Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001

Section 161.001(1)(F) permits termination when a parent provides no support during the required one-year period despite having some ability to pay.

in the Interest of M.C.G., a Child · filed 2010-09-16(1)(F)

It is undisputed that appellant had at least $13,500 in income in the relevant time frame but provided no support at all. This is sufficient to support a finding by clear and convincing evidence of a violation of section 161.001(1)(F).

Section 161.001(1)(F) requires clear and convincing proof that a parent had the ability to support the child during each month of a consecutive twelve-month period but failed to do so.

in the Interest of L.J.N., a Minor Child · filed 2010-11-23(1)(F)

In other words, based on L.N.’s declarations of in-digency alone, no reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief that the matter to be proved by Stanfield — a consecutive twelve-month period in which L.N. both had the ability to pay and failed to pay — was true.

Section 161.001(1)(F) requires clear and convincing proof that a parent failed to support the child despite having the ability to do so during each month of the required twelve-month period.

In Re LJN · filed 2010-11-23(1)(F)

Although L.N. did testify that he has received twenty to thirty dollars from friends and relatives for his commissary fund, there was no testimony or other evidence that he received that assistance regularly or consistently, and as such, we do not find it to be evidence of his ability to pay support during each month of the relevant twelve-month statutory period.

Subsection (1)(F) permits termination when a parent fails to support a child according to the parent's ability; one payment below half the usual monthly obligation does not satisfy that duty.

in the Interest of D.S.W., a Child · filed 2010-12-29(1)(F)

One payment of less than half the usual monthly child support obligation does not equate to supporting a child in accordance with one’s ability.

Section 161.001(1)(F) permits termination when a parent fails to support a child according to the parent's ability for twelve consecutive months ending within six months before the termination petition; a parent who has acknowledged the child has a duty to support the child before formal paternity adjudication.

in the Interest of A.S.L., a Child · filed 2011-05-26(1)(F)

Thus, we hold that appellant had a duty to support Adam at least by January 1, 2008, and continuing in the time period relevant to section 161.001(1)(F).

Under section 161.001(1)(B), an unfulfilled suggestion of a single visit does not express an intent to return for the children.

in the Interest of G.A.H. and K.D.B., Children · filed 2011-10-06(1)(B)

One suggestion of a single visit that was never followed through on is not an expression of an intent to return. A factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm conviction that Father voluntarily left the children in the Browns’ possession without expressing an intent to return. We hold there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support termination under subsection (B).

Under subsection (F), a prior child-support order is no evidence of a parent's ability to pay; termination requires clear and convincing evidence of the parent's ability to support the child during the statutory period.

In Re DMD · filed 2012-03-27(1)(F)

We decline to adopt this rule and instead agree with the majority of courts which have considered this issue that a previous child-support order is no evidence of a parent's ability to pay for purposes of subsection (F); to hold otherwise would improperly shift the burden to the parent to disprove ability to pay.

A prior child-support order does not establish a parent’s ability to pay support for termination under subsection (F).

in the Interest of D.M.D., T.S.D., T.M.D., D.M.D AKA D.D., Children · filed 2012-03-27(1)(F)

Accordingly, the fact that appellant was ordered to pay $282.00 per month in child support has no bearing on her actual ability to provide support under subsection (F).

A parent may be found to have abandoned a child by leaving the child with another for at least six consecutive months without providing or arranging adequate support.

in the Interest of T.L.S and E.A.S., the Children · filed 2012-12-13(1)(C)

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support termination of appellant’s parental rights under section 161.001(C).

Under subsection (1)(C), a parent who leaves a child with another person must make arrangements for the child’s adequate support, though the parent need not personally provide it.

in the Interest of C.L.B., a Child · filed 2014-02-20(1)(C)

But under subsection 161.001(1)(C), while the parent is not required to “personally support” the child, an abandoning parent does not provide adequate support if she does not “make arrangements” for the child’s adequate support.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(F) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent had the ability to pay support each month during the required twelve-month period.

in the Interest of S. K. S., and C. H. S., Children · filed 2017-07-31(b)(1)(F)

Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to support termination of R.M.’s parental rights, and termination of her rights cannot be supported under section 161.001(b)(1)(F).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(F) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent had the ability to pay support and failed to pay according to that ability during each month of a qualifying twelve-month period.

in the Interest of A.L.M., a Child · filed 2017-11-29(b)(1)(F)

Brandi bore the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Enrique had the ability to pay during each of these months. See In re N.A.F., 282 S.W.3d 113, 116 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.). She likewise had to prove that he failed to pay support commensurate with his ability for each of those twelve months. See Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex. 1976). ... Because the evidence was factually insufficient, we sustain Enrique's sole issue.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(C) permits termination when a parent voluntarily leaves a child alone or with another without adequate support and remains away for at least six consecutive months.

R. M. v. D. R. and B. R. · filed 2018-03-06(b)(1)(C)

Accordingly, the evidence in this record is legally and factually sufficient to support a statutory ground for termination of Appellant’s parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(C) of the Family Code.

Under section 161.001(b)(1)(C), a parent may satisfy the support requirement by arranging adequate support for a child rather than providing it personally.

in the Interest of A.R., A.R., and A.R., Children · filed 2019-03-14(b)(1)(C)

Under section 161.001(b)(1)(C), a parent may provide for a child’s support by making arrangements for their support rather than by personally providing support.

Subsections (b)(1)(A)–(C) require a parent to leave the child voluntarily; leaving a child with court-appointed sole managing conservators pursuant to the order does not satisfy that requirement.

in the Interest of B.C.H. · filed 2019-05-02(b)(1)(A)–(C)

Likewise, here, the order from the SAPCR proceeding named the grandparents as the sole managing conservators, thus requiring Mother to leave the child with the grandparents. Accordingly, she cannot be said to have left B.C.H. voluntarily for purposes of subsections (A) through (C).

Subsection (b)(1)(C) provides a ground for termination when a parent voluntarily leaves a child with another without adequate support and remains away for at least six months.

in the Interest of J.E.R., a Child · filed 2020-02-12(b)(1)(C)

Applying our standard of review, we hold the evidence supports the trial court’s finding of abandonment under section 161.001(b)(1)(C).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(C) permits termination when a parent voluntarily leaves a child with another person, fails to provide adequate support, and remains away for at least six months.

in the Interest of B.G.O. and T.D.H., Children · filed 2020-02-14(b)(1)(C)

We hold that the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented at trial, as to the truth of the findings made by the trial court pursuant to subsection (C)—that Appellant had voluntarily left T.D.H. alone or in the possession of another without providing adequate support of T.D.H. and remained away for a period of at least six months.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(C) provides a ground for termination when a parent voluntarily leaves a child alone or with another without adequate support and remains away for at least six months.

in the Interest of D.D v. a Child · filed 2021-09-01(b)(1)(C)

We conclude the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to produce in the trial court’s mind a firm belief that appellant voluntarily left D.D.V. in the possession of the Department without providing adequate support and remained away for at least six months. Therefore, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding on subsection (C).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(F) permits termination when a parent fails to support a child according to the parent’s ability for the required year, even if the parent makes a payment during that period.

in the Interest of S.E.F. and M.C.F., Minor Children · filed 2021-09-03(b)(1)(F)

Even where there is no consecutive twelve-month period in which a parent entirely fails to make child support payments, parental rights may be terminated if the parent makes partial payment but fails to make payments in accordance with his ability to pay.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(C) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent voluntarily left a child with another without adequate support and remained away for at least six months.

in the Interest of E.M.R · filed 2022-02-03(b)(1)(C)

We cannot conclude that Cindy has proven as a matter of law, by clear and convincing evidence, that Robert voluntarily left Eric alone or in the possession of another without providing adequate support for Eric and remained away for a period of at least six months.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(C) requires a parent who leaves a child with another person to arrange adequate support; the parent need not provide that support personally.

in the Interest of T.S.W., a Child · filed 2022-03-31(b)(1)(C)

The Martins concede, and we agree, that pursuant to Holick, the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(b)(1)(C) because Appellant arranged for the adequate support of T.S.W.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(A) requires leaving the child with someone other than a parent; under (C), the parent must voluntarily leave the child and remain away without adequate support for six consecutive months.

in the Interest of M.L.H., a Child · filed 2022-04-07(b)(1)(A), (C)

Because predicate ground (A) requires the parent leave the child with somebody other than the child’s parent, the evidence is legally insufficient to support termination under this ground. ... Because compliance with a court order does not constitute voluntarily leaving the child with another, Amber was required to show that the six-month period of inadequate support and remaining away pre-dated the May 2015 SAPCR order. ... The evidence is legally insufficient to prove each element of predicate ground (C) during the same consecutive six-month period.

Subsection (b)(1)(F) allows circumstantial evidence of a parent’s financial means to establish the ability to support a child during the required 12 consecutive months.

S. B., J. B., and C. C. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2022-09-15(b)(1)(F)

But Adam himself provided testimony regarding his income and financial obligations for 12 consecutive years; and, regardless, relevant circumstantial evidence regarding Adam’s financial means would allow a reasonable juror to draw inferences about Adam’s support of Allie during the 12 months set forth by statute.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(F) requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent was able to support the child during the statutory period before parental rights may be terminated for failure to support.

In the Interest of J.S., A/K/A J.T.S., H.S., A/K/A H.L.S., Jr., J.S., A/K/A J.D.S., A.S., A/K/A A.J.S., Children v. the · filed 2023-03-14(b)(1)(F)

The trial court may not order termination under subsection F without clear and convincing evidence of the parent’s ability to support the children during the statutory period. ... Likewise, our independent review of the record reveals no such evidence. We therefore sustain Father’s third issue.

Subsection (F) requires the party seeking termination to prove the parent’s ability to support the child during the statutory period.

In the Interest of I.M.S. and C.K.S., Children v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-04-27(b)(1)(F)

Mother bore the burden to establish that Father had the ability to pay support during the statutory time period but failed to do so.

Termination for failure to support requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent was able to pay during each month of the required twelve-month period.

In the Interest of L.S.G, a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2023-05-02(b)(1)(F)

J.O. and K.O. had the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother and Father had the ability to pay each month during that time frame.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(F) permits termination when a parent fails to support a child according to the parent’s ability during the required one-year period; the petitioner can establish ability to pay by showing sufficient sources of funds.

Hanson v. Garza · filed 2026-03-26(b)(1)(F)

Rather, Garza was required only to demonstrate that Hanson had sufficient sources of funds from which to support her children, not to disprove Hanson’s contention she could not financially support herself and her children at the same time.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(F) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent failed to support a child according to the parent’s ability during a twelve-month period ending within six months before the termination petition was filed.

In the Interest of A.S., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-04-16(b)(1)(F)

This admission alone constitutes sufficient evidence that he failed to support A.S. in accordance with his ability during the relevant time period.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(F) requires proof that the parent had the ability to support the child during each month of a consecutive twelve-month period.

In the Interest of A. A. S. v. the State of Texas · filed 2026-06-03(b)(1)(F)

Thus, to the extent that the trial court considered evidence from the SAPCR, it could only have supported a finding that Mother had the ability to support Child for some months of the required twelve-month period under subsection (F), but not for each month of a consecutive twelve-month period as required under the statute.

Section 161.001(1)(N)'s one-year conservatorship requirement cannot be satisfied with time before the constructive-abandonment amendment took effect when doing so retroactively impairs vested parental rights.

In Re RAT · filed 1997-01-30(1)(N)

In order to terminate appellant's parental rights based on constructive abandonment, a period of approximately seven months before the effective date must be added to the almost five months between the effective date and the date of trial to achieve the requisite one year under Section 161.001(1)(N). ... We hold that appellant's parental rights to her four children is such a "vested right" or a "well-founded claim" that the jury instruction on constructive abandonment violated her constitutional protection against retroactive laws.

Section 161.001(1)(N)’s constructive abandonment period cannot be measured from before the provision’s effective date to terminate vested parental rights.

In the Interest of Shaw · filed 1998-03-26(1)(N)

We conclude that by measuring the requisite statutory period of constructive abandonment from the date of September 13, 1994, nearly a year before the effective date of the statute, Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(N) was applied retroactively in violation of Freeman’s constitutional protections.

Section 161.001(1)(N)'s constructive-abandonment ground cannot be applied by counting custody time before the amendment took effect toward its one-year requirement when doing so violates a parent's vested rights.

R.A.T., in Re · filed 1997-01-30(1)(N)

In order to terminate appellant’s parental rights based on constructive abandonment, a period of approximately seven months before the effective date must be added to the almost five months between the effective date and the date of trial to achieve the requisite one year under Section 161.001(1)(N). This use of time prior to the effective date of the amendment to meet the one-year requirement is what appellant argues is a prohibited retroactive application. We agree. ... We hold that appellant’s parental rights to her four children is such a “vested right” or a “well-founded claim” that the jury instruction on constructive abandonment violated her constitutional protection against retroactive laws.

The 1997 amendments to § 161.001 do not apply to a termination case tried in June 1997.

Vargas v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 1998-07-16

However, because this case was tried in June 1997, the amended statute does not apply.

Subsection (1)(T) permits termination based on a parent's conviction for murdering the child's other parent, even if the conviction predates the subsection's enactment, when termination is in the child's best interest.

In Re EMN · filed 2007-04-05(1)(T)

Therefore, termination of Appellant's parental rights under subsection (T) did not violate her rights against retroactive application of laws and did not deny her any defenses that might otherwise have been available under the older subsections applicable to these facts.

Section 161.001(1)(T) may be applied when a parent’s conviction for murdering the child’s other parent predates the subsection’s enactment.

in the Interest of E.M.N., a Child · filed 2007-04-05(1)(T)

Despite her conviction and imprisonment before subsection (T)’s enactment, Appellant’s rights were not violated by its retroactive application.

Section 161.001(1)(M) was unconstitutionally retroactive as applied when a termination from more than 25 years earlier, before the subsection was enacted, was the sole ground for terminating the parent’s rights.

in the Interest of N. L. T., a Child · filed 2014-01-15(1)(M)

We conclude the Department’s reliance on subsection (M) as the sole ground for termination in this case is an unconstitutional retroactive application of the law as applied to Mother.

Section 161.001(c) does not apply to termination suits filed before its September 1, 2017 effective date.

in the Interest of G.R.B., A.R.B., I.E.B.S., J.B.G., and E.A.G., Minor Children · filed 2018-10-10(c)

The statute, by express admonition of the Texas Legislature, is inapplicable to suits filed before the effective date of the act. The act from which section 161.001(c) arose was effective September 1, 2017.

Section 161.001(d) applies only to suits filed on or after September 1, 2017.

in the Interest of A.W., a Child · filed 2018-10-18(d)

But Father misplaces his reliance on section 161.001(d). It applies only to suits filed on or after its effective date, which was September 1, 2017.

Section 161.001(c) does not apply to termination suits filed before September 1, 2017.

in the Interest of M.A.L.R., a Child · filed 2018-10-24(c)

Because section 161.001(c) does not apply to the instant case, we overrule his sole issue on appeal and affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of J.P., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2025-02-05(b)(1)(D)

Together, the foregoing evidence presented was such that the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that R knowingly placed or knowingly allowed JP to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered her physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in conditions that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of A. B. G. a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2025-02-21(b)(1)(D)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to trial court’s finding, we conclude the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father knowingly placed or knowingly allowed Amy to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered her physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination when a parent’s pattern of illegal drug use creates an environment that endangers the child.

In the Interest of E.A.G.C. v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-10-30(b)(1)(D)

In looking at all this evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that even before E.A.G.C. was removed, Melissa F. had a pattern of illegal drug use, a pattern that had previously led to the termination of her rights to two previous children, which contributed to an environment that endangered E.A.G.C. See In re J.A.B., 2024 WL 1421986, at *2. We therefore hold the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under subsection (D).

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of P.W., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-09-26(b)(1)(D)

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and recognizing that the factfinder is the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor, we hold that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father had knowingly placed or had knowingly allowed Penny to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered her emotional or physical well-being.

A finding under subsection (b)(1)(D) lacks factual support when the Department’s own evidence significantly contradicts its claim that the parent knowingly placed or allowed the child to remain in endangering conditions.

C. L. and R. H. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2024-10-11(b)(1)(D)

We hold that no reasonable factfinder could ignore this caseworker’s testimony directly contrary to the Department’s Paragraph (D) position and thus that the evidence against the Paragraph (D) finding—this admission plus the evidence showing Father’s ... relatives’ care for Child—was so significant that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.

Subsection (D) does not support termination when there is no evidence that the parent knew or should have known the child’s environment was endangering.

In the Interest of A.F.M., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-12-04(b)(1)(D)

The trial court’s finding under statutory ground (D) did not hinge on credibility determinations in the face of conflicting evidence; rather, the evidence was conclusively insufficient to justify termination on that ground because there was no evidence that Father knew or should have known that Mother’s conduct would create an endangering environment for the child.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in endangering conditions.

In the Interest of S.R.S., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-07-19(b)(1)(D)

Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding under paragraph (D), we conclude that the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that P.R. knowingly placed S.R.S. or knowingly allowed S.R.S. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered him.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of S.D., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-07-11(b)(1)(D)

Further, we conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to support termination under Subsection (D) and therefore deny Father’s counsel’s request to modify the trial court’s order.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows a parent knowingly placed a child in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of M.P.M., a Child v. the State of Texas · filed 2024-09-06(b)(1)(D)

Here, when considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we conclude the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction H.A. knowingly placed M.P.M. in conditions or surroundings endangering her physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) covers another person's conduct when it makes a child's living environment unsafe.

Stoglin v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 1997-06-19(1)(D)

This Court, however, embraces the plain meaning of the statute, which in addition to protecting a child from a dangerous physical environment, protects a child from another person's conduct when that conduct renders the child's living environment unsafe.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly allows children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger their physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of S.B., R.B. and J.B., Children · filed 1998-04-16(1)(D)

Thus, the evidence supports a finding that he knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions and surroundings which endangered their emotional and physical well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires evidence that the parent knew the child remained in a dangerous environment.

In the Interest of B.S.T. · filed 1998-10-08(1)(D)

Termination under subsection (D) requires knowing conduct. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D) (Vernon Supp.1998). No witness testified to appellant’s knowledge of the conditions in which the children were living. Appellant refused to testify. The ease files admitted as exhibits likewise do not reflect appellant’s knowledge. Thus, there is no evidence supporting termination under subsection (D).

Section 161.001 permits termination when a parent knowingly allows a child to remain in conditions that endanger the child's physical or emotional well-being and termination is in the child's best interest.

In Re JR · filed 1999-04-01(1)(D), (2)

Based on the above, we conclude that the evidence before the trial court was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that A.T. knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their emotional or physical well-being and that termination is in the best interest of the children. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D) and (2) (Vernon Supp.1999).

Section 161.001 requires proof of an enumerated act or omission and that termination is in the child’s best interest; knowingly allowing a child to remain in endangering conditions satisfies subsection (1)(D).

In the Interest of J.R. · filed 1999-04-01(1)(D), (2)

Based on the above, we conclude that the evidence before the trial court was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that A.T. knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their emotional or physical well-being and that termination is in the best interest of the children.

Unsanitary home conditions can be surroundings that endanger a child’s physical or emotional well-being under section 161.001(1)(D).

Leal v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 2000-07-27(1)(D)

Unsanitary conditions can qualify as surroundings that endanger a child. ... We hold that a reasonable jury could have found by clear and convincing evidence that these conditions created surroundings that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly allows children to remain in surroundings that endanger their physical or emotional well-being, including by continuing to live with a person who has abused a child.

In the Interest of J.M.C.A. · filed 2000-10-12(1)(D)

Based on these facts, the jury could have reasonably found clear and convincing evidence the Mother had endangered her children’s physical and emotional well-being by continuing to live with the Father.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child's physical or emotional well-being.

Retzlaff v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 1999-07-29(1)(D)

After careful review of the record, we are persuaded that clear and convincing evidence exists that is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Retzlaff knowingly placed or knowingly allowed his two children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger their physical or emotional well-being and that termination is in the best interest of the children.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly allows children to remain in surroundings that endanger their physical or emotional well-being.

In Re JMCA · filed 2000-10-12(1)(D)

We hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict that the Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Subsection (1)(D) independently supported termination, so the court did not reach subsection (1)(E).

in the Interest of A.M. and C.W., Children · filed 2000-11-10(1)(D)

Having found sufficient justification for terminating Dana’s parental rights under subsection D of section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code, we need not address her point of error under subsection E.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child's physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of S. Q., C. Q., F. Q., M. Q., and A. Q., Children · filed 2001-12-06(1)(D)

Therefore we find there was sufficient evidence to enable the trial court as the fact-finder to determine by clear and convincing evidence that Quitugua knowingly placed or knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a child's surroundings endanger the child's physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of C.F. and C.F., Minor Children · filed 2002-04-04(1)(D)

In any event, section 161.001(1)(D) requires a showing that the environment in which the child is placed endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires proof that the child’s surroundings endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of H.R. · filed 2002-07-10(1)(D)

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires the evidence to establish that the environment within which the child was placed caused the child’s physical or emotional well-being to be endangered.

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires evidence that the child's surroundings endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re HR · filed 2002-07-10(1)(D)

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires the evidence to establish that the environment within which the child was placed caused the child's physical or emotional well-being to be endangered.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly allowed children to remain in surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being, provided termination is also in their best interest.

Monica Ward v. Texas Dept. of Protective Services · filed 2003-02-27(1)(D)

After considering the record in its entirety, we conclude the evidence was legally and factually sufficient for the trial court to have reasonably formed a firm belief that Monica allowed her children to remain in surroundings that endangered their physical and emotional well-being.

Section 161.001 allows termination based on endangering conditions or surroundings, including people in the child's environment.

Harris v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2003-04-03(1)(D), (1)(E)

Further, termination may be based not only on the parent's direct conduct toward the child, but also on the placement of the child in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child. Those "conditions and surroundings" include the people in the child's environment.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows a parent knowingly placed or allowed children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

In Re PEW · filed 2003-05-13(1)(D)

The foregoing constitutes ample evidence entitling a reasonable jury to form a firm belief or conviction that Caren knowingly placed or knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in conditions that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of P.E.W., II, K.M.W., and D.L.W., Children · filed 2003-05-13(1)(D)

The foregoing constitutes ample evidence entitling a reasonable jury to form a firm belief or conviction that Caren knowingly placed or knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly allowed a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re CLC · filed 2003-08-27(1)(D)

Therefore, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the finding, is sufficiently clear and convincing that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Crawford knowingly placed or knowingly allowed his children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) provides a termination ground when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of G.G., S.J.G., and Z.E.C. · filed 2003-12-04(1)(D)

Having done so in accordance with the applicable standard of review, (footnote: 2) we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Melissa knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly allows a child to remain in conditions that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of A.B., R.B., T.B., C.R. and D.M., Children · filed 2003-12-31(1)(D)

Looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the finding of the trial court, we conclude a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm conviction that Palmer knowingly placed or allowed her children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) treats abusive or unlawful conduct by household members as part of the conditions or surroundings that can endanger a child.

Pedro Castorena and Penny Renee Delgado v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2004-04-29(1)(D)

Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons who live in the home of the child or with whom the child is compelled to associate on a regular basis in his home inherently is a part of the “conditions or surroundings” of the child’s home under section 161.001(1)(D).

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child's physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of H.B. and B.P., Children · filed 2004-06-14(1)(D)

Consequently, there is both legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that §161.001(1)(D) of the Texas Family Code had been satisfied.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being.

King v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services · filed 2004-07-02(1)(D)

We find there is clear and convincing evidence to establish that King knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Subsection (1)(D) allows termination when a parent knowingly leaves children in surroundings that endanger their physical or emotional well-being, assessed before the children’s removal.

in the Interest of L.C., L.C., Children · filed 2004-09-16(1)(D)

Under this section, we must examine the time before the children’s removal to determine whether the environment itself posed a danger to the child’s physical or emotional well-being. ... Looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the finding of the trial court, we conclude a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm conviction that James knowingly-placed or allowed her children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires evidence that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of J.P.B., a Child · filed 2005-02-10(1)(D)

Under the circumstances, we hold that there is no evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Lonnie knowingly placed J.P.B. or knowingly allowed J.P.B. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional well-being. Accordingly, we conclude that Lonnie’s parental rights could not be properly terminated based upon section 161.001(1)(D) because there is no evidence to support the jury’s answer on these grounds.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being, if termination is in the child’s best interest.

Latham v. Department of Family & Protective Services · filed 2005-04-07(1)(D)

We thus determine whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that (1) Latham knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being; and (2) that termination is in the children’s best interests. ... We hold that legally and factually sufficient evidence exists to support the trial court’s finding of endangerment.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being, if termination is also in the child’s best interest.

Latham v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2005-04-07(1)(D)

We hold that legally and factually sufficient evidence exists to support the trial court’s finding of endangerment.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly allowed a child to remain in surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional wellbeing.

in the Interest of R.D.H. and L.N.A. · filed 2005-04-29(1)(D)

Although there is some disputed evidence, this evidence is not so significant that a reasonable trier of fact could not have reconciled the evidence in favor of its finding and formed a firm belief or conviction that Robert knowingly placed or knowingly allowed R.D.H. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional wellbeing.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly allowed a child to remain in conditions endangering the child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re MF · filed 2005-09-30(1)(D)

Because the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's order terminating Mother's rights pursuant to section 161.001(1)(D) of the family code, we need not address the other statutory grounds urged by the Department.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly allowed a child to remain in surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being, and termination is in the child’s best interest.

In the Interest of M.F. · filed 2005-09-30(1)(D)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the termination order, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the order because a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother knowingly allowed M.F. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical and emotional well-being by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of A. L. W. and E. L. W., IV, Minor Children · filed 2005-09-30(1)(D)

Therefore, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the finding, was sufficiently clear and convincing that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Edward knowingly placed or knowingly allowed his children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(d) allows a finding of knowing endangerment when a parent seeks medical care for a child but knowingly leaves the child in dangerous surroundings.

In Re JPB · filed 2005-12-09(1)(d)

In light of this evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that, even though Lonnie sought medical treatment for J.P.B., he nevertheless allowed the child to remain in surroundings that endangered his physical well-being. While Lonnie may have reacted appropriately to symptoms of abuse, the evidence supports a finding that he knowingly failed to ameliorate the underlying cause.

Seeking medical care for a child does not negate a finding that a parent knowingly allowed the child to remain in dangerous surroundings when evidence supports ongoing abuse.

in the Interest of J.P.B., a Child · filed 2005-12-09(1)(D)

While it is true that Lonnie sought medical care for J.P.B. multiple times and that J.P.B.’s doctors initially failed to diagnose the fractures, that evidence does not negate the jury’s finding that Lonnie knowingly permitted J.P.B. to remain in a setting that was dangerous to his physical well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of J.P.B., a Child · filed 2006-05-04(1)(D)

After reviewing all of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence supports the jury’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Lonnie knowingly placed or allowed J.P.B. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered his physical or emotional well-being.

Subsection (1)(D) requires dangerous conditions or surroundings that endanger a child; a parent’s conduct alone generally does not establish this ground.

In the Interest of J.A.J. · filed 2006-08-10(1)(D)

However, section 161.001(1)(D) of the Family Codes applies only to the acceptability of a child’s living conditions or surroundings; it generally does not apply to the conduct of the parent toward the child.

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires clear and convincing proof that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in conditions that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of S.K. · filed 2006-08-15(1)(D)

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires clear and convincing proof that the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.”

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child's physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of M. J. F., a Child · filed 2006-09-01(1)(D)

The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the finding that Wreathye knowingly placed or allowed M.J.F. to be placed in conditions or surroundings that endangered his physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires evidence that the child's conditions or surroundings endangered the child; concerns unrelated to the child's home environment cannot support termination under this ground.

Colbert v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2006-12-21(1)(D)

These reasons are not related to the environment in the home when the twins were removed and therefore cannot support termination under subsection (1)(D).

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in surroundings that endanger the child's physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of L. F. B., a Child · filed 2007-07-12(1)(D)

The evidence is such that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction, based on the clear and convincing evidence at trial, that Larry and Rosemary placed L.F.B or allowed L.F.B. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered her physical and emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires evidence that the child's conditions or surroundings endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being; reasons unrelated to that environment cannot support termination.

Colbert v. DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY & PROTECTIVE SERVICES · filed 2007-07-02(1)(D)

These reasons are not related to the environment in the home when the twins were removed and therefore cannot support termination under subsection (1)(D).

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of A.R.R. and D.M.T., Children · filed 2007-08-01(1)(D)

The evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Thomas knowingly placed or knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires clear and convincing evidence that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings.

Lopez v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2008-09-25(1)(D)

We conclude that the evidence at trial was not such that a fact-finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Lopez knowingly placed or knowingly allowed A.L.O.–boy and A.L.O.–girl to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger their physical or emotional well-being. We hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s subsection D finding.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in conditions or surroundings endangering the child's physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of H.W., Minor Child · filed 2008-10-29(1)(D)

Section 161.001(1)(D) of the Texas Family Code states that the court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child. ... The evidence is thus legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings on the endangerment grounds.

Section 161.001(1)(D) concerns the child's dangerous conditions or surroundings rather than the parent's conduct.

In Re SN · filed 2008-11-05(1)(D)

However, this predicate ground for termination is concerned with S.N.'s "conditions and surroundings" rather than Nancy's "conduct." ... Therefore, we hold that the evidence is factually insufficient to sustain the jury's finding that Nancy knowingly placed or allowed S.N. to remain in dangerous conditions or surroundings.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being, if termination is also in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of Z.J.C. and T.J.M.C., Minor Children · filed 2009-07-22(1)(D)

After looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding that S.T. knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the children, we hold that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination for endangering surroundings or parental conduct; a parent’s knowledge of drug use and unsafe living conditions, coupled with failure to improve them, can support endangerment findings.

in the Interest of M.M. and J.M., Children · filed 2009-07-23(1)(D), (1)(E)

The evidence at trial demonstrated that Father knew about Mother’s drug use and knew about the conditions in which the children were living while in the parents’ care but did nothing to improve them. Accordingly, applying the appropriate standard of review,11 we hold that, based upon our review of the record, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment findings regarding Father under subsections (D) and (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly fails to protect a child from conditions that endanger the child’s physical well-being.

in the Interest of S.K.A., a Child · filed 2009-08-19(1)(D)

Donald’s failure to take any action to protect S.K.A. from Charlene’s drug abuse is sufficient to establish that he knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered her physical well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires proof that a parent knowingly placed or allowed children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of G.K., A.J.S. and C.S.C. · filed 2009-08-27(1)(D)

To prove endangerment under section 161.001(D), the Department had to prove the parent knowingly placed or allowed her children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) makes knowingly leaving a child in surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being a ground for termination.

in the Interest of C.L., a Child · filed 2009-09-24(1)(D)

Having carefully considered the evidence, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment finding under subsection D of family code section 161.001(1).

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows a parent knowingly allowed a child to remain in surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Intererst of C.W., Jr., I.S., E.R., & D.G · filed 2009-12-10(1)(D)

This evidence is sufficient to allow the trial court to form a firm belief or conviction that appellant knowingly placed or knowingly allowed D.G. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered her physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in conditions that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of J. A. W. and S. P. W., Minor Children · filed 2010-04-01(1)(D)

This is, standing alone, sufficient evidence to allow a fact-finder to find by the requisite clear and convincing standard that Princess had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child—as to both children.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in conditions that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

Jordan v. Dossey · filed 2010-05-13(1)(D)

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we hold a fact-finder could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that Jordan knowingly placed and knowingly allowed R.A. to remain in conditions and surroundings that endangered his physical and emotional well-being.

Subsection (1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly leaves a child in an endangering environment; the child need not suffer actual injury.

in the Interest of Z.D.G. AKA Z.D.S., a Child · filed 2010-06-10(1)(D)

As noted above, however, “endangerment” means to expose to loss or injury—actual loss or injury is not required to support an endangerment finding.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) allow termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed children to remain in endangering conditions or with someone whose conduct endangered them.

Jesse Calderon and Marixza Melendez v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2010-06-11(1)(D), (1)(E)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's determination, we conclude that the jury could reasonably have reached a firm belief that Calderon knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions or with someone whose conduct endangered their well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) permit termination when a child’s environment or a parent’s course of conduct endangers the child; conduct involving an older child may establish that endangerment.

in the Interest of J.C.R., a Child · filed 2010-06-16(1)(D), (1)(E)

We conclude the trial court did not err in ordering termination of Ramirez’s parental rights to J.C.R. based on both environmental and conduct endangerment. There is both legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings.

Section 161.001 permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in endangering conditions and that termination is in the child's best interest.

Laura Annie Cathey and Paul C. Cathey v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2010-08-31(1)(D)

The record provides legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the finding by clear and convincing evidence that the parents knowingly placed and knowingly allowed the boys to remain in a home that presented physical and emotional dangers to the boys when they were removed that had not been adequately mitigated by the time of trial.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of A.S., a Child · filed 2010-09-27(1)(D)

All of this constitutes clear and convincing proof that the child’s surroundings and environment endangered A.S.’ physical and emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of N.E.S., a Child · filed 2010-10-06(1)(D)

Under the applicable standard, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the court’s finding that Elaine knowingly placed or allowed N.E.S. to remain in dangerous conditions or surroundings.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly allowed a child to remain in conditions that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of J.R.H. and J.T.H., Children · filed 2010-12-02(1)(D)

Based on the record before us, we believe that the evidence was factually and legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Harris knowingly allowed J.T.H. to remain in conditions that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of J.T.H.

Section 161.001 permits termination on endangerment grounds when a parent knowingly leaves children with a caregiver whose psychological and substance-abuse problems endanger their physical or emotional well-being.

Byrne v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2010-09-29(1)(D), (1)(E)

In particular, there was sufficient evidence that Byrne had knowingly placed the children in Monica's care when undisputed evidence demonstrated that she posed a danger to the children's physical or emotional well-being on account of her significant psychological and substance-abuse problems. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(D), (E).

Section 161.001(1)(D) allows termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly allowed children to remain in surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being, if termination is also in their best interest.

Hanselman v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2010-12-09(1)(D)

We agree that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Hanselman knowingly placed or knowingly allowed his children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

A parent's failure to protect children from the other parent's known drug abuse can establish that the parent knowingly allowed them to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings.

in the Interest of L v. J.M., A.M., Minor Children · filed 2011-02-24(1)(D)

Appellant‟s failure to take any action to protect his children from Stephanie‟s drug abuse is sufficient to establish that he knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination based on a single act or omission that endangers a child.

in the Interest of R.S., A.S., N.S., and B.J.S., Children · filed 2011-06-22(1)(D)

Section D permits termination based upon only a single act or omission.

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires proof that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of C.F., K.F., K.F., J.F.K. and J.F., Children · filed 2011-06-23(1)(D)

To prove endangerment under subsection (D) of section 161.001(1), the Department of Family and Protective Services had to prove that Father (1) knowingly (2) placed or allowed the children to remain (3) in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well- being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in surroundings that endangered the child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re Jlb · filed 2011-09-02(1)(D)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we find a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction the parents knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the boys to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the boys' physical or emotional well-being. The evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding of termination under Section 161.001(D).

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

In the Interest of J.L.B. and J.R.B., Children · filed 2011-09-02(1)(D)

There was ample evidence to support the finding that the parents knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in surroundings that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly allows a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child's physical or emotional well-being.

In Re Mc · filed 2011-10-17(1)(D)

After reviewing all of the evidence under the appropriate standards of review, we conclude the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Father knowingly allowed I.C. and U.C. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) focuses on a child’s living conditions and can support termination when a parent knowingly allows the child to remain in an endangering environment, even if the child cannot live with that parent.

In the Interest of M.C. · filed 2011-10-17(1)(D)

But under section 161.001(1)(D), the focus is not on the responding parent’s conduct — the focus is on the child’s living conditions. ... But the fact that the children could not live with Father did not preclude the trial court from finding that Father knowingly allowed the children to remain in an environment that endangered their well-being.

Subsection (1)(D) requires proof of endangering conditions or surroundings, but does not require proof of abuse or neglect as defined by section 261.001.

in the Interest of JS, a Child · filed 2011-10-27(1)(D)

Subsection (D) refers to acts that “endanger” the child, and nothing in the statutory text requires proof of “abuse” or “neglect” as defined by section 261.001.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or left a child in surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of D.M., A.M., A.J., and D.W., Children · filed 2012-01-18(1)(D)

We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to allow the trial court to form a firm belief or conviction that, under section 161.001(1)(D), Jesse knowingly placed or knowingly allowed D.W. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered his physical or emotional well-being, especially given D.W.’s unexplained skull fracture.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s well-being.

A.A. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2012-01-12(1)(D)

We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient for a reasonable fact finder to form a “firm belief or conviction” that appellant had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered his well-being and the trial court did not err in terminating appellant’s parental rights on the ground that he had violated section 161.001(1)(D) of the Texas Family Code.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly allows a child to remain in surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

Aguilar v. Kimberly Lee Foy and Thompson Ray Foy, Jr. · filed 2012-03-01(1)(D)

We conclude that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that Aguilar knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being, and knowingly placed the children with a person who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

G. A. v. Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2012-03-29(1)(D)

We conclude that the jury could reasonably have resolved the disputed evidence in favor of its finding and formed a firm belief or conviction that the father either knowingly placed or knowingly allowed G. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered her physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in conditions that endanger the child's physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of J.R., L.R., B.R., H.R., Children · filed 2012-05-08(1)(D)

Based on the foregoing evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Johnny and Christina knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 161.001(1)(D). We overrule their first issues.

Subsection (1)(D) permits termination when a father knows the mother is using drugs during pregnancy and fails to protect the unborn child from the resulting endangering conditions.

in the Interest of A.J.R., a Child · filed 2012-06-05(1)(D)

Frank’s failure to take any action to protect the unborn A.J.R. from Heidi’s drug use during her pregnancy is sufficient to establish that he knowingly allowed A.J.R. to remain in conditions and surroundings that endangered the child's well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) requires proof that a parent knew of an endangering condition or surrounding and allowed the child to remain there.

Rios v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2012-07-11(1)(D)

Therefore, we conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding that Rios knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the statutory endangering-conditions ground.

in Re CAG and IO · filed 2012-07-12(1)(D)

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was appropriate under § 161.001(1)(D). And having considered the entire record, we similarly conclude that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding.

Subsection (1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or leaves a child in endangering conditions, including an environment created by the parent's conduct.

in the Interest of R.M v. and E v. Children · filed 2012-10-04(1)(D)

We thus hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to allow the jury to form a firm belief or conviction that, under subsection 161.001(1)(D), R.V. knowingly placed or knowingly allowed R.M.V. and E.V. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-beings.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of S.J.T.B. · filed 2012-11-15(1)(D)

The jury could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that Daniealle and Leslie knowingly placed or knowingly allowed S.J.T.B. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows children to remain in conditions that endanger their physical or emotional well-being.

W. C. and L. H. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2013-01-08(1)(D)

Having reviewed the evidence, we conclude that a fact-finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that W.C. placed or allowed C.H. and R.H. to be placed or remain in conditions that endangered their physical and emotional well being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly allows a child to remain in conditions that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of M.K.C-D., S.E.C.J, and E.M.C., Children · filed 2013-01-30(1)(D)

We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s termination on subsection (D) grounds.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination on clear and convincing evidence that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

Spurck v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2013-02-08(1)(D)

Under subsection (D), a jury must find by clear and convincing evidence that Spurck “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D).

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly allows a child to remain in surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

D. H. A/K/A D. T. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2013-03-06(1)(D)

We conclude that the jury “could have formed a firm belief or conviction” that appellant “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child.”

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly allowed a child to remain in surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being, and termination is in the child’s best interest.

in the Interest of J.A.C., Jr. · filed 2013-03-28(1)(D)

For all of the reasons outlined in the previous section, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights under section 161.001(1)(D) of the Texas Family Code.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in conditions or surroundings endangering the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of T.B., K.Y., D.R., and D.R., Children · filed 2013-05-31(1)(D)

Subsection (D) allows termination of parental rights if the parent knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being. ... The evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of termination under the subsection (D) predicate ground.

Section 161.001(1)(D) allows a finding that parents knowingly kept a child in endangering conditions based on circumstantial evidence of repeated unexplained injuries while the child was in their care.

in the Interest of I. R. , a Child · filed 2013-06-25(1)(D)

We conclude that the trial court reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that both the mother and the father knowingly placed I.R. or allowed him to remain in conditions that endangered his physical and emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly allowed a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of Z.C.J.L AKA Z.C.J v. a Child · filed 2013-07-09(1)(D)

We conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the finding that Father knowingly allowed Z.C.J.L. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered her physical or emotional well-being.

Subsection (1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in an endangering environment; a single act or omission can suffice.

in the Interest of G.J.W. and C.W.R. II, Children · filed 2013-06-20(1)(D)

Subsection (D) permits termination based on a single act or omission, and conduct that demonstrates awareness of an endangering environment is sufficient to show endangerment.

Section 161.001(1)(D) allows termination when a pattern of domestic violence, alcohol abuse, and physical violence against children creates an endangering home environment.

in the Interest of R.B., a Child · filed 2013-08-12(1)(D)

Such a pattern can produce an environment that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of a child that will support a finding under section 161.001(1)(D).

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly leaves a child in surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of R.L., X.L., P.L., and E.L. · filed 2013-10-02(1)(D)

Subsection D permits termination if the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” ... By leaving them in her care, Robert left them in an environment injurious to their physical and emotional well-being as shown by the children’s own account of Samantha’s physical abuse and two of the children’s failure to thrive.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows a parent knowingly placed or allowed a child to remain in conditions that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

R. P. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2013-10-17(1)(D)

The evidence is factually and legally sufficient to support the finding by clear and convincing evidence that appellant knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or allows a child to remain in endangering surroundings; a parent’s abusive or violent conduct can create such an environment.

in the Interest of A.I.T-A. and D.C.T-A. · filed 2013-11-07(1)(D)

Specifically, a parent’s abusive or violent conduct may produce an endangering environment.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent allows children to remain in conditions that endanger their physical or emotional well-being.

in the Interest of A.M. and M.V.M., Children · filed 2014-01-30(1)(D)

The testimony showed that the conditions of the mother’s home endangered the children and also that the father was aware of the conditions of that home but allowed the children to remain there. Thus, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(1)(D), and we overrule the father’s first issue on appeal.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent knowingly placed a child in conditions that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

D. K., Sr. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2014-05-09(1)(D)

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we find that the court could reasonably have formed a firm conviction that David knowingly placed D.D.K. in conditions that endangered his physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(1)(D). Therefore, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that a statutory ground for termination exists.

The evidence legally and factually supported an endangering-surroundings finding under subsection (1)(D).

M. Z. and R. B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services · filed 2014-05-22(1)(D)

Thus, we conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding as to M.Z. under section 161.001(1)(D) and overrule M.Z.’s first issue.

Section 161.001(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly allows a child to remain in an endangering environment; repeated inflicted injuries in the parent’s care can support an inference that the parent knew of the danger.

In the Interest of J.D.B., a Child · filed 2014-06-17(1)(D)

In light of this evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that, even though J.D.B. was not fussy and Mother and Father sought medical treatment when they noticed a problem, they nevertheless knowingly allowed J.D.B. to remain in an environment that endangered his physical well-being.