Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414

A juvenile court may receive a child's wishes either directly from the child or through the guardian ad litem, and its choice not to conduct an in-camera interview is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

In the Matter of Beresh Children, Unpublished Decision (9-15-2003) · filed 2003-09-15(D)(2)

That is to say, a juvenile court has the option of either having the child assert his or her opinion, through, for example, an in-camera interview or testimony, or the court may rely upon the guardian ad litem's representations with respect to the child's desires. Because the juvenile court has a choice, the decision not to conduct an in camera interview will be reversed only if the court abused its discretion in declining to do so.

Subsection (D)(2) requires reliable evidence of the children's wishes, and failure to consider those wishes requires reversal of a permanent-custody judgment.

In the Matter of Swisher, Unpublished Decision (10-14-2003) · filed 2003-10-14(D)(2)

As in Williams, the record in the instant case does not contain reliable evidence concerning the children's wishes. ... Our conclusion concerning the trial court's erroneous failure to consider the children's wishes is dispositive of this appeal and forms the basis for our decision to reverse and remand this case.

When a child cannot express a custody preference, subsection (D)(2) requires a finding about the child's wishes as expressed through the guardian ad litem's best-interest opinion.

In the Matter of Salsgiver, Unpublished Decision (11-26-2003) · filed 2003-11-26(D)(2)

If the trial court cannot make a finding concerning the child's wishes as expressed by her, it must then make a finding about her wishes as expressed by the guardian ad litem through his opinion as to her best interests."

Section 2151.414(D)(2) requires evidence of both the child's wishes and maturity, and a caseworker's testimony cannot substitute for wishes expressed directly by the child or through the guardian ad litem.

In Re Ridenour, Unpublished Decision (4-16-2004) · filed 2004-04-16(D)(2)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (D), the juvenile court must consider this desire as a factor affecting Billy's best interests with due regard for Billy's maturity. ... Before the juvenile court can do this, it must have some evidence before it concerning both Billy's desire and his maturity. ... Furthermore, it was error for the juvenile court to rely on the testimony of Billy's caseworker as evidence of his wishes regarding his custody.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) requires the trial court to consider the child's wishes as expressed directly by the child or through the guardian ad litem, with due regard for the child's maturity.

In Re Miller, Unpublished Decision (2-24-2005) · filed 2005-02-24(D)(2)

R.C. 2151.414 (D)(2) requires the trial court to consider the children's wishes "as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the child's maturity." The guardian ad litem's report, in the case sub judice, does not address Paige's wishes. Nor does the report indicate that Paige is unable to express her wishes. Furthermore, Paige did not testify at the hearing. Also, neither the magistrate's decision nor the judgment entry approving and adopting the magistrate's decision indicates that Paige was interviewed during an in camera hearing. Paige's wishes were also not addressed in the magistrate's decision or the trial court's judgment entry. {¶ 38} Although the caseworker testified regarding Paige's placement, a caseworker's testimony cannot be considered as an expression of the child's wishes in lieu of the guardian ad litem's report. In re C.M. , Summit App. No. 21372, 2003-Ohio-5040, at ¶ 15. Accordingly, due to the lack of any evidence, in the record, concerning Paige's wishes, we remand this matter to the juvenile court.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) requires the permanent-custody court to consider the child's wishes and to determine whether the child is capable of expressing those wishes and, if so, what they are.

In Re T v. Unpublished Decision (8-18-2005) · filed 2005-08-18(D)(2)

As noted, in determining the best interest of a child, the court must consider all relevant factors, including the wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child. ... In short, there is nothing in the record suggesting that anyone asked H.V. his wishes, and no one testified as to what those wishes were. ... A record completely devoid of any evidence that anyone made any attempt to discern whether a five-year-old child is capable of expressing his own wishes about losing all contact with his biological mother, let alone to discern what those wishes are, does not meet the "clear and convincing" standard. ... Likewise, here, the trial court's failure to discern whether H.V. and T.V. were capable of expressing their views and, if so, what those views are, requires reversal of the trial court's findings.

Section 2151.414(D) requires a child's wishes to be expressed directly or through the guardian ad litem, but does not require an in camera interview when the child lacks sufficient maturity and reunification with either parent is barred regardless of the child's wishes.

In the Matter of T.W., Unpublished Decision (3-29-2007) · filed 2007-03-29(D)

We agree that the statute requires that the child's wishes be either expressed directly or through the guardian ad litem. On the facts of this case, however, we find no error in the trial court's denial of Mother's motion for an in camera interview. The guardian ad litem testified that T.W. lacked sufficient maturity to meaningfully express her wishes as to her own best interest. In addition, an in camera interview with T.W. regarding whether she wanted to live with Mother or Father would have been meaningless under these circumstances. Mother's testimony in which she acknowledged that she had not visited or maintained contact with T.W. for nearly two years was a tacit admission that she had abandoned the child, thereby precluding T.W. from being placed with her. R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11). Further, because Father will be incarcerated for the next 16 years, the trial court obviously could not place T.W. with him. Thus, under these circumstances, where, regardless of the child's expressions, reunification with either parent was barred, an in camera interview would have accomplished nothing except to discourage an already disheartened child.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) treats a child's wishes as wishes about placement and permits the court to consider them through the guardian ad litem rather than directly from the child.

In Re D.S., 07ap-479 (12-18-2007) · filed 2007-12-18(D)(2)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (D)(2), the court must take into account "[t]he wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child" in determining whether PCC is in the child's best interest. ... "The statute unambiguously gives the trial court the choice of considering the child's wishes directly from the child or through the guardian ad litem." ... The statute states that the trial court must take into account "the child's wishes" but is silent as to whether this means the child's wishes as to his or her placement , or the more specific issue of termination of parental rights. This court has interpreted the statute to refer to the child's wishes as to placement.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) does not require a young child to make a definitive choice between adoption and her parents when the child's age and developmental limitations prevent one, and her wishes may be adequately conveyed through a guardian ad litem's supplemented report.

In Re A.L., 07ap-638 (2-28-2008) · filed 2008-02-28(D)(2)

{¶ 107} Next, mother reiterates the arguments presented in her fourth assignment of error, which asserted that the trial court did not have credible, reliable evidence of the maturity or wishes of A.L., as required by R.C. 2151.414 (D)(2). As we stated previously, however, our review of the record indicates that the court had a great deal of information and evidence concerning A.L.'s current wishes. We also concluded that the GAL's report, as supplemented at trial, was sufficient. {¶ 108} What appellants appear to want is a definitive statement by A.L. that she either wants to be adopted or wants to be with mother or father. The record shows that A.L. was simply unable to do so at the time of trial, given her young age, developmental delays, and her lack of understanding of the process. Instead, she stated that she wants to stay with her foster family, but also stated that she likes her visits with mother and father. We can expect nothing more from a child just shy of her fourth birthday.

Section 2151.414(D)(2)'s reference to the child's wishes means the child's wishes regarding placement, and the court may consider those wishes through a guardian ad litem with due regard for the child's maturity.

In Re J. W., 07ap-791 (3-27-2008) · filed 2008-03-27(D)(2)

The statute states that the trial court must take into account "the child's wishes" but is silent as to whether this means the child's wishes as to his or her placement , or the more specific issue of termination of parental rights. This court has interpreted the statute to refer to the child's wishes as to placement. See, e.g., In re D.S. , Franklin App. No. 07AP-479, 2007-Ohio-6781 , ¶ 37 ; In re J.W. , Franklin App. No. 06AP-864, 2007-Ohio-1419 , ¶ 20-21 , discretionary appeal not allowed, 114 Ohio St.3d 1512 , 2007-Ohio-4285 , 872 N.E.2d 952 ; In re Brooks , Franklin App. No. 04AP-164, 2004-Ohio-3887 , ¶ 48 , discretionary appeal not allowed, 103 Ohio St.3d 1495 , 2004-Ohio-5605 , 816 N.E.2d 1081 . Thus, in this case, the GAL's opinion is not rendered unreliable because she did not use the words "custody, adoption or permanency" and did not specifically inquire whether J.W. wanted to stop visiting with appellant.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) permits a court to consider a child's wishes through the guardian ad litem and does not also require the court to consider whether the child wants to testify or whether testifying would be detrimental.

In Re Hammons, 4-08-04 (7-21-2008) · filed 2008-07-21(D)(2)

However, the Ohio Supreme Court in In re C.F. determined that when determining the wishes of the child, a court is required by R.C. 2151.414 (D)(2) to consider the wishes of the child, "as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child." The statute does not impose the additional requirement that the trial court also consider whether the children want to testify or whether testifying would be detrimental to them.

A trial court sufficiently considers a child's wishes under subsection (D)(1)(b) when the record contains the guardian ad litem's recommendation based on the child's young age and limited ability to express himself; any failure to inquire separately into the child's wishes and maturity may be harmless.

In re K.H. · filed 2010-08-16(D)(1)(b)

We find that this evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that the trial court considered K.H.’s wishes pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) and its corresponding finding that permanent custody was in his best interest. Further, we find that any possible error in the trial court’s failure to specifically inquire into K.H.’s wishes and maturity was harmless.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires a court deciding a child's best interests to consider the child's wishes, expressed directly or through the guardian ad litem with due regard for the child's maturity; appointing independent counsel can represent a child's wishes when they conflict with the guardian ad litem's recommendation.

In re B.P. · filed 2012-03-26(D)(1)(b)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires the court to consider “[t]he wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child.” ... The court had to consider the GAL’s recommendation based on the children’s maturity. However, the juvenile court appointed counsel for M.C. because he had asked when he would be able to go home. Throughout the hearing, M.C.’s counsel opposed CPSU by cross examining each of their witnesses. M.C.’s counsel thus represented M.C.’s desire to return to his parents during the judicial process. As a result, the juvenile court met all of the procedural requirements for representing the children’s interests during the permanent custody hearing.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) generally requires a court determining a child's best interest to consider the child's wishes or determine whether the child is incapable of expressing them, but failure to do so may be nonprejudicial under unique circumstances demonstrating insufficient maturity.

In re M.H. · filed 2013-03-22(D)(1)(b)

As discussed above, when determining a child's best interest in a permanent custody hearing, R.C. 2151.414 requires a court to consider all relevant factors, including "[t]he child wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child." R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b). ... While, in general, a court must consider the child's wishes or should determine whether the child is incapable of expressing her wishes, we find that based on the unique nature of the facts in this case, the trial court's failure to determine the child's wishes was not prejudicial error. ... Given the specific facts of this case, we find the failure to determine the child's wishes, or to determine if she was capable of expressing her wishes, was not reversible error.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires consideration of the child’s wishes, which the court may receive directly from the child or through the guardian ad litem, and failure to consider those wishes is reversible.

In re B.R.C. · filed 2014-01-13(D)(1)(b)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires that the court consider “[t]he wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child” in reaching its best interest determination. “A judgment that fails to consider the children’s wishes is subject to reversal.” In re M.J., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2011-A-0014, 2011-Ohio-2715, ¶ 64. The trial court has the discretion to consider the child’s wishes as expressed either through the guardian ad litem or directly though the child. In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 56. ... Based on the foregoing, we cannot find that the trial court failed to consider the children’s wishes as required by R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b).

The court need not obtain a child's wishes directly in every permanent-custody case because it may consider wishes expressed through the guardian ad litem and must account for the child's maturity.

In re C.A. · filed 2014-04-08(D)(1)(b)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) states that the trial court shall consider the child’s wishes “as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child.” The statute thus does not require the trial court to consider the child’s wishes as expressed directly by the child in all circumstances. Instead, the statute recognizes that the trial court may consider the child’s wishes as expressed through the child’s guardian ad litem. Additionally, the statute requires the court to consider the child’s maturity when examining the child’s wishes.

A trial court ordinarily errs under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) if it completely fails to address the child's wishes.

In re S.M. · filed 2014-06-18(D)(1)(b)

A trial court ordinarily errs if it completely fails to address a child’s wishes.

A child's stated wish to return to a parent does not control the best-interest determination when evidence of the parent's repeated physical aggression supports a contrary result.

In re J.G. · filed 2014-09-19(D)(1)(b)

Regarding the wishes of the children under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), the juvenile court noted that J.G. expressed her desire to be returned to her mother. However, in light of the evidence presented at the hearing involving appellant’s repeated acts of physical aggression toward her children, we find no error in the juvenile court reaching a conclusion contrary to J.G.’s wishes.

Children's wishes to reunify with a parent do not defeat a best-interest finding under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) when the parent is uncooperative, homeless, and not taking adequate steps to provide a safe and stable home.

In re C.H. · filed 2014-10-31(D)(1)

The court noted that M.H.2 was “too young to fully express his wishes,” but that N.H. and J.H. had been appointed an In re Williams attorney because they “want to be re-united with their mother.” See In re Williams, 101 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-1500, 805 N.E.2d 1110. Angela, however, was not cooperating with child-caring authorities or taking adequate steps to provide a safe and stable home. In fact, she was homeless and had been living with a friend for several months. The children were in need of legally secure placement that could not be achieved other than by granting permanent custody to HCJFS. Thus, competent and credible evidence exists to support the court’s finding that permanent custody with HCJFS was in the best interests of N.H., J.H., and M.H.2.

The child's-wishes factor is satisfied when competent evidence shows that the trial court considered the child's wishes in light of the child's maturity.

In re L.M. · filed 2014-09-12(D)(1)(b)

Accordingly, the record contains competent and credible evidence that the trial court did consider L.M.’s wishes in light of her maturity.

A guardian ad litem may testify to children's placement wishes as then-existing states of mind, although the state-of-mind exception does not admit their stated reasons for those wishes.

In re D.W. · filed 2015-08-11(D)(1)(b)

The children's placement wishes are a factor trial courts must consider in making its best interest determination. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b). The GAL's testimony described the childrens' wishes concerning their placement and their reasons for having those wishes. This court has previously determined that statements regarding children's fears and wishes about placement are admissible as statements of then existing state of mind pursuant to Evid.R. 803(3).

A child's wishes regarding placement may be presented either directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem.

In re T.R. · filed 2015-10-08(D)(1)(b)

With respect to T.R.’s wishes regarding placement, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) provides that a child’s wishes may be expressed by the child directly or through the child’s guardian ad litem. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony for purposes of its dispositional determination.

The child-wishes factor requires consideration of wishes expressed directly by the child or through the guardian ad litem with due regard for the child's maturity.

In re D.Y. · filed 2015-10-19(D)(1)(b)

Ohio case law is clear that as part of the analysis of the best interest of the child, the trial court must consider “‘[t]he wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child.’”

A child need not be informed of every consequence of permanent custody before the child's wishes may be considered; the court must understand and appreciate each child's wishes with due regard for the child's maturity.

In re L.J. · filed 2016-04-22(D)(1)(b)

This provision does not require that all of the specific consequences of a permanent custody determination be explained to the child as a prerequisite to consideration of his or her “wishes.” ... What is required is that the court have an understanding and appreciation of the wishes of each child concerning his or her future life with the parent.

A court may find children unable to reasonably express placement wishes when a guardian tried to discuss custody with older children who remained silent and younger children were too young to understand.

In re D.H. · filed 2016-11-29(D)(1)(b)

Given Cusick’s testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the children were unable to make a reasonable expression of their wishes as regarding the permanent custody motion.

A child's placement preference is only one of the relevant factors a court must consider in determining the child's best interest under subsection (D)(1).

In re S.S. · filed 2017-06-23(D)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) directs the trial court to consider all relevant factors when determining the best interest of the child; thus, the preference of the child is but one factor for the court to consider.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) permits a child's wishes to be expressed through the guardian ad litem and requires due regard for the child's maturity.

In re A.C. · filed 2018-02-01(D)(1)(b)

But R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) also involves the child’s wishes as expressed by the child’s GAL. ... As to the wishes of children ages seven and eight years old, the statute requires the court to take “due regard for the maturity of the child” and the trial court expressly stated it considered the wishes of the minor child as stated by the GAL, “though the court has considered the age of the child.”

A child's wishes are only one of the five enumerated best-interest factors and do not alone control the permanent-custody determination.

In re: T.R.-B. · filed 2018-08-02(D)(1)(b)

We note that the child’s wishes is only one of five enumerated factors that the court is required to consider when determining whether a grant of permanent custody is in a child’s best interest.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) does not require a trial court to follow a guardian ad litem's recommendation when the evidence does not support it.

In re A.M. · filed 2019-04-22(D)(1)(b)

In their second Assignment of Error, Mother and Father contend the trial court did not consider the child’s wishes as expressed through the GAL pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b). ... We find no abuse of discretion for the trial court to find the evidence did not support the GAL’s recommendation.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires consideration of children's custody wishes but does not obligate the trial court to follow them.

In re C.M.B. · filed 2020-01-17(D)(1)(b)

The trial court appropriately considered the children’s attachment to Mother and their wishes in its best-interest analysis. Although the children’s wishes were relevant, the trial court was not obligated to follow them.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) gives the trial court discretion to consider a child's custody wishes either directly from the child or through the guardian ad litem.

In re B.N.R. · filed 2020-05-08(D)(1)(b)

We note that R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) “unambiguously gives the trial court the choice of considering the child’s wishes directly from the child or through the guardian ad litem.” ... Thus, “[t]he trial court has discretion to accept the testimony of the guardian ad litem on the child’s wishes rather than hearing a direct expression of those wishes made by the child.”

Section 2151.414(D) may guide a legal-custody best-interest analysis, but it does not require the juvenile court to comply with the children's custody wishes.

In re J.T. · filed 2020-08-28(D)

Nothing in R.C. 3109.04(F)—or R.C. 2151.414(D)—requires the trial court to comply with the children’s wishes.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires consideration of children's custody wishes with due regard for their maturity, but those wishes do not outweigh all other best-interest factors.

In re K.M. · filed 2020-09-09(D)(1)(b)

The statute itself instructs the court to consider the wishes of the children “with due regard for the maturity of the child.” R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b). ... Although the trial court acknowledged appellants’ parenting time efforts, their parental bond with the children, and the children’s wishes, these factors are not enough to overcome the overwhelming evidence of unabated addiction.

A juvenile court may consider a guardian ad litem's report when determining a young child's wishes in a termination-of-parental-rights case.

In re V.J.P. · filed 2021-05-24(D)(1)(b)

Accordingly, the trial court was permitted to consider the GAL’s report in support of its best-interest finding under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b).

When a child is too young to state meaningful wishes, the court may consider the guardian ad litem's opinion under the wishes factor.

In re A.B. · filed 2021-09-30(D)(1)(b)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires consideration of the child’s wishes, however, A.B. was too young to meaningfully inform the court. The court could consider the opinion of the GAL in considering this factor.

Children's consistent statements that they want to remain with their foster family support the statutory wishes factor.

In re R.R. · filed 2021-10-01(D)(1)(b)

The record is clear that the children did not wish to live with Mother.

A finding that a child is too young to express wishes is insufficient; the court must then consider the child's wishes through the guardian ad litem's best-interest opinion.

In re D.P. · filed 2022-01-20(D)(1)(b)

In a termination-of-parental-rights case, the act of making a specific finding as to a child’s capabilities is not sufficient to satisfy the trial court’s duty under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2). If the trial court cannot make a finding concerning the child’s wishes as expressed by him, it must then make a finding about his wishes as expressed by the guardian ad litem through his opinion as to the child’s best interests.

When subsection (D) guides a legal-custody decision, a court may consider a child’s wishes as expressed through the guardian ad litem without conducting an in-camera interview.

In re F.B. · filed 2022-02-22(D)(1)(b)

{¶51} Mother cites no authority for the proposition that in a legal custody case, the court must interview the children in camera in order to consider their wishes. As stated above, courts have looked to the factors set forth under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and 2151.414(D) for guidance in assessing a legal custody motion. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), regarding parental rights in shared parenting, does require an in camera interview in order to consider the wishes of the child. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(b). On the other hand, R.C. 2151.414(D), concerning permanent custody, provides that the court may consider the wishes of the child if expressed through the guardian ad litem. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b).

A guardian ad litem's best-interest recommendation does not satisfy subsection (D)(1)(b); the court must consider the child's own wishes, conveyed directly or through the guardian.

In re D.V. · filed 2022-03-30(D)(1)(b)

While the statute permits a GAL to convey the child’s wishes to the juvenile court, a GAL’s belief or report stating that permanent custody is in the best interest of a child is insufficient because the court must consider the child’s wishes, not the GAL’s. ... We agree with mother that the juvenile court’s express failure to consider the wishes of J.A. in its best-interest analysis is a reversible error.

A juvenile court need not separately discuss the child's wishes under subsection (D)(1)(b) when its findings affirmatively indicate that it considered the child's age, communication ability, and guardian ad litem's recommendation.

In re K.P. · filed 2022-04-05(D)(1)(b)

The juvenile court did not discuss this factor with reference to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), likely because of the lack of focus and evidence upon the issue during the permanent custody hearing and K.P.'s young age. ... The foregoing indicates a consideration of this factor by the juvenile court.

Permanent custody must be reversed when the decision and record do not show consideration of the children's wishes, maturity, or ability to express wishes.

In re E.H. · filed 2022-04-18(D)(1)(b)

Accordingly, we cannot discern from the juvenile court's decision and judgment entry that the court satisfied the statutory requirement that it consider the enumerated factor of R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b). The record does not demonstrate any consideration of the children's wishes, nor does it provide any information as to the children's maturity or capability to express those wishes.

When a child is too young to express a permanent-custody preference, the juvenile court may properly consider the guardian ad litem’s recommendation under subsection (D)(1)(b).

In re I.A.-W. · filed 2022-05-26(D)(1)(b)

Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), the juvenile court was to consider the child’s wishes as expressed directly or through her GAL. At the time of trial, I.A.-W. was too young to express her wishes with regard to permanent custody. “The juvenile court properly considers the GAL’s recommendation on the permanent-custody motion as part of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) analysis where the children are too young to express their wishes.” In re B/K Children, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190681, 2020-Ohio-1095, ¶ 45.

When a child is too young to express meaningful wishes, the court may consider the guardian ad litem's recommendation under subsection (D)(1)(b).

In re Q.S. · filed 2022-08-11(D)(1)(b)

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires consideration of the child’s wishes; however, Q.S. was too young to meaningfully inform the court. The court could consider the opinion of the GAL in considering this factor.

The record must reflect some investigation into the child’s wishes, and ordinarily it is reversible error to fail completely to address them.

In re D.V. · filed 2022-12-21(D)(1)(b)

We stated that the record “must reflect some investigation into the child’s wishes. ‘A trial court ordinarily errs if it completely fails to address a child’s wishes.’ ” Id. at ¶ 21, quoting In re S.M., 4th Dist. Highland No. 14CA4, 2014-Ohio-2961, ¶ 32.

A young child's inability to express a meaningful custody preference may make subsection (D)(1)(b) of minimal value, allowing the court to consider the guardian ad litem's recommendation.

In re A.W. · filed 2023-02-10(D)(1)(b)

We have previously indicated that this factor may be “of minimal value in determining [a child’s] best interests” in cases of young children. ... The GAL recommended that A.W. be placed in the permanent custody of HCJFS.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) permits a trial court to consider a child's wishes as expressed through the guardian ad litem instead of interviewing the child directly.

In re E.M.J. · filed 2023-09-29(D)(2)

As explained by the Ohio Supreme Court, R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) directs the trial court to consider the children’s wishes “as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem.” (Emphasis added). It was within the trial court’s discretion here to consider the children’s wishes as expressed through the GAL.

A child's wish for reunification does not require denial of permanent custody and cannot receive greater weight than the other section 2151.414(D)(1) best-interest factors.

In re M.M. · filed 2024-04-18(D)(1)(b)

However, while the juvenile court recognized M.M.’s desire to be reunited with her parents, this court has previously noted that R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) ... “does not give any one factor greater weight than the others,” but rather “the statute requires a weighing of all relevant factors.” ... Accordingly, the juvenile court “could not give [the child’s] wishes under the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) factor greater weight than the other best interest factors.”

Section 2151.414(D)(2) does not require a court to assess a child's wishes when the child is affirmatively shown to be incapable of communicating them.

In Re Wright, Unpublished Decision (8-3-2004) · filed 2004-08-03(D)(2)

When it is affirmatively demonstrated that a child is not capable or competent to communicate his or her wishes, a trial court is not required to assess the wishes of that child in determining whether permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires the court to consider the child’s wishes when deciding the child’s best interest; absent contrary evidence, an appellate court may presume the trial court did so without an express finding.

In re D.N. · filed 2011-07-06(D)(1)(b)

Because there is no evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the juvenile court considered D.N.’s wishes. Therefore, we find no plain error under Mother’s wishes-of-the-child argument.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(b) permits a court to consider the guardian ad litem’s recommendation instead of a child’s wishes when the child lacks sufficient maturity to express those wishes.

In re B.W. · filed 2012-07-30(D)(1)(b)

Therefore, the trial judge was not required to consider the wishes of R.W., but could instead consider the recommendation of the guardian ad litem. See R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b).

A court must consider a child’s wishes when deciding the child’s best interest, but those wishes do not control the outcome.

In re A.C. · filed 2014-11-05(D)(1)(b)

The fact that the children wished to return to Mother is not dispositive when considering the children’s best interest.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) permits a child’s wishes to be conveyed directly or through a guardian ad litem; declining an in-camera interview is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Lichtenwalter v. Stark Cty. Dept. of Jobs & Family Servs. · filed 2012-01-09(D)(2)

In In re Funk, Portage App. Nos.2002-P-0035, 2002-P-0036, 2002-Ohio-4958, the Ninth District Court of Appeals noted, “ * * * R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) clearly provides that a child's wishes may be ‘expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem * * * [.]’ That is to say, a juvenile court has the option of either having the child assert his or her opinion, through, for example, an in-camera interview ... or testimony, or the court may rely upon the guardian ad litem's representations with respect to the child's desires. Because the juvenile court has a choice, the decision not to conduct an in camera interview will be reversed only if the court abused its discretion in declining to do so. (Citation omitted).” Id. at para. 30. ... Based on the testimony of Dr. Tener and the CASA/GAL, and in light of the entire record and GAL report, we find the trial court’s failure to conduct of an in camera interview of the two older children was not an abuse of discretion or reversible error in this case.

Section 2151.414(B) requires a written opinion setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law only upon a party's request, and section 2151.414(A)'s required determinations need not be specifically listed in the judgment entry.

In Re Covin · filed 1982-11-10(A) and (B)

Upon this state of the record and the language of the above-quoted provision, we hold that the lower court did not err in not filing a written opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law. ... R.C. 2151.414(A) lists numerous determinations to be made by the lower court during a hearing upon a motion for permanent custody. The statute, however, does not require these determinations to be specifically listed in the lower court’s judgment entry, and thus the failure to do so is not error.

Section 2151.414 does not require a judgment entry to reproduce the exact statutory language when explicit findings under subsection (E) implicitly establish the required parental-placement determination.

In the Matter of Ramirez, Unpublished Decision (12-20-2000) · filed 2000-12-20(E)

The court's explicit findings under R.C. 2151.414 (E) are an implicit conclusion by the court that one of the situations under R.C. 2151.414 (B) was applicable. Therefore, the court's failure to reproduce the exact statutory language cannot be considered prejudicial to the appellant.

Findings supporting permanent custody under section 2151.414 need not repeat statutory language or cite specific provisions, but must state the statutory determinations on the record with factual support.

In Re Baker, Unpublished Decision (1-16-2001) · filed 2001-01-16(B)(1)

The trial court is not required to use the specific statutory language or to explicitly refer to specific statutory provisions. Rather, the trial court must "find, by clear and convincing evidence, that certain statutory criteria have been met, and the court must state those findings on the record, such that it is clear to all parties that the decision is supported by the facts."

Section 2151.414(D) does not require a custody decision to state explicit findings on every best-interest factor where the record does not indicate that the court failed to consider the child’s wishes.

In Re Fouty, Unpublished Decision (3-7-2001) · filed 2001-03-07(D)

We do not read the Mays decision as requiring a trial court to explicitly state its findings with respect to each of the factors in R.C. 2151.414 (D). There is nothing in the record to indicate the trial court did not consider the wishes of the children in making its determination.

A claim that Section 2151.414(D)’s factors were not considered fails where the court heard evidence on each factor and expressly stated that it considered them all.

In the Matter of Franklin, Unpublished Decision (06-28-2001) · filed 2001-06-28(D)

The trial court heard evidence concerning each and every factor contained in R.C. 2151.414 . ... Because the trial court specifically stated that it considered all the factors under R.C. 2151.414 , we find appellants' argument lacks merit.

Sections 2151.353 and 2151.414 authorize a juvenile court to transfer permanent custody, thereby terminating parental rights, but do not authorize an order that merely terminates parental rights without granting custody to another person or agency.

In the Matter of Sims, Unpublished Decision (6-28-2002) · filed 2002-06-28

Neither R.C. § 2151.353 nor R.C. § 2151.414 provides a mechanism for the juvenile court merely to terminate parental rights. The statutes permit the court to transfer permanent custody to a children's services agency or another person. The effect of that transfer is to permanently divest the parents of their parental rights.

Section 2151.414(D) requires the trial court itself to state findings addressing the statutory best-interest factors so the decision can be meaningfully reviewed.

In Re Strong, Unpublished Decision (5-9-2002) · filed 2002-05-09(D)

However, the trial court "is required by the statute to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that certain criteria have been met, and the court must state those findings on the record, such that it is clear to all parties that the decision is supported by the facts."

A permanent-custody judgment is facially defective unless the juvenile court expressly makes at least one of § 2151.414(B)(1)'s mandatory findings by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re Belanger, Unpublished Decision (9-20-2002) · filed 2002-09-20(B)(1)

Instead, the court found that "[a]ll three statutory factors alleged have been proven clearly and convincingly against Mr. Reese, and once the Court makes a finding that even one of the statutory factors exist, it is mandated to enter a finding that the child cannot and should not be placed with Mr. Reese." ... The court's failure to fully discuss these factors renders its judgment facially defective and warrants its reversal. Thus, this matter must be reversed and remanded for the court to make one of the mandatory findings required under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1).

A permanent-custody decision need not specifically enumerate every best-interest factor in division (D), and absent a contrary record an appellate court presumes that the juvenile court considered the required criteria.

In Re Christian, Unpublished Decision (6-17-2003) · filed 2003-06-17(D)

There is simply no evidence in the record that the trial court did not consider placement of the children without the need for terminating appellants' parental rights. ... Moreover, "`A trial court is not required to specifically enumerate each factor under R.C. 2151.414 (D) in its decision.'"

On limited review after a parent failed to object to a magistrate's findings, findings addressing unremedied conditions and the children's best interests were sufficient to support permanent custody.

In the Matter of Zachary, Unpublished Decision (11-24-2003) · filed 2003-11-24(B)(1), (D)

These findings and conclusions are sufficient upon which to find that the trial court's grant of permanent custody was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Former Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody to be granted to the agency that filed the motion, not to a private individual.

In Re Shepherd, Unpublished Decision (9-29-1999) · filed 1999-09-29(A)(1), (B)

In sum, neither former R.C. 2151.414 nor former 2151.353 give a juvenile court the authority to grant permanent custody to a private individual.

Section 2151.414(B), read with Sections 2151.413 and 2151.415, permits only an agency to move for permanent custody, so private individuals cannot seek permanent custody for themselves or direct it to an agency.

In Re Matter of Shepherd, Unpublished Decision (3-26-2001) · filed 2001-03-26(B)

We add to that the proposition that private individuals cannot move the court to place the child in the permanent custody of themselves or an agency; permanent custody is a mechanism wholly prescribed to an agency.

Section 2151.414(D) does not require an agency to prefer a relative over permanent agency custody when permanent agency custody is in the child's best interest.

In Re P.P., Unpublished Decision (3-7-2003) · filed 2003-03-07(D)

Although R.C. 2151.412 (G) and 2151.414 (D) provide guidelines for an agency to consider in placing a child, the statutes do not require the agency to award custody to a relative rather than to the agency.

Section 2151.414 does not mandate custody to relatives except when a child is orphaned, but it generally favors giving appropriate relatives priority consideration.

In Re Mitchell, Unpublished Decision (8-01-2003) · filed 2003-08-01(B)(1)(c)

The trial court stated in its April 18, 2002 judgment entry that "[w]hile the [c]ourt recognizes that these statutes [R.C. 2151.412 , R.C. 2151.413 , and R.C. 2151.414 ] do not mandate custody to relatives, except in cases wherein the child is orphaned, still they clearly indicate the intent of the legislature that appropriate relatives should generally be given priority consideration." See, also, In re Martin (Sept. 22, 1983), 10th Dist. Nos. 83AP-29 and 83AP-30, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 14985, at 6. We agree.

Section 2151.414 requires a permanent-custody motion to be filed by the appropriate children services agency and does not authorize a guardian ad litem to file it on the agency’s behalf.

In Re C.T. · filed 2007-12-26(B)(2)

This statute is specifically referenced by R.C. 2151.414, which is the statute governing the hearing on the motion for permanent custody. ... Since R.C. 2151.413 and 2151.414 require a motion by the agency, the GAL did not have standing to seek an award of permanent custody of C.T. to the agency, and the GAL’s motion is not permitted under R.C. 2151.413.

Section 2151.414 governs how a court may order permanent custody but does not restrict permanent-custody motions to public children services agencies or private child placing agencies.

In re C.T. · filed 2008-09-17

R.C. 2151.413 and 2151.414 provide when and how a court may order permanent custody in a child welfare case. Although those statutes refer to motions filed by a public children services agency or a private child placing agency, there is no language that mandates that only an agency may file for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) allows the six-month period for remedying the conditions that caused removal to run while a parent is imprisoned.

Matter of Armijo, Unpublished Decision (10-28-1999) · filed 1999-10-28(E)(1)

Although this Court is mindful that Appellant was incarcerated during this six month period, we have previously held that the time a parent is in prison does not toll the six month period set forth in R.C. § 2151.414 (E) (1).

Section 2151.414(E) does not make a parent's mere failure to comply with a case plan automatic grounds for granting permanent custody.

Matter of Anais G., Unpublished Decision (12-10-1999) · filed 1999-12-10(E)

We initially note that, contrary to LCCS implications, appellant's mere failure to comply with the case plan is not automatic grounds for granting permanent custody. See R.C. 2151.414 (E).

Section 2151.414(E)(1) focuses on whether a parent substantially remedied the conditions causing removal, not merely whether the parent complied with the case plan; under section 2151.414(C), the court may not deny permanent custody solely because the agency failed to implement a particular case-plan aspect.

In the Matter of Harmon, Unpublished Decision (9-25-2000) · filed 2000-09-25(C), (E)(1)

Second, we note that in a permanent custody proceeding, the question is not "whether the parent has substantially complied with the case plan, but whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child's removal." ... See, generally, R.C. 2151.414 (C) (stating that "[t]he court shall not deny an agency's motion for permanent custody solely because the agency failed to implement any particular aspect of the child's case plan").

Partial progress on a case plan does not preclude permanent custody under section 2151.414(E)(1) when the parent has failed to remedy the conditions causing removal.

In Re garner/flowers Children, Unpublished Decision (1-22-2001) · filed 2001-01-22(E)(1)

Although the Goodwill parenting classes and other case plan components fared somewhat better, we are compelled to note that SCDHS was not necessarily required to prove at trial that appellant completely failed in achieving the goals of the case plan. This court has upheld permanent custody findings despite evidence in the record that a parent made partial progress on his or her case plan.

Repeated drug relapses and incarceration despite partial case-plan completion can support permanent custody under Section 2151.414.

In Re Radu Children, Unpublished Decision (2-20-2001) · filed 2001-02-20(E)(1)

There was substantial evidence that appellant chose to continue her lifestyle with Mr. Radu over successfully completing the case plan. Appellant suffered from relapses into drug abuse and was incarcerated several times over a two year period. In the meantime, the child was placed in and out of appellee's custody. Based upon the parents' failure to successfully complete the case plan, we find there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision to grant permanent custody of the child to appellee.

The absence of a case plan from the record can be harmless when testimony clearly supports failure to remedy conditions, lack of parental commitment, and reasonable agency efforts under Section 2151.414(E).

In Re Gill, Unpublished Decision (3-15-2001) · filed 2001-03-15(E)(1), (E)(4)

Given the evidence before the juvenile court, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion by making the findings disputed by appellant. Therefore, the absence of a case plan in the record of this case constitutes harmless error.

Occasional case-plan compliance does not prevent permanent custody where parents continually relapse into substance use and incur criminal or probation violations.

In Re Voorhies, Unpublished Decision (6-6-2001) · filed 2001-06-06(E)

In its judgment entry filed January 10, 2001, the trial court characterized the history of this case very accurately: The Court had status review hearings every three months to monitor services, compliance, needs of the parties, requests of the parties and while the parents had occasional periods of compliance, they continually relapsed and had criminal or probation violations throughout the case up to the permanent custody hearing and the permanent custody motion for which the mother has received CBCF placement for six months and the father is in jail awaiting CBCF or other sentencing for probation violations involving continued alcohol or other drug use.

Section 2151.414(D)(3)’s custodial-history factor does not entitle a parent to a full year to complete the case plan before parental rights may be terminated.

In Re Bailey, Alleged Neglected, Unpublished Decision (7-20-2001) · filed 2001-07-20(D)(3)

There is no support for appellant's argument that a parent must be given at least a full year to fulfill his or her case plan prior to the termination of parental rights and the custodial history of the child. R.C. 2151.414 (D)(3), is just one of the factors that the court must consider and no one factor is dispositive.

A stipulation that a parent is working a case plan does not prevent a noncompliance finding where the parent refuses to accept the sexual abuse that the plan addresses.

In the Matter of meyer/riehl Children, Unpublished Decision (1-7-2002) · filed 2002-01-07(E)(1)

Appellant refused to accept the sexual abuse diagnosis even as it referred to the mother. Such a blind sighted approach to the case plan cannot be termed cooperating with the case plan. We find the trial court's findings of fact to be supported by the evidence despite the stipulation.

Substantial case-plan compliance alone does not defeat permanent custody because Section 2151.414(E)(1) focuses on whether the parent substantially remedied the removal conditions.

In Re Jones Children, Unpublished Decision (4-17-2002) · filed 2002-04-17(E)(1)

First, substantial compliance with a case plan, in and of itself, does not prove that a grant of permanent custody to an agency is erroneous. ... Second, the dispositive issue is not whether the parent has substantially complied with the case plan, but whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child's removal.

Completing a case plan does not defeat permanent custody under section 2151.414(D) when the parent has not shown the consistency or ability to use the skills learned and the remaining evidence favors permanent placement.

In Re Barker, Unpublished Decision (7-29-2002) · filed 2002-07-29(D)

Although appellant completed her case plan, she has not shown the consistency or the ability to use the skills she learned. She still makes poor financial decisions, has difficulty in consistently disciplining the children, and is inconsistent with taking her medicine. Over the past two and a half years, appellant has shown a lack of stability and consistency.

Substantial compliance under § 2151.414(E)(1) requires actual improvement of parenting skills, not merely attendance at and completion of parenting classes.

In the Matter of Johnson, Unpublished Decision (5-1-2003) · filed 2003-05-01(E)(1)

Clearly, taking classes is not the object — the object is improvement of parenting skills which, according to the evidence of FCCS, did not improve substantially.

A parent who signs a reunification case plan but delays seriously attempting its objectives until shortly before the permanent-custody hearing may be found unable to receive the child within a reasonable time under § 2151.414(E)(1).

In Re Honaker, Unpublished Decision (5-7-2003) · filed 2003-05-07(E)(1)

Appellant father signed the case plan in June of 2001 and did not seriously attempt to complete the objectives until two weeks prior to the July 10, 2002 hearing. Although his paternity of the child was established in May of 2001, he did not visit with the child, and the child does not have a relationship with him. We find the trial court did not err in finding the child could not be placed with appellant father in a reasonable time.

A reasonable-time placement finding is supported when a parent makes almost no effort to comply with the case plan, continues using drugs, remains unemployed, fails to complete required assessments and programs, and admits being unfit.

Cunningham Children, Unpublished Decision (5-27-2003) · filed 2003-05-27(E)(1), (E)(4), (E)(16)

The trial court found father had "made next to no attempt to comply with the case plan, and finds [his] lack of motivation to do whatever necessary to see the return of [his] children, appalling." ... Father failed to comply with the urinalysis. Father submitted two urine screens, both of which were positive for cocaine. Father did not complete the required psychological assessment. Father remained unemployed throughout the pendency of the action. ... Additionally, father admitted he was not a fit parent.

A failure-to-remedy finding under division (E)(1) may rest on incomplete case-plan requirements where the parent cannot document or corroborate claimed completion and the trial court credits the agency's witnesses.

In Re D.F., Unpublished Decision (6-19-2003) · filed 2003-06-19(E)(1)

At the time of trial, L.F. had completed the initial drug assessment and parenting classes, but had not completed her GED, obtained appropriate housing, or stable employment. She had also failed to enter into psychological counseling, as recommended by Dr. Anuszkiewicz. Although L.F. testified at trial that she had, in fact, completed these aspects of her case plan, she was unable to provide any documentation or witness testimony to verify or corroborate her claims. ... Accordingly, the trial court's determination that D.F., E.F., and M.F. could not be placed with L.F. within a reasonable time is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

A parent's delayed efforts to satisfy a reunification case plan may demonstrate a lack of commitment supporting a finding that the child should not be placed with that parent.

In Re A.F., Unpublished Decision (9-19-2003) · filed 2003-09-19(B)

The trial court's finding that Alexis A. and Jacqueline J. should not be placed with Flory, because Flory's delays in her attempts to comply with her case plan demonstrated her lack of commitment to her children, wasis supported by clear and convincing evidence.

A parent's failure to complete a case plan is not, by itself, a ground for terminating parental rights.

In Re Richardson, Unpublished Decision (9-26-2003) · filed 2003-09-26(E)

With respect to parents' third assignment of error, parents assert a parent's failure to adhere to or complete a case plan is not, in and of itself, a ground for terminating parental rights. We agree.

Substantial completion of case-plan requirements does not preclude permanent custody because the court must determine whether the parent substantially remedied the conditions that caused removal.

In Re Conn, Unpublished Decision (10-7-2003) · filed 2003-10-07(E)(1)

Moreover, Jessica's compliance with the case plan was only one element to be considered by the trial court in considering the best interests of the children pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E). Substantial completion of case plan requirements does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a social services agency. In this case, we must consider whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child's removal. See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1); In re Shchigelski (Oct. 20, 2000), Geauga App. No. 99-G-2241.

The COVID-19 pandemic does not excuse a parent's failure to address substance abuse when no evidence shows that the pandemic impeded that case-plan component.

In re D.B. · filed 2021-11-24(E)(4)

Notably, neither parent presented evidence to show that the pandemic impeded their efforts to complete the substance abuse component of their case plan. As the GAL opined, the parents’ continued drug use and failure in addressing their substance use underlies all the issues regarding their inability to adequately provide and care for D.B. That failure, which well demonstrated the parents’ lack of commitment, was not attributable to the pandemic.

COVID-19 restrictions do not defeat failure-to-remedy and lack-of-commitment findings when a parent's lack of interaction primarily resulted from the parent's own failure to attend and participate in visits.

In re J.H. · filed 2021-12-08(E)(1), (E)(4)

Mother’s visits were eventually suspended because of Mother’s lack of attendance and active participation in the visits, the child’s expressed wishes, and the recommendations of the child’s counselor and the guardian ad litem. The evidence demonstrated that Mother’s lack of interaction with J.H. was primarily the result of her own lack of effort to see him, not the health restrictions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Failing to begin court-ordered services in time and visiting only sporadically despite transportation assistance can establish failure to remedy and lack of commitment.

In re H.S. · filed 2022-03-31(E)(1), (E)(4)

By failing to engage in services in a timely manner, Mother had not even begun to remedy the mental health, domestic violence victimization, and parenting concerns underlying the child’s removal. ... Moreover, the juvenile court’s finding that both parents demonstrated a lack of commitment to H.S. was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See R.C. 2151.414(E)(4). Although CSB provided the parents with bus passes, neither visited the child on a consistent basis.

Little or no progress on housing, mental health, financial stability, visitation, and substance-abuse requirements can establish that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re E.M. · filed 2022-10-31(B)(1)(a)

The evidence demonstrates that both parents had made little to no progress on several requirements of their case plans, including housing, mental health, financial stability, visitation, and drug and alcohol issues. ... Overall, the judgment was supported by clear and convincing evidence sufficient to satisfy R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

Sections 2151.414(E)(4), (E)(10), (E)(12), and (E)(16) support a reasonable-time placement finding when an incarcerated parent fails to pursue the child or provide a permanent home despite knowing paternity.

In re Ang.O. · filed 2018-12-21(E)(4), (E)(10), (E)(12), (E)(16)

In reaching its decision, the trial court reasoned that father demonstrated a lack of commitment toward N.O. despite knowledge that she was his biological child. The court found that appellant had taken a DNA test prior to his incarceration but failed to follow through with the court or child support agency until after LCCS’ permanent custody motion had been filed. At the time of trial he was still incarcerated and even assuming an early release in August 2018, he had a 16-month probation obligation. In addition, appellant’s mother, L.C., testified that following his release from incarceration, appellant intended on remaining in New York where he had employment. Thus, we hold that the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(E) are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Incarceration does not excuse a parent's failure to communicate with or support the children, and sending Christmas presents does not constitute the regular support contemplated by subsection (E).

In re Da.B. · filed 2018-02-22(E)(4)

Father’s incarceration does not qualify as an excuse for those failures. ... Further, sending Christmas presents to Da.B. cannot constitute the regular support that R.C. 2151.414(E) contemplates.

The incarceration factor does not apply when the parent is no longer incarcerated at the permanent-custody hearing, though the court may consider the prior incarceration as another relevant factor.

In re S.W. · filed 2018-04-30(E)(5), (E)(16)

Wiley argues that this is inapplicable since he was no longer incarcerated for Child Endangering at the time of the permanent custody hearing. We agree that the court erred in finding that this factor applied, given that he was not incarcerated when the hearing took place. Regardless, this error resulted in no harm to Wiley. It was appropriate for the court to consider incarceration under (E)(16), which allows for application of “[a]ny other factor the court considers relevant.”

Section 2151.414(E)(7) requires the conclusion that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time when the parent is serving the prison sentence addressed by that provision.

In Re Gray, Unpublished Decision (12-22-1999) · filed 1999-12-22(E)(7)

In deciding whether a child can be placed with his or her parent within a reasonable time or should be placed with a parent, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that at least one of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (E) are present. ... R.C. 2151.414 (E), therefore, required the conclusion that Cory and Joshua could not be placed with Appellant within a reasonable time.

A parent's remaining prison term of less than the eighteen months specified in section 2151.414(E)(12) does not preclude a placement finding supported by other statutory circumstances.

In the Matter of Azbell, Unpublished Decision (6-17-2002) · filed 2002-06-17(E)(12)

Appellant also relies on the fact that, as of September 16, 2002, he had only sixteen months left to serve in prison and that this was less than the eighteen months specified in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(12) as a factor to consider by the trial court in determining whether the children could be placed in his custody. We note that appellant's incarceration was just one of several reasons why the trial court found that the children could not, and should not, be placed in his custody.

The placement-with-parent finding was supported where a mother failed parenting and counseling requirements and was serving a three-year sentence for child endangering, making reunification unavailable within a reasonable time.

In Re Mastache Children, Unpublished Decision (1-21-2003) · filed 2003-01-21(E)(1), (5), (12)

Given the facts that appellant admits to failing the Goodwill Parenting Program and not complying with the requirement that she undergo counseling, and was early into a three year prison sentence for child endangering, we are loath to find the trial court erred in concluding reunification could not be accomplished in a reasonable time. ... Upon review, we find the trial court had clear and convincing evidence before it to grant appellee permanent custody of the children.

Section 2151.414(E)(12) applies when a parent is incarcerated at the time of the permanent-custody motion or dispositional hearing and will remain unavailable to care for the child for at least eighteen months; incarceration during only part of the hearing is insufficient.

In Re Alexis K. · filed 2005-03-24(E)(12)

Remaining is the finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(12) that the parent is incarcerated at the time of filing or at the dispositional hearing and will not be available to care for the child for at least 18 months. We do not perceive “incarcerated” as used in this section to encompass only a portion of the dispositional hearing. The import of this section clearly is that a parent is jailed at the time of the motion or dispositional hearing and will not be let free for at least 18 months.

Section 2151.414(E)(12) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent who is incarcerated at the dispositional hearing and will be unavailable to care for the child for at least eighteen months, and a merely speculative possibility of earlier release on appeal does not defeat that finding.

In Re Noda, Unpublished Decision (5-5-2005) · filed 2005-05-05(E)(12)

As to appellant, the court satisfied the requirement which provides that the court "shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent if the court finds that the parent is incarcerated at the time of the dispositional hearing and will not be available to care for the child for at least eighteen months." R.C. 5121.414. (E)(12). {¶ 35} The court found that appellant was incarcerated at the time of the September 20, 2004 hearing for permanent custody serving his eleven-year federal prison term. 2 That finding is supported by the record and evidence presented at the hearing. Jaime Lette ("Lette"), a caseworker from LCJFS, testified that appellant's potential release date is April 30, 2013. Certified copies of appellant's sentence were also admitted into evidence. {¶ 36} Appellant asserts that his federal conviction is on appeal, which was also a finding by the court. However, other than the pending appeal, no other evidence that appellant would be subject to an early release was presented. The possibility of release based upon appeal is far too speculative for the court to find that Deserie could be placed with appellant within a reasonable time. In re Hederson (1986), 30 Ohio App.3d 187 , 189 , ("the trial court cannot be faulted for rejecting speculative projections concerning the length of the [father's] incarceration"). See, also, In re Brown, 11th Dist. No. 2004-L-027, 2004-Ohio-3337, at ¶ 13. As such, appellant's argument is not welltaken.

Incarceration does not preclude a failure-to-remedy finding when substance-abuse treatment is available in prison and the parent refuses it until shortly before the permanent-custody hearing.

In re C.S. · filed 2015-11-20(E)(1)

Thus, despite her incarceration, appellant had options available. However, appellant did not avail herself of any substance abuse treatment program until the week before the permanent custody hearing. Moreover, the evidence shows that appellant repeatedly denied that she had a substance abuse problem that she needed to address. Under these circumstances, we believe that the evidence permits a finding that appellant repeatedly and continuously failed to substantially remedy her substance abuse issue, which was one of the conditions that caused the children’s removal.

Speculation that an incarcerated parent may receive early or judicial release does not establish availability to care for the child within Section 2151.414(E)(12)'s eighteen-month period.

In re C.B.C. · filed 2016-03-04(E)(12)

Any hopes the mother or father harbor of his earlier release are purely speculative; we have previously rejected speculative release dates as establishing that a parent will be available to care for a child within the eighteen-month timeframe set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(12).

An incarcerated parent who will remain unavailable to care for the child for at least eighteen months must be found unable to receive the child within a reasonable time under Section 2151.414(E)(12).

In re K.R. · filed 2016-02-09(E)(12)

If the trial court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, a parent is incarcerated at the time of the filing of the motion for permanent custody and will not be available to care for the child for at least eighteen months, the court shall enter ... a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(E)(1)'s reasonable-case-planning and diligent-efforts requirement does not require an agency to hold a child in temporary custody until an incarcerated parent is released when no available agency effort could remove the obstacle to reunification.

In re N.B. · filed 2016-10-12(E)(1)

As we observed in P.S., “[b]eyond maintaining the child[ ] in [her] temporary custody pending Father's release from transitional control and waiting to see if he could secure housing, maintain employment, and maintain his sobriety when not incarcerated, it is not clear what other efforts [the Agency] could have undertaken to remove the obstacle preventing reunification between Father and the children.” ... “As noted by the Fourth District, the permanent custody statutes do not appear to contemplate holding a child in custodial limbo while a parent completes a prison term.”

Speculative parole eligibility does not establish that an incarcerated parent will be available to care for the child within subsection (E)(12)’s eighteen-month period.

In re A.W. · filed 2021-11-03(E)(12)

{¶23} Although father now asserts for the first time in his brief that he will be eligible for parole in March 2022, and not July 2022, he put on no evidence at the hearing to support this. Nevertheless, parole is not guaranteed. In re Lenix, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 05-COA-039, 2006-Ohio-1294, ¶ 47. Courts have rejected speculative release dates as establishing that a parent will be available to care for a child within the 18-month timeframe in R.C. 2151.414(E)(12). Matters of J.F., 4th Dist. Nos. 21CA2 and 21CA3, 2021-Ohio-2713, ¶ 48; Lenix at ¶ 47.

Section 2151.414(E) permits a finding that children cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time when clear and convincing evidence shows qualifying prolonged or repeated incarceration.

In Re Nicole K., Unpublished Decision (4-18-2003) · filed 2003-04-18(E)(12), (E)(13)

"(12) The parent is incarcerated at the time of the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing of the child and will not be available to care for the child for at least eighteen months after the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing. ... "(13) The parent is repeatedly incarcerated, and the repeated incarceration prevents the parent from providing care for the child." ... This court has thoroughly reviewed the record of proceedings in the trial court and, upon consideration thereof, we find that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision to award permanent custody of Nicole, Raymond and Courtney K. to appellee LCCS.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) no longer contains the former six-month requirement, but an agency must prove that allegation when it is included in the complaint; under division (E)(4), lack of parental commitment may show unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home.

In Re Munday, Unpublished Decision (1-31-2000) · filed 2000-01-31(E)(1), (E)(4)

The "six month" language was in a previous version of 2151.414 but was deleted as of September 18, 1996. However, since the "six month" language was in the complaints and that is what the appellant received notice of, we find that SCDHS had to prove that allegation to prevail on that portion of its complaint. But, it was impossible for the SCDHS to prove that allegation by clear and convincing evidence in the case sub judice. The parents could not have failed for a period of six months following the placement of Majestic outside her home to remedy the conditions causing removal, when Majestic had only been removed by court order three months prior to the permanent custody hearing. Therefore, we agree with appellant and find that the trial court's finding of fact as to the "six month" language is unsupported by the evidence.

Under § 2151.414(E)(1), the former six-month language had been deleted from the statute, but when that allegation appeared in the complaint, the agency still had to prove it, which was impossible here because removal occurred less than six months before the hearing.

In Re Mingle, Unpublished Decision (2-28-2000) · filed 2000-02-28(E)(1)

The language actually used in the complaint filed by appellee and in the trial court's findings contains the additional language that the parents "failed continuously and repeatedly for a period of six (6) months to substantially remedy the conditions. . . ." (Emphasis added.) The "six month" language was in a previous version of 2151.414 but was deleted as of September 18, 1996. However, since the "six month" language was in the complaint and that is what the appellant received notice of, we find that SCDHS had to prove that allegation to prevail on that portion of its complaint. But, it was impossible for the SCDHS to prove that allegation by clear and convincing evidence in the case sub judice. The parents could not have failed for a period of six months following the placement of Baby Boy Mingle outside his home to remedy the conditions causing removal when Baby Boy Mingle was removed from Mingles' care by court order less than six months prior to the permanent custody hearing. Therefore, we find that the trial court's finding of fact as to the "six month" language is unsupported by the evidence.

Section 2151.414(C) requires a guardian ad litem's written report before or at the hearing, while divisions (B)(1)(a), (D), and (E) require clear-and-convincing best-interest and parental-placement findings before permanent custody may be granted.

In the Matter of Brad C., Unpublished Decision (3-17-2000) · filed 2000-03-17(C), (B)(1)(a), (D), and (E)

R.C. 2151.414 (C) provides in part: "(C) * * * A written report of the guardian ad litem of the child shall be submitted to the court prior to or at the time of the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section or section 2151.35 of the Revised Code but shall not be submitted under oath." ... In the case sub judice, a written report was submitted by the guardian ad litem on May 19, 1998, prior to the adjudicatory hearing and is contained in the record. Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is found not well-taken. ... R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) 3 sets forth the criteria and the clear and convincing evidence standard that the trial court must apply in making its determination that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency. R.C. 2151.414 (E) 4 requires the trial court to find that the child cannot be placed with either of his or her parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents once the court has determined by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the enumerated factors exist. Once the trial court finds from all relevant evidence that one of the enumerated factors exists, it then must consider whether permanent commitment is in the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414 (D). 5 Only then may it grant permanent custody of the child to the agency.

Section 2151.414(E)(2) requires a court to find that a parent’s chronic mental illness is so severe that the parent cannot provide an adequate permanent home at the time of the hearing or within one year, while subsection (C) requires the guardian ad litem’s written report before or at the hearing.

In the Matter of Michael Breslav, Unpublished Decision (4-13-2000) · filed 2000-04-13(C), (E)(2)

R.C. 2151.414 does not mandate a judge to specifically use the exact language of the relevant statute in its findings in the journal entry, and the failure to do so is not a basis for reversal. ... In short, ample testimony was provided which clearly indicated that Milinevskaya suffers from a severe and chronic mental illness which severely hinders her ability to provide an adequate permanent home for Michael within the next year, and likely a lifetime. As a result, since CCDCFS made every reasonable effort to reunify Michael with his mother through case plans and education, and since all measures unfortunately failed due to her mental condition, the judge had sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support the transfer Michael's custody to CCDCFS pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E) (2). ... R.C. 2151.414 (C) provides: (C) In making the determinations required by this section or division (A) (4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code, a court shall not consider the effect the granting of permanent custody to the agency would have upon any parent of the child. A written report of the guardian ad litem of the child shall be submitted to the court prior to or at the time of the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section or section 2151.35 of the Revised Code but shall not be submitted under oath. ... Milinevskaya is correct in her assertion that the judge did not comply with the mandates of R.C. 2151.414 (C), when he held the hearings prior to the guardian ad litem's submission of his September 25, 1998 report. ... Because Milinevskaya cannot produce evidence of prejudice from the above alleged error, this assignment of error is overruled.

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

In Re fitch/alford Children, Unpublished Decision (6-28-2000) · filed 2000-06-28(B)(1), (D), and (E)

Before a juvenile court can terminate parental rights and award to a proper moving agency permanent custody of a child who is neither abandoned nor orphaned, it must find by clear and convincing evidence that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, and that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. See In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95 , 99 ; see also, R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1).

Section 2151.414(B) requires clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, while subsection (D) lists best-interest factors and subsection (E)(1) addresses a parent's repeated failure to remedy the conditions causing removal.

In Re Coffman, Unpublished Decision (9-7-2000) · filed 2000-09-07(B), (D), and (E)(1)

Permanent custody may be granted to a public children services agency under R.C. 2151.414 (B) if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that (1) it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody, and (2) the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents. ... The trial court was required to consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) The custodial history of the child; (4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency[.] R.C. 2151.414 (D). ... The second element of R.C. 2151.414 (B) applicable here requires that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents. In assessing that factor, R.C. 2151.414 (E) requires the trial court to consider all relevant evidence and to find that one of the factors in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exists. ... Here, the trial court determined pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) that "[c]lear and convincing evidence supports the fact that Stella Coffman `failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child's home.'" (Decision, p. 6.)

Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence of both the child's best interest in agency permanent custody and the child's inability or unsuitability for placement with a parent within a reasonable time; subsection (D)(4) recognizes that a legally secure placement may be achieved without agency permanent custody.

In Re Stanley, Unpublished Decision (10-11-2000) · filed 2000-10-11(B)(1) and (D)(4)

Under the circumstances here, the court may permanently terminate parental rights only if there is clear and convincing evidence both (1) that a grant of permanent custody to CSB is in the best interest of the child and (2) that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parent. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). ... Thus, despite the fact that the legislature has determined that in some cases a "legally secure permanent placement * * * can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to [CSB]," R.C. 2151.414 (D)(4), the guardian ad litem here determined that anything less than permanent custody is not a "legally secure permanent placement" and therefore is de facto not in Brenden's best interest. ... There was not clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that the only legally secure placement was a grant of permanent custody to CSB. ... The determination by the trial court that permanent custody was in the best interest of Brenden was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 2151.414 allows permanent custody to an agency when clear and convincing evidence shows it is in the child's best interest and the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, including when a parent fails to remedy placement conditions or regularly support the child.

In Re Reeves, Unpublished Decision (11-8-2000) · filed 2000-11-08(B)(1), (D)(1), (D)(3), (D)(4), (E)(1), (E)(4)

R.C. 2151.414 (B) states that a juvenile court may grant permanent custody of a child to an agency such as CSB if two conditions are met. First, the trial court must find that granting permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (D). Second, the trial court must find that "[t]he child is not abandoned or orphaned and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents[,]" R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (E). These findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. R.C. 2151.414 (B). ... We conclude that the juvenile court's finding that Kalli could not or should not be placed with Appellant, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E), was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant demonstrated a lack of commitment toward Kalli by failing to regularly support her when he persistently failed to pay child support, even when his case plan called for him to do so. See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4). Appellant also failed continuously and repeatedly to remedy the conditions that caused Kalli's placement outside the home, as found in the case plan. See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1). ... We also conclude that the juvenile court's finding that permanent custody was in Kalli's best interest was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Kalli showed some attachment to her foster mother and foster sister and to her natural brother and sister, but no truly enduring attachment to Appellant or his wife. R.C. 2151.414 (D)(1). Kalli had been in the temporary custody of CSB for a significant period of time (from August 1997 to March 2000), longer than the time period required by R.C. 2151.414 (D)(3). The evidence also appeared to demonstrate that a secure placement was needed and that placement with Appellant would not achieve that goal. R.C. 2151.414 (D)(4).

Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), a court may grant an agency permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In Re C.F., Unpublished Decision (12-12-2005) · filed 2005-12-12(B)(1)(a)

As we previously noted, permanent custody to Children's Services may be granted if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that permanent custody is in the child's best interest, and as applicable and pertinent here, the child cannot be placed with either of the parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a).

Section 2151.414(A)(1) bars readjudication of the abuse, neglect, or dependency adjudication and grant of temporary custody at the hearing, but it does not bar reiteration of relevant testimony in disposition proceedings.

In the Matter of Tiffany B., Unpublished Decision (6-2-2000) · filed 2000-06-02(A)(1)

We read that passage to mean that the legislature did not intend to prevent the reiteration of certain testimony, as proposed by appellant. Rather, the language indicates that disposition proceedings, regardless of the outcome, would have no effect on initial adjudicatory determination. In this case, while the testimony by the principal of the school had limited value, we cannot say it was so irrelevant to be inadmissible. Likewise, although some of the references made by the caseworker were not specific as to the source, the facts as to appellant's failure to follow through with Maurice's psychiatric care and medications are undisputed. Via the same testimony, appellant's motives for such failure were also presented, i.e. , her dissatisfaction with the effects of the medication and her unwillingness to continue with Maurice's therapy. Therefore, we cannot say that the testimony was inadmissible pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (A).

Section 2151.414(A)(1)’s prohibition on readjudicating dependency does not prevent consideration of evidence from the earlier dependency hearing when deciding the permanent-custody factors.

In Re Cavender, Unpublished Decision (3-19-2001) · filed 2001-03-19(A)(1)

The trial court could consider evidence elicited in the dependency hearing in making its determination of permanent custody without engaging in the "readjudication" of Michael's status as a dependent child that is prohibited by R.C. 2151.414 (A)(1) in a permanent custody determination.

Section 2151.414(A)(1) permits a permanent-custody court to consider testimony previously presented or relevant to an admission of neglect despite the prohibition on readjudicating neglect or dependency.

In the Matter of Nice · filed 2001-03-20(A)(1)

The prohibition in R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) against readjudication of neglect and dependency does not preclude the court from hearing testimony that was presented or may have been relevant to the admission of neglect.

Section 2151.414(A)(1) bars a permanent-custody court from readjudicating a prior abuse, neglect, or dependency adjudication or the resulting disposition under R.C. 2151.353.

In re N.E. · filed 2010-12-06(A)(1)

The adjudication that the child is abused, neglected, or dependent and any dispositional order that has been issued in the case under R.C. 2151.353 pursuant to the adjudication shall not be readjudicated at the permanent custody hearing. R.C. 2151.414(A)(1). Thus, the dependency finding was final, and it was not the permanent custody court’s duty to readjudicate that issue.

Section 2151.414(A)(1) bars readjudication of a prior dispositional order at a permanent custody hearing, including a previously decided request for legal custody.

In re G.A. · filed 2025-09-29(A)(1)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(A)(1), “[t]he adjudication that the child is an abused, neglected, or dependent child and any dispositional order that has been issued in the case under section 2151.353 of the Revised Code pursuant to the adjudication shall not be readjudicated at the [permanency] hearing.” The awarding of legal custody is one of the potential dispositional orders under R.C. 2151.353. As such, the trial court appropriately declined to readdress the legal custody issue at the permanency hearing and in the April 17, 2025 judgment entry and correctly focused on the termination of mother’s parental rights.

Section 2151.414, as amended by H.B. No. 484, applies retroactively to certain permanent-custody cases and is remedial, so its retroactive application does not violate Ohio’s constitutional ban on retroactive laws.

In Re Rodgers · filed 2000-06-05(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d), (D)(3)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (d) and R.C. 2151.414(D)(3) each contain language indicating that this statute is supposed to apply retroactively to a limited amount of cases where a motion for permanent custody was filed before the amendment’s effective date. ... Therefore, the plain language of the statute demonstrates that the General Assembly intended the courts to apply this statute retroactively. ... Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 as amended by H.B. No. 484 is a remedial statute, and retroactive application of this law did not violate appellant’s rights under the Ohio Constitution. ... Therefore, we find that R.C. 2151.414 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.

Section 2151.414 is not a criminal statute subject to the federal Ex Post Facto Clause, and its permanent-custody requirements are met under either the amended or prior version when the court finds sufficient prior-version factors.

In Re Gregory Williams, Unpublished Decision (9-20-2000) · filed 2000-09-20(E)

However, the ex post facto Clause, Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution, applies only to criminal statutes. State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404 , 415 , citing California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales (1995), 514 U.S. 499 , 504 . R.C. 2151.414 is not a criminal statute. In re Rodgers (June 5, 2000), Preble App. No. CA99-08-017, unreported, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2385, at *17. See, also, In re Moody (August 7, 2000), Athens App. No. 99CA62, unreported, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3645, at *18. There is a constitutional prohibition against certain retroactive laws expressed in Section 28 , Article II , of the Ohio Constitution. However, it is unnecessary to consider that question here, since the juvenile court's judgment can be affirmed, despite its references to the two factors Ms. Williams finds objectionable. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a juvenile court need find only one of these factors before it can terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to a public children services agency. In re William S. , 75 Ohio St.3d at syllabus. The juvenile court here expressly found three factors listed in the prior version of R.C. 2151.414 (E), besides the new ones to which Ms. Williams objects. Thus, the statutory requirements for terminating Ms. Williams parental rights and granting permanent custody to CSB were met, whether under the new version or the old.

The H.B. 484 amendments to § 2151.414 are remedial procedural changes, so the amended statute may be applied retroactively to a pending permanent-custody case without violating the Ohio Constitution’s retroactivity prohibition.

In Re Hallie Kerby, Unpublished Decision (9-25-2000) · filed 2000-09-25

While R.C. 2151 affects a substantial right in that it provides the mechanism through which parental rights may be terminated, we disagree that the amendment at issue makes a substantive change in the permanent custody statute. The changes that H.B. 484 made to R.C. 2151.414 did not change parents' fundamental liberty interest in the care of their children. Long before the enactment of H.B. 484, the General Assembly had established the permanent custody process, which legally terminates parental rights to care for children. H.B. 484 only changed the method and procedure by which the court is to determine whether parental rights are to be terminated. ... Therefore, the amendments to R.C. 2151.414 are remedial in nature, and retroactive application of this law does not violate appellant's rights under the Ohio Constitution.

The H.B. 484 amendments to Section 2151.414 apply retroactively as remedial legislation.

In Re Oliver, Unpublished Decision (8-6-2001) · filed 2001-08-06(B)(1)(d)

R.C. 2151.414 as amended by H.B. 484 is a remedial statute that is intended to be applied retroactively.

Section 2151.414(B)(1), including the twelve-of-twenty-two-month route in division (B)(1)(d), does not require a separate reasonable-time placement finding when the child has been in qualifying temporary agency custody for that period, and the version in effect when the permanent-custody motion is filed and heard governs.

In the Matter of Moody, Unpublished Decision (8-7-2000) · filed 2000-08-07(B)(1), (B)(1)(d), and (B)(2)

After HB 484's amendments, a trial court may grant permanent custody of a child who has not been abandoned or orphaned to an agency if doing so is in the best interest of the child and the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies for at least twelve months of a twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999. See R.C. 2151.414 (B) (1) (d). ... Thus, the trial court is required to determine whether the child could not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parent only if the child is not abandoned, orphaned, or has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies for at least twelve months of a twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999. R.C. 2151.414 (B) (1); R.C. 2151.414 (B) (2).

Under § 2151.414(B)(1)(d), an agency's temporary custody of a child for at least twelve of twenty-two consecutive months can support permanent custody without a separate finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with the parents within a reasonable time under § 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

In the Matter of Moody, Unpublished Decision (8-7-2000) · filed 2000-08-07(B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d)

R.C. 2151.414 (B) (1) (a) requires a finding that the child can not be placed with her parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her parents only when, among other things, the child has not been in the temporary custody of an agency as required by R.C. 2151.414 (B) (1) (d). Since ACCS had temporary custody of Thelma for at least twelve of the twenty-two consecutive months prior to the hearing, the trial court was not required to find that Thelma could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, or should not be placed with either of her parents. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err by failing to make such a finding.

The amended Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when it is in the child's best interest and the child has been in agency care under a court disposition for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, and it applies retroactively to qualifying cases ending on or after March 18, 1999.

Matter of Morris, Unpublished Decision (10-16-2000) · filed 2000-10-16(B)(1)(d), (D)

The trial court should have applied R.C. 2151.414 as amended by H.B. 484, 2 which came into effect after the motion for permanent custody was filed but before the permanent custody hearing began. ... R.C. 2151.414 as amended applies to permanent custody cases where a child has been in the temporary custody of children's services under an order of the court following a finding of dependency or neglect for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999 (the amendment's effective date). ... Therefore, Patricia was in the care of BCCSB under an order of disposition by the trial court for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on March 18, 1999, and R.C. 2151.414 as amended is applicable to this case.

Once the twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody condition is met, section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits permanent custody based on the child's best interest without a separate finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In Re Decker, Unpublished Decision (2-13-2001) · filed 2001-02-13(B)(1)(d)

Thus, when considering a permanent custody motion brought pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), the only other consideration becomes the best interests of the child. A trial court need not conduct an R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) analysis of whether the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) permits permanent custody without any minimum period in agency temporary custody when the required parental-placement and best-interest findings are supported.

In Re Layne Children, Unpublished Decision (3-5-2001) · filed 2001-03-05(B)(1)(a)

A grant of permanent custody made pursuant to that subsection does not require a finding that the children have been in the agency's temporary custody for any given period of time.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)’s twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody route does not invoke the parental-placement factors in division (E).

In Re Thompson, Unpublished Decision (4-26-2001) · filed 2001-04-26(B)(1)(d), (E)

The present motion for permanent custody was filed under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), based upon the children having been in the temporary custody of children's services for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period. The factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (E) are not invoked in the present case.

After a child has spent the requisite twelve months in agency custody, the remaining determination for permanent custody under section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is the child's best interest.

In Re Laird, Unpublished Decision (5-23-2001) · filed 2001-05-23(B)(1)(d)

By that time, Michael had been in the agency's custody for more than twelve months. Because of these circumstances, the trial court needed only to determine whether the termination of parental rights was in Michael's best interest.

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month temporary-custody condition applies, Section 2151.414 does not also require a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In Re Epperly-Wilson Children, Unpublished Decision (8-06-2001) · filed 2001-08-06(B)(1)(d)

Additionally, the trial court found Josef had been in the temporary custody of the department for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22 month period. As such, the trial court was not required to find Josef could not or should not be placed with father within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)’s twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody period was measured as of the permanent-custody hearing rather than the motion’s filing date.

In the Matter of Dyal, Unpublished Decision (8-9-2001) · filed 2001-08-09(B)(1)(d)

The statute appears to permit the trial court to award permanent custody if the child has been, as of the date of the permanent custody hearing (as opposed to the date the permanent custody motion was filed), in the children services agency's custody for at least twelve out of the prior twenty-two months.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits permanent custody after twelve of twenty-two months in agency custody and a clear-and-convincing best-interest finding without a separate parental-placement determination under division (E).

In Re E.M., Unpublished Decision (11-8-2001) · filed 2001-11-08(B)(1)(d), (E)

Under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), in effect since March 1999, if a child has been in the custody of CCDCFS for no less than twelve of the last twenty-two months — here it was seventeen continuous months — and it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that permanent placement with the agency is in the child's best interest under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), a judge may properly award permanent custody to the agency under R.C. 2151.414 . It was not necessary to determine whether the child could or should be placed with a natural parent under R.C. 2151.414 (E).

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) does not require an additional finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In Re Ross, Unpublished Decision (11-29-2001) · filed 2001-11-29(B)(1)(d)

While the trial court decided the motion under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), the trial court nonetheless appears to have engaged in some analysis of whether A'uantae could be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time period. Although such analysis was unnecessary under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), the trial court's conclusions are supported by the evidence.

Clear and convincing evidence of both the child's best interest and the twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody condition supports permanent custody under section 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

In Re Pierce, Unpublished Decision (12-31-2001) · filed 2001-12-31(B)(1)(d)

The trial court determined that granting permanent custody would be in McKenzie's best interest and that McKenzie had been in the custody of WCCS for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after May 18, 1999. Reviewing the record, we find that the trial court's decision to grant permanent custody of McKenzie to WCCS is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

A planned permanent living arrangement counts as temporary custody under section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) because both remove the child from home, give legal custody to another without terminating parental rights, and remain terminable by the court.

In Re Tolley, Unpublished Decision (6-17-2002) · filed 2002-06-17(B)(1)(d)

We find that pursuant to its definition, planned permanent living arrangement is tantamount to temporary custody when considering R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d). In both instances, a child has been removed from his or her home and legal custody has been granted to another by the trial court. The trial court, in both circumstances, may terminate the custody at its discretion. Further, in neither circumstance has the trial court terminated parental rights.

Under section 2151.414(B)(1)(d), a child's continuous agency custody for twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period is independently sufficient to support termination and an award of permanent custody.

In the Matter of Miqueal M., Unpublished Decision (6-28-2002) · filed 2002-06-28(B)(1)(d)

Moreover, it appears that by enacting R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), the legislature intends that the mere amount of time in which a child is in the continuous care of a public or private children services agency is sufficient to terminate a parent's right to raise her child and to award permanent custody to the requesting agency.

When a child has been in agency custody for at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, § 2151.414(B)(1)(d) requires a best-interest finding but not a separate finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In Re Cather, Unpublished Decision (8-30-2002) · filed 2002-08-30(B)(1)(d)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 , quoted infra, the trial court was required to find that it was in the best interest of the children to award permanent custody and that any of four factors apply. The trial court found that the fourth factor, R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), applied. This factor is that the children have been in the custody of a public children services agency for twelve or more months in a twenty-two month period.

Once § 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody condition and the child's best interest are established, the parent's case-plan efforts are irrelevant and no subsection (E) inability-to-place finding is required.

In Re Legg, Unpublished Decision (9-5-2002) · filed 2002-09-05(B)(1)(d)

Under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), * * *, if a child has been in the custody of CCDCFS for no less than twelve of the last twenty-two months and it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that permanent placement with the agency is in the child's best interest under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), a judge may properly award permanent custody to the agency under R.C. 2151.414 . It was not necessary to determine whether the child could or should be placed with a natural parent under R.C. 2151.414 (E). ... As the lower court made the requisite 12 months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period determination, the case plan efforts of appellant Allan Gump are wholly irrelevant in considering the assignment of error which challenges the lower court's best interest finding.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) does not require an agency to wait twenty-two months before seeking permanent custody; the condition is met as soon as the child has spent at least twelve months in temporary custody within a consecutive twenty-two-month period.

In Re T.B., Unpublished Decision (9-25-2002) · filed 2002-09-25(B)(1)(d)

There is nothing in the plain language of the statute that requires a public agency to wait until a child has been in its custody for twenty-two months before filing a motion for permanent custody. The statute requires only that the child must have been in the custody of a public agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period. ... In either event, once a child has been in temporary custody for at least twelve months out of twenty-two consecutive months, the second prong of the two-part test set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) is met.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s temporary-custody duration requirement is satisfied when children have remained in agency custody for almost three years.

In Re P.R., Unpublished Decision (4-25-2002) · filed 2002-04-25(B)(1)(d)

In the case at bar the children had been in county custody for almost three years at the time of the dispositional hearing. They, therefore, clearly qualify for permanent placement under that requirement.

When a child has been in agency custody for at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, section 2151.414 does not require a separate finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In Re Tritch Children, Unpublished Decision (5-28-2002) · filed 2002-05-28(B)(1)(d)

Additionally, the trial court found Chester had been in the temporary custody of the department for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22 month period. As such, the trial court was not required to find that Chester could not or should not be placed with Appellant-Mother or Appellant-Father within a reasonable time.

A trial court's misstatement of section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) as requiring twelve months of custody in twenty-four months is harmless when the evidence satisfies the statute's actual twelve-of-twenty-two-month requirement.

In the Matter of Borders, Unpublished Decision (5-28-2002) · filed 2002-05-28(B)(1)(d)

Appellant also alleges that the trial court erred by finding that the child had been in an out-of-home placement "for twelve of the last twenty-four months" when R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) requires a finding that the child be in an out-of-home placement for 12 of the prior 22 months. However, appellant concedes that "the state has sufficiently shown that the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period," as required by statute. Accordingly, we find this contention to be without merit. The trial court's misstatement is harmless error.

When a child has been in temporary agency custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the court need not also find that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In Re Penley, Unpublished Decision (11-25-2002) · filed 2002-11-25(B)(1)(d)

{¶ 77} Additionally, the trial court found that Gene had been in the temporary custody of the department for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22 month period. As such, the trial court was not required to find that Gene could not or should not be placed with Appellant-father within a reasonable time. ... In light of the foregoing and based upon the entire record in this matter, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting permanent custody of Gene to the Agency.

When the twelve-month custody condition in section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is met, the trial court need not also determine under division (B)(1)(a) whether the child can be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In Re Billingsley Alleged Neglected Child, Unpublished Decision (1-28-2003) · filed 2003-01-28(B)(1)(d)

According to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), the children herein have continuously been in the temporary custody of the Agency since August 18, 2000, far exceeding the twelve month statutory mandate. While Patricia raises error in response to the trial court's determination that the children could not be placed in her care within a reasonable amount of time, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a), such a determination was not required by the trial court considering its finding under division (B)(1)(d). 12 Consequently, Patricia's argument in relation thereto is not material to this appeal.

When the twelve-month period is measured from removal under section 2151.414(B)(1), the first sixty days after removal are excluded from the temporary-custody calculation.

In Re Gambrel, Unpublished Decision (3-7-2003) · filed 2003-03-07(B)(1)(d)

However, the trial court was then required by statute to subtract a period of sixty days from this time in making its determination as to whether the children were in the continuous custody of Children's Services for a twelve-month period. See R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1).

Once a child has been in agency custody for twelve of the preceding twenty-two months, section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) presumes parental unfitness and leaves the child's best interest as the remaining permanent-custody question.

In Re Fricke, Unpublished Decision (3-11-2003) · filed 2003-03-11(B)(1)(d)

Once the children have been in custody for 12 of the previous 22 months, the parents are presumed to be unfit and all the trial court must find is that granting permanent custody is in the best interests of the children.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody calculation, a child enters temporary agency custody on the earlier of adjudication or sixty days after removal from the home.

In Re C.F., Unpublished Decision (11-13-2002) · filed 2002-11-13(B)(1)

{¶ 8} The trial court found that the children had been in the temporary custody of LCCS for more than twelve of the past twenty-two months and that finding was supported by the record. According to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), {¶ 9} "[A] child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home." {¶ 10} The children were adjudicated dependent and neglected, pursuant to R.C. 2151.28 , on September 1, 2000. The permanent custody hearing was held April 1, 2002. Thus, at the time of the hearing, the children had been in the temporary custody of LCCS for seventeen months. Consequently, the first prong of the permanent custody test was satisfied.

When permanent custody is sought under subsection (B)(1)(d) based on twelve months of temporary custody within a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the remaining consideration is the child's best interests and no subsection (B)(1)(a) placement analysis is required.

In Matter of Williams, Unpublished Decision (12-24-2002) · filed 2002-12-24(B)(1)(d)

Accordingly, when considering a permanent custody motion brought pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), the only other consideration becomes the best interests of the child. A trial court need not conduct an R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) analysis of whether the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

A court may grant permanent custody based on clear and convincing evidence of the child's best interests and twelve months of agency custody within a consecutive twenty-two-month period, without reaching the mandatory subsection (E) factors.

In Re Sullivan, Unpublished Decision (1-21-2003) · filed 2003-01-21(B)(1)(d)

Because the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in Aaliyah's best interest for BCCSB to take permanent custody, and Aaliyah had been in the temporary custody of BCCSB for well over 12 months in a consecutive 22-month period, the juvenile court had the power to grant permanent custody to BCCSB. See R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). We find no error in the juvenile court's discretionary grant of permanent custody to BCCSB. Therefore, we need not reach appellant's second assignment of error regarding the mandatory factors in R.C. 2151.414 (E).