filed 2009-06-15(1)(O)

Although the service plan is not itself a court order, the trial court's temporary order established that compliance with the requirements of the service plan was an action necessary to obtain return of the children. We conclude the temporary order complied with section 161.001(1X0).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires proof that the child was removed because of abuse or neglect of that child; removal based on risk alone does not suffice.

Mann v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2009-09-17(1)(O)

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that C.M. was removed due to abuse or neglect by appellant, as required to support termination under section 161.001(1)(O). Consequently, we hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to support termination of appellant's parental rights to C.M. under section 161.001(1)(O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (1)(O) requires proof that the child was removed for abuse or neglect, the Department held conservatorship for at least nine months, a court order specified the steps for the child’s return, and the parent failed to comply with that order.

in the Interest of C.L., and I.L., Children · filed 2009-10-14(1)(O)

To establish this predicate ground for termination, the Department must prove: (1) the child was removed from the parent because of abuse or neglect; (2) the Department has been the permanent or temporary managing conservator of the child for at least nine months; (3) a court order “specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child”; and (4) the parent failed to comply with that order.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires clear and convincing evidence that the child was removed for abuse or neglect, the Department held managing conservatorship for at least nine months, a court order specified the steps for the child's return, and the parent failed to comply with that order.

In Re CL · filed 2009-11-04(1)(O)

To establish this predicate ground for termination, the Department must prove: (1) the child was removed from the parent because of abuse or neglect; (2) the Department has been the permanent or temporary managing conservator of the child for at least nine months; (3) a court order "specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child"; and (4) the parent failed to comply with that order. ... Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision, we hold that the evidence is legally insufficient.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a child was removed for abuse or neglect and the parent failed to comply with court orders setting the actions necessary for the child’s return.

in the Interest of M.G. · filed 2009-11-17(1)(O)

Based on the foregoing evidence, a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that appellant failed to comply with court orders establishing actions necessary for the return of M.G. from State custody.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits an order approving and adopting a family service plan to establish the actions a parent must take to regain custody.

in the Interest of K.L.A.C., D.D.C., and S.L.H.C · filed 2010-01-21(1)(O)

Although the family service plan is not a court order itself, the trial court’s order approving and adopting the family service plan established that compliance with the requirements of the family service plan was an action necessary for appellant to obtain the return of her children.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires full compliance with the court-ordered family services plan; an excuse for noncompliance bears on the child's best interests rather than whether the statutory ground is met.

In Re MCG · filed 2010-12-02(1)(O)

Further, the Family Code does not provide for excuses for failure to comply in assessing a statutory violation. ... The Family Code does not provide for substantial compliance with a family services plan.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires full compliance with a court-ordered family services plan; substantial compliance does not satisfy it.

in the Interest of M.C.G., a Child · filed 2010-12-02(1)(O)

The Family Code does not provide for substantial compliance with a family services plan.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A parent’s failure to complete court-ordered service plan tasks can establish noncompliance under section 161.001(1)(O).

Enriquez v. State · filed 2010-12-21(1)(O)

After viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we conclude that there was legally sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to form a firm belief or conviction that V.S. failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the children.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) does not require the parent who failed to comply with a court order to be the same parent whose abuse or neglect caused the child’s removal.

in the Interest of M.N., G.R. IV, and G. R., Children · filed 2011-03-17(1)(O)

It is not necessary that the parent who failed to comply with a court order be the same parent whose abuse or neglect warranted the child’s removal.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order specifying the steps required to obtain the return of a child.

in the Interest of T.C., T.B. Jr., T.B. and T.B., Children · filed 2011-04-14(1)(O)

Thus, there was clear and convincing evidence from which the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief that the mother failed to comply with the provisions of the trial court’s earlier order establishing the actions necessary for the mother to obtain the return of her children. The evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(1)(O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination for failure to comply with a court-ordered plan after a child has been in Department conservatorship for at least nine months following removal for abuse or neglect.

in the Interest of E.M.C.G., a Child · filed 2011-05-25(1)(O)

Griffith next contends that termination under section 161.001(1)(O) requires proof that the children were removed from their mother for abuse or neglect and that “the record is unclear” whether abuse or neglect was proven. The judgment recites the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that the child was in the Department’s conservatorship “as a result of the child’s removal from the parent . . . for the abuse or neglect of the child.” Griffith does not cite to any evidence that would contradict this finding, and the finding is consistent with the Department’s affidavit accompanying the original petition.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) does not excuse a parent’s failure to comply with a court order setting out the actions required to regain a child.

M.W. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2011-06-16(1)(O)

We note that the Family Code does not excuse a failure to comply in assessing whether a violation of section 161.001(1)(O) has occurred.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order specifying the actions needed to regain children removed for abuse or neglect after at least nine months in state care.

in the Interest of S.P. and S.M.J., Children · filed 2011-08-18(1)(O)

The record shows, and the parents admitted, that they did not fully comply with the court-ordered service plan as required. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations that each parent failed to comply with the service plan.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination for failure to comply with a court order specifying the actions needed to regain a child; substantial compliance is insufficient.

in the Interest of T.N.C., C.M.C., and J.P.C., Minor Children · filed 2011-11-03(1)(O)

In addition, substantial compliance is not enough to avoid a termination finding under section 161.001(1)(O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order specifying the steps to regain a child removed for abuse or neglect.

in the Interest of A.W.B., Minor Child · filed 2012-03-27(1)(O)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Mother failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for Mother to obtain the return of A.W.B.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under subsection (1)(O), failure to comply with four requirements of a court-ordered family service plan can support termination even if the parent complied with other requirements.

in the Interest of R.B. and E.H.B., Minor Children · filed 2012-04-11(1)(O)

However, that Elvia M. failed to comply with four of the requirements is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to complete the court-ordered actions required to obtain the return of her children, even if she attempted to complete most of them.

in the Interest of D.J.H. and D.A.H., Children · filed 2012-05-09(1)(O)

Although it is apparent that Kathy attempted to complete most of the service plan’s requirements and that she wanted to be reunited with her sons, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Kathy violated section 161.001(1)(O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires completion of every court-ordered service plan requirement; substantial compliance or an excuse for noncompliance does not prevent termination.

in the Interest of R.N.W. and T.M.W., Children · filed 2012-06-06(1)(O)

We do not consider “substantial compliance” to be the same as completion for purposes of subsection (O) of the Family Code, nor does that subsection provide for excuses for failure to complete court ordered services.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) does not require the parent who failed to comply with a court order to be the parent whose abuse or neglect caused the child’s removal.

in the Interest of D.R.A. and A.F., Children · filed 2012-06-15(1)(O)

However, subsection (O) does not require that the parent who failed to comply with a court order be the same parent whose abuse or neglect of the child warranted the child’s removal.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) does not allow excuses for failure to comply with court-ordered services; those excuses are considered when deciding the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of F. H. T., a Child · filed 2012-06-21(1)(O)

To the contrary, the family code does not provide for or allow excuses for failure to comply with court-ordered services in a termination case.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent’s continued cocaine use and failure to perform service plan tasks support a finding of noncompliance with a court order.

in the Interest of J.J.D. and A.M.C., Children · filed 2012-06-21(1)(O)

The record shows that Mother continued to use cocaine during the court-ordered service plan and failed to comply with the tasks specified in the plan. Accordingly, based on our review of the record and giving appropriate deference to the jury’s factfindings, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support a reasonable trier of fact’s firm belief or conviction that Mother failed to comply with her court-ordered service plan.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when evidence sufficiently establishes the statutory ground.

in the Interest of A.W.C. and G.A.C., Children · filed 2012-07-12(1)(O)

Therefore, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support termination under Section 161.001(1)(O) of the Texas Family Code.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires full compliance with a court order specifying the steps needed to regain a child; substantial compliance does not suffice.

in the Interest of K.H., a Child · filed 2012-07-12(1)(O)

The statute, however, does not provide for substantial compliance.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires full compliance with a court order specifying the steps necessary to regain a child; substantial compliance does not suffice.

in the Interest of I.G., I.G. and I.G., Children · filed 2012-10-15(1)(O)

Based on David‘s admission that he failed to fully comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for David to obtain the return of his children, which is supported by record evidence, we conclude that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the jury‘s finding under section 161.001(1)(O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) does not require a parent to have caused the child’s removal.

Salazar v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2013-07-19(1)(O)

However, the Legislature did not scribe into subparagraph (O) a distinction between an offending parent and a non-offending parent. This Court declines to read such a requirement into section 161.001(1)(O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires a court order that specifically establishes the actions a parent must take to regain a child before termination can be upheld for failure to comply.

in the Interest of M.D.C., a Child · filed 2013-08-27(1)(O)

A termination finding under subsection (O) cannot be upheld where there is no court order that specifically establishes the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) can support termination for failure to comply with court-ordered services even when the children were physically removed from the other parent, if its other requirements are met.

in the Interest of A.D.C. and J.D.C., Children · filed 2013-10-03(1)(O)

Contrary to Father’s statement that the law is “silent” about whether a parent from whom a child is not physically removed may face termination under subsection (O), this court and many of our sister intermediate appellate courts have held that a parent from whom children are not physically removed must comply with court-ordered services and that subsection (O) may operate as a ground for termination for such a parent so long as the other requirements under subsection (O) are fulfilled. ... Because Father falls within the purview of subsection (O) and because he does not contest the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the other requirements of subsection (O)—whether CPS maintained conservatorship for at least nine months, whether he complied with the court-ordered service plan, or whether the children were removed due to abuse or neglect—we conclude that the evidence was not legally or factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that termination was supportable under subsection (O) and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by submitting a question to the jury concerning that subsection.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) did not support termination of a father whose children were removed from their mother while he lived elsewhere.

R. J. O. v. the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2013-11-13(1)(O)

We also agree that the evidence does not support termination under section 161.001(1)(O). We therefore reform the trial court’s final decree to remove that statutory ground for termination.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (1)(O) allows termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order setting the steps for a child’s return after the child has spent at least nine months in state care following removal for abuse or neglect.

in the Interest of S.E.C., a Child · filed 2014-01-30(1)(O)

The evidence showed that the father failed to complete the services and, thus, failed to comply with the trial court’s order. The evidence also showed that S.E.C. had been in the Department’s care for at least nine months and that S.E.C. had been removed from the parents due to abuse or neglect. Thus, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(1)(O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) requires compliance with the court order establishing actions for a child’s return; substantial compliance is insufficient.

in the Interest of C.M.D. and H.M.A., Children · filed 2014-02-06(1)(O)

As this court has previously explained, subsection (O) of the statute is not satisfied by substantial compliance.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when the Department has had managing conservatorship for at least nine months following removal for abuse or neglect and the parent fails to comply with a court order setting the steps to regain the child.

in the Interest of A.D., a Child · filed 2014-07-31(1)(O)

Thus, under subsection (O), the Department must prove that (1) the Department has been the child’s temporary or permanent managing conservator for at least nine months; (2) the Department took custody of the child as a result of a removal from the parent for abuse or neglect; (3) a court issued an order establishing the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child; and (4) the parent did not comply with the court order.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (1)(O)’s removal-for-abuse-or-neglect element was met even though prescription validity and actual harm were disputed.

in the Interest of A. S. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2014-07-31(1)(O)

Thus, we conclude that, without regard to whether the mother’s prescription for hydrocodone was valid or her use of the hydrocodone actually harmed her baby, A.S. was removed for abuse or neglect.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) does not require an order to have a particular title; the order must direct the parent to perform specific acts and warn that failure to provide a safe environment within a reasonable time could result in termination.

in the Interest of K.N.D., a Child · filed 2014-08-14(1)(O)

The order need not bear a title stating that it is an order “to obtain return of a child”; rather, it will be sufficient under subsection (O) so long as it directs a parent to perform specific acts and advises the parent that failure to provide a safe environment within a reasonable time period could result in termination of her parental rights.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (1)(O) provides no excuse for failing to comply with court-ordered steps for a child’s return after removal for abuse or neglect and at least nine months in Department conservatorship.

in the Interest of J.R.A.F. and P.F., Children · filed 2015-02-19(1)(O)

Section 161.001(1)(O) does not “make a provision for excuses” for the parent’s failure to comply with the court-ordered services. ... Consequently, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(1)(O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (1)(O) permits failure to comply with a family service plan to serve as a ground for termination.

in the Interest of L.A.A., L.B.A., and K.S. · filed 2015-03-11(1)(O)

We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the challenged elements of subsection 161.001(1)(O), failure to comply with the family service plan, as a predicate ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to complete all court-ordered steps for regaining a child, even if the parent completes some of them.

in the Interest of C.C.C. and C.S.C., Children · filed 2015-03-12(1)(O)

Although the father did comply with some portions of the trial court’s order, the evidence, as detailed above, was undisputed that the father failed to comply with all of the provisions of the service plan as ordered by the trial court. Thus, there was clear and convincing evidence that the father failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of the children.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) permits termination when a parent fails to comply with a court order setting out actions required to regain custody after a child has been removed for abuse or neglect for at least nine months.

L. W. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2015-04-24(1)(O)

Jane’s recent progress does not mean that she fully complied with the court’s orders issued following John’s removal due to neglect. We overrule Jane’s first issue on appeal.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) does not require a court to consider a parent’s excuses for failing to complete court-ordered services.

in the Interest of G.R. and T.R. · filed 2015-05-14(1)(O)

While the Father made a number of excuses for his failure to complete the services, section 161.001(1)(O) does not require the court to consider excuses for a parent’s failure to comply with the court-ordered services.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(1)(O) does not excuse a parent’s failure to complete court-ordered services.

in the Interest of M.H. and Z.H. · filed 2015-08-13(1)(O)

While the mother made a number of excuses for her failure to complete the services, section 161.001(1)(O) does not require the court to consider excuses for a parent’s failure to comply with the court-ordered services. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s finding with regard to subsection 161.001(1)(O) is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (b)(1)(O) requires a court order identifying the actions necessary to obtain the child’s return; an order warning that failure to comply may terminate parental rights satisfies the warning requirement.

in the Interest of C.Y., the Child · filed 2015-10-22(b)(1)(O)

Thus, this order notified Appellant that the actions listed in the order were necessary to obtain C.Y.’s return and that failure to fully comply with the orders could result in the termination of his parental rights.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) requires a court order specifying the actions a parent must take to regain a child; a family service plan that is not incorporated into an order does not suffice.

in the Interest of Z.B. and Z.B., Children · filed 2016-07-12(b)(1)(O)

A family service plan that is not incorporated in a court order does not suffice.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(O)’s nine-month conservatorship requirement may be established through the trial court’s judicial notice of its own appointment order in a bench trial.

in the Interest of S.W., a Child · filed 2016-10-06(b)(1)(O)

Accordingly, we find that the record contained factually sufficient evidence establishing that Stephen was in the “temporary managing conservatorship of the Department . . . for not less than nine months” and overrule Dan’s factual sufficiency challenge to Ground O.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Ground (O) requires an existing court order specifying the actions a parent must take to regain the child.

in the Interest of T.C.H., a Child · filed 2016-12-08(b)(1)(O)

As Rachel points out, before her parental rights may be terminated for failing to comply with the court’s order, an order must be in existence. ... Since both the order and service plan are in the record, this point of error is without merit.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) requires a court order specifying the actions needed to regain the child; a service plan not incorporated into a court order does not suffice.

in the Interest of T.C. and J.C., Children · filed 2018-06-12(b)(1)(O)

A family service plan that is not incorporated in a court order does not suffice.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A family service plan made an order of the court satisfies ground (O)’s requirement for a court order specifying the actions needed to obtain the child’s return.

in the Interest of L.G., a Child · filed 2019-04-10(b)(1)(O)

Since the trial court made the FSP an order of the court, the FSP in this case qualified as a court order that established the actions necessary for Matt to obtain the return of the child, as required under ground (O).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

For suits filed before subsection (d) took effect, subsection (b)(1)(O) requires compliance with every requirement of a court-ordered service plan; substantial compliance is insufficient.

in the Interest of M.M., a Child · filed 2019-04-11(b)(1)(O)

Parents must comply with each requirement of a court-ordered service plan; complying merely substantially is not good enough to avoid termination under subsection (O). ... In light of the entire record, we hold that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that both parents violated the subsection (O) ground and that the evidence thus factually suffices.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) requires a court order specifying the tasks a parent must complete; tasks stated only in a family service plan cannot support termination.

in the Interest of C.R., A.R., and I.R., Children · filed 2019-04-16(b)(1)(O)

Because these five tasks were not specified in any court order, they cannot be used against the parents to terminate their rights under subparagraph O.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A reunification order is sufficiently specific under subsection (b)(1)(O) when its terms tell the parent with certainty what duties must be performed.

in the Interest of D.K.J.J. AKA D.K.J.J., D.K.D.J. AKA D.K.D.J., D.D.J., Jr., D.Q.D.J., D.K.J.J., AKA B.B.B. Minor Child · filed 2019-06-13(b)(1)(O)

A trial court order referenced by section 161.001(b)(1)(O) that establishes the actions necessary for the parent to obtain return of a child in the Department’s custody is sufficiently specific when the terms for compliance are set forth with certainty so that the parent knows what duties and obligations have been imposed.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A service plan can establish required actions under subsection (b)(1)(O) even if it phrases the tasks as requests, when the court order and plan together make them mandatory.

in the Interest of A.L.R., a Child · filed 2021-06-24(b)(1)(O)

Although some of the language used in the service plan could have been more authoritative and phrased as a command rather than a request, it was clear from the combined terms of the court order and the service plan that Appellant was required to complete the tasks and services set forth in the service plan.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) permits termination for failure to follow a service plan only when the plan specifies actions the parent is required to take.

in the Interest of A.L.R., a Child · filed 2022-06-17(b)(1)(O)

Subsection (O) authorizes termination for failure to comply with a family service plan only when that plan requires the parent to perform specific actions.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) requires the court order specifying the actions needed for a child’s return to be sufficiently specific for the parent to comply.

in the Interest of A.I., a Child · filed 2022-09-22(b)(1)(O)

Because a trial court must necessarily decide that a court order is sufficiently specific for the parent to comply before terminating a parent’s rights under Section 161.001(b)(1)(O), a trial court cannot terminate parental rights for failure to comply without first considering the order’s specificity.
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Constitutionality of best-interest requirement

Section 161.001(2)’s best-interest requirement withstands a facial constitutional challenge because termination first requires clear and convincing proof of a predicate act.

in the Interest of R.M.W., a Child · filed 2001-12-28(2)

The Texas statute, however, requires one of nineteen predicate acts be proven by clear and convincing evidence before the “best interest” of the child is even considered. ... The Texas statute does not suffer the same constitutional impediments as the Washington statute at issue in Troxel .
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Section 161.001 requires clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for termination and that termination is in each child's best interest.

Wischer v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2012-08-29(2)

To appropriately balance the interrelated and correlative interests affected in termination proceedings, the parent-child relationship cannot be terminated unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the parent committed one or more of the acts specifically set forth in family code section 161.001(1) and that termination is in each child's best interest.
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Section 161.001(b)(2) requires the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest, even when a parent voluntarily signs an irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment.

in the Interest of K.S.L., a Child · filed 2016-07-06(b)(2)

Accordingly, we hold that the State is not relieved of its burden to prove best interest merely because a parent has executed a voluntary and irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights.
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Section 161.001(b)(2) requires clear and convincing evidence that terminating parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of K. G-J. W. AKA K. W. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2018-03-06(b)(2)

Here, the Department was required to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother’s actions satisfied one of the predicate grounds listed in Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) and that termination was in K.W.’s best interest.
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Child born addicted to a controlled substance

Section 161.001(1)(R) permits termination when a parent causes a child to be born addicted to alcohol or a controlled substance, if termination is also in the child's best interest.

in the Interest of M.N.O., M.T.O. and L.O., Children · filed 2002-12-19(1)(R)

From the medical records, a fact finder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that, under the statute, Odom was the cause of a child's being born addicted to a controlled substance. The medical records constitute both legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that Odom engaged in conduct justifying termination.
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Section 161.001(1)(P) and (R) support termination when a parent's drug use endangers children and continues after treatment, or when the parent causes a child to be born addicted.

in the Interest of M.J. and A.M. · filed 2006-11-30(1)(P), (R)

We hold the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's findings under section 161.001(1)(P) and (R).
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Section 161.001(1)(R) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent’s prenatal drug use caused the child to have withdrawal symptoms, adverse health effects, or a controlled substance in the child’s bodily fluids.

in the Interest of P.K.C. A/K/A P.K.G.C., a Child · filed 2009-02-05(1)(R)

We therefore review the record to determine whether the trial court’s finding that P.K.C. was born addicted is supported by clear and convincing evidence that L.C. used a controlled substance and that, as a result, P.K.C. suffered from withdrawal symptoms, displayed adverse health effects, or had the controlled substance in her bodily fluids. ... Viewing all this evidence most favorably to the finding and judgment, and deferring to the trial court’s resolution of credibility issues, we conclude that the trial court’s “born addicted” finding is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.
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Section 161.001(1)(R) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent caused a child to be born addicted to a controlled substance.

in the Interest of A. M., a Minor Child · filed 2009-11-05(1)(R)

Based on this testimony and giving due deference to the trial court's observation of the witnesses and weighing of the evidence, we determine that a reasonable fact finder could have concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that A.T. caused A.M. to be born addicted to a controlled substance.
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Section 161.001(1)(R) permits termination when evidence supports a finding that the mother caused the child to be born addicted to a controlled substance.

in the Interest of J.D.L.R., a Child · filed 2012-04-18(1)(R)

Considering the evidence under the respective standards of review, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Espinoza violated section 161.001(1)(R).
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Section 161.001(1)(R) permits termination when evidence shows that a parent caused a child to be born addicted to a controlled substance.

in the Interest of R.S.O.C., T.L.-R.C., and K.C.-D.E., Children · filed 2012-07-19(1)(R)

Even if she had not waived this issue, there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Mother was the cause of a child being born addicted to a controlled substance.
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Section 161.001(1)(R) permits termination when a mother’s drug use causes her child to be born with a controlled substance in the child’s bodily fluids; proof of the drug’s level is unnecessary.

in the Interest of D.D.G., a Child · filed 2014-01-23(1)(R)

Under the family code, a child is born addicted to a controlled substance if that child is born to a mother who used a controlled substance during her pregnancy and exhibits the demonstrable presence of a controlled substance in the child’s bodily fluids after his birth. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 261.001(8)(A), (B)(iii). Proof of the level of the controlled substance in the child’s system is not required. See id. ... After applying the applicable standards of review, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Mother was the cause of Daniel being born addicted to a controlled substance.
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The court upheld a finding that the mother violated subsection (1)(R).

in the Interest of v. G., Children · filed 2015-04-08(1)(R)

Considering the evidence under the applicable standards of review, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Bethany violated subsection 161.001(1)(R).
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(R) permits termination when a parent causes a child to be born addicted to a controlled substance; proof of withdrawal symptoms is unnecessary if the substance is demonstrably present in the child’s bodily fluids.

In the Interest of L.G.R. · filed 2016-06-07(b)(1)(R)

The Family Code, however, does not require proof of signs of withdrawal. Under the Family Code definition, it is sufficient to show that the demonstrable presence of a controlled substance was observable in the Child’s bodily fluids.
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Section 161.001 permits termination when a parent causes a child to be born with a controlled substance in the child’s bodily fluids; signs of withdrawal are unnecessary.

in the Interest of L.S., C.S., A.S.R., and A.S.R. · filed 2017-07-20(b)(1)(R)

However, even if the adverse health consequences were disputed, the Family Code does not require any signs of withdrawal or “serious physical problems or psychological problems” to support termination. Rather, it is sufficient to show that a child “exhibit[ed] the demonstrable presence of alcohol or a controlled substance in the child’s bodily fluids.”
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(R) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent caused a child to be born addicted to a controlled substance; maternal drug use during pregnancy and a positive newborn meconium test can support that finding.

in the Interest of L.A.J., a Child v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2019-05-30(b)(1)(R)

Mother’s prior positive drug test, admission of consumption of marijuana, and Levi’s meconium test results constitute sufficient evidence under the Family Code that Mother was the cause of Levi being born addicted to a controlled substance.
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Knowledge of endangerment

Under section 161.001(1)(E), a father's past criminal conduct alone did not clearly and convincingly establish that the mother knowingly endangered her child by leaving him with the father.

In Re DJ · filed 2003-03-28(1)(E)

Accordingly, the jury's finding Mother violated section 161.001(1)(E) could be premised only on Mother knowingly placing D.J. with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered D.J.'s physical or emotional well-being. ... We do not believe Father's past criminal conduct alone constitutes clear and convincing evidence that Mother's leaving D.J. with Father posed a danger to D.J.'s emotional or physical well-being.
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Section 161.001(1)(E) does not require a parent to know his own conduct is dangerous, but requires knowledge when the parent places a child with others who engage in endangering conduct.

In Re UP · filed 2003-04-17(1)(E)

Scienter, however, is not required for appellant's own acts under § 161.001(1)(E); scienter is required only under subsection (E) when a parent places his child with others who engage in endangering acts.
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Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allows a jury to infer a parent’s knowledge of endangerment from the evidence without explicit testimony about that knowledge.

J. M. and A. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2013-04-19(1)(D), (E)

The Department was not required to introduce testimony or evidence explicitly stating that J.M. knew he was endangering the children. Instead, the jury was entitled to draw that conclusion from the evidence presented and, as we have explained, the evidence supports such a determination.
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Under section 161.001, a jury may infer a parent’s knowledge of endangerment from the evidence; the Department need not present explicit testimony that the parent knew the conduct was dangerous.

J. M. and A. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2013-06-11(1)(D), (E)

The Department was not required to introduce testimony or evidence explicitly stating that J.M. knew he was endangering the children. Instead, the jury was entitled to draw that conclusion from the evidence presented and, as we have explained, the evidence supports such a determination.
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Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly allows a child to remain in an endangering environment; a parent’s unawareness of that environment precludes termination under this ground.

in the Interest of D.M.K, C.A.K, J.J.K. and J.A.K., Children · filed 2013-08-27(1)(D)

While it is true that subsection D cannot provide the basis for terminating parental rights if the parent was unaware of the endangering environment, I.W. ignores other evidence in the record demonstrating his awareness of the physical abuse taking place in his home.
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Under subsection (1)(E), lack of knowledge of an outstanding warrant did not preclude a finding that the parent’s conduct endangered her children.

in the Interest of S.A.G., J.S., J.V.S., J.S., J.S.J., and J.S., Children · filed 2015-06-15(1)(E)

For all these reasons, J.G.’s contention she lacked knowledge of the outstanding warrant, even if believed by the trial court, did not preclude a finding her conduct endangered her children.
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A parent can endanger a child under subsections (D) and (E) by knowing of a potential danger of sexual abuse and disregarding that risk, even without knowing that abuse occurred.

in the Interest of T.D.S., T.L.S., C.B.D., and M.K.D., Children · filed 2015-08-28(b)(1)(D), (E)

Thus, the evidence does not have to show that appellant actually knew that the stepfather was sexually abusing T.L.S., as she argues, but it must show that appellant was aware of the potential for danger of the sexual abuse and disregarded that risk.
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Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) require evidence connecting the parent to the child’s endangering conditions or conduct; a finding cannot rest on danger the parent was not shown to know about or cause.

in the Interest of I. W., a Child · filed 2019-06-28(b)(1)(D), (E)

Absent proof that R.S. placed or allowed I.W. to remain in an endangering environment or with persons who engaged in endangering conduct, a reasonable trier of fact could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that R.S. knowingly placed or knowingly allowed I.W. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered her physical or emotional well-being, or engaged in conduct or knowingly placed I.W. with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered her physical or emotional well-being.
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) does not require a parent to know that her own conduct is dangerous.

in the Interest of M.R., a Child · filed 2020-01-14(b)(1)(E)

Subsection (E) in particular does not include a “knowing” requirement; in other words, the parent need not know that her own conduct is dangerous.
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Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination when a parent is aware of a potential danger to a child’s physical or emotional health but disregards it and allows the child to remain in endangering surroundings.

in the Interest of A.C.D., C.N.D., M.M.D., E.N.A.-D., S.S.L., B.F.L., H.E.L., Children v. . · filed 2021-01-13(b)(1)(D)

Second, the Department was not required to prove that B.A. knew E.L. had harmed B.F.L. Rather, it was required to prove B.A. was aware of the potential for danger to the children’s physical or emotional health, but disregarded it.
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Notes 3151–3300 of 3,826, oldest cases first.

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