Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001

Section 161.001(1)(M) permits termination based on a prior decree terminating the parent’s rights to another child under subsections (D) or (E), without requiring proof of the earlier conduct again.

in the Interest of J.H., a Child · filed 2014-05-30(1)(M)

The Department need show only that the parent’s rights were terminated as to another child based on findings that the parent violated subsections (D) or (E).

Section 161.001(1)(M) permits termination based on a prior termination for conduct covered by paragraph (D) or (E), without a time limit on the prior order.

in the Interest A.L.D., C.D., Children · filed 2014-09-10(1)(M)

Furthermore, the statute itself does not specify any kind of time period within which the prior order must have been rendered.

Section 161.001(1)(M) permits termination when a parent's rights to another child were terminated based on conduct violating subsection (D) or (E).

in the Interest of G.H., a Child · filed 2015-06-19(1)(M)

The order shows that Mother’s parental rights to C.C. were terminated on (D) and (E) grounds. Mother did not object to the admission of the termination order. The evidence is therefore factually sufficient to support termination on the ground that her parental rights had been terminated with respect to another child based on a finding that her conduct violated subsection (D) or (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(M) permits termination when a parent’s rights to another child were previously terminated based on conduct violating endangerment grounds (D) or (E), if termination is in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of R.M. · filed 2016-06-30(b)(1)(M)

Even if we liberally construe L.B.’s brief challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the “grounds for termination” to include a challenge to the trial court’s finding under section 161.001(b)(1)(M), we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s ruling under section 161.001(b)(1)(M).

Subsection (b)(1)(M) permits termination based on a prior termination of the parent’s rights to another child under subsection (D) or (E).

in the Interest of G.H. and G.H., Children · filed 2018-08-16(b)(1)(M)

The subsection (D) and (E) grounds mentioned in subsection (M) thus relate to the parent’s conduct toward another child in a prior termination suit—not to the parent’s conduct in the present case.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(M) permits termination based on a prior termination involving another child under subsection (D) or (E), without requiring the Department to prove the earlier conduct again.

in the Interest of B. M., and J. M., Children · filed 2018-10-03(b)(1)(M)

It is well established, moreover, that when a prior decree of termination as to another child is properly admitted into evidence, the Department need not reestablish that the parent’s conduct with respect to that child was in violation of Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(M)’s predicate ground can be established on summary judgment by prior termination decrees showing findings under subsections (D) or (E), absent evidence that the decrees were suspended or reversed.

in the Interest of C. M. J. AKA C.W. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2019-03-05(b)(1)(M)

Under this circumstance, summary judgment on whether the parent violated section 161.001(b)(1)(M) is appropriate because decrees showing that the parent violated subsections (D) or (E) satisfy the Department’s burden under subsection (M) as a matter of law, with no evidence weighing required.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(M) provides a ground for termination when a parent previously lost parental rights to another child based on conduct violating subsections (D) or (E).

in the Interest of J.J.L., a Child v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2019-05-07(b)(1)(M)

Mother’s parental rights to Julia and Debby were terminated based on findings that her conduct violated subsections D and E. Both termination decrees were admitted into evidence and are included in the appellate record. The terminations were upheld on appeal. Because there is evidence to support the unchallenged finding under subsection M, we are bound by that finding.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(M) permits termination when a parent previously lost rights to another child based on conduct violating paragraph (D) or (E), if termination is in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of A.D.M., a Child v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2019-05-14(b)(1)(M)

If termination is in the best interest of the child, the parent-child relationship may be terminated if the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has “had his or her parent-child relationship terminated with respect to another child based on a finding that the parent’s conduct was in violation of Paragraph (D) or (E) or substantially equivalent provisions of the law of another state[.]” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(M). Mother’s parental rights to Andrew were terminated based on, among other things, a finding that her conduct violated subsection E. ... We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s predicate finding.

Subsection (M) requires a prior termination order that is final by appeal and whose qualifying finding has not been deleted or set aside.

in the Interest of P.W., a Child v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2019-06-04(b)(1)(M)

Therefore, we interpret subsection (M) to require the Department to prove that a trial court had signed a final order terminating the parent’s parent-child relationship as to another child based on a finding that the parent’s conduct violated (1) subsection (D) or subsection (E) or (2) a substantially equivalent provisions of another state’s law, and also that (1) the final termination order is final by appeal and (2) no court has deleted the finding or reversed or set aside the final order.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(L)(viii) permits termination based on aggravated sexual assault of a child when the parent’s conduct caused serious injury, which may be emotional or psychological rather than bodily.

in the Interest of J.K. and S.K. · filed 2019-10-03(b)(1)(L)(viii)

Thus, evidence allowing the factfinder to infer that a child suffered a serious emotional or psychological injury as opposed to having suffered a bodily injury is all that is needed to prove a serious injury resulted from an aggravated assault under Section L.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(M) permits termination based on an earlier termination grounded in a finding under (D) or (E); evidence of the earlier decree and the children’s adoption status can support that predicate.

D. J. and A. S. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2021-03-03(b)(1)(M)

We need not address this split because even applying P.W.’s more restrictive standard, we still conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the Subsection (M) finding here.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(M) makes a prior termination of parental rights on child-endangerment grounds a sufficient predicate for terminating rights to another child.

in the Interest of A. R. Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2021-10-14(b)(1)(M)

Thus, standing alone, the prior termination of the appellant’s rights as to another child constitutes legally and factually sufficient evidence of a predicate ground for the termination of the appellant’s parental rights as to A.R. as a matter of law.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(M) permits termination based on a prior termination on endangering-conduct ground (E), even if the prior order was under appeal when the later case was tried.

in the Interest of H.Y., a Child · filed 2022-03-03(b)(1)(M)

Because the trial court had evidence before it that Mother’s parental rights to Calvin had previously been terminated on predicate ground (E) for endangering conduct, ... legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s termination finding on predicate ground (M) in this appeal.

Subsection (b)(1)(M) permits termination when a parent’s rights to another child were previously terminated on endangerment grounds (D) or (E).

in the Interest of A.B., a Child · filed 2022-07-07(b)(1)(M)

The Department’s evidence was thus sufficient to establish termination under predicate ground (M).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(M) permits termination based on a prior termination under either ground (D) or ground (E).

in the Interest of M.P.B. ., Children · filed 2022-09-12(b)(1)(M)

In reaching this conclusion, we reject Father’s argument that he was prejudiced because section 161.001(b)(1)(M) authorizes termination of a parent- child relationship based on a previous termination under (D) or (E) grounds. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M). Father has not challenged the jury’s (D) finding, which carries the same collateral consequence as (E).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(M) permits termination based on a prior termination of the parent’s rights to another child under ground (D) or (E).

In the Interest of D.M.-H., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-08-18(b)(1)(M)

As a result, we overrule this issue and conclude that the evidence in support of ground (M) was both legally and factually sufficient.

For constructive abandonment under subsection (b)(1)(N), two visits to an infant over four months despite six additional opportunities can support a finding that the parent failed to visit regularly.

In the Interest of D.B.J. AKA D.J., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-12-06(b)(1)(N)

Mother’s two visitations with D.J., an infant baby, during a four-month period in which she was given the opportunity to visit D.J. an additional six times supports the trial court’s implicit finding that Mother failed to regularly visit D.J.

Evidence of constructive abandonment under former subsection (1)(N) can support termination without reaching other grounds.

In the Interest of P.R. · filed 1999-06-17(1)(N)

Having carefully reviewed and considered the evidence, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Dana constructively abandoned P.R. Because Dana did not challenge the trial court’s finding of best interest and because the evidence supports the trial court’s finding of constructive abandonment, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment terminating Dana’s parental rights, and we need not address the evidence supporting the court’s other findings of fact.

Former section 161.001(1)(N) treats a child as constructively abandoned after at least a year in TDPRS conservatorship when the agency reasonably tried to return the child and the parent failed to maintain regular contact and provide a safe environment.

In Re PR · filed 1999-07-15(1)(N)

Under that section, a child is considered constructively abandoned if the child has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the TDPRS for at least one year, and (1) TDPRS has made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent; (2) the parent has not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the child; and (3) the parent has demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment. ... Having carefully reviewed and considered the evidence, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Dana constructively abandoned P.R.

Under section 161.001(1)(N), a parent's misunderstanding of a visitation report does not excuse failure to maintain contact with the child for purposes of constructive abandonment.

Corning v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 1999-10-07(1)(N)

By the same logic, misinterpretation of a report cannot excuse Corning's failure to maintain contact with K.C.

Section 161.001(1)(N) requires evidence that the Department or an authorized agency made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent, even when the parent is imprisoned.

In the Interest of A.V. · filed 2001-07-11(1)(N)

As to the second element, it is undisputed, and the State admits, that the Department or another authorized agency never made any effort to return the children to Pablo. Obviously, that is because he was in prison. Nevertheless, there was no evidence of this element.

A parent's probation violation and the resulting unsafe environment can support constructive abandonment under subsection (1)(N).

in the Interest of K. B. and J. B. · filed 2001-10-19(1)(N)

Accordingly, her violation of the terms of her probation created an unsafe environment for her children and we conclude that evidence is legally and factually sufficient to establish that Margaret constructively abandoned her children.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when its elements are proved by clear and convincing evidence, even if the parent left Texas to prevent DPRS from taking another child.

in the Interest of D. D. H., a Child · filed 2002-09-24(1)(N)

Omitted from that statute is any proviso declaring that the parent-child relationship cannot be terminated due to constructive abandonment if the elements of §161.001(1)(N) are satisfied but the parent flees Texas to avoid the DPRS and leaves a child behind.

Under section 161.001(1)(N), service plans designed to reunite a parent and child can satisfy the reasonable-efforts element of constructive abandonment.

In Re KMB · filed 2002-11-07(1)(N)(i)

Based on this, the record contains ample evidence to establish that TDPRS made efforts to work with Kristin on the service plans; however, Kristin failed to complete any of them. Therefore, the State showed it made reasonable efforts to return K.M.B. under the first element of section 161.001(1)(N).

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in Department conservatorship for at least six months, the Department has made reasonable efforts to return the child, the parent has not maintained regular visits or significant contact, and the parent cannot provide a safe environment.

Sawyer v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2003-02-27(1)(N)

To find that Sawyer had constructively abandoned her children, the jury had to find that (1) the children had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for at least six months; (2) the Department had made reasonable efforts to return the children to Sawyer; (3) Sawyer had not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the children; and (4) Sawyer had demonstrated an inability to provide the children with a safe environment. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(N). ... Thus, we hold that there is legally and factually sufficient evidence that Sawyer constructively abandoned her children.

Reasonable efforts to return a child under section 161.001(1)(N) may be shown by service plans designed to help the parent regain custody, even when the parent does not complete them.

In the Interest of K.M.B. · filed 2002-11-07(1)(N)

Based on this, the record contains ample evidence to establish that TDPRS made efforts to work with Kristin on the service plans; however, Kristin failed to complete any of them. Therefore, the State showed it made reasonable efforts to return K.M.B. under the first element of section 161.001(1)(N).

Section 161.001(1)(N) can apply to an incarcerated parent if the requirements for constructive abandonment are met.

In Re DSA · filed 2003-08-06(1)(N)

In sum, incarceration does not render sub-paragraph (N) inapplicable simply because of incarceration.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when its conditions are met, and incarceration alone does not make it inapplicable.

in the Interest of Desarae Simberly Arrendondo, Evony Evonne Arredondo, Odyssey Jasell Arredondo, Children · filed 2003-08-06(1)(N)

In sum, incarceration does not render sub-paragraph (N) inapplicable simply because of incarceration.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in agency conservatorship for at least six months, the agency made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, and the parent failed to maintain regular contact and could not provide a safe environment.

In Re JJO · filed 2004-03-11(1)(N)

Looking at all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, giving due consideration to evidence that the fact finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing, we hold that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Appellant constructively abandoned J.J.O. under section 161.001(1)(N).

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has spent at least six months in agency conservatorship, the agency made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent failed to maintain regular visits or significant contact and could not provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of J.J.O. · filed 2004-03-11(1)(N)

Looking at all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, giving due consideration to evidence that the fact finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing, we hold that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Appellant constructively abandoned J.J.O. under section 161.001(1)(N).

Section 161.001(1)(N) provides a ground for termination when a child has been in temporary managing conservatorship for at least six months, the agency made reasonable efforts to return the child, the parent did not regularly visit or maintain significant contact, and the parent cannot provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of A.W. and J.K., Children · filed 2004-08-12(1)(N)

We have carefully reviewed the entire record, and under the applicable standards of review, we hold that the State established by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant constructively abandoned A.W. and J.K. under family code section 161.001(1)(N).

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes a statutory ground, including constructive abandonment, and termination is in the child's best interest.

in the Interest of T.A.C.W., Children · filed 2004-08-18(1)(N), (2)

This evidence constitutes legally and factually sufficient evidence to support both the trial court's finding of one of the statutory grounds for termination and its finding that termination is in the child's best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (Vernon 2002).

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when clear and convincing evidence establishes the required period of agency conservatorship, reasonable efforts to return the child, insufficient parental contact, and the parent's inability to provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of M.D.L.E. · filed 2007-03-08(1)(N)

We have carefully reviewed and considered the evidence and hold that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Eason constructively abandoned M.D.L.E. pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(N).

Section 161.001(1)(N) requires proof that the Department held the child for at least six months, made reasonable efforts to return the child, that the parent lacked regular contact, and that the parent could not provide a safe environment.

Earvin v. Department of Family & Protective Services · filed 2007-03-15(1)(N)

To support a ruling to terminate parental rights based on subsection 161.001(1)(N), the Department was required to prove that (1) the child has been under the conservatorship of the Department for not less than six months; (2) the Department has made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent; (3) the parent has not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the child; and (4) the parent has demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment. Id. § 161.001(1)(N). While we agree with the Department that the first three elements of constructive abandonment have been met, we do not agree that the Department met its burden on the fourth element.

Section 161.001(1)(N) requires proof that the parent cannot provide a safe environment; limited visitation addresses a separate element of constructive abandonment.

Malcolm Troy Earvin A/K/A Malcolm Earvin v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2007-03-15(1)(N)

The fifth fact goes to the third element of constructive abandonment, and it does not show, as the statute requires, that Earvin has demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment.

Section 161.001(1)(N)(i) requires evidence that the agency made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent before constructive abandonment can support termination.

McLane v. McLane · filed 2006-12-07(1)(N)(i)

Returning a child to a parent, under section161.001(1)(N)(i), does not necessarily mean that the child has to be physically delivered to the individual. ... Without any evidence of an effort by CPS to return E.A.W.S. to David, no reasonable fact-finder could form a firm belief or conviction that this element in the constructive abandonment ground for termination was proven.

Evidence of missed visits and intermittent contact can support submitting the visitation and contact ground under section 161.001(1)(N) to a jury.

in the Interest of B.S., D.R.S. and P.W.S. · filed 2007-05-17(1)(N)

The evidence in the record contains some evidence that Lisa did not regularly visit or maintain significant contact with her children. The record does not support Lisa's claim that there was no evidence to support the jury charge on this aspect of the Department's termination case.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the Department has had custody of the child for at least six months, made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent has not maintained regular contact or shown an ability to provide a safe environment.

Jose Luis Gonzalez, Sr. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2008-06-05(1)(N)

We hold that there is legally and factually sufficient evidence in this record supporting the district court’s finding that appellant constructively abandoned O.M.G., M.L.G., and J.L.G. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(N).

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when clear and convincing evidence establishes the required period of conservatorship, reasonable efforts to return the child, insufficient parental contact, and inability to provide a safe environment.

Gentry v. State · filed 2008-12-18(1)(N)

Under this state of the evidence, we must conclude that the evidence is factually and legally sufficient to support termination pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(N).

Section 161.001(1)(N) allows termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in state or agency conservatorship for at least six months, reasonable efforts were made to return the child, and the parent failed to maintain significant contact and provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of M.R.J.M., a Child · filed 2009-02-26(1)(N)

Based on the foregoing and giving due deference to the jury’s findings, the jury could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Michael constructively abandoned M.R.J.M. by failing to regularly visit or maintain significant contact with her, by demonstrating an inability to provide her with a safe environment, and by failing to complete his service plan despite the State’s reasonable efforts to return M.R.J.M. to him.

Section 161.001(1)(N)(i) requires the Department to make reasonable efforts to return a child to the parent before parental rights may be terminated for constructive abandonment.

White v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2008-12-19(1)(N)(i)

To support termination pursuant to section 161.001(1)(N), the Department also had to show that it had made "reasonable efforts" to return T.S. to White. ... We conclude that the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support that the Department made reasonable efforts to return T.S. to White.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the agency makes reasonable efforts to return the child; preparing and administering a service plan is evidence of those efforts.

in the Interest of J.R.S., J.L.S., and B.L.N.S. · filed 2009-02-05(1)(N)

As TDFPS points out, this court and others have reasoned that TDFPS’s preparation and administration of a service plan for the parent constitutes evidence that TDFPS made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent. ... Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s section 161.001(1)(N) finding that Melissa constructively abandoned her children.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when DFPS has held managing conservatorship for at least six months, made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent has not maintained regular contact or shown an ability to provide a safe environment.

Quiroz v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2009-04-09(1)(N)

We hold that the evidence of Quiroz's inability to provide S.M. a safe environment is legally and factually sufficient for the finding of termination of parental rights.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in department custody for at least six months, the department made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent has neither maintained significant contact nor shown an ability to provide a safe environment.

Dashonnon D. Johnson, Sr. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2009-07-23(1)(N)

We hold that the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Johnson constructively abandoned his children as the Legislature has defined it.

Section 161.001(1)(N) allows evidence of endangering conduct and environment to bear on whether a parent can provide a child with a safe environment.

in the Interest of J. J. W., a Child · filed 2009-08-11(1)(N)

We recognize that M.R.J.M. and S.M.L. examine incarceration as a consideration under Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E), but, since safe environment is an element of subsection (N), we think evidence of endangering environment and endangering conduct is also relevant to a parent's ability to provide a child with a safe environment.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the child has been in Department custody for at least six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child, the parent has not regularly visited or maintained significant contact, and the parent cannot provide a safe environment.

M.C. v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services · filed 2009-10-28(1)(N)

To prove constructive abandonment, clear and convincing evidence must establish that the child has been in the custody of the Department for at least six months and: (1) the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent; (2) the parent has not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the child; and (3) the parent has demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment. ... In light of the aforementioned evidence, we hold that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that M.C. constructively abandoned her child.

Section 161.001(1)(N) makes constructive abandonment a ground for termination when the child has been in Department custody for at least six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent failed to maintain significant contact and could not provide a safe environment.

M. C. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2009-10-28(1)(N)

Because we find there was both legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding under Section 161.001(1)(N), we need not address the other findings of statutory acts or omission or commission under subparagraphs (D), (E), or (O).

Section 161.001(1)(N)(i)'s reasonable-efforts requirement for constructive abandonment can be satisfied through a service plan to reunite parent and child.

in the Interest of A.B., a Child · filed 2009-10-28(1)(N)(i)

We find the evidence is legally and factually sufficient that the department made reasonable efforts to return the child as required by Section 161.001(N)(i).

Section 161.001(1)(N)(ii) permits a finding of constructive abandonment when a parent never visits the children and maintains only sporadic, misleading telephone contact.

in the Interest of T.M., D.M., Jr., C.M. A/K/A S.M., and D.M., Children · filed 2009-12-31(1)(N)(ii)

We conclude that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Father did not maintain significant contact with the children, and we therefore hold that the evidence detailed above is legally and factually sufficient in that regard.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in DFPS conservatorship for at least six months, DFPS made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent failed to visit regularly and provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of K. L. L. H. and T. J. A., Minor Children · filed 2010-01-12(1)(N)

Further, the record demonstrated that DFPS was temporary managing conservator of the children for well over six months, that Allison visited the children only once prior to her incarceration, and that she was unable to provide them with a safe environment. Thus, constructive abandonment was also established by clear and convincing evidence.

Constructive abandonment under section 161.001(1)(N) requires at least six months in state care, reasonable efforts to return the child, lack of regular visits or significant contact, and inability to provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of M.V.G., a Child · filed 2010-03-03(1)(N)

There is conflicting evidence in the record, but we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the court’s finding of constructive abandonment under section 161.001(1)(N).

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in Department custody for at least six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent failed to maintain regular contact and could not provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of T.G. · filed 2010-04-08(1)(N)

Having carefully reviewed the entire record under the applicable standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency, we hold the Department established by clear and convincing evidence that appellant constructively abandoned T.G. under family code section 161.001(1)(N).

Under Section 161.001(1)(N), a service plan and consideration of relative placements can satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement for constructive abandonment.

in the Interest of K. J. T. M., a Child · filed 2010-04-27(1)(N)

The Department‘s preparation and administration of a service plan, in conjunction with its consideration of all relative placements, demonstrate that the trial court did not err in finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to McFarland.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the child has been in Department conservatorship for at least six months, the Department has made reasonable efforts to return the child, the parent has not regularly visited or maintained significant contact, and the parent cannot provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of B.N., a Child · filed 2010-09-01(1)(N)

The evidence was both legally and factually sufficient for the trial court to have determined that Mary had constructively abandoned B.N.

Section 161.001(1)(N) allows a constructive abandonment finding when reasonable efforts to return the child are proved and the parent demonstrates an inability to provide a safe environment, along with the other required elements.

in the Interest of D.A., a Child · filed 2010-09-16(1)(N)

We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to prove that the Department made reasonable efforts to return D.A. to Terrance. ... Thus, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient as to the “safe environment” element of constructive abandonment.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the Department has made reasonable efforts to return the child, the parent has not regularly visited or maintained significant contact, and the parent cannot provide a safe environment.

LaRocca v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2010-11-04(1)(N)

As a result, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to determine that statutory grounds exist for terminating LaRocca’s parental rights under part (N) of family code section 161.001(1).

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in the Department’s custody for at least six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent failed to maintain regular contact and cannot provide a safe home.

Suazo v. State · filed 2010-11-04(1)(N)

As a result, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to determine that statutory grounds exist for terminating LaRocca’s parental rights under part (N) of family code section 161.001(1).

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when an incarcerated parent cannot provide a safe environment for the child, including through family members.

In Re NRT · filed 2011-03-22(1)(N)

Based on this record, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's findings that the mother constructively abandoned N.R.T., as described in § 161.001(1)(N).

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the Department has cared for the child for at least six months, made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent has failed to maintain significant contact and shown an inability to provide a safe environment.

In the Interest of N.R.T., a Child · filed 2011-03-22(1)(N)

Based on this record, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's findings that the mother constructively abandoned N.R.T., as described in § 161.001(1)(N).

Under § 161.001(1)(N), regular visits may still fall short of significant contact, and a parent’s homelessness and undisclosed move may show inability to provide a safe environment.

In the Interest of G.B. · filed 2011-06-01(1)(N)

She did not bring anything with her to the visits and did not inquire about G.B.II’s well-being when calling the Department. Further, sometime between the date the “Final Hearing Court Report” was filed and the date the final hearing was held, that being ten days, E.F. left the State without notifying the Department. E.F. also could not provide G.B.II with a safe environment because she had been homeless for some time and left the State without letting the Department know where she was living. After reviewing the entire record, we find a fact-finder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that E.F. constructively abandoned G.B.II.

Section 161.001(1)(N) defines constructive abandonment through at least six months in state conservatorship, reasonable efforts to return the child, lack of regular visits or significant contact, and inability to provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of K.G., a Child · filed 2011-07-28(1)(N)

Based on our review above, we determine that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that each of the elements under section 161.001(1)(N) were proven.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in department care for at least six months, the department made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent neither maintained regular contact nor demonstrated an ability to provide a safe environment.

D.O.H. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2011-08-23(1)(N)

When considering the whole record, we determine that Butler’s testimony is factually sufficient for a fact finder to form a reasonable belief that appellant constructively abandoned C.D.H. for the reasons stated above.

Under section 161.001(1)(N), minimal and sporadic correspondence does not establish regular, significant contact with a child.

in the Interest of J.D.S. · filed 2011-09-22(1)(N)

Though his desire to have contact with J.D.S. is commendable, his minimal and sporadic correspondence supports the trial court’s conclusion that he did not regularly maintain significant contact with her.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the Department has held conservatorship for at least six months and made reasonable efforts to return the child, but the parent has not maintained significant contact and cannot provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of E.N.C., a Child · filed 2011-09-28(1)(N)

We find the above evidence was sufficient to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that appellant constructively abandoned E.N.C.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when clear and convincing evidence establishes the statutory conditions.

In the Interest of D.W., a Child · filed 2011-11-18(1)(N)

Under this state of the evidence, we must conclude that the evidence is factually and legally sufficient to support termination pursuant to Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(N).

Constructive abandonment under Section 161.001(1)(N) requires at least six months of agency managing conservatorship, reasonable efforts to return the child, lack of regular parental contact, and the parent's inability to provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of Z.G., L.H., A.B., and L.W., Children · filed 2012-03-08(1)(N)

To support termination for constructive abandonment under Section 161.001(1)(N), it must be shown that the Department or an authorized agency had been the managing conservator of the child for not less than six months, that the Department or authorized agency had made reasonable efforts to return the child, that the parent had not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the child, and that the parent had demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when clear and convincing evidence establishes the required period in Department custody, reasonable efforts to return the child, lack of regular contact, and inability to provide a safe environment.

In the Interest of K.L. · filed 2012-05-31(1)(N)

To establish that a child is constructively abandoned, the party seeking the termination must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the parent constructively abandoned the child who has been in temporary managing conserva-torship of the Department for not less than six months; (2) the Department has made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent; (3) the parent has not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the child; and (4) the parent has demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment. ... The evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding regarding Father’s constructive abandonment of K.L.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the Department has held conservatorship for at least six months and made reasonable efforts to return the child, but the parent has failed to maintain regular visits or significant contact and cannot provide a safe environment.

Nuyen v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2012-07-25(1)(N)

In order to prove constructive abandonment, the Department must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (1) it had a permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the child for at least six months; (2) it made reasonable efforts to return the child to Nuyen; (3) Nuyen did not regularly visit or maintain significant contact with the child; and (4) Nuyen demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the Department has held managing conservatorship for at least six months, made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent has failed to maintain regular contact and cannot provide a safe environment.

Nuyen v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2012-08-23(1)(N)

We conclude that the above evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support an affirmative finding under section 161.001(1)(N).

Section 161.001(1)(N)’s six-month requirement for constructive abandonment can be satisfied by temporary managing conservatorship that begins with an emergency order and continues through termination.

in the Interest of K.A.S., a Child · filed 2012-09-12(1)(N)

We agree that the Department was appointed temporary managing conservator on July 20, 2011, and that K.A.S. was in the Department’s conservatorship for six consecutive months.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the child has been in Department or agency conservatorship for at least six months, the agency made reasonable efforts to return the child, the parent lacked regular visits or significant contact, and the parent could not provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of A.D.P., L.P., and M.R.B., Children · filed 2013-03-07(1)(N)

To support termination for constructive abandonment under Section 161.001(1)(N), it must be shown that the Department or an authorized agency had been the managing conservator of the child for not less than six months, that the Department or authorized agency had made reasonable efforts to return the child, that the parent had not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the child, and that the parent had demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment. ... The trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(1)(N) is supported by the record.

Subsection (1)(N) requires proof of six months of constructive abandonment before the parent's incarceration.

in the Interest of M.L.B., a Child · filed 2013-03-12(1)(N)

We note that the trial court’s ruling on the motion for instructed verdict was in error because the Department did not prove constructive abandonment for six months prior to appellant’s incarceration. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(N).

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has spent at least six months in state or agency conservatorship, reasonable efforts were made to return the child, and the parent neither maintained significant contact nor could provide a safe environment.

H. N. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2013-03-13(1)(N)

Under Section 161.001(1)(N) of the Texas Family Code, a parent constructively abandons a child when (1) the child has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the State or an authorized agency for at least six months; (2) the State or authorized agency has made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent; (3) the parent has not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the child; and (4) the parent has demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment. ... After carefully reviewing the entire record under the applicable standards of review, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that H.N. constructively abandoned S.R.

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the child has been in the Department’s conservatorship for at least six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parents failed to maintain significant contact and could not provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of B.S.M., a Child · filed 2013-03-15(1)(N)

The findings made by the trial court pursuant to Section 161.001(1)(N), including the disputed findings that the parents had not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with B.S.M. and had not demonstrated an ability to provide B.S.M. with a safe environment, are supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 161.001(1)(N)’s constructive abandonment ground can apply to incarcerated parents.

in the Interest of A.H., a Child · filed 2013-03-21(1)(N)

Accordingly, we conclude and hold that subsection N can be applied to incarcerated parents.

Section 161.001(1)(N) requires reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent, including a reasonable opportunity to comply with a service plan; subsection (1)(P) requires evidence of drug use that endangered the child and failure to complete treatment or continued drug abuse after treatment.

in the Interest of A.Q.W. · filed 2013-01-23(1)(N), (1)(P)

On this scant record, we must conclude the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding that the Department made a reasonable effort to return A.Q.W. to his father. ... Therefore, we conclude the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding under section 161.001(1)(P).

Section 161.001(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in state care for at least six months, the state made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent failed to maintain regular contact and could not provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of S.A.N., a Child · filed 2013-06-20(1)(N)

We thus hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s section 161.001(1)(N) finding, and we overrule Mother’s first issue.

Section 161.001(1)(N)(ii) makes a parent's failure to visit regularly or maintain significant contact with the child an element of constructive abandonment.

in the Interest of E. Y., a Child · filed 2013-07-03(1)(N)(ii)

One element of constructive abandonment under section 161.001(N) of the Family Code is the parent’s failure to regularly visit or maintain significant contact with the child. ... We conclude the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that appellant did not visit or maintain contact with E.Y.

Reasonable efforts to return a child can satisfy the constructive abandonment ground even when a service plan is waived, if the Department offers services and arranges visitation.

in the Interest of S.A.C., a Child · filed 2013-05-22(1)(N)(i)

After considering the evidence set forth above, as well as the rest of the evidence in the record, we hold the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that A.A.M. constructively abandoned S.A.C. and that the Department made reasonable efforts to return S.A.C.

Section 161.001(1)(N) supports termination when the evidence establishes constructive abandonment.

in the Interest of B.C., a Child · filed 2013-08-01(1)(N)

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the termination judgment and disregarding all contrary evidence that a reasonable factfinder could disregard, we find the evidence supports the trial court’s termination of J.G.’s parental rights to B.C. pursuant to section 161.001(1)(N) of the Family Code.

Section 161.001(1)(N)’s reasonable-efforts requirement can be supported by the State’s preparation and administration of a service plan for the parent.

in the Interest of R.P. Children · filed 2013-10-23(1)(N)

The State’s preparation and administration of a service plan for the parent constitutes evidence that the State made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent.

Section 161.001(1)(N) supports a constructive-abandonment finding when the parent fails to maintain contact, provide a safe environment, and complete the service plan.

in the Interest of L.L.M. and E.M. · filed 2013-11-06(1)(N)

Looking at all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, giving due consideration to evidence that the fact-finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that O.M. constructively abandoned L.L.M. and E.M. (1) by failing to regularly visit or maintain significant contact with the children, (2) by demonstrating an inability to provide them with a safe environment, and (3) by failing to complete his service plan.

Section 161.001(1)(N) supports termination when the evidence establishes constructive abandonment.

in the Interest of B.M., M.L., and A.A.C., Children · filed 2013-12-10(1)(N)

We conclude, after applying the appropriate standards of review, that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of constructive abandonment under section 161.001(1)(N).

Subsection (1)(N) supports termination when the evidence establishes constructive abandonment.

in the Interest of H.E.M.T. and E.A.T., Children · filed 2014-04-24(1)(N)

Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(1)(N).

The evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support constructive abandonment under subsection (1)(N).

in the Interest of M.R., J. and M.R., Children · filed 2014-06-09(1)(N)

The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's findings under section 161.001(1)(N).

The evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support constructive abandonment under subsection (1)(N).

in the Interest of D.J.B., a Child · filed 2014-06-09(1)(N)

The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's findings under section 161.001(1)(N).

The evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support termination under subsection (1)(N).

in the Interest of K. B., a Child · filed 2014-07-09(1)(N)

Furthermore, although some of the evidence conflicts with the trial court’s finding, this evidence is not so significant that a reasonable trier of fact could not have reconciled it in favor of its finding and formed a firm belief or conviction that grounds for termination of D.B.’s parental rights exist under subsection 161.001(1)(N). Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of grounds for termination.

The evidence legally and factually supported constructive abandonment under subsection (1)(N).

in the Interest of V.D.A., a Child · filed 2014-12-23(1)(N)

In sum, under the applicable standards of review, the record evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the finding that the Father constructively abandoned the Child pursuant to section 161.001(1)(N).

The evidence legally and factually supported the constructive-abandonment finding.

in the Interest of K.W. and K.W., Minor Children · filed 2014-12-23(1)(N)

After carefully reviewing and considering the evidence, we hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Mother constructively abandoned both Boy and Girl.

An incarcerated parent’s proposed caregiver who failed to seek custody did not establish an arrangement for the child’s care.

in the Interest of v. G., Children · filed 2015-01-28(1)(N)

Here, Patricia made arrangements for Joel to take custody of M.V.G. during her incarceration, but he failed to take the necessary actions to gain custody.

One visit in eight months does not count as regular visitation or significant contact under the constructive-abandonment ground for termination.

in the Interest of E.L., M.R., and H.R., Children · filed 2015-04-09(1)(N)(ii)

In any event, one visit in eight months does not constitute “regular” visitation or “significant” contact with the children.

For constructive abandonment under subsection (1)(N), a service plan can show reasonable return efforts, but the parent must also be able to provide a safe home.

in the Interest of A.C.B., a Child · filed 2015-05-29(1)(N)

A service plan alone is evidence that the Department made reasonable attempts to return the child to the parents, In the Interest of N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 674 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.), and there is evidence here that the Department made extra efforts to help them complete the plan. The evidence also supports a finding that the parents are not able to provide the child with a safe environment.

Section 161.001(1)(N) requires at least six months of Department conservatorship, reasonable efforts to return the child, a lack of regular contact by the parent, and the parent’s inability to provide a safe environment to establish constructive abandonment.

in the Interest of L.L., a Child · filed 2015-05-29(1)(N)

To support a finding of constructive abandonment, the Department must have shown that L.L. had been in the managing conservatorship of the Department for at least six months, that the Department had made reasonable efforts to return L.L., that the mother had not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with L.L., and that the mother had demonstrated an inability to provide L.L. with a safe environment.

Attempted service of a termination suit and steps to establish paternity, standing alone, do not prove reasonable efforts to return a child to a parent.

in the Interest of A.L.H., Child · filed 2015-06-16(1)(N)(i)

We conclude attempted service of suit and establishment of paternity, standing alone, are insufficient to produce in the trial court’s mind a firm belief or conviction that the Department made reasonable efforts at reunification.

Under section 161.001(1)(N), preparing and administering a service plan and considering placement with relatives can satisfy the Department’s duty to make reasonable efforts to return a child to a parent.

in the Interest of A.T.L., a Child · filed 2015-10-28(1)(N)

We conclude the Department’s preparation and administration of a service plan, in conjunction with its consideration of relative placements, supports the trial court’s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to appellant.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) provides a ground for termination when a child has spent at least six months in Department conservatorship, the Department has made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent has failed to maintain regular contact or provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of J.M., a Child · filed 2016-09-22(b)(1)(N)

The Department presented clear and convincing evidence as to each of the elements under subsection (N).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the Department has held conservatorship for at least six months, made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent has neither maintained regular contact nor shown an ability to provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of G.P., a Child · filed 2016-09-28(b)(1)(N)

Constructive abandonment under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(N) has four elements: (1) the Department had permanent or temporary conservatorship of the child for at least six months; (2) the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent; (3) the parent did not regularly visit or maintain significant contact with the child; and (4) the parent demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) requires reasonable efforts to return a child to a parent, not ideal efforts.

in the Interest of N.K.T. · filed 2016-10-27(b)(1)(N)

However, as aptly noted by one court, “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination under Section 161.001(1)(N), the issue is whether the Department made reasonable efforts, not ideal efforts.”

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the child has been in the Department’s conservatorship for at least six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child, the parent failed to maintain regular contact, and the parent cannot provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of L.F.B., a Child · filed 2017-07-18(b)(1)(N)

Therefore, the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support termination under § 161.001(b)(1)(N).

Subsection (b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the Department has had custody for at least six months, made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent has not maintained regular contact or shown an ability to provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of D.R.M., J.Y.M., D.M.M., and D.N.M., Children · filed 2017-12-28(b)(1)(N)

Based on the above evidence, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support termination under 161.001(b)(1)(N).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) requires the Department to make reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent before constructive abandonment can support termination.

In re Interest of F.E.N. · filed 2018-02-06(b)(1)(N)

We do not agree that the Department's actions constitute a reasonable effort to return Fay to Father. The record does not shed light on the Department's failure to serve Father with notice of the first suit or whether any attempt at service was made. Additionally, the Department's 2011 permanency goal of unrelated adoption is contrary to an attempt to return Fay to Father.

Constructive abandonment requires proof of reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent, and failure to comply with a service plan cannot support termination when the Department never served the plan on the parent.

in the Interest of D.G. · filed 2018-01-25(b)(1)(N), (b)(1)(O)

Because there is no evidence to support the first element of constructive-abandonment, we hold the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s constructive-abandonment finding. ... Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s subsection (O) finding, we hold that the trial court could not have reasonably formed a firm conviction or belief that the Department put on clear and convincing evidence to support the finding that Father had failed to comply with the provision of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for Father to obtain the return of Douglas because the Department never served the service plan on Father.

A parent’s failure to meet visitation conditions can support a constructive-abandonment finding when the parent also fails to maintain significant contact or demonstrate an ability to provide a safe environment.

L. R. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2018-06-21(b)(1)(N)

Whether viewed through the lens of legal or factual sufficiency, the record, although sparse, contains evidence from which the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm conviction or belief that Lori had neither regularly visited or maintained significant contact with Abby nor demonstrated an ability to provide a safe environment.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N)(iii) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent cannot provide a safe environment; a preference for placement with a relative does not establish that inability without evidence about the parent's living conditions.

In re Of · filed 2018-02-13(b)(1)(N)(iii)

Given the lack of any evidence about Father's living conditions, we are unwilling to equate Father's supposed preference that Rico live with Father's mother (the only evidence of which is hearsay admitted over objection) with proof by clear and convincing evidence that he is unable to provide Rico a safe environment. The Department failed to meet its burden of proof.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) allows termination for constructive abandonment when the child has been in Department care for at least six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent failed to maintain significant contact or provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of C.W., a Child · filed 2018-07-05(b)(1)(N)

Further, the evidence considered by the trial court legally and factually supported the trial court’s findings that (1) Father’s actions satisfied at least one ground listed in section 161.001(b)(1) and alleged in the termination petition and (2) terminating Father’s parental rights was in C.W.’s best interests under section 161.001(b)(2).

Subsection (b)(1)(N) requires proof that the parent failed to maintain significant contact with the child; an incarcerated parent’s letters asking a caseworker about the child can defeat that finding.

in the Interest of A.H., A.D. and A.T., Children · filed 2018-11-28(b)(1)(N)

Therefore, reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that C.T.T. constructively abandoned the children because he did not maintain significant contact with the children and, therefore, the evidence of abandonment under subsection (N) is legally insufficient.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the Department has cared for the child for at least six months and made reasonable efforts to return the child, while the parent has not maintained significant contact and cannot provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of T.T., a Child · filed 2019-04-18(b)(1)(N)

We hold that the Department presented clear and convincing evidence as to each of the four elements under subsection (N).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in agency conservatorship for at least six months, the agency has made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent has failed to maintain regular contact and provide a safe home.

C. G. and B. E. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2019-07-26(b)(1)(N)

Based on the foregoing, the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm conviction or belief that Chad constructively abandoned Alan and Zoe by failing to regularly visit or maintain significant contact with them, by demonstrating an inability to provide them with a safe environment, and by failing to complete his service plan despite the Department’s reasonable efforts to return Alan and Zoe to him. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(N).

Subsection (b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the Department has held managing conservatorship for at least six months, made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent has neither maintained regular contact nor shown an ability to provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of B.C. and P.C., Children · filed 2019-07-30(b)(1)(N)

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the termination judgment and disregarding all contrary evidence that a reasonable factfinder could disregard, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the evidence supports the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights to B.C. and P.C. pursuant to section 161.001(b)(1)(N).

Subsection (b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the child has been in Department conservatorship for at least six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent failed to maintain regular contact or provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of C. E. P., III Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2019-08-06(b)(1)(N)

We therefore hold that there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination was justified as to Mother under predicate (N).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the Department has held conservatorship for at least six months, made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent has not maintained significant contact or shown an ability to provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of A.H. · filed 2019-10-03(b)(1)(N)

Viewing all the evidence in the record in a light most favorable to the trial court’s finding of constructive abandonment, as we must in a legal sufficiency review, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the finding of constructive abandonment under subsection N.

The reasonable efforts element of constructive abandonment can be satisfied by efforts to locate a parent and arrange services and visitation when the parent does not attend the arranged meeting or provide contact information.

in the Interest of J.S. and R.S., Children · filed 2019-10-31(b)(1)(N)

Applying the appropriate standards of review, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the girls to Mother.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in state conservatorship for at least six months, the State made reasonable efforts to return the child, the parent did not regularly visit or maintain significant contact, and the parent cannot provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of X.A.S., a Child · filed 2020-03-03(b)(1)(N)

Therefore, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support termination of Mother’s parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(N).

Under subsection (N), reasonable efforts to return a child to a parent may be shown by means other than implementing a service plan.

in the Interest of A.R., a Child · filed 2020-03-26(b)(1)(N)

Implementation of a service plan, however, is not the only means by which the Department can demonstrate reasonable efforts to return a child to a parent for purposes of satisfying subsection (N).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the Department makes reasonable efforts to return the child, but the parent does not maintain significant contact and cannot provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of N.F., J.G., and O.M. · filed 2020-04-30(b)(1)(N)

On this record, the trial court could have concluded, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent, that Rick did not regularly visit or maintain significant contact with Jack, and that Rick had demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment.

Subsection (b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the child has been in Department conservatorship for at least six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent failed to maintain significant contact or provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of J.A., Children v. . · filed 2020-08-26(b)(1)(N)

Therefore, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Mom constructively abandoned the children.

Under the constructive abandonment ground, a family service plan designed to reunify the parent and children can support a finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children.

in the Interest of S.B. & S.B., Children · filed 2020-09-08(b)(1)(N)(i)

However, the evidence shows that the Department implemented a family service plan that provided services to Mother and was designed to reunify Mother with the children. ... We conclude the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children to Mother.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent cannot provide a safe environment; without sufficient evidence of that element, constructive abandonment cannot support termination.

in the Interest of D.P.G., a Child · filed 2020-12-09(b)(1)(N)

Because the trial court’s finding of constructive abandonment under subsection (N) is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, the finding cannot support the trial court’s order of termination.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the Department makes reasonable efforts to return the children and the parent neither maintains significant contact nor demonstrates an ability to provide a safe environment.

in Re J.I.P., A.R.P., S.R.P., I.S.P., and F.A.P., Children · filed 2021-04-07(b)(1)(N)

Based on the above, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that appellant constructively abandoned his five children.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) provides a termination ground for constructive abandonment when a child has been in Department conservatorship for at least six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent failed to maintain regular contact and demonstrated an inability to provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of V.S., a Child · filed 2021-04-14(b)(1)(N)

Therefore, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Dad constructively abandoned V.S.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) requires reasonable, rather than ideal, efforts by the Department to return a child to the parent.

in the Interest of M.S., a Child · filed 2021-05-06(b)(1)(N)

When reviewing whether sufficient evidence supports termination under Section 161.001(b)(1)(N), the issue is whether the Department made reasonable efforts, not ideal efforts.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N)(ii) can support a constructive abandonment finding despite suspended visitation when the parent could regain access by complying with drug testing.

in the Interest OF I.D. & A.D., Minor Children · filed 2021-09-17(b)(1)(N)(ii)

Here, we conclude that the Department did not unreasonably thwart Father’s possession and access, because submitting to drug testing to regain access to the children was within his control.

Under subsection (b)(1)(N), the Department can establish reasonable efforts to return a child by showing that an alleged father impeded its attempts to adjudicate his parentage.

in the Interest of A.M., a Child · filed 2022-01-31(b)(1)(N)

We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to prove that the Department made reasonable efforts to return A.M. to appellant, but appellant impeded its attempts to timely adjudicate appellant’s parentage.

A restriction on visitation does not prevent a constructive abandonment finding when the parent makes no effort to seek updates about the children or maintain contact.

in the Interest of S.P. and J.P. · filed 2022-02-03(b)(1)(N)

Evidence in the record indicated that Daniel made no effort to contact the Department and to seek updates or information about the children, even if his criminal court bond conditions may have required that he have no personal contact with the children. On this record, the trial court could have found that, as a result of his own actions and indifference, Daniel failed to regularly visit or maintain significant contact with Sandra and Jared.

Subsection (b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the child has been in Department conservatorship for at least six months and the Department proves the required reunification efforts, lack of regular parental contact, and inability to provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of B. N. M., a Child · filed 2022-04-29(b)(1)(N)

The court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if the parent constructively abandoned the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than six months and (1) the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent, (2) the parent has not regularly visited or maintained contact with the child, and (3) the parent demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment. ... Based on the evidence at trial, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that C.M. constructively abandoned B.N.M., and the disputed evidence is not so significant that a reasonable factfinder could not form a firm belief or conviction of this finding.

A parent’s failure to regularly visit or maintain significant contact with a child can support constructive abandonment even when the parent wanted to visit but failed to meet a condition for visitation within the parent’s control.

in the Interest of A.G.N. and A.T., Children · filed 2022-05-12(b)(1)(N)(ii)

On this record, we conclude that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Horace failed to regularly visit or maintain significant contact with Amber.

Subsection (b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in TDFPS conservatorship for at least six months, TDFPS made reasonable efforts to return the child, the parent lacked regular visits or significant contact, and the parent could not provide a safe environment.

in the Interest of E.B., a Child · filed 2022-11-23(b)(1)(N)

We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Mother constructively abandoned E.B. Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s issue regarding termination under Subsection (N).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in DFPS conservatorship for at least six months and clear and convincing evidence establishes reasonable efforts to return the child, lack of regular visitation or significant contact, and the parent’s inability to provide a safe environment.

In the Interest of M.J.G., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-06-07(b)(1)(N)

Therefore, viewing the evidence with deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and indulging every reasonable inference, we hold there is legally sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that M.M. constructively abandoned M.J.G. under subsection (N).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when the child has been in Department conservatorship for at least six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent failed to maintain regular contact and demonstrated an inability to provide a safe environment.

A. D. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2023-06-21(b)(1)(N)

After considering the relevant factors under the appropriate standards of review, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that Mother constructively abandoned Michael.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N)(ii) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent has not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the child to support termination for constructive abandonment.

In the Interest of M.G., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-06-15(b)(1)(N)(ii)

To support termination of a parent’s rights under Subsection (N), a factfinder must find by clear and convincing evidence that, among other things, “the parent has not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the child.” ... As Father’s appellate counsel points out in his brief, the evidence in this case—including the testimony of the Department’s own witnesses—shows that Father regularly visited M.G. and maintained significant contact with her. ... Therefore, even though correcting this finding does not alter the final outcome of this case, we nonetheless “modify the trial court’s order to match the facts” by striking the unproven Subsection (N) predicate-ground finding.

For constructive abandonment, sporadic visits and lengthy gaps without contact can support a finding that a parent did not regularly visit or maintain contact with the child.

In the Interest of S.S.B. and A.A.C., Children v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2023-10-05(b)(1)(N)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, the factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother had not regularly visited or maintained contact with Alan.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in the Department’s conservatorship for at least six months, the Department has made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent has neither maintained significant contact nor shown an ability to provide a safe environment.

In the Interest of A.M., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-11-02(b)(1)(N)

Despite the Department’s reasonable reunification efforts, Appellant’s unwillingness to demonstrate that she could provide A.M. with a safe environment, and her failure to communicate or maintain significant contact, furnished the trial court with legally and factually sufficient evidence to support its finding that Appellant constructively abandoned A.M. under subsection (N).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in DFPS conservatorship for at least six months, DFPS made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent failed to maintain significant contact or provide a safe environment.

In the Interest of K.W. AKA K.D. a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2023-12-07(b)(1)(N)

Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding pursuant to section 161.001(b)(1)(N) of the Family Code.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when DFPS made reasonable efforts to return the child, the parent failed to maintain significant contact, and the parent could not provide a safe environment.

In the Interest of K.W. AKA K.D. a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2024-01-11(b)(1)(N)

Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding pursuant to section 161.001(b)(1)(N) of the Family Code.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in the Department’s care for at least six months, the Department has made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent has neither maintained significant contact nor shown an ability to provide a safe environment.

In the Interest of K.S.G., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-03-19(b)(1)(N)

The Department established by clear and convincing evidence that (1) it made reasonable efforts to return the child, (2) A.G. failed to maintain any contact whatsoever with his child, and (3) A.G. was not able to provide a safe environment for his child. Thus, there is clear and convincing evidence to establish A.G. constructively abandoned his child.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) does not require proof that a parent intended to constructively abandon the child.

In the Interest of C.K.T., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-02-29(b)(1)(N)

Likewise, we do not find a requirement of scienter in subsection N.

Under Section 161.001(b)(1)(N), implementing a service plan is one way to prove reasonable efforts to return a child, but other reunification efforts can also satisfy that element.

In the Interest of Y.T.A.D. AKA Y.D.A. and K.A., Children v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2024-08-08(b)(1)(N)

However, implementing a service plan is not the exclusive means of establishing that reasonable efforts were made. ... Based on this evidence, a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children to Mother.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment when a child has been in Department custody for at least six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child, and the parent neither regularly visited nor maintained significant contact and could not provide a safe environment.

In the Interest of J.A., a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2024-08-08(b)(1)(N)

Here, we conclude that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports termination under the predicate ground of constructive abandonment, subsection 161.001(b)(N).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) identifies constructive abandonment as a ground for terminating parental rights.

J. S. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2025-05-14(b)(1)(N)

However, the language of the order before the reference to ground (G) discusses Mother’s having constructively abandoned the children, which is the language used in ground (N), not (G). ... Accordingly, we modify the decree of termination to reflect that Mother’s parental rights were terminated on ground (N) and not (G).

A reunification service plan can satisfy the Department’s reasonable-efforts element of constructive abandonment.

In the Interest of L. S. R. and C. W. R., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-06-05(b)(1)(N)

Therefore, a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm conviction that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children to Father through its uncontroverted preparation and attempted execution of the reunification service plan.

A parent’s failure to support the children, take required drug tests, and maintain significant contact can support a finding that the parent cannot provide a safe environment.

In the Interest of K.E.C. and N.S.L., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-07-24(b)(1)(N)(iii)

By failing to make contributions to the children’s care, refusing to take required drug tests, and failing to maintain significant contact with the ... children, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Mother had demonstrated an inability to provide K.E.C. and N.S.L. with a safe environment.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(N) requires proof that a parent failed to regularly visit or maintain significant contact with the children before parental rights may be terminated for constructive abandonment.

In the Interest of D. G. and A. G., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-11-24(b)(1)(N)

Because the record evidence indicates that Mother “ha[d] been attending parent-child visits regularly,” we must conclude that no reasonable factfinder could have found that Mother failed to regularly visit or maintain significant contact with the children.

A certified order placing a parent on deferred adjudication community supervision for injury to a child can alone provide clear and convincing evidence of this ground for termination.

Tidwell v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2001-01-25(1)(L)(ix)

This evidence alone is sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination based on section 161.001(1)(L)(ix).

Section 161.001(1)(L)(iv) requires evidence that the parent caused a child’s death or serious injury while committing a listed offense; a conviction or deferred adjudication alone does not establish that result.

Vidaurri v. Ensey · filed 2001-02-14(1)(L)(iv)

Additionally, we find nothing in the statute itself expressly directing a court to infer the existence of death or serious injury to a child simply because a parent was convicted of or granted deferred adjudication viz-a-viz an enumerated crime.

Section 161.001(1)(L) permits termination when a parent commits an enumerated crime, guilt is adjudicated or deferred, and the underlying acts cause a child's death or serious injury.

In Re ARR · filed 2001-11-08(1)(L)

In applying the elements of section 161.001(1)(L), termination is permissible only if: (1) the parent has committed acts constituting a violation of one of the statutorily enumerated crimes listed in subsection L; (2) the parent's guilt for committing the crime has been adjudicated or the adjudication of that guilt has been deferred; and (3) the parent, in committing the acts that underlie the crime, was responsible for a child's death or serious injury.

Section 161.001(1)(L)(iv) requires proof that the parent's conduct caused a child's death or serious injury; a conviction or deferred adjudication alone is insufficient when that harm is not an element of the offense.

In Re LSR · filed 2001-12-06(1)(L)(iv)

While the conviction might be sufficient evidence of death or injury in those cases where death or serious injury to the child is an element of the offense, we hold that where death or serious injury is not an element of the offense, the conviction or deferred adjudication is not by itself sufficient evidence to support termination under section 161.001(1)(L)(iv).

Section 161.001(l)(L)(iv) requires proof that the conduct caused death or serious injury to a child; a conviction or deferred adjudication alone is insufficient when that harm is not an element of the offense.

In the Interest of L.S.R. · filed 2001-11-08(l)(L)(iv)

While the conviction might be sufficient evidence of death or injury in those cases where death or serious injury to the child is an element of the offense, we hold that where death or serious injury is not an element of the offense, the conviction or deferred adjudication is not by itself sufficient evidence to support termination under section 161.001(l)(L)(iv).

Section 161.001(1)(L)(iv)’s serious-injury ground does not categorically exclude molestation of a four-year-old or indecency with a child.

In the Interest of L.S.R · filed 2002-12-05(1)(L)(iv)

We deny the petitions for review, but disavow any suggestion that molestation of a four-year-old, or indecency with a child, generally, does not cause serious injury.

Section 161.001(1)(L) allows a final conviction for murdering a child to support termination without retrying the offense.

In the Interest of Castillo · filed 2003-03-17(1)(L)

The undisputed evidence that appellant had been convicted of the murder of his child is factually sufficient to sustain the termination. With regard to appellant’s continuing efforts to overturn his conviction, Subsection L does not required a retrial of the conviction, it is sufficient that the conviction has become final.