Statute Annotations › Texas › Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011

Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011

Common and technical meanings of words and phrases: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Texas
Case notes
562
Cited in passing
1,119
Citing cases indexed
359
Case dates
1987–2025
Screened through
2025-11-21
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-01
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

1,681 citing cases reviewed: 562 interpreted the section (annotated below), 1,119 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2025-11-21 may not have been reviewed yet.

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Plain and ordinary meaning

Section 311.011(a) directs courts to construe statutory words according to common usage.

Daniels v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-07-18(a)

Thus, we construe words according to common usage. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a).
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Section 311.011’s common-meaning rule applies when construing a municipal ordinance; its words determine the ordinance’s scope.

Rhino Real Estate Investments, Inc. and the Rhino Group, L.P. v. City of Runaway Bay, Texas · filed 2009-07-23(a)

Giving the words of Ordinance 430 their plain meaning, the ordinance simply amends appendix 1, section 26.00 of the code of ordinances to set a fee for building permits and inspections in the City’s ETJ. ... Nothing in the plain language of Ordinance 430 purports to extend the City’s building code to its ETJ.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for statutory words to be read in context according to grammar and common usage.

Shipp v. State · filed 2009-08-18(a)

Statutory words are to be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005). The phrase “commercial instrument” is not defined in Black’s Law Dictionary or any Texas Code. Shipp’s complaint and our research and analysis concerning it also lead us to conclude that the term “commercial instrument” is not a phrase in common use; accordingly, without a statutory definition of the term and the absence of a common use definition, we find it difficult to absolutely define.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read statutory words in context and give them their common meaning.

In Re Wilkinson · filed 2009-04-10(a)

The Texas Government Code instructs that “words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Tex. Gov’t Code, § 311.011(a). ... The Texas Property Code’s use of the term “firearm” is not ambiguous and, under the common meaning of the term firearm, the Wilkinsons’ Guns are very clearly firearms.
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Section 311.011 requires courts to use a word’s common meaning when construing a statute; in the context of a written contract, “executed” means signed.

San Jacinto County and San Jacinto Commissioners Court v. John Nunn, Sr. · filed 2006-09-28

In analyzing the enabling provision of section 262.007, we look to the common meaning of the term “executed” in the context of contracts, as required by section 311.011 of the Code Construction Act. ... Based upon the common usage of “executed” as reflected by Black’s and Webster’s, we hold that “executed,” as commonly used in the context of a written contract signed by the parties, means the date the contract is signed.
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Section 311.011(a) requires statutory words to be read in context and given their meaning under grammar and common usage.

the City of Galveston, Texas and Landry's Restaurants, Inc. v. the Texas General Land Office · filed 2006-04-20(a)

First, in interpreting statutory language, “[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a). As we previously discussed, in common usage, the term “lease” implies that rental payments may be the required consideration provided in exchange for the right to use and occupy certain property.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read statutory words in context and construe them according to grammar and common usage.

Zaborac v. Texas Department of Public Safety · filed 2005-06-23(a)

According to section 311.011(a) of the government code, “Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” ... The word “detectable” has a plain and ordinary meaning that may be understood by a person of ordinary intelligence.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read words and phrases in context and construe them according to grammar and common usage.

Perez v. City of Dallas · filed 2005-12-13(a)

When interpreting a statute or municipal ordinance, we read words and phrases in context and construe them according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005). ... Accordingly, because section 1716 is unambiguous, we construe the term “loading dock” according to its plain meaning.
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Section 311.011 requires courts to give statutory words their common meaning.

Brenham Housing Authority v. Davies · filed 2005-03-24

BHA’s argument cannot overcome the plain language of the statute. We must give effect to a statute’s common meaning. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011 (Vernon 1998).
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to give undefined statutory words their common usage meaning.

Dornbusch v. State · filed 2005-03-24(a)

We adopt the word’s meaning in common usage, see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 1998), which is “to move by persuasion or influence” or “to bring about by influence.” Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed.1996.
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Section 311.011(a) requires courts to read statutory words in context and according to grammar and common usage.

In the Interest of A.V. · filed 2003-07-03(a)

But to us, the phrase “two years from the date of filing the petition” reasonably indicates, consistent with the common usage of the word “from,” a prospective reading.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read undefined words in context according to grammar and common usage.

In Re Walkup · filed 2003-08-07(a)

When the Act or other law does not give a specific definition to a word, the Act states that “[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Tex. Gov’t Code ANN. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 1998). We therefore look to the ordinary meaning of the word “date,” which Black’s Law Dictionary defines as “[t]he day when an event happened or will happen,” and we conclude that the term “date” does not generally include a specific time of day.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for giving statutory words their common meaning; “paid” means compensated for services.

Housing Authority of the City of El Paso, Texas v. Rangel · filed 2004-02-05(a)

In construing the statute, we must determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent by looking at the statute's common meaning and presuming that the Legislature intended the plain meaning of its words. See Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a)(Vernon 1998); National Liability and Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000). The ordinary and plain meaning of "pay" or "paid" is to compensate or give something in return for goods or services. ... Applying the plain and common meaning of the term "paid," we conclude that HACEP commissioners are not public employees under the Whistleblower Act.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for statutory words to be read according to their plain, common meaning; “paid” means compensated in return for services.

Housing Authority of the City of El Paso v. Rangel · filed 2004-03-17(a)

In construing the statute, we must determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent by looking at the statute’s common meaning and presuming that the Legislature intended the plain meaning of its words. ... Applying the plain and common meaning of the term “paid,” we conclude that HACEP commissioners are not public employees under the Whistleblower Act.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for a term’s ordinary meaning unless the statute expresses a different meaning.

Amoroso v. Aldine Independent School District · filed 1991-02-28(a)

In construing a statute, this Court will apply the ordinary meaning of a term, unless a different meaning is expressed in the statute. Hopkins v. Spring Indep. School Dist., 736 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex.1987); Inwood North Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Meier, 625 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ); Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 1988). Generally, “may” is construed as permissive.
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Section 311.011 directs courts to give statutory words their plain meaning.

State v. One 1985 Chevrolet · filed 1992-03-27

Under the rules of statutory construction, we must presume that: (1) the legislature never does a useless act, Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 551 (Tex.1981), (2) words in a statute should be given their plain meaning, Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011 (Vernon 1988), and *781(3) the legislature intends a just and reasonable result.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for the ordinary meaning of undefined statutory terms.

Bond v. Employees Retirement System of Texas · filed 1992-04-15(a)

Therefore, in construing the statute, we will apply the ordinary meaning of the terms therein.
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Section 311.011 gives statutory words their acquired special meanings and undefined common words their ordinary meanings.

Smith v. State · filed 1987-09-28

Words in statutes are to be given any special meanings they have acquired, whether by legislative definition or technical usage. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(b) (Vernon Supp.1987). Common words not defined by statute are given their ordinary meanings.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to construe words in context according to grammar and common usage; the common meaning of “willful” includes “intentional.”

Wilson v. State · filed 1989-09-27(a)

The Code Construction Act provides that “[wjords and phrases should be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (1988). The common meaning of “willful” is “intentional” or “obstinately self-willed.”
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read undefined statutory words in context and give them their ordinary meaning under the rules of grammar and common usage.

Hernandez v. State · filed 1990-01-10(a)

When statutory words are not defined, the Code Construction Act prescribes that words and phrases under attack shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 1989). ... In the instant case, the term “remain” can be construed according to its ordinary usage and is not so vague or indefinite as to prevent appellant from understanding the offense for which he is accused.
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Section 311.011(a) requires statutory words and phrases to be read in context and construed according to grammar and common usage.

Hawkins v. State · filed 1990-05-24(a)

Statutory words and phrases must be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage, according to the Code Construction Act. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 1988). Nothing within the language of the statute indicates that the legislature used “may” in anything but its usual sense.
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Undefined statutory words are construed according to common usage.

Weirich v. Weirich · filed 1990-07-31

When words used in a statute are not defined in that statute, then such words shall be construed according to common usage. TEX.GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011 (Vernon 1988). ... Applying these definitions of aid, assist, retain and conceal to the evidence in the record, we hold that the above-referenced evidence is no evidence and insufficient evidence that Opal aided or assisted Ralph in retaining or concealing the children after the February 25, 1982, taking by Ralph.
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Section 311.011(a) requires a statutory term to be construed in its context; a meaning drawn from the Tax Code does not necessarily govern its use in eminent domain proceedings.

G.P. Show Productions, Inc. v. Arlington Sports Facilities Development Authority, Inc. · filed 1994-03-23(a)

... we must construe this term in the context of eminent domain proceedings.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to construe an undefined word in an ordinance according to grammar and common usage.

Mayo v. State · filed 1994-05-12(a)

The ordinance does not define “display” in the context of conducting a business in an enterprise. However, we shall construe the word “display” according to rules of grammar and common usage. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 1988).
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read an undefined statutory word in context and construe it according to grammar and common usage.

Regalado v. State · filed 1994-05-18(a)

The word dildo is not defined in the Penal Code. In such case, courts are to read the word in context and construe it according to rules of grammar and common usage. See Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) and (b) (Vernon 1988); Pettijohn v. State, 782 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).
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Section 311.011(b) requires words with a technical or particular meaning to be construed according to that meaning.

Dinkins v. State · filed 1995-02-01(b)

Further, we find no merit in appellant’s vagueness claim because the Penal Code adequately limits those acts which constitute “murder.” The Code Construction Act provides that words having a technical or particular meaning must be construed according to that meaning. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(b) (Vernon 1988).
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Section 311.011 directs courts to read words without a technical meaning in context and according to grammar and common usage.

Salisbury v. State · filed 1993-12-16(a) and (b)

“Patently” is not specifically defined in § 42.07 and therefore has not acquired a particular or technical meaning. When a statutory term has not acquired a technical meaning, the term should be read in context and construed according to rules of grammar and common usage.
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Section 311.011(a) requires courts to read statutory words and phrases in context and construe them according to grammar and common usage.

Lane v. State · filed 1996-11-06(a)

In addition to definitions, a plain meaning analysis must include reading words and phrases in context and construing them in accordance with the rules of grammar and common usage. See Bingham, 913 S.W.2d at 209-210 (citing Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.011(a)).
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read statutory words in context and construe them according to grammar and common usage.

Pruit v. Orr · filed 1999-04-01(a)

We are to construe this phrase by giving the words used their ordinary meaning, in the context of the subsection. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 1998) (“Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.002 (Vernon 1998) (“[W]ords shall be given their ordinary meaning.”).
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Statutory words are read in context and construed according to grammar and common usage.

Carroll v. State · filed 1995-11-08(a)

Statutory words are to be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read statutory words in context and give undefined words their common meaning.

Gonzalez v. State · filed 1997-08-20(a)

Words and phrases in a statute should be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Tex. Gov’t Code ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 1988) (Code Construction Act). ... The statute in question did not define “agreement” so it must be given its common or plain meaning as noted earlier.
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Section 311.011 calls for undefined statutory words to be construed according to common usage.

University of Texas Law School v. Texas Legal Foundation · filed 1997-12-18

The Act does not define the meaning of the words “related to.” In this circumstance, we construe the words according to common usage.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for clear and unambiguous statutory words to be given their plain and common meaning.

Mueller v. Beamalloy, Inc. · filed 1999-06-03(a)

When statutes are clear and unambiguous, we discern the legislature’s intent by according the words chosen their plain and common meaning and by giving effect to all of the statute’s terms.
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Section 311.011 directs courts to give statutory words their plain meaning unless a statutory definition or another source gives them a particular meaning.

Texas Ass'n of School Boards, Inc. v. Ward · filed 2000-04-26

We give words in the statute their plain meaning unless they are given a particular meaning by statutory definition or otherwise.
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Section 311.011 directs courts to give statutory words their plain meaning unless they have been given a particular meaning by definition or otherwise.

Nugent v. City of Houston · filed 2001-07-20

Words are to be given their plain meaning unless they have been given a particular meaning by statutory definition or otherwise. ... The court concludes that the plain and unambiguous meaning of the term “beginning position” in Chapter 143 includes “academy trainee” within its definition.
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Section 311.011 gives statutory words their ordinary and plain meaning unless they are clearly shown to be used in another sense.

Brazeal v. State of Texas · filed 2001-09-17

Words used in a statute are given their ordinary and plain meaning unless clearly shown to be used in another sense.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read statutory words in context and according to grammar and usage when determining their plain meaning.

Frieling v. State · filed 2002-01-17(a)

In determining the plain meaning of the language of a statute, “[w]ords and phrases should be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and usage.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (West 1998); Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
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Section 311.011 gives statutory words their ordinary meaning unless they are defined or have a particular or technical meaning.

Delgado v. Jim Wells County · filed 2002-05-31

Words in statutes have their ordinary meaning unless (1) the statute defines them, (2) they are connected with and used with reference to a particular trade or subject matter, or (3) are a term of art. ... Giving the word “report” its ordinary meaning, there is simply no evidence that Delgado gave an account of anything to Ranger Ramon.
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Section 311.011 calls for statutory words to be read in their commonly understood, everyday sense.

Alba v. Nueces County Sheriff's Department · filed 2002-09-12

We use the commonly understood, everyday meaning of the word “suspended” when interpreting the statute.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to construe statutory words in context according to grammar and common usage; applying that rule, “furnish” permits mailing materials to opposing counsel.

Salazar v. Canales · filed 2002-08-22(a)

Further, the Texas Legislature has stated that words and phrases used in a statute should be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon Supp.2002). ... Further, we conclude that under the plain meaning of the statute sending the materials in the mail is an acceptable means of furnishing them.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for courts to give statutory words their plain and ordinary meaning.

in the Interest of Scotty Morgan Henry and Shelby Leann Henry, Children · filed 2003-06-17(a)

In our analysis, we consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute's words and examine the entire statute, not only the questioned sections. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005); Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Systems, Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999).
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Section 311.011 directs courts to begin with the plain and common meaning of statutory words.

State of Texas v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland and Colonial American Casualty and Surety Company · filed 2004-01-29

When construing statutes, we first look to the plain and common meaning of the words used by the legislature.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read words in context and give undefined words their ordinary meaning according to grammar and common usage.

McCelvey v. State · filed 2004-09-30(a)

As used in the statute and the indictment, “adequate” modifies “service.” “Adequate” is not defined in the water code or penal code. It should be given its ordinary meaning. “Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”
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Section 311.011 directs courts to use the plain and common meaning of statutory words to determine legislative intent.

William McMillin and Mary Furse//Cross-Appellant, State Farm Lloyds v. State Farm Lloyds//Cross-Appellees, William McMillin and Mary Furse · filed 2005-08-26

We ascertain the legislature’s intent in the plain and common meaning of the words used. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011; Keng, 23 S.W.3d at 349.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read an undefined statutory term in context and give it its plain and ordinary meaning.

Schmidt v. State · filed 2006-02-02(a)

Applying the basic rules of statutory construction, when a statutory term is not directly defined, it is to be read in context and construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning.
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Section 311.011 calls for courts to give clear, unambiguous statutory words their plain meaning.

Beedy v. State · filed 2006-04-27

When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning of its words. ... see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011 (Vernon 2005).
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Section 311.011 calls for statutory words to be read according to their plain and common meaning.

Greg Abbott, Attorney General of the State of Texas v. North East Independent School District · filed 2006-05-12

We first look to the plain and common meaning of the words the legislature used.
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Section 311.011 calls for statutory words to be read according to their plain and common meaning.

Abbott v. North East Independent School District · filed 2006-05-12

We first look to the plain and common meaning of the words the legislature used.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to give undefined statutory words their plain meaning in context, using ordinary grammar and usage.

Stanford v. City of Lubbock and Lubbock Fire Fighter and Police Officer Civil Service Commission · filed 2007-07-26(a)

Words not defined in a statute are given their plain meaning, read in context, and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005).
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Section 311.011(a) calls for undefined statutory words to be read in context and given their plain meaning under ordinary grammar and usage.

Geeslin v. State Farm Lloyds · filed 2008-05-22(a)

Words not defined in a statute are given their plain meaning, read in context, and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.
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Section 311.011 calls for undefined statutory words to be given their plain and common meaning unless the context requires a different construction.

Harrington v. State · filed 2008-09-03

In the absence of a statutory definition and a context requiring a different construction, we construe the statute's words according to their plain and common meaning.
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Section 311.011 gives words their ordinary meaning unless they are used as terms of art or in a particular trade or subject matter.

Griffin v. Birkman · filed 2008-09-17

And words, unless used as a term of art or connected with a particular trade or subject matter, are given their ordinary meaning. ... The plain meaning of the word “expenditure” does not support Griffin’s assertion that an emergency expenditure must increase the budget.
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Section 311.011 requires statutory words and phrases to be read in context according to grammar and common usage.

State v. Posey · filed 2009-10-20

The Texas Government Code requires that the plain meaning of phrases within a statute be our guide in interpreting a statutory provision: "Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage." See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 (Vernon 2005).
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Section 311.011 directs courts to use the plain and common meanings of statutory words.

M.T.D. Environmental, L.L.P. v. City of Midland · filed 2010-05-13

We first look to the plain and common meaning of the words used by the legislature.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to give an undefined statutory word its plain and ordinary meaning.

Saenz v. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation, Inc. · filed 2012-07-25(a)

Because the term “sale” is not defined in chapter 74, we simply apply its plain and ordinary meaning.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for undefined words to be read according to their ordinary meaning in statutory context.

Cadena Comercial USA Corp. D/B/A Oxxo v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission · filed 2017-04-28(a)

Finally, because the Legislature has not provided specific definitions for many terms, we look to their plain and ordinary meaning, unless a different meaning is apparent from the context of the statute.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for undefined statutory words to be given their common and ordinary meaning.

John Ward Hunt v. State · filed 2017-08-01(a)

“Agreement” is not defined in the statute, so we give the word its common and ordinary meaning.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for statutory words to be read in context and given their ordinary meaning.

Kilgore ISD v. Anderson · filed 2020-12-22(a)

To ascertain that intent, we look first to the plain and common meaning of the statute’s words. McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 745; Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 865; see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011 (West 2013). ... The tax code does not provide a definition for “adopt.” Undefined terms in a statute are typically given their ordinary meaning, but if a different or more precise meaning is apparent from the term’s use in the context of the statue, we apply that meaning.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read undefined statutory words in context and construe them according to grammar and common usage.

Rodgers v. State · filed 2021-03-30(a)

The term “refuse” is not defined in the Penal Code, but is not ambiguous, so we consider its plain ordinary meaning. In determining plain meaning, words and phrases must be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and usage.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to give undefined statutory words their plain meaning.

Walker v. the State of Texas · filed 2022-02-09(a)

When a statute does not define the words used therein, we give the words their plain meaning. See Parker v. State, 985 S.W.2d 460, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (“Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”).
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read statutory words in context and construe them according to grammar and common usage.

Mason v. State · filed 2022-05-11(a)

To do so, the reviewing court focuses on the literal text of the statutory language in question, reading it in context and construing it “according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.011(a).
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Section 311.011(a) gives statutory terms the plain and ordinary meaning when the legislature has not defined them.

Ortiz v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-08-26(a)

Terms not specifically defined by the legislature are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Edwards v. State, 666 S.W.3d 571, 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (first citing Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a); and then citing State v. Bolles, 541 S.W.3d 128, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)).
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Plain meaning unless ambiguous

Section 311.011 directs courts to apply the plain meaning of statutory language unless that meaning would produce an absurd result.

Menefee v. Kathryn and Jeremy Medlen · filed 2010-06-24

In other words, giving the language of subsection (f) its plain meaning, a suit that “could have been brought under this chapter against the governmental unit” necessarily means a suit that falls within the TTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011.
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Undefined terms and ordinary meaning

Section 311.011(a) directs courts to construe undefined statutory terms according to common usage.

Fuentes v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-07-30(a)

The statute does not define the terms “penetrate,” “sexual organ,” or “contact,” so we construe them “according to common usage.”
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Undefined statutory words are read in context and construed according to grammar and common usage.

Fairlawn Assets, LLC, John Ferrante, and Jarrod Freeborn v. Barbara Booker, as Guardian of the Person and Estate of M.H. · filed 2020-05-07(a)

Words that are not defined in a statute are read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.
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Section 311.011 directs courts to give an undefined statutory word its meaning in common usage.

Jerilyn Ann Cerda, as Next Friend of Noel Doe v. Rjl Entertainment, Inc. D/B/A Club Cheetah · filed 2013-12-12

“Induce” is not defined by the penal code, so we adopt the word’s meaning in common usage.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to construe undefined statutory words in context according to grammar and common usage.

Fresh Coat, Inc. v. Parexlahabra, Inc. · filed 2014-02-20(a)

Under the Code Construction Act, the words of a statute that are not expressly defined are to be examined in context and in accord with “the rules of grammar and common usage.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a).
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Section 311.011(a) requires courts to read undefined statutory words in context according to grammar and common usage.

Crosstex NGL Pipeline, L.P. v. Reins Road Farms-1, Ltd. · filed 2013-05-23(a)

Courts construing the terms of a statute are to examine the words of a statute that are not expressly defined in context and in accord with “the rules of grammar and common usage.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a).
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Section 311.011 directs courts to give undefined statutory words their common meaning unless they have acquired a technical meaning; “operate” in the DWI statute is a common term.

Kirsch, Scott Alan · filed 2012-01-25

We have explained that jurors may “freely read [undefined] statutory language to have any meaning which is acceptable in common parlance.” Denton, 911 S.W.2d at 390; see also Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769, 771-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read undefined statutory words in context and give them their common meaning.

Watson v. State of Texas · filed 2011-01-27(a)

Instead, the words must be read in the context in which they are used and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for an undefined statutory word to be interpreted in context according to common usage.

Bell v. State · filed 2010-10-26(a)

The penal code does not define the word “induce.” We determine its meaning given its context and the rules of common usage.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for undefined statutory words to be read in context and given their plain meaning under the rules of grammar and common usage.

Mike Geeslin, Commissioner of Insurance, and Texas Department of Insurance v. State Farm Lloyds · filed 2008-05-22(a)

Words not defined in a statute are given their plain meaning, read in context, and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to give undefined statutory words their plain meaning in context, using grammar and common usage.

Botello v. State · filed 2008-05-22(a)

Words not defined in a statute are given their plain meaning, read in context, and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.
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Section 311.011 requires an undefined statutory word to be given its common meaning unless it has acquired a technical or particular meaning.

LeClear v. State · filed 2007-10-16

Because the Texas Penal Code does not define the term “offense”; see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07 (Vernon 2003), the term must be defined by common usage unless the word has acquired a technical or particular meaning.
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Section 311.011(a) requires statutory words to be read in context according to common usage; dictionaries may establish that usage.

Green v. State · filed 2007-12-05(a)

This provision states: “Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Tex. Gov.Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005). Dictionaries determine a word’s common use.
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Section 311.011(a) requires courts to read an undefined statutory phrase in context and construe it according to grammar and common usage.

Green v. State · filed 2004-05-27(a)

Subtitle B of the occupations code does not define “psychological harm.” Thus, we must read the phrase in context and construe it according to the rules of grammar and common usage.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to use definitions that comport with common usage when a statutory phrase is undefined.

Opinion No. · filed 2000-03-09(a)

The statute itself does not define the phrase "change in status." In such a case, we must apply definitions that comport with common usage. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 (a) (Vernon 1998).
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Section 311.011 calls for undefined statutory terms to be construed according to their ordinary meaning.

Mount Pleasant Independent School District v. Estate of Lindburg Ex Rel. Lindburg · filed 1989-02-15

However, because the legislature failed to define the phrase “operation or use,” it must be construed according to the ordinary meaning of the terms “operation” and “use.” Satterfield v. Satterfield, 448 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex.1969); see also Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011 (Vernon 1988).
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Undefined statutory terms are construed according to grammar and common usage.

Rezapour v. State · filed 1990-04-10

Accordingly, we must apply the rules of grammar and common usage to determine the meaning of the statute. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011 (Vernon 1988).
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Section 311.011(a) gives an undefined statutory term its common meaning in ordinary usage.

Garcia v. State · filed 1990-06-22(a)

The definitions in § 46.01 are expressly limited to chapter 46 of the Penal Code. Since “firearm” is not defined elsewhere, it is given its common meaning from common usage.
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Section 311.011(a) requires an undefined statutory word to be given its ordinary meaning.

Bullock v. Marathon Oil Co. · filed 1990-11-28(a)

Since “sale” is not defined, it must be given its ordinary meaning.
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Section 311.011 directs courts to read undefined statutory phrases in context under the rules of grammar and give them their common meaning.

Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Blackburn · filed 1992-05-29

Neither of the phrases is defined in the Act. Therefore, we will consider the phrases in context according to the rules of grammar and apply the meaning of their common usage. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011 (Vernon 1988).
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Section 311.011 directs courts to use the common meaning of an undefined statutory term.

Cullen v. State · filed 1992-06-24

The appellant, the State, and the trial court all agreed that “destroy” is not statutorily defined. It follows that the term’s meaning should be determined by its common usage. See Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011 (1988).
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Section 311.011 calls for grammar and common usage to determine the meaning of a statutory term undefined by the relevant codes or case law.

Onofre v. State · filed 1992-11-25

Because.the term “negotiate” is not defined in the Health and Safety Code, or in the Penal Code, or by caselaw definition, we apply the rules of grammar and common usage to determine its meaning.
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Undefined statutory terms receive their ordinary everyday meaning; “mouth” includes the tongue.

Montoya v. State · filed 1993-01-27(a)

Statutory terms that are not defined in the statute are given their ordinary everyday meaning. ... Common sense and common usage leads us to conclude that the legislature intended the word “mouth” to include its parts, such as the teeth and tongue.
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Section 311.011(a) gives undefined statutory words their ordinary meaning unless the statute clearly shows they were used in another sense.

Flowers v. State · filed 1994-12-22(a)

The word “believing” is not defined in Section 31.03 or elsewhere in the Penal Code, and we have found no decision construing the meaning of the word in the context of Section 31.03(b)(3). When words in a statute or ordinance are not defined they are ordinarily given their plain meaning without construction of penal laws or laws on other subjects, unless the statute or ordinance clearly shows that they were used in some other sense. Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 219 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 1988).
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Section 311.011 directs courts to use grammar and common usage to determine the meaning of undefined statutory terms.

Sauceda v. State · filed 1993-06-29(a)

The Code does not define the terms “finance” or “invest.” We apply the rules of grammar and common usage to determine their meaning.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read statutory words in context and according to grammar and common usage; an undefined term can be sufficiently definite when read that way.

Ex Parte: Shawn Paul Anderson · filed 1995-06-28(a)

When read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage, the term is not vague and indefinite.
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Section 311.011(a) gives undefined statutory terms their ordinary meaning.

Thomas v. State · filed 1995-08-17(a)

Statutory terms which are not defined are given their ordinary meaning.
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Section 311.011 calls for an undefined statutory word to be given its commonly understood, everyday meaning.

Burleson v. State · filed 1996-12-18

The legislature has not defined “occur”; thus, we use the commonly understood, everyday definition of the word when interpreting the statute.
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Section 311.011 requires courts to interpret undefined statutory terms by the rules of grammar and common usage.

Walker v. State · filed 1997-09-11

The word "collaborate" is not defined in section 71.01(a). When terms of a statute are not defined, courts must interpret them by the rules of grammar and common usage. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 (West 1988); Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Given its common usage, "collaborate" means to work together in a joint project, to cooperate and assist.
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Section 311.011(a) requires courts to give an undefined statutory phrase its common meaning.

Surgitek, Inc. v. Adams · filed 1997-10-09(a)

The legislature did not define “essential need,” so we must give the phrase its common meaning. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 1988).
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Section 311.011(a) calls for an undefined statutory term to be given its common and ordinary meaning.

John Sharp, Comptroller of Public Accounts for the State of Texas, and Dan Morales, Attorney General of the State of Texas v. F. W. Gartner Company · filed 1998-06-18(a)

As there is no definition of the term “use” in the Code, we will apply its common and ordinary meaning.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for an undefined statutory term to be given its common and ordinary meaning.

Cornyn v. Universe Life Insurance Co. · filed 1999-04-15(a)

As there is no definition of the term “use” in article 4.11, we apply its common and ordinary meaning.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for construing an undefined statutory term according to common usage.

X. L. Jefferson, Jr. v. State · filed 2001-12-20(a)

The Health and Safety Code does not define “open to the public.” Thus, we construe the term according to common usage. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (West 1998).
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Section 311.011 calls for the commonly understood, everyday meaning of an undefined word when construing a municipal ordinance.

Rosenblatt v. City of Houston · filed 2000-10-19

The Houston City Council did not define direct line of sight in the ordinance; thus we use the commonly understood, everyday definition of the word direct when interpreting the ordinance.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for the usual meaning of “have resided” when there is no indication the Legislature intended a technical meaning; the phrase means living together in the same household.

Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services v. Sherry · filed 2001-04-26(a)

Although the law sometimes gives a technical meaning to the noun “residence,” it does not similarly interpret the verb “resided,” and there is no indication that the Legislature meant anything more than the usual meaning of those words.
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Section 311.011 gives an undefined statutory term its common meaning unless it has acquired a technical or particular meaning.

Deleon II, Orlando v. State · filed 2003-03-06

The Code Construction Act provides that when a statute does not define a term it must be given its common meaning, except in the case of words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning.
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Section 311.011 directs courts to give undefined statutory phrases their ordinary and common meaning.

in the Matter of N.S., a Juvenile · filed 2004-02-11

However, that precise phrase is not defined in the Juvenile Justice Code. Accordingly, we must apply the ordinary and common meaning of the phrase. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011 (Vernon 1998); City of Austin v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 92 S.W.3d 434, 442 (Tex. 2002).
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read an undefined statutory phrase in context and construe it according to grammar and common usage.

Green v. State · filed 2004-06-24(a)

Subtitle B of the occupations code does not define “psychological harm.” Thus, we must read the phrase in context and construe it according to the rules of grammar and common usage.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read statutory words in context and give undefined words their ordinary meaning under the rules of grammar and common usage.

McCelvey v. State · filed 2004-08-26(a)

“Adequate” is not defined in the water code or penal code. It should be given its ordinary meaning. “Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (West 1998); Ex parte Anderson, 902 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, pet. ref’d). “Adequate” is normally defined as “able to satisfy a requirement; suitable.” American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1973) at 15. This is the common usage and understanding of the word.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to interpret undefined statutory terms according to their common usage.

Doyle v. State · filed 2004-10-07(a)

Given our commitment to interpret statutory language “according to the rules of grammar and common usage,” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (West 1998), we cannot read “tampers with” as limited by “damages, defaces, or renders ... inoperable.”
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Undefined statutory words are given their plain meaning in context, according to grammar and common usage.

In Re the Commitment of Lowe · filed 2004-12-09(a)

Words not defined in a statute are given their plain meaning, read in context, and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.
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An undefined statutory term is construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.

Villasan v. O'ROURKE · filed 2005-05-26(a)

The term “irrevocable” is not defined by the statute, and is therefore construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005). “Irrevocable” is defined as “incapable of being recalled, or revoked: past recall: unalterable.”
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to give an undefined statutory term its meaning in common usage.

Scott v. State · filed 2005-09-08(a)

Since the term “induce” is not defined by the Texas Penal Code, we must adopt the word’s meaning in common usage.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for code words to be read in context according to grammar and common usage; undefined words receive their ordinary meaning.

Jones v. State · filed 2005-11-10(a)

When we interpret a code enacted by the Legislature, we read words and phrases in context and construe them according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a). ... Accordingly, we look to the ordinary meaning of the words “proceed” and “seek.”
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to construe undefined statutory terms according to grammar and common usage.

In Re Narvaiz · filed 2006-05-11(a)

Since none of the terms in the phrase “actual care, control, and possession” are defined by statute, the terms are construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005).
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Section 311.011(a) calls for undefined statutory words to be given their plain meaning in context, according to grammar and common usage.

Stanford v. City of Lubbock · filed 2007-07-26(a)

Words not defined in a statute are given their plain meaning, read in context, and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.
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Section 311.011 calls for statutory terms to receive their established meaning unless the statute indicates a different meaning.

Burnett-Dunham v. Spurgin · filed 2007-12-11

We presume the legislature knows the meaning of “final judgment,” and there is nothing within the statute implying the legislature intended “final judgment” to have a different meaning within the context of the family code. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011.
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Section 311.011(a) requires courts to construe undefined statutory words according to their ordinary meaning.

Indemnity Insurance Co. v. City of Garland · filed 2008-04-04(a)

Instead, we must construe words used in a statute according to their ordinary meaning unless the statute defines those words.
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Undefined statutory words are construed according to their ordinary meaning.

Indemnity Insurance Co. v. City of Garland · filed 2008-06-24(a)

Instead, we must construe words used in a statute according to their ordinary meaning unless the statute defines those words. ... Because “against” is not a defined term in the TTCA, we construe it according to its ordinary meaning, which is “in opposition to.”
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read undefined words in procedural rules in context and according to grammar and common usage.

Goodman v. Wachovia Bank, National Ass'n · filed 2008-08-13(a)

Rule 107 does not define “verified.” Nevertheless, when a procedural rule does not give a specific definition to a word, the Code Construction Act states that “[wjords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”
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Section 311.011 directs courts to give undefined statutory terms their common meaning.

Holz v. State · filed 2009-09-30

Because the term "destroy" is not statutorily defined in the Texas Penal Code, the term's meaning is determined by its common usage.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for an undefined statutory phrase to be given its common, plain meaning.

Chacon v. ANDREWS DISTRIBUTING CO. LTD. · filed 2009-08-13(a)

“Intentional disregard” is not defined in the statute or our case law; therefore, we must look to the phrase’s common usage and accord it a plain meaning. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005); see e.g., McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex.2003).
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Section 311.011(a) calls for an undefined statutory term to be given its ordinary or common meaning.

Harris County Appraisal District v. Wilkinson · filed 2010-08-05(a)

When the legislature has not defined a term or phrase, we give it its ordinary or common meaning.
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Undefined words are read in context and construed according to grammar and common usage.

Smith v. State of Texas · filed 2011-01-27(a)

Instead, the words must be read in the context in which they are used and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005). The undefined terms about which appellant complains – ―unprovoked‖ and ―attack‖ – relate to the actions of the dog, not the conduct of the person, and are such that they may be given their common meaning.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to use grammar and common usage to construe undefined statutory terms.

Woodard v. State · filed 2011-03-10(a)

Because the penal code does not define “actual care, custody, control, or management,” we refer to the rules of grammar and common usage to construe the terms.
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Section 311.011 directs courts to use the common meaning of undefined statutory terms.

City of Oak Ridge North v. Mendes · filed 2011-03-24

In the absence of statutory definitions of these terms, and in accord with the requirements of the Code Construction Act, we look to the common meaning of the phrase “properly executed” to determine its meaning.
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Undefined statutory terms are read in context and given their common meaning under the rules of grammar and common usage.

Smith v. State · filed 2011-06-15(a)

Instead, the words must be read in the context in which they are used and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005). The undefined terms about which appellant complains — “unprovoked” and “attack” — relate to the actions of the dog, not the conduct of the person, and are such that they may be given their common meaning.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to read undefined statutory words in context according to grammar and common usage.

Watson v. State · filed 2011-06-15(a)

Instead, the words must be read in the context in which they are used and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005). The undefined terms about which appellant complains — “unprovoked” and “attack” — relate to the actions of the dog, not the conduct of the person, and are such that they may be given their common meaning.
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Undefined statutory terms are given their ordinary meaning.

in the Interest of S. W., a Child · filed 2011-06-30

When a statute does not define a term, we apply the term’s ordinary meaning.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to give undefined statutory words their ordinary and common meaning; dictionary definitions may help determine that meaning.

Smith v. State · filed 2012-01-20(a)

The words “false” and “fictitious” are not defined in the statute, so we must give them their ordinary and common meaning. In determining the ordinary and common meaning of an undefined word in a statute, we may consider dictionary definitions.
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Section 311.011 directs courts to give undefined statutory terms their common meaning unless they have acquired a technical meaning; “operate” is a common term.

Kirsch, Scott Alan · filed 2012-01-25

Our cases have consistently held that “operate” is a common term that has not acquired a technical meaning and may be interpreted according to its common usage.
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Undefined statutory terms are read in context and given their plain and ordinary meaning under the rules of grammar and common usage.

Berry v. State · filed 2012-05-09(a)

In interpreting the meaning of an undefined statutory term, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words, reading them in context and construing them in accordance with the rules of grammar and common usage.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for an undefined term to be given its common meaning, which dictionaries can help determine.

Absher v. Michael Zimmer and Erin Zimmer · filed 2012-12-05(a)

The ordinance at issue here utilizes the term “to let,” which is not defined in the ordinance; therefore, we give it its common meaning. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a) (West 2005) (terms not specifically defined by statute are construed according to rules of grammar and common usage). Dictionaries determine a word’s common use.
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Section 311.011 directs courts to construe an undefined Penal Code term according to grammar and common usage unless it has a technical or particular meaning.

Pena v. State · filed 2012-12-20

There is no contention that the term normal use has acquired any technical or particular meaning which would require anything other than construction according to the rules of grammar and common usage. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011.
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Section 311.011 gives undefined statutory words their meaning under grammar and common usage unless they have acquired a technical or particular meaning. Under that rule, a person operates a truck by causing it to function.

State v. Saenz · filed 2012-12-28

Statutorily undefined words and phrases must be “construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning . . . shall be construed accordingly.” ... It is apparent that Saenz was “operating” the truck when—as observed by Officer Bintliff—he was in the driver’s seat with the key in the ignition, the engine running, and the vehicle in reverse gear.
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An undefined statutory term is construed according to its plain, common meaning unless a legislative definition, context, or absurd result calls for a different reading.

Brent Timmerman D/B/A Timmerman Custom Builders v. Richard Dale, J. · filed 2013-03-27(a)

We rely on the plain meaning of the text, unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from the context, or unless such a construction leads to absurd results. City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex. 2008); see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011 (West 2005). ... To properly construe an undefined statutory term, we begin with the plain meaning of the word.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for undefined statutory terms to be read in their ordinary and common usage.

Perez v. State · filed 2013-10-11(a)

In the absence of statutory definition, we use the term in its ordinary and common usage. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a) (West 2013).
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to give an undefined statutory term its common meaning.

Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Bragg · filed 2013-11-13(a)

The Act does not define “implementation”; therefore, we give it its common meaning. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (West 2005) (terms not specifically defined by statute are construed according to rules of grammar and common usage).
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Under Section 311.011(a), “nongovernmental purpose” takes its common meaning: an activity or function unrelated to a governmental function.

Tidwell v. State · filed 2013-12-04(a)

According to Section 311.011 of the Texas Government Code, undefined terms shall be “construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” ... The parties have not cited any authority indicating that the phrase “nongovernmental purpose” has a technical or specialized meaning and we have found none. ... In common parlance, the phrase “nongovernmental purpose” means an activity or function which is not related to or associated with a governmental function.
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Undefined statutory words are construed according to their common, everyday usage.

Hanna v. State · filed 2014-04-09

When interpreting a statute, an undefined word or phrase should be construed and understood according to its common, every day usage25 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a “victim” is a “person who is the object of a crime... .”26 But can there be a victim, for purposes of restitution, when the defendant is charged with a “victimless crime”?
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Section 311.011(a) calls for statutory words to receive their common meaning when the Legislature has not given them a technical or particular meaning.

Agbeze v. State · filed 2014-07-25(a)

The Legislature did not attach a technical or particular meaning to “scheme” or “continuing course of conduct”; accordingly we give the words their common meaning.
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An undefined statutory term is construed according to its ordinary meaning in common usage.

Ryser v. State · filed 2014-11-25(a)

Thus, the jury was to use the ordinary meaning of the term—not a special legal definition—and that definition was found in the dictionary used by the juror.
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Undefined statutory words are construed according to their ordinary meaning.

Ryser, Drew · filed 2014-12-30(a)

The statute does not define the term “mistreatment,” and neither did the jury charge. Thus, the jury was to use the ordinary meaning of the term—not a special legal definition—and that definition was found in the dictionary used by the juror.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for the common meaning of statutory terms when the Legislature has given them no technical or particular meaning.

Agbeze v. State · filed 2014-09-18(a)

The Legislature did not attach a technical or particular meaning to “scheme” or “continuing course of conduct”; accordingly we give the words their common meaning.
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Jurors may apply their ordinary understanding of an undefined common term without a limiting definition in the charge.

Wilson v. State · filed 2015-03-31

As a common term, the jury was entitled to rely on its understanding of “repeated.” See id. Thus, similar to the challenged definition in Kirsch, the proffered definition would have impermissibly confined the jury’s understanding of the term and improperly focused them on the frequency of the calls and the length of time between them, constituting an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly rejected the proffered definition.
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Section 311.011 gives an undefined common word its ordinary meaning; jurors may rely on that meaning without a limiting definition.

Wilson, Elisa Merrill · filed 2015-05-27

The Court looked to the Code Construction Act for guidance, which provides that statutorily undefined words and phrases shall be “construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 650 (quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011). ... As a common term, the jury was entitled to rely on its understanding of “repeated.” See id. Thus, similar to the challenged definition in Kirsch, the proffered definition would have impermissibly confined the jury’s understanding of the term and improperly focused them on the frequency of the calls and the length of time between them, constituting an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly rejected the proffered definition. See Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 652.
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Undefined statutory terms are construed according to their common usage.

Baker v. Baker · filed 2015-06-25(a)

“Physical abuse” is undefined, which means that we construe it according to its common usage.
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Section 311.011 allows jurors to apply the common meaning of an undefined statutory term that has no technical meaning, without a special definition in the jury charge.

Wilson, Elisa Merrill · filed 2015-05-26

Words that have a technical or particular legal meaning may require definition in the charge, but common terms that have not acquired a technical meaning and may be interpreted according to their common usage need not be defined. ... As a common term, the jury was entitled to rely on its understanding of “repeated.”
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Section 311.011 directs courts interpreting an undefined statutory term to consider any legislative definition or technical meaning before using its plain and common meaning.

Mitchell v. State · filed 2015-08-31

Further, in accordance with Section 311.011 of the Texas Government Code, when determining the meaning of an undefined term used in a statute, a court should first look to “definitions prescribed by the Legislature and any technical or particular meaning the words have acquired” in accordance with the construction, and if no such meaning is apparent, then to “their plain and common meaning[.]”13 Hughes, 246 S.W.3d at 625-26; see also Greater Houston P'ship v. Paxton, __ S.W.3d ___, No. 13-0745, 2015 WL 3978138, at *5 (Tex. June 26, 2015) (“Undefined terms in a statute are typically given their ordinary meaning, but if a different or more precise definition is apparent from the term’s use in the context of the statute, we apply that meaning.”).
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Section 311.011 directs courts to construe undefined statutory phrases according to grammar and common usage.

Robert Michael Arteaga, Jr. v. State · filed 2015-10-22

“Prohibited from marrying” is not defined in any section of the penal code. Since no definition was available within the penal code, “prohibited from marrying” should have been determined according to the “rules of grammar and common usage.”
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Section 311.011(a) requires statutory words and phrases to be read in context according to grammar and common usage.

Ex Parte Justin River Carter · filed 2015-08-31(a)

Statutory words and phrases are to be “read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.011(a); see Tex. Penal Code § 1.05(b) (making section 311.011 applicable to Texas Penal Code).
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When a statutory word has more than one common meaning, the meaning most consistent with its statutory context applies.

Robert Westerburg, Administrator of the Estate of R.D. West A/K/A Randy Dixon Westerburg v. Western Royalty Corporation · filed 2015-12-11(a)

When a word has more than one common meaning, we apply the meaning most consistent with its statutory context.
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Section 311.011(a) directs courts to give an undefined statutory term its common meaning.

2004 Dodge Ram 1500 TX LP CPL1988 and 2000 Buick TX LP CV1N817 v. State · filed 2016-08-26(a)

The forfeiture statute does not define “possession,” so we give the term its common meaning. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.011(a); City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. 2008).
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Undefined statutory terms receive their plain, commonly accepted meanings.

Ex Parte Derek Ty Poe · filed 2016-04-20(a)

We begin by looking to the language of the statute and giving terms their plain meaning. See Parker, 985 S.W.2d at 464; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a).
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Undefined statutory words are examined in context according to grammar and common usage.

Lone Star Groundwater Conservation District, Richard J. Tramm, Sam W. Baker, M. Scott Weisinger, Jim Stinson, John D. Bl · filed 2017-02-02(a)

Under the Code Construction Act, if the words of a statute are not expressly defined, the words used in the statute are to be examined in context and in accord with “the rules of grammar and common usage.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (West 2013). ... Finally, our construction of section 36.066(a) is consistent with the common meaning of the terms “official votes” and “official actions,” as neither term is statutorily defined.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for dictionary definitions to give undefined statutory terms their common meanings.

Collins v. State · filed 2017-03-29(a)

When the Legislature does not specifically define a term used in a statute, we apply the definitions that are found in dictionaries to give words their commonly used meanings.
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Undefined statutory terms receive their ordinary meaning unless the statute indicates a different meaning or that meaning would produce absurd results.

Harris County Appraisal District v. Texas Workforce Commission · filed 2017-05-12(a)

It is true that when a statute does not define a term, the common, ordinary meaning of the term applies unless a contrary meaning is apparent from the statute’s language or the common meaning would lead to absurd or nonsensical results.
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Section 311.011(a) calls for an undefined statutory term to be read according to its plain and common meaning.

in Re Estate of Timothy Glen Chapman · filed 2017-11-09(a)

When a term is not defined in a statute, we look to its plain and common meaning and how it is commonly used. See McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a) (West 2013).
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Notes 1–150 of 562, oldest cases first.

1,119 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Amarillo Oil Co. v. Energy-Agri Products, Inc., the court cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 only as support for the plain-meaning rule while interpreting the Natural Resources Code's definition of casinghead gas; it does not construe, apply, or state what § 311.011 itself means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Opinion No., Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) is cited only as supporting authority for the opinion's interpretation of Human Resources Code § 122.022; the opinion does not decide what § 311.011 itself means, requires, authorizes, or how it interacts with another provision. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.011(a) is cited only as supporting authority for the general rule that statutory words and phrases are construed according to context, grammar, and common usage. The opinion's holding concerns Human Resources Code section 50.023(e), not the meaning, requirements, or effect of section 311.011(a). opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.011(b) is cited only as general support for construing words with a technical or particular meaning; the opinion does not interpret, apply, or state a holding about the meaning or operation of section 311.011 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 only as general statutory-construction authority while interpreting the Education Code's term "severance payment." It does not construe, apply, or state a holding about the meaning, requirements, or authorization of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.011(a) is cited only as general support for interpreting the Local Government Code's term "control"; the opinion decides the effect of section 351.0415, not the meaning, requirements, or operation of section 311.011(a). opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.011(a) is cited only as general support while interpreting the Natural Resources Code's term "plant"; the opinion decides the scope of the Aggregate Quarry Pit Safety Act, not the meaning, requirements, or operation of section 311.011(a). opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites §311.011(a) only for the general interpretive proposition that statutory words are read in context and according to grammar and common usage. Its substantive conclusion concerns Health and Safety Code §775.036(b), not what §311.011 means, requires, or authorizes; moreover, this is an Attorney General opinion rather than a court holding. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.011 is cited only as authority for the general interpretive rule that statutory words should be read in context and according to common usage; the opinion does not construe, apply, or hold what section 311.011 itself means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites section 311.011(a) only as a general statutory-construction rule supporting its reading of Local Government Code section 402.001(b); it does not decide what section 311.011 means, requires, authorizes, or how it interacts with another provision. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites Tex. Gov't Code § 311.011(a) only as a general statutory-construction authority while interpreting the Labor Code's newspaper-delivery exemption; it does not decide what § 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 only as supporting authority for construing the word "consistent" in Local Government Code § 283.056(b); it does not decide what § 311.011 itself means, requires, authorizes, or how it interacts with another provision. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.011(a) is cited only as authority for using grammar and common usage to interpret the phrase "reinstated prospectively" in Tax Code section 33.04(e); the opinion does not state what section 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) only as a general interpretive rule requiring statutory words to be read in context and according to grammar and common usage. The court's actual conclusion concerns Local Government Code chapter 245 and the effect of a property conveyance on locked-in development regulations; it does not decide what § 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
[case name unavailable], the court cites section 311.011 only in a footnote while explaining that “fuel factor” is a term of art given a particular meaning in Commission rules. The court does not say what section 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes, so the citation is incidental rather than a holding. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.011(b) is cited only as a general interpretive canon supporting the opinion's construction of Election Code section 254.0401(b); the opinion does not decide what section 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Jaubert v. State, the opinion does not cite or interpret Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011. Its only Government Code citation is § 311.023, listed in a footnote among statutory-construction authorities, so there is no holding about § 311.011. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 only as general support for defining statutory words while interpreting other statutes; it does not state what § 311.011 means, requires, authorizes, or how it interacts with another provision. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) only as a parenthetical statement of the general plain-language statutory-construction rule while interpreting Health and Safety Code § 691.030(f). It does not analyze what § 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Opinion No., this is an Attorney General opinion, not a court decision, and §311.011(a) is cited as a general interpretive rule supporting the opinion's construction of appropriation riders; the opinion's actual conclusion concerns riders 38 and 90, not what §311.011 itself means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Morgan Buildings & Spas, Inc v. Turn-Key Leasing, Ltd., the opinion addresses the applicability and waiver of Texas U.C.C. Article Nine provisions, especially sections 9.501(c), 9.504, and 9.505; it does not state what Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Opinion No., Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 is cited in a string of authorities for the general plain-language construction principle. The opinion's actual conclusion concerns Family Code §§ 2.006 and 2.007, not what § 311.011 itself means, requires, authorizes, or how it interacts with another provision. opinion →
Randon v. State, the Albert Randon opinion does not interpret, apply, or discuss Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011. The only § 311.011 citation appears in an unrelated appended passage concerning another case and is merely included in a footnote listing an interpretive rule, so it is not a holding of this case. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.011(a) is cited only as a general statutory-construction principle supporting the treatment of “informed consent” as a technical term; the opinion does not interpret, apply, or decide the meaning or operation of §311.011 itself. opinion →
Curtis v. Anderson, the court cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) only as authority for the general principle that statutory interpretation begins with the plain and common meaning of legislative words. It does not interpret, apply, or hold what § 311.011(a) itself means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
In Re AJK, the court cites section 311.011(a) as a general rule of statutory construction while construing Family Code section 263.405; it does not decide what section 311.011 itself means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) only in a footnote as support for the ordinary meaning of the word “measure”; the court does not interpret, apply, or state what § 311.011 requires or authorizes. opinion →
[case name unavailable], the court cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 only as authority for the general statutory-construction proposition that courts first consider the plain and common meaning of legislative words. It does not interpret, apply, or hold what § 311.011 itself means or requires in this case. opinion →
Campbell v. State, section 311.011 is mentioned only in a footnote listing the general statutory-construction directions incorporated through Penal Code section 1.05. The court does not decide what section 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes; its holding concerns whether resisting arrest was a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault under the case's facts. opinion →
Cruz v. State, the citation to Tex. Gov't Code § 311.011 appears only in a footnote reproducing language from Cullen v. State about using common usage to interpret the word “destroy.” Cruz’s holding concerns the sufficiency of the evidence under Penal Code §§ 28.03 and 28.06; it does not itself decide what § 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Opinion No., Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §311.011(a) is cited only as general authority for construing statutory language in context and according to ordinary meaning; the opinion does not interpret, apply, or define §311.011 itself. Its substantive holdings concern Tex. Loc. Gov't Code §§143.072(g) and 143.075. opinion →
STATE EX REL. DEPT. OF PARKS v. Shumake, the court cites section 311.011 only as authority for the general proposition that courts begin statutory interpretation with plain and common meaning; it does not construe, apply, or state what section 311.011 itself means or requires. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites section 311.011(a) only as a general contextual-reading principle while choosing the Tax Code as the source of refund authority; it does not decide what section 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
in Re: Donnie L. Fox, Relator, the court cites §311.011 only as part of a general statutory-interpretation framework, describing it as requiring words and phrases to be construed in context. The court's actual holding concerns Texas Property Code §51.007 and does not decide a disputed meaning, requirement, or authorization under §311.011. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.011(a) is cited only as a general interpretive principle that words and phrases are read in context; the opinion does not construe, apply, or state what that section itself requires beyond citing it among statutory-construction authorities. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.011(a) is cited only as a general statutory-construction principle that words and phrases are read in context; the opinion does not construe, apply, or otherwise hold what section 311.011 itself means in this dispute. opinion →
City of Lubbock, TX v. Adams, the court cites section 311.011 as a general statutory-construction instruction while construing Local Government Code sections 143.038(b), 143.041, and 141.032. Its holding concerns whether temporary assignees receive longevity or seniority pay, not what section 311.011 itself means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Global Santa Fe Corporation, F/K/A Santa Fe International Corporation v. Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty, the court cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 as a statutory-construction rule requiring attention to plain, common, technical, or particular meanings, but it does not construe or apply § 311.011 as the subject of a holding. The actual holding interprets the phrase “paid on behalf of” in the insurance-code net-worth recoupment statute. opinion →
Anderson-Clayton Bros. Funeral Home, Inc. v. Strayhorn, the court cites §311.011(b) as one of several general statutory-construction authorities and recites its rule about technical or particular meanings, but it does not interpret, apply, or decide what §311.011 itself requires in this case. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.011(a) is cited only as a general statutory-construction canon that words and phrases are read in context; the opinion does not interpret, apply, or decide any meaning or legal effect specific to section 311.011. opinion →
[case name unavailable], the court cites § 311.011 only for the general proposition that statutory words are given their plain and common meaning; it does not decide what § 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. The substantive interpretation concerns the word “may” under § 311.016. opinion →
City of Austin v. Lamas, the court cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 only as authority for the general interpretive approach of consulting the plain and common meaning of statutory words; it does not construe, apply, or state what § 311.011 itself requires or authorizes. opinion →
Simmons v. Kuzmich, section 311.011 is cited only as support for the general statement that statutory interpretation begins with the plain and common meaning of legislative words; the court does not interpret, apply, or hold what section 311.011 itself means or requires. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(b) only as interpretive authority for construing a technical phrase in another statute; it does not decide what § 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) only as authority for the general interpretive principle that words and phrases are read in context. It does not interpret, apply, or hold what § 311.011 itself means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion is an Attorney General opinion, not a court holding, and cites Tex. Gov't Code §311.011 only parenthetically for the general rule that words and phrases use common meanings. It does not analyze, apply, or state what §311.011 itself means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Opinion No., Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) is cited only as general authority for giving statutory words their ordinary meaning. The opinion does not construe, apply, or state what § 311.011 itself means, requires, or authorizes; its holding concerns Tax Code § 351.0025(b). opinion →
in the Estate of Irma Lou Wilcox, the court cites § 311.011(a) only as boilerplate authority for the general plain-meaning method of interpreting another statute, Tex. Probate Code § 243. It does not interpret, apply, or decide what § 311.011(a) itself means or requires. opinion →
Abbott v. NORTH EAST INDEPENDENT SCH. DIST., the court cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 as authority for the general interpretive approach of looking first to the plain and common meaning of statutory words, but it does not construe, apply, or decide what § 311.011 itself means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
TPCIGA, for Reliance National Indemnity Company v. Magdalena Ford Morrison A/N/F of Eric Ford, the court cites section 311.011(a) only as authority in a general statement of the statutory-construction standard; it does not interpret, apply, or decide what that section means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Griggs v. Triple S Industrial Corporation, section 311.011 is cited only in Griggs's argument that “testify” should be construed according to common usage; the court does not hold what §311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion applies general plain-meaning and ordinary-meaning principles to construe Chapter 176, but it does not cite, construe, or state what Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. The discussion is therefore not a holding on § 311.011. opinion →
City of Port Isabel, Texas v. Hp Pinnell, Trustee of Pinnell Trust and Town of South Padre Island, the court cites § 311.011 only in the standard-of-review discussion as general authority for looking to a statute's plain and common meaning; it does not decide what § 311.011 itself means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.011(a) is cited only as a general interpretive rule supporting the plain-meaning reading of Transportation Code §252.304(b); the opinion does not construe, apply, or determine the meaning, requirements, or validity of §311.011 itself. opinion →
Tejada Ex Rel. Tejada v. Rowe, the court cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) only as general interpretive support for reading phrases in context; its holding concerns the meaning and application of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.106(f), not what § 311.011(a) means or requires. opinion →
Rose Tejada, A/N/F of Kaylee Tejada and Kelsey Tejada v. Thomas F. Rowe, M.D., Thomas F. Rowe, M.D.,P.A. and Jessica Lin, the court cited section 311.011(a) only for the general interpretive proposition that phrases are read in context while construing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.106(f); it did not decide or explain the meaning, operation, or legal effect of section 311.011(a) itself. opinion →
[case name unavailable], the court mentions Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 only as authority cited in DuPont's argument that the tax statute's language should be construed according to grammar and common usage. The court does not interpret, apply, or state a holding about § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Camacho, the court cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) as one authority for its general statutory-construction approach, stating that words and phrases are construed in context. The court's actual holding interprets the term "skull" in the Workers' Compensation Act, not § 311.011(a), so the citation is incidental. opinion →
May v. State, the Valerie L. May opinion does not interpret, apply, or discuss Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §311.011; the opinion's later §311.011 discussion is from an unrelated case and cannot support a holding for this row. opinion →
Terra XXI, LTD., Veigel Farm Partners, D/B/A Veigel Partners v. Harmon, the court cites section 311.011 only for the general interpretive principle that words and phrases are construed in context; it does not decide a disputed issue about what section 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Texas Parks & Wildlife Department v. Milburn Dearing, Kenneth Head, and Mike Warren, Individually and on Behalf of All O, the court cites section 311.011(b) as part of a general statement of statutory-construction methodology, but it does not decide what that provision means, requires, or authorizes; the court's actual statutory holding concerns Texas Labor Code section 21.122(b). opinion →
Allen R Hartman and Lisa Hartman v. Harris County Appraisal District and the Appraisal Review Board of the Harris County, the court cited Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 only as a general statutory-construction authority while interpreting Tax Code § 1.111(e); it did not decide what § 311.011 means, requires, authorizes, or how it interacts with another provision. opinion →
National Golf Operating, P.S., L.P. v. Williamson County Appraisal District, the court cites § 311.011(b) as a general statutory-construction principle in its discussion, but its holding concerns whether Tax Code § 42.225(a) barred dismissal for want of prosecution; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide the meaning or effect of § 311.011(b) itself. opinion →
Pandozy v. Beaty, the Pandozy case in the supplied row is a procedural order withdrawing a dismissal and reinstating an appeal; it does not interpret or apply Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011. The later passage discussing § 311.011 concerns a different case, Waldrop v. State, and cannot be attributed to Pandozy. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.011(b) is cited only as general authority for construing legislatively defined words; the opinion's actual conclusion interprets Government Code section 614.122 and does not state what section 311.011 means, requires, authorizes, or how it interacts with another provision. opinion →
Victor A. Pallares, M.D. and Pain and Anesthesia Associates, P.L.L.C D/B/A Headache + Pain Center v. Magic Valley Electr, the court cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) as a statutory-construction canon supporting its reading of Chapter 74, but it does not decide what § 311.011(a) itself means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
City of Austin v. Leggett, the opinion does not discuss or interpret Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011. Its statutory analysis concerns Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.022 and related tort-claims provisions, so any relevance to § 311.011 is incidental. opinion →
City of Austin, Texas v. Trudy Leggett, Individually and as Heir of Nathan Leggett, the court cites section 311.011(a) as supporting general statutory-construction methodology—considering statutory language in context and, when possible, using the plain meaning of the words—but does not construe, apply, or state what section 311.011(a) itself means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Muniz v. State, the court cites § 311.011 as a general statutory-construction principle requiring words and phrases to be read in context and according to grammar and common usage, but the court's actual holding interprets Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 18.01(i), not § 311.011. opinion →
State of Texas, by and Through Greg Abbott, the Attorney General v. Young, the court cites § 311.011 only as a general statutory-construction rule and quotes its text in a boilerplate discussion of interpretive principles; the court's actual holding concerns the meaning of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 103, not what § 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Molano v. State, the court cites section 311.011(a) only as support for the general proposition that statutory construction begins with the plain and common meaning of statutory words; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise state what section 311.011(a) itself means or requires. opinion →
Harris Methodist Fort Worth v. Ollie, the only citation to Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 appears in the dissent as parenthetical support for giving statutory words their common meaning; the majority opinion does not interpret, apply, or hold anything about § 311.011. opinion →
Edwards v. State, the court cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) only as a general statutory-construction canon in its standard-of-review discussion. The court's actual holding concerns waiver of the statutory right to jury-assessed punishment under Code of Criminal Procedure article 26.14, not the meaning, requirements, or operation of § 311.011(a). opinion →
[case name unavailable], the court cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 only as authority for the general rule that courts look to a statute's plain and common meaning; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide what § 311.011 itself means or requires. opinion →
[case name unavailable], the court cited Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 only as a general statutory-construction principle that words are read in context and according to grammar and common usage; it did not interpret, apply, or decide what § 311.011 itself means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Discover Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Tate, the court cites section 311.011 only as a general statutory-construction principle while interpreting Texas Labor Code section 408.221(c); it does not decide what section 311.011 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Stanley Shook// Terry Walden and Joy Walden v. Terry Walden and Joy Walden// Stanley Shook, Patrick Jaehne and S&J Endea, the court cites section 311.011 as a general statutory-construction rule while discussing how it interprets other statutes; it does not decide what section 311.011 itself means, requires, authorizes, or how it interacts with another provision. opinion →
GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Susan Combs, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and Greg Abbott, Attorney Gene, section 311.011 is cited as general statutory-construction authority and quoted in the court's methodological discussion; the court's actual holding concerns the meaning of Tax Code section 151.318(a)(2), not the meaning, requirement, or operation of section 311.011. opinion →
Opinion No., section 311.011(a) is cited only as general authority for reading another statute according to grammar and common usage; the opinion's actual conclusion concerns Election Code sections 501.107 and 501.108, not the meaning, requirements, or authorization of section 311.011. opinion →
Texans Uniting for Reform & Freedom v. Saenz, section 311.011 is cited only in a footnote reporting the officials' argument that Transportation Code section 228.004 would control under the general-versus-specific statutory-construction rule; the court expressly says it does not address that argument because it found no section 556.004 claim. opinion →
[case name unavailable], the court cited Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 as a general statutory-construction rule while interpreting the Occupations Code, but it did not decide what § 311.011 itself means, requires, authorizes, or how it applies as an issue in the case. opinion →
Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v. Texas Attorney General Child Support Division, the court cites section 311.011 as part of a general statutory-construction discussion supporting its reliance on plain meaning and contextual reading; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide what section 311.011 itself means or requires. opinion →
S & P CONSULTING ENGINEERS, PLLC v. Baker, the court cites § 311.011(a) only as authority for the general plain-meaning approach to construing another statute; it does not hold what § 311.011 means or requires. opinion →
In Re Ezukanma, the court cites § 311.011(a) only as general support for distinguishing present and past tense in construing another statute; it does not interpret or decide the meaning or operation of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
[case name unavailable], filed 2011-03-16 — The court cited § 311.011(a) only as a boilerplate statement of the general plain-meaning approach to construing the tax statutes; it did not interpret or decide the operation of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Thomas v. State, the court cited § 311.011(a) only as a general statutory-construction canon while deciding the meaning and applicability of other statutes; it did not hold anything about § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Philip Jasek and Lorine Jasek v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cited § 311.011 only as a general statutory-construction rule and as support for interpreting the Family Code term “actual”; it did not hold what § 311.011 itself means, requires, authorizes, or how it operates. opinion →
[case name unavailable], filed 2011-08-24 — The court cited § 311.011 only as part of a general statutory-construction discussion; it did not decide what § 311.011 itself means, requires, authorizes, or how it operates. opinion →
Comptroller v. LANDSFELD, the court cites § 311.011(b) only as authority for a general statutory-construction principle about using legislative definitions and technical meanings; it does not interpret or apply § 311.011(b) itself. opinion →
Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services v. Beltran, the court cites § 311.011(a) only for a general statutory-construction principle and bases its holding on § 311.034 and the State Applications Act, not on § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Henley v. Scott & White Memorial Hospital Scott, Sherwood & Brindley Foundation And Scott & White Continuing Care H, the court cited § 311.011 only as a boilerplate statement of general statutory-construction principles and did not decide what that statute itself requires or means. opinion →
CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, the court cited § 311.011(a) only for the general plain-meaning rule of statutory construction; it did not decide anything about § 311.011 itself. opinion →
[case name unavailable], filed 2011-12-30 — Section 311.011 is cited only for a general statutory-construction rule in the court's analysis of another statute; the court does not decide what § 311.011 itself means or requires. opinion →
Stanley Shook// Terry Walden and Joy Walden v. Terry Walden and Joy Walden// Stanley Shook, Patrick Jaehne and S&J Endea, the court cited § 311.011 only as part of a general list of statutory-construction principles while construing Property Code § 5.079; it did not decide what § 311.011 means, requires, authorizes, or how it operates. opinion →
M-E Engineers, Inc. and Allen Y. Tochihara v. City of Temple, the court cites § 311.011 only as a general statutory-construction canon while construing Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 150; it does not hold what § 311.011 itself means or requires. opinion →
in Re Charles Norris, the court cites § 311.011 only as a general statutory-construction rule while construing Family Code § 109.001; it does not decide what § 311.011 itself means or requires. opinion →
[case name unavailable], filed 2012-08-03 — The court cited § 311.011 only as part of its general statutory-construction principles and did not hold what § 311.011 itself means or requires. opinion →
Jerry Ulmer, D/B/A Longhorn Construction & Maintenance v. Sam Moore and Sharie Moore, the court cites § 311.011(b) only as a general statutory-construction rule about legislative definitions and technical meanings; it does not decide what § 311.011 itself means, requires, authorizes, or how it operates. opinion →
Jaster v. Comet II Construction, Inc. Joe H. Schneider Laura H. Schneider And Austin Design Group, the court cites § 311.011(b) only as general support for using statutory definitions; it does not interpret, apply, or hold anything about that statute itself. opinion →
Noah S. Bunker, Paul Carrell, Everett Brew Houston, Jr., W. Andrew Buchholz, Scott J. Leighty, Jad L. Davis, and Holly C, the court cites § 311.011 in a general statutory-construction statement about using plain and common meaning, without interpreting or deciding anything about § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Doe v. Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline And Linda Acevedo, in Her Offi, the court cited § 311.011(a) only for the general grammar-and-context rule while construing a different statute; it did not hold what § 311.011 means or how it operates. opinion →
Graphic Packaging Corporation v. Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas And Ken Paxton, Attor, the opinion contains no opinion text from Graphic Packaging; § 311.011(b) appears only in a LexisNexis case-note summary, which is not this court's holding and cannot be relied on. opinion →
City of Plainview Texas, William Mull, in His Official Capacity as Chief of Police of the City of Plainview Police Department v. [name unavailable], the cached passage is mismatched case text and does not provide the named opinion's discussion of § 311.011; no holding is recorded. opinion →
Persimmon Ridge Partners EO, L.P., Russ Vandenburg, and Martha Vandenburg v. Mae, the only reference to Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(b) appears in a sentence listing other authorities in a discussion of the definition of “state”; the opinion does not state this court’s holding about what § 311.011(b) itself means, requires, authorizes, or how it operates. opinion →
Cooper, Joseph Bernard, the only reference to § 311.011 appears in the appellant's argument that undefined Penal Code terms should be construed according to common usage. The court did not adopt or decide that argument; it found the appeal wholly frivolous, agreed no arguable issues supported it, and affirmed. opinion →
In re State, the court cites § 311.011(b) only in a footnote to state the general rule that words with a technical or particular meaning are construed accordingly; it does not construe, apply, or state what § 311.011 itself means or requires in this case. opinion →
Garden Oaks Maintenance Org. v. Chang, the court cites Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) only as support for the general, boilerplate principle that statutory interpretation begins with the plain and common meaning of legislative words. the opinion does not state what § 311.011 itself means, requires, authorizes, or how it operates. opinion →
Doyal, Craig, filed 2018-03-08 — The court cites § 311.011(a) while applying a general plain-meaning rule to another statute; it does not hold anything about § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist., filed 2018-04-19 — The court cites § 311.011(a) as a general interpretive rule, but its holding concerns Tax Code § 11.11(a), not the meaning or operation of § 311.011. opinion →
Hays County, Texas, Ruben Becerra, Debbie Ingalsbe, Michelle Cohen, Morgan Hammer, and Walt Smith, in Their Official Cap, section 311.011 is cited in appellees’ response to state contextual and common-usage principles for construing the word “against.” This is a party’s argument in a filing, not this court’s holding about what § 311.011 itself means, requires, authorizes, or how it operates. opinion →
United States v. Fort, section 311.011 appears only in the government's argument as support for a general interpretive rule. The court did not analyze or apply that statute; it resolved the meaning of “detain” under the transportation statutes using its own practical reasoning. opinion →
Hoyt v. City of El Paso, the court cited § 311.011 only as authority for a general Texas statutory-construction rule while deciding the meaning and application of Tex. Elec. Code § 253.094(b); it did not construe or apply § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Blanken v. State, the court cited § 311.011(a) only as a general statutory-construction canon while interpreting other statutes; it did not decide what § 311.011 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Jeff Heck v. CitiMortgage, Incorporated, the statute is cited only as support for CitiMortgage’s argument about the meaning of “without delay”; the court did not adopt that argument and held that the term’s meaning was irrelevant because no agreement on payment timing was reached. opinion →
State of Texas v. Vasilas, James, the court merely recited § 311.011(b)'s general interpretive instruction. It did not decide whether any word or phrase had a technical or particular meaning under that provision; the ruling instead applied § 311.005(13) to construe "including" as a term of enlargement. opinion →
Nash v. State of Tex., the court quotes § 311.011’s common-usage rule while analyzing Article 5154d, but does not decide the meaning or scope of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Naranjo v. Southwest Independent School District, the court applies the ordinary-meaning rule to the Texas Tort Claims Act and cites § 311.011 as supporting authority; it does not decide § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
State v. Kost, the court applied an ordinary-meaning rule to a Department of Public Safety regulation; it cited § 311.011 only for comparison and did not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
Grunsfeld v. State, the court invokes § 311.011 as an aid to construing article 37.07, but does not decide the meaning or scope of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Dallas County Child Welfare Unit of the Texas Department of Human Services v. Black, the court cites § 311.011 as a rule of construction but decides the meaning of “action” in § 105.002, not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
State v. Rosenbaum, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Article 44.01(d); it does not decide a question about § 311.011 itself. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Holmes v. Lanford, the court cites § 311.011 as a rule of construction while deciding the meaning of § 74.053; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
TDIndustries, Inc. v. NCNB Texas National Bank, the court cites Section 311.011 as a rule of construction while deciding what “completion” means under Property Code Section 53.106(e); it does not decide Section 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
State v. Sandoval, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding whether “procure” in the barratry statute is vague; it does not decide § 311.011’s meaning or limits. opinion →
Williams v. Anderson, the court decides the meaning of Family Code § 11.03(a)(8); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011, which appears only in a supporting footnote citation. opinion →
Williams v. Anderson, the court applies an ordinary-meaning principle while deciding Family Code § 11.03(a)(8); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Raitano v. Texas Department of Public Safety, the court applies article 6687b, § 1’s common-usage rule and cites § 311.011 only as a similar provision. opinion →
Villarreal v. State, the identified Villarreal opinion is a dissent and does not address § 311.011. The citation appears in a separate, later child-support opinion included. opinion →
Martin v. State, the court cited § 311.011’s general rule while deciding whether forfeiture was proper under article 18.19(e); it did not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Miller v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction while deciding whether the gambling statute is vague; it does not decide a rule or limit of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Lawrence Systems, Inc. Ex Rel. Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Superior Feeders, Inc., the court uses § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding what “action” means in § 16.066(b); it does not decide the meaning or scope of § 311.011(a) itself. opinion →
R.R.E. v. Glenn, the court cites § 311.011 as a general rule of construction, but decides the constitutional effect of article 42.12 rather than a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
Reuters America, Inc. v. Sharp, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule, then decides the scope of Tax Code § 151.0038(2), not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Brushy Creek Municipal Utility District v. Texas Water Commission, the court cites § 311.011(a) while construing Water Code provisions, but does not decide a rule of § 311.011(a) itself. opinion →
Bingham v. State, the court decides the meaning of “testimony” in article 38.14; it cites § 311.011 only as support for its interpretation. opinion →
Linick v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., the court cited § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction while deciding the meaning of an Insurance Code provision; it did not decide § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
Bond v. Employees Retirement System of Texas, the court cites § 311.011(a) as support for using ordinary meanings, but decides the meaning of “occupational disability” under § 811.001(12), not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Naranjo v. State, the court cites § 311.011 as a general interpretive rule while deciding challenges to § 485.031; it does not decide § 311.011’s own meaning or limits. opinion →
Reuters America, Inc. v. Sharp, the court recites § 311.011(a)’s rule but decides what the Tax Code’s definition of information service covers, not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Harkins v. Crews, the court cites § 311.011 while deciding what “nominal damages” means under a different statute; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
State v. Thompson, the court cites § 311.011 but decides the relationship between the provisions under § 311.026; it does not decide § 311.011’s rule on common or technical meanings. opinion →
Bisby v. State, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of an affirmation under other provisions; it does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
Carroll v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding what “obtained” means in article 38.23(a); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011(a) itself. opinion →
ADP Credit Corporation v. Sharp, the court cites this interpretive rule while deciding what a Tax Code provision requires; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
ADP Credit Corp. v. Sharp, the court quotes § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction, but decides the meaning of the Tax Code provision rather than a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Dowthitt v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction while deciding what Article 38.22 requires; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
El Paso Independent School District v. Sharp, the court cited § 311.011(a) while deciding the meaning of Education Code § 11.86(i), without deciding § 311.011(a)'s own requirements or limits. opinion →
Hardaway v. State, the court cites § 311.011 as a rule of interpretation but decides the notice requirement under article 37.07, not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Osby v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a rule of interpretation while deciding the meaning of article 38.36; it does not decide a question about § 311.011(a) itself. opinion →
Washington v. State, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule but decides the notice requirement of Article 37.07, § 3(g), not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Dallas v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive principle while deciding article 44.04; it does not decide the meaning or scope of § 311.011(a). opinion →
Washington v. State, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the notice requirement of article 37.07, § 3(g); it does not decide § 311.011’s own meaning or limits. opinion →
Rodriguez v. State, the court used a general plain-meaning rule to interpret the felony murder statute, but did not decide § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
Rodriguez v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) while interpreting the felony murder statute; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011(a) itself. opinion →
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Woods, the court applies an interpretive rule to Article 18.01(b), but does not decide the meaning, scope, or requirements of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Masonite Corp. v. Garcia, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction while deciding the scope of a different statute; it does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
Atascosa County v. Atascosa County Appraisal District, the court cited § 311.011 as an interpretive rule but decided the meaning of Tax Code provisions, not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Abel v. Surgitek, the court cites § 311.011(a) for its interpretive method, but decides the meaning of “establish” in § 15.003, not a rule of § 311.011(a). opinion →
Texas Department of Public Safety v. Levinson, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a rule for reading other statutes; it does not decide the meaning or application of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Shirley v. Texas Department of Public Safety, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule but decides whether a warning complied with the Transportation Code, without deciding the meaning or scope of § 311.011(a). opinion →
Harlow v. Hayes, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction while deciding the applicability of Agriculture Code § 143.028; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011(a) itself. opinion →
The Kroger Co. v. Keng, the court cites § 311.011 for a general rule of construction while deciding how other statutes apply; it does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
Swails v. State, the court decides the meaning of “imminent” under the Penal Code and cites § 311.011(a) only as general support; it does not decide this section’s rules. opinion →
Gonzales v. State, the court used § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding whether a Penal Code provision was vague; it did not decide this section's own rules. opinion →
Cornyn v. Universe Life Insurance Company, the court cites § 311.011(a) while interpreting the Insurance Code’s tax-credit provision; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011(a) itself. opinion →
Sanchez v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a general rule while deciding the meaning of the official oppression statute; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Hatcher Cleaning Co. v. Comerica Bank-Texas, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding what “report” means under UCC § 4.406; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Butler v. State, the court cites § 311.011 as a rule of construction while deciding the presentment requirement of an appellate rule; it does not decide § 311.011’s own meaning or limits. opinion →
Bouldin v. Bexar County Sheriff's Civil Service Commission, the court cites § 311.011 as a general interpretive rule but decides when the filing period under § 158.037(a) begins. opinion →
Helena Chemical Co. v. Wilkins, the court cited § 311.011(a) as a general rule while deciding the Agriculture Code’s arbitration requirements; it did not decide this section’s meaning or limits. opinion →
Moss v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as support for interpreting “lost” in an appellate rule; it does not decide a rule or limit of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
State of Texas v. Gonzalez, the court uses § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding what “condition” means under § 101.060(a)(2); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011(a) itself. opinion →
State ex rel. State Department of Highways & Public Transportation v. Gonzalez, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a rule for interpreting “condition” in the Tort Claims Act; its decision concerns that Act, not § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
State v. Wofford, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the validity of Penal Code § 47.01(4)(B); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Weyandt v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the Medical Practice Act’s vagueness; it does not decide this section’s own meaning or limits. opinion →
Moody National Bank v. Texas City Development Ltd., the court cites § 311.011 for a general rule of statutory construction, but decides the scope of Article 4A rather than this section’s own rules. opinion →
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Montana, the court cites § 311.011 for a general rule of statutory construction while deciding the meaning of Labor Code § 408.147(c); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Brazeal v. State of Texas, the court applies the ordinary-meaning rule to decide whether article 62.04 is vague; it does not decide the meaning or limits of § 311.011. opinion →
Ledesma v. Allstate Insurance Co., the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Texas Labor Code § 21.254; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Ripkowski v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Article 37.071; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, the court cites § 311.011 in a background footnote about “fuel factor,” but does not decide that section’s meaning or requirements. opinion →
Reliant Energy, Incorporated v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, the court cites section 311.011 in a background footnote about the term “fuel factor,” but decides the validity of the Commission’s rule without deciding section 311.011’s requirements. opinion →
Collins v. Ison-Newsome, the court uses § 311.011 as a rule of interpretation while deciding what § 22.001(a)(2) means; it does not decide § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
Boyd v. Boyd, the court cites § 311.011 as a general rule while construing Texas Family Code § 6.602; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
City of Houston v. Fletcher, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction but decides what Labor Code § 21.252 requires, not what § 311.011 means or requires. opinion →
Frieling v. State, the court cited § 311.011(a) as a rule of interpretation while deciding whether the jury needed an instruction on the word “agree”; it did not decide the meaning or scope of § 311.011(a). opinion →
Smith, Sean Allen v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) while deciding the elements of a Family Code offense; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Authority, the court cites § 311.011 for its general approach to interpretation while deciding what the Property Rights Act requires; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Continental Casualty Co. v. Downs, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a general construction principle while deciding the Labor Code’s payment and notice deadlines; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
Lenz v. Lenz, the court applied a plain-meaning rule to construe Family Code § 105.002; it did not decide the meaning or scope of § 311.011. opinion →
Cities of Austin v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., the court decides the meaning of a Utilities Code provision. The cited § 311.011(b) language appears in a party’s argument, and the court does not decide that subsection’s own rule. opinion →
Terry v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., the court invokes § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding Insurance Code article 21.55; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Travis County v. Pelzel & Associates, Inc., the court decides what Local Government Code § 89.004 requires; it cites § 311.011(a) as support without deciding that section’s own rules. opinion →
Nipper-Berthram Trust v. Aldine Independent School District, the court cites Section 311.011 as an interpretation rule but decides the meaning of Tax Code Section 34.04(c)(3), not a rule of Section 311.011 itself. opinion →
Luis Felipe Rodriguez, Jr. v. State, the court cites § 311.011 as a general rule of construction but decides whether a reasonable-doubt jury instruction was erroneous; it does not decide the meaning or application of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Page v. Marton Roofing, Inc., the court cited § 311.011(a) as a general interpretive rule while deciding what “completion of work” means under the Property Code; it did not decide § 311.011’s own meaning or scope. opinion →
Page, Herman v. Marton Roofing, Inc., the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding what “completion of work” means under the Property Code; it does not decide § 311.011(a)’s own rules. opinion →
Texas Workers' Compensation Commission The Subsequent Injury Fund And Leonard W. Riley, Jr. v. Continental Casualty Company, the court cites § 311.011 as a general rule of statutory construction while deciding reimbursement under the Labor Code; it does not decide § 311.011’s own meaning or scope. opinion →
Rose v. Garland Community Hospital, the court cites § 311.011 as a general rule of interpretation, but decides the meaning and scope of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, not a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
Southwest Bank v. Information Support Concepts, Inc., the court cites § 311.011 as a construction rule while deciding whether the proportionate responsibility statute applies to a UCC claim; it does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
Fallin v. State, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Penal Code § 37.12; it does not decide § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
Rodriguez v. State, the court cites § 311.011 for a general interpretive rule but decides whether the reasonable-doubt jury instruction was erroneous and harmful, not a rule of this section. opinion →
Cardinal Health Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen, the court applies this interpretive rule to § 15.51(a) but does not decide § 311.011’s own meaning or scope. opinion →
Porter v. State, the court cited § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction while deciding the elements of a Family Code offense; it did not decide what § 311.011(a) itself means or requires. opinion →
Hooper v. State, the court cites Section 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding whether words in the controlled substance analogue statute are unconstitutionally vague; it does not decide the meaning or scope of Section 311.011(a). opinion →
Curtis v. Anderson, the court cited § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the scope of Family Code § 1.108; it did not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Webb v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding what the child pornography statute covers; it does not decide the meaning or requirements of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Webb v. State, the court quotes § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction while deciding the meaning of the child pornography statute; it does not decide § 311.011(a)’s meaning or scope. opinion →
Mohl v. State, the court applied a general reading rule while deciding the scope of the Penal Code provisions; it did not decide § 311.011(a)'s own rules. opinion →
in the Interest of Silas J. Hurd & Monique C. Hurd, Minor Children, the court uses §311.011 as an interpretive aid while deciding the effect of Family Code provisions; it does not decide a rule of §311.011 itself. opinion →
Hope v. Baumgartner, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding how to classify attorney’s fees under the Probate Code; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011(a) itself. opinion →
Town of Flower Mound, Texas v. Tom Teague and David Burkett, the court used § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Finance Code § 304.104; it did not decide the meaning or limits of § 311.011(a). opinion →
Town of Flower Mound, Texas v. Tom Teague and David Burkett, the court cited § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of a phrase in Finance Code § 304.104; it did not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Michael L. Hope F/K/A Michael Baumgartner, Independent of the Estate of Dorothy Dolores Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a rule for interpreting statutes, but decides how to classify a claim under Probate Code § 322, not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Guthery v. Taylor, the court cites § 311.011(b) as an interpretive rule while deciding what “complaint” means under §§ 614.022 and 614.023; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
in the Interest of A. J. K., the court cited § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction while deciding the meaning of Family Code § 263.405; it did not decide § 311.011(a)’s own rules. opinion →
Jeanne N. Taylor, D.D.S., D/B/A Jeanne N. Taylor D.D.S., Individually, and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. State Farm Lloyds, Inc., the court cited § 311.011 as a general rule while deciding what the Insurance Code requires; it did not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
City of Marshall v. City of Uncertain, the court cites § 311.011 as a general rule while deciding provisions of the Water Code; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
City of Marshall and Texas Commission on Environmental Quality v. City of Uncertain, the court cites § 311.011 as a general rule of statutory construction while deciding provisions of the Water Code; it does not decide § 311.011’s own meaning or limits. opinion →
Taylor v. State Farm Lloyds, Inc., the court cites § 311.011 for a general interpretive rule but decides the requirements of the Insurance Code, not this section’s own rules. opinion →
State v. Ricky Shumake and Sandra Shumake, Individually and as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Kayla Shumake, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule but decides the meaning of the recreational use statute, not § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
Shell Cortez Pipeline Company v. Shores, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule but decides the scope of Probate Code § 5A(c), not § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Shell Cortez Pipeline Company v. Shores, the court applies the section’s plain-language rule to decide the scope of probate court jurisdiction under Probate Code § 5A(c); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
State v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, the court cites § 311.011 for a general rule of construction but decides the scope of Transportation Code provisions, not this section’s own rules. opinion →
Segal, Richard and Judith Joe Fogarty and Nancy Fogarty v. Emmes Capital, LLC, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Property Code § 51.002(a); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Cruz v. State, the statement about § 311.011 is quoted from an earlier opinion; this court does not decide the section’s rule in this case. opinion →
Shell Cortez Pipeline Co. v. Shores, the court applies § 311.011 while deciding the scope of Probate Code § 5A(c); it does not decide § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
Franks v. Woodville Independent School District, the court quotes § 311.011(a) among general interpretive rules, but decides the requirements of Tax Code §§ 34.03 and 34.04, not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Franks v. Woodville Independent School District, Tyler County Education District and Tyler County, the court cites the section as a general rule of construction but decides the timing requirements of the Tax Code, not a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
In Re Miller, the court cites § 311.011 as a rule for interpreting § 74.351 and decides the scope of § 74.351’s discovery stay, not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Spann, Ex Parte Lucian Lee Jr., the citation appears in a dissent, not the court's own decision. opinion →
C.M. Asfahl Agency v. Tensor Inc., the court addressed the definition of “wholesale” in a jury charge; it did not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Huddleston v. Lovvorn, the court decides which version of Labor Code § 417.001 applies; it does not decide § 311.011’s rule on common and technical meanings. opinion →
Huddleston v. Lovvorn, the court chooses which version of Labor Code § 417.001 applies; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
Robles v. State, the court recites § 311.011(b) as an interpretive principle, but decides the meaning of “state” under other provisions. opinion →
In Re MCC, the court invokes § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction but decides the meaning of Family Code § 157.265, not any rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
in the Interest of M.C.C., a Child, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a general rule of interpretation while deciding the meaning of Family Code § 157.265; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Rodgers v. the Commission for Lawyer Discipline, the court used § 311.011(a) to support its interpretation of a disciplinary rule; it did not decide what § 311.011 itself means or requires. opinion →
City of Lubbock, TX v. Adams, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of “or” in Local Government Code § 143.038(b); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
City of Lubbock, TX v. Adams, the court invokes § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding what “or” means in Local Government Code § 143.038(b); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Porath v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule, but decides the meaning and constitutionality of Penal Code § 43.26(a), not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Harris County Bail Bond Board & International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Carl R. Pruett & National American Ins. Co., the court invokes § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the Board’s authority under the Bail Bond Act; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, this is a Texas Attorney General opinion, not a court decision. opinion →
BASF FINA Petrochemicals Ltd. Partnership v. H.B. Zachry Co., the court recites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule but decides whether separate procedural rules authorize attorneys’ fees, without deciding this section’s own meaning or scope. opinion →
Rodgers v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, the court applies the section’s interpretive rule to decide what disciplinary rule 7.01(a) prohibits; it does not decide the meaning or limits of § 311.011(a) itself. opinion →
Global Santa Fe Corp. v. Texas Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule but decides the meaning of a phrase in the Insurance Code, not the meaning or scope of § 311.011. opinion →
City of Austin v. Lamas, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the notice requirement in a different statute; it does not decide § 311.011’s own meaning or limits. opinion →
in Re: The Commitment of George Lowe, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of a different statute; it does not decide § 311.011(a)'s own meaning or limits. opinion →
City of Lubbock v. Adams, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule, but decides the meaning of Local Government Code § 143.038(b), not § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
Houston Professional Fire Fighters' Ass'n, Local 341 v. City of Houston, the court cited § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Local Government Code § 143.003(4); it did not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Houston Professional Fire Fighters Assoc., Local 341 v. the City of Houston & Fire Chief Christopher Conneally, the court cites § 311.011 as a general rule of interpretation while deciding what Local Government Code § 143.003(4) covers; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
El Paso County Hospital District v. Texas Health, the court cites § 311.011 for a general interpretive principle, but decides the meaning of the Commission’s administrative appeals rule, not § 311.011’s own requirements or limits. opinion →
Tarrant County Hospital District v. GE Automation Services, Inc., the court cites § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction but decides the scope of §§ 16.061 and 2.725, not this section’s own rules. opinion →
Tarrant County Hospital District v. GE Automation Services, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a general interpretive rule while deciding the effect of other statutes; it does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
Tarrant County Hospital District v. GE Automation Services, the court cited § 311.011(a) as a general rule of construction while deciding the meaning of other statutes; it did not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
Nurridin v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule but decides the meaning of article 42.12, section 24, rather than a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Harris County Bail Bond Board v. Pruett, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the Board’s authority under the Bail Bond Act; it does not decide this section’s meaning or limits. opinion →
Harris County Bail Bond Board & International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Carl R. Pruett & National American Ins. Co., the court cites § 311.011 for a general interpretive principle, then decides the Board’s authority under the Bail Bond Act; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Roberts v. Titus County Memorial Hospital, the court decides whether Roberts reported to an appropriate law enforcement authority under the Whistleblower Act. Section 311.011(b) is cited in a quotation supporting that interpretation, but the court does not decide that section’s own rule. opinion →
El Paso County Hospital District v. Texas Health & Human Services Commission, the court cites § 311.011 as a general interpretive principle while deciding what the Commission’s administrative appeals rule permits; it does not decide § 311.011’s own meaning or limits. opinion →
In Re Robinson, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the duties imposed by Local Government Code § 9.005(b); it does not decide § 311.011’s own meaning or limits. opinion →
Group v. Vicento, the court cites § 311.011 as a general rule while construing § 74.402; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Pruett v. Harris County Bail Bond Board, the court cites § 311.011 for an interpretive principle while deciding the constitutionality of § 1704.109, without deciding a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
City of Alton v. City of Mission, the court decides the scope of section 212.001 and cites section 311.011 only as an interpretive aid; it does not decide section 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
State v. Haltom Medical Investors, L.L.C., the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of “assess” in another statute; it does not decide § 311.011’s own requirements. opinion →
Herring v. Bank of America, N.A., the court cites § 311.011 for a general rule of statutory construction, but decides the priority of claims under the Probate Code without construing § 311.011. opinion →
Robert Morrow Welch, M.D. v. McLean, the court used § 311.011 as an interpretive rule but decided the meaning of section 11.02, not § 311.011’s own requirements or scope. opinion →
Robert Morrow Welch, M.D. v. McLean, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule, but decides the meaning of the damages-cap statute, not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Zaborac v. Texas Department of Public Safety, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding whether § 524.012 is vague; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Zaborac v. Texas Department of Public Safety, the court recited section 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule, but decided the meaning and constitutionality of Transportation Code section 524.012, not a rule of section 311.011 itself. opinion →
Griffin Industries, Inc. v. State, the court used the common-usage rule while deciding the meaning and constitutionality of a Water Code provision; it did not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
American Housing Foundation v. Brazos County Appraisal District, the court cites § 311.011 as a rule of construction while deciding the meaning of Tax Code § 11.182(e); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.011(a) while deciding what “lien” means in Occupations Code § 1201.205(6); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Sheshunoff v. Sheshunoff, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Family Code § 4.105; it does not decide § 311.011’s own meaning or scope. opinion →
Sheshunoff v. Sheshunoff, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Family Code § 4.105; it does not decide a question about § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Torres, the court cites § 311.011 as a general rule of construction, but decides the meaning of Labor Code § 408.221, not § 311.011's own rules. opinion →
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Torres, the court cites § 311.011 for a general rule of interpretation, but decides who may recover attorney’s fees under Labor Code § 408.221, not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Linicomn v. State, the § 311.011(a) citation appears only in the separate Shipp opinion appended to the Linicomn opinion. Linicomn decides whether a suppression issue was preserved for appeal. opinion →
Keller, Ex Parte Garrin Wardner, the discussion of §311.011 appears in a dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
Diversicare General Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, the discussion of § 311.011 appears in a dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
McMillin v. State Farm Lloyds, the court applies a general interpretation rule while deciding the notice requirement of Insurance Code article 21.55; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
Adams v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a general rule of construction while deciding the peremptory challenges allowed by article 35.15(b); it does not decide this section’s meaning or limits. opinion →
In Re MCC, the court decides how Family Code § 157.265 applies; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011, which appears only in a string citation. opinion →
in the Interest of M.C.C., a Child, the court decides whether the Family Code amendment applies retroactively; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the scope of Local Government Code § 242.001(d)(4)(B). It does not decide what § 311.011 itself means or requires. opinion →
Hotels.com, L.P. v. Canales, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding what the Tax Code covers; it does not decide § 311.011’s own meaning or limits. opinion →
Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a general rule of construction but decides when benefits become payable under Labor Code § 408.161, not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Mid-Century Insurance Company v. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission, the court cites § 311.011(a) as support for a general rule of interpretation while deciding when benefits become payable under the Labor Code; it does not decide this section's own rules. opinion →
in Re: Covenant Health System, Relator, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive principle while deciding § 74.351; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Scott v. Menchaca, the court decides what § 14.005 requires and cites § 311.011 only as support for its reading of that provision. opinion →
J.M.K. 6, Inc v. Gregg & Gregg, P.C., the court applies a plain-meaning principle to section 16.069; it does not decide the meaning or operation of section 311.011. opinion →
City of Galveston v. Texas General Land Office, the court applies § 311.011(a)’s common-usage rule to interpret Local Government Code § 307.042(e); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Beedy v. State, the court cites § 311.011 for a general rule of interpretation but decides what “conviction” means under the cumulative-sentencing statutes, not what § 311.011 requires. opinion →
TPCIGA Ex Rel. Reliance National Indemnity Co. v. Morrison, the court cites § 311.011(a) while interpreting the Labor Code, but does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
TPCIGA, for Reliance National Indemnity Company v. Magdalena Ford Morrison A/N/F of Eric Ford, the court cites § 311.011(a) for a general rule of statutory construction while deciding provisions of the Labor Code; it does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
City of Seabrook v. Port of Houston Authority, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive principle while deciding the Water Code provision; it does not decide § 311.011(a)’s own rules. opinion →
Griggs v. Triple S Industrial Corp., the citation appears in Griggs’s argument. The court decides the meaning of Labor Code § 451.001, not a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
City of Houston v. Clark, the court cites Section 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding what Section 143.1016(j) means; it does not decide Section 311.011’s own meaning or limits. opinion →
Ex Parte Santiago Morales Jr., the court invokes § 311.011(a) while deciding the meaning and vagueness of Penal Code § 21.12, without deciding a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
In Re Covenant Health System, the court uses § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of § 74.351; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011(a) itself. opinion →
In Re Estate of Wilcox, the court cites § 311.011(a) as support for an interpretive rule, but decides the meaning of Probate Code § 243, not a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
American Housing Foundation v. Calhoun County Appraisal District, the court applied the ordinary-meaning rule while deciding the scope of Tax Code § 11.182(e); it did not decide a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
In Re Estate of Blevins, the court recites subsection (a) as a rule of statutory construction but decides the scope of Texas Probate Code § 93, not the meaning or limits of § 311.011. opinion →
Medellin v. State, the court quotes § 311.011 but decides the effect of “including” under § 311.005(13); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
Garcia v. State, the court applies contextual reading to construe Penal Code § 25.07 but does not decide a rule of § 311.011(a). opinion →
Garcia v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a)’s context rule while construing Penal Code § 25.07, but does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
City of Port Isabel v. Pinnell, the court cites § 311.011 for a general interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of a different statute; it does not decide § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
In Re Hecht, the court cites the section as a general interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Canon 5(2); it does not decide the section’s own meaning or limits. opinion →
Douglass v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding what § 433.099(c) means; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Ex Parte Medellin, the opinion cites § 311.011 but contains no sentence in which this court states a holding about the section. opinion →
Valley Baptist Medical Center v. Stradley, the court cited § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction while deciding the meaning of a different statute; it did not decide this section’s own meaning or limits. opinion →
Valley Baptist Medical Center v. Stradley, the court applies the section's grammar rule to decide the meaning of § 74.001(13), without deciding a rule of § 311.011(a) itself. opinion →
DuPont Photomasks, Inc. v. Strayhorn, the citation supports DuPont’s argument, which the court rejected. The court did not decide a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
In Re County of Galveston, the court cites § 311.011(a) as support for its interpretation of the venue statutes; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Gauna v. State, the court cited § 311.011(a) as a rule for interpreting Penal Code § 25.07, without deciding § 311.011’s own meaning or operation. opinion →
Ex Parte Hood, the court cited § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Article 11.071, § 5; it did not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sonic Systems International, Inc., the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding reimbursement under the Labor Code; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
in Re Estate of Lloyd Sherman Blevins, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction but decides the meaning of Probate Code § 93, not the meaning or limits of § 311.011(a). opinion →
Haynes v. Beceiro, the court applied a common-meaning rule to a consent form but did not decide what § 311.011(a) means or requires. opinion →
Hollis v. State, the § 311.011 discussion appears in a separate Holz opinion appended after the Hollis opinion ends, not in the Hollis court's decision. opinion →
DuPont Photomasks, Inc. v. Strayhorn, the citation to § 311.011 supports DuPont’s argument, which the court did not adopt; the court did not decide that section’s rule. opinion →
Waldrop v. State, the court uses § 311.011 as support for giving a word its common meaning, but decides the meaning of Penal Code § 37.09, not a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
Astoria Industries of Iowa, Inc. v. SNF Inc. D/B/A Brand FX Body Company, the opinion cites § 311.011(a) in a footnote and quotes the statute, but contains no sentence in which this court decides the section’s rule. opinion →
In Re the Guardianship of Finley, the court invokes Section 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule, but decides the meaning of Probate Code § 690, not a rule of Section 311.011 itself. opinion →
Mills v. Fletcher, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a rule for interpreting § 41.0105, but decides the meaning of § 41.0105 rather than a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites section 311.011(a) as a general rule of construction but decides the deduction required by section 403.302(d)(4), not a rule of section 311.011 itself. opinion →
Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v. Vega-Garcia, the court cites § 311.011 as general interpretive authority while deciding attorney’s fees under the Labor Code; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, the opinion invokes § 311.011(b) as an interpretive rule but decides what chapter 751 requires, not what § 311.011 means or requires. opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, the opinion decides the meaning of Local Government Code § 395.016(b). It cites § 311.011(a) for the ordinary-meaning method without deciding that section’s own rules. opinion →
John L. Hawkins and Rischon Development Corp. v. Ron Walker and Marla Walker, the court decided the meaning of Property Code § 202.004; it cited § 311.011(a) only as interpretive authority and did not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
Duncantell v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a general interpretive rule, but decides whether Penal Code § 38.15 is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, not what § 311.011(a) itself means or requires. opinion →
Jim Wells County Appraisal District v. Cameron Village, Ltd., the court cites § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction while deciding the exemption under Tax Code § 11.182; it does not decide a question about § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion uses § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction while deciding the meaning of Tax Code § 6.411(c); it does not decide § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
Texas Parks & Wildlife Department v. Milburn Dearing, Kenneth Head, and Mike Warren, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Labor Code § 21.122(b); it does not decide any rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites section 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Occupations Code sections 2001.202(8) and 2001.207(8); it does not decide a rule of section 311.011 itself. opinion →
State v. Horton, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the scope of Education Code § 11.154; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Haynes v. State, the court cited § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction, but decided the scope of Penal Code § 22.01, not a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
Hawkins v. Walker, the court decides a Property Code issue; § 311.011(a) appears only in a supporting citation, and the court does not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Camacho, the court uses § 311.011(a) as an interpretive aid but decides the meaning of a workers’ compensation provision, not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Christus Health D/B/A Christus New Horizons Center v. Bennie Beal, III, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction while deciding the meaning of a different statute; it does not decide this section’s own meaning or scope. opinion →
City of DeSoto v. White, the court cites § 311.011(a) to support its interpretive approach, but decides the Civil Service Act’s notice and jurisdiction requirements, not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Terra XXI, Ltd. v. Harmon, the court cites § 311.011 as a general interpretive aid while deciding the requirements of Texas Property Code § 51.007; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Jones v. State, the § 311.011(b) discussion appears in an unrelated parental-rights opinion appended after Jones; the Jones court does not address this section. opinion →
Hartman v. Harris County Appraisal District, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Tax Code § 1.111(e); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Rotenberry v. State, section 311.011(a) is cited only in the dissent; the majority did not decide its rule. opinion →
Canal Insurance Co. v. Hopkins, the court recites § 311.011’s rules but decides the meaning of a different statute, § 2303.156(b). opinion →
Canal Insurance Company v. Mark Hopkins D/B/A Hopkins Towing and Recovery, the court recites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule but decides the meaning of Occupations Code § 2303.156(b), not § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion applies Section 311.011(a)'s ordinary-meaning rule to interpret Local Government Code Section 395.016(b); it does not decide a rule of Section 311.011 itself. opinion →
Volosen v. State, the court construed former Penal Code § 42.09(e), without deciding a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Gillebaard v. BAYVIEW ACRES ASS'N, INC., the court used § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction to interpret Property Code § 204.006(a); it did not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the permit requirements of Health and Safety Code chapter 751; it does not decide § 311.011's own meaning or limits. opinion →
Pearson v. State, the § 311.011(b) reference appears in a quotation from Needham, not in this court's own decision about that section. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites section 311.011(a) as a rule for construing Tax Code section 6.02(f); it decides what the Tax Code phrase covers, not what section 311.011 itself means or requires. opinion →
the City of Rockwall, Texas v. Vester T. Hughes, as Sole Independent of the Estate of W. W. Caruth, the discussion of § 311.011(a) appears in a dissent, not the Court’s decision. opinion →
City of Rockwall v. Hughes, the court cites § 311.011(b) as a general interpretive standard but decides the meaning of Local Government Code § 43.052(i), not a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
Pastrano v. State, the court cited § 311.011(a) as an aid to interpreting Penal Code § 39.04; it did not decide § 311.011(a)'s own rule. opinion →
Pastrano v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) while interpreting Penal Code § 39.04; it does not decide § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
Omaha Healthcare Center, L.L.C. v. Johnson Ex Rel. Estate of Reed, the court used § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of the health care liability statute; it did not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., this is a Texas Attorney General opinion, not a court decision. opinion →
Opinion No., this is a Texas Attorney General opinion, not a court decision. opinion →
CRITERIUM-FARRELL ENGINEERS v. Owens, the court uses section 311.011 as a guide while deciding what section 150.002 requires; it does not decide a rule of section 311.011 itself. opinion →
Little v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of “custody” under the Penal Code; it does not decide the rule’s own meaning or scope. opinion →
County of Bexar v. Bruton, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding what § 311.034 means; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Maxwell v. State, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule but decides the effect of Transportation Code § 724.019, not a rule of § 311.011. opinion →
National Golf Operating, P.S., L.P. v. Williamson County Appraisal District, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding the effect of Tax Code § 42.225(a); it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Maxwell v. State, the court cites § 311.011 as an interpretive rule but decides the meaning of a Transportation Code provision, not § 311.011 itself. opinion →
National Golf Operating, P.S., L.P. v. Williamson County Appraisal District, the court cites section 311.011 as an interpretive rule while deciding what Tax Code section 42.225(a) requires; it does not decide section 311.011’s own meaning or limits. opinion →
Texas Orthopaedic Association v. Texas State Board of Podiatric Medical Examiners, No. The § 311.011 citation supports the Association's argument, which the court rejected; the court did not decide that section's rule. opinion →
in the Matter of the Guardianship Kathryn Houseworth Gibbs, as an Incapacitated Person, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a general rule of interpretation but decides the scope of the probate and trust jurisdiction statutes, not § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion uses § 311.011(a) to interpret article 59.06(c)(1), without deciding a disputed rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
PASTRANO v. State, the court used § 311.011(a) as a construction aid but decided the meaning of Penal Code § 39.04, not a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Merritt v. State, the court applied ordinary statutory language to the sentencing provisions; it did not decide the meaning or requirements of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
MFC Finance Company of Texas v. Strayhorn, the court cites Section 311.011 as an interpretive rule but decides the tax code refund issue, not the meaning or scope of Section 311.011. opinion →
Texas Logos, L. P. v. Brinkmeyer, the court cites § 311.011(a) as support for an interpretive rule while deciding TxDOT’s jurisdiction; it does not decide the section’s own meaning or requirements. opinion →
In Re Guardianship of Gibbs, the court cites § 311.011(a) as support for its interpretation of probate and trust statutes, without deciding this section’s own rules. opinion →
Pallares v. Magic Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc., the court decides the scope of the health care liability statute and cites § 311.011(a) only as an interpretive rule; it does not decide what § 311.011(a) means or requires. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites section 311.011(a) as a common-usage rule while deciding what “juristic entity” means under chapter 606; it does not decide a rule of section 311.011. opinion →
City of Houston v. Hildebrandt, the court cites § 311.011 as a general interpretation rule while deciding issues under the Local Government Code; it does not decide § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
Texas Orthopaedic Ass'n v. Texas State Board of Podiatric Medical Examiners, the § 311.011 citation supports the Association’s argument, which the court did not adopt. opinion →
Texas Orthopaedic Association v. Texas State Board of Podiatric Medical Examiners, the citation to § 311.011 supports the Association's argument; the court did not adopt that argument or decide the section's rule. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites § 311.011(a) as a rule of construction while deciding the meaning of “local option status” under Alcoholic Beverage Code § 251.72; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
City of Austin, Texas v. Trudy Leggett, Individually and as Heir of Nathan Leggett, the court cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive principle while deciding what counts as a special defect under the Tort Claims Act; it does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
In the Interest of A.A.A., the court cites § 311.011 as a general rule while interpreting a Family Code provision; it does not decide § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, the opinion cites § 311.011 for a general rule while deciding the meaning of “gift” under § 2054.022(a)(7). It does not decide § 311.011’s own rules. opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, this is an Attorney General opinion, not a court decision. Section 311.011(a) is cited to support an interpretation of the District's enabling act. opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, the opinion decides the meaning of Tax Code sections 313.021(2) and 313.025(a). It cites § 311.011(b) only for a general principle of statutory construction. opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, the opinion recites section 311.011(a)'s interpretive rule but decides the meaning of a term in Penal Code section 42.092, not a rule of section 311.011 itself. opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, the opinion cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of a term in Alcoholic Beverage Code § 251.72; it does not decide § 311.011's own rules. opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, the opinion cites § 311.011(a) while interpreting “juristic entity” in Chapter 606; it does not decide the meaning or limits of § 311.011(a). opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, the opinion cites § 311.011(b) as an interpretive rule but decides whether § 614.122 requires identification cards for unpaid investigators. It does not decide § 311.011's own meaning or scope. opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, the opinion uses § 311.011(a)'s context rule to interpret Tax Code § 6.02(f); it does not decide what § 311.011 itself means or requires. opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, the opinion cites § 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of Tax Code § 1.111; it does not decide the meaning or scope of § 311.011(a). opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites section 311.011(a) as an interpretive rule but decides the meaning of a Penal Code term, not any rule of section 311.011 itself. opinion →
Constante v. State, the court cites § 311.011(a) as a general rule of construction while deciding how Penal Code § 49.09(e) applies; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Muniz v. State, the court uses § 311.011 as an interpretive rule but decides the meaning of a different provision, article 18.01(i). opinion →
State of Texas, by and Through Greg Abbott, the Attorney General v. Young, the court cites § 311.011(b) as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of chapter 103; it does not decide a rule of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, this is a Texas Attorney General opinion, not a court decision. opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, this is a Texas Attorney General opinion, not a court decision. opinion →
Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion, the opinion applies section 311.011(a) as a rule for interpreting other provisions; it does not decide that section's own rules. opinion →
Centerpoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC v. Gulf Coast Coalition of Cities, the court uses § 311.011(b) as an interpretive rule while deciding the meaning of PURA § 39.252(b); it does not decide a rule or limit of § 311.011 itself. opinion →
…and 719 more.

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