Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07

Section 1.07(a)(23)’s definition of felony includes state jail felonies.

State v. Thompson · filed 1995-10-26(a)(23)

To the contrary, state jail felonies are included within the definition of felony.

Section 1.07(a)(23) defines “felony” to include an offense designated by law as a state jail felony.

Adger v. State · filed 1999-12-23(a)(23)

Under this definition, a state jail felony, i.e., “an offense so designatéd,” is a felony.

Section 1.07(a)(23) defines felony to include an offense designated a felony by law; a state jail felony therefore counts as a felony unless specifically excluded.

Waits v. State · filed 2000-01-13(a)(23)

The penal code defines “felony” in subsection 1.07(a)(23) as “an offense so designated by law or punishable by death or confinement in a penitentiary.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(23) (Vernon 1994). ... Hence, as its name suggests, a “state jail felony” is a felony under the penal code. Unless specifically excluded, then, state jail felonies are and will be treated as “felonies.”

Section 1.07 defines a felony to include an offense designated as a felony by Texas statute, including delivery of cocaine under the Health and Safety Code.

in Re: Benjamin Wayne McCoin · filed 2002-11-01(a)(23), (a)(30)

The definition of "felony" is "an offense so designated by law or punishable by death or confinement in a penitentiary." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(23) (Vernon Supp. 2008). The Code further defines "law" as including "the constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(30) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Since the Health and Safety Code is a Texas law that designates delivery of cocaine as a felony, and this felony is not manslaughter, the plain reading of the statute leads us to conclude delivery of a controlled substance can be used to supply the underlying offense in a felony murder charge.

Section 1.07 defines “felony” and “law” so that a felony designated by the Texas Health and Safety Code can supply the underlying offense for felony murder.

Christian v. State · filed 2009-04-24(a)(23), (a)(30)

The definition of “felony” is “an offense so designated by law or punishable by death or confinement in a penitentiary.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(23) (Vernon Supp.2008). The Code further defines “law” as including “the constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(30) (Vernon Supp.2008). Since the Health and Safety Code is a Texas law that designates delivery of cocaine as a felony, and this felony is not manslaughter, the plain reading of the statute leads us to conclude delivery of a controlled substance can be used to supply the underlying offense in a felony murder charge.

Section 1.07(a)(23) defines a felony to include an offense punishable by confinement in a penitentiary, including an out-of-state offense used for enhancement.

Ozuna v. State · filed 2011-05-27(a)(23)

Because Ozuna was sentenced to time in a penitentiary, his conviction for assault by a confined person was a felony under Texas law.

Section 1.07’s definitions allow an offense punishable by confinement in both a penitentiary and a jail to qualify as both a felony and a misdemeanor.

State v. Richardson · filed 2014-06-05(23), (31)

But he is not correct when he concludes that if his offense meets section 1.07’s definition of “misdemeanor” that it could not also meet that of “felony.” As we have seen, the “aggravated misdemeanor” in Iowa meets the definitions of both “felony” and “misdemeanor” in Texas. Under section 1.07 of our penal code, at least, Appellee’s prior offense was both a felony and a misdemeanor.

Section 1.07’s definition of “felony” includes state-jail felonies because they are designated as felonies by law.

Dustin Wade Hestand AKA Dustin W. Hestand v. State · filed 2020-02-27(a)(23)

In the Penal Code, a felony is defined as “an offense so designated by law or punishable by death or confinement in a penitentiary,” and state-jail felonies are expressly classified as felonies.

A viewing booth is a public place when the public has free access to it; one occupant cannot make it private by closing and locking the door.

Westbrook v. State · filed 1981-10-22(29)

Appellant intruded upon Roberts, a stranger, indicating that the public had free access to the room. The public nature of the booth could not be changed by appellant, acting alone, closing and locking the door.

A public place is any place the public can access, including streets and highways.

Hutchison v. State · filed 1993-06-30(29)

A "public place" means any place to which the public has access and includes, but is not limited to, streets and highways. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(29) (West 1974). ... We hold that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was driving his pickup in a public place when he lost control, crashed through the fence, and came to rest on Thomas's property.

Section 1.07(a)(40) includes a guarded military base as a public place when a broad segment of the public can access and use its roads without supervision.

Woodruff v. State · filed 1995-05-31(a)(40)

We hold that Bergstrom fell within the definition of "public place" as set forth in the relevant statutes and interpreted by case law.

Section 1.07(a)(40) defines a public place by public access; a vacant house used for storage did not qualify.

Waddell v. State · filed 1996-03-13(a)(40)

In addition, the evidence does not suggest that the house was a "public place," defined by the Penal Code as "any place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes, but is not limited to streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals . . . ." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(40) (West 1994).

Section 1.07(a)(40) treats a Dallas street as a public place.

Peddicord v. State · filed 1997-02-28(a)(40)

Although no officer saw appellant drive the Honda, they observed the aftermath of the accident involving the Honda with appellant sitting behind the steering wheel on a Dallas street, a public place.

A place is public under § 1.07(a)(40) when the public can enter it, even if it is enclosed or charges an entrance fee.

State v. Nailor · filed 1997-05-07(a)(40)

These distinctions are without legal significance. First, that a lot is wide and open verses enclosed is irrelevant to the determination of whether the place is one to which the public has access. The relevant inquiry is whether the public can enter the premises. Second, a place can be public, despite the requirement of an entrance fee.

Section 1.07(a)(40) treats an accessible park as a public place regardless of its hours of operation.

Perry v. State · filed 1999-02-03(a)(40)

In the instant case, the evidence before the trial court was that the park was accessible to the public and is therefore a public place under 1.07(a)(40) of the penal code, regardless of its hours of operation or manner of access.

A marina accessible to the public is a public place under section 1.07(a)(40).

Shaub v. State · filed 2003-01-16(a)(40)

A rational jury could have found from the facts and the reasonable inferences from those facts that the marina was a public place within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1.07(a)(40) defines a public place by public access; a marina accessible to anyone who wants to use it qualifies.

Shaub v. State · filed 2003-01-16(a)(40)

We hold that, in the instant case, the marina is a public place. We agree with the State that the evidence before the trial court was sufficient for the jury to infer that the public has access to the marina and it therefore is a public place.

Section 1.07(a)(40) defines a public place by whether the public has access to it; a marina accessible to anyone qualifies.

Shaub v. State · filed 2003-03-13(a)(40)

We hold that, in the instant case, the marina is a public place. We agree with the State that the evidence before the trial court was sufficient for the jury to infer that the public has access to the marina and it therefore is a public place.

Section 1.07(a)(40) defines a public place as a place accessible to the public or a substantial group of the public, including streets and highways.

Perry v. State · filed 2003-04-24(a)(40)

The penal code defines "public place" as any place that the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes, but it not limited to, streets and highways. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(40) (Vernon 2003). When defense counsel asked Rinard whether the road where the accident occurred was heavily traveled, he responded, "At times." Officer Tuggle also described the area as a "small, narrow roadway." Thus, appellant was operating a motor vehicle in a public place.

A place does not become a public place merely because an automobile can enter it; the public or a substantial group of the public must have access.

Ex Parte Natalee Mychelle Walters · filed 2006-05-11(a)(40)

Given the numerous private lands where individuals operate automobiles that the public or a substantial group of the public does not have access to, we disagree that any place one can enter with an automobile is then automatically considered a public place.

Section 1.07(a)(40) includes an apartment complex parking lot within the definition of a public place when it is a common area, regardless of the complex's size or whether the lot is gated.

State v. McAlpin · filed 2007-03-07(a)(40)

Under the penal code, a "public place" means any place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and expressly includes the common areas of apartment houses. ... Nevertheless, the conclusion that the parking lot was a common area of an apartment building did not turn on the size of the complex or whether the lot was gated.

Section 1.07(a)(40)'s definition of a public place covers a front yard open to the general public, even when a rudimentary fence surrounds it.

Purvis v. State · filed 2008-05-30(a)(40)

A "public place" is defined as "any place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes, but is not limited to, streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(40) (Vernon Supp. 2007). ... Although the yard was surrounded by a rudimentary fence, access to the yard was not restricted but open to the general public. ... The front yard at 813 Cottonwood was a "public place."

Section 1.07(a)(40) defines a public place by whether the public has access; an admission fee or restrictions on entry do not necessarily make a place private.

Ackley v. State · filed 2011-11-23(a)(40)

Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the public has any access to the area. ... These factors, however, do not dictate that a place is private.

Section 1.07(a)(40) defines a public place as one accessible to the public or a substantial group of the public; evidence of driving on a county road at a paved intersection can support a finding that the location is a public place.

Campbell v. State · filed 2012-03-13(a)(40)

Nor is there a failure of proof of the statutory element appellant was driving in a public place. A public place is defined as "any place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes, but is not limited to, streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(40) (West Supp. 2011). The warden's testimony showed appellant was driving on a county road at an intersection with a paved road controlled by a stop sign. That evidence, and the video showing the appearance of the "paved road," allowed the jury to find appellant was driving in a public place.

Section 1.07(a)(40) defines a public place by public access; government ownership is not required.

Bradford v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-02-03(a)(40)

To qualify as a public place, however, there is no requirement that the property be owned by a governmental entity. Rather, the determining factor is whether the public has access to the property.

A person with a greater right to possess property than the actor qualifies as its owner, and that right may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

Koehl v. State · filed 1993-06-24(a)(24)(A)

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(24)(A) (Vernon Supp.1993) defines an “owner” as a person who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor. ... This was circumstantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. Garnica had a greater right to the actual care, custody, control, or management of the vehicle than appellant.

Section 1.07(24) permits a jury instruction defining an owner as a person who has possession of the property when that definition fits the evidence.

Lassere v. State · filed 1983-04-20(24)

The record shows that owner was defined as “a person who has possession of the property.” This meets the requirements of the evidence presented in the case and Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(24) (Vernon 1974).

Section 1.07(a)(24) defines an owner as someone with title, possession, or a greater right of possession than the defendant.

Rios v. State · filed 1993-10-13(a)(24)

An "owner" has title to property, possession of property, or a greater right of possession of property than the defendant. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(24) (Vernon 1974). ... If "Sgt. Melendez," who was apparently given a rank but no first name, was in fact "Javier Melendez" or "Sergeant Javier Melendez" mentioned in the evidence, the State failed to prove at the time of the commission of the alleged offense on August 6, 1991, that Melendez had title to the property or was in possession of the property, or had the greater right of possession of the property on that date than the appellant.

Section 1.07(a)(24) treats a restaurant employee as an owner of register money when the employee has a greater right to possess it than the accused.

Coleman v. State · filed 1985-09-24(a)(24)

We find there was sufficient evidence to establish that complainant, as an employee of the restaurant, had a greater right to possession of the money in the cash register than did appellant. This greater right to possession establishes complainant as an owner of the funds as defined in Section 1.07(a)(24).

An owner of property is a person with title, possession, or a greater right to possession than the actor.

Arebalo v. State · filed 1993-06-09(24)(a)

The owner of property is the person who has title, possession, or greater right to possession than the actor.

Section 1.07 treats a person with a greater right to possess a building as its owner when that person exercises some care, custody, control, or management of it.

Roy v. State · filed 1995-03-08(a)(35), (a)(39)

"Owner" is defined as "a person who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35) (West 1994). ... Ygnacio's testimony provided sufficient evidence in the record to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude that he had a greater right of possession of the building than Roy.

Section 1.07(a)(35)(A) includes a person with a greater right to possession than the actor in its definition of owner.

Lawler v. State · filed 1995-10-11(a)(35)(A)

The Penal Code defines "owner," in relevant part, as a person who has "a greater right to possession of the property than the actor." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35)(A) (West 1994). ... A rational trier of fact could conclude from this evidence that Virginia Lawler had a greater right to possession of the home than appellant.

Section 1.07(35)(A) treats a person with a greater right to possess a building as its owner even when the accused retains some rights to it.

MacK v. State · filed 1996-07-17(35)(A)

The Penal Code, however, clearly indicates that a defendant who has some, but less, right to control a building than the alleged owner may be prosecuted for burglary. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(35)(A) (West 1994).

For theft, ownership may be proved by showing that the alleged owner had a superior right to possess the property than the accused.

Hutson v. State · filed 1996-12-05(a)(35)(A)

The State needed to prove only that Case had a superior right of possession to Hutson.

Section 1.07(a)(35) defines an owner to include a person with title, possession, or a greater right to possession than the actor; proof of any one of those criteria suffices to establish ownership in a theft prosecution.

Zess v. Funke · filed 1997-04-09(a)(35)

However, the term “owner” is defined by section 1.07(a)(35) of the Texas Penal Code as “a person who: (A) has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor—” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35) (Vernon 1994). Consequently, the evidence in a prosecution for theft is sufficient if it shows that the party alleged as owner fits any one of those criteria.

Section 1.07(35)(A) defines an owner as someone with title, possession, or a greater right to possession than the defendant.

Callahan v. State · filed 1997-09-18(35)(A)

To prove Green owned the bond the State had to either prove he had title to the ... bond, possession of the bond, or a greater right to its possession than Callahan. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(35)(A) (Vernon 1994). The State proved none of these alternatives.

A person with a greater right to possess property may qualify as its owner even when someone else holds title.

Burleson v. State · filed 1999-03-04(a)(35)(A)

The fact that Freeman's relative was the title owner did not preclude Freeman from being considered an "owner."

Section 1.07(a)(35)'s greater-right-of-possession standard can establish that public property is “of another” for criminal trespass, even when the charge does not allege ownership.

Bader v. State · filed 2000-03-30(a)(35)

We hold that in cases involving public property, the State satisfies the "of another" element of the criminal-trespass statute by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant has a greater right of possession of the property than does the accused.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control or management.

Wallace v. State · filed 1997-10-22(a)(39)

Possession is defined as “actual care, custody, control or management.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (Vernon 1994). ... Longlois’s testimony at least raised a fact issue with regard to the “care, control, and management” prong of possession.

Section 1.07 permits an association to qualify as an owner of property even if it lacks a current corporate charter.

Huett v. State · filed 1998-05-14(35)(A), (38)

All of these factors combine to lead us to the inescapable conclusion that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to prove that ORC was an association as contemplated by the penal code.

Section 1.07(a)(35) includes a person who possesses property, whether lawfully or not, within the definition of “owner,” so illegally possessed property can be stolen or robbed.

Nguyen v. State · filed 1998-12-17(a)(35)

From these statutes we can conclude that the legislature intends that there may be a theft or robbery of property that is illegally possessed.

Section 1.07(a)(35)’s definition of owner does not make someone who possesses a check payable to another person the owner of the payment the check represents.

Heimlich v. State · filed 1999-03-11(a)(35)

While the complainant may have actually possessed the piece of paper called a "check," Heimlich remained the only person with a legal ownership interest in the thing of value the check signified— the order to pay $5050.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; watching pornographic material in one’s home requires possessing it.

Allbright v. State · filed 2000-02-17(a)(39)

The trial court correctly defined possession as actual care, custody, control, or management. ... It also was correct in its finding that Appellant had to possess the pornographic material in order to watch it in his home.

A renter is an owner under § 1.07(a)(35)(A) when the renter has a right to possession superior to the defendant.

Renteria v. State · filed 2001-08-09(a)(35)(A)

Though Weatherill was renting the house, he is an “owner” because he had a right to possession superior to Renteria. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35)(A) (West 1994).

An owner has title, possession, or a greater right to possession than the actor; a bona fide dispute over that right can leave ownership unproved in a theft prosecution.

Bokor v. State · filed 2002-12-19(a)(35)(A)

An “owner” is a person who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to posséssion of the property than the actor. ... While we do not speculate here as to the ultimate outcome of any civil suit between the parties concerning the ownership of the property, we do find, for the purpose of this appeal, that a bona fide dispute exists between Appellant and Trimble over which party had a greater right of possession to the payments Trim-ble made.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Moore v. State · filed 2001-05-03(a)(39)

The penal code defines possession as "actual care, custody, control, or management." ... The direct and circumstantial evidence in this case is sufficient to support a reasonable inference by the trier of fact of knowing possession of marihuana.

Section 1.07(a)(35) allows ownership to be proved through possession even when possession of the property is unlawful.

Brown v. State · filed 2001-09-20(a)(35)

For these reasons, we hold that for purposes of section 1.07(a)(35), ownership may be proved even if the complainant unlawfully possessed the property that was the object of the appropriation.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession through care, control, or management of an item; possession may be shared.

Booker v. State · filed 2003-10-30(a)(39)

With respect to the possession element of the offense of possession with intent to deliver, the State must prove two elements: (1) that the accused exercised care, control, or management over the item, and (2) that the accused knew the illegal nature of the possessed item. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(38) (Vernon 2003); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (Vernon 2003); McQuarters v. State , 58 S.W.3d 250, 259 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d). It is well established that drug possession need not be exclusive, and that an individual can possess drugs jointly with others. ... Applying the appropriate standards of review, we hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to link Appellant to the drugs and to support the jury’s determination that Appellant possessed the drugs found at 1508 South Lindsay Street.

Section 1.07(a)(35) includes as an owner a person with a greater right to possess property than the actor; a board member can qualify as an owner of the organization's funds.

Myers v. State · filed 2004-08-26(a)(35)

Accordingly, the evidence is legally sufficient to show that Barrow, as a member of the Community Chest board, had a greater right to possession of the monies improperly transferred by Appellant from the Community Chest bank accounts to DMDA.

Section 1.07(a)(35)(A) treats a person with possession or a greater right to possession than the actor as an owner; marriage to the actor does not diminish that greater right.

Harris v. State · filed 2005-05-17(a)(35)(A)

“Owner” means a person who “has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.” ... However, even if a common law marriage existed between appellant and Flaniken, such marriage did not diminish in any way Flaniken’s greater right to possession of the apartment.

A person with specific permission to occupy an apartment can have a greater right to possession than someone with general permission to visit, making the occupant an owner under § 1.07(a)(35)(A).

Henderson v. State · filed 2005-11-23(a)(35)(A)

Although appellant had Teresa’s consent to come over to the apartment anytime, on July 15, Rose had Teresa’s specific permission to be at the apartment. ... Because we hold that the evidence shows that Rose had a greater right of possession on the date of the offense, appellant’s final argument is not persuasive.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as exercising actual care, custody, control, or management over a substance.

Leniskie Tyree Guy v. State · filed 2005-02-17(a)(39)

A person possesses a substance when he exercises “actual care, custody, control, or management” over the substance. ... Based on our review of the record, we hold that the evidence was factually sufficient to establish that Appellant was in possession of cocaine.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as exercising actual care, custody, control, or management over a substance.

Guy v. State · filed 2005-03-10(a)(39)

A person possesses a substance when he exercises “actual care, custody, control, or management” over the substance. ... Based on our review of the record, we hold that the evidence was factually sufficient to establish that Appellant was in possession of cocaine.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; firing a gun and placing it under a seat satisfies that definition.

Renfro v. State · filed 2006-05-25(a)(39)

Possession is defined by the penal code as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” ... This testimony reflects that Appellant had actual care, custody, control, or management of the gun.

Section 1.07’s definitions of owner, person, and association include an independent school district as a possible property owner.

Guin v. State · filed 2006-10-25(6), (35), (38)

It is true that subsection 35 of Article 1.07 defines owner as a person. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(35). However, subsection 38 of that same article defines “person” as an individual, corporation, or association. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(38). Further, in subsection 6 of the same article, one definition of “association” means a “government or government subdivision or agency.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(6). ... The allegation that the owner of the property involved was the Gladewater ISD was sufficient to allege that element of the offense.

Section 1.07(a)(35) allows the State to establish ownership in a criminal trespass case by proving the complainant had a greater right to possession than the defendant.

Anthony v. State · filed 2006-11-30(a)(35)

Therefore, in criminal trespass cases where the State alleges ownership, subsection 1.07(a)(35), the current section, is applicable and the State may establish ownership by proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the complainant had a greater right to possession of the property than the defendant.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management over a substance.

Washington v. State · filed 2007-01-25(a)(39)

Proof of possession requires evidence that the accused exercised “actual care, custody, control, or management” over the substance. ... The logical force of the evidence indicates that the many rocks of crack cocaine throughout Washington’s car were knowingly under Washington’s care, custody, control, or management.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; a jury may infer it from a firearm’s location and the defendant’s familiarity with it.

Smith v. State · filed 2007-07-31(a)(39)

Given these circumstances, the jury could reasonably infer that Appellant exercised “care, custody, control, or management” of the pistol.

Section 1.07(a)(35) treats a landowner as an owner of abandoned personal property on the premises when the landowner has a greater right to possess it than a trespasser.

Ingram v. State · filed 2008-06-18(a)(35)

Instead, the owner of the land and structure possessed a greater right to the personal property.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as care, custody, or control, but that definition does not make every use of “care, custody, or control” mean possession.

Hicks v. State · filed 2007-12-12(a)(39)

Although “possession” in Section 1.07(a)(39) is defined as “care, custody, or control,” the court of appeals incorrectly assumed that “care, custody, or control” under Section 22.04(b)(2) means “possession.”

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as care, custody, or control, but that definition does not make every use of “care, custody, or control” mean possession.

Hicks, James Corey · filed 2007-12-12(a)(39)

Although "possession" in Section 1.07(a)(39) is defined as "care, custody, or control," the court of appeals incorrectly assumed that "care, custody, or control" under Section 22.04(b)(2) means "possession."

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, control, custody, or management.

Korell v. State · filed 2008-04-24(a)(39)

A person is guilty of possession if he knowingly or intentionally exercises actual care, control, custody, or management over a controlled substance. ... Because of the lack of evidence showing that Clem exercised actual control or management over any of the drugs at issue, let alone possessed them with intent to deliver, her criminal liability, if any, must arise under the law of parties.

Section 1.07(a)(35)(A) includes a person with possession or a greater right to possession within the definition of an owner.

Beason v. State · filed 2008-01-09(a)(35)(A)

An “owner” of property includes a person who has possession of the property, whether lawful or not or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor. ... From the foregoing, we conclude that there was legally sufficient evidence that the hospital was the legal owner of the records.

A person who lacks the owner’s effective consent to take a vehicle does not have a greater right to possess it under § 1.07(a)(35)(A).

Jackson v. State · filed 2008-08-29(a)(35)(A)

However, because Appellant did not have Leverett’s effective consent to take the Taurus, he did not have a greater right of possession to the Taurus.

Section 1.07 defines an owner to include someone who possesses property, and possession includes care, custody, control, or management that may be shown by circumstantial evidence.

Jesse Bud Graham v. State · filed 2009-05-06(a)(35)(A), (a)(39)

The legislature gave the word "owner" as used in the theft statute an expansive meaning. It is defined as a person who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2008). "Possession" means actual care, custody, control, or management. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (Vernon Supp. 2008). ... This is circumstantial evidence that the named owner, Danny Partridge, on behalf of TXU, exercised some degree of care, custody, control, or management of the stolen copper wire.

A dealership employee with care, custody, or control of a vehicle can be its owner under § 1.07(a)(35)(A).

Jackson v. State · filed 2008-10-02(a)(35)(A)

The penal code defines “owner” as a person who “has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.” ... Accordingly, Leverett, as the dealership’s finance director, was the proper owner of the Taurus.

Section 1.07(a) defines possession in terms of care, custody, and control.

Byard v. State · filed 2009-02-13(a)

To prove its case, the State must show appellant exercised care, custody and control over the methamphetamine and had knowledge that the substance in her possession was contraband. ... Taking all of the evidence together and considering Johnson’s testimony that appellant participated in the “cook” and used methamphetamine while at the residence, we find legally sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer appellant controlled, and thus knowingly possessed, the methamphetamine for which she was charged.

Section 1.07(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

McGee v. State · filed 2009-03-06(39)

Possession means “actual care, custody, control, or management,” § 481.102(38) (Vernon 2003). See also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(39) (Vernon Supp. 2008), and is established by evidence that the accused exercised control, management, or care over the substance and knew that the matter possessed was contraband. King v. State , 895 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). ... A rational juror could have found these circumstances sufficient to show Appellant’s knowing possession of the marihuana.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; knowledge of and control over a firearm can establish possession.

Westbrook v. State · filed 2009-02-26(a)(39)

Possession is defined by the penal code as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (Vernon Supp. 2008). ... We therefore hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to prove that Westbrook knew of, exercised control over, and therefore possessed the shotgun.

Section 1.07(35) defines an owner to include a person with title, possession, or a greater right to possession than the actor; ownership can be established without that person’s testimony.

In re J.M. · filed 2009-06-16(35)

The Texas Penal Code defines an “owner” as a person who “has title to the property, possession of the property, ... or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(35) (Vernon Supp.2008). The fact that Talley did not testify is of no consequence.

Section 1.07(39) defines possession through actual care, custody, control, or management; a person who can no longer exercise those powers cannot jointly possess the substance.

Shipp v. State · filed 2009-07-23(39)

He no longer had the ability to care, manage, or control the substance and, therefore, could not jointly possess the substance.

Section 1.07 defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; presence near contraband, together with other links, can establish possession.

Judd v. State · filed 2009-09-23(39)

Appellant's presence in the camper, coupled with these links, is sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that Appellant had custody, control, or management over the contraband.

Section 1.07(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; circumstantial links can establish that possession.

Joas v. State · filed 2009-10-29(39)

We conclude that the logical force from these links is sufficient for a rational jury to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Joas exercised care, custody, control, or management over the methamphetamine.

For theft, an owner includes a person with a greater right to possess the property than the defendant, including a dealership salesman with that right.

Washington v. State · filed 2009-07-16(a)(35)(A)

For purposes of theft, the "owner" is a person who has "a greater right to possession [of the stolen property] than the [defendant]." See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35)(A) (Vernon 2003). ... Here, Aguirre, as a salesman for Ed Payne Motors, had a greater right to possession of the Durango than Washington and was, therefore, an appropriate person to be named as victim in the indictment.

Section 1.07(35)(A) defines an owner as a person with title, possession, or a greater right to possession than the actor; a representative of the titleholder can qualify.

Holz v. State · filed 2009-09-30(35)(A)

An owner, as defined in the Texas Penal Code, is a person who "has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(35)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2008). ... We find this evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to enable the jury to find that Jones had title as a representative and had a greater right to possession of the property than Holz.

Section 1.07(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management of property.

Triplett v. State · filed 2009-08-05(39)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s implied finding that Appellant exercised “actual care, custody, control, or management” of the substance and knew the matter possessed was contraband.

Section 1.07(a)(35)(A) defines an owner to include a person with a greater right to possess property than the actor.

DeVance v. State · filed 2009-10-27(a)(35)(A)

An owner, as defined in the Texas Penal Code, is a person who "has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor ."... This evidence was legally sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Goodson was the owner of the car, with greater right of possession than DeVance.

Section 1.07(a)(39) permits joint possession when a person knows drugs are in a vehicle under his control and has time to end that possession but does not.

Williams v. State · filed 2010-03-31(a)(39)

If Williams knew that drugs were placed in a vehicle under his control while he had sufficient time to terminate that possession, but he failed to do so, he could be a joint possessor. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and giving deference to the jury’s ability to resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the element of possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

Possession requires control of the substance and knowledge that it is a controlled substance; ownership of the car containing it is unnecessary when the accused’s sole control of the car links her to it.

Bereata Jeanette Laws v. State · filed 2010-05-27(39)

To prove possession, the State must prove that the accused (1) exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over the substance and (2) knew that the matter possessed was a controlled substance. ... Proof that appellant owned the car was not necessary as appellant’s sole control of the car linked her to the marijuana.

Section 1.07(a)(35) defines an owner as someone with title, possession, or a greater right to possession than the actor.

Bishop v. State · filed 2010-04-08(a)(35)

The jury could have determined that Cranford had title to the wall, possession of the wall, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the wall than Bishop.

Section 1.07(39) defines possession through actual care, custody, control, or management of a substance.

Satchell v. State · filed 2010-06-10(39)

To prove possession, the State must prove that an accused (1) exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over the substance and (2) knew that the matter possessed was a controlled substance. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(39) (Vernon Supp. 2009); Evans , 202 S.W.3d at 161. ... Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for the offense of possession of PCP.

Section 1.07(a)(35) defines an owner to include a person with title, possession, or a greater right to possession than the actor; a minor depicted in sexually explicit videos can have a right to possess them.

Carlson v. State · filed 2011-02-17(a)(35)

The Penal Code defines an “owner” as a person with title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35) (Vernon Supp.2010). ... S., on the other hand, had an interest in possessing the underage, sexually explicit images that her uncle recorded without her effective consent in order to preserve her own privacy, report the incident to police, and prevent their further publication. The record supports the conclusion that S. had a right to possession of the videos.

Section 1.07(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; that definition can encompass electronic photographs controlled during upload.

Roller v. State · filed 2010-07-15(39)

The Texas Penal Code likewise defines possession as "actual care, custody, control, or management." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(39) (Vernon Supp. 2009). ... We hold that this testimony was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Roller possessed, although in electronic format, these photos on his person at the time they were uploaded to the internet.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; attenuated links to contraband do not establish control beyond a reasonable doubt.

Xayavong v. State · filed 2010-11-10(a)(39)

“Possession” is defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” ... Here, there is no evidence that Xayavong was in close proximity to the marihuana or had access to it; the links (ownership of vehicle, inconsistent statements, failure to stop) stand alone.

Section 1.07(a)(39) requires actual care, custody, control, or management for possession; mere ownership is insufficient when the owner exercises no control over the item.

Woodard v. State · filed 2010-12-09(a)(39)

We conclude that appellant’s mere ownership of the purse and its contents, under these circumstances, is insufficient to establish that she exercised care, custody, control, or management over them while in the correctional facility.

Section 1.07(a)(35)(A) treats a person with a superior right to possess property as its owner, even without actual possession.

Campos v. State · filed 2010-07-27(a)(35)(A)

Under the Penal Code, the State need only show a superior right to possess.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; proof of control is required.

Sayadeth v. State · filed 2010-11-10(a)(39)

“Possession” is defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” ... Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the quality of the evidence here is far too weak and the links too attenuated for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Sayadeth knew of, or had control over, the contraband.

Possession requires actual care, custody, control, or management of an object; control before entering a jail does not establish possession there.

Woodard v. State · filed 2011-03-10(a)(39)

A person possesses an object if she has actual care, custody, control, or management of that object. ... Appellant’s exercise of control and custody over the purse prior to her arrival at the jail does not satisfy the State’s burden of proof as to possession after her arrival at the jail.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession in terms of care, custody, control, or management of an item.

Bell v. State · filed 2011-12-13(a)(39)

At trial, the State was required to prove that Bell exercised control, custody, management, or care over the Ecstasy and that he knew the matter possessed was contraband. See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(39) (West 2011). ... The evidence supporting Bell's conviction was sufficient to show Bell had control, management, custody, or care over the Esctasy.

Section 1.07(a)(35)(A) defines an owner to include a person who possesses property, whether lawfully or not.

Dominguez v. State · filed 2011-12-01(a)(35)(A)

Because it is reasonable to conclude from the evidence that Alma had possession of the house, and thus was the owner as defined by the penal code and in the jury charge, we hold that the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s motion for directed verdict on this issue.

Section 1.07(a)(35) treats a person as an owner when that person has a greater right to possess the property than the actor.

Brown v. State · filed 2012-04-17(a)(35)

Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to establish complainant had a greater right to possession of the apartment than appellant and can therefore be classified as the owner of the apartment.

Section 1.07(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Huerta v. State · filed 2012-01-31(39)

Possession means "actual care, custody, control, or management." Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(38) (West 2010); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(39) (West 2011). ... Viewing all of the evidence under the required standard, we conclude the jury was free to make rational inferences from the evidence and to conclude appellant was in knowing possession of the cocaine.

Section 1.07(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; it does not define joint possession.

Earnest Ross v. State · filed 2013-01-04(39)

The penal code defines possession as ―actual care, custody, control, or management.‖ Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(39) (West Supp. 2012). The penal code, however, does not define ―joint possession.‖ Rather, ―joint possession,‖ like ―affirmative links,‖ is a rule for assessing evidentiary sufficiency.

Section 1.07(35) treats a property titleholder as an owner even when eviction proceedings are unfinished.

Calahan v. First State Bank Texas · filed 2012-03-12(35)

But under the Penal Code’s definitions, he was nonetheless an owner because he held title to the property, and because he had a greater right to its possession than “the actor,” who under these facts would be Calahan.

Section 1.07(a)(35)(A) treats a store’s loss prevention supervisor as an owner of merchandise when the supervisor has a greater right to possess it than the accused.

Sandone v. State · filed 2013-01-17(a)(35)(A)

As J.C. Penney’s loss prevention supervisor, Butler had a greater right to possession of the ties than appellant, and that made him the ties’ owner, just as the State pled in its charging instrument.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; a person’s handling of and access to a firearm can establish possession.

Ramirez v. State · filed 2012-10-18(a)(39)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as we must, we hold that sufficient evidence exists that Ramirez had actual care, custody, control, or management of the rifle to support the jury’s verdict. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 1.07(a)(39), 46.04; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

Section 1.07 defines an owner to include a person with a greater right to possess the property than the defendant, even without actual possession.

Rodgers, Edwin DeWayne v. State · filed 2013-02-21(a)(35)(A)

Appellant presents no authority to support this logical fallacy; the penal code definition of owner is not limited to those having only possession. Instead, under the “greater right to possession” method of proving ownership, any person who has a greater right than defendant to the actual care, custody, control or management of the property can be alleged as the owner.

Section 1.07(35) includes a store security employee as an owner when the employee has a greater right to possess the merchandise than the accused.

Martinez v. State · filed 2015-04-30(35)

This testimony was sufficient to establish Cook as a special owner of the property with a greater right to possession of it than Martinez.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; evidence of control over contraband can establish possession.

Wright v. State · filed 2013-05-09(a)(39)

“Possession” is defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (West 2011); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(38) (West 2010). ... These facts amply support a conclusion that when appellant was inside the home, he possessed the narcotics and knew it to be contraband.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; ownership of the place where property is found does not determine possession.

Haggerty v. State · filed 2013-07-11(a)(39)

But, an analysis as to exclusive possession does not necessarily turn on ownership; rather, the crucial inquiry is who exercised “actual care, custody, control, or management.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39).

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; sole occupancy of a vehicle can support a finding of that control over marijuana inside it.

Thompkins v. State · filed 2013-10-03(a)(39)

Here, the fact that Thompkins was the sole occupant of the truck supports a finding that he exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over the marijuana.

Section 1.07(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Wood v. State · filed 2014-08-07(39)

Possession is defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” ... The evidence was sufficient to show that Brown had care, custody, and control—possession—of the antlers and that Wood took the antlers to the truck.

Section 1.07(a)(35)(A) defines an owner to include a person with title, possession whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession than the defendant.

Ex Parte Kenneth Jannereth · filed 2013-12-12(a)(35)(A)

To eliminate the distinction between special and actual ownership, the legislature expansively defined “owner” and included in the definition a person who has title to the property, possession of the property (whether lawful or not), or a greater right to possession of the property than the defendant.

A store employee responsible for serving customers qualifies as an owner of store property when the employee has a greater right to possess it than the person who took it.

Sherman v. State · filed 2015-03-05(a)(35)

As an employee who had responsibility for serving the store’s customers, Rome qualifies as an “owner” with a greater right to possession of the clothing than appellant.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as exercising actual care, custody, control, or management over an item.

Simington v. State · filed 2015-06-29(a)(39)

“Possession” means that the accused exercised “actual care, custody, control, or management” over the substance. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (West Supp. 2014); see Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). ... Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Simington exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over the gun.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Hebert v. State · filed 2016-02-11(a)(39)

Under the Penal Code, “possession” is “actual care, custody, control, or management,” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a trier of fact reasonably could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the PCP was within appellant’s actual custody, control, care, or management and that appellant knew the PCP was contraband.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Moreno v. State · filed 2016-04-19(a)(39)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a trier of fact reasonably could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the heroin found under the driver’s seat and in appellant’s shirt pocket was within appellant’s actual care, custody, control, or management, (2) appellant knew there was heroin under the driver’s seat and in appellant’s shirt pocket, and (3) appellant knowingly possessed with intent to deliver heroin with an aggregate weight of four or more grams but less than two hundred grams.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; evidence that a firearm was within the accused’s control can satisfy that definition.

Perry v. State · filed 2016-08-04(a)(39)

The Penal Code defines “possession” as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a trier of fact reasonably could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) appellant knew there was a gun in the car and (2) the gun found beside the driver’s seat was within appellant’s actual care, custody, control, or management.

Section 1.07(a)(35)(A) includes a person with a greater right to possess property than the defendant as an owner; a store’s asset protection specialist can qualify.

Short v. State · filed 2015-07-31(a)(35)(A)

Viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we affirm the jury’s implicit finding that Brock was a special owner and had a greater right to possession of the property than appellant.

Section 1.07(a)(35)(A) allows a person with a greater right to possess a home than the defendant to qualify as its owner for a burglary charge.

Morrow v. State · filed 2016-02-19(a)(35)(A)

Consequently, the State was entitled to prove Gina’s .ownership of the Ivanhoe home by showing that she had title to the home, possession of the home, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the home than Morrow. ... This evidence is legally sufficient to prove that Gina had a greater right to the actual care, custody, control, or management of the property than did Morrow.

Section 1.07(a)(35) defines an owner to include a person who possesses property, even if another person holds title.

Davis v. State · filed 2015-12-10(a)(35)

The term “owner” as used in section 31.03 includes any person who has title to the property, possession of the property, or a greater right to possession of the property than the defendant. ... Though the complainant’s employer was the legal owner of the property, the complainant had possession of the property and was entrusted with that property on behalf of the owner. ... The evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding that the complainant was the owner of the property that was unlawfully appropriated.

An employee with a greater right to possess company funds than the accused can be an “owner” for purposes of theft.

Binnion v. State · filed 2017-06-29(a)(35)(A)

Because we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Ortego was the owner of the stolen funds under Texas’ definition of “owner” for purposes of theft, we overrule appellant’s first issue.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; a jury may find possession based on a defendant’s right of control or management over an item.

Brown v. State · filed 2016-10-05(a)(39)

Possession is defined by the Penal Code as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (West 2011). ... As the factfinder, the jury was entitled to infer from the evidence that Brown had used the bedroom in Daniels’ home as a place to store the cocaine and the firearm that they found there, and to conclude that he had a right of control or management over the items that the police recovered there.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Chevis v. State · filed 2016-11-30(a)(39)

“Possession” is statutorily defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.”

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management; affirmative links to contraband can establish that possession.

Barbosa v. State · filed 2017-12-06(a)(39)

The evidence affirmatively links Barbosa to the cocaine and marijuana hidden in the vehicle and it is legally sufficient to establish beyond .a reasonable doubt that he exercised actual care, custody, .control, or management of the cocaine and marijuana.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management, which a jury may infer from circumstantial evidence.

Hawkins v. State · filed 2019-07-10(a)(39)

The Texas Penal Code defines “possession” as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (West Supp. 2018). ... Viewing the evidence cumulatively in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational jury could have reasonably inferred that Hawkins knowingly had care, custody, control, or management of the pornographic images of unknown children found on an SD card hidden in his former apartment which also contained images of him.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Rodriguez v. State · filed 2019-10-03(a)(39)

Both the Texas Health and Safety Code and the Texas Penal Code provide the same definition for “possession”: “actual care, custody, control, or management.” See id. § 481.002(38); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39). ... A definite link between Appellant and the controlled substance is that he had his hand in the bag containing it shortly before it was discovered, and no other person had access to the bag between the time that his hand was observed in the bag and the discovery of the cocaine.

Section 1.07(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Jose Hector Ponce A/K/A Jose H. Ponce v. State · filed 2020-10-08(39)

Possession “means actual care, custody, control, or management.” ... The statements to the officers were statements of Appellant’s intentional and knowing exercise of control over the firearm.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Williams v. State · filed 2019-01-30(a)(39)

Possession is defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (West Supp. 2018). ... Based on the record, the evidence established affirmative links from which a rational jury could have concluded that Williams possessed the cocaine with intent to deliver the cocaine to the CI.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

King v. State · filed 2019-11-13(a)(39)

Possession is defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.”

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Howard v. the State of Texas · filed 2021-05-19(a)(39)

Under the Penal Code, possession is defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.”

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control or management.

Gilstrap v. the State of Texas · filed 2021-05-27(a)(39)

Both the Texas Health and Safety Code and the Texas Penal Code provide the same definition for “possession”: “actual care, custody, control or management.” Id. § 481.002(38); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39).

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Waldrup v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-06-21(a)(39)

The abstract definitions contained in the court’s charge to the jury correctly defined possession as “actual care, custody, control, or management” and explained that “possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 1.07(a)(39) (defining possession), 6.01(b) (explaining possession as a voluntary act).

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Waldrup v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-09-13(a)(39)

The abstract definitions contained in the court’s charge to the jury correctly defined possession as “actual care, custody, control, or management” and explained that “possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 1.07(a)(39) (defining possession), 6.01(b) (explaining possession as a voluntary act).

Section 1.07 defines an owner to include a person with title to property, possession of it whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possess it than the person who appropriates it.

in the Estate of Dolores Elizabeth Douglas, Derek Douglas and Charles Douglas, Jr., Both Individually and Charles Dougla · filed 2022-09-22(a)(35)(A)

Under the Penal Code, an “owner” is a person who has title to the property; possession of the property, whether lawful or not; or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor who appropriates it. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35)(A).

Section 1.07(35) includes as an owner a secured party whose right to possess property after the debtor’s default is greater than the debtor’s.

Brazoria County Imaging Center, LLC, Robert D. Neidert, and Robert S. Neidert v. Celeste Investment Group Angleton, LLC · filed 2023-07-18(35)

We conclude that when the MRI machine was removed from the Leased Premises, Celeste was an “owner” of the MRI machine with a greater right to possession of the MRI machine than Brazoria Imaging.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Batiste v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-03-09(a)(39)

The Penal Code defines “possession” as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39).

Section 1.07(a)(35) defines an owner to include a person who possesses property or has a greater right to possess it than the actor.

Riynaldo Gray v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-08-21(a)(35)

Applying the test that an owner “has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor,” the evidence supports the conclusion that the complainant had that greater right. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35).

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Pointer v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-01-15(a)(39)

To convict Pointer of possession of cocaine and methamphetamine, the State had to prove that he knowingly or intentionally exercised control, management, or care over the cocaine and methamphetamine.

Section 1.07 defines an owner to include a person who possesses property and defines possession as actual care, custody, control or management.

Gallegos v. State · filed 1981-12-10(a)(24), (28)

The information upon which appellant was charged, while inartfully drawn, is sufficient to allege ownership of the property in Furr Food Store # 51 as general owner and Art Haar as special owner, Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 21.08 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(24), (28) (Vernon 1974); ... and that the taking was without consent of either.

Section 1.07(a)(35)’s greater-right-of-possession standard can establish the “of another” element of criminal trespass involving public property.

Bader v. State · filed 2000-03-30(a)(35)

The court of criminal appeals has not decided whether the definition of ownership under section 1.07(a)(35) of the Texas Penal Code applies in cases where the information does not allege ownership. ... Based on this reasoning, in cases involving public property, we think the State satisfies the “of another” element by showing that the complainant has a greater right of possession of the property.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Sutfin v. State · filed 2004-06-03(a)(39)

Possession is defined in the penal code as “actual care, custody, control or management.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (Vernon Supp. 2004). ... Thus, in the light most favorable to the verdict, the first element of possession is established: appellant exercised actual care, custody, control, and management over the contraband.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, and management.

Allen v. State · filed 2008-03-25(a)(39)

“Possession means the actual care, custody, control, and management.”

Section 1.07(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Triplett v. State · filed 2009-07-07(39)

To prove possession, the State was required to show that Appellant (1) exercised “actual care, custody, control, or management” of the substance and (2) knew the matter possessed was contraband. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s implied finding that Appellant exercised “actual care, custody, control, or management” of the substance and knew the matter possessed was contraband.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Hall v. State · filed 2011-02-24(a)(39)

Thus, the State was required to prove appellant knew of the weapon’s existence and that he exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over it.

Section 1.07(39) defines possession as exercising actual care, custody, control, or management over a substance.

Horton v. State · filed 2012-01-19(39)

To prove possession, the State must prove that the accused (1) exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over the substance and (2) knew that the matter possessed was a controlled substance. ... We conclude based on the logical force created by these links that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Horton possessed the marijuana in the console.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management over an object.

Jackson v. State · filed 2015-04-16(a)(39)

When an accused is charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove: (1) the defendant exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over the contraband and (2) the accused knew the object he possessed was contraband.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management.

Jackson, Jason B. · filed 2015-07-10(a)(39)

When an accused is charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove: (1) the defendant exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over the contraband and (2) the accused knew the object he possessed was contraband.

Section 1.07(a)(39) defines possession as actual care, custody, control, or management over a substance.

Valentin v. State · filed 2015-09-10(a)(39)

“Possession” means the accused exercised “actual care, custody, control, or management” over the substance. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (West Supp. 2014); see Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

An owner includes a person with title, possession whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession than the person charged with damaging the property.

Ken Jannereth v. State · filed 2011-08-04(a)(35)(A)

An owner is a person who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the person charged with damaging or destroying the property. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35)(A) (West 2011). ... Because the State alleged Petty as the owner and the evidence showed that he was the president of the HOA, that the HOA was a non-profit corporation, and that Petty acted on its behalf during the relevant time period, we hold the evidence is sufficient to show ownership as alleged and we overrule subpoint IA.

A BB gun can be a deadly weapon when its use threatens deadly force, even if the actor did not intend to hurt anyone.

Anthony Charles Foster, Jr. v. State · filed 2012-01-26(a)(17)(B)

So, it may well be that the appellant here never intended to hurt anyone; that alone does not bar the BB gun from being a deadly weapon. It was enough if his conduct could be reasonably interpreted as threatening the use of a deadly weapon, and that inference could be made from the evidence here.

An ordinary knife is not a deadly weapon by design under Section 1.07(a)(17)(A).

Martinez v. State · filed 2012-03-29(a)(17)(A)

An ordinary knife is not a deadly weapon per se; that is, it is not an object manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) treats a vehicle as a deadly weapon when it is used in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Pina v. State of Texas · filed 2012-05-03(a)(17)(B)

Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant used his blue Kia in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and, thus, used his blue Kia as a deadly weapon.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) requires proof that the manner of a vehicle’s use or intended use was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury for a deadly weapon finding.

Pointe v. State · filed 2012-05-30(a)(17)(B)

Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could not find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the manner in which Pointe used his vehicle was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(a)(17)(B) permits fire to qualify as a deadly weapon when the evidence shows that fire as used was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Gregory Longoria, Jr. v. State · filed 2013-02-21(a)(17)(B)

We hold that the photographs and the testimony provided sufficient evidence to establish that fire as used in this case was a deadly weapon for purposes of section 1.07(a)(17)(B).

Section 1.07(a)(17)(A) treats a pistol or handgun as a deadly weapon per se.

Boston v. State · filed 2012-06-27(a)(17)(A)

A pistol or handgun is a deadly weapon per se under the Texas Penal Code.

Section 1.07 treats an object as a deadly weapon when its intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, even if the user did not intend that harm.

Hull v. State · filed 2012-07-10(a)(17)(B)

Further, it is not necessary that appellant actually intended to cause death or serious bodily injury; an object is a deadly weapon if appellant intends a use of the object in which it would be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(17)(B) treats a pocket knife as a deadly weapon when its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Manns v. State · filed 2012-12-06(17)(B)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have reasonably concluded that the knife—sharp enough to cut wires—was used in a manner—striking at Kent’s stomach—that was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

A vehicle can be a deadly weapon when it is used in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Silverio Hernandez, Jr. v. State · filed 2013-02-04(a)(17)(B)

A vehicle is not a deadly weapon per se; however, it can become a deadly weapon if it is used in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Section 1.07(17)(B) defines a deadly weapon by its capacity to cause death or serious bodily injury in the manner used or intended; actual serious bodily injury is unnecessary.

Kennedy v. State · filed 2013-02-28(17)(B)

The State was not required to show that Bruce actually suffered serious bodily injury, only that Appellant used his hands or the television in a manner that was capable of causing serious bodily injury.