Statute Annotations › Texas › Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001

Termination of the parent-child relationship: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Texas
Case notes
3,825
Cited in passing
943
Citing cases indexed
10,838
Case dates
1995–2026
Screened through
2026-06-24
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-19
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

4,768 citing cases reviewed of 10,838 in the citation index: 3,825 interpreted the section (annotated below), 943 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-24 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 2003-07-03 In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355 (Tex.), reversed the appellate ruling that former subsection (1)(Q) was unconstitutionally retroactive as applied and measured its two-year imprisonment period forward from the petition's filing. Source
  • 2017-09-01 H.B. 7 added subsection (c)'s limits on termination grounds based solely on homeschooling, poverty, specified nonviolent charges, prescribed low-THC cannabis, or conscientious refusal of immunization, and added subsection (d)'s defense to the former service-plan ground. Source
  • 2019-05-17 In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, required appellate review of challenged endangerment findings under subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E), even when another ground supports termination, because those findings can affect rights to other children. Source
  • 2021-05-15 H.B. 2536 added protection in subsection (c) for seeking another medical opinion or transferring a child's medical care; the Act took effect immediately on enactment. Source
  • 2021-09-01 H.B. 567 revised subsection (c)'s formulation and added protection for allowing age-appropriate independent activities. Source
  • 2023-09-01 H.B. 2658 added former subsection (b)(1)(V), making specified criminal or online solicitation convictions another termination ground in suits filed from that date. Source
  • 2023-09-01 H.B. 4595 reconciled the 2021 amendments to subsection (c) and moved the independent-activity protection from paragraph (6) to (7), without changing that protection. Source
  • 2025-09-01 H.B. 116 repealed the former subsection (b)(1)(O) ground for failure to follow a court-ordered reunification plan and renumbered the later grounds. Its transition rule applies the change to suits pending in a trial court on that date or filed afterward. Source
  • 2025-09-01 H.B. 1151 added subsection (c) protections for specified refusals of psychiatric treatment and choices of recognized alternative health care; the change applies to Department suits filed from that date. Source

Endangering conduct

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being; violent and criminal conduct can support that finding.

In the Interest of M.H. and M.H., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-12-12(b)(1)(E)

Accordingly, the evidence is factually—and thus legally—sufficient to support the trial court’s Subsection (E) finding.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Continued drug use can establish an endangering course of conduct under subsection (b)(1)(E).

In the Interest of A.L., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-11-26(b)(1)(E)

Under the applicable standards of review, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s predicate finding of endangerment under section 161.001(b)(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) requires sufficient evidence to support termination on that predicate ground.

D.M.K. and S.M. v. Department of Family and Protective Services and J.S. and B.S. · filed 2024-10-10(b)(1)(E)

We reverse the portion of the final order of the trial court with respect to the conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support termination on the predicate ground of Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), and we render the judgment the trial court should have rendered, with the result that we strike the conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support termination under subsection (E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (b)(1)(E) permits a court to consider a parent’s endangering conduct toward a child’s siblings when deciding whether the parent endangered the child.

In the Interest of F.S., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-10-09(b)(1)(E)

Although F.S. was in Father’s custody for about five months, the trial court could consider Father’s endangering conduct while he had custody of F.S.’s siblings.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows a parent’s course of conduct endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of F.S.F., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-08-14(b)(1)(E)

Further, after considering the entire record, including any disputed or contrary evidence, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s termination under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E) of the Texas Family Code.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being, including conduct before the child’s birth.

In the Interest of J.F. and J.F., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-07-25(b)(1)(E)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, we conclude a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father “engaged in conduct . . . which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child[ren].” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1) treats parental conduct as endangering a child when it jeopardizes the child’s well-being, even if the conduct is not directed at the child and causes no actual injury.

In the Interest of J.J. & K.J. · filed 1995-10-31(1)

In order for parental conduct to constitute endangerment of a child’s well-being, it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer injury; rather, it is sufficient that the child’s well-being be jeopardized or exposed to loss or injury.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) does not require proof that a parent’s conduct caused an actual adverse effect on the child.

In the Interest of B.R. · filed 1997-05-08(1)(E)

Contrary to his view of Section 161.001(1)(E), the statute does not require a showing that a parent’s conduct caused an actual adverse effect upon the child.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a course of parental conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of R.D. · filed 1997-10-16(1)(E)

Instead, subsection E is satisfied simply by showing a parental course of conduct endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent's course of conduct endangered a child's physical or emotional well-being.

Spangler v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 1998-02-04(1)(E)

If the evidence shows a course of conduct on Spangler's part "which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well-being of" his children, a finding under § 161.001(1)(E) will be upheld. ... Based on this evidence, the jury could have reasonably found by clear and convincing evidence that Spangler engaged in a course of conduct which endangered his daughters' physical or emotional well-being such that termination of his parental rights was appropriate.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows a parent’s conduct endangered a child’s physical or emotional well-being and termination is in the child’s best interest.

Spangler v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 1998-02-04(1)(E)

Under the clear and convincing standard of review, we find that the jury reasonably could have found that Spangler engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who have engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of his children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires the parent’s acts or omissions to directly cause endangerment of the child.

in the Interest of M.D., a Child · filed 1998-04-16(1)(E)

Subsection E requires that the parent’s conduct be the direct cause of the endangerment, as evidenced by both the parent’s acts and omissions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's voluntary course of conduct endangers the child's emotional well-being, even if the conduct was not directed at the child.

In Re KMM · filed 1999-04-01(1)(E)

The trial court may order termination of the father's parental rights if it finds that one or more of the grounds listed in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon Supp.1999) exist and that termination is in the best interest of the child. We find that the trial court was correct in finding that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. Section 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's voluntary course of conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being, even if the conduct was not directed at that child.

In the Interest of K.M.M. · filed 1999-04-01(1)(E)

The trial court may order termination of the father’s parental rights if it finds that one or more of the grounds listed in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon Supp.1999) exist and that termination is in the best interest of the child. We find that the trial court was correct in finding that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. Section 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001 permits a finding of endangerment based on a parent's misconduct even if the parent never physically possessed the child.

Robert Rojas, Sr. v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 1998-02-12(1)(D), (1)(E)

Rojas argues that because he never had physical possession of the child there is no way he could have endangered the "physical or emotional well-being of the child" as required by section 161.001(D) & (E). We disagree. "Danger" to a child can be inferred from parental misconduct alone.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Conduct endangering one child can support termination as to another child in the household even when the conduct was not directed at that child.

Lou Ann Krauss Baetz v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 1998-12-10(1)(E)

Because conduct endangering one child places all children in the household in jeopardy, the conduct required to support this finding need not be directed toward Dustin.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Under section 161.001(1)(E), abuse directed at the other parent can establish endangerment of a child.

Hogeda v. Mendez-Dotson · filed 1998-12-29(1)(E)

It is not necessary for a finding that a person engaged in conduct that endangered the physical and emotional well-being of a child that the abusive conduct be directed at the child.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits endangerment to be inferred from a parent’s sexual assault of another child in the home without proof that the parent’s child suffered actual injury.

In the Interest of King · filed 2000-03-23(1)(E)

The aggravated sexual assault of a child living in the home with the child whose parental rights are in question is conduct that we may infer will endanger or jeopardize the well-being, both physical and emotional, of other children in the home who may discover the abuse or be abused themselves. Section 161.001(1)(E) does not require such actual injury before a parent’s parental rights may be terminated.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct endangers the child's physical or emotional well-being, including conduct before the child's birth.

In Re SF · filed 2000-09-29(1)(E)

Hanes's criminal behavior before his imprisonment and S.F.'s birth, along with his continued misbehavior during his prison stay shows Hanes has engaged in a course of conduct that would be detrimental to S.F. We find this evidence was factually sufficient to produce in the mind of the trial judge a firm belief that by his course of conduct, Hanes's behavior endangered S.F.'s physical or emotional well being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being, even if the conduct occurs outside the child's presence.

Paige Cox and Tawnya Cox v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2000-10-05(1)(E)

After an extensive review of the record, we hold that the district court had clear and convincing evidence that is legally and factually sufficient to support the findings that appellants' course of conduct endangered S.H.C.'s emotional or physical well-being despite the fact that all of the events occurred outside S.H.C.'s presence.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) does not permit termination based on poverty alone without evidence that poverty endangered the child.

Doyle v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 2000-05-03(1)(E)

In the absence of such evidence, we will not conclude that a showing of poverty, standing alone, demonstrates endangerment under this section.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) allows courts to consider a parent’s conduct before and after a child’s birth when deciding whether the parent engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the child.

In the Interest of M.J.M.L. · filed 2000-09-27(1)(E)

However, no court has held, and we do not find that the statutory definition of “child” conflicts with a definition of a course of conduct endangering a child which incorporates conduct occurring before and after a child’s birth.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Evidence of endangering conduct was legally sufficient to support termination under subsection (1)(E).

In the Interest of J.O.C. · filed 2001-04-25(1)(E)

Consequently, we find that the record contains legally sufficient evidence to support an involuntary termination under Section 161.001(1)(E) of the Family Code.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Under subsection (1)(E), a parent’s conduct can endanger a child even if it is not directed at the child and causes no actual injury.

In the Interest of N.K. · filed 2001-08-16(1)(E)

In order for parental conduct to constitute endangerment of the children’s well-being, the conduct need not be directed at the children and the children need not actually suffer injury.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Clear and convincing evidence of endangering conduct supported termination under subsection (1)(E).

In the Interest of W.C. · filed 2001-09-06(1)(E)

Therefore, we find there was legally sufficient evidence to enable a factfinder to determine by clear and convincing evidence that appellant engaged in conduct which endangered the physical and emotional well-being of the child.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A parent's conduct can endanger a child even if it is not directed at the child and causes no actual injury.

In Re NK · filed 2001-09-18(1)(E)

In order for parental conduct to constitute endangerment of the children's well-being, the conduct need not be directed at the children and the children need not actually suffer injury. Rather, endanger means to expose to loss or injury, to jeopardize.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) treats a voluntary course of parental conduct that endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being as a ground for termination.

In Re DM · filed 2001-10-04(1)(E)

We conclude that, viewing the evidence most favorably to the jury's verdict, there is legally sufficient evidence of a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by Appellant from which the jury could reasonably conclude there was a high probability that her conduct endangered the children's emotional or physical well-being. Viewing all the evidence in the record in a neutral light, both that favoring termination and that favoring maintaining Appellant's parental rights, we conclude there is also factually sufficient evidence that Appellant engaged in conduct that endangered the children's physical and emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a course of parental conduct that endangers the child; a single act or omission is insufficient.

In the Interest of D.P., a Child · filed 2001-11-28(1)(E)

We first address the contention that Cordell engaged in conduct that endangered D.P. which is part of the requirement under section 161.001(1)(E). Termination under this provision may not be based on a single act or omission, but a showing of a course of conduct is required.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits a parent's conduct toward one child to establish endangerment of another child, even without proof that the other child was injured.

Davis v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2001-12-13(1)(E)

Misconduct directed towards one child can support a finding that the parent engaged in a course of conduct that endangered another child.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination for conduct endangering a child even if the conduct was not directed at the child and caused no actual injury.

in the Interest of H. R. S., a Child · filed 2002-02-26(1)(E)

Second, one need not prove that the misconduct creating the danger was directed at the child or that the child actually suffered injury to succeed in terminating parental rights.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) covers parental acts and omissions that endanger a child without requiring proof that the conduct caused actual harm.

in the Interest of A. N. L., a Child · filed 2002-03-26(1)(E)

The State was not required to establish that Lamb's conduct actually caused A.N.L.'s malnourishment. It was required to establish only that Lamb's conduct, including both acts and omissions, posed a danger to A.N.L., exposing A.N.L. to loss or injury.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) is satisfied when imprisonment forms part of a course of conduct that endangers a child.

Lola Garcia and Willie Thompson, Jr. v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2002-08-30(1)(E)

Thus, if the evidence, including imprisonment, proves a course of conduct that has the effect of endangering the child, the requirement of section 161.001(1)(E) is met.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Failure to take medication that leaves a parent unable to care for a newborn can constitute endangering conduct under Section 161.001(1)(E).

in the Interest of S.A.A., a Child · filed 2002-09-13(1)(E)

The trial court could have discounted this testimony, reasoning that appellant's endangerment of S.A.A. was not a case of active conduct as the passive conduct of failure to take her medication, thus disabling her from taking care of herself and incapacitating herself from meeting the physical and emotional needs of a newborn child. ... We hold the evidence is factually sufficient for the trial court to have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that appellant had engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of S.A.A.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows a parent’s conduct endangered a child’s emotional well-being; one statutory ground is sufficient.

Robinson v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 2002-09-30(1)(E)

Viewing all the evidence in the record, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to reasonably form a firm belief that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered her children’s emotional well-being. Because we have concluded the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under section 161.001(1)(E), we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence under section 161.001(1)(D). Only one finding alleged under section 161.001(1) is necessary for a judgment of termination.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits a finding of endangering conduct based on a parent's continued illegal drug use despite a reunification plan.

Robinson, Lisa v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2002-09-30(1)(E)

We conclude that appellant's illegal drug activity, a violation of community supervision after agreeing not to commit such acts in the Plan for reunification with her children, established clear and convincing proof of voluntary, deliberate, and conscious conduct that endangered the well-being of her children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a course of parental conduct that endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being.

Porter v. the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2003-03-06(1)(E)

To support a finding under paragraph (E) of section 161.001(1), the evidence must show that the parent engaged in a course of conduct which endangered the children's physical and emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being, even if the child suffers no actual injury.

in the Interest of N.N.S. and J.D.L.S., Minors · filed 2002-11-21(1)(E)

The facts set forth above constitute "more than a scintilla" of evidence that Shinkle engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of his children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being; imprisonment may be considered as part of that course.

in the Interest of R.G., S.G., and B.L., Children · filed 2003-03-27(1)(E)

We hold that the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s grant of termination under subsection E.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in Re: D.S., a Minor Child · filed 2003-04-24(1)(E)

Accordingly, we find the evidence presented was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that appellant endangered D.S. and violated section 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires evidence that a parent engaged in a course of conduct endangering the children’s physical and emotional well-being.

Porter v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 2003-05-29(1)(E)

To support a finding under paragraph (E) of section 161.001(1), the evidence must show that the parent engaged in a course of conduct which endangered the children’s physical and emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Clear and convincing evidence that a parent engaged in endangering conduct or knowingly placed a child with someone who did can support termination if termination is also in the child’s best interest.

Garcia v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2003-06-26(1)(E)

The evidence in this cause is legally and factually sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to form a firm conviction that Garcia engaged in conduct or knowingly placed her children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's drug use and resulting incarceration are part of a course of conduct that endangers a child.

Carlos Smith and Bobbie Hinojosa Smith v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2003-09-11(1)(E)

In this case, the evidence proves that Carlos's incarceration due to his drug use and Bobbie's drug use are part of a course of conduct endangering their children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re RF · filed 2003-09-29(1)(E)

After reviewing all the evidence, we conclude the jury could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of her children as set out in subsection (E). Under subsection (E), the cause of danger to the child must be the parent's conduct alone, including the parent's actions or omissions or failures to act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s acts or omissions endanger a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In Re the Interest of R.F. · filed 2003-09-29(1)(E)

After reviewing all the evidence, we conclude the jury could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of her children as set out in subsection (E). Under subsection (E), the cause of danger to the child must be the parent’s conduct alone, including the parent’s actions or omissions or failures to act.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(E) does not require proof that a parent intended to harm the child; conduct that endangers the child's physical or emotional well-being is enough.

in the Interest of K. W. and C. G. III · filed 2003-09-30(E)

And the Family Code does not require a showing that T.K. intentionally engaged in violence in an effort to harm the children; it is enough that she engaged in conduct (no matter who started it) endangering the physical or emotional well-being of C.G.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent knowingly leaves another child with someone who has abused that child.

In the Interest of C.J.F., a Child · filed 2003-11-25(1)(E)

Likewise, the singular fact that Brenda allowed N.T. to remain unattended in the company of one she knew had abused him in the past provides a basis for termination of her parental rights to C.J.F. under section (E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a course of conduct that endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re AB · filed 2003-12-31(1)(E)

Subsection (D) permits termination based on a single act or omission, while subsection (E) requires a "course of conduct." ... The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the finding that Palmer engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of parental conduct that endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re RW · filed 2004-02-05(1)(E)

Termination under section 161.001(1)(E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits a finding of endangerment based on a parent's course of conduct even if the child has not yet suffered injury.

In Re ST · filed 2004-02-05(1)(E)

Again, to "endanger" a child for purposes of the statutory termination provisions, the parent's acts or omissions in question need not be directed at the child and the child need not have yet suffered injury. Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.1987). If the evidence shows a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well-being of the child, a finding under section 161.001(1)(E) is supportable.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangers a child; a single act or omission is insufficient.

in the Interest of R.W. · filed 2004-02-05(1)(E)

Termination under section 161.001(1)(E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent knowingly fails to protect another child from abuse and that conduct endangers the child whose parental relationship is at issue.

In Re CJF · filed 2003-11-25(1)(E)

Likewise, the singular fact that Brenda allowed N.T. to remain unattended in the company of one she knew had abused him in the past provides a basis for termination of her parental rights to C.J.F. under section (E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) treats cocaine use during pregnancy as conduct that can endanger a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of S. E. L., II, a Minor Child · filed 2003-12-04(1)(E)

Based on this evidence, we conclude the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to produce in its mind a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered S.E.L., II’s physical and emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A parent's course of neglect can support a conduct endangerment finding for a child who was never in the parent's custody.

in the Interest of S.T., O.T.H., G.T.H. and M.L.T. · filed 2004-02-05(1)(E)

Barbara could not take care of M.L.T., and the child would be left unattended in her care upon her release from the hospital and subject to the same environment as the other children. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support a finding that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered the physical and emotional well-being of M.L.T., as well as that of his other three children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent’s conduct, or the conduct of someone with whom the parent knowingly placed a child, endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of J. W. M., Jr. and L. P. M., Children · filed 2004-03-29(1)(E)

The record contains sufficient uncontroverted, clear and convincing evidence, much of it from appellant’s own testimony, for the court to have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the physical and emotional well-being of the children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent engaged in conduct, or knowingly placed children with people whose conduct, endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of J.W.M. · filed 2004-04-29(1)(E)

The record contains sufficient uncontro-verted, clear and convincing evidence, much of it fi'om appellant’s own testimony, for the court to have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the physical and emotional well-being of the children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) provides a ground for termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent engaged in conduct, or knowingly placed children with people whose conduct, endangered the children's physical or emotional well-being.

Clayton Edward Davis, Jr. v. State · filed 2004-05-14(1)(E)

The record contains sufficient uncontroverted, clear and convincing evidence, much of it from appellant's own testimony, for the court to have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the physical and emotional well-being of the children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination on clear and convincing evidence that a parent engaged in endangering conduct or knowingly placed children with someone who did.

in the Interest of R.S., J.S., and A.L. · filed 2004-07-01(1)(E)

Section 161.001(1)(E) of the Texas Family Code allows the trial court to terminate the parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children. Here, the State established this ground by clear and convincing evidence.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) provides a ground for termination when a parent engages in conduct, or knowingly places a child with someone whose conduct, endangers the child's physical or emotional well being.

In Re AJL · filed 2004-04-29(1)(E)

After a review of the evidence, we hold that the physical symptoms of abuse on the children, appellant's admitted drug abuse, her criminal history and incarceration, the expert witness testimony regarding A.J.L., appellant's long history with DFPS and KCPS, and her continuing course of violent conduct are all sufficient to support the jury's finding that appellant engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when sufficient evidence shows that a parent engaged in conduct, or knowingly placed a child with someone who engaged in conduct, that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well being.

in the Interest of A.J.L. and C.R.L., Children · filed 2004-04-29(1)(E)

After a review of the evidence, we hold that the physical symptoms of abuse on the children, appellant’s admitted drug abuse, her criminal history and incarceration, the expert witness testimony regarding A.J.L., appellant’s long history with DFPS and KCPS, and her continuing course of violent conduct are all sufficient to support the jury’s finding that appellant engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a sustained course of parental conduct endangers a child's physical well-being, including repeated failure to maintain a safe home.

Parie v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2004-07-01(1)(E)

Evidence of this "course of conduct" is legally and factually sufficient to find that Parie engaged in conduct that endangered T.K.P.'s physical well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Under section 161.001(1)(E), a parent's continuing criminal conduct can endanger a child's physical and emotional well-being by depriving the child of contact with the parent.

Karl v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2004-07-15(1)(E)

From this evidence, a fact-finder could have reasonably formed a firm belief that Karl's course of criminal conduct endangers his infant son's emotional well-being, if nothing else, by depriving the child of contact with his parent.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) treats a parent’s conduct as endangering a child when it exposes the child to loss or injury, even if the conduct is directed at another child and the parent’s child suffers no actual injury.

in the Interest of S.F., M.F., C.F., Children · filed 2004-07-23(1)(E)

“Endangerment,” as used in subparagraph (1)(E) of Section 161.001, means exposure to loss or injury. It is not a requirement that the conduct be directed at the parent’s child, or that the child actually suffer injury.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of parental conduct that endangers a child; a single act or omission is insufficient.

in the Interest of M.N.G. · filed 2004-08-19(1)(E)

Termination under section 161.001(1)(E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent follows a voluntary, deliberate course of conduct that endangers a child; courts may consider conduct before the child's birth.

In Re MNG · filed 2004-09-16(1)(E)

Termination under section 161.001(1)(E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required. ... To determine whether termination is necessary, courts may look to parental conduct both before and after the child's birth. ... Based upon this evidence, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's finding that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered M.N.G.'s physical or emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A parent's failure to protect children after learning of sexual abuse can constitute a course of conduct that endangers their well-being under subsection (1)(E).

In Re LC · filed 2004-09-16(1)(E)

James' failure to protect the children adequately, even after having been told about the sexual abuse, represents a course of conduct which endangered the well-being of the children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being, including drug use during pregnancy.

In Re SMLD · filed 2004-09-23(1)(E)

The record contains sufficient clear and convincing evidence for the court to have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Carter engaged in conduct that endangered the physical and emotional well-being of her child, and is thus legally sufficient to support that finding. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Termination for endangering conduct requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct, rather than a single act or omission.

in the Interest of K. L., J. H., C. J. L., S. F. L. and I. J. L., Children · filed 2004-10-19(1)(E)

Additionally, termination under section 161.001(1)(E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A parent’s repeated refusal to believe a child’s sexual abuse allegations can constitute endangering conduct under section 161.001(1)(E) when it leaves the child without a safe and stable environment.

in the Interest of K.M., a Child · filed 2004-11-12(1)(E)

The evidence established that by her conduct in continuing to disbelieve K.M.’s allegations, Yama is unable to provide a safe and stable environment for K.M. Applying the appropriate standards of review, we find that there is factually sufficient evidence to support termination of Yama’s parental rights based upon the grounds listed in section 161.001(1)(E), that Yama knowingly engaged in conduct which endangered K.M.’s physical or emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of parental conduct; a single act or omission is insufficient.

in the Interest of J.H., a Child · filed 2004-11-18(1)(E)

Additionally, termination under section 161.001(1)(E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of J.W. · filed 2004-12-02(1)(E)

Viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, both in favor of and contrary to the trial court’s judgment, we conclude that there is factually sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Smith engaged in a course of conduct endangering J.W.’s physical and emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's violent conduct toward one child and the other parent endangers the other children.

In Re JC · filed 2004-12-07(1)(E)

The violent acts and behavior directed at one child and at the child's mother in the presence of the other children satisfy the requirement of Section 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being, including violence toward another child or the other parent.

in the Interest of J.C., G.C., I.C., and T.C., Children · filed 2004-12-07(1)(E)

The violent acts and behavior directed at one child and at the child’s mother in the presence of the other children satisfy the requirement of Section 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination on the ground of endangerment by conduct when the evidence supports a finding that a parent knowingly exposed children to conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of T.N. and M.N., Children · filed 2004-07-22(1)(E)

we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury findings on endangerment by conduct.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being.

Perez v. TEX. DEPT. OF PRO. & REG. SERVICES · filed 2004-08-05(1)(E)

Additionally, termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required. ... Likewise, the evidence is factually sufficient to support the finding that Perez had engaged in conduct or had knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of parental conduct that endangers a child; a single act or omission is insufficient.

Antero Perez AKA Antero P. Gonzalez and Patricia Saenz v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2004-08-05(1)(E)

Additionally, termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct, including failures to act, endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being.

Castaneda v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 2004-08-31(1)(E)

Applying the appropriate standard of review, the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support a finding of endangerment under subsection (E), which includes both acts and omissions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s conduct, or knowing placement of a child with others, endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of B. S. W. · filed 2004-12-23(1)(E)

Based on our review of the evidence, we find that it is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of endangerment.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent engaged in conduct endangering a child's physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of H.D.H. and C.M.H. · filed 2004-12-30(1)(E)

Accordingly, we find the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction that Horton engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent engaged in conduct endangering a child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re AAT · filed 2005-04-26(1)(E)

The evidence as set out above provides clear and convincing proof that both parents engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent engaged in conduct endangering a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of A.A.T., L.L.T., A.C., W.L.C., Jr., Children · filed 2005-04-26(1)(E)

The evidence as set out above provides clear and convincing proof that both parents engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent pursues a course of conduct that endangers a child, without proof that the child was the focus of the conduct or was actually harmed.

in the Interest of S.D.S., G.R.R., J.R.R. and E.M.R., Children · filed 2005-05-03(1)(E)

To satisfy that ground, one need not prove that the children were the focus of the conduct or actually harmed by it. In re C.J.F., 134 S.W.3d 343, 351 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. denied). Rather, it is enough to simply show that the parent pursued a course of conduct having the effect of endangering the child.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination for conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being; delaying necessary medical treatment can support that ground.

in the Interest of G.G. and J.G., Children · filed 2005-05-19(1)(E)

Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that the trial court could reasonably form a belief or conviction that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered her children’s physical or emotional well-being, and therefore, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) provides a ground for termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent’s conduct endangered a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of S.E.W. · filed 2005-05-19(1)(E)

Based on this and other evidence in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the findings, the jury could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Father “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child[ren] with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child[ren].” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E). We conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent’s course of conduct endangered a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of C.C., C.C., C.C., C.C., and K.B., Children · filed 2005-05-26(1)(E)

Applying the appropriate standard of review, we hold that the evidence is such that a trier of fact could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Appellants knowingly engaged in conduct that endangered C.C.(1)’s, C.C.(2)’s, C.C.(3)’s, C.C.(4)’s, and K.B.’s physical or emotional well-being. Consequently, we hold that there is factually sufficient evidence to support the termination of Lynetta H.’s and Marcell B.’s parental rights based upon that ground.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (1)(E) allows an endangerment finding based on a parent’s conduct toward other children, including conduct before the child at issue was born.

In the Interest of S.P. · filed 2005-05-26(1)(E)

We have consistently held that a parent’s conduct both before and after a child is born is relevant to the determination of whether the conduct endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being. ... Thus we reject Mother’s argument that the endangerment finding as to M.G. can only be supported by evidence of her conduct toward that child, and look at all the evidence in the record under the appropriate standard of review.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination based on a parent’s own endangering conduct or the parent’s knowing exposure of the child to the other parent’s endangering conduct.

in the Interest of K. M.H · filed 2005-07-14(1)(E)

The allegations permitted termination based not only on each parent’s own conduct endangering K.M.H., but upon each parent’s knowing exposure of K.M.H. to the other parent’s endangering conduct.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being; persistent unsanitary conditions can support that finding, including for a later-born child.

In Re WRE · filed 2005-07-18(1)(E)

Because we conclude that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's findings under subsection (E), and a finding as to any one of the acts or omissions enumerated in section 161.001(1) is sufficient to support termination, we need not address Elrod's other issues.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) provides a ground for termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent’s conduct, or the conduct of someone with whom the parent knowingly placed a child, endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of D.T.D. and K.C.H., Children · filed 2005-08-04(1)(E)

Termination based on section 161.001(E) is proper if clear and convincing evidence shows that the parent engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being. ... Accordingly, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support termination of Augustine’s parental rights under section 161.001(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits consideration of a parent’s conduct before a child’s birth and conduct toward other children when deciding whether the parent endangered that child.

In Re SP · filed 2005-08-05(1)(E)

We have consistently held that a parent's conduct both before and after a child is born is relevant to the determination of whether the conduct endangers the child's physical or emotional well-being. ... Thus we reject Mother's argument that the endangerment finding as to M.G. can only be supported by evidence of her conduct toward that child, and look at all the evidence in the record under the appropriate standard of review.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination based on clear and convincing evidence of parental conduct, including failures to act, that endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re SEW · filed 2005-08-19(1)(E)

Based on this and other evidence in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the findings, the jury could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Father "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child[ren] with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child[ren]." Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E). We conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's finding.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A parent's course of drug use and negligent supervision can establish endangerment under subsection (1)(E) without proof that the child was actually injured.

Vasquez v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 2005-12-30(1)(E)

Despite there being no direct evidence of appellant's drug use or neglect actually injuring Z.M., TDPRS presented evidence that appellant engaged in a course of conduct that endangered Z.M.'s physical and emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of drug use and inadequate supervision endangers a child, even without proof of actual injury.

Vasquez v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2005-12-30(1)(E)

Despite there being no direct evidence of appellant’s drug use or neglect actually injuring Z.M., TDPRS presented evidence that appellant engaged in a course of conduct that endangered Z.M.’s physical and emotional well-being. ... We hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to show that appellant endangered Z.M.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a voluntary course of parental conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being; a single act or omission is insufficient.

in the Interest of H.H. and R.H., Children · filed 2006-01-26(1)(E)

We hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support a jury’s finding of endangerment under section 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits a court to consider a parent's conduct before and after a child's birth when deciding whether that conduct endangered the child.

Wyatt v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2006-02-16(1)(E)

However, a court may consider a parent’s conduct both before and after a child’s birth as grounds for termination. ... In this case, appellant showed a pattern of medical neglect with her first two children as well as a pattern of angry disturbances. A factfinder could have reasonably believed that appellant’s conduct endangered the physical and emotional well-being of A.W.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination for a parent's course of conduct that endangers a child, even if the child was not the focus of the conduct or actually harmed.

in the Interest of P.M., a Child · filed 2006-02-22(1)(E)

To satisfy that ground, the complainant need not prove that the child was the focus of the conduct or actually harmed by it.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent’s conduct, or the conduct of someone with whom the parent knowingly placed a child, endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of S.K.D.C., T.K.B., and I.J.W., Children · filed 2006-03-29(1)(E)

We hold that the evidence is sufficient to show that Lawanda engaged in conduct or knowingly placed S.K.D.C, T.K.B., and I.J.W. with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being; sexual assault of a stepchild can support that finding.

In the Interest of Baby Boy R. · filed 2006-05-22(1)(E)

We conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Gidney, having pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of his stepchild, engaged in conduct which had the effect of endangering the child’s physical or emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a parent to act knowingly when placing children with a person whose conduct endangers them.

in the Interest of T.R.E., D.E., S.L.R., and K.J.P. · filed 2005-12-08(1)(E)

To the extent the Department claims Jacquelyn failed to protect the children from Robert's endangering conduct, her act of placing the children with the endangering person must be made knowingly. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E) (Vernon Supp. 2005). ... We hold the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of conduct endangerment.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination for conduct endangering a child’s physical or emotional well-being, including conduct before the child’s birth.

Wyatt v. Department of Family & Protective Services · filed 2006-02-16(1)(E)

However, a court may consider a parent’s conduct both before and after a child’s birth as grounds for termination. ... A factfinder could have reasonably believed that appellant’s conduct endangered the physical and emotional well-being of A.W.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits an endangerment finding without proof that parental conduct caused an actual injury if the conduct exposed the child to injury or jeopardized the child's well-being.

Rochelle v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2006-02-09(1)(E)

Thus, even though no causal connection was established between appellant’s actions and an actual injury to the twins, the trial court could have inferred that appellant’s conduct exposed the twins to injury and placed them in jeopardy, i.e. endangered the twins’ physical well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Sexual abuse of another child in the home can establish endangerment under § 161.001(1)(E).

In the Interest of E.A.K. · filed 2006-02-28(1)(E)

This properly considered evidence supports the conclusion that Mustofa molested J.J. while she was living in his home and under his care and while E.A.K. was also present in the home. Consequently, we find that it constituted legally sufficient evidence of endangerment to E.A.K. to support the jury’s finding of termination.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child, including when past abuse of other children supports an inference of future harm.

Reyna v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2006-04-27(1)(E)

From appellant’s abuse of her three oldest daughters and her subsequent assault on a police officer, the trial court could have inferred that (1) appellant had engaged in course of conduct that endangered physical or emotional well-being of A.E.R., (2) appellant would continue her pattern of abusive behavior, and (3) A.E.R. would face abuse if placed in appellant’s care.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination for a parent’s course of conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being without requiring proof of actual injury.

Clawson v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2006-07-21(1)(E)

Section 161.001(1)(E) focuses on the risk of both physical and emotional injury and does not require any actual injury to the child, let alone serious physical injury. It does, however, require that the parent’s behavior constitutes a course of conduct endangering the child.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's prenatal cocaine use endangers the child's physical or emotional well-being.

Kovey Amanette Cervantes-Peterson A/K/A Kovey Peterson Cervantes A/K/A Kovey Turner Cervantes v. Department of Family an · filed 2006-08-03(1)(E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under section 161.001(1)(E) that Cervantes engaged in conduct that endangered the physical and emotional well-being of J.M.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent’s conduct, or the conduct of someone with whom the parent knowingly placed the child, endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of D.D.S., a Child · filed 2006-08-10(1)(E)

Accordingly, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support termination of appellant’s parental rights under section 161.001(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A parent’s inability to oversee children’s safety because of disability and required medication can support a finding of endangering conduct under § 161.001(1)(E).

In the Interest of R.B. · filed 2006-08-22(1)(E)

We conclude the evidence is clearly legally sufficient to support a finding that Mother engaged in conduct which endangered the well-being of the children. The evidence of Mother’s disability, her required medication, and her resulting inability to oversee the safety of the children were well established by the record.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Repeated criminal conduct that leaves a parent incarcerated and absent from a child’s life can support termination for endangering the child’s emotional well-being.

Curtis v. State · filed 2006-08-31(1)(E)

Having carefully reviewed the evidence, we hold that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Phillip had engaged in conduct that endangered B.P.W.’s emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent engaged in conduct endangering a child and that termination is in the child's best interest.

In Re Rb · filed 2006-09-18(1)(E)

A court may order involuntary termination of a parent's rights only if the court finds that: (1) the parent has committed a predicate act or omission harmful to the child, and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon 2002). ... We conclude the evidence is clearly legally sufficient to support a finding that Mother engaged in conduct which endangered the well-being of the children. ... Finally, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's finding that termination was in the children's best interest.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) allows an endangerment finding based on a parent's course of conduct that jeopardizes a child's well-being.

In Re AJH · filed 2006-09-28(1)(E)

Given the circumstances of both Appellant and the child, and based on the applicable standard of review, [8] we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the finding that Appellant engaged in conduct that endangered A.J.H.'s well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child’s well-being.

in the Interest of A.J.H., a Child · filed 2006-09-28(1)(E)

Given the circumstances of both Appellant and the child, and based on the applicable standard of review, ... we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the finding that Appellant engaged in conduct that endangered AJ.H.’s well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's conduct, including omissions, endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re CMB · filed 2006-10-27(1)(E)

To terminate a parent's rights under subsection (E) of section 161.001, the evidence must show the parent engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the child's physical or emotional well being. ... We further conclude that, based on the evidence in this case, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude by clear and convincing evidence that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered her children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent engaged in conduct endangering a child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re SB · filed 2006-11-02(1)(E)

Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of S.B. and Y.B., and therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) covers parental conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being, including violence in the home and drug use while caring for the child.

in the Interest of S.B. and Y.B., Minor Children · filed 2006-11-02(1)(E)

Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of S.B. and Y.B., and therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct endangers a child's well-being.

Willie A. Milton, 561014 v. Doug Dretke, Director, TDCJ-CID · filed 2006-09-28(1)(E)

Given the circumstances of both Appellant and the child, and based on the applicable standard of review, (footnote: 8) we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the finding that Appellant engaged in conduct that endangered A.J.H.’s well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination for a parent's endangering course of conduct even if the conduct was not directed at the child, caused no injury, or occurred before the child's birth.

in the Interest of C.S.C., a Child · filed 2006-11-30(1)(E)

However, endangering acts need not be directed at the child or cause actual injury or threat of injury to the child, and as mentioned above, endangerment may include what a parent does both before and after the birth of a child.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination for endangering conduct when evidence of a parent’s physical abuse and drug use supports a firm belief that the parent endangered the children.

in the Interest of H.J.A., a Minor Child · filed 2006-12-14(1)(E)

Thus, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under section 161.001(1)(E) of the family code.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Under subsection (1)(E), a parent's conduct that endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being can support termination when proved by clear and convincing evidence.

in the Interest of H.G., a Child · filed 2007-01-11(1)(E)

Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of H.G., and therefore, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's continuing course of conduct, including drug use, endangers the child's well-being.

in the Interest of M. L. M., a Child · filed 2007-01-12(1)(E)

The evidence is sufficient to support a firm conviction or belief that appellant engaged in conduct that endangered MLM's well-being, and thus is legally and factually sufficient to support the court's finding.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination for a parent's own endangering conduct even if the parent did not know the conduct was dangerous.

in the Interest of D.R., C.D., Jr., Q.R., E.R., and Y.R., Children · filed 2007-01-25(1)(E)

The parent need not know that his or her own conduct is dangerous for a termination order pursuant to section 161.001(1)(E) to be proper.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) allows a parent’s endangering conduct toward one child to support termination of parental rights to another child, even if that child was not present or injured.

in the Interest of B.C. and O.C., Children · filed 2007-03-29(1)(E)

This argument fails because a parent’s conduct need not be directed at the child who is the subject of the termination proceedings or even result in injury to the child to constitute endangerment.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being; imprisonment may be considered as part of that course of conduct.

In Re NSG · filed 2007-09-12(1)(E)

On the other hand, if the evidence, which includes imprisonment, shows a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well-being of the child, a finding under Section 161.001(1)(E) is supportable.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's course of conduct, including conduct resulting in imprisonment, endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of N.S.G., a Minor Child · filed 2007-09-12(1)(E)

On the other hand, if the evidence, which includes imprisonment, shows a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well-being of the child, a finding under Section 161.001(1)(E) is supportable.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being; continued drug use and related conduct can support that finding.

In the Interest of S.K.A., M.A., and SA., Minor Children · filed 2007-10-17(1)(E)

The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the predicate finding of conduct endangerment.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent’s conduct endangered a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of J.A.B., a Child · filed 2007-10-18(1)(E)

Having carefully considered the evidence and applying the appropriate standards of review, (footnote: 32) we hold that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Jerri engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of J.A.B., and the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the court’s finding under family code section 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent's conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re SKA · filed 2007-11-06(1)(E)

The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the predicate finding of conduct endangerment. Having found legally and factually sufficient evidence of Chad's conduct endangering the children, we need not assess the sufficiency of the evidence on the other predicate grounds for termination.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) does not require proof that the children were the focus of the endangering conduct or were actually harmed by it.

in the Interest of T.U., K.U., and K.U., Children · filed 2007-11-08(1)(E)

To satisfy it, the State need not have proved that the children at issue here were the focus of the conduct or that they were actually harmed by it.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A parent's abuse of controlled substances during pregnancy can support a child endangerment finding under § 161.001(1)(E).

In Re As · filed 2007-10-11(1)(E)

Evidence that Perkins abused controlled substances while pregnant will support a finding of child endangerment.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) allows controlled-substance abuse during pregnancy to support a finding of child endangerment.

in the Interest of A.S. · filed 2007-10-11(1)(E)

Evidence that Perkins abused controlled substances while pregnant will support a finding of child endangerment.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of M.R. and W.M., Children · filed 2007-12-13(1)(E)

Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that W.P.M. engaged in conduct and knowingly placed W.M. with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of W.M. Therefore, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under section 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of J.E.H., a Child · filed 2008-02-21(1)(E)

Thus, the evidence was factually sufficient to support the court’s finding under family code section 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a conscious course of endangering conduct; a single use of marijuana during pregnancy, standing alone, is insufficient.

in the Interest of A.S., D.S. and L.A.S · filed 2008-03-04(1)(E)

While unquestionably, an exercise of poor judgment, Veronica’s use of marijuana on a single occasion, standing alone, does not rise to the level of a conscious course of conduct.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (1)(E) permits termination when a parent's voluntary, deliberate course of conduct endangers a child's well-being; actual injury is unnecessary.

in the Interest of L.A.W., a Minor Child · filed 2008-03-20(1)(E)

Based on the applicable standards of review, (footnote: 16) we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding as to Kenneth’s endangering course of conduct.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) allows termination based on a deliberate course of parental conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of D.F., a Child · filed 2008-03-27(1)(E)

Thus, when viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the court’s finding that David has engaged in a deliberate course of conduct that has endangered D.F.’s well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E)'s endangerment ground can be supported by a parent's criminal conduct, including involvement with marihuana, when it endangers the child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re ST · filed 2008-05-28(1)(E)

The evidence of Donald's criminal conduct, and in particular his involvement with marihuana, is such that the trial court as factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Donald engaged in conduct which endangered S.T.'s physical and emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s acts or omissions form a course of conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of L.E.W., a Child · filed 2007-12-13(1)(E)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of endangerment under subsection (E), which includes both acts and omissions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child, even if the conduct is not directed toward the child.

In the Interest of S.T. · filed 2008-05-28(1)(E)

Donald contends in his second point that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the court’s finding under section 161.001(1)(E) that he engaged in conduct which endangered S.T.’s physical or emotional well-being. ... A parent may be found to have engaged in conduct which endangers a child even if that conduct is not directed toward the child. ... The evidence of Donald’s criminal conduct, and in particular his involvement with marihuana, is such that the trial court as factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Donald engaged in conduct which endangered S.T.’s physical and emotional well-being.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of M.B., M.M.A., M.G.A., M.R.A., and M.W.A., Jr., Children · filed 2008-07-31(1)(E)

Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under subsection 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent’s conduct endangered a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of T. H., T. H., and D. H., Children · filed 2008-08-12(1)(E)

Viewing the evidence before us as a whole, we find there was sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Julie engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of her children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a conscious course of endangering conduct; a single use of marijuana during pregnancy does not suffice.

In Re As · filed 2008-08-26(1)(E)

While unquestionably, an exercise of poor judgment, Veronica's use of marijuana on a single occasion, standing alone, does not rise to the level of a conscious course of conduct.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (1)(E) requires a voluntary, deliberate course of conduct that endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being; repeated domestic violence can satisfy that requirement.

In Re JJS · filed 2008-10-22(1)(E)

Termination under subsection 161.001(1)(E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required. ... Having reviewed the entire record, we find the evidence of Laura's conduct is such that the trial court as factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Laura engaged in conduct which endangered the physical and emotional well-being of her children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A parent’s conduct exposing children to domestic violence can support a finding of endangerment under subsection (1)(E).

in the Interest of J.J.S., D.D.S., and L.S., Children · filed 2008-10-22(1)(E)

Having reviewed the entire record, we find the evidence of Laura’s conduct is such that the trial court as factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Laura engaged in conduct which endangered the physical and emotional well-being of her children.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent's conduct endangers a child's physical or emotional well-being.

Weaver v. State · filed 2008-11-12(1)(E)

The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the predicate finding of conduct endangerment.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits an endangerment finding based on a parent’s course of drug use and recent criminal conduct.

in the Interest of L.D.K., M.L.P., S.D.P. and D.E.P. · filed 2008-07-31(1)(E)

Further, when considering the entire record, we hold that a fact-finder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that Michael violated section 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination for a parent’s voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangers a child, even if the child suffers no actual injury.

in the Interest of Z.D., a Child · filed 2008-09-25(1)(E)

We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under section 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of parental conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of M.C, N.L., and D.L., Children · filed 2008-10-09(1)(E)

Under subsection (E), the relevant inquiry is whether evidence exists that the endangerment of the child’s physical or emotional well-being was the direct result of the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, and failures to act, and it must be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required. ... Therefore, we conclude that the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to terminate E.C.’s parental rights based on the endangerment by conduct ground in subsection (E), and we overrule her second issue.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of parental conduct; a single act or omission is insufficient.

in the Interest of M.C., a Child · filed 2008-11-26(1)(E)

Termination under section 161.001(1)(E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Repeated drug use before and after a child's birth or removal can establish an endangering course of conduct under subsection (1)(E).

in the Interest of R.R., a Child · filed 2008-12-11(1)(E)

Based on this evidence, Mary engaged in conduct that endangered the children's physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E). She exposed the children to injury and jeopardized their well-being, see Boyd , 727 S.W.2d at 533, through a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) allows a parent’s acts and omissions to establish an endangering course of conduct.

Carpenter v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2008-12-31(1)(E)

The cause of the endangerment under subsection 161.001(1)(E) must be the parent’s conduct, evidenced not only by the parent’s acts but also by the parent’s omissions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 161.001(1)(E) permits termination when a parent’s course of conduct endangers a child’s well-being, even if the child suffers no actual injury.

in the Interest of A.R., R.T.R., and L.R.M., Children · filed 2009-01-08(1)(E)

Accordingly, we conclude and hold, based on the appropriate standards of review, that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support termination under subsection E.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subsection (1)(E) makes endangering conduct, or knowingly placing children with people who engage in it, a ground for termination when termination is also in the children’s best interest.

in the Interest of J.A.W., J.A.W., J.E.W., and J.A.W., Children · filed 2009-03-05(1)(E)

Therefore, the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under section 161.001(1)(E).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Notes 1–150 of 3,825, oldest cases first.

943 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

In re D.B., a Child, another copy of the opinion filed. opinion →
In the Interest of A.M. and E.M., another copy of the opinion filed. opinion →
in the Interest of J.A., a Child, this record contains another copy of the S.B. and Y.B. opinion is judged separately. opinion →
Henry v. Flintrock Feeders, Inc., the court dismissed an appeal about a special appearance as moot; the § 161.001 discussion is from a different termination opinion appended to its text. opinion →
Guerra v. DEPT. PROTECTIVE & REGUL. SERV., the court cites the section to describe the jury's findings, then resolves the appeal on the late appellate record and the severance issue. opinion →
Guerra v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services, the court cites the section to describe the jury’s findings but decides the appeal on appellate procedure and severance. opinion →
In the Interest of Rodriguez, the court cites section 161.001 to distinguish termination of parental rights from the conservatorship issue it decides under section 153.131. opinion →
McIllwain v. State, the court affirmed an aggravated sexual assault conviction; the discussion of the section belongs to a different opinion appended after its disposition. opinion →
in the Interest of J.B., C.B., S.J., B.J., and L.Z., Children, the court cites the section to identify the grounds for termination but decides only that Burton failed to preserve her challenges to the evidence for appeal. opinion →
In Re Verbois, the court mentions the section in describing the parents’ argument about possible termination, then denies mandamus without deciding the section’s requirements. opinion →
In Re Doe 2, a concurring justice cites § 161.001 to compare parental-termination cases with the parental-notification bypass proceedings at issue. opinion →
Doty-Jabbaar v. Dallas County Child Protective Services, the court cited the section to contrast Texas’s best-interest standard with the ICWA standard that controlled the appeal. opinion →
In the Interest of T.V., the court cites section 161.001 as the grounds for termination but decides whether the earlier trial produced a final judgment and whether the trial court could consider evidence from it. opinion →
In the Interest of S., a justice discusses the interpretation of section 161.001(1)(D) while dissenting from the denial of review; the court does not decide that interpretation. opinion →
In the Interest of M.A.C., the dissent discusses the section's termination grounds while arguing to affirm the judgment; that analysis is not the court's decision. opinion →
In Re JRP, the court cites section 161.001 only when describing TDPRS's allegations. opinion →
In the Interest of J.R.P., M.C. and R.P., Jr., Minor Children, the court cites section 161.001 while describing TDPRS’s allegations and decides the timing of appointed counsel under section 107.013. opinion →
in Re Trinity Universal Insurance Company, Relator, the court grants an emergency stay pending its decision on a mandamus petition; the discussion of Section 161.001 belongs to another opinion. opinion →
Barrow v. Nicky J. Curry, the court dismissed Barrow’s appeal on his motion and did not address Section 161.001. opinion →
in the Matter of the Marriage of William Joseph Stewart and Tammy Lynne Stewart and in the Interest of Joseph Brogan Ste, the court dismissed the appeal by agreement without deciding any issue under the section. opinion →
In the Interest of CDK, the court cites the section to identify CPS’s alleged grounds for termination, then reverses because expert testimony was improperly admitted. opinion →
In the Interest of G.C., the court cites the section to distinguish two jury findings while deciding that the parent failed to preserve her sufficiency challenge. opinion →
Salas v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services, the court affirmed termination under Section 161.003 and declined to address the challenge under Section 161.001. opinion →
In Re MS, the court cites the section to explain why the orders might have been relevant, but decides issues of evidence and preservation of error. opinion →
in the Interest of J.D.F., S.M.F., B.R.F. and J.D.F., Minors, the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s termination grounds while rejecting a separate due process claim about drug addiction. opinion →
Kregg Behrends and JoAnna Behrends v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, the court cites the section to identify the termination judgment on appeal, then affirms after finding the appeal frivolous and without merit. opinion →
in the Interest of K.C., Children, the dissent cites the section’s best-interest requirement while arguing for a new trial; that discussion is not the court’s decision. opinion →
Moomaw v. State, the court dismissed Moomaw's criminal appeal at his request; the section appears only in a different opinion appended after that disposition. opinion →
In Re ELT, the court cites the section within a broad range of Family Code provisions while deciding whether the parent's alleged incompetence required postponing the trial. opinion →
In the Interest of E.L.T., the court cites § 161.001 as the start of a range of Family Code provisions while deciding whether the parent's alleged incompetence required postponing the termination trial. opinion →
Foreman v. State, the discussion of Section 161.001 belongs to a separate parental-rights opinion appended after the court’s decision in Foreman’s criminal appeal. opinion →
In Re KL, the court cites the section in a termination case but decides whether counsel was ineffective and whether testimony was admissible under another section. opinion →
Prewitt v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, the court cites the section to identify the basis for the termination judgment and affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
In the Interest of K.L., the opinion cites the section in footnotes while addressing the right to effective appointed counsel in termination proceedings. opinion →
Alvarez v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, the court cites the section to identify the statute governing the termination judgment but decides other issues on appeal. opinion →
Union Carbide Corporation v. Adair, the court dismissed Union Carbide's appeal under Rule 42.1; the discussion of Section 161.001 belongs to a different opinion. opinion →
In Re JFC, the opinion cites § 161.001 for the required termination findings while resolving the jury-charge issue under procedural rules. opinion →
In the Interest of J.F.C., the dissent discusses the section’s required findings, but the opinion does not make a holding about the section. opinion →
Pretzer v. Motor Vehicle Board, the court cites the section as an example of a proceeding requiring clear and convincing evidence while deciding the proof standard for license revocation. opinion →
W. L. Epps, Independent of the Estate of Paul C. Ledrick v. National Bank of Commerce, the court decides liability for bank loans made under a power of attorney; the termination statute appears only in an appended, unrelated opinion. opinion →
Pretzer v. Motor Vehicle Board, the court cites the section as an example of a civil matter requiring clear and convincing evidence while deciding the standard of proof for license revocation. opinion →
in the Interest of M.G.D. and B.L.D, the dissent discusses section 161.001’s termination requirements while disagreeing with the majority’s best-interest analysis. opinion →
In Re MS, the court cites section 161.001 for termination grounds and best-interest considerations but decides the right to effective counsel under section 107.013(a)(1). opinion →
In the Interest of M.S., the opinion cites section 161.001 to identify the grounds for termination, while its ruling on effective assistance of counsel rests on section 107.013(a)(1). opinion →
in the Interest of T. C. and Baby Boy Cortez, Children, the court recites the section's termination requirements but resolves the appeal under section 263.405's preservation rules. opinion →
In Re JDS, the court cites the section for the burden of proof as background to its decision on the parent's request to attend the termination hearing. opinion →
In Re AJK, the court cites § 161.001 as the start of a Chapter 161 range while deciding which statute governs the appeal deadline. opinion →
In the Interest of J.D.S., a Child, the court cites the section for the burden of proof while deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a bench warrant. opinion →
in the Interest of A. J. K., the court cites § 161.001 only as part of a range identifying Chapter 161 while deciding which statute governs the appeal deadline. opinion →
In Re BLM, the court affirmed termination under section 161.003 and declined to address the grounds under section 161.001. opinion →
In the Interest of B.L.M. and Jr., Children, the court affirmed termination under section 161.003 and did not decide the challenges to the grounds under section 161.001. opinion →
in the Interest of B.L.M. and J.L.M., Jr., Children, the court affirmed termination under section 161.003 and did not decide the challenges to the section 161.001 grounds. opinion →
Carr v. Lubbock-Cooper Independent School District, the court decided a construction dispute; the termination discussion appears in a separate opinion appended to this record. opinion →
Paslay v. State, the Paslay court decided a criminal appeal and did not address Section 161.001; the section appears in a separate parental-rights opinion. opinion →
Mosley v. Dallas County Child Protective Services Unit of the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, the court cites the section to describe the earlier termination decree while deciding whether Mosley showed a meritorious defense to support her bill of review. opinion →
Pacheco v. State, the court dismisses an untimely criminal appeal; the section appears only in a separate termination opinion appended after that ruling. opinion →
in the Interest of L.M.I. and J.A.I., Minor Children, the dissent cites section 161.001 only in a footnote while discussing the parents’ relinquishment affidavits. opinion →
Brown v. State, the court cites the section to explain why drug treatment records mattered while deciding whether federal confidentiality law permitted their admission. opinion →
Caudillo v. Lubbock Independent School District, the court cites the section to support its decision that the school could protect students’ well-being under the Equal Access Act. opinion →
Brice v. Denton, the court cites the section when recounting the trial court's findings and reverses for ineffective assistance of counsel without deciding the section's requirements. opinion →
Brice v. Lisa K. Denton & in the Interest of A.R.B. and B.J.B., Children, the court cites section 161.001 while recounting the trial court’s findings, then reverses because Brice was denied effective assistance of counsel. opinion →
in the Interest Of: M. E. P., a Child, the court cites the section to describe TDPRS’s petition, then dismisses the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it was untimely. opinion →
In Re SAP, the court cites § 161.001 in describing the termination findings but reverses on equitable estoppel without deciding the section's rules. opinion →
In the Interest of S.A.P., the dissent mentions § 161.001 while recounting a jury question, without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
in the Interest of D. M. S., a Child, the court dismissed Senter's appeal on his motion under appellate rule 42.1 without deciding Section 161.001. opinion →
Monroe County Department of Human Services v. Kelli B., the opinion lists the Texas section among other states’ termination statutes without deciding its rules. opinion →
State v. Sang Minh Doan, the court decided a DWI blood-test suppression appeal; the discussion of § 161.001 belongs to a different opinion appended after this opinion ends. opinion →
Babcock v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, the court cites the section as the basis for the termination but decides only that Babcock cannot challenge it on King's behalf. opinion →
Ex Parte: Teddy Robinson, Relator, the court dismissed an untimely criminal appeal; the reference to § 161.001 belongs to a different family-law opinion. opinion →
In Re KCP, the court cites the section to explain why the drug treatment records were relevant when deciding whether their admission complied with a federal confidentiality statute. opinion →
in the Interest of K.C.P. and J.D.P., Children, the court cites the section to explain why the treatment records mattered while deciding whether federal confidentiality law permitted their admission. opinion →
Mondine v. State, the court dismissed Mondine's criminal appeal under an appellate rule; the section citation belongs to a separate parental-rights opinion. opinion →
Tammy Rose Wiggins v. State, the Wiggins opinion decides a Confrontation Clause challenge; the discussion of § 161.001 belongs to a different parental-rights opinion. opinion →
In Re Cochran, the court mentions Section 161.001 to describe the prior terminations and explain how a final termination could differ from the temporary possession issue it decides under Section 262.201. opinion →
in the Interest of H. L. H, a Child, the court reviewed the termination appeal for arguable grounds and affirmed without addressing Section 161.001. opinion →
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Garza, the court lists the section as one example of a statute requiring clear and convincing evidence while addressing the standard of review. opinion →
Coleman v. State, the court cites the section to describe the trial court’s termination findings while deciding whether counsel’s brief supports withdrawal. opinion →
Dennis Fisher, and Wife, Jean M. Fisher and the Veterans Land Board of Texas v. Deford Properties, a Partnership, and Ho, the court cited section 161.001’s proof requirement while deciding whether Brown was denied a meaningful opportunity to participate in the termination hearing. opinion →
in the Interest of S.A.P., the court recounts the jury’s findings under Section 161.001 while deciding that the parents waived their estoppel defense. opinion →
In Re LDT, the court cites section 161.001 to describe the trial court's findings while deciding whether appointed counsel may file an Anders brief on appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of L.D.T., C.R.E.T. and W.G.T., the court cites section 161.001 to describe the trial court’s findings while deciding whether appointed counsel may file an Anders brief in a termination appeal. opinion →
Huff v. State, the court granted Huff's motion to dismiss his appeal; the Section 161.001 discussion belongs to a different opinion. opinion →
Garrett v. Del Fierro, the court dismissed Garrett’s appeal as moot; the citation to section 161.001 appears in a different opinion appended to it. opinion →
Richard R. Reyes, Sr. v. State, the court denied Reyes’s motion to return exhibits as moot; the section appears only in a separate termination opinion following the order. opinion →
In Re CDS, the court cites the section to describe the trial court’s termination order while deciding whether Amador was entitled to appointed counsel. opinion →
in the Interest of C.D.S., a Child, the court cites the section to describe the trial court’s termination order while deciding whether Amador was entitled to appointed counsel. opinion →
in Re Randy MacK Lackey, Relator, the Lackey court decided a mandamus petition and did not address § 161.001; the section appears in a separate parental-rights opinion appended after it. opinion →
Higgins v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the opinion cites the section to describe the trial court's grounds for termination, then affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. and PennzEnergy Exploration and Production v. Terry County Appraisal District, the court decided a mineral appraisal dispute; the discussion of § 161.001 concerns different parties in a different case. opinion →
in the Interest of J.M.E., K.R.B.R., and H.L.H., Children, the court cites § 161.001 to identify the trial court’s termination findings while deciding whether the delayed appointment of counsel harmed Appellant. opinion →
Brown v. Lubbock County Commissioner's Court, the Brown court decided claims arising from a criminal conviction; the discussion of section 161.001 belongs to a separate parental termination opinion. opinion →
in the Interest of S.H., a Child, the court cites the section when recounting the trial court’s termination order, then decides the appeal under rules governing continuances and notice of trial settings. opinion →
Opinion No., the opinion cites the section as the current version of a parental support provision while interpreting an assisted living licensing statute. opinion →
Charleston County Department of Social Services v. Jackson, the court lists the Texas section as an example of another state's incarceration ground while deciding the case under South Carolina law. opinion →
in Re Kenneth Micheal Riggs, the court dismissed the settled proceeding without deciding any issue under section 161.001. opinion →
In Re CRP, the court describes the grounds for the earlier termination under section 161.001 but decides the challenge under section 161.211's six-month limit. opinion →
in the Interest of C.R.P., a Child, the court cites the section to explain the basis for the original termination while deciding that the later challenge was time-barred. opinion →
Vanden Bosch v. Wilbarger General Hospital, the court cites the section only as a comparison while deciding the standard of proof for emergency medical care claims. opinion →
Vanden Bosch v. Wilbarger General Hospital, the court cites § 161.001 as an example of a heightened standard of proof while deciding a medical malpractice expert-report issue. opinion →
in the Interest of P.M.S., a Child, the court recites the section’s grounds for termination as background and decides that an existing termination order left Melvin without standing to seek conservatorship. opinion →
Hughes v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the opinion cites the section when recounting the trial court's termination decision, then affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
Hydi Wall v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section as a possible consequence of an involuntary termination while deciding whether Wall’s relinquishment was voluntary. opinion →
Bosch v. WILBARGER GENERAL HOSPITAL, the court cites the section as an example of a heightened standard of proof while deciding an expert-report issue under Chapter 74. opinion →
In the Interest of K.D., the court cites section 161.001 when stating the proof standard, then decides whether the trial court reasonably found the proposed appeal frivolous. opinion →
Martinez v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to describe the trial court's termination findings and affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
Dessie Hunt Simmons v. State, the Simmons court decided a cocaine-possession appeal; the Section 161.001 references belong to a different parental-termination opinion. opinion →
in the Interest of A. H. L., III, a Child, the court mentions Section 161.001(1)(Q) in an ineffective-assistance argument it finds unpreserved. opinion →
Brice v. Terri G. Wilson, John R. MacLean & Dan M. Boulware, Individually and the Law Partnershp of MacLean an, the court cites the section when describing the earlier termination proceeding, then decides Brice’s legal malpractice appeal. opinion →
Jones v. State, the court affirmed a drug conviction because the appellant failed to preserve his evidentiary complaints; the section appears in a separate termination opinion appended after that decision. opinion →
In the Interest of A.H.L., the court mentions subsection (1)(Q) in describing an ineffective-assistance argument that was not preserved for appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of N. L. G., a Minor Child, the court cites the section to identify the termination grounds submitted to the jury, then resolves the parents' challenges on preservation grounds. opinion →
Doe v. Brazoria County Child Protective Services, the court cites the section in footnotes identifying termination grounds, but resolves the appeal on ineffective assistance of counsel and does not reach the direct sufficiency challenge. opinion →
Doe v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the opinion cites the section for the agency's termination allegations and a proposed jury question, while deciding whether counsel's errors prejudiced Doe. opinion →
in the Interest of K.R., K.P., Jr., K.P. and J.R., the court identifies § 161.001 as the basis for the trial court’s termination findings but declines to consider challenges to those findings because the statement of points was late. opinion →
Goodson v. Castellanos, the court mentions § 161.001 as the first provision in a range of termination statutes while deciding the deadline for challenging an adoption under § 162.012. opinion →
in the Interest of A. P. C. O., III R. O. M. O. And M. O., the court cites the section to identify the termination grounds submitted to the jury while deciding an evidentiary issue under the discovery rules. opinion →
Adams v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services, the court affirmed termination under section 161.003 and did not decide the challenges to section 161.001. opinion →
Adams v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the court declined to decide the challenges under section 161.001 because section 161.003 independently supported termination. opinion →
Goodson v. Castellanos, the court cites § 161.001 as part of a range of provisions offering ways to terminate a parent-child relationship while deciding whether an adoption decree could be challenged. opinion →
Jonathon E. Pool v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the court declined to review the sufficiency of the evidence under section 161.001 because Pool did not file the statement of points required by section 263.405. opinion →
in the Interest of C.S. and C.S., the court cites section 161.001 to contrast the burden of proof for termination with the burden governing modification of conservatorship. opinion →
in the Interest of A.M., a Child, the court cites section 161.001 to describe the jury’s findings, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding a rule under the section. opinion →
Remsburg v. State, the Remsburg opinion decides an ineffective-assistance claim in a burglary appeal; the Section 161.001 analysis belongs to a separate parental-rights opinion. opinion →
In Re RJS, the court cites the section to identify where termination grounds are listed while deciding the appeal requirements under section 263.405. opinion →
In the Interests of R.J.S., the court cites section 161.001 to identify where termination grounds are listed while deciding appeal requirements under section 263.405. opinion →
Campbell v. State, the court decided Campbell’s sentencing appeal; § 161.001 appears only in an unrelated parental-rights opinion appended after it. opinion →
Gomez-Cordero v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the opinion cites section 161.001 when reporting the trial court’s termination findings, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
Ellis Butler v. State of Texas, the Butler opinion dismisses untimely appeals from inmate account withdrawal orders; the citation to §161.001 belongs to a different termination opinion. opinion →
Kendrick J. Fulton, 1995 Chevrolet Blazer VIN: 1GNDT13W1S2180389 Texas Tag: 5GN S11 v. State of Texas, the court dismissed Fulton's appeal for filing deficiencies; the discussion of Section 161.001 concerns Arredondo's parental rights in a different opinion. opinion →
Harris v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the dissent applies subsection (1)(M) in arguing that the jury’s conservatorship finding lacked sufficient evidence. opinion →
McKay v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the court identifies the section as a basis for the trial court’s termination findings but decides the appeal on witness testimony and waiver grounds. opinion →
Morgan v. Texas Department of Public Safety, the court decided a driver's license suspension; the discussion of Section 161.001 belongs to a separate parental rights opinion appended after it. opinion →
in the Interest of C.S. A.K.A. C.R. and C.S., the Children, the court cites the section to identify the jury’s termination findings but decides only whether the trial court improperly limited voir dire. opinion →
Duenas v. Duenas, the court cites section 161.001 for the general burden of proof while deciding the voluntary termination request under section 161.005's best-interest standard. opinion →
in the Interest of J.G. and T.L., the court cites the section when reporting the trial court's findings, then affirms without deciding any rule under the section. opinion →
in the Interest of a Child, the court cites the section to identify the termination grounds alleged and found by the trial court while rejecting the father's appellate arguments. opinion →
Moses v. State, the court dismisses Moses’s criminal appeal for lack of an appealable order; the Section 161.001 discussion belongs to a different opinion appended after it. opinion →
in the Interest of J.F., J.J., and J.J., Children, the court cited section 161.001 to identify the termination grounds and best-interest requirement, then held that failure to comply with section 262.114 could not bar consideration of termination. opinion →
Anderson v. State, the Anderson court decided a criminal appeal; the discussion of Section 161.001 belongs to a different termination opinion appended after its decision. opinion →
in the Interest of D.R., the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s termination grounds, then affirms after finding no arguable ground for appeal. opinion →
Lewis v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., the court decided a mortgage foreclosure dispute; the references to § 161.001 belong to a separate parental-rights opinion appended after it. opinion →
Owen v. State, the court cites Section 161.001 to determine whether prior terminations qualify as aggravated circumstances under Section 262.2015. opinion →
Sylvia Garcia and Rocky Martinez Garcia, Sr. v. Texas Department of Family, the opinion cites the section when recounting the trial court’s findings, then affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
Mitchell v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section when recounting the district court’s findings, then affirms because Mitchell identified no reversible error. opinion →
Geeslin v. State Farm Lloyds, the court cites the section as an example of a clear-and-convincing proof standard while deciding an insurance-rate case. opinion →
Mike Geeslin, Commissioner of Insurance, and Texas Department of Insurance v. State Farm Lloyds, the court cites the section as an example of a proceeding that uses the clear-and-convincing standard while deciding an insurance-rate dispute. opinion →
Botello v. State, the court cites the section as an example of a civil matter using a clear-and-convincing proof standard while deciding an insurance-rate statute. opinion →
Hughen v. State, the court decided Hughen’s criminal appeal; the discussion of § 161.001 belongs to a different opinion. opinion →
In Re Walker, the opinion cites section 161.001 while recounting Walker's arguments about the evidence supporting termination, but decides no rule under that section. opinion →
Samuel Loy Graham, Jr. v. State, the court ordered the reporter to file the record in Graham’s marijuana appeal; the discussion of parental rights belongs to a different opinion. opinion →
Simmons Theodore Yliyah Na`bi v. Lynwood Cook, Suzzan Fleming, Ken Kuykendall and Charlotte West, the Na'bi court affirms dismissal of an inmate lawsuit under Chapter 14; the discussion of § 161.001 belongs to a separate Rogers opinion. opinion →
Ramirez v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites section 161.001 to identify the termination order being appealed, then decides an appeal deadline issue under section 263.405. opinion →
Ramirez v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the basis for the trial court’s termination order, then reverses and remands on the parties’ agreed motion. opinion →
Jackson v. State, the court cites the section for the grounds of the underlying termination and decides whether Aguilar qualified for bill of review relief. opinion →
Amado Aguilar, Jr. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to describe the grounds for the earlier termination while deciding whether Aguilar qualified for relief by bill of review. opinion →
In Re KY, the court cites the section to identify the new termination ground alleged in the third petition, then decides whether those allegations allowed DFPS to refile and retain temporary custody under section 263.401. opinion →
in the Interest of K.Y. and K.Y., Minor Children, the court cites section 161.001 as a termination ground newly alleged in DFPS’s third petition while deciding whether DFPS could retain temporary custody under section 263.401. opinion →
in the Interest of B.J.B., Children, the court cites the section to identify the termination judgment on appeal and decides the appeal under Anders without interpreting the section. opinion →
in the Interest of T.L.B. a Child, the court cites section 161.001 for the termination standard while reversing because Brown was denied a meaningful opportunity to participate in the hearing. opinion →
C.Y. Fletcher v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites section 161.001 to identify the termination findings, but resolves the appeal on preservation and unchallenged-ground rules. opinion →
in the Interest of C.C.W., N.R.W., M.D.W., and K.A.W., Children, the court cites the section for the burden of proof in termination cases while deciding whether the appeal was frivolous under section 263.405. opinion →
in the Interest of M.P.O. and J.M.B., Children, the opinion cites section 161.001 to describe the jury's findings, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding the section's rules. opinion →
in Re Department of Family & Protective Services, the dissent cites the section only to identify the grounds the trial court found for terminating parental rights. opinion →
Roddy v. McGee, the court dismissed the appeal on the appellant’s motion and made no ruling under Section 161.001. opinion →
in the Interest of C.H., T.H. and S.H., Children, the court abated the appeal for findings of fact without deciding what findings § 161.001 requires. opinion →
William Lee Brothers v. West, the court cites section 161.001(1)(L) while recounting the trial court’s termination order, then decides the appeal on jury waiver and appointed counsel. opinion →
In Re JHG, the court cites section 161.001 as authority to seek termination while deciding whether the suit had to be dismissed under section 263.401. opinion →
Rian v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, an individual justice discusses the section in a concurrence, but the opinion does not establish the court's holding on it. opinion →
in the Interest of G. M. and X. M., Children, the court cites the section while recounting counsel's possible points of error, then finds the appeal wholly frivolous without deciding the section's rules. opinion →
Rusty B. Beene v. State, the Beene opinion decides a criminal appeal; the discussion of Section 161.001 belongs to a different parental-rights opinion appended to it. opinion →
Vail v. Brown, the court reversed the denial of Vail's bill of review because of defective service; the discussion of Section 161.001 belongs to another opinion. opinion →
in the Interest of M.G., D.G., S.G., E.G., R.M., Children, the court cites § 161.001 only to identify the trial court’s termination grounds and decides the appeal under § 263.405’s preservation rule. opinion →
In the Interest of A.L.M. and S.M.M., Minor Children, the court mentions Section 161.001 to contrast its grounds with Section 161.003, which was the basis of its termination decision. opinion →
In Re DEH, a separate opinion cites the section to identify the trial court's basis for terminating parental rights. opinion →
in the Interest of D.E.H., a Minor Child, a dissent cites the section as the basis for termination on an affidavit of relinquishment; the court does not decide the section’s requirements. opinion →
In Re ALM, the court declined to substitute Section 161.001 endangerment grounds after finding the evidence insufficient under Section 161.003, without deciding the Section 161.001 grounds. opinion →
In the Interest of J.J.C., the court mentions section 161.001 as the basis for unchallenged termination findings while deciding whether ICWA notice was required. opinion →
In Re JJC, the court cited § 161.001 to identify the termination requirements, but decided whether the parents preserved their challenges and whether their appeals were frivolous. opinion →
in the Interest of A.G.C.M., the court cites the section when reporting the trial court’s findings, then affirms after finding no arguable grounds for appeal. opinion →
In Re ES, the court cites a prior decision about Section 161.001 only to illustrate its reading of the personal jurisdiction statute. opinion →
Newsom v. Brazoria County Child Protective Services, a Unit of the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory S, the court cites section 161.001 to identify the trial court's termination grounds while deciding Newsom's ineffective-assistance claim. opinion →
Casillas v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section while assessing whether the exclusion of evidence was harmless, without deciding a rule of the section. opinion →
Noronha v. State, the court dismissed Noronha’s appeal on his motion; the section appears only in a separate termination opinion. opinion →
in the Interest of J.J.C., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s termination judgment, then reverses based on the determination that the children are Indian children. opinion →
Robinson v. Department of Family & Protective Services, the court mentions section 161.001(1)(E) while describing the Department’s account of the trial evidence, but decides only Robinson’s ineffective-assistance claim. opinion →
Robinson v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cited section 161.001(1)(E) while describing evidence the Department said supported termination, then decided Robinson’s ineffective-assistance claim. opinion →
Frank R. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court recites section 161.001’s termination requirements but decides whether the father’s relative-placement challenge made his appeal nonfrivolous. opinion →
Rodriguez v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites section 161.001(1)(k) to describe Rodriguez's challenge, then decides that her appeal was frivolous. opinion →
In the Interest of B.G., the court cites section 161.001 only to identify the grounds for the termination suit; it decides an issue about appellate procedure under section 263.405. opinion →
In Re BG, the court cites section 161.001 to identify the grounds alleged for termination, while deciding an issue under section 263.405. opinion →
in the Interest of D.S., N.S., Children, the court cites the section to describe the trial court’s termination order, then resolves counsel’s withdrawal motion without deciding the termination issues. opinion →
Taylor v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cited § 161.001 for the general termination standard but decided only whether Taylor's appeal was frivolous. opinion →
Valencia v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the opinion discusses section 161.001 in a dissent that would have reversed the termination of Valencia’s parental rights. opinion →
Anthony Rigal, Jr. v. S. M., the court cites § 161.001 only as part of a statutory range while deciding whether the evidence supported termination under § 161.007. opinion →
in the Interest of K.B.R.R.K., a Child, the court cites the section while summarizing counsel's possible issues, then affirms after finding no arguable ground for appeal. opinion →
Prince v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the opinion cites section 161.001 when reporting the trial court’s findings and affirms without analyzing the section’s requirements. opinion →
Chapa v. Livingston, the court affirmed dismissal of Chapa’s inmate suit under Chapter 14; the section 161.001 discussion belongs to a separate termination opinion. opinion →
Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., the court cites the section only while discussing an earlier case in its analysis of retroactive laws. opinion →
In Re RTK, the court cites section 161.001 to contrast termination requirements with the conservatorship standard it decides under section 153.131(a). opinion →
in the Interest of R.T.K., the court cites Section 161.001 to contrast termination requirements with the parental presumption it applies in a custody dispute. opinion →
Jesse Calderon and Marixza Melendez v. Texas Department of Family, another copy of the same opinion is judged separately. opinion →
Byrne v. Texas Department of Family, another copy of the same opinion is judged separately. opinion →
Fish v. Lebrie, the court cites the section's termination grounds as a comparison when reviewing an order denying a parent all physical access to his child. opinion →
Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Phillippi, the court dismissed the appeal on the appellant's motion without addressing Section 161.001. opinion →
in the Interest of M.L.C., a Child, the court described section 161.001’s grounds for termination but did not review them because Amy had not preserved a challenge. opinion →
in Re: Carlos A. Armenta, the court distinguishes Section 161.001 endangerment grounds from the Section 161.003 ground it decides and declines to substitute those grounds on appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of J.J.L., Minor Children, the court cites the section to identify the grounds for the trial court’s termination order, then affirms after finding no arguable grounds for appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of J.T. AKA J.C.E.F.-T., a Child, the opinion cites § 161.001 to identify the trial court’s termination findings, then affirms after an independent review of the record under Anders. opinion →
In the Interest of J.S., the court cites Section 161.001 to identify the mother’s challenges to the termination order while deciding whether the trial court properly found her appeal frivolous. opinion →
In Re Mw, the court identifies section 161.001 as the basis of the trial court's termination order but resolves the appeal under section 263.405's statement-of-points rule. opinion →
A. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s grounds for termination, then decides whether the appeal was frivolous under section 263.405. opinion →
IN THE INTEREST OF M.W., L.W., J.W., H.W., I.W., Mi.W., MINOR CHILDREN, the court cites section 161.001 to identify the termination grounds found below, then affirms because the mother waived her appellate issues under section 263.405. opinion →
Michael v. Pishko v. Dr. Lale Yurttas, the court dismissed appeals from presuit deposition orders for lack of jurisdiction; the section appears in a different opinion appended to this one. opinion →
in the Interest of B. D. and W. D., Children, the court cites the section to describe the grounds for termination, then affirms because the missing reporter’s record requires it to presume the evidence was sufficient. opinion →
Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. Doe, the court describes the Texas section to compare its incarceration rule with Idaho law, which the court applies to Doe. opinion →
in the Interest of R.M.H., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the grounds found by the trial court, then decides the appeal under section 263.405. opinion →
in the Interest of J.D.L. Children, the court identifies section 161.001 as a basis for the trial court’s order and affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
Gerstacker v. Gerstacker, the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s grounds for termination, then affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
Smith v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section when recounting the trial court’s termination findings, then affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
in the Interest of S.L.L., Minor Child, the court cites the section’s termination standard but decides whether the mother’s appeal was frivolous. opinion →
in the Interest of A.A.A., Children, the court cites the section to identify the basis for the trial court’s termination of parental rights, then affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
in the Interest of D. A. L. and M. L., Minor Children, the court cites the section as a possible best-interest issue identified in counsel’s Anders brief, then affirms without deciding the section’s requirements. opinion →
Boyd v. Palmore, the court cites § 161.001 to distinguish the heightened standard in parental termination cases from the standard for family violence protective orders. opinion →
in Re: Stephen Clay Johnston, the court denied Johnston’s mandamus petition; the discussion of Section 161.001 appears in a separate parental-rights opinion appended after it. opinion →
In Re Rmt, the court cites the section’s termination grounds and burden of proof while deciding John’s due process and witness competency claims. opinion →
Rushing, Brandon Gene, the court cites Section 161.001 as one of several other statutes raised in an argument about how to interpret a Penal Code sentencing enhancement. opinion →
in the Interest of A. M. and J. E. M., Children, the opinion lists the trial court’s section 161.001 termination grounds but decides whether the parent preserved his appeal and whether it was frivolous. opinion →
in the Interest of M.M.W., a Child, the court cited section 161.001 to identify the termination grounds submitted to the jury, but declined to review them because the appellate points were untimely. opinion →
in the Interest of E.P., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s grounds for termination, then affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
in the Interest of A.W., a Child, the opinion cites the section as the basis for the trial court’s termination order but decides whether the appeal was frivolous. opinion →
In the Interest of E.C.R., the dissent criticizes the panel’s construction of the section and states how its author would rule. opinion →
In Re DW, this is another copy of the D.W. opinion is judged separately. opinion →
in the Interest of E.M.C., and I.M.C., Children, the court cites the section to identify the grounds for the trial court’s termination, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding a rule of the section. opinion →
Bobby Oxford, Jr. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the Department's alleged grounds for termination, then resolves the appeal because Oxford did not provide a reporter's record. opinion →
in the Interest of C.B., a Child, the court identifies an arguable issue concerning the evidence for termination and remands for new appellate counsel without deciding whether the section's requirements were met. opinion →
Donna Sue Philipp and Carl Edward Philipp v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section as a comparison when deciding whether the evidence supports denying a parent all access to her child. opinion →
in the Interest of L.M., A.M., and N.H., Children, the court cites section 161.001 to identify the termination judgment but decides only evidentiary and preservation issues. opinion →
S.H.R. v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the section is discussed in a dissent that reports the court’s ruling; the supplemental opinion does not construe it. opinion →
S.H.R. v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the concurring justice applies the section’s endangerment requirement to the evidence in his separate opinion. opinion →
in the Interest of J.A.M., Jr., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the jury’s termination findings, while deciding evidentiary and ineffective assistance issues. opinion →
Larson v. Giesenschlag, the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s grounds for termination, then reverses because Larson was denied a meaningful way to participate. opinion →
in the Interest of C.N.H., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the basis of the termination order, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
Purcell v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the trial court's grounds for termination and affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
Davis v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites section 161.001 when recounting the trial court’s findings, then affirms after an Anders review. opinion →
Saucedo v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the termination order, then affirms after finding no arguable issue on Anders review. opinion →
Lockwood v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cited section 161.001 to identify the termination grounds but reversed because the mediated settlement agreement was not binding and Lockwood lacked counsel at trial, without deciding whether the grounds were proved. opinion →
J. C. S. and B. H. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites section 161.001 when reporting the trial court’s findings and affirms after reviewing the appeals as frivolous. opinion →
A. S. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the allegations in the termination petition, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding the section’s requirements. opinion →
in the Interest of B.W.F., a Child, the court cites the section to report the trial court's termination grounds while deciding a notice and harm issue under Rule 245. opinion →
in the Interest of N.D., a Child, the opinion cites the section to describe the trial court’s termination findings, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding a rule under the section. opinion →
Tanguma v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the opinion cites the section while recounting the Department’s allegations, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding any rule under the section. opinion →
in the Interest of H.L. and H.L, Children, the court mentions section 161.001 when describing Erika’s argument and the grounds in the termination order, but resolves the appeal on evidentiary grounds. opinion →
in the Interest of E.C.R., a Child, Justice Keyes discussed subsection 161.001(1)(O) in a dissent from the denial of en banc reconsideration. opinion →
Ayala v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the jury's termination findings, then affirms after finding no arguable ground for reversal. opinion →
in the Interest of E.E.L., the court cites the section while reporting the jury’s termination findings and does not decide a rule under it. opinion →
in the Interest of M.D., Jr., Children, the court cites the section to identify the basis for the trial court’s termination and affirms without analyzing the section’s requirements. opinion →
S. E. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the statute governing the termination order and affirms after finding no arguable grounds for appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of D.J.W., a Child, Justice Jennings discusses section 161.001(1)(E) in a dissent, while the majority affirms the termination. opinion →
in the Interest of A.M. AKA A.R., Minor Children, the court cites Section 161.001 to describe the trial court’s termination grounds and affirms after an Anders review without deciding the section’s requirements. opinion →
in the Interest of W. K. Jr., T. M. and C. M., the court cites the section while recounting the mother’s affidavit of relinquishment and affirms after finding no arguable grounds for appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of K.N.D., a Child, the section is analyzed in a dissent that would have upheld the termination, rather than in the court’s decision. opinion →
in the Interest of T.M., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the jury’s termination grounds, then affirms after finding no arguable issue on appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of S.B.G., a Child, the court cited the section when identifying arguable issues for new counsel to brief, then abated the appeal without deciding whether the evidence supported termination. opinion →
in the Interest of M.A.-O.R., the Child, the court cites section 161.001 to identify the trial court’s termination grounds, which Mother did not challenge on appeal. opinion →
Angelica Mitchell Moore and Kevin Alexander Moore v. Donna M. Brown and Alvin Benard Brown, the opinion cites the section to describe the grounds alleged in the termination petition, without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
D. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites section 161.001 to identify the grounds for the trial court’s termination judgment, then orders counsel to amend an inadequate Anders brief. opinion →
in the Interest of M.S. and K.A.S., Children, the court cites the section to identify the termination grounds but decides only whether the trial court properly denied a continuance. opinion →
in the Interest of S.F., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the jury’s grounds for termination, then affirms after finding no arguable issue on appeal. opinion →
M. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to describe the jury’s termination grounds, then affirms after finding no arguable grounds for reversal. opinion →
in the Interest of P.J.B., A.B., and I.B., Children, the court cites the section to identify the termination judgment on appeal, then decides issues about appointed counsel and the Indian Child Welfare Act. opinion →
C. B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the opinion cites the section when recounting the termination proceedings, but decides whether the trial court properly denied a new trial. opinion →
in the Interest of T v., the opinion cites the section while reporting the trial court’s findings and affirms after finding no arguable ground for appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of T.G., A.G. and A.H., Children, the court cited the section’s termination grounds while deciding whether the parents’ claims should have been tried separately. opinion →
in the Interest of L.L.M. and S.M.M., Children, the court cites section 161.001 to identify the termination grounds for supplemental findings required because the written order omitted them. opinion →
in the Interest of L.L.M. and S.M.M., Children, the court cites the section when describing an earlier remand for supplemental findings, then lifts the abatement and orders the trial court’s termination order added to the record. opinion →
A. K. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the termination order, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding a rule under the section. opinion →
G. C., Sr. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section as the basis for the termination order and affirms after an Anders review without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
J. A. B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the termination grounds and decides whether the jury charge also needed conservatorship questions. opinion →
J. T. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section while recounting the district court’s termination findings, then affirms after finding no arguable issue on appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of L.L.M. and S.M.M., Children, the court cites the section to identify the termination grounds, then affirms because a replacement order stated those grounds. opinion →
in the Interest of M.D.R. and A.M.R., Children, the opinion cites the section to describe the trial court’s termination grounds, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding a rule under the section. opinion →
in the Interest of R.R. Children, the court cites the section to describe the trial court’s termination findings and affirms after an Anders review without deciding a rule under the section. opinion →
in the Interest of C.G., L.G., and P.G., the court cited the section while recounting the trial court’s termination grounds, then affirmed after finding no substantial question for appellate review. opinion →
in the Interest of P.L.G.M., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s termination findings, then reverses on the separate jury-trial issue. opinion →
J. R. v. the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court recites the district court’s termination findings under section 161.001 and affirms after an Anders review without deciding a rule under the section. opinion →
in the Interest of J.N.M., Children, the opinion cites the section to report the trial court’s termination findings, then affirms after finding no substantial question for appellate review. opinion →
in the Interest of D.C., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the termination grounds announced at trial while correcting the written order to match them. opinion →
in the Interest D.T., a Child, the court affirmed termination under section 161.002 without reaching the challenges to the section 161.001 findings. opinion →
in the Interest of T.S.L. a Child, the court cites section 161.001 to identify the trial court’s grounds for termination, then affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
in the Interest of J.R.P.R., a Minor Child, the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s termination grounds, then decides continuance and due process issues without construing the section. opinion →
J. Y. S. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the termination order on appeal and affirms after an Anders review without deciding the section’s requirements. opinion →
S. N. G. v. the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to describe the trial court’s grounds for termination, then affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
in the Interest of K.P., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the basis of the earlier termination order and decides the challenge under bill of review rules. opinion →
in Re J. R., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s termination grounds, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding any rule under the section. opinion →
in the Interest of I.M.G. and M.L.G., Children, the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s grounds for termination and affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
in the Interest of G.M. III, A.M., and N.M., Children, the court cites the section as the basis for the termination sought below, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding a rule of the section. opinion →
T. v. N. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cited section 161.001 among the jury’s termination grounds but affirmed under section 161.003 without reaching those grounds. opinion →
in Re Kenneth Gordon, the court cites the section to identify the termination grounds the jury rejected, while deciding whether the suit had to be dismissed under sections 263.401 and 263.402. opinion →
M. E. D. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the termination decree, then affirms after finding no arguable issue in its Anders review. opinion →
in the Interest of A.M.L., a Child, the court cited the section’s termination criteria while deciding that any error in admitting evidence was harmless. opinion →
in the Interest of N.P., Jr., Children, the court cites the section to identify the termination grounds, then affirms after finding the appeal frivolous under Anders without deciding a rule under the section. opinion →
M. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section as the basis for the termination decree and affirms after reviewing the appeal for arguable grounds. opinion →
S. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section only to identify the grounds found by the district court, then affirms after finding no arguable basis for appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of A.R., a Child, the court cited subsection (1)(Q) to frame the father’s complaint about presenting a defense, then rejected the complaint because he had not tried to offer evidence about a proposed caregiver. opinion →
J. B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the basis of the termination order being appealed, then corrects the deadline for a pro se brief. opinion →
in the Interest of G.D.P., the court cites section 161.001 for the jury’s termination findings, then reverses the mother’s termination after the Department concedes it failed to satisfy the Indian Child Welfare Act. opinion →
in the Interest of S.N.C., a Child, the court cites the section when recounting the trial court’s termination order and decides only whether the trial court properly denied Father’s motion for a bench warrant. opinion →
in the Interest of S.O.J.P., Children, the court cites the section when recounting the trial court’s findings, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding a rule under the section. opinion →
in the Interest of K.R.L., a Minor Child, the court cites section 161.001 for the general burden of proof but affirms termination under section 161.002(b)(1). opinion →
J. B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cited the section to identify the grounds for termination, then affirmed after finding no arguable issue on appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of C.O. and C.G., Minor Children, the court cites the section while recounting the trial court’s termination findings and affirms after finding no arguable issue on appeal. opinion →
A. A. P. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the grounds in the trial court’s termination order and affirms after finding no arguable basis for appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of A.E. and A.E., Children, the court cites the section while recounting the trial court’s findings, but resolves Father’s challenge under section 161.004. opinion →
J. B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section when noting its earlier affirmance of a termination order, then decides only a deadline for seeking rehearing. opinion →
in the Interest of J.R.I., a Child, the court identifies section 161.001 as the source of predicate acts and affirms termination based on findings required by section 161.004. opinion →
in the Interest of N.A.S, B.R.S., and R.C.S., the court cites the section to describe the trial court’s grounds for termination, then affirms after reviewing an Anders brief without deciding any rule under the section. opinion →
in the Interest of R.D.S., the court cites the section to describe the trial court’s termination findings and affirms after finding no arguable grounds for appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of R.A.D.G., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the termination judgment and decides Rene's ineffective-assistance claim under Strickland. opinion →
in the Interest of C.L., a Child, the court rejected the challenge to termination under the section because B.L. had not preserved it, and discussed the merits only conditionally. opinion →
A. H. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s termination grounds and affirms without deciding what the section requires. opinion →
in the Interest of S.G., a Child, the court cited the section to identify the trial court’s termination grounds and affirmed after an Anders review without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
Schlittler v. State, the court cites the section to illustrate that parental rights can be terminated while deciding a challenge to a different statute. opinion →
in the Interest of D. M., a Child, the dissent invokes section 161.001 to argue that the Department failed to prove termination was in the child’s best interest. opinion →
T. L. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the opinion cites section 161.001 to identify the Department’s termination grounds, then decides conservatorship after the jury rejected termination. opinion →
in the Interest of J. L. H., a Child, the court affirmed termination under Section 161.003 and declined to address the challenges under Section 161.001. opinion →
in the Interest of J.W v. and L.M v. Children, the opinion cites the section to identify the trial court’s findings, then affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
L. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the termination order under review and affirms after finding no arguable ground for appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of J. M., a Minor Child, the appellee’s brief cites the section to support its argument for affirming the termination order; the court makes no decision in this document. opinion →
in the Interest of L.J., a Child, the court reports the trial court’s alternative finding under section 161.001 while affirming termination under section 161.002. opinion →
in the Interest of D.O.R. Jr., A.B.B. and J.L., the court cites the section to describe the jury’s findings, then affirms after finding no arguable grounds for appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of I.L.M., the appellee cites the section to defend termination, but this filing is its brief rather than a decision by the appellate court. opinion →
C. R. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites Section 161.001 to identify the termination grounds submitted to the jury and affirms after finding no arguable ground for appeal. opinion →
A. L. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the district court’s grounds for termination, then concludes that the appeal presents no arguable issue. opinion →
G. W. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites section 161.001 to identify the disputed best-interest issue while reversing the judgment for denial of a jury trial. opinion →
in the Interest of T.F., a Child, the court cites § 161.001 when recounting the trial court’s termination findings, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding a rule under the section. opinion →
in the Interest of H.F., the court cites the section to identify the agreed ground for termination, then affirms after finding no arguable grounds for appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of B.C., P.C., Jr., and A.C., the Department’s appellate brief argues that the trial court’s termination findings under the section should be affirmed. opinion →
in the Interest of A. B. a Child, the court identified subsection (1)(O) as a ground in the termination decree but decided an unpreserved challenge to the parties’ agreement and corrected clerical errors. opinion →
in the Interest of D.T. Jr., a Child, Appellant’s Anders brief reports the trial court’s termination under the section; it contains no decision by the appellate court. opinion →
in the Interest of C.J.,JR., a Child, the court cites the section when reporting the trial court’s termination findings, then decides Mother’s ineffective-assistance claim concerning retained counsel. opinion →
in the Interest of A.L.W. and A.N.W., Minor Children, the court cited section 161.001 to identify possible sufficiency issues for new counsel to brief when it abated the appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of J.M.A.E.W., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s grounds for termination, while deciding Josh’s ineffective-assistance claim. opinion →
T. T. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the grounds for the termination order, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
in the Interest of T.M.P. and M.B.R., a Child, the court cites the section to describe the trial court’s grounds for termination, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding the section’s requirements. opinion →
in the Interest of L.K.S., C.C.S. II, and G.E.O.S., Children, the court cites section 161.001 while recounting counsel’s assessment of the termination grounds, then affirms after an independent Anders review without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
in the Interest of J.L.T. III, a Child, the court cites the section while listing issues identified by counsel, then affirms after finding no arguable basis for appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of A.L.H., Child, the Department cites section 161.001 in its appellate brief to defend the trial court’s termination order. opinion →
A. E. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cited the section to identify the district court’s grounds for termination and affirmed after an Anders review without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
in the Int of DMB, Jr and ILB, the court cites section 161.001 only to describe a ground for termination alleged by the Department. opinion →
In the Interest of D.M.B., the court cites the section to describe the Department’s alleged grounds for termination and dismisses the restricted appeal on jurisdictional grounds. opinion →
in the Interest of A.B. and K.B., Children, the court cites the section to describe the jury charge, then decides whether the trial court should have granted a mistrial over misattributed criminal history. opinion →
in the Interest of A. v. and I. v. Minor Children, the court cites section 161.001 for the alleged termination grounds and general standard, but vacates the judgment because no petition sought to terminate the father’s parental rights. opinion →
in the Interest of R.H., M.D.J. and M.K. Children v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the appellant’s brief argues that the evidence was insufficient under the section, but it contains no appellate court decision on the section. opinion →
T. L. B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cited the section when describing the termination case and alleged grounds, then affirmed after finding no arguable issue in its Anders review. opinion →
B. B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the grounds for termination, while deciding B.B.’s challenge to the handling of her counsel. opinion →
Y. R. v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cited the section to identify the alleged termination grounds, then affirmed after finding no arguable issue on appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of K.D., a Child, the court mentions Section 161.001 when recounting unchallenged termination findings, then decides the bench warrant and guardian ad litem issues. opinion →
in the Interest of J.T., J.T., and J.T., the Children, the court cites § 161.001 for the termination grounds but decides that Mother failed to preserve her appellate complaints. opinion →
E. L. and S. L. F., Jr. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section as the basis for the termination order but affirms after finding the appeal frivolous, without deciding any rule of the section. opinion →
A. M. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section while recounting the trial court’s termination findings, then affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
in the Interest of I.C.G., a Child, the court mentions section 161.001 as the grounds Child requested for termination, then dismisses the petition because Child lacked standing. opinion →
in the Interest of V.E.C., II, a Child, the court cites the section to identify the termination grounds found below, then affirms after finding no arguable ground for appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of D. L. D., Jr., L. L.S., J. J. S., H. N. S., Children v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the Department's appellate brief cites the section while describing the trial court's termination judgment. opinion →
in the Interest of K.M.-J. AKA K.M-J and D.A.R.-J. v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the appellee’s brief argues that section 161.001 supports termination, but it contains no decision by the appellate court. opinion →
in the Interest of W.J.B. & J.B., Children, the court cites section 161.001 as the basis for the Department’s termination petition and decides the appeal under section 263.401’s dismissal deadline. opinion →
in the Interest of M.C. and T.C., Children, the petitioner invoked the section to challenge the termination findings, but the petition contains no decision by the Supreme Court of Texas. opinion →
in the Interest of J.D., the court cited the section to describe the trial court’s termination findings and affirmed after finding no arguable grounds for appeal. opinion →
in the Interest of J.M, B.L.U., B. L.U., K.U. Children, the appellant’s brief discusses the section, but the appellate court makes no decision in this filing. opinion →
in the Interest of J.-M. A.Y., a Minor Child, the appellee’s brief argues that Section 161.001 supports termination of parental rights; it contains no appellate court decision. opinion →
W. T. W. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s grounds for termination, then affirms after finding the appeal frivolous. opinion →
D. K. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the district court’s grounds for termination, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
in the Interest of A. B. B. and P. L. B., Minor Children, the court describes Section 161.001’s termination ground, which Father conceded, while deciding his ineffective-assistance claim. opinion →
In the Interest of A.B.B., the court describes Section 161.001’s termination requirements but resolves Father’s ineffective-assistance claim without deciding whether the statutory predicate was met. opinion →
in the Interest of S. R.- M. C., the section appears in the appellant’s brief and attached opinions from other cases, but this court makes no decision about it. opinion →
in the Interest of T v. P v. and K v., the court cited the section to identify the trial court’s grounds for termination, then affirmed after an Anders review without deciding the section’s requirements. opinion →
in the Interest of A.G. and F.G., Children, the filing is the mother’s appellate brief arguing that the evidence was insufficient under § 161.001(1)(D), with no ruling by the court. opinion →
E. T. and T. T. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the termination order under appeal and decides procedural challenges under other rules. opinion →
in the Interest of S. R.- M. C., the Department cites Section 161.001 in its appellate brief while urging the court to affirm the termination judgment. opinion →
in the Interest of M.J.F., a Child, the opinion reports the trial court’s termination grounds under the section and affirms after an Anders review without deciding a rule of the section. opinion →
Roper v. Jolliffe, the dissent cites section 161.001 as an analogy in its argument for a jury trial in a family violence protective order proceeding. opinion →
K. A. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section to identify the grounds for termination, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding a rule of the section. opinion →
in the Interest of M.N., a Child, the court recites the trial court’s section 161.001 findings but reverses the termination because both parents were denied effective assistance of counsel. opinion →
in the Interest of B.C., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the endangerment findings Father challenged and effectuates the parties’ agreement to reverse his termination judgment. opinion →
in the Interest of N.B., Children, the court recites the section’s termination requirements but rejects Father’s challenge because he did not address the mediated settlement agreement supporting the trial court’s finding. opinion →
in the Interest of E.D., M.S., M.S., R.S., and R.C., the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s termination grounds and affirms after finding no arguable error, without deciding any rule under the section. opinion →
in the Interest of C.M. and C.F., Children, the Department cites Section 161.001 in its appellate brief to argue that termination grounds should have been submitted to the jury. opinion →
in the Interest of v. L. R., a Child, the court identifies the section as the basis for the termination petition but reverses under the Indian Child Welfare Act without deciding the section’s requirements. opinion →
In the Interest of V.L.R., the court identifies Section 161.001 as the basis for the termination petition but reverses under the Indian Child Welfare Act without deciding the Texas section’s requirements. opinion →
in the Interest of A.H., a Child, the court cites the section to identify the trial court’s grounds for termination, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
in the Interest of M.N., a Child, the court cites the section to describe the trial court’s termination findings, then reverses the termination order because both parents were denied effective assistance of counsel. opinion →
in the Interest of K.I.B.C., a Child, the opinion presents the appellant’s arguments under the section and reproduces other courts’ rulings without making its own decision on the section. opinion →
in the Interest of S.R.-B. and T.R.-B., Minor Children, the court cites the section to describe the termination requirements and grounds, then affirms because Father failed to preserve his sufficiency challenge. opinion →
C. D. C. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section when recounting the trial court’s findings and affirms after finding no arguable grounds for reversal. opinion →
C. Y. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites section 161.001 in describing the termination order and affirms after finding no arguable issue on appeal. opinion →
In the Interest of B.J.C., the court cites section 161.001 to support the clear and convincing evidence standard while deciding termination under section 161.003. opinion →
In the Interest of X.A.H.-B., the opinion cites the section to report the trial court’s termination findings, then affirms after an Anders review without deciding a rule under the section. opinion →
in the Interest of Z.W., a Child, the court cited the section while expressly declining to decide whether the earlier termination could support terminating parental rights to a newborn. opinion →
in the Interest of G.W.R., J.J.P. and M.L.P., Children, the court cites the section to identify the termination findings counsel addressed in an Anders brief, without deciding a rule under the section. opinion →
F. M. F.-C. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court cites the section in describing the termination order, then decides that the appeal presents no arguable issue under Anders. opinion →
D. L. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the opinion cites the section to report the district court’s grounds for termination; the appellate court decides that the appeal is frivolous. opinion →
…and 543 more.

Which of these rulings fit your facts?

Describe your situation under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001. Ezel checks it against the cases on this page and answers with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace