Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001

Section 161.001(b)(1)(C) permits termination when a parent voluntarily leaves a child with another without adequate support and remains away for at least six months; a clear, unretracted judicial admission of those facts precludes a sufficiency challenge.

In the Interest of A v. and J.M.R., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-12-14(b)(1)(C)

This clear, unequivocal, unretracted judicial admission precludes Appellant from now asserting on appeal that there is insufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights under subsection (C).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) assesses the children’s environment before removal, so safer conditions at trial do not overcome evidence of earlier endangerment.

In the Interest of C.N.L. and C.T.F., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-04-25(b)(1)(D)

However, Subsection (D) requires us to look at the children’s environment prior to removal, thus, Shannon’s testimony at trial, even if taken as true, does not overcome the evidence related to the children’s environment before removal.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) evaluates endangering conditions before the child’s removal.

In the Interest of H.M.L., and D.J.C., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-07-30(b)(1)(D)

The relevant timeframe for evaluating subsection (D) is before the children’s removal.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits an endangerment finding based on dangerous conditions before removal; subsection (E) permits one based on a parent’s continuing conduct before and after removal.

In the Interest of H.D.J.A., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-12-23(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

We conclude that this evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of endangerment under subsection (D). ... We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under subsection (E) that Mother engaged in a conscious course of conduct that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) provides termination grounds for knowingly exposing a child to endangering surroundings or engaging in a course of endangering conduct.

A. L.-E. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2025-01-08(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

We conclude under the applicable legal- and factual-sufficiency standards that the evidence was sufficient to support the findings made against Mother under statutory predicate grounds Paragraphs (D) and (E).

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination based on a parent’s knowing exposure of a child to endangering surroundings or an endangering course of conduct.

In the Interest of J.T., A.P., L.P., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-02-13(b)(1)(D), (E)

Because the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support both endangerment grounds, we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the remaining grounds.

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent’s criminal conduct and assaults in the home endanger the children.

In the Interest of I.A. and A.A., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-02-13(b)(1)(D)–(E)

And Father’s criminal history leading to incarceration, including his assaults of Mother in the home––one of which occurred with at least one child present––was endangering conduct sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment findings under (D) and (E) grounds.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a child’s surroundings or a parent’s conduct endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of B.J., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-02-27(b)(1)(D), (E)

We hold that both legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding as to grounds (D) and (E) and overrule Mother’s first and second issues.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's continued drug use and criminal conduct create a substantial risk of harm to the child.

In the Interest of A.D. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2025-02-27(b)(1)(E)

We therefore hold that the above evidence, including the evidence of Father’s continued drug use and criminal conduct both before and during the pendency of this case, demonstrates a pattern of continued substantial risk of harm to Ava that is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of endangerment under subsection (E).

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent’s mental health, domestic violence, and drug use endanger a child’s surroundings or well-being.

In the Interest of K.L.G.S., K.B., and K.B. v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-02-13(b)(1)(D), (E)

Viewed either separately or together, the evidence of Mother’s mental health, domestic violence, and drug use would enable the trial court to form a firm belief or conviction that Mother knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being and engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes endangerment through a child’s surroundings or a parent’s conduct.

In the Interest of L.W.R.L. and S.O.L. v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-01-16(b)(1)(D), (E)

We conclude that the Department established, by clear and convincing evidence, that Jill committed the predicate acts enumerated in subsections D and E.

Under subsection (b)(1)(E), evidence of unstable housing, untreated mental health needs, failure to complete a court-ordered service plan, and suspended visits can support an endangerment finding.

In the Interest of I.E., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-01-16(b)(1)(E)

We also conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish that Appellant violated subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E).

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed a child to endangering surroundings or engaged in or knowingly exposed the child to endangering conduct.

In the Interest of A.D.-P., J.E.-D., and S.E.-D. v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-01-16(b)(1)(D), (E)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, we conclude that the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed Amanda, Jacob, and Sue to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed them with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly leaves a child in endangering surroundings; subsection (E) permits termination for a parent’s course of conduct that endangers a child.

In the Interest of C.J.P., L.B.P., and J.J.P., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-12-23(b)(1)(D), (E)

We therefore hold the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment finding under subsections (D) and (E).

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly kept children in an endangering environment or engaged in an endangering course of conduct.

In the Interest of A.J.O., A.J.C., A.L.C., and A.J.C., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-12-18(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

We hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s subsection (D) and (E) findings as to Father.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent endangered a child through the child's surroundings or the parent's conduct.

In the Interest of A.S. v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-09-19(b)(1)(D), (E)

We conclude that the Department established, by clear and convincing evidence, that Chad committed the predicate acts enumerated in subsections D and E.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being; a pattern of instability and injuries in the parent’s care can support that finding.

In the Interest of J.H., A.H., and S.H., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-10-17(b)(1)(E)

For the above reasons, we hold that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding of endangerment under Subsection (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent exposed a child to endangering surroundings or engaged in endangering conduct, including repeated exposure to domestic violence.

In the Interest of E.M.A., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-10-23(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

Further, after considering the entire record, including any disputed or contrary evidence, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s termination under subsections (D) and (E) of the Texas Family Code.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit endangerment findings based on unsafe surroundings or a parent’s conduct without proof that the child was injured or witnessed the conduct.

R. R. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2024-10-25(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

But the endangerment grounds do not require proof that the child actually suffer injury from the parent’s conduct or limit the review of a parent’s conduct to his or her conduct in the presence of the ... child.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) addresses a child’s endangering surroundings, while (E) addresses a parent’s endangering course of conduct.

In the Interest of G.M.S. and G.W.S.-S. v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-10-31(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

Having reviewed the entire record under this standard, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury’s findings with respect to subsections (D) and (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination for knowingly leaving a child in endangering conditions, while subsection (E) addresses endangering conduct.

In the Interest of J.G., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-11-12(b)(1)(D), (E)

We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support termination of Mother’s parental rights as to D.G. and J.G. under both subsections (D) and (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being, including through continued narcotics use.

In the Interest of H. M.-W. J., E. R. J. AKA Baby Boy M., Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2024-11-21(b)(1)(E)

Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that father engaged, or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) address endangerment arising from a child’s surroundings and from a parent’s conduct, respectively.

M. S. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2024-11-22(b)(1)(D) and (E)

Given the evidence here, a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father subjected the children to endangerment under subsection (D) and (E).

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent knowingly leaves a child in an endangering environment or follows a course of conduct that endangers the child.

In the Interest of E. A. R. AKA A. E. R. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2024-12-03(b)(1)(D), (E)

We hold the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent knowingly exposes a child to an endangering environment or engages in a course of conduct that endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of B.M. and M.M., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-11-22(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

Accordingly, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support parental termination under subsections (D) and (E).

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent knowingly leaves a child in endangering surroundings or engages in endangering conduct.

In the Interest of A.Y.G., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-10-30(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

After reviewing the competent evidence under the appropriate standards of review, we conclude that a factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother knowingly allowed A.Y.G. to remain in conditions or surroundings and engaged in conduct (e.g., prolonged illegal drug use, failure to provide proof of stable housing and employment, and a period of recent incarceration) which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of A.Y.G.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed a child to dangerous surroundings or engaged in conduct that endangered the child.

In the Interest of R.R and RR a Minor Child v. the Department of Family and Protective Services; Marcus Omar Neal · filed 2024-12-02(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

Considering the entire record, we conclude that the disputed evidence that the trial court could not have credited in favor of the finding is not so significant that the trial court could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that its findings pursuant to subsections (D) and (E) were true.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent exposes a child to endangering surroundings or engages in an endangering course of conduct.

In the Interest of J.A.D., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-10-16(b)(1)(D), (E)

Therefore, we hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s subsection (D) and (E) findings.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination for endangerment without proof that the child suffered actual injury.

In the Interest of K.N., K.L., K.L., and K.L., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-09-19(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

Though endangering requires more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a questionable family environment, the child need not suffer actual injury to satisfy the parameters of either (D) or (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent exposes children to endangering conditions or conduct, including continued exposure to drugs and a dangerous person in the home.

In the Interest of B.C.F., Jr., D.E.F., A.R.F., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-09-18(b)(1)(D), (E)

When considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother knowingly placed the children in conditions or surroundings endangering their well-being. ... Because Mother allowed the children to be continuously exposed to D.T., drugs, and verbal altercations, the trial court could have also formed a firm belief or conviction that termination was justified under subsection (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed a child to dangerous conditions or engaged in endangering conduct.

In the Interest of O.O., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-10-04(b)(1)(D), (E)

Having reviewed the entire record, including the trial court’s extensive, unchallenged findings of fact, we conclude the Department carried its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child,” see TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), and “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child,” see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

Section 161.001(b) permits termination when one statutory ground and the child's best interest are established, even if another ground is disputed.

In the Interest of I.Z., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-10-17(b)

The jury’s Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) findings, coupled with the jury’s best-interest finding, sufficed to support the trial court’s termination order.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent’s abuse of another child endangers the child at issue through the home environment or the parent’s conduct; the abuse need not be directed at the child at issue.

In the Interest of W.H., N.H., and T.D., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-09-13(b)(1)(D), (E)

Father fails to recognize that endangering conduct need not be directed at the child to whom his rights are being terminated. ... Accordingly, we hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s subsection (D) and (E) findings.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit endangerment findings when repeated, unexplained injuries sustained in the parents’ care support an inference that the parents endangered the child.

In the Interest of C.D.L., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-07-10(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

Thus, we hold the evidence is also factually sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment finding under subsections (D) and (E).

Subsections (D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed a child to an endangering environment or engaged in a continuing course of conduct that endangered the child.

In the Interest of A.H., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-08-21(b)(1)(D), (E)

On this record, we conclude that there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Appellant engaged in a continuing course of conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of A.H. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). We likewise conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to establish that Appellant was aware of A.H.’s endangering environment prior to removal and consciously disregarded it. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent knowingly exposes children to endangering surroundings or engages in an endangering course of conduct.

In the Interest of O.S.G., O.N v. and O.H v. Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-08-29(b)(1)(D) and (E)

Therefore, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support termination of Father’s parental rights under subsections (D) and (E) of Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent knowingly exposes a child to endangering conditions or engages in conduct that endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of W.T., A.T., R.T., S.B., E.B., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-08-28(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

We conclude the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that, before their removal, Mom and Dad knowingly engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical and emotional well-being.

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly kept children in endangering surroundings or engaged in conduct that endangered them.

In the Interest of A.M.A., N.X.A., N.A.A., and A.J.A., Children v. the Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2024-08-27(b)(1)(D), (E)

Thus, we hold that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the subsection (D) and (E) predicate endangerment findings, and we overrule Mother’s second issue to the extent it challenges those findings.

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a child’s surroundings or a parent’s conduct endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of K.G., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-08-22(b)(1)(D), (E)

Because the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support both endangerment grounds, we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the remaining grounds.

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly kept a child in endangering surroundings or engaged in conduct that endangered the child.

In the Interest of Q.M-K., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-08-07(b)(1)(D), (E)

After reviewing the evidence under the appropriate standards of review, we conclude that a factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother knowingly allowed Q.M.-K. to remain in conditions and surroundings and engaged in conduct (e.g., prolonged illegal drug use—including during Mother’s pregnancy with Q.M.-K.—and association with individuals who used illegal substances) that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of Q.M.-K.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent endangered a child through the child’s surroundings or through the parent’s conduct.

In the Interest of J. C., M. C. and K. J. C., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-07-31(b)(1)(D), (E)

Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support termination of J.P.C.’s parental rights under subsections (D) and (E) of Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1).

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) focus on endangerment; compliance with a court-ordered family service plan is not the test for either ground.

M. Y. and D. Y. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2024-07-03(b)(1)(D), (E)

Whether a parent has complied with (or has the ability to comply with) a court-ordered family service plan is not the relevant analysis for subsection (D) or (E); rather, the focus of subsections (D) and (E) is endangerment.

Subsection (b)(1)(D) addresses endangering conditions or surroundings, and subsection (b)(1)(E) addresses endangering conduct; either ground can support termination when proved by clear and convincing evidence.

In the Interest of L.L., L.L., L.L., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-07-18(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

Moreover, in light of the entire record, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that L.L. knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being, and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

Subsection (D) covers endangerment before removal, including prenatal drug use; subsection (E) also covers a parent’s endangering conduct after removal.

In the Interest of R.M., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-08-28(b)(1)(D), (E)

Based on the trial evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that M.L. endangered R.M. both before and after removal, beginning with using drugs while pregnant (resulting in R.M. testing positive for methamphetamine at birth) and ending with an arrest for possession of methamphetamine after substance abuse treatment (resulting in incarceration from October 2023, on).

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) permit endangerment findings when a parent’s drug use creates a substantial risk of harm to the child.

J. H. and A. L. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2024-07-03(b)(1)(D), (E)

Here, Irene herself tested positive for methamphetamine, confirming that Mother’s drug use created a substantial risk of harm to Irene. This evidence alone permitted the factfinder to reasonably find endangerment to Irene by Mother.

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) provide endangerment grounds for terminating parental rights.

In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-04-30(b)(1)(D) and (E)

We also conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish that Father violated subsections (D) and (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly allows a child to remain in endangering conditions, and subsection (E) covers a conscious course of conduct that endangers a child.

In the Interest of K.L.G., K.L.G., K.A.R.G., K.L.G., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-04-30(b)(1)(D), (E)

Based on the foregoing and giving due deference to the trial court’s findings and the appropriate standards of review, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being and engaged in a conscious course of conduct including not only acts but also omissions or failures to act that endangered the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Accordingly, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the challenged statutory grounds for termination, and we overrule Father’s two issues.

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) permit endangerment findings based on a parent’s drug use, missed drug tests, and other evidence of unsafe care.

In the Interest of D.J., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-04-30(b)(1)(D), (E)

Applying the standards of review set forth above, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment findings.

A parent’s pattern of drug abuse and related dangers to the child can support endangerment findings under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E).

In the Interest of Z.D., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-05-08(b)(1)(D), (E)

With respect to the trial court’s endangerment findings in particular, the evidence established that Appellant’s pattern of drug abuse, accompanied by related dangers to the child, presented a substantial risk of harm to the child and rendered ... Appellant incapable of parenting.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination for endangering conditions or a parent’s endangering conduct when supported by clear and convincing evidence.

In the Interest of A.T.G., A.G.G., A.G.G. II, A.G.G., and A.G.G., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-05-13(b)(1)(D), (E)

We conclude that the evidence detailed herein, taken together, is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of endangering conditions and endangerment by Father. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes an endangering environment or endangering conduct, respectively.

In the Interest of J.E.F. and J.J.F., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-05-13(b)(1)(D), (E)

When viewed through the applicable standards of review, the evidence described above is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent endangered a child through the child’s surroundings or the parent’s conduct.

In the Interest of J.J. III and D.R.L.J., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-06-03(b)(1)(D), (E)

Further, after considering the entire record, including any disputed or contrary evidence, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s termination under subsections (D) and (E) of the Texas Family Code.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination for endangering conditions or conduct when supported by clear and convincing evidence; repeated physical and emotional abuse can satisfy those grounds, but mere proximity to another child’s abuse does not.

In the Interest of K.N., K.L., K.L., and K.L., Children · filed 2026-06-05(b)(1)(D)-(E)

As to Mother, we hold that legally sufficient evidence supported the Paragraph (D) and (E) predicates that led to the termination of her parental rights as to Karen. ... As to Father, we hold that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish the endangerment predicates under Paragraphs (D) and (E).

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows endangering surroundings or a parent’s course of endangering conduct, including drug use.

In the Interest of P.A., Jr., L.L.-A., and S.A., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-06-05(b)(1)(D), (E)

Having found that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s grounds D and E findings, we overrule the parents’ first point of error.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed a child to endangering conditions or engaged in conduct that endangered the child.

In the Interest of J.C.B.G., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-06-17(b)(1)(D), (E)

Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and disregarding all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found incredible, we conclude that the evidence would enable a factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being and that she likewise engaged in a course of ... conduct that endangered their well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

Subsection (b)(1)(D) requires proof that a parent knew of an endangering environment, while subsection (b)(1)(E) requires proof of a course of endangering conduct; incarceration alone does not establish either ground.

In the Interest of P.H.S. and E.K.S., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-06-24(b)(1)(D), (E)

To put it plainly, the Department wholly failed to meet its burden to connect the circumstances around Father’s incarceration to a course of conduct that endangered the children. Thus, the evidence is legally insufficient to terminate Father’s parental rights under subsection (E). ... As mentioned above, the Department wholly failed to provide evidence that Father knew of the children’s dangerous circumstances while in Mother’s care. The Department further failed to establish a causal link between the circumstances surrounding Father’s incarceration to the endangering environment the children were subjected to while they were in Mother’s care. Thus, the evidence is legally insufficient to terminate Father’s parental rights under subsection (D).

Under subsection (b)(1)(P), methamphetamine use during pregnancy can support a finding that a parent’s controlled substance use endangered the child’s health or safety.

In the Interest of S.Q.-M.B., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-08-21(b)(1)(P)

The trial court could have reasonably found the evidence of S.S.B.’s drug use during pregnancy supported a finding that she used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered S.Q.-M.B.’s health or safety.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination when a mother’s drug use during pregnancy endangers the child, even if the child is removed at birth.

In the Interest of B. A. M. A/K/A B. M. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2026-01-22(b)(1)(D)

Based on Mother’s admitted methamphetamine use throughout her pregnancy and her positive test for methamphetamine at Ben’s birth, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction Mother’s actions endangered Ben by knowingly placing him or allowing him to remain in conditions or surroundings endangering his physical or emotional well-being. ... We therefore hold the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment finding under subsection (D).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s drug use during pregnancy endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

R. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2026-03-20(b)(1)(E)

The evidence of Mother’s drug use during pregnancy is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Ground (E) exists.

Section 161.001(c)(4) does not protect a parent whose unlawful cannabis use exposes children to the drug when the cannabis was not prescribed to them.

In the Interest C.S. Jr. and Z.S., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-12-12(c)(4)

However, her argument fails because there is no evidence that her children were prescribed low-THC cannabis by the proper authority. The unlawful use of any form of cannabis in the presence of one’s children, regardless of the amount, and the children’s resulting exposure to it, is not tantamount to the cannabis being prescribed to them for their benefit. Thus, Section 161.001(c)(4) is inapplicable here, and we decline to construe this statute beyond its plain and unambiguous meaning.

Section 161.001(c)(6) bars treating a parent’s decision to seek another medical opinion about a child’s care as clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In the Interest of J.M.B. and J.A.B., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-03-12(c)(6)

The family code expressly states evidence that a parent sought a medical opinion from more than one medical provider relating to the child’s medical care does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the children’s best interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(c)(6). Here, Mother’s decision to discontinue the thickener was based on a second medical opinion and is a legally insufficient reason to support the trial court’s best interest findings.

Section 161.001 requires clear and convincing evidence of a listed parental-conduct ground and that termination is in the child's best interest.

In Re T.T. · filed 2007-05-17

In this case, the Department had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Johnny and Melissa engaged in the conduct described in subsection 161.001(1)(D), (E), or (O), and that termination of their parental rights is in the children's best interest.

Section 161.001's clear and convincing evidence burden does not apply when an alleged father's rights are summarily terminated under section 161.002(b)(1) after he fails to timely claim paternity.

in the Interest of J. L. W., a Child · filed 2010-12-29

Therefore, the trial court was statutorily authorized to terminate Benny's rights as an alleged father without requiring the Department to meet the clear and convincing burden of proof found in section 161.001.

Section 161.001(b) requires clear and convincing evidence for termination of parental rights; that burden does not apply to a conservatorship modification.

In the Interest of E.L.D., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-09-25(b)

Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). On the other hand, a finding that appointment of a parent as managing conservator would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development is governed by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Id. §§ 105.005, 153.131(a); Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. 1990). The trial court did not err in instructing the jury to base its verdict on the preponderance of the evidence.

Subsection (b)(1)(O) remains applicable to an appeal filed before its September 1, 2025 repeal.

In the Interest of S.L., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-10-21(b)(1)(O)

Because the notice of appeal was filed prior to the effective date of HB 116, subsection (O) remains in effect for the purpose of this appeal.

The prior version of Section 161.001(b)(1), including ground (O), applies to cases filed before September 1, 2025.

In the Interest of D.S. and M.S. v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-11-06(b)(1)(O)

The prior version of the statute controls cases filed before September 1, 2025, and therefore, applies to this case.

The prior version of Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) applies to cases filed before September 1, 2025.

In the Interest of M.G., Jr., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-12-04(b)(1)(O)

The prior version of the statute controls cases filed before September 1, 2025, and therefore, applies to this case.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) cannot support a termination finding in a proceeding pending on or after its September 1, 2025 repeal.

In the Interest of G.L.M., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-04-23(b)(1)(O)

Because the proceedings below were pending on or after the effective date of the amendments to Section 161.001(b), the trial court’s finding pursuant to the repealed version of subsection (O) is void.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly allows a child to remain in an endangering environment; subsection (E) permits termination for an endangering course of conduct, including failures to act.

In the Interest of S.A., A.A., A.L.A., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-02-05(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

Based on the foregoing and giving due deference to the trial court’s findings and the appropriate standards of review, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother and Father knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being and engaged in a conscious course of conduct including not only acts but also omissions or failures to act that endangered the children.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent knowingly exposes a child to endangering surroundings or engages in endangering conduct, including repeated failures to maintain a medically necessary clean environment.

In the Interest of C.R., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-02-25(b)(1)(D)–(E)

Further, after considering the entire record, including any disputed or contrary evidence, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s termination under subsections (D) and (E) of the Texas Family Code.

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) support termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly exposed a child to dangerous conditions or engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the child, even if the parent never had custody.

In the Interest of R.R.L., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-03-05(b)(1)(D), (E)

The evidence is therefore legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under subsections (D) and (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being; repeated illegal drug use and exposure to violence can support that finding.

In the Interest of A.Y a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2026-03-12(b)(1)(E)

Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, and considering any undisputed evidence to the contrary, we conclude that a factfinder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother engaged in a course of conduct that endangered Adam’s physical and emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent’s conduct and the environment to which the parent exposed the children endangered them.

In the Interest of A.I.M.H., S.R v. Jr., and F.K v. Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-03-25(b)(1)(D), (E)

Based on the evidence detailed above, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction Mother’s actions and the environment she subjected them to endangered both children and constituted grounds for termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) support termination on endangerment grounds when a parent’s pattern of drug abuse and related dangers pose a substantial risk of harm to the children.

In the Interest of P.S.R.F, D.M.R.F, D.A.R, P.R.R, B.I.R, B.E.R, B.L.R, and Y.R.R., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-04-23(b)(1)(D), (E)

With respect to the trial court’s endangerment findings in particular, the evidence established that Appellant’s pattern of drug abuse, accompanied by related dangers to the children, presented a substantial risk of harm to the children and rendered Appellant incapable of parenting.

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when a parent’s abusive conduct creates an endangering home environment and forms a deliberate course of conduct endangering a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of D.D.D.-H. A/K/A D.D.D.H., A.R.M., and O.N.H. A/K/A O.H., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-04-28(b)(1)(D) and (E)

Mother’s “inappropriate” and “abusive” conduct directed toward Daniel and Alex created an environment that endangered the physical and emotional well-being of the children, supporting termination under subsection (D). See In re R.R., 711 S.W.3d at 139; In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d at 845. That same conduct was part of a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the children’s physical and emotional well-being, supporting termination under subsection (E).

The 2025 amendment to subsection (O) applies to parental termination suits pending in a trial court on September 1, 2025.

In the Interest of A.R.B., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-05-07(b)(1)(O)

Thus, because this case was pending when the 2025 amendment took effect on September 1, 2025, the trial court was required to apply the newly amended statute.