Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001

Section 161.001(1)(L) permits termination based on a final conviction for murdering a child without retrying the conviction.

in the Interest of A. L. C. and A. E. C., Minor Children · filed 2003-03-17(1)(L)

With regard to appellant's continuing efforts to overturn his conviction, Subsection L does not required a retrial of the conviction, it is sufficient that the conviction has become final.

A conviction for injury to a child establishes a ground for termination even while the conviction is on appeal.

Rogers v. Department of Family & Protective Services · filed 2005-02-17(1)(L)(ix)

Although Rogers contends that his criminal conviction cannot be used as evidence because it was on appeal at the time of trial, that is not an accurate reflection of the statute, which makes no reference to post-conviction proceedings.

Section 161.001(1)(L) permits termination based on a parent’s criminal responsibility for a child’s serious injury when the evidence also establishes that termination is in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of C.A.L., a Child · filed 2007-02-15(1)(L)

Because we hold that the termination of Jennifer’s parental rights can be upheld under section 161.001(1)(L), we need not address whether the evidence could be sufficient to support termination under any of the other three grounds found by the trial court.

Section 161.001(1)(L) permits termination based on a qualifying conviction even if the conviction is not yet final.

in the Interest of C.R, E.R. and R.R., Jr., Children · filed 2008-04-10(1)(L)

We therefore follow the precedent set by our sister courts and hold that a nonfinal conviction that otherwise meets the requirements of section 161.001(1)(L) will support termination.

Section 161.001(1)(L) permits termination for serious injury to a child without requiring bodily injury or serious bodily injury as defined in the Penal Code.

K.D.G. and L.L.G. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2012-02-23(1)(L)

Subsection L’s inclusion of such offenses indicates that the type of “serious injury” supporting termination of parental rights does not require “bodily injury” nor is it synonymous with “serious bodily injury,” as defined in the Penal Code.

A conviction for bodily injury to a child can satisfy subsection (1)(L) if the offense involved serious injury; the Family Code does not require serious bodily injury as defined by the Penal Code.

Medellin v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2012-09-26(1)(L)

However, demonstrating “serious injury” to a child under the family code does not necessarily require showing “serious bodily injury” as defined in the penal code.

Section 161.001(1)(L)(iv) does not require indecency with a child to be the sole cause of the child’s serious injury.

R. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2012-11-08(1)(L)(iv)

Appellant cites no authority, and we have found none, suggesting that sexual indecency must be the sole cause of serious injury. Considering all evidence in a light favorable to judgment, we find the evidence legally sufficient to support, by clear and convincing evidence, a determination that Child C suffered serious injury as a result of Appellant’s indecent conduct.

Section 161.001(1)(L)(ix) does not require proof of “serious bodily injury” as defined in the Penal Code to establish serious injury to a child.

in the Interest of A.L., M.L., and J.Y.R., Children · filed 2012-12-18(1)(L)(ix)

We conclude demonstrating “serious injury” to a child under subsection (L) does not require a showing of “serious bodily injury” as defined in the Penal Code.

A parent’s conviction for causing serious injury to any child can support termination, even when that child is not the child in the termination proceeding.

in the Interest of C. T. and K. T., Minor Children · filed 2012-12-27(1)(L)(ix)

Part (L) of section 161.001(1) merely requires a showing that the parent was convicted of causing serious injury to “a” child—not necessarily the child subject to termination proceedings.

A conviction for injury to a child under Penal Code § 22.04, together with evidence of serious injury, can support a clear and convincing finding under Section 161.001(1)(L).

in the Interest of B.C.T., a Child · filed 2013-05-09(1)(L)

He also introduced into evidence the judgment showing that Appellant had been convicted of the offense of injury to a child pursuant to Section 22.04(a)(1) of the Penal Code. The trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(1)(L) of the Family Code is, thus, supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 161.001(1)(L)(iv)'s predicate ground is satisfied by a conviction for indecency with a child that caused serious injury to a child.

in the Interest of M.R.L. a Child · filed 2013-08-21(1)(L)(iv)

Having reviewed the record as a whole, including the evidence summarized above, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient for the trial court to have formed a firm belief or conviction that Michael was convicted for being criminally responsible for the serious injury of a child by committing the offense of indecency with a child.

The Department established that the father was the person named in the criminal case supporting termination under subsection (1)(L).

in the Interest of G.M.G., a Child · filed 2014-06-19(1)(L)

We conclude the Department’s evidence conclusively establishes that the Father is the same person named in the criminal case for sexual assault of a child to support termination under Subsection L.

The evidence supported a finding that the child suffered serious injury as a result of indecency conduct under subsection (1)(L)(iv).

in the Interest of F.G.M., a Child · filed 2014-11-26(1)(L)(iv)

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we hold that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that L. suffered serious injury as a result of Lanny’s indecency conduct.

A conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a young child can satisfy Section 161.001(b)(1)(L)’s serious-injury ground based on the offense and the child’s age.

in the Interest of M.A.S. and K.D.S., Minor Children · filed 2016-12-22(b)(1)(L)

Instead, given the seriousness of the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child, and the young age of the child Father assaulted, we conclude that when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, the evidence in this case is legally sufficient to establish that Father was convicted for being criminally responsible for the serious injury of a child under Section 22.021 of the Texas Penal Code.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(L) requires a qualifying conviction or community supervision involving the death or serious injury of a child; subsection (U) requires community supervision for sexually assaulting the child’s other parent.

in Re A.G.B. · filed 2020-01-22(b)(1)(L), (b)(1)(U)

This was the only conviction for which evidence was presented. No evidence was admitted establishing K.Y.B. was a child when the sexual assault occurred. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(c)(1) (defining “child” to mean “a person younger than 17 years of age”). Accordingly, the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding that C.D.B. was convicted for being criminally responsible for the death or serious injury of a child. In addition, the evidence clearly established C.D.B. was sentenced to confinement for the sexual assault, not placed on community supervision. Although a parent’s rights can be terminated under Section 161.001(b)(1)(T)(iv) if the evidence establishes the parent has been convicted of the sexual assault of the other parent, the trial court’s order did not terminate C.D.B.’s rights on that statutory ground. Accordingly, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that C.D.B. “committed one or more acts in Texas Family Code 161.001(b)(L)(U).”

A conviction for indecency with a child can, by itself, support a reasonable inference of serious injury under ground (L), but a parent may rebut that inference.

In THE INTEREST OF Z.N., a CHILD v. the State of Texas · filed 2020-05-15(b)(1)(L)(iv)

We hold that, under section 161.001(b)(1)(L)(iv), a parent’s conviction for indecency with a child can constitute legally sufficient evidence that the parent was “criminally responsible” for the “serious injury of a child.”

Section 161.001(b)(1)(L) requires proof that the parent was convicted or placed on community supervision for an enumerated offense involving the death or serious injury of a child; a conviction for sexually assaulting an adult does not satisfy it.

In the Interest of L.M. v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-03-09(b)(1)(L)

We agree the record shows the undisputed facts in evidence do not support the trial court’s subsection L finding. We also conclude the evidence before the trial court reveals no reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the Department proved Father was criminally responsible for the death or injury of a child.

A conviction for sexual assault of a child can provide sufficient evidence for the termination ground in Section 161.001(b)(1)(L).

In the Interest of A.Z., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-03-26(b)(1)(L)

Thus, the trial court had sufficient evidence from which it could find the termination ground in Subsection (L).

Section 161.001’s grounds and best-interest requirement cannot support involuntary termination of parental rights when the Indian Child Welfare Act applies.

In the Interest of W.D.H. · filed 2001-02-15

Moreover, because the Family Code provisions for involuntary termination of parental rights are in conflict with the ICWA and, thus preempted by it, it was improper for the trial court to base its findings regarding termination on the Family Code.

Section 161.001’s involuntary termination requirements are preempted when the Indian Child Welfare Act applies.

In Re WDH · filed 2001-04-19

Moreover, because the Family Code provisions for involuntary termination of parental rights are in conflict with the ICWA and, thus preempted by it, it was improper for the trial court to base its findings regarding termination on the Family Code.

Section 161.001(b) termination findings may be made alongside the findings ICWA requires for an Indian child.

In the Interest of R.H., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-03-21(b)

In other words, while a parent’s rights to an Indian child may not be terminated without a Section 1912(f) finding, the existence of that finding does not preclude, and is not inconsistent with, the trial court’s also making state-court findings.

A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence on a Section 161.001 predicate ground or the child's best interest is reviewable on appeal even without a trial court motion or objection.

In Re AP · filed 2001-02-28

Our holding is limited to the core issues to be decided by a jury in an involuntary termination case, i.e., the section 161.001(1) violations of a predicate act and whether termination is in the best interest of the child. We hold that when either of these two core issues is challenged on appeal for sufficiency of the evidence, and no motion or objection was made at the trial court which would have preserved the complaint for appellate review under ordinary civil-review standards, we will nevertheless review the complaint.

Section 161.001 termination grounds and the best-interest requirement receive appellate sufficiency review even when the parent did not preserve the complaint at trial.

In the Interest of A.P. · filed 2001-02-28(1)

Our holding is limited to the core issues to be decided by a jury in an involuntary termination case, i.e., the section 161.001(1) violations of a predicate act and whether termination is in the best interest of the child. We hold that when either of these two core issues is challenged on appeal for sufficiency of the evidence, and no motion or objection was made at the trial court which would have preserved the complaint for appellate review under ordinary civil-review standards, we will nevertheless review the complaint.

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes an enumerated parental ground and the child's best interest; unchallenged findings on both support affirmance.

in the Interest of J. L. M., a Child · filed 2001-11-05(1), (2)

If a trial court's finding that the parent has committed or engaged in one of the matters enumerated in Section 161.001(1) is sustained or not challenged, and the trial court's finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the child is not challenged, the judgment will be affirmed.

A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting termination under Section 161.001 must be preserved in the trial court.

in the Interest of M.S., E.S., D.S., S.S. and N.S., Minor Children · filed 2002-04-11

Accordingly, we join the First, Second, and Thirteenth Courts of Appeals in holding that in a termination of parental rights case a sufficiency challenge must be preserved at the trial level.

Section 161.001 requires clear and convincing evidence of a listed ground and the child's best interest; a termination finding survives factual sufficiency review if a reasonable jury could form a firm belief or conviction that grounds exist for termination.

In Re CH · filed 2002-07-03

We hold that termination findings must be upheld against a factual sufficiency challenge if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could form a firm belief or conviction that grounds exist for termination under Texas Family Code sections 161.001 and 161.206(a).

Section 161.001 termination findings withstand a factual sufficiency challenge when the evidence could reasonably give a factfinder a firm belief or conviction in the State’s allegations.

In the interest of C.H. · filed 2002-07-03

We hold that the appellate standard for reviewing termination findings is whether the evidence is such that a fact-finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.

Section 161.001 requires clear and convincing proof of at least one listed ground and that termination is in the child’s best interest; proof under ground (E) can satisfy the ground requirement.

in the Interest of B.G., E.H. and J.M.H., Children · filed 2002-10-30(1)(E)

Based on our review of the record in light of the appropriate standards of review and burden of proof, we find there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings regarding ground (E) as it relates to each child, and that termination of the parent-child relationships between Gutierrez and B.G., E.H., and J.M.H. was in the best interest of each child.

Section 161.001 requires clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for terminating parental rights.

In the Interest of Stacey Ann UVALLE and Vanessa Uvalle, Children · filed 2003-03-25

Termination requires the Department to establish one of the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence. ... Under this record, the evidence is sufficient that the jury, as factfinder, could reasonably form a firm conclusion or belief about the truth of the Department’s allegations. Appellant’s second point is overruled.

When the State appeals a jury’s failure to find that termination is in a child’s best interest, it must show that termination was the only reasonable finding.

In the Interest of J.R.K. · filed 2003-05-07

Stated another way, the State must show on appeal that the only reasonable decision a factfinder could reach is that termination is in the child’s best interest.

Section 161.001 permits termination of parental rights when clear and convincing evidence establishes an enumerated ground and shows that termination is in the child's best interest.

in the Interest of Katelyn Ann Cook a Child · filed 2003-06-06

It provides that parental rights may be terminated if the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent engaged in one or more of the enumerated acts or omissions and that termination is in the best interest of the child. ... The evidence was sufficient to justify the judgment of the trial court.

Section 161.001 termination findings are reviewed for whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the allegations are true.

In Re SGS · filed 2004-01-22

Shawn's and Penny's third issue challenges the legal and the factual sufficiency of the evidence that it was in the children's best interest to terminate parental rights and the finding of a statutory factor under Texas Family Code § 161.001(1)(D), (E), or (O) that the parental relationship between the parent and each child should be terminated. The appellate standard for reviewing termination findings is whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the Department's allegations.

Termination findings under Section 161.001 are reviewed for whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the allegations are true.

in the Interest of S.G.S., S.A.S. and S.L.L. · filed 2004-01-22

Shawn’s and Penny’s third issue challenges the legal and the factual sufficiency of the evidence that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate parental rights and the finding of a statutory factor under Texas Family Code § 161.001(1)(D), (E), or (O) that the parental relationship between the parent and each child should be terminated. The appellate standard for reviewing termination findings is whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the Department’s allegations.

Section 161.001 permits termination when a predicate act and the child’s best interest are established; unchallenged grounds on both prongs support the judgment.

In the Interest of K.N.R. · filed 2004-04-14(1)(R), (2)

Because Jones has not contested the sufficiency of the evidence of these two allegations, the fifth predicate act and the best interest of K.N.R., the judgment is supported by unchallenged grounds on both prongs necessary for termination.

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence supports a finding of endangerment under subsection (1)(D) or (1)(E) and a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest under subsection (2).

In the Interest of J.L. · filed 2005-04-08(1)(D), (1)(E), (2)

Therefore, the evidence, under a clear and convincing standard, is legally sufficient to support the jury’s findings that Bettina endangered J.L. under sections 161.001(1)(D),(E) and that the termination was in J.L.’s best interest.

A parent appealing termination under § 161.001(1) must challenge each independent ground for termination; an unchallenged ground can support affirmance.

in the Interest of D.H., K.L.H., and C.H. · filed 2006-01-19(1)

Indeed, appellant was required to challenge each independent ground for termination under section 161.001(1); otherwise, we can affirm on the unchallenged grounds.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when evidence of unsafe conditions and neglect supports a firm belief in the termination findings.

In Re SMT · filed 2007-11-29(1)(D), (E)

The jury could reasonably have formed a firm belief as to the truth of the termination findings. See TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D), (E) (Vernon Supp.2007).

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination findings when evidence of neglect and danger allows a jury to form a firm belief that the grounds are true.

in the Interest of S.M.T. and S.E.C. · filed 2007-11-29(1)(D), (E)

The jury could reasonably have formed a firm belief as to the truth of the termination findings. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D), (E) (Vernon Supp.2007).

Section 161.001 permits termination when factually sufficient evidence supports at least one statutory ground and a finding that termination is in the child's best interest.

in the Interest of B.S., C.C. and P.C., Children · filed 2008-01-25

We agree also with appellate counsels' conclusion that factually sufficient evidence (6) supports at least one ground on which termination was predicated, and supports the trial court's finding concerning the best interest of the children.

Section 161.001 requires at least one predicate ground and a best-interest finding to terminate parental rights; a sufficiency appeal must challenge every predicate ground found or the best-interest finding.

in the Interest of S.N., a Child · filed 2008-09-17

Therefore, to mount a successful challenge on appeal based on evidentiary insufficiency, a party must challenge each affirmative finding of a predicate ground for termination or at minimum challenge the best interest finding.

Section 161.001 permits termination to be affirmed on any one predicate ground when multiple grounds were found.

in the Interest of J.C., F.A., A.A., A.A., G.A., and V.A., Children · filed 2010-04-28(1)

But A.A.’s parental rights were also terminated based on subsections 161.001(1)(D) and (E), and if multiple grounds are found by the trial court as a basis for termination, we will affirm on any one ground.

Including a disputed failure-to-support ground in a termination decree causes no harm when the evidence supports other grounds for termination.

Ozuna v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2010-05-07(1)(F)

Ozuna's attorney argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that Ozuna failed to support the children for a year before the Department's petition was filed. However, because the evidence is sufficient to support the other grounds, the attorney concluded there was no harm in the trial court's including that ground in its termination decree. We agree.

Termination under subsections (1)(D) and (E) requires evidence sufficient to give a reasonable factfinder a firm belief that the parent endangered the child through the child's surroundings or the parent's conduct.

in the Interest of A.B. and H.B., Children · filed 2010-07-29(1)(D), (1)(E)

Because the evidence viewed in a neutral light cannot produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established under subsections (D) and (E), factually insufficient exists to support termination of Father’s parental rights under subsections (D) and (E).

An unchallenged ground under section 161.001(1) supports the statutory grounds for termination without review of challenges to other grounds.

Michael Conti and Rainbow Conti v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2011-01-27(1)

Because the judgment could be upheld on this unchallenged ground, we must uphold the judgment concerning the statutory grounds for termination, and we do not address the Contis’ challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence under subsections (D) and (E).

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence supports at least one statutory ground and shows that termination is in the child's best interest.

in the Interest of J.R. and H.R., Children · filed 2012-09-11

Based upon the record in this case, we find the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings, both as to the grounds for termination and best interests of the children.

Termination under section 161.001(1)(D) or (E) cannot stand when the evidence supporting those grounds is factually insufficient.

in the Interest of A.B. and H.B., Children · filed 2012-09-13(1)(D), (E)

Having determined that the evidence is factually insufficient to terminate Father’s parental rights under subsections (D) and (E) of section 161.001(1) of the family code and having overruled his other points, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

Section 161.001 requires one predicate ground and a best-interest finding to support termination; an unchallenged predicate finding can sustain the judgment on appeal.

in the Interest of A.N.H. and T.D.H., Children · filed 2015-08-19(1)

Because they are not challenged, this court is bound by the trial court’s finding supporting termination under Section 161.001(1)(O) and the trial court’s best-interest finding.

Section 161.001(b) supports termination when a predicate ground and the best-interest finding remain unchallenged on appeal, even if the parent challenges a separate ground for termination.

in the Interest of J.P., a Child · filed 2016-10-20(b)

A.P. does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence supporting any of the section 161.001(b)(1) grounds, nor does she contest the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that termination was in J.P.’s best interests. ... Accordingly, the judgment was proper, and we overrule the issue.

Section 161.001 permits termination when one predicate ground and the child’s best interest are established; unchallenged findings on both points support the judgment on appeal.

in the Interest of A.M.L. and L.M.R., Minor Children · filed 2017-12-21(b)

When paired with the trial court’s unchallenged finding that termination was in the best interest of the child, any of the four unchallenged predicate findings will support the order of termination.

Section 161.001(b) permits termination when an unchallenged statutory ground and an unchallenged best-interest finding support the judgment, even if other grounds are contested.

in the Interest of A.L.S., a Child · filed 2018-09-13(b)

Accordingly, we need not address Appellant’s second and third issues because the unchallenged findings are sufficient to support termination. See id.; see also FAM. § 161.001(b).

One ground under section 161.001(b)(1) is sufficient to support termination, so a parent who leaves an independent ground unchallenged cannot obtain review of challenges to the other predicate grounds.

in the Interest of P.L.F., a Child · filed 2018-09-19(b)(1)

A finding of only one ground for termination alleged under section 161.001(b)(1) is sufficient to support a judgment of termination. ... Because appellant does not challenge every ground upon which the trial court could have based its decision to terminate his parental rights, we do not address the unchallenged findings or the grounds raised in his brief.

When a parent leaves independent predicate grounds under section 161.001(b)(1) unchallenged, those grounds can sustain termination despite a challenge to another predicate ground.

in the Interest of B.C. AKA B.B.H. a Child · filed 2018-12-04(b)(1)

Because Mother has not challenged the trial court’s findings under subsections E and R, we must overrule Mother’s challenge to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding under subsection D.

Section 161.001(b) requires a best-interest finding and only one predicate ground to support termination; unchallenged findings can sustain the order on appeal.

in the Interest of A.R.R. · filed 2018-12-12(b)

Because only one statutory ground for termination is required to be established and Mother challenged only two of the five grounds found by the trial court and failed to challenge the trial court’s best interest finding, we overrule Mother’s appellate issues.

Unchallenged findings of endangerment and the child’s best interest under § 161.001(b) are sufficient to support termination.

E. J. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2018-12-18(b)(1)(D)–(E), (b)(2)

Here, the unchallenged findings that termination of Mother’s parental rights was warranted under subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and that termination was in the child’s best interest are sufficient to support the court’s termination order.

When termination is in the child’s best interest, unchallenged grounds under section 161.001(b)(1) can support termination without review of an alternative ground.

in the Interest A. T., a Child · filed 2018-12-27(b)(1)

Because Alice does not challenge the trial court’s findings supporting termination under paragraphs (N), (O), or (P) of section 161.001(b)(1), we need not review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the section 161.003 findings.

A finding under Section 161.001(b)(1)(K) must be deleted from a termination order when the petitioner abandons that ground.

in the Interest of I. D. G. v. A. G., E. R. G. and R. J. G., Children · filed 2019-04-09(b)(1)(K)

The record reflects, however, that the Department abandoned its request for termination under Section 161.001(b)(1)(K). Consequently, we sustain Issue Three and modify the judgment by deleting the challenged finding.

After a trial court denies termination, an appellant challenging legal sufficiency must conclusively establish that a reasonable factfinder would find both a statutory ground under Section 161.001 and termination in the child’s best interest.

in Re M.I.A., a Child · filed 2019-10-09

In other words, M.I.A. must conclusively establish that any reasonable trier of fact would have unavoidably formed a firm belief that Father had committed an act listed in section 161.001 and that termination was in the best interest of the child.

When a parent challenges a termination finding under subsection (b)(1)(D), the appellate court must address the challenge because that finding can affect the parent’s rights to other children under subsection (b)(1)(M).

in the Interest of C.W., a Child · filed 2019-10-18(b)(1)(D)

Because the mother specifically challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding under section 161.001(b)(1)(D), a finding which can affect her parental rights to other children under section 161.001(b)(1)(M), we hold that the court of appeals erred in failing to address the mother’s challenge to the section 161.001(b)(1)(D) finding.

An appellate court need not review findings under subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) when the parent does not challenge them.

in the Interest of J.N.C., a Child · filed 2019-12-18(b)(1)(D), (E)

In this proceeding, Appellant did not challenge Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E). Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019), does not require us to review those grounds for termination.

An unchallenged subsection (E) finding independently triggers subsection (M)’s potential collateral consequences, so an appellate court need not review a challenged subsection (D) finding.

C. W. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2020-02-20(b)(1)(D)

However, we need not review Father’s challenge under Subsection (D) because the potential collateral consequences are triggered separately by the Subsection (E) portion of the trial court’s judgment, which he does not challenge.

Challenged findings under subsections (D) and (E) must be reviewed on appeal because they may affect future parental rights proceedings.

in the Interest of M.R.D., J.A.D., and A.M.A. · filed 2020-02-19(b)(1)(D), (E)

However, because termination pursuant to subsections (D) or (E) may implicate future parental rights proceedings, we must address issues raised on appeal challenging a trial court’s findings under subsections (D) or (E).

When a parent challenges termination findings under subsection (b)(1)(D) or (E), the appellate court must review those findings and detail its analysis.

in the Interest of L.G., a Child · filed 2020-03-13(b)(1)(D), (E)

Consistent with In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 235–36, we conclude that the court of appeals erred in failing to detail its analysis of the challenged findings under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1) requires only one predicate termination ground, along with a best-interest finding, to affirm a termination judgment on appeal.

in the Interest of F.B.C.L., B.A.I.L., L.K.A.L., and J.J.W.L, Children · filed 2021-04-28(b)(1)

Only one termination ground—in addition to a best interest finding—is necessary to affirm a termination judgment on appeal.

A court need not review a challenged subsection (D) endangerment finding when an unchallenged subsection (E) finding independently supports termination and the same collateral consequences.

In the Interest of M.N.R., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-04-23(b)(1)(D)

We hold that Mother’s failure to challenge subsection (E) waives any error as to subsection (D).

Adverse findings under subsections (D) or (E) require appellate review even when another predicate ground supports termination, because those findings can affect future proceedings.

In the Interest of A.M., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-05-01(b)(1)(D), (E)

In other words, even when other predicate grounds would suffice for termination in this case, we must still review findings that a parent violated subsections (D) or (E) due to their potential consequences in future proceedings.

An unchallenged predicate ground under Section 161.001(b)(1) can support termination without appellate review of another predicate ground if the best interest finding is upheld.

In the Interest of Z. J. M, a Minor Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2026-01-29(b)(1)

By failing to challenge the trial court’s termination findings under Section 161.001(b)(1) (D), (E), (O), and (P), Mother waived any complaint about the sufficiency of the evidence supporting these findings and thus we need not consider whether sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding under Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(N).

Section 161.001(b) requires one statutory ground and a best-interest finding to support termination, so a parent seeking reversal must successfully challenge every ground found by the trial court and its best-interest finding.

In the Interest of KM, K.LR, Children v. Department of Family and Protective Servies · filed 2026-03-10(b)(1)–(2)

When a trial court finds that termination is warranted based on more than one statutorily enumerated predicate act or omission under Section 161.001(b)(1), the parent must successfully challenge all of these findings, as well as the trial court’s best-interest finding under Section 161.001(b)(2), in order to obtain reversal of the trial court’s termination decree.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) allows an incarcerated parent to arrange for someone else to care for the child, but the parent must produce evidence of that arrangement once the Department establishes knowing criminal conduct resulting in incarceration for more than two years.

in the Interest of A. C., a Child · filed 2001-03-14(1)(Q)

The better reasoned rule is that once the Department has established a parent's knowing criminal conduct resulting in their incarceration for more than two years, the parent must produce some evidence as to how they would provide or arrange to provide care for the child during that period. When that burden of production is met, the Department would have the burden of persuasion that the arrangement would not satisfy the parent's duty to the child.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) allows a parent to arrange for someone else to care for a child during incarceration; the parent must produce evidence of that arrangement before the Department must show it is inadequate.

In the Interest of Caballero · filed 2001-04-16(1)(Q)

The better reasoned rule is that once the Department has established a parent's knowing criminal conduct resulting in their incarceration for more than two years, the parent must produce some evidence as to how they would provide or arrange to provide care for the child during that period. When that burden of production is met, the Department would have the burden of persuasion that the arrangement would not satisfy the parent's duty to the child.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent's knowing criminal conduct results in conviction and confinement that leaves the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years from the petition date.

in the Interest of A. E., a Child · filed 2001-07-25(1)(Q)

Thus, we conclude that there is legally sufficient evidence of a clear and convincing character on which the trial court could have based its finding that Everhart was convicted of criminal conduct, in which she knowingly engaged, which resulted in her confinement for a period of more than two years, during which time she was unable to care for her child.

Legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under subsection (1)(Q).

In the Interest of A.R.R. · filed 2001-11-08(1)(Q)

Accordingly, we find the evidence both legally and factually sufficient for the trial court to terminate Appellant’s rights under section 161.001(1)(Q).

Subsection (1)(Q) permits termination when a parent's knowing criminal conduct results in imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years from the filing of the termination petition.

In Re IV · filed 2001-11-29(1)(Q)

We interpret this provision to mean that a person's parental rights may be terminated if the person knowingly engages in criminal conduct that results in his imprisonment and he is unable to care for the child for at least two years from the date the termination petition is filed.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years from the filing of the termination petition.

in Re I v. a Minor Child · filed 2001-11-29(1)(Q)

We interpret this provision to mean that a person’s parental rights may be terminated if the person knowingly engages in criminal conduct that results in his imprisonment and he is unable to care for the child for at least two years from the date the termination petition is filed.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conviction results in incarceration and inability to care for the child for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

Ex Parte: Darrick Marciano Kizzee · filed 2002-04-10(1)(Q)

Viewing the evidence under the proper standards, we find the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to permit the court to form a firm conviction or belief Bill would remain incarcerated until at least April 13, 2012. We find the evidence similarly sufficient that Bill would be unable to care for his son during his incarceration.

Under the former subsection (1)(Q), the required two years of imprisonment and inability to care for the child may be measured before the termination petition is filed.

In the Interest of A.L.S. · filed 2002-04-18(1)(Q)

We adopt the statutory intepretation expressed by both the Fort Worth and Waco courts which requires a petitioner to prove that a respondent knowingly committed criminal conduct resulting in his imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years prior to the date the petition is filed.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires proof that the parent cannot care for the child for at least two years; incarceration alone is insufficient, and financial and emotional support are relevant to that determination.

In Re BMR · filed 2002-08-29(1)(Q)

Although the term "care" has not been defined, either in the statute itself or in subsequent case law, we hold that among the factors to be considered when deciding if there is an inability to care are the availability of financial and emotional support from the incarcerated parent.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires proof that an incarcerated parent cannot care for the child for at least two years from the petition date; the availability of financial and emotional support bears on that inquiry.

in the Interest of B.M.R., a Minor Child · filed 2002-08-29(1)(Q)

Although the term “care” has not been defined, either in the statute itself or in subsequent case law, we hold that among the factors to be considered when deciding if there is an inability to care are the availability of financial and emotional support from the incarcerated parent.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent knowingly engages in criminal conduct resulting in imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years before the petition is filed.

In Re ALS · filed 2002-04-18(1)(Q)

We adopt the statutory intepretation expressed by both the Fort Worth and Waco courts which requires a petitioner to prove that a respondent knowingly committed criminal conduct resulting in his imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years prior to the date the petition is filed.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination only when knowing criminal conduct results in a conviction, confinement for at least two years from the filing of the petition, and inability to care for the child for at least two years.

In the Interest of D.R.L.M. · filed 2002-07-03(1)(Q)

We hold termination under subsection Q is authorized only upon proof that the parent has knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in the parent’s conviction and confinement for at least two years from the date of the filing of the petition and in the parent’s inability to care for the child for not less than two years.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires proof that the parent's criminal conduct resulted in a conviction, confinement for at least two years from the filing of the termination petition, and inability to care for the child for at least two years.

In Re DRLM · filed 2002-08-15(1)(Q)

We hold termination under subsection Q is authorized only upon proof that the parent has knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in the parent's conviction and confinement for at least two years from the date of the filing of the petition and in the parent's inability to care for the child for not less than two years.

Section 161.001(1)(q) requires proof that the parent's criminal conduct resulted in imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years before the petition was filed.

In Re BSW · filed 2002-09-18(1)(q)

We adopt the statutory interpretation expressed by Fort Worth, Waco, and El Paso which requires a petitioner to prove that a respondent knowingly committed criminal conduct resulting in the respondent's imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years before the date the petition is filed. It is undisputed that S.E.W. has been incarcerated since 1998, and the State filed the petition to terminate on May 2, 2001, more than two years after S.E.W.'s incarceration. The evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court's finding.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires proof that the parent’s criminal conduct resulted in imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years before the termination petition was filed.

In the Interest of B.S.W., a Child · filed 2002-09-18(1)(Q)

We adopt the statutory interpretation expressed by Fort Worth, Waco, and El Paso which requires a petitioner to prove that a respondent knowingly committed criminal conduct resulting in the respondent’s imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years before the date the petition is filed. It is undisputed that S.E.W. has been incarcerated since 1998, and the State filed the petition to terminate on May 2, 2001, more than two years after S.E.W.’s incarceration. The evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) allows an incarcerated parent to provide care through another person if the parent arranges for that person to act on the parent's behalf.

in the Interest of Rebekah Lynn Thompson, a Child · filed 2003-06-24(1)(Q)

Rather, it was and is implicit in our opinion that the surrogate arise through agreement with or arrangement by the incarcerated parent.

Section 161.001(1)(Q)'s two-year period runs forward from the filing of the termination petition and may apply to a parent incarcerated before the subsection took effect.

In Re AV · filed 2003-07-03(1)(Q)

We hold that subsection Q's time period is prospective and that the subsection is constitutional even though applied to a parent incarcerated before the subsection's effective date.

Section 161.001(1)(Q)'s two-year period runs forward from the filing of the termination petition, and the ground may apply to a parent convicted and imprisoned before its enactment.

In the Interest of A.V. · filed 2003-07-03(1)(Q)

It is to be read prospectively. ... Considering that subsection Q aims to remedy the conditions of abused and neglected children, not to enhance the punishment of the parent, and that subsection Q does not disappoint any reasonable reliance Puig could have placed on the law when he was convicted of the federal offenses, we hold that subsection Q was not unconstitutionally retroactively applied to Puig.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires proof that an imprisoned parent cannot care for the child; imprisonment alone does not establish that requirement.

In Re ESS · filed 2004-03-11(1)(Q)

Although Appellant admitted that he is currently serving a prison term that will exceed two years, there is no evidence that Appellant is unable to care for E.S.S. Proof that Appellant is unable to care for E.S.S. is an additional requirement not met by showing incarceration alone.

When the Department establishes the incarceration element of subsection (1)(Q), the parent must produce evidence of arrangements for the child's care; if the parent does so, the Department must show those arrangements are inadequate.

Hampton v. TX DEPT. PROTECTIVE & REG. SERV. · filed 2004-06-10(1)(Q)

The Amarillo Court of Appeals, in analyzing the burden of proof presented by this subsection, found that once the Department has established the incarceration element, the burden shifts to the parent to produce some evidence of how he or she will arrange care during that period. When that burden of production is met, the Department is then required to persuade the court that the stated arrangements would not satisfy the parent's burden to the child. Caballero, 53 S.W.3d at 396. We agree that this is a reasoned approach, and we adopt it here.

Under subsection (1)(Q), once the Department establishes incarceration, the parent must produce evidence of arrangements for the child’s care; the Department must then show why those arrangements are inadequate.

Hampton v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2004-06-10(1)(Q)

The Amarillo Court of Appeals, in analyzing the burden of proof presented by this subsection, found that once the Department has established the incarceration element, the burden shifts to the parent to produce some evidence of how he or she will arrange care during that period. When that burden of production is met, the Department is then required to persuade the court that the stated arrangements would not satisfy the parent’s burden to the child. ... We agree that this is a reasoned approach, and we adopt it here.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires proof that an incarcerated parent is unable to care for the child; incarceration alone does not establish that requirement.

in the Interest of E.S.S. · filed 2004-03-11(1)(Q)

Although Appellant admitted that he is currently serving a prison term that will exceed two years, there is no evidence that Appellant is unable to care for E.S.S. Proof that Appellant is unable to care for E.S.S. is an additional requirement not met by showing incarceration alone.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires proof that an incarcerated parent cannot care for the child; the parent’s ability to provide financial and emotional support bears on that question.

Brazoria County Children's Protective Services v. Frederick · filed 2004-07-15(1)(Q)

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires a showing of the parent’s inability to care for the child. ... Incarceration alone does not show inability to care for the child. ... After considering the evidence in the light most favorable to CPS, we conclude that the evidence raised triable issues of fact for the jury’s determination concerning Frederick’s ability to care for T.F. Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court premised its ruling on section 161.001(1), the directed verdict was improper.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years from the date the termination petition is filed.

Brazoria Co. Children's Protective Services Unit v. Kenneth Ray Frederick & Roberta Wiggins · filed 2004-07-15(1)(Q)

Thus, because Frederick’s incarceration will extend for not less than two years from the date of filing the petition, CPS could properly seek termination of Frederick’s parental rights under subsection 161.001(1)(Q).

Once knowing criminal conduct resulting in imprisonment for more than two years is established, the parent must produce some evidence of how the child will be cared for during that period.

in the Interest of C.E v. · filed 2004-08-26(1)(Q)

Once it has been established that a parent's knowing criminal conduct resulted in his incarceration for more than two years, the parent must produce some evidence as to how he would provide or arrange to provide care for the child during that period.

A parent’s hope for early parole does not defeat the imprisonment ground when the evidence supports a finding that confinement will continue for more than two years after the termination petition was filed.

In Re KRM · filed 2004-09-01(1)(Q)

Martin's hope that he might be granted early release is pure speculation. The evidence is sufficient that the jury could have formed a firm belief that Martin knowingly engaged in conduct for which he was convicted of a crime and that his imprisonment is likely to continue for more than two years from the date the termination petition was filed.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in imprisonment likely to prevent care of the child for at least two years after the termination petition is filed; a speculative chance of early release does not defeat that ground.

In the Interest of K.R.M. · filed 2004-09-01(1)(Q)

Martin’s hope that he might be granted early release is pure speculation. The evidence is sufficient that the jury could have formed a firm belief that Martin knowingly engaged in conduct for which he was convicted of a crime and that his imprisonment is likely to continue for more than two years from the date the termination petition was filed.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) applies prospectively to a parent’s imprisonment and inability to care for a child for more than two years after termination proceedings begin.

Thompson v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2004-10-28(1)(Q)

By looking at future imprisonment and inability to care for the child, Family Code subsection 161.001(1)(Q) protects children whose parents will be incarcerated for periods exceeding two years after termination proceedings begin; thus, we apply this statute prospectively.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent's criminal conduct results in conviction, imprisonment, and inability to care for the child for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

Goddard v. State · filed 2005-01-05(1)(Q)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the section 161.001(1)(Q) finding.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) applies prospectively to a parent's imprisonment and inability to care for the child for more than two years after termination proceedings begin.

Thompson v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services · filed 2005-03-09(1)(Q)

By looking at future imprisonment and inability to care for the child, Family Code subsection 161.001(1)(Q) protects children whose parents will be incarcerated for periods exceeding two years after termination proceedings begin; thus, we apply this statute prospectively.

An incarcerated parent may arrange for someone else to care for the child, but the proposed arrangement must adequately meet the child's needs.

Schexnider v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2005-04-07(1)(Q)

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that appellant's proposed arrangement to care for B.W.S. was inadequate.

An incarcerated parent must show how the child will be cared for during incarceration; merely naming possible caregivers does not meet that burden.

Zieger v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2005-08-25(1)(Q)

Zieger cannot frustrate the purpose of this section to ensure against the child’s neglect and meet his burden of showing how he would care for the child by simply tossing out name after name.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires proof that the parent's criminal convictions will result in confinement for at least two years from the date the termination petition was filed.

In Re DJJ · filed 2005-10-06(1)(Q)

Thus, to support termination on this ground, the Department was required to prove that Kevin's criminal convictions would result in his confinement for at least two years from the date the petition was filed. ... Because there is no evidence that Kevin's convictions will result in his confinement for not less than two years from the date the petition was filed, the evidence is legally insufficient to support termination on this ground.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires proof that a parent’s criminal conviction will result in confinement for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

In the Interest of D.J.J., a Child · filed 2005-10-06(1)(Q)

Because there is no evidence that Kevin’s convictions will result in his confinement for not less than two years from the date the petition was filed, the evidence is legally insufficient to support termination on this ground.

Subsection (1)(Q) requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent will remain confined or imprisoned for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

in the Interest of H.R.M. · filed 2006-02-14(1)(Q)

We conclude the evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding he will be confined or imprisoned for at least two years after the date the petition was filed and do not reach the element of inability to care.

A ten-year prison sentence creates a rebuttable presumption that the parent will be incarcerated for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

In Re JPH · filed 2006-05-18(1)(Q)

A ten-year sentence satisfies subsection Q because it raises the need to take proactive measures to ensure the child's welfare. If a parent wishes to challenge the statute's applicability, then the parent must produce evidence that he or she will be out of prison less than two years after the filing of the petition of termination.

Subsection (1)(Q) requires proof that the parent's imprisonment and inability to care for the child will continue for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

In Re TBD · filed 2006-08-23(1)(Q)

No evidence shows that Maiwald's incarceration will extend for two years from the initiation of the termination proceeding. On this record, his parental rights cannot be terminated under subsection 161.001(1)(Q).

Subsection (1)(Q) requires proof that the parent's imprisonment will extend at least two years from the filing of the termination petition.

In the Interest of T.B.D., a Child · filed 2006-08-23(1)(Q)

No evidence shows that Mai-wald’s incarceration will extend for two years from the initiation of the termination proceeding. On this record, his parental rights cannot be terminated under subsection 161.001(1)(Q).

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires evidence that the other parent agreed to care for the child on the incarcerated parent's behalf before leaving the child with that parent can establish an ability to provide care.

In the Interest of H.R.M. · filed 2006-12-01(1)(Q)

Absent evidence that the non-incarcerated parent agreed to care for the child on behalf of the incarcerated parent, merely leaving a child with a non-incarcerated parent does not constitute the ability to provide care.

Under subsection (Q), an incarcerated parent cannot show an ability to care for a child merely by leaving the child with a non-incarcerated parent, absent an agreement to care on the incarcerated parent's behalf.

In Re HRM · filed 2006-12-01(1)(Q)(ii)

Absent evidence that the non-incarcerated parent agreed to care for the child on behalf of the incarcerated parent, merely leaving a child with a non-incarcerated parent does not constitute the ability to provide care.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent's criminal conduct resulted in conviction and imprisonment that prevents the parent from caring for the child for at least two years from the petition's filing.

Lopez v. Max Kushner and Sara Kathryn Kushner · filed 2008-02-13(1)(Q)

The trial court did not err by finding that clear and convincing evidence established that Lopez engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and his inability to care for the child for not less than two years from the date the petition was filed, that termination of Lopez's parental rights is in the best interest of the child, and that adoption by Kushner is in the best interest of the child.

One proven ground under Section 161.001, including imprisonment and inability to care for a child for at least two years under subsection (1)(Q), supports termination when termination is also in the child's best interest.

In Re RS · filed 2008-04-08(1)(Q)

The undisputed evidence shows that Sanders knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in his conviction of several offenses, and his imprisonment and inability to care for R.S. and S.L.S. for more than two years from the date of the filing of the petition for termination. That is the conduct specified in Section 161.001(1)(Q) of the Texas Family Code. Only one statutory predicate finding under Section 161.001 is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the best interest of the children. There is such a finding here, and we find both it and the finding relating to imprisonment and inability to support to be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent's knowing criminal conduct results in conviction and confinement that leaves the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

in the Interest of R. S. and S. L. S., Children · filed 2008-04-08(1)(Q)

The undisputed evidence shows that Sanders knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in his conviction of several offenses, and his imprisonment and inability to care for R.S. and S.L.S. for more than two years from the date of the filing of the petition for termination. That is the conduct specified in Section 161.001(1)(Q) of the Texas Family Code.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires the parent to have knowingly engaged in the criminal conduct; it does not require the parent to have known of the child at that time.

Earl Clarence Smith AKA Clarence Earl Smith v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2008-06-19(1)(Q)

Subsection Q cannot be reasonably read to require a showing that the parent knew he was the child’s parent at the time he engaged in the criminal conduct.

Subsection (1)(Q)(ii) requires proof that the parent will be imprisoned and unable to care for the child for at least two years from the petition's filing.

Frazier Rutherford Lewis and Carla Gibbons v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2008-08-20(1)(Q)(ii)

To support termination pursuant to section 161.001(1)(Q), the Department also had to show Lewis was unable to care for M.T.G. for not less than two years from the date of filing of the petition.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination only if the parent’s imprisonment will leave the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed.

in the Interest of G.F.A., a Child · filed 2008-08-20(1)(Q)

Thus, section 161.001(1)(Q) allows for termination when the parent will be confined or imprisoned and unable to care for the child for at least two years after termination proceedings begin.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) allows termination when a parent's criminal conduct results in conviction and imprisonment that leave the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed, if termination is in the child's best interest under subsection (2).

in the Interest of J.B., D.B., C.B. and W.B. · filed 2008-10-30(1)(Q), (2)

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding, we conclude that a reasonable fact finder could form a firm belief or conviction of LaFleur's inability to care for D.B. for not less than two years from the date the State filed the petition, and that termination was in D.B.'s best interest.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in conviction and imprisonment that leaves the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

in the Interest of Z.C., C.C., L.C., and D.A.C., Jr., Children · filed 2009-02-12(1)(Q)

We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that David violated section 161.001(1)(Q) of the family code.

When the original petition alleges subsection (1)(Q) as a ground for termination, its two-year period is measured from the filing of that petition.

C.B. v. D.S. · filed 2009-05-22(1)(Q)

Because section 161.001(1)(Q) was listed as a ground for termination in the original petition, we will calculate “two years from the date of filing the petition” from the date the original petition was filed.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent will remain imprisoned and unable to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed.

In Re RAL · filed 2009-07-09(1)(Q)

Reviewing the evidence, we conclude the jury could have formed a clear and convincing belief that both parents would be incarcerated until May 20, 2010, and that they would be unable to support or care for the child during that period. Thus, it can be determined that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that the requirements of Section 161.001(1)(Q) were met.

Under Section 161.001(1)(Q), a parent’s hope for parole does not defeat a finding that imprisonment will leave the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years from the petition date.

In the Interest of R.A.L., a Child · filed 2009-07-09(1)(Q)

Reviewing the evidence, we conclude the jury could have formed a clear and convincing belief that both parents would be incarcerated until May 20, 2010, and that they would be unable to support or care for the child during that period. Thus, it can be determined that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that the requirements of Section 161.001(1)(Q) were met.

A conviction supporting termination under subsection (1)(Q) need not be final on appeal.

Rian v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2009-07-31(1)(Q)

We have concluded that there is no requirement that the appellate process be exhausted before subsection Q can provide grounds on which to terminate parental rights.

When a parent's knowing criminal conduct results in imprisonment for more than two years, the parent must produce some evidence of how the child will be cared for during that time.

in the Interest of E.A.R., a Child · filed 2009-08-27(1)(q)

Once TDFPS established, through Rawlins's own testimony, that his knowing criminal conduct resulted in his incarceration for more than two years, (1) the burden of production shifted to Rawlins to provide some evidence as to how he intended to care for or arrange for E.A.R.'s care during his incarceration. ... Rawlins failed to produce any such evidence.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires clear and convincing proof that the parent’s conviction will result in confinement for at least two years from the filing of the termination petition.

in the Interest of K.B.C., a Child · filed 2009-09-30(1)(Q)

For these reasons, we hold that the evidence was legally insufficient for a reasonable factfinder to form a “firm belief or conviction” that John’s criminal conviction would result in confinement for at least two years from the date the petition was filed, and we sustain this issue. We further hold that the trial court erred in terminating John’s parental rights under subsection 161.001(1)(Q).

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in a conviction, imprisonment, and inability to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed.

in the Interest of J.H.M, a Child · filed 2009-12-29(1)(Q)

Given the record, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the section 161.001(1)(Q) finding, was sufficiently clear and convincing to enable a reasonable factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that Short knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in his (i) conviction of an offense and (ii) confinement or imprisonment and an inability to care for the child for not less than two years from the date of the filing of the petition.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent's criminal conduct results in imprisonment and an inability to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed; the possibility of parole does not necessarily defeat that ground.

in the Interest of A.J.P., a Child · filed 2010-01-11(1)(Q)

Therefore, the record did permit the factfinder ( i.e. the trial court) to form a firm belief or conviction that the requirements of §161.001(1)(Q) had been met.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in conviction and at least two years of imprisonment and inability to care for the child after the petition is filed.

Layton v. State · filed 2010-10-08(1)(Q)

Subsection Q provides a basis for termination on a finding that the parent knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in the parent’s conviction for an offense and confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for the child for not less than two years from the date of filing the petition. ... On this record, the trial court could have reached a firm conviction that the requirements of § 161.001(1 )( Q) were met as to the father, making the evidence legally and factually sufficient.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed; speculative hopes of early release do not defeat that finding.

in the Interest of K.R.L. AKA K.R.L., a Child · filed 2010-10-19(1)(Q)

Because appellant’s testimony was speculative, the trial court was not prevented from forming a firm belief that appellant would be incarcerated for at least two years from January 2009.

A parent's ability to care for a child under subsection (1)(Q) requires more than emotional support.

in the Interest of S.J.P.P., a Child · filed 2011-08-19(1)(Q)

While Bill is correct that emotional support is an important element of care for a child, the concept of "care" in subsection Q clearly involves more than emotional support.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires imprisonment for at least two years after the termination petition is filed and an inability to care for the child during that period.

in the Interest of T. E. and A. E., Children · filed 2011-11-23(1)(Q)

In addition to requiring the parent be confined or imprisoned for not less than two years from the date of filing the petition, Section 161.001(1)(Q) of the Texas Family Code also requires an inability on the part of the incarcerated parent to care for the child during the period of incarceration.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in imprisonment and an inability to care for the child for at least two years from the petition’s filing.

in the Interest of J.J., a Child · filed 2012-02-28(1)(Q)

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we conclude that the trial court reasonably could have formed a firm conviction or belief that Jason would be unable to care for J.J. due to his two-year sentence for forgery under subsection Q.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) does not require a final conviction when a parent's criminal conduct results in imprisonment and inability to care for the child for the required period.

in the Interest of D.L.S., C.M.Y. AKA C.M.Y., V.D.Y. AKA V.D.Y., Children · filed 2012-03-01(1)(Q)

Additionally, finality of a conviction is not required to support termination under subsection Q.

The court may find the criminal-conduct element of § 161.001(1)(Q) satisfied when the parent knowingly committed conduct leading to imprisonment for more than two years from the petition’s filing.

in the Interest of S.S.A., a Child · filed 2012-07-19(1)(Q)

We hold that, even assuming the complained-of evidence should not have been admitted, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings as to the first element of a 161.001(1)(Q) finding; namely, that Frank knowingly committed criminal conduct resulting in his incarceration for more than two years from the petition’s filing.

Under subsection (1)(Q), the two-year period runs from the filing of the original termination petition, even if an amended petition first adds that ground.

in the Interest of D.J.H., a Child · filed 2012-08-01(1)(Q)

Given that the purpose of subsection (Q) is to protect children from being neglected, and not to provide notice, it is logical to conclude that when subsection (Q) refers to “the petition,” it is referring to the original petition for termination, and not a subsequently amended one adding an allegation for termination under subsection (Q).

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires knowing criminal conduct that results in conviction, at least two years of confinement, and inability to care for the child during that period; it does not require a knowing guilty plea.

in the Interest of C.J. and L.J., Children · filed 2012-08-02(1)(Q)

The statute requires that Father knowingly engage in criminal activity that results in conviction, confinement, and an inability to care for his children for at least two years following the date of the Department’s original petition, not that Father knowingly agreed to plead guilty or receive a certain sentence of imprisonment.

Section 161.001(1)(Q)’s two-year period begins when the original termination petition is filed, even if the subsection (Q) allegation is added later.

in the Interest of K.G. and C.G., Children · filed 2012-08-31(1)(Q)

We agree with this reasoning; therefore, we conclude that the two- year statutory period in subsection Q started on March 4, 2010.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in confinement for at least two years after the petition is filed and the parent cannot arrange care for the child during that period.

in the Interest of K.G.B. · filed 2012-11-15(1)(Q)

Accordingly, we conclude and hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support termination under subsection (Q).

Subsection (1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in conviction and imprisonment and the parent cannot care for the child for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

in the Interest of L.O. and K.O., Children · filed 2012-11-21(1)(Q)

Therefore, we hold that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the finding, is sufficiently clear and convincing that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that M.O. knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in his conviction of an offense, and imprisonment and inability to care for his children for not less than two years from the date of filing the petition.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) requires proof that the parent knowingly engaged in the criminal conduct; mere negligence does not suffice.

in the Interest of C.D.E., C.V.E., and S.D.E., Children · filed 2012-12-21(1)(Q)

Keeping in mind that we must strictly construe involuntary termination statutes in favor of parents and that under the principle of strict construction we are to exclude from subsection (Q)’s operation all conduct that does not clearly come within the scope of the language used— that language being “knowingly engaged in criminal conduct” — we hold that to establish that a parent “knowingly engaged in criminal conduct” as set forth in subsection (Q), the Department must prove more than mere negligence.

Subsection (1)(Q) requires proof that a parent’s criminal conduct resulted in at least two years’ confinement from the petition’s filing and that the parent cannot care for the child, including through arrangements with another person.

in Re G. C., a Child · filed 2013-03-05(1)(Q)

In light of the entire record, and giving deference to the proper role of the fact finder, we conclude that the evidence regarding the grandmother’s ability to provide financial and emotional support was not so significant as to preclude the trial court from reasonably forming a firm conviction that the father, individually or through family surrogates, was unable to care for G.C. during his incarceration.

Subsection (1)(Q) requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent's confinement and inability to care for the child will last at least two years from the filing of the termination petition.

in the Interest of B.W., B.W., and R.C. Jr., Children · filed 2013-03-12(1)(Q)

Based on this evidence, no reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the State established the subsection (1)(Q) statutory ground for termination, and the evidence supporting this ground was therefore legally insufficient.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s criminal conduct results in imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years from the petition’s filing, including through care arranged on the parent’s behalf.

E. L. M., Jr. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2013-05-14(1)(Q)

We conclude that legally sufficient evidence supports the finding that termination is justified under section 161.001(1)(Q).

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in imprisonment and an inability to care for the child, personally or through others, for at least two years from the petition’s filing.

in the Interest of R.N.W. · filed 2013-07-05(1)(Q)

Therefore, we hold there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that D.C.W. was unable to care for R.N.W., either himself or through family surrogates, while incarcerated.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) allows termination when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in conviction, imprisonment, and an inability to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed.

in the Interest of M.P., K.G., and J.P., Children · filed 2013-10-17(1)(Q)

Regardless of which filing date is used or which release date is used, more than two years would elapse from the date the petition was filed to the date of the father’s release. Thus, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(1)(Q).

Section 161.001(1)(Q) supports termination when the evidence establishes its imprisonment ground.

in the Interest of T.L.C. and C.A.C., Children · filed 2013-11-27(1)(Q)

We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(1)(Q).

Subsection (1)(Q) looks prospectively at whether a parent's imprisonment will leave the parent unable to care for the child for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

in the Interest of M. R. G. L., Minor Children · filed 2014-01-09(1)(Q)

Section 161.001(1)(Q) is applied prospectively. In other words, the relevant inquiry here is whether Father D’s conviction under penal code section 22.02 would result in his confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for Child E, Child S, and Child D for not less than two years from the date of the Department’s filing of the petition.

Subsection (1)(Q) requires an incarcerated parent to produce some evidence of how the parent would provide or arrange care for the child during the required two-year period.

in the Interest of D.Z.R-M., Child · filed 2014-04-08(1)(Q)

We conclude that the Father failed to produce some evidence showing how he would provide or arrange to provide care for the Child during the period of the Father’s incarceration through at least August 27, 2014.

A possible early release does not prevent a finding that a parent will remain incarcerated for at least two years after the termination petition is filed.

in the Interest of L.K.C., K.D.B., and C.Y.S. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2014-06-26(1)(Q)

Viewing the evidence under the proper standards, we find the evidence before the trial court was legally and factually sufficient to permit the court to form a firm conviction or belief that Father would remain incarcerated until at least two years after the petition was filed, i.e., until November 2014.

Section 161.001(1)(Q) permits termination when a parent’s knowing criminal conduct results in imprisonment and inability to care for the child for at least two years after the petition is filed.

in the Interest of D.L.B. · filed 2014-09-25(1)(Q)

Having reviewed the record under the standard for legal and factual sufficiency, we conclude the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction based on clear and convincing evidence that MOTHER violated section 161.001(1)(Q) by knowingly engaging in criminal conduct resulting in her conviction, imprisonment, and inability to care for D.L.B. for the two-year period at issue.