Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001

Section 161.001(f)'s reasonable efforts requirement applies only to termination suits filed on or after September 1, 2023.

In the Interest of J.S., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-11-06(f)

Because Section 161.001(f) was not the law in effect when the Department initiated the underlying suit, it does not apply.

Section 161.001(f)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child before trial and that a continuing danger in the home prevents the child’s return.

In the Interest of T.D.-B., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-12-12(f)(1)

Here, the Department made reasonable efforts to return Talia to Father by implementing a family service plan and by attempting to complete a home study. ... From this evidence, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father posed a continuing danger to Talia. As a result, we find no error in the trial court’s Section 161.001(f) finding.

Section 161.001(g) requires a termination order to describe with specificity the Department’s reasonable efforts to return the child home when a continuing danger prevented the child’s return.

D. F. and W. C. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2026-01-08(g)

The trial court ordered the termination of the parent-child relationship under subsection (b)(1) and thus its order must comport with subsections (f) and (g). However, the termination order lacks written findings describing with specificity the reasonable efforts the Department made to return the children to their home.

Section 161.001(g) requires specific written findings describing the Department’s reasonable reunification efforts; an order need not explain conflicting drug tests when the record cannot support such a finding and its findings about the efforts are sufficiently specific.

C. Q. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2026-02-05(g)

Mother is correct that the order does not speak to the issue of what the Department did to resolve the inconsistent drug test results; the record does not speak to how the tests might be reconciled and could therefore support no such finding. But the record does support the seventeen findings the trial court included in its order, and Mother does not dispute that those findings are sufficiently specific as to the matters contained therein. We therefore determine that the trial court’s written findings described with sufficient specificity the reasonable efforts the Department made during the pendency of the termination suit to return the child to Mother.

The Department’s attempts to arrange family therapy can satisfy subsection (f)’s reasonable-efforts requirement even when family therapy does not resume.

In the Interest of J.T. and J.T., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-02-12(f)

There is sufficient evidence here for the factfinder to conclude that the Department made reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification by the Department’s attempts to implement family therapy.

Section 161.001(g) requires a separate section of a termination order with specific written findings describing the Department’s reasonable efforts to return the child home.

D. F. and W. C. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2026-02-20(g)

These findings, which are set forth in a separate section of the order, reflect evidence presented at trial regarding the efforts the Department made to return the children to their home and are sufficiently specific to comply with what the plain language of the statute requires.

Subsection (f) requires a specific written finding, supported by clear and convincing evidence, that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child and that a continuing danger in the home prevents return.

R. C. and P. K. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2026-03-04(f)

This constitutes sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that despite the Department’s reasonable efforts to return the children to Mother, a continuing danger in the home prevented their return.

Section 161.001(f) requires clear and convincing evidence of a continuing danger in the home that prevents the child’s return despite reasonable efforts to return the child.

In the Interest of T.M., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-03-19(f)

We conclude that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that there is a continuing danger in Appellant’s home that prevents the return of T.M.

Reasonable reunification efforts under Section 161.001(f)(1) may be shown by a detailed service plan, parent-child visits, and placement with a suitable relative.

C. R. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2026-03-27(f)(1)

There was evidence that the Department created a detailed service plan for Mother, provided Mother with opportunities to visit the children, and placed the children with a relative whom Mother agreed was a good placement. Viewed in a light favorable to the judgment, the evidence was legally sufficient for the factfinder to conclude that the Department made reasonable reunification efforts.

Section 161.001(f)(1) requires the Department to make reasonable efforts to return children to a parent before trial when a continuing danger prevents their return.

In the Interest of A.C. and E.C., Jr., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-03-31(f)(1)

After performing an exacting review of the entire record, we determine that the record is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s reasonable efforts finding.

Section 161.001(f) requires clear and convincing evidence that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child before trial and that a continuing danger in the home prevents the child’s return.

In the Interest of A.J.L. and G.M.L., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-04-08(f)

Because Mother waived a challenge to the statutory grounds for termination as found by the trial court and because we hold the trial court had sufficient evidence to find that the ... Department made reasonable efforts to return the child but did not do so because of a continuing danger in the home, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Section 161.001(f) requires an existing danger that prevents a child’s return, although past parental conduct can support a continuing-danger finding.

In the Interest of TR, RR, Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-04-09(f)

We conclude that, at the least, section 161.001(f) requires that a danger be in existence and prevent return of the child. That does not necessarily mean that prior conduct is insufficient to support a finding of a “continuing danger.”

Section 161.001(f) requires reasonable efforts to reunite a family but does not prescribe particular actions the Department must take.

In the Interest of J.H, A.H, J.H a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2026-04-10(f)

Section 161.001(f) does not mandate any particular actions that the Department must take to demonstrate that it made reasonable efforts to return the children to the parents.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N)(i) allows repeated attempts to contact an unresponsive parent to establish reasonable efforts to return a child; a family service plan is not the only means of proof.

In the Interest of A. Children v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2026-04-14(b)(1)(N)(i)

However, evidence of an FSP is not the exclusive means of establishing that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return a child. ... Here, the record shows that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return Z.A.A. to father. DFPS made consistent efforts to contact father throughout the case, which father rejected.

Subsections (f) and (g) require specific written findings about the Department’s efforts to return a child, and a parent must raise missing findings in the trial court to preserve the complaint for appeal.

In the Interest of A.W., N.W., N.W., P.W., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-05-07(f), (g)

Therefore, the termination order was required to comply with subsections (f) and (g) by including separate sections with specific, written findings about the Department’s reasonable efforts to return the children to their home. It is undisputed that the trial court’s termination order failed to do so. ... Because Mother did not object to the trial court’s failure to comply with subsections 161.001(f) and (g), that error cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal.

Under subsection (f)(1), a family service plan, therapy, contact with the parent, efforts to place the child with a relative, and visitation can support a finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child.

L. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2026-05-22(f)(1)

As a matter of legal sufficiency, we conclude that the evidence allowed the trial court to form a firm belief or conviction that the Department made reasonable efforts to return Child to Mother.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) does not require the parent’s conviction to occur before the termination petition is filed.

in the Interest of C.C.L., a Child · filed 2013-10-11(1)(Q)

Nor does the language of subsection Q contain the requirement that the parent’s conviction occur before the filing of the petition.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination based on criminal conduct that occurred before the child’s conception if the resulting imprisonment leaves the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years from the petition’s filing.

in the Interest of J.M.G., a Child · filed 2016-10-27(b)(1)(Q)

Subsection Q simply does not speak to the relationship between the time of conception of the child and the time of occurrence of the criminal conduct.

Section 161.001(1)(P) permits termination when a parent's controlled substance use endangers the children and the parent fails to complete court-ordered treatment.

in the Interest of A.F., C.J., Jr., C.J., C.J., Children · filed 2015-04-01(1)(P)

We hold this evidence is such that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Father used a controlled substance, failed to complete drug treatment, and Father’s drug use endangered the health and safety of his children.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(P) supplies a termination ground when a parent’s controlled-substance use endangers a child and continues after court-ordered treatment.

in the Interest of K.D., a Child · filed 2018-11-27(b)(1)(P)

For example, there was evidence that Mother tested positive for methamphetamine when K.D. was found walking down the street alone, and again tested positive for methamphetamine in a hair follicle test after she had completed a court-ordered substance abuse program, establishing a violation of subsection (P) of section 161.001(b)(1).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(P) permits termination when a parent uses a controlled substance in a way that endangers a child and continues to abuse a controlled substance after completing court-ordered treatment.

in the Interest of A.L.H., S.S.H., H.R.H., H.L.H., V.A.P., R.J.R., Children · filed 2021-03-24(b)(1)(P)

We therefore hold that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding under subsection (P).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(P) permits termination when a parent uses a controlled substance in a way that endangers the child and continues to abuse a controlled substance after completing a court-ordered treatment program.

in the Interest of F.A.M., Jr, a Child · filed 2021-06-09(b)(1)(P)

We conclude factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that G.R. violated section 161.001(b)(1)(P), and therefore overrule G.R.’s first argument on appeal.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(P) requires use of a controlled substance; alcohol use alone does not satisfy that ground for termination.

In the Interest of A. C. K. A/K/A A. K. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2024-03-21(b)(1)(P)

Alcohol is not listed on the schedules of controlled substances maintained by the Department of State Health Services or in any of the penalty groups found in the Health and Safety Code.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(P) permits termination when a parent’s pattern of controlled substance use impairs the parent’s ability to parent and presents a substantial risk of harm to the child’s health or safety.

In THE INTEREST OF R.R.A., H.G.A., H.B.A., CHILDREN v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-03-22(b)(1)(P)

A parent’s pattern of illegal use of a controlled substance like methamphetamine supports a finding of endangerment under (P) when the evidence shows it adversely affected the parent’s ability to parent, presenting a substantial risk of harm to the child’s health and safety.

Subsection (b)(1)(P) permits termination when a parent’s controlled substance use endangers a child and the parent fails to complete court-ordered treatment.

In the Interest of J.D.R., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-09-25(b)(1)(P)

Based on these facts, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that J.R. used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the child and failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(P) requires endangering controlled substance use and either failure to complete court-ordered treatment or continued abuse after completing it.

In the Interest of H.M.Q. a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2025-04-08(b)(1)(P)

This section provides for termination when a parent used a controlled substance in a way that endangered his or her child’s health and safety and the parent either failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program or continued to abuse a controlled substance after the completion of a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program. ... Given this record, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s section 161.001(b)(1)(P) finding.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(P) permits termination when a parent’s controlled substance use endangers a child and the parent continues using after completing court-ordered treatment.

In the Interest of T.I.P. and I.O., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-11-12(b)(1)(P)

After reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that N.B. used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health and safety of the children, and that after completion of a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program, N.B. continued to use a controlled substance.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(P) permits termination when a parent uses a controlled substance in a way that endangers a child and continues to abuse it after completing court-ordered treatment.

In the Interest of J.C.D.Y. A/K/A J.Y., J.E.D.Y. AKA J.Y., M.M.D.Y. AKA M.Y., J.T.D.Y., AKA J.Y. Children v. Department · filed 2026-02-03(b)(1)(P)

Further, in view of the entire record, we conclude that the disputed evidence is not so significant as to prevent the trial court from forming a firm belief or conviction that prior to the September 2023 order, Mother used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health or safety of Jack, John, and Mark, and Mother continued to abuse a controlled substance after she completed a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(P) permits termination when a parent’s controlled substance use endangers a child and the parent fails to complete court-ordered treatment or continues abusing a controlled substance after completing it.

In the Interest of J.C.D.Y. A/K/A J.Y., J.E.D.Y. AKA J.Y., M.M.D.Y. AKA M.Y., J.T.D.Y., AKA J.Y. Children v. Department · filed 2026-03-24(b)(1)(P)

Moreover, because there is legally and factually sufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that Mother committed the predicate act under Section 161.001(b)(1)(P), we need not consider whether there is sufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s findings under Subsections (E) and (O).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) permits termination when a parent uses a controlled substance in a manner that endangers a child and fails to complete court-ordered substance abuse treatment.

In the Interest of M.S., M.J.S., and N.E.S., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-06-10(b)(1)(O)

Thus, the trial court could form a firm belief or conviction that Father used a controlled substance—methamphetamines—in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the children and failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program.

Section 161.001 does not require evidence of a material and substantial change in circumstances to terminate parental rights.

in the Interest of E.C.C. · filed 2018-01-18

Section 161.001 of the Family Code, which provides for involuntary termination of parental rights, does not require evidence of a material and substantial change.

Subsection (b)(1)(L) requires serious injury to a child, but the injury need not meet the Penal Code’s definition of serious bodily injury.

In the Interest of O.S., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-11-14(b)(1)(L)

All that is required is a showing of a “serious injury”—a showing of a “hurt, damage, or loss sustained” that has “important or dangerous possible consequences.”

Serious injury under subsection (L) does not require serious bodily injury and can include psychological or emotional harm.

in the Interest of Z.W., a Child · filed 2018-09-13(b)(1)(L)

Demonstrating “serious injury” to a child under subsection (L) does not require a showing of “serious bodily injury” as defined in the penal code.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(L) permits a jury to infer serious injury from a parent’s conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14.

in the Interest of D.D.-G.P., a Child · filed 2019-02-12(b)(1)(L)

We therefore hold that the jury could infer serious injury from Don’s father’s conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 years of age for the purpose of termination under section 161.001(b)(1)(L).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(L) permits a jury to infer serious injury from a parent’s conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14.

in the Interest of D.D.-G.P., a Child · filed 2019-04-02(b)(1)(L)

We therefore hold that the jury could infer serious injury from Don’s father’s conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 years of age for the purpose of termination under section 161.001(b)(1)(L).

A conviction for indecency with a child alone does not prove the serious injury required for termination under subsection (L).

in the Interest of Z. N., a Child · filed 2019-06-06(b)(1)(L)(iv)

Nor can we agree with the Department that it proves serious injury merely by proving a conviction for indecency with a child.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(L)(iv) permits termination when a parent’s conviction for indecency with a child supports a finding that the child suffered serious injury.

in the Interest of Z. N., a Child · filed 2020-12-22(b)(1)(L)(iv)

With regard to our review of the evidence in this matter for factual sufficiency, we hold that the finder of fact was the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, and was permitted to infer from the undisputed evidence that the children suffered serious injury from S.N.’s criminal conduct. Accordingly, in light of the entire record, we cannot say there exists any evidence contrary to the finding that is so significant it would have reasonably prevented a factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction that S.N.’s criminal acts caused serious injury to his child victims for the purpose of ground (L).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(L)(x) requires evidence that an abandonment or endangerment offense caused a child’s death or serious injury; deferred adjudication community supervision for the offense alone does not establish serious injury.

In the Interest of X.R., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-06-03(b)(1)(L)(x)

In sum, we have no evidence from which a person may reasonably infer that the unexplained form of abandonment or endangerment to which AM pleaded guilty resulted in serious injury to XR. Thus, no evidence supports the trial court’s finding related to § 161.001(b)(1)(L)(x).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(L) and (Q) can support termination when the grounds are tried by consent and sufficient evidence supports the findings.

in the Interest of J.M.B. III and A.J.J. · filed 2018-10-04(b)(1)(L), (b)(1)(Q)

We therefore conclude that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s findings regarding subsections (L) and (Q).

Termination under subsection (b)(1)(C) cannot rest on a ground that was neither pleaded nor tried by consent.

in the Interest of I.A.B.N., a Child · filed 2022-09-29(b)(1)(C)

We hold that the trial court erred by finding, in its termination order, that Father violated subsection (C) because Mother did not plead subsection (C) as a predicate ground for termination and the parties did not try the issue by consent at the November 2021 hearing.

Section 161.001(c)(2) prohibits terminating parental rights based on a parent’s economic disadvantage.

in the Interest of G.N., N.G., A.G., and C.S., Children · filed 2018-12-27(c)(2)

A court may not order termination of the parent-child relationship based on evidence that the parent is “economically disadvantaged.” ... Instead, it is apparent that, although J.R.’s ability to financially provide for her family is in doubt, that is due in large part to economic disadvantage. In light of this, our consideration of the fourth and sixth Holley factors weighs neither for nor against termination.

Section 161.001(c)(2) bars a best interest finding and termination of parental rights based on a parent’s economic disadvantage.

in the Interest of G.A.L., a Child · filed 2020-02-06(c)(2)

However, the trial court may not make a best interest finding against a parent based on evidence that a parent is economically disadvantaged, FAM. CODE § 161.001(c)(2), and indeed the court’s termination order recites that it is not based on such evidence. Although we agree that the evidence supports a conclusion that Mother could have difficulty financially providing for G.A.L., the evidence indicates that this difficulty would be due to economic disadvantage, and there is no evidence tying her financial problems to any misconduct on her part. Therefore, we do not include this evidence in our final analysis.

Section 161.001(c)(2) bars termination based on a parent’s economic disadvantage but permits the Department to offer evidence of it.

in the Interest of A.F.,A.F., and A.F., Jr., Children · filed 2020-03-19(c)(2)

The statute limits the bases that a court may use to order a parental termination under subsection 161.001(b), but subsection (c) neither requires nor prohibits the Department from offering evidence that the parent is economically disadvantaged. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the termination of Kate’s parental rights was not improper just because some of the evidence indicated that she is economically disadvantaged.

Section 161.001(c)(2) prevents a court from treating a parent’s economic disadvantage as sufficient evidence for termination, but does not bar evidence of that disadvantage.

in the Interest of J.M.F. and J.H.B., Children · filed 2022-06-22(c)(2)

The statute limits the bases that a court may use to order a parental termination under subsection 161.001(b), but subsection (c) neither requires nor prohibits the Department from offering evidence that ... the parent is economically disadvantaged.

Section 161.001(c)(2) says a parent’s economic disadvantage does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that termination is in a child’s best interest.

In the Interest of J.T.W., and J.L.A., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-07-02(c)(2)

While we understand the trial court’s concern, the Family Code expressly states a parent’s economic disadvantage does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the children’s best interests.

Section 161.001(c) prohibits termination grounds based on listed circumstances but does not require the Department to prove those circumstances were absent.

in the Interest of D.B., B.N.B., and T.L.S., Children · filed 2019-02-20(c)

In the absence of any authority to the contrary, we conclude the Department was not required to prove the trial court’s finding of grounds for termination was not based on evidence of any of the circumstances listed in section 161.001(c).

Section 161.001(c) prohibits termination based on its listed circumstances but does not require the Department to prove those circumstances are absent.

in the Interest of E. A. M. v. a Child · filed 2019-05-01(c)

In the present case, the Department was not required to provide proof that the grounds for termination were not based any of the circumstances listed in section 161.001(c).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) does not require a person to know he is a parent, or even for the child to have been born, when the criminal conduct occurs.

in the Interest of R.H., a Child · filed 2019-10-03(b)(1)(Q)

More importantly, nothing in the language of section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) requires the subject be aware of his status as a parent at the time of the offense, or even that the child be born before the offense occurs.

Subsection (b)(1)(Q) requires proof that the parent will be incarcerated or confined and unable to care for the child for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

in the Interest of A.D.M., a Child · filed 2019-10-10(b)(1)(Q)

To support a finding under subsection (Q), the record must show that the parent will be incarcerated or confined and unable to care for the child for at least two years from the date the termination petition was filed.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) requires proof that the parent’s criminal conduct will leave the parent confined and unable to care for the child for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

in the Interest of J.E.D., a Child · filed 2019-10-24(b)(1)(Q)

To support a finding under subsection (Q), the record must show that the parent will be incarcerated or confined and unable to care for the child for at least two years from the date the petition for termination was filed. ... Appellant’s projected release date is September 23, 2021, a date that is well after the two-year period required by subsection (Q).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in at least two years of confinement after the petition is filed and the parent cannot care for the child; relying on another parent for care requires an agreement to act on the incarcerated parent’s behalf.

in the Interest of D.D., Jr., a Child · filed 2020-02-19(b)(1)(Q)

In absence of evidence indicating such an agreement, the test espoused in H.R.M. was not met. And, because the Department illustrated that appellant engaged in criminal conduct resulting in his incarceration for the requisite two-year period, we conclude that the decision to terminate appellant’s parental rights under subsection Q has the support of both legally and factually sufficient evidence.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in imprisonment and an inability to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed.

in the Interest of M.M., a Child · filed 2020-03-16(b)(1)(Q)

Thus the trial court was entitled to form a firm belief or conviction that J.M. had engaged in knowing criminal conduct and would remain confined or imprisoned until the expiration of his full term in August 2020, more than two years from the date of the Department’s petition. ... We conclude that no evidence demonstrates how J.M. would provide or arrange to provide for the care of M.M. during his incarceration.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in conviction, imprisonment, and inability to care for the child for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

in the Interest of G.S., a Child · filed 2020-03-19(b)(1)(Q)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father, who pleaded guilty, knowingly engaged in the criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction and confinement, that the duration of his confinement was for more than two years from the date T.S. filed the petition, and that Father was unable to care for G.S. during that time.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent will remain imprisoned for at least two years after the petition is filed and cannot provide or arrange consistent care for the child; temporary babysitting does not fulfill that duty.

in the Interest of H.P., III, a Minor Child · filed 2020-05-01(b)(1)(Q)

We cannot say that the provision of temporary care, such as babysitting, fulfills a parental responsibility to care for a child. ... The trial court could have reached a firm conviction that the requirements of section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) were met, making the evidence legally and factually sufficient.

Under subsection (b)(1)(Q), when criminal conduct results in confinement for at least two years, the parent must produce evidence of how the child will be cared for during that time.

in the Interest of A.T.M., G.B., and P.F.L., Children · filed 2021-06-24(b)(1)(Q)

We conclude that, on this record, ... the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that G.B.’s II criminal conduct and incarceration resulted in his “inability to care for [G.B.] for not less than two years from the date of filing the petition.”

Subsection (b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years; the court may consider whether the parent’s proposed alternative caregivers can adequately provide that care.

in the Interest of J.D. · filed 2021-09-23(b)(1)(Q)

Because the record contains evidence that allowed the trial court to resolve the dispute in favor of the ruling the trial court made terminating Father’s rights to James, his legal sufficiency argument lacks merit and is overruled.

An incarcerated parent relying on relatives to care for a child must show they will do so on the parent’s behalf, rather than from their own obligation or desire.

in the Interest of S.C. · filed 2022-04-07(b)(1)(Q)

While there was some evidence that Father’s brother and his wife agreed to care for Sally and may have been appropriate given their lack of criminal and CPS history coupled with their financial responsibility, Father must establish that they are doing so on behalf of Father, not out of their own, personal obligations to or desires for the child.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent’s criminal conduct resulted in imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years after the petition was filed; a projected parole date within that period does not necessarily defeat the finding.

in the Interest of A.L.R., a Child · filed 2022-08-11(b)(1)(Q)

Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding (legal sufficiency), we hold that a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Appellant knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for A.L.R. for not less than two years from December 12, 2019—the date that the Department filed its petition.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in conviction and the parent will be imprisoned and unable to care for the child for at least two years from the petition date.

in the Interest of O.P., a Child · filed 2022-12-08(b)(1)(Q)

Having determined that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q), we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights.

An incarcerated parent cannot defeat subsection (Q)’s inability-to-care ground by arranging for a caregiver who seeks to terminate that parent’s rights.

In the Interest of E.K. and P.K., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-03-02(b)(1)(Q)

Simply arranging for the children’s care is not enough—the person agreeing to care for the children must agree to do so on behalf of the ... incarcerated parent.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed.

In the Interest of A.C.R., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-06-08(b)(1)(Q)

Here, Appellant did not present any evidence of any arrangements that he had made to provide care for A.C.R. during his period of incarceration. Thus, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that, due to his incarceration, Appellant would be unable to care for A.C.R. for at least two years from the date of the petition. Thus, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under subsection (Q).

Subsection (b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in conviction and an inability to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed; a caregiver must agree to act on the incarcerated parent’s behalf.

In the Interest of C.C., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-09-14(b)(1)(Q)

Thus, the evidence did not show that Aunt and Uncle had agreed to care for C.C. on Father’s behalf. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the Q finding.

Subsection (E) does not require a parent to know that her conduct is dangerous to the child.

in the Interest of M.R., a Child · filed 2019-12-05(b)(1)(E)

Subsection (E) in particular does not include a “knowing” requirement; in other words, the parent need not know that her own conduct is dangerous.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) does not require proof of scienter for a parent’s own endangering acts, but does require it when the parent places the child with others who engage in endangering acts.

in the Interest of C.B., a Child · filed 2023-01-19(b)(1)(E)

However, scienter is not required for a parent’s own acts under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E); scienter is required under subsection (E) only when the parent places the child with others who engage in endangering acts.

A service plan requiring a parent to follow a psychiatrist’s recommendations need not itemize medications, dosages, treatment dates, times, or providers to support termination for material noncompliance.

In the Interest of J.Z.A., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-07-31(b)(1)(O)

We further reject the argument that termination under Subsection (O), based on non-compliance with the mental health recommendations provided by appropriate experts, requires that those recommendations be itemized in the service plan to include specific, named medications, dosages, treatment dates, times, and providers.

Findings under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) must be removed from a termination order when the Department sought termination at trial only under other grounds.

L. R. J. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2020-10-15(b)(1)(D), (E)

Because at trial the Department limited its request for termination to paragraphs (N) and (O), we reform the trial court’s order of termination to delete its findings of statutory grounds under paragraphs (D) and (E).

Subsection (b)(1)(Q) requires evidence that the parent knowingly engaged in the criminal conduct that led to the conviction and incarceration.

in the Interest of C.C. v. . · filed 2020-11-25(b)(1)(Q)

The Department concedes it did not meet its burden of proof to show termination of L.C.’s parental rights was warranted under subsection Q. After reviewing the record, we agree. There is no evidence identifying the offense that resulted in L.C.’s conviction and subsequent incarceration.

One ground under Section 161.001(b)(1), together with a best-interest finding, is sufficient to support termination, so additional grounds need not be decided.

In the Interest of N v. a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-02-20(b)(1)

Because the Subsection (D), (E), and (N) and best-interest findings support the trial court’s termination order, we do not have to decide the Subsection (O) finding.

Section 161.001(b) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes a listed ground and shows that termination is in the child’s best interest; physical abuse and escalating criminal conduct can support the endangering-conduct ground.

In the Interest of W.H., V.H., E.H., and C.R., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-11-07(b)(1)(E), (b)(2)

We need only address the endangering-conduct finding and the best-interest finding, and we hold that sufficient evidence supports both findings.

Section 161.001 requires a best-interest finding and only one predicate ground to support termination of parental rights.

In the Interest of E.P. v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-10-10(b)(1)

Together with a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest, only one predicate finding under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination.

Section 161.001 requires sufficient evidence of one predicate ground and a best-interest finding to affirm a termination judgment.

In the Interest of A.A. Jr. and K.A., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-08-08(b)(1)

Additionally, if the evidence is sufficient as to one predicate act, it is not necessary to address the other predicate acts because sufficient evidence as to only one predicate act in addition to the best interest finding is necessary to affirm a termination judgment.

Section 161.001(b) requires clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interests.

In the Interest of A.J.S., A.B.S., A.R.C., & A.N.M., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-07-17(b)

The record establishes by clear and convincing evidence the grounds for termination and that termination is in the children’s best interests.

Section 161.001(b)(1) requires only one predicate ground for termination, so an appellate court may affirm when other grounds remain unchallenged.

in the Interest of C.W. and M.W., Children · filed 2022-01-13(b)(1)

The trial court found four statutory violations under Section 161.001(b)(1), but Mother challenges only one of the four. ... We need not address Mother’s attack on the one finding because we can affirm on the bases of the other three.

When termination rests on multiple predicate grounds under Section 161.001(b)(1), an appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence must challenge every ground to obtain reversal.

in the Interest of C.U.D., S.L.D., A/K/A S.D., J.P.J.D., K.K.J.D., A.E.D., II, Children v. Texas Department of Family an · filed 2022-03-10(b)(1)

To succeed on appeal from a termination decree, an appellant must establish that the findings on all of the termination grounds found by the factfinder are unsupported by the evidence. ... Because Mother does not challenge three other grounds supportive of the judgment, we need not address her argument that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding on the one ground she challenges on appeal.

Section 161.001 requires only one predicate ground, along with a best-interest finding, to support termination of parental rights.

in the Interest of A.P., a Child · filed 2022-05-04(b)(1)(D)

Because Ashley has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to Subsection (D), we find that there was sufficient evidence as to one ground to support the termination of her parental rights.

Section 161.001(b)(1) requires only one predicate finding to support termination when termination is also found to be in the child’s best interest.

T.Z.M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2022-05-12(b)(1)

Accordingly, counsel’s error does not necessitate additional briefing to comply with the requirements of Anders, because only one predicate finding under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a final order of termination when there is also a finding, as here, that termination is in the child’s best interest.

Section 161.001 requires only one predicate ground and a best-interest finding to support termination of parental rights.

F. T. and B. T. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2022-04-22(b)

Only one predicate ground finding, however, is necessary to support termination of parental rights when there is also a best interest finding.

Section 161.001 permits termination when the court finds at least one predicate ground under subsection (b)(1) and finds that termination is in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of J.J. and L.J., Children · filed 2022-06-02(b)(1)

“Only one predicate finding under Section 161.001[b](1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.” ... Thus, Father’s own testimony established the Department’s Grounds D, E, and L allegations and supported the trial court’s best-interest findings.

One predicate finding under subsection (b)(1), together with a best-interest finding, is sufficient to support termination of parental rights.

In the Interest of E.C., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-12-19(b)(1)

Because only one predicate finding under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support an order of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in a child’s best interest, we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting ... the trial court’s predicate findings under either subsection (F) or (O).

A best-interest finding and one ground under subsection (b)(1) suffice to support termination, so a court need not decide a challenge to an additional ground.

In the Interest of E.L., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-10-10(b)(1)

Because the Subsection (D), (E), and (O) and best-interest findings support the termination order, we do not have to decide the dispute over the Subsection (P) finding.

Section 161.001(b)(1) requires only one predicate ground for termination when termination is also in the child’s best interest.

In the Interest of K.S., a Minor Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2025-04-10(b)(1)

Only one predicate finding under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. ... Because the mother did not challenge both statutory predicate grounds for termination, we need not review the merits of her challenge to the constructive abandonment finding.

Section 161.001 permits termination when sufficient evidence supports an endangerment finding under subsection (D) or (E) and a finding that termination is in the children’s best interest.

In the Interest of I.J.A, A.J.A III, A.J.A, X.J.A., & E.J.A., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-06-11(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E), (b)(2)

Having held that there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s predicate findings under subsections (D) and (E) and to support the trial court’s best-interest finding, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Robert A.’s parental rights.

Section 161.001 requires only one supported predicate ground for termination, so a court need not review other predicate grounds when a parent concedes an endangerment ground is supported.

R. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2025-08-07(b)(1)

However, because Mother does not challenge each of the predicate grounds and concedes that sufficient evidence supports one of the two endangerment grounds, we need not address her challenges to the predicate grounds.

Only one predicate ground under section 161.001(b)(1) is needed to support termination when termination is also found to be in the child’s best interest.

In the Interest of J.M.L.H, a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2026-01-08(b)(1)

Because Mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s predicate findings under subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O) of the Family Code or the trial court’s finding that termination was in J.M.L.H.’s best interest, we need not consider whether sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(N).

Section 161.001(b) requires only one statutory ground and a best-interest finding to affirm a termination judgment.

In the Interest of T.J.T., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-01-21(b)

However, only one statutory ground is necessary to affirm a termination judgment under section 161.001(b) when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.

When termination is valid on another predicate ground, factually insufficient findings under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) should be struck from the order rather than retried.

in the Interest of M.P., a Child · filed 2022-02-04(b)(1)(D), (E)

Thus, the proper remedy was to affirm the trial court’s termination under (O) and strike the (D) and (E) findings, which would dispose of the case.

A termination ground under subsection (b)(1)(P) is waived when it is omitted from the jury charge without objection.

S. W. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2022-11-04(b)(1)(P)

When subsection (P) was not submitted to the jury without objection, the Department waived that ground.

In a jury trial under § 161.001(b), parents must preserve legal and factual sufficiency challenges to termination findings in the trial court.

B. S. and M. S. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2022-11-10(b)

We therefore decline to except factual and legal sufficiency challenges in parental-rights termination cases decided by a jury from the longstanding requirement of error preservation for appellate review.

Challenges to the sufficiency of evidence supporting findings under subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) must be preserved in a jury trial before appellate review.

In the Interest of T.S., L.S., and D.S., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-07-11(b)(1)(D), (E)

Thus, the ruling in N.G. does not eliminate the long-established requirement of error preservation of legal and factual sufficiency issues in parental-rights termination cases decided by a jury.

Under subsection (b)(1)(Q), an incarcerated parent must produce some evidence of an arrangement to care for the child; the other parent’s independent care does not establish that ability.

James Allen Brickley, Jr. v. Marie Laurence Gloria Joseph-Stephen · filed 2023-03-02(b)(1)(Q)

Under H.R.M. and the inability-to-care burden-shifting framework, and given Father’s stipulation to his incarceration and 35-year sentence, Father needed to produce some evidence of his ability to arrange for care for Child outside of Mother’s care.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination, with a best-interest finding, when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in a conviction and at least two years of confinement during which the parent cannot care for the child.

In the Interest of Z.E., Child(ren) v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-05-23(b)(1)(Q)

We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s implied finding that Father knowingly committed criminal conduct that resulted in “imprisonment and inability to care for the children for not less than two years from the date the petition was filed.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(Q); see In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 110.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in conviction, imprisonment for at least two years from the petition’s filing, and inability to care for the child.

In the Interest of I.H., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-11-16(b)(1)(Q)

We conclude that this record contains legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding regarding Appellant’s conviction, continued incarceration, and inability to care for I.H. under subsection (Q).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in a conviction and confinement that leaves the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed.

R. v. Jr. v. S. V. · filed 2024-08-30(b)(1)(Q)

Because we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support termination under subsection (Q), even without considering the MSA and its stipulation as to subsection (Q), any error committed by the trial court in refusing to set aside the MSA is harmless.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) has no placement-time limit; courts may consider all relevant conduct when deciding whether a parent endangered a child.

In the Interest of R.J.N., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-05-24(b)(1)(E)

Subsection (b)(1)(E) does not specify the applicable time period. ... Thus, we consider all of C.N.'s conduct that may be relevant to the question of whether she endangered her son, not just her conduct at the time R.J.N. was placed in C.B.'s care.

Subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) do not require endangerment evidence to come from a specific source.

In the Interest of S.A.L., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-06-08(b)(1)(D), (E)

Nonetheless, the statute does not require that evidence of endangerment come from a specific source.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) requires clear and convincing evidence of conduct endangering a child’s physical or emotional well-being; the father’s anger and arrest history were insufficient here.

In the Interest of N.J., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-08-14(b)(1)(E)

We conclude that these bases, taken together, are insufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that Father engaged in conduct as described in subsection (E).

A parent’s pattern of illegal drug abuse and domestic violence can support endangerment findings under subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E).

In the Interest of J.A.B., J.LB., and J.B., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-04-03(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

Given Vanessa A.’s pattern of illegal drug abuse and domestic violence, of which there was evidence both before and after removal, we hold the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under subsections (D) and (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly allowed children to remain in endangering conditions or engaged in conduct that endangered them.

In the Interest of J.G., J.G., J.G., and J.Z., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-06-13(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

Based on the entire record, we hold that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm conviction or belief that Father had engaged in conduct or had knowingly allowed Andrew, Benson, and Charlotte to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent endangered the children, including by killing their other parent, and termination is in their best interest.

In the Interest of A.K.B., C.J.B., and M.L.A.B. v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-06-20(b)(1)(E)

We hold the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding under section 161.001(b)(1)(E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent endangers a child through the child’s conditions or surroundings or through the parent’s conduct.

S. E. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2024-06-27(b)(1)(D), (E)

Viewing the evidence under the applicable standards of review, we conclude that it was legally and factually sufficient to support the endangerment findings against Mother.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a parent endangers a child through the child’s surroundings or through the parent’s conduct.

Y. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2024-04-10(b)(1)(D), (E)

Thus, we hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings of statutory grounds under subsections (D) and (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D)–(E) allows termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a child was endangered by the child’s environment or by a parent’s course of conduct.

In the Interest of S.G., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-04-25(b)(1)(D)–(E)

We conclude that the quantum of evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under subsections D and E of Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1).

Subsections (D) and (E) permit termination when a parent knowingly allows a child to remain in endangering conditions or engages in conduct that endangers the child.

In the Interest of E.S.P., C.S.P., U.A.S.P., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-04-17(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E)

After reviewing the evidence under the appropriate standards of review, we conclude that a factfinder could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother and Father knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings and engaged in conduct (e.g., prolonged illegal drug use, including during Mother’s pregnancy with U.A.S.P. and her unborn child) which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children.