Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414

Section 2151.414(E) focuses on a parent's demonstrated ability to provide a suitable home and does not require a finding of parental fault.

In Re J.E., 23865 (2-6-2008) · filed 2008-02-06(E)

Moreover, although Ms. Lamtman has asserted that her inability to parent J.E. is not her fault, the focus of R.C. 2151.414 (E) is on the demonstrated ability or inability of the parent to provide a suitable home for the child. When a juvenile court determines, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E), whether a child cannot be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with them, the court is not required to find parental fault.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) does not require a separate finding of parental unfitness; it requires findings that termination is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In Re B.L., Unpublished Decision (3-17-2005) · filed 2005-03-17(B)(1)(a)

Under that statute, a trial court must find that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child and that the child could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with them. Parental unfitness is not a finding that a trial court must make to terminate parental rights under that section.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits termination of parental rights without a separate finding that the parent is unfit when termination is in the child's best interest and the 12-months-out-of-22 custody condition is satisfied.

In Re W.A., Unpublished Decision (11-2-2006) · filed 2006-11-02(B)(1)(d)

R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) applied in the instant case, and, thus, the trial court was required to find that the termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children and that the "12 months out of 22 months rule" applies. Parental unfitness is not a required finding to terminate parental rights under that section. See In the Matter of S.W., at ¶ 27. Further, even if such a finding were required, some level of parental unfitness is inherent in the trial court's finding compliance with the "12 months out of 22 months rule" in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d). In the Matter of S.W., at ¶ 28.

Section 2151.414 does not require a separate finding that a parent is unfit before the court terminates parental rights.

In re J.R. · filed 2018-04-17

R.C. 2151.414 does not require a juvenile court to find a parent unfit before it may terminate that parent's parental rights.

Prenatal opiate exposure, a later drug-related supervision failure, and repeated rejection or refusal of case-plan treatment supported application of Section 2151.414(E)(9).

In re J.D. · filed 2014-12-26(E)(9)

Appellant placed K.D. at substantial risk of harm when K.D. was born with opiates in her system. And an incident occurred where J.D. was pushing A.G. in a stroller down a busy road with no sidewalks and appellant did not know or care that the girls were gone from the house. Additionally, the testimony demonstrated that appellant has rejected and refused treatment multiple times even though it was part of her case plan.

Section 2151.414 permits an award of permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes a listed statutory circumstance and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest; repeated relapse after drug treatment can support findings that the parent cannot provide a safe home within a reasonable time and that permanent custody serves the child's best interest.

In Re McNab, 2007 Ap 11 0074 (3-31-2008) · filed 2008-03-31(B)(1), (D), and (E)

Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. ... Based upon our review of the record, we find there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding that the children could not be placed with Appellant within a reasonable time. The evidence demonstrated that Appellant has been provided with the appropriate case plan and has successfully completed drug treatment two previous times. But even with those services and her participation therein, Appellant still was unable to abstain from drug use and safely provide for her children. ... Upon review of the record, we find the trial court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that the children should be placed in the permanent custody of Appellee.

Section 2151.414(E)(9) supports permanent custody when a parent's alcohol abuse has twice placed a child at substantial risk of harm and the parent has repeatedly rejected or refused court-ordered treatment.

In Matter of Heintz, Unpublished Decision (8-7-2002) · filed 2002-08-07(B)(1), (D)(5), (E)(9)

Additionally, subsection (E)(9), which states the following, is also established by the evidence: "The parent has placed the child at substantial risk of harm two or more times due to alcohol or drug abuse and has rejected treatment two or more times or refused to participate in further treatment two or more times after a case plan issued pursuant to section 2151.412 of the Revised Code requiring treatment of the parent was journalized as part of a dispositional order issued with respect to the child or an order was issued by any other court requiring treatment of the parent." Herein, in both instances the children were removed from Appellant's care resulted from her alcoholism. Each time at least one of the children was drawn into ensuing violence between Appellant and Proffitt, resulting in physical harm.

The twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground in subsection (B)(1)(d) does not create an unjustified presumption that a parent is unfit.

In re A.J.P.-H. · filed 2017-06-26(B)(1)(d)

This court has held that “[R.C.] 2151.414(B)(1)(d) does not create an unjustified presumption of parental unfitness.”

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is not unconstitutional on the ground that it creates an irrebuttable presumption of parental unfitness.

In Re D.T., 07ap-853 (5-6-2008) · filed 2008-05-06(B)(1)(d)

Notwithstanding waiver, this court also addressed the issue: whether R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) is unconstitutional by creating an irrebuttable presumption of parental unfitness. On each occasion, our review found the argument to lack merit.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is constitutional both on its face and as applied where a parent had sufficient time and opportunities to demonstrate parental fitness.

In the Matter of Bray, Unpublished Decision (3-31-2005) · filed 2005-03-31(B)(1)(d)

Given this court's prior precedent and the concurrence among other districts who have squarely addressed the issue, we find that R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) is not unconstitutional on its face. Further, consistent with our reasoning in In re Brooks, supra, we do not find R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) unconstitutional as applied in the present case.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is constitutional both facially and as applied.

In Re E.W., Unpublished Decision (5-25-2006) · filed 2006-05-25(B)(1)(d)

First, appellant contends that her counsel was ineffective by not asserting that R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) is unconstitutional, facially and as applied in this case. ... Indeed, this court has consistently rejected constitutional challenges to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d). ... As such, we find appellant's contention that R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) is unconstitutional to be without merit.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) does not unconstitutionally create an irrebuttable presumption of parental unfitness.

In Re V.M., Unpublished Decision (8-29-2006) · filed 2006-08-29(B)(1)(d)

{¶ 9} We have previously weighed appellant's assertion that R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) is unconstitutional in that it creates an irrebuttable presumption of parental unfitness. On each occasion, our review found the argument advanced by appellant to lack merit. In re S.W., supra, at ¶ 11; In re J.S., Franklin App. No. 05AP-615, 2006-Ohio-702, at ¶ 11; In re C.C., Franklin App. No. 04AP-883, 2005-Ohio-5163, at ¶ 11-12; In re Abram, Franklin App. No. 04AP-220, 2004-Ohio-5435, at ¶ 12-13; In re Brooks, Franklin App. No. 04AP-164, 2004-Ohio-3887 . We see no reason to diverge from this precedent. We find that R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) is not unconstitutional. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s 12-out-of-22-month provision is constitutional both on its face and as applied.

In Matter of C.C. v. Fuqua, Unpublished Decision (9-29-2005) · filed 2005-09-29(B)(1)(d)

Given this court's prior precedent and the concurrence among other districts that have squarely addressed the issue, we find that R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) is not unconstitutional on its face. Further, consistent with our reasoning in In re Brooks, supra, we do not find R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) unconstitutional as applied in the present case.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s twelve-of-twenty-two-month provision is constitutional and permits a court to proceed to the child's best interests without separately finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent because the statutory custody period implicitly establishes parental unsuitability.

In Re C.R., 06 Be 53 (6-21-2007) · filed 2007-06-21(B)(1)(d)

{¶ 52} In conclusion, a "twelve of twenty-two" finding bypasses the statutory requirement that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent in a reasonable period of time. A finding that the child has been adjudicated and in the agency's custody for twelve of a consecutive twenty-two month period implicitly involves a finding of unsuitability. See, e.g. Workman , 4th Dist. No. 02CA574 at ¶ 39-40. Moreover, an adjudication of abuse, neglect or dependency implicitly involves a determination that the parent is unsuitable. In re C.W. , 108 Ohio St.3d 369 at ¶ 22. Finally, the best interests test takes unsuitability into consideration in granting permanent custody after an abuse, neglect or dependency adjudication. In re Cunningham (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 100 , 106-107 . Considering all of the foregoing items, we refuse to hold that the lack of a statutory provision specifically requiring consideration of a separate unfitness or unsuitability test is constitutionally invalid.

When a court relies on the catch-all factor in R.C. 2151.414(E)(16), it must specifically identify the alternative factor and explain how it substitutes for one of the factors in (E)(1) through (15).

In Re Davontae W., L-07-1342 (5-30-2008) · filed 2008-05-30(E)(16)

R.C. 2151.414 (E)(16) is the "catch-all" provision of the statute. It provides that a finding that a child cannot now or within a reasonable period be reunited with his or her parent may be premised on "[a]ny other factor the court considers relevant." This court has repeatedly held that when a court relies on the (E)(16) factor "* * * it must articulate with specificity what factor or factors the court feels can be a substitute for one of the (E)(1) through (15) findings. In re Alyssa Nicole C , 153 Ohio App.3d 10 , 16-17 , 2003-Ohio-2673 , ¶ 31 ; In re Crystal C , 6th Dist. No. L-01-1336, 2002-Ohio-855; In re Tashayla S. , 6th Dist. No. L-03-1253, 2004-Ohio-896 , ¶ 24." In the matter of Rashaun B. , 6th Dist. No. L-03-1306, 2004-Ohio-7349 , ¶ 22 . The judgment in this matter does not articulate a specific alternative factor or state any equivalency reasons. Thus, R.C. 2151.414 (E)(16) is unavailable to support the court's conclusions.

Section 2151.414(E)(16) requires the trial court to identify the specific other relevant factor used in place of factors (E)(1) through (15) so that appellate review is possible.

In the Matter of Kaylee T., Unpublished Decision (5-4-2004) · filed 2004-05-04(E)(16)

This court has held that in order for an appellate court to review an (E)(16) finding, it must know what "other factor" the court feels can be a substitute for one of the (E)(1)-(15) findings. In re Alyssa Nicole C., 153 Ohio App.3d 10 , 2003-Ohio-2673 . ... In this case, the magistrate clearly set out the "other factors" she felt could substitute for one of the (E)(1)-(15) findings. We have thoroughly reviewed the record before us. In determining the best interest of Kaylee, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in considering appellant's recent incarceration for a violent offense involving Kaylee's stepfather, appellant's subsequent incarceration for a drug related probation violation, and previous allegations of sexual abuse that were serious enough to warrant an agency investigation and a "no contact order."

A finding under the catchall factor in R.C. 2151.414(E)(16) must specifically identify the other factor and explain how it is comparable to a factor enumerated in divisions (E)(1) through (15).

In Re Delfino L.M., Unpublished Decision (1-28-2005) · filed 2005-01-28(E)(16)

We initially discount the court's finding with respect to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(16). This is the "catchall" portion of section (E) which permits a finding that the child cannot or should not be reunited with their parents for "any other factor." We have repeatedly held that for a finding under this provision to pass scrutiny, the trial court must, "* * * explain with specificity what the other factor the court deems comparable to one of those enumerated in sections (E)(1) through (15) of R.C. 2151.414 ." In re Tashayla S., supra, at ¶ 24; In re Alyssa Nicole, 153 Ohio App.3d 10 , 17 , 2003-Ohio-2673 , at ¶ 31 ; In re Kaylee, 6th Dist. App. No. L-03-1320, 2004-Ohio-2227 , at ¶ 18 ; In re Crystal C., 6th Dist. App. No. L-01-1336, 2002-Ohio-855. No such discussion appears in either of the judgments at issue here.

Section 2151.414(E)(16) permits reliance on a catchall factor only when the trial court specifically explains what that factor is and how it is comparable to a factor enumerated in divisions (E)(1) through (15).

In Re Sean B. · filed 2007-03-16(E)(16)

R.C. 2151.414(E)(16) is the “catchall” portion of section (E), which permits a finding that the child cannot or should not be reunited with his or her parents for “any other factor.” “We have repeatedly held that for a finding under this provision to pass scrutiny, the trial court must ‘ * * * explain with specificity what the other factor the court deems comparable to one of those enumerated in sections (E)(1) through (15) of R.C. 2151.414.’ ” ... No such discussion appears in the judgment at issue here.

Section 2151.414(E)(16) permits a court to consider as a relevant catchall factor that a parent remains in a relationship with the person alleged to have abused an older child.

In re Ja.B. · filed 2024-02-08(E)(16)

R.C. 2151.414(E)(16) allows a trial court to make a “catchall” finding by considering any other factor the court finds relevant. Here, the trial court found that Mother had lost custody of her older child due to allegations of abuse, alleged Father was the purported perpetrator of the abuse, and Mother was still in a relationship with and living with alleged Father. The trial court’s finding was clearly and convincingly supported by the record.

Section 2151.414(E)(4)'s lack-of-commitment factor does not require an agency to show diligent reunification efforts and can independently support a permanent-custody judgment.

In Matter of Johnston, 2008-A-0015 (7-18-2008) · filed 2008-07-18(E)(4)

Subsection (E)(4) does not require a demonstration of "diligent efforts" to assist the parents as does subsection (E)(1). Accordingly, even if we found a lack of "diligent efforts" on the part of the Children Services Board with respect to assisting Johnston's compliance with the case plan (which finding we do not make), the juvenile court's judgment would still be affirmed on the basis of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4).

Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires the agency to make diligent efforts to help parents remedy the problems that caused the child’s removal.

In Re Nelson, Unpublished Decision (12-9-2005) · filed 2005-12-09(E)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) does require diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the removal. While it is true that the Juvenile Court did use the words "substantially assisted," instead of diligent assistance, the record shows that the agency did diligently assist Helen to make family counseling occur. Despite Helen's insistence to the contrary, the agency did not hinder family counseling. It was the participants, specifically the children, who were not ready for family counseling.

Section 2151.414(E) requires a court to find only one listed factor for each parent, so proof of diligent agency efforts under (E)(1) is unnecessary when another factor supports termination of parental rights.

In re M.L. · filed 2013-02-08(E)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(E) provides a list of fifteen factors to be considered, in addition to R.C. 2151.414(E)(16), which includes “[a]ny other factor the court considers relevant.” However, the court must only find one or more factors with regard to each parent; it need not find that all factors apply. Accordingly, the trial court did not have to find that the agency made diligent efforts to assist the parents, if one or more of the other factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) justify termination of parental rights.

When a juvenile court relies on Section 2151.414(E)(1), it must examine whether the agency's case planning and efforts to help the parent were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances.

In re L.P. · filed 2023-06-01(E)(1)

Although the agency did not have to show reasonable case planning and diligent efforts at the time of the permanent custody hearing, “[t]o the extent that the trial court relie[d] on R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) at the permanency hearing, the court must examine ‘the reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents’ when considering whether the child cannot or should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.” In re C.F. at ¶ 42.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires an agency not only to make reasonable case plans but to use steady, earnest, and energetic efforts actively helping parents remedy the problems that caused removal.

In re D.D. · filed 2023-11-16(E)(1)

The agency must establish “reasonable case planning” and then use “diligent efforts” to “assist the parents to remedy the problems.” R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). FCCS’s activities toward reunification with father must be “characterized by steady, earnest, and energetic application and effort.” In re Jeroncic, 8th Dist. No. 58619 (June 27, 1991). An agency’s role is not over once a child is removed. It “has the responsibility to actively aid the parent so that the children could be returned to the parent.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires case planning and diligent efforts to help a parent remedy the conditions that led to removal, but those efforts are required only when the court relies on that finding.

In the Matter of J., Unpublished Decision (6-30-2000) · filed 2000-06-30(E)(1)

"Diligent efforts" and time to remedy the situation are required only when a court makes a finding under (E)(1).

Section 2151.414 may be applied to terminate a mentally disabled parent's rights without specialized reunification services when those services would be futile.

In re Cannon · filed 1990-12-31

This court has previously held that R.C. 2151.414, authorizing permanent termination of parental rights under certain circumstances, is not per se unconstitutional when applied to retarded parents. In ... this case, we address a claim that the statute was unconstitutionally applied to this mentally retarded mother. ... There is no need to implement a reunification plan when such an attempt would be futile. ... Given the evidence of her failure at such efforts, the termination of her parental rights complied with due process as mandated by the United States and Ohio Constitutions.

Under § 2151.414(D), a court may not base its best-interest decision solely on a parent's limited cognitive abilities, but it may determine that permanent custody is necessary for a legally secure placement based on the parent's history of relinquishing or permanently losing custody of other children.

In Re A.L.D., 08ap-238 (7-22-2008) · filed 2008-07-22(D)

Indeed, "[w]hen determining the best interest of a child under R.C. 2151.414 (D) at a permanent-custody hearing, a trial court may not base its decision solely on the limited cognitive abilities of the parents." In re D.A. , 113 Ohio St.3d 88 , 2007-Ohio-1105 , 862 N.E.2d 829 , syllabus. In In re D.A. , the trial court granted PCC based on the parents' mental retardation, despite the fact that every best-interest factor favored the parents. Here, in contrast, none of the best-interest factors favors appellant, and the juvenile court found that PCC was the only method of achieving a legally secure permanent placement because of appellant's undisputed history of giving up or permanently losing custody of her six other children. It was not against the manifest weight of the evidence to find that because appellant has proven unable to provide a legally secure permanent placement for her other six children, she will not be able to provide one for A.L.D.

Under § 2151.414(E)(2), a parent's intellectual disability supported finding that her children could not be placed with her when she had an IQ of 61, could not apply lessons from parenting classes, required constant supervision to care for the children, and no agency could provide the assistance she needed.

In Re Kinkel Children, Unpublished Decision (10-31-2005) · filed 2005-10-31(E)(2)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) sets out the factors relevant to determining permanent custody. Said section states in pertinent part as follows: ... "(2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, mental retardation, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent that is so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year after the court holds the hearing pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code; ... Appellant has cooperated and has fulfilled the requirements of the case plan. T. at 50. However, appellant's functioning level is well below average and she has an IQ of 61. T. at 31. Although she participated in the parenting classes, she is unable to use the information in a novel situation or apply the information abstractly. T. at 32. ... It was the general opinion that appellant would not be able to care for the children without constant physical supervision and monitoring. T. at 40, 55. It was also opined that there were not any agencies available to render the type of assistance appellant would need to effectively care for the children. T. at 88. ... Upon review, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence of appellant's inability to parent and that all available means to assist her had been exhausted.

A court determining a child’s best interest may not terminate parental rights solely because of the parents’ limited cognitive abilities or mental retardation.

In re D.A. · filed 2007-03-28(D)

We hold that the termination of appellants’ parental rights based solely on mental retardation does not comply with R.C. 2151.414. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.

In determining a child's best interest, limited cognitive ability alone cannot justify terminating parental rights, but termination may be upheld when the parent is unable to parent safely or provide an adequate home.

In Matter of Kinkle, 2006ca00358 (5-14-2007) · filed 2007-05-14(D), (E)(2)

The Supreme Court continued R.C. 2151.414 "does not permit a parent's fundamental right to raise his or her child to be terminated based on mental retardation alone ." Id at par. 37 (Emphasis added). ... Although the trial court recognized mother's limited cognitive ability and set forth its concern such would affect her parenting, the trial court found mother was unable to safely parent the child and was unable to provide an adequate environment for her. ... Thus, we find the trial court's findings did not suffer from the same deficiencies as the trial court's findings in In Re: D.A .

Section 2151.414 does not permit termination of parental rights based on a parent's mental retardation alone; objective evidence must establish the statutory permanent-custody criteria.

In Re Spicuzza, 2007-L-121 (2-8-2008) · filed 2008-02-08(E)(1), (E)(2)

R.C. 2151.414 , however, does not permit a parent's fundamental right to raise his or her child to be terminated based on mental retardation alone. ... Although the trial court relied on her cognitive limitations as a factor, there were other objective facts that satisified the statutory criteria for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D) requires a court deciding permanent custody to weigh the specified best-interest factors and prohibits basing termination solely on a parent's limited cognitive abilities.

In Re M.N., 08ca9 (9-12-2008) · filed 2008-09-12(D)

R.C. 2151.414 (D) requires a trial court to consider specific factors to determine whether a child's best interests would be served by granting a children services agency permanent custody. The factors include: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4) the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; and (5) whether any factors listed under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(7) to (11) apply. ... When determining the best interest of a child under R.C. 2151.414 (D) at a permanent-custody hearing, a trial court may not base its decision solely on the limited cognitive abilities of the parents. ... Unlike in D.A. , here, ACCS presented objective evidence, other than Appellant's cognitive abilities, to show that awarding ACCS permanent custody would serve the children's best interests. Appellant's cognitive status impeded her ability to care for her children in that she was unable to recognize or protect her children from harm. As in C.E. and King , supra, the evidence presented by ACCS indicated that Appellant would require excessive community support in order to care for her children. ACCS also presented evidence that Appellant required prompting and did not seem to intervene appropriately when the children displayed inappropriate behavior. Further, the children in the present case all require counseling and additional services as a result of their behavioral problems and cognitive delays, unlike D.A. Additionally, as opposed to the trial court in D.A. , in this case the trial court appropriately considered all of the best interest factors, which have been discussed, supra, and did not simply rely upon Appellant's cognitive ability.

Section 2151.414(E)(2) does not permit termination of parental rights solely because a parent has limited cognitive abilities, although those abilities may be considered when linked to the parent's ability to provide an adequate home.

In Matter of Cunningham, 13-08-27 (11-17-2008) · filed 2008-11-17(E)(2)

Despite making several findings regarding the parents' limited cognitive abilities, the trial court did not find that appellants were unable to provide an adequate home for D.A. due to their mental retardation, a finding that is required to satisfy R.C. 2151.414 (E)(2) (footnote omitted). ... Thus, although the trial court may not terminate parental rights solely based upon limited cognitive abilities, it is a factor that may be considered.

Permanent custody lacks clear-and-convincing support when the record establishes neither an applicable parental-unfitness factor nor that the best-interest factors favor termination.

In re A.T. · filed 2021-12-09(D)(1), (D)(2)(a), (E)

After reviewing the record, we cannot say that that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in A.T.’s best interest. Specifically, we find that the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(a) applies — that one or more of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E) exists with respect to Mother and A.T. cannot be placed with Mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed with Mother.

A best-interest finding is supported when the juvenile court considers the statutory factors and the evidence supports its finding on each factor.

In re D.Y. · filed 2017-07-07(D)(1)

The manifest weight of the evidence is not against the juvenile court’s finding that granting MCCS permanent custody is in Dana’s best interest. The court considered the statutory best-interest factors, and the evidence supports the court’s findings as to each factor. Based on the evidence and the court’s findings, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by granting MCCS permanent custody of Dana.

Section 2151.414(D)'s best-interest requirement is satisfied when competent, credible evidence clearly and convincingly supports that permanent custody serves the child's best interest, including the child's need for stability and a legally secure placement.

In Re Sterling, 2008ca18 (7-25-2008) · filed 2008-07-25(D)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (D), in determining the best interest of a child, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to the following: ... "(4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; * * *" ... Based on the foregoing, we find that there was competent, credible evidence to support the trial court's determination that granting permanent custody of Sandra Sterling to the Fairfield County Child Protective Services was in her best interest. We also find that the trial court did not err in finding that this was so by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that the child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time and that permanent custody serves the child's best interests.

In Re Wilks, Unpublished Decision (9-29-2006) · filed 2006-09-29(B)(1)(a), (D), (E)(1)

While some attempts were made as to the case plan, such were totally inadequate and the totality justified the court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that placement was not feasible within a reasonable period of time. ... Therefore, we find the evidence sufficiently supports the finding by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the child were served by the order terminating parental rights.

Subsections (D) and (E) support an award of permanent custody when the evidence establishes that the children cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time and that permanent custody is in their best interest.

In Re Rushing, Unpublished Decision (10-12-2006) · filed 2006-10-12(D), (E)

In the case sub judice, testimony was adduced that appellant is simply unable to parent her children. ... Based upon the foregoing, we find that the trial court's findings, that the children cannot be placed with the appellant within a reasonable time and should not be placed with her and that the grant of permanent custody was in the children's best interest, were not against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence.

Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes the statutory grounds and shows that permanent custody is in the child's best interest, including when a parent repeatedly fails to remedy the conditions that caused the child's removal.

In Matter of Rehart, 06ca160 (4-27-2007) · filed 2007-04-27(B), (D), and (E)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) sets out the factors relevant to determining permanent custody. ... R.C. 2151.414 (B) enables the court to grant permanent custody if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414 (D) sets out the factors relevant to determining the best interests of the child. ... Upon review, we find sufficient, competent and credible evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings by clear and convincing evidence, and find the trial court did not err in determining the best interests of the child was best served by terminating the parental rights and granting permanent custody to appellee.

Under the best-interest factors, permanent custody may be granted despite the children's contrary wishes and the guardian ad litem's misgivings when competent, credible evidence shows that the children need a permanent, stable, loving home and that permanent custody is the best available option.

In Re conethan/hughes Children, 2007-Ca-00066 (7-23-2007) · filed 2007-07-23(D)(1)

The court cited the factors contained in R.C. 2151.414 (D)(1): ... (4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; ... We have reviewed the record, and we find there was sufficient competent and credible evidence presented to the trial court to support its judgment the children were in need of a permanent stable and loving home. Despite the children's wishes and the guardian ad litem's misgivings, the court could properly conclude from the evidence before it a grant of permanent custody to appellee was the best option available under the circumstances.

Evidence that, after more than a year of agency assistance, a parent remains unable to create a safe environment may satisfy § 2151.414's clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for permanent custody.

In re J.F. · filed 2012-04-25(B)(1), (D)(1), (E)

R.C. 2151.414(E) sets out the factors relevant to determining permanent custody. ... R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) enables a trial court to grant permanent custody if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child: ... R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) sets out the factors relevant to determining the best interests of the child. ... These facts are sufficient to establish that after more than a year of assistance, appellant's parenting skills are not sufficient to create a safe environment for the child. ... Upon review, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard for a permanent custody award to appellee and that more than sufficient time and assistance have been afforded to appellant.

Sections 2151.414(B)(1) and (D)(1) support an award of permanent custody when the evidence establishes reasonable agency efforts, the parents' failure to remedy the conditions causing removal, their inability to provide an adequate permanent home, and that permanent custody is in the children's best interest.

In re L.B. · filed 2011-09-26(B)(1), (D)(1)

In light of all this evidence and in considering R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and (D)(1), we do not find that the trial court erred in concluding that the case plan was reasonable and that the Agency provided reasonable services and attempts to assist the parents to remedy the problems that caused the children to be removed from the home. Further, the trial court had ample evidence to conclude that despite these efforts, Kermit and Belina failed to successfully remedy the conditions causing the children to be removed from the home and they were unable to provide an adequate, safe, permanent home for the children now or in the reasonable future. Moreover, considering this evidence and the GAL’s report and recommendation, the trial court also had clear and convincing evidence to conclude that permanent custody to the Agency was in the children’s best interest.

Section 2151.414(B) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes that it is in the child's best interest; a parent's serious mental-health impairments, inability to protect the child from a sexual offender, and choice of the offender over the child can support that determination.

In re D.S. · filed 2011-12-12(B)

R.C. 2151.414(B) enables the court to grant permanent custody if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child. ... In reviewing the entire record, we find the trial court's decision on the best interests of the child to be supported by the testimony. Clearly appellant's extreme religious delusions, her inability to comprehend the seriousness of permitting a sexual offender to live in the home, and her choice to support the sexual offender over her child, are sufficient to support the trial court's determination.

Section 2151.414(B)'s requirements for permanent custody were satisfied where the father failed to maintain stable housing, failed to address an ongoing substance-abuse problem, and displayed angry, erratic, and potentially violent behavior during visits.

In re A.J. · filed 2016-11-30(B)

Specifically, the record establishes that Father failed to maintain stable housing, and he has a significant, ongoing substance abuse problem that he failed to properly address. Moreover, his angry, erratic, and potentially violent behavior during visitation with the Children speaks to his questionable fitness as a caretaker and provider for the Children. ... Our review of the record, transcript, and exhibits establishes that there is clear and convincing evidence which supports the juvenile court's decision finding that the statutory elements for termination under R.C. 2151.414(B) have been satisfied.

The prohibition on readjudicating dependency or neglect at a permanent-custody hearing does not bar evidence from the earlier adjudicatory hearing or evidence of the parent’s past conduct.

In re J.G.S. · filed 2019-03-08(A)(1)

This prohibition does not preclude the court from considering evidence elicited in the dependency or neglect hearing at a permanent-custody hearing. ... Under R.C. 2151.414, the court is required to look at all relevant evidence, including a parent’s pattern of conduct.

Section 2151.414 requires findings under the relevant statutory factors before permanent custody may be granted.

In re T.T. · filed 2026-03-02

In thorough judgment entries, the trial court applied the R.C. 2151.414 analysis as required and supported its findings under each relevant statutory factor. We recognize the gravity of the court’s decisions and do not doubt Mother’s love for her children, but we cannot say there is insufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s determinations.

After prior involuntary terminations of sibling rights, the parent must rebut the resulting ground with clear and convincing evidence of a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re D.C.J. · filed 2021-12-10(E)(11)

Mother failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove, notwithstanding the prior termination, she could provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the Child.

After a prior involuntary termination of rights to a sibling, subsection (E)(11) puts the burden on the parent to show an ability to provide the child a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re S.G. · filed 2020-11-10(E)(11)

Therefore, mother had the burden to show that she could provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for S.G.

A parent’s evidence that the child and home were healthy at removal does not rebut prior-termination unfitness when the parent’s domestic violence, untreated mental illness, criminal conduct, and illegal drug use remain unchanged.

In re J.M. · filed 2019-03-07(E)(11)

We find that the testimony as to the condition of the home and J.M. does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that rebutted the presumption of parental unsuitability, especially in light of the considerable evidence in the record demonstrating that life for T.B. remained unchanged since her previous loss of parental rights. ... We find that competent, credible evidence in the record supports the trial court’s determination by clear and convincing evidence of the existence of factor R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) in this case.

A prior involuntary termination and felony child-endangering convictions are directly relevant to best interest, and the parent must present clear and convincing evidence of a current ability to provide a safe and secure home.

In re B.E. · filed 2019-03-25(D)(1)(e), (E)(11)

The trial court also found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) applied because Mother’s parental rights to a sibling of B.E. had been involuntary terminated and Mother failed to rebut the current presumption of her unfitness by presenting “clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, [she] can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.” ... Mother’s past parenting ability was directly relevant to the trial court’s best interest determination.

A prior involuntary termination of rights to a sibling creates a rebuttable presumption of unfitness that the parent may overcome with clear and convincing evidence of an ability to provide secure placement and adequate care.

In re G.L.S. · filed 2018-04-25(E)(11)

As amended effective January 9, 2009, however, Section 2151.414(E)(11) allows a parent to rebut the presumption that they are unfit by presenting “clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, [they] can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.” Notably, neither parent in this case presented any evidence that they could provide a legally secure placement for G.L.S.

A parent's prior involuntary loss of parental rights to the child's siblings weighs against the parent in the best-interest analysis.

In Re J.B., 08-Ca-21 (8-15-2008) · filed 2008-08-15(D)(5), (E)(11)

In determining the best interest of J.B., the trial court considered all of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (D). Clear and convincing evidence established that Mother was unwilling to make the necessary effort and sacrifice to provide a safe and healthy environment for J.B. Instead, Mother conceded that she failed to complete the majority of the case plan that was established with the specific goal of reuniting her with J.B. Further, Mother testified that her parental rights to two of her children other than J.B. had previously been involuntarily terminated, which weighed against her in the best interest analysis under R.C. 2151.414 (D)(5).

Section 2151.414(E)(11) permits a court to find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when that parent previously had parental rights involuntarily terminated as to the child's sibling.

In Re Craig, 2008 Ap 05 0030 (8-19-2008) · filed 2008-08-19(E)(11)

"(11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated pursuant to this section or section 2151.353 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code with respect to a sibling of the child. ... Upon a review of the record in light of the pertinent statutory factors, particularly the impact of subsection (E)(11), we find the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's determination.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) requires a juvenile court to find that a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent when clear and convincing evidence shows that the parent previously had parental rights terminated concerning a sibling.

In Re Farris, Unpublished Decision (10-18-2000) · filed 2000-10-18(E)(11)

This Court notes that the plain language of the amended statute provides an additional factor for courts to consider; whether a parent has had their parental rights terminated in a prior proceeding. See R.C. 2151.419 (A)(2)(e) and 2151.414 (E)(11).

A prior voluntary surrender of custody of siblings may be considered as another relevant factor under section 2151.414(E)(16), even if it does not qualify as an involuntary termination under subsection (E)(11).

In Re Thompson, Unpublished Decision (1-10-2001) · filed 2001-01-10(E)(16)

Evidence that Appellant had previously surrendered three other children to the custody of a children services agency was relevant to the trial court's determination of whether Appellant's parental rights to Justin and Marissa should be terminated. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing, and considering, evidence that Appellant voluntarily surrendered the custody of three other children to the Portage County Department of Human Services.

Prior involuntary termination of parental rights to another child can independently support the parental-placement finding under Section 2151.414(E)(11).

In Re Demetrius H., Unpublished Decision (3-9-2001) · filed 2001-03-09(E)(11)

Primarily, Melissa's parental rights to four other children and Kenneth's parental rights to one other child had recently been terminated. This finding alone was enough to support the court's decision.

Section 2151.414(E)(11)’s established prior-termination factor independently requires a finding against parental placement regardless of a challenge to the separate failure-to-remedy factor.

In Re Songer, Unpublished Decision (10-3-2001) · filed 2001-10-03(E)(11)

To satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2151.414 (E), LCCS was required to establish only one of the enumerated factors. Therefore, even if Shuman were to convince us that the trial court erred in its finding under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1), she presents no argument to refute the trial court's finding of the factor enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11). ... Given that the trial court found that the factor set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11) had been established, the court was required to find that Frederick could not or should not be placed with Shuman within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent whose parental rights to the child's sibling were involuntarily terminated under the section.

In the Matter of Destiny R., Unpublished Decision (4-19-2002) · filed 2002-04-19(E)(11)

Further, R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11) states that if the trial court finds that the parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated pursuant to this section with respect to a sibling of the child, it must enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

When a parent's rights to a sibling were previously involuntarily terminated, § 2151.414(E)(11) independently supports an inability-to-place finding, so the court need not decide whether case-plan compliance defeats subsection (E)(1).

In Re Porter, Unpublished Decision (9-18-2002) · filed 2002-09-18(E)(1), (E)(11)

In this case, the juvenile court found that Mother's parental rights were terminated concerning a sibling of W.P. Therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11) applied to Mother in addition to any other factor under R.C. 2151.414 (E). Because there was an additional basis under R.C. 2151.414 (E) upon which the trial court determined that W.P. could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed with Mother, we need not consider the effect of Mother's compliance with the case plan and the application of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1).

Prior involuntary termination of each parent's rights to another child can independently support the parental-placement finding under subsection (E)(11).

In the Matter of Kristiana B., Unpublished Decision (10-3-2003) · filed 2003-10-03(E)(11)

In the case sub judice, Melony's parental rights to five other children, including one whom Paul fathered, and Paul's parental rights to two other children had been terminated. This finding alone was enough to support the court's decision.

Section 2151.414(E)(11)'s prior involuntary termination factor applies only to the parent whose rights to the child's sibling were terminated and cannot be attributed to the child's other parent through division (D)(5).

In Re T.O., Unpublished Decision (3-31-2004) · filed 2004-03-31(D)(5), (E)(11)

The factor set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11): is that "[t]he parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated pursuant to section 2151.353 [2151.35.3], 2151.414 [2151.41.4], or 2151.415 [2151.41.5] of the Revised Code with respect to a sibling of the child." This factor applies to Jane, but not Howard, as he is not the father of the three older siblings.

Section 2151.414(E)(11)'s prior involuntary termination factor applies to each parent who previously had parental rights terminated with respect to a sibling of the child.

In the Matter of Richardson, Unpublished Decision (4-27-2004) · filed 2004-04-27(E)(11)

Here, under R.C. § 2151.414 (E)(11), the finding that parental rights for a child's sibling have previously been involuntarily terminated reflects on both the minor child's mother and father. Evidence was presented that each of the appellants parental rights to other children had been terminated, the mother as to five other children and the father as to two other children.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) requires a court to find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when that parent previously had parental rights involuntarily terminated under the section as to the child's sibling.

In Re A.S., Unpublished Decision (11-29-2004) · filed 2004-11-29(E)(11)

In considering this requirement, R.C. 2151.414 (E) provides that the trial court shall consider all relevant evidence. This provision also provides that a trial court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent if "[t]he parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated pursuant to this section * * * with respect to a sibling child." ... Therefore, the trial court was required to make a determination that A.S. could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when clear and convincing evidence shows that the parent previously had parental rights to the child's sibling involuntarily terminated; one statutory factor alone is sufficient.

In Re Cazad, Unpublished Decision (5-9-2005) · filed 2005-05-09(E)(11)

Here, R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11) is applicable. It provides that a parent's rights must be terminated if "[t]he parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated pursuant to this section or section 2151.353 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code with respect to a sibling of the child." Evidence presented at the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings revealed that in the early 1980s Norman had three children removed from his care, and his parental rights to those children involuntarily terminated. Therefore, we believe that some competent, credible evidence exists to support the trial court's finding that placement with Norman is not in Elisha's best interest.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) applies when a parent previously had parental rights involuntarily terminated as to a sibling, and that factor alone can support a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

In Re West, Unpublished Decision (6-10-2005) · filed 2005-06-10(E)(11)

A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time upon the existence of any one of the above factors. The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. See In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95 , 661 N.E.2d 738 ; In re Hurlow (Sept. 21, 1998), Gallia App. No. 98 CA 6; In re Butcher (Apr. 10, 1991), Athens App. No. 1470. {¶ 43} In the case at bar, we find ample competent and credible evidence to support the trial court's decision to award ACCS permanent custody of the child. First, sufficient evidence supports the court's finding that the child cannot and should not be returned to either parent within a reasonable time. The evidence shows that appellant previously had her parental rights terminated with respect to two children. See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11).

Section 2151.414(E)(11) concerns an involuntary termination of parental rights under Ohio's statutory scheme, not an out-of-state adoption proceeding of which the parent was unaware.

In Re G.B., Unpublished Decision (6-23-2005) · filed 2005-06-23(E)(11)

This is not the situation contemplated in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11). That statute specifically refers to the involuntary termination of parental rights pursuant to Ohio's statutory scheme for such proceedings, not the loss of parental rights in a proceeding in another state of which the parent was unaware. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to consider this factor.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) requires a court to find that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time when that parent's rights to a sibling were involuntarily terminated; proof of one subsection (E) factor is enough.

In the Matter of Spangler, Unpublished Decision (7-5-2005) · filed 2005-07-05(E)(11)

If the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing * * * that one or more of the following exist as to each of the child's parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent: * * * (11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated * * * with respect to a sibling of the child. R.C. 2151.414 (E). {¶ 5} In this case, Loretta had her parental rights to Cody's siblings, Christopher Asbury and Aaron Spangler, terminated on September 3, 2004. Thus, the trial court was required to enter a finding that Cody could not be placed with Loretta within a reasonable period of time. Since the trial court need find one factor to enter a finding that the children should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable period of time, any error of the requirement that Spangler have no contact with Norris is harmless.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when clear and convincing evidence shows that the parent previously had parental rights involuntarily terminated as to the child’s sibling.

In Re Melchizedek M., Unpublished Decision (6-16-2006) · filed 2006-06-16(E)(11)

Before granting a motion for permanent custody, the trial court must find clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the conditions listed in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exists as to each of the child's parents. Here, the trial court found that both appellants' prior loss of permanent custody of Melchizedek's siblings satisfied the predicate of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11), which requires a court to enter a finding against a child's placement with his parent if that "parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated pursuant to this section or section 2151.353 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code with respect to a sibling of the child." Clear and convincing evidence, specifically, Jose's testimony and the prior judgment entries involuntarily terminating both appellants' parental rights to Melchizedek's siblings, supports this finding. Thus, the trial court was required to enter a finding that Melchizedek could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

A prior involuntary termination of a parent's rights to a child's sibling can be sufficient under Section 2151.414(E)(11) and (D)(5) to support an award of permanent custody.

In Re Deasean J., Unpublished Decision (8-18-2006) · filed 2006-08-18(E)(11), (D)(5)

Upon a thorough review of the record in this case, we conclude that the trial court's findings that Deasean should not be placed with Jamila within a reasonable time and that permanent custody was in Deasean's best interest were supported by clear and convincing evidence. That Jamila's parental rights to Deasean's brother had been terminated four years earlier was sufficient under the statute to support the court's decision. R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11); R.C. 2151.414 (D)(5).

Section 2151.414(E)(11) requires a court deciding permanent custody to consider a parent's prior involuntary termination of parental rights to a sibling and, if that fact is established by clear and convincing evidence, to find that the child cannot or should not be placed with that parent.

In Re Matter of Jordan B., L-06-1161 (5-21-2007) · filed 2007-05-21(E)(11)

When determining a motion for permanent custody, R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11) requires the trial court to consider all relevant evidence and, if the trial court determines by clear and convincing evidence that "[t]he parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated * * * with respect to a sibling of the child," the court "shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent."

Section 2151.414(E)(11) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent when clear and convincing evidence shows that the parent previously had parental rights involuntarily terminated as to the child's sibling; that finding is sufficient to support permanent custody.

In Re Henslee, 08ap010004 (5-29-2008) · filed 2008-05-29(E)(11)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11), once a trial court has determined, by clear and convincing evidence, the parent has had parental rights involuntary terminated with respect to a sibling of the child, it "shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent". As such, this finding is sufficient to support the trial court's permanent custody decision.

Under § 2151.414(E)(11), a parent’s prior involuntary loss of parental rights to the child’s siblings supports a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with that parent.

In Matter of Brown, 2008 Ca 00029 (7-22-2008) · filed 2008-07-22(E)(11)

In regard to appellant, the trial court particularly emphasized that she had lost permanent custody of five other children in three separate cases in Stark County Juvenile Court. See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11), supra. ... Accordingly, upon full review, we find the trial court's conclusions pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E) were supported by the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.

When a parent previously had parental rights to the child's siblings involuntarily terminated and failed to demonstrate improvement since that termination, division (E)(11) applies and requires a finding that the child should not be placed with that parent.

In re Baby Boy W. · filed 2011-05-16(E)(11)

Under these circumstances, R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) applied, and as such, the trial court was required, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E), to find that the child should not be placed with Amber.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) applies when a parent whose parental rights to the child’s siblings were involuntarily terminated fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent can nevertheless provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the child.

In re S.F. · filed 2013-02-15(E)(11)

In this case, Y.D. had her parental rights terminated with regard to seven of S.F.’s siblings. The Agency has been involved with Y.D. for nearly half of her life and has provided numerous services in an attempt to reunify her with her various children, including S.F. Despite these efforts, Y.D. has lost custody of her other seven children. Thus, we find the record supports the juvenile court’s determination that this section of R.C. 2151.414(E) is applicable.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) permits a prior termination of parental rights to a sibling, standing alone, to support a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

In re J.M-R. · filed 2013-04-18(E)(11)

This section sets forth 16 factors that the trial court may consider in its determination. It provides that if the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that any of the 16 factors exists, the court must enter a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time. ... It is undisputed that mother had two previous children involuntarily removed from her custody. This factor alone would have supported the trial court’s finding that J.M-R. could not or should not be returned to mother within a reasonable period of time.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) satisfies the first prong of the permanent-custody test when a parent's rights to a sibling were involuntarily terminated and the parent fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the child.

In re L.M. · filed 2013-06-26(B)(1)(a), (E)(11)

The first-prong of the statutory test may be satisfied by clear and convincing evidence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors. See R.C. 2151.414(E). We find it unnecessary to consider Mother’s arguments concerning the other factors because we conclude that the test is satisfied by reliance on R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). That factor is applicable where the parent has had parental rights terminated with respect to a sibling of the child and the parent has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate that the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare and safety of the child. Id. ... Accordingly, the weight of the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Mother’s parental rights were involuntarily terminated as to a sibling of L.M. See R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). That finding, in turn, supports the trial court’s determination that L.M. cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). The first prong of the permanent custody test is thereby satisfied.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) permits a prior involuntary termination of parental rights concerning a sibling, standing alone, to support a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

In re D.G. · filed 2013-08-15(E)(11)

The trial court’s determination of whether the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent is guided by R.C. 2151.414(E). This section sets forth 16 factors that the trial court may consider in its determination. It provides that if the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that any of the 16 factors exists, the court must enter a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time. ... Here, one of the 16 factors would have been sufficient. ... It is undisputed that M.G. had two previous children involuntarily removed from her custody. This factor alone would have supported the trial court’s finding that D.G. could not or should not be returned to mother within a reasonable period of time.

Under § 2151.414(E)(11), a parent whose rights to a sibling were involuntarily terminated does not carry the clear-and-convincing burden of proving an ability to provide legally secure placement and adequate care merely by showing a present ability to provide a home when unresolved addiction has prevented sustained care.

In re C.K. · filed 2013-09-03(E)(11)

“(11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of the child pursuant to this section * * *, and the parent has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.” ... However, the mere fact that King and Gildersleeve may be able to provide a home for C.K. at the present time is not sufficient to carry their burden of proof under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). Given that King and Gildersleeve have already lost their rights in regard to two other children, the children services board demonstrated that they have not been able to provide sustained adequate care for any of their children. Moreover, the evidence showed that this inability to give proper care was due to their continuing drug addiction. If the record indicated that King and Gildersleeve had been successfully rehabilitated and able to sustain their sobriety for a considerable period, a finding that they were able to be proper parents for C.K. might be justified. But, there is no dispute that King and Gildersleeve had only taken the initial steps to be accepted into a drug treatment program. Therefore, the evidence supported the finding that, even if King and Gildersleeve were successful in overcoming their drug addictions, it would not happen within a reasonable time period.

A prior involuntary termination of parental rights to a sibling alone supports finding that a child cannot or should not be returned to the parent within a reasonable time, after which the parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care.

In re M.J. · filed 2013-12-12(E)(11)

As an initial matter, it is undisputed that appellant has previously had other children involuntarily removed from her custody. This factor alone would have supported the trial court’s finding that M.J. and C.S. could not, or should not, be returned to her within a reasonable period of time. R.C. 2151.414(E)(11); In re D.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99587, 2013-Ohio-3537, ¶ 16; In re M.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91539, 2009-Ohio-121, ¶ 49. Moreover, where this factor is established, the burden is then on the parent to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, he or she can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.

Under Section 2151.414(E)(11), a prior involuntary termination of parental rights to a sibling weighs against placement unless the parent proves by clear and convincing evidence an ability to provide a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re A.G. · filed 2013-12-19(E)(11)

Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), the trial court found that Mother had her parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of the child. We further conclude Mother failed to present clear and convincing evidence that, notwithstanding the prior termination, she can provide a legally secure placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the children.

Subsection (E)(11) supports a cannot-be-placed finding when a parent previously lost parental rights to a sibling and, despite substantial case-plan work, has not remedied the continuing inability to care safely and independently for a child.

In re S.S. · filed 2014-01-31(E)(11)

While Mother completed all aspects of her case plan, those individuals working with Mother on her case plan testified to serious concerns with Mother’s parenting abilities. Dr. Thomas testified that due to Mother’s cognitive deficits, Mother was unable to respond sufficiently to the needs of a growing and changing child. ... Mother had her parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to one sibling of S.S. The trial court noted in its decision that while Mother substantially worked through her case plan as to the sibling, Mother’s parenting assessment indicated that because of her cognitive deficits, Mother would continue to have problems dealing with the day-to-day issues and could not safely independently care for a child. In the present case, we find clear and convincing evidence that, notwithstanding the prior termination, Mother has not remedied that issue to show she can provide a legally secure placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child. R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).

When a parent previously lost parental rights to a sibling, Section 2151.414(E)(11) supports a cannot-or-should-not-be-placed finding if the parent fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prior conduct has been remedied and adequate care can now be provided.

In re J.S. · filed 2014-07-16(E)(11)

It is undisputed that mother had her parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to two siblings of this child. The issues in those cases were again, predominantly, mental health and domestic violence. Although mother testified in this case that she no longer visits on-line chat rooms to meet men and is learning to walk away from men who are violent toward her, the court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) that mother has failed to demonstrate that she has remedied the conduct that led to the involuntary termination of her parental rights to siblings of this child, was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

After a prior involuntary termination as to a sibling, a parent who presents no evidence of the ability to provide a legally secure placement and adequate care fails to rebut Section 2151.414(E)(11).

In re R.S. · filed 2014-12-31(E)(11)

Mother lost parental rights to her younger child, V.S., in November 2013. Mother did not testify at trial or present any evidence at trial to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that she can provide a legally permanent placement for R.S. and adequately care for the health, welfare, and safety of R.S. We find that competent, credible evidence in the record supports the trial court’s determination by clear and convincing evidence of the existence of factor R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) in this case.

A parent with prior involuntary terminations may rebut Section 2151.414(E)(11) only by clear and convincing evidence that the parent can now provide a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re S.R.T. · filed 2016-03-02(E)(11)

Mother may challenge the determination that the child cannot or should not be placed in her custody within a reasonable time, by clearly and convincingly establishing that, notwithstanding the several prior terminations of her parental rights, she can now provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.

A parent with a prior involuntary termination must present clear and convincing evidence that the parent can now provide a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re N.M. · filed 2016-08-03(E)(11)

Mother had failed to present any evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, that “notwithstanding the prior termination, [she] can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.”

Once evidence shows prior loss of custody of siblings, the parent bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence an ability to provide secure placement and adequate care.

In re Z.B. · filed 2017-01-23(E)(11)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), evidence was presented that Father has lost custody of two children. The burden then shifts to Father to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(e) requires considering whether a parent previously had parental rights to another child involuntarily terminated under Section 2151.414(E)(11).

In re S.M. · filed 2017-04-24(D)(1)(e)

In this case, Mother admitted that her parental rights to another child had previously been involuntarily terminated. R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).

Section 2151.414(E)(11) shifts to a parent whose rights to a sibling were involuntarily terminated the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent can now provide a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re Y.W. · filed 2018-01-26(E)(11)

R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) continues with a burden shift to the appellant: “(11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of the [children] * * * under an existing or former law of this state, * * * and the parent has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the [children].” ... In turn, appellant failed to meet her clear and convincing burden that, notwithstanding the prior termination of parental rights to D.W., she can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of Y.W., J.W. and T.W.

A prior involuntary termination of parental rights to a sibling under Section 2151.414(E)(11) alone may support a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

In re J.S. · filed 2018-02-01(E)(11)

There is no dispute that appellant had a prior parental rights termination to support the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). This factor alone would have supported the trial court’s finding that J.S. could not, or should not, be returned to appellant within a reasonable period of time.

A trial court may rely on a prior involuntary-termination judgment under Section 2151.414(E)(11) before that judgment has been affirmed on appeal.

In re S.S., H.S., A.S. · filed 2018-06-13(E)(11)

Notably, there was no need for the trial court to wait until this Court affirmed the prior permanent custody judgment to consider it under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) or R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e). ... Although the trial court would run the risk that its judgment might later be reversed for that reason, it was not precluded from relying on the March 2017 termination of Mother’s parental rights before that decision was affirmed on appeal. See, e.g., R.C. 2151.414(E)(11); In re J.P., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA01082, 2016-Ohio-337, ¶ 6.

Under Section 2151.414(E)(11), a parent whose rights to a sibling were involuntarily terminated must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent can now provide a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re C.S. · filed 2018-12-03(E)(11)

However, the trial court determined that appellant failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that she can provide a legally secure placement and adequately care for the health, welfare and safety of the child. ... Given these facts, we find no error in the trial court's determination that appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that she could provide a legally secure placement and adequately care for the health, welfare and safety of the child.

When parental rights to older siblings were involuntarily terminated, Sections 2151.414(D)(1)(e) and (E)(11) require considering whether the parents prove they can now provide an appropriate home.

In re A.F. · filed 2018-12-05(D)(1)(e), (E)(11)

The trial court was also required to consider the fact that the parents’ rights to A.F.’s older siblings had been involuntarily terminated and they failed to present evidence to demonstrate that, despite the prior terminations, they could provide an appropriate home for A.F. See R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e); R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).

Section 2151.414(E)(11) requires a finding that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time when the parent's rights to a sibling were involuntarily terminated and the parent fails to prove an ability to provide the child a secure placement and adequate care.

In re G.W. · filed 2019-04-29(E)(11)

Moreover, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), the juvenile court was required ... to find G.W. could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time if Mother (1) has had her parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to any one of G.W.'s siblings and (2) failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, that she could provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of G.W.

A prior termination of parental rights to older siblings is sufficient under Section 2151.414(E)(11) to support a reasonable-time placement finding for newborn siblings unless the parents prove they can provide legally secure and adequate care despite the prior termination.

In re A.M.Z. · filed 2019-08-30(E)(11)

Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), this fact alone was sufficient to underpin a finding that the twins could not be placed with their parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with them absent clear and convincing proof that they were in a position to give the twins legally secure and adequate care notwithstanding the prior termination. Their parents proffered no such proof.

A parent's prior involuntary termination of rights to older children may satisfy Section 2151.414(E)(11)'s permanent-custody ground when supported by the record.

In re L.W. · filed 2019-12-23(E)(11)

The trial court found that the first prong of the permanent custody test was satisfied for several alternative reasons, including that Mother’s parental rights to other children had been involuntarily terminated. See R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). Mother does not challenge that finding by the trial court, which was fully supported by the record.

A supported Section 2151.414(E)(11) finding based on a prior involuntary termination and failure to prove the ability to provide a secure home satisfies the first permanent-custody prong.

In re P.G. · filed 2020-04-10(E)(11)

Although the juvenile court’s finding pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) satisfied the requirements of the first prong for determining permanent custody, the court made further findings in the record by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(4).

Section 2151.414(E)(11) shifts to a parent whose rights to a sibling were involuntarily terminated the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence an ability to provide the child a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re R.D. · filed 2020-04-10(E)(11)

The burden is shifted to Mother to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, notwithstanding the prior termination, she can provide a legally-secure permanent placement and adequate care for R.D.’s health, welfare, and safety. R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), supra.

Division (E)(11) places on a parent whose rights to other children were involuntarily terminated the burden to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the presumption that the parent is unsuitable for another child.

In re D.T. · filed 2020-05-15(E)(11)

R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) placed the burden on appellant to essentially rebut a presumption, by clear and convincing evidence, that because her parental rights were involuntarily terminated as to other children, she is not a suitable parent for additional children.

A division (E)(11) prior-termination finding alone satisfies division (B)(1)(a)'s parental-placement condition.

In re H.R.H. · filed 2020-06-03(E)(11)

Although the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) alone satisfied the condition set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), the court also found that mother failed to remedy the problems that caused H.R.H. to be placed outside the home.

Under division (E)(11), proof of a prior involuntary termination concerning a sibling shifts to the parent the burden to prove an ability to provide a legally secure placement.

In re T.G. · filed 2020-10-07(E)(11)

Subsection (E)(11) requires only that the agency prove the prior involuntary termination of parental rights regarding the child’s sibling. At that point, the statutory burden shifts to the parent to prove her ability to provide a legally secure placement for the child.

Under Section 2151.414(E)(11), a parent whose rights to another child were involuntarily terminated bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence an ability to provide a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re Dn.R. · filed 2020-12-21(E)(11)

Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), “the burden is on the parent to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that he or she can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.”

After an agency establishes a parent’s prior involuntary termination, the parent bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she remedied the condition that caused the prior termination.

In re J.F. · filed 2021-07-06(E)(11)

{¶ 112} A review of the record shows LCCS established, inter alia, that mother’s parental rights to the children had been involuntarily terminated. Mother had the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that she remedied the condition which caused the termination of her parental rights.

A prior involuntary termination of parental rights to a sibling requires a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with the parent unless the parent proves an ability to provide secure placement and adequate care.

In re D.C. · filed 2021-08-09(E)(11)

Moreover, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), the trial court was required to find the Child could not and should not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time because Mother (1) has had her parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to the Child's siblings, and (2) Mother failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove, notwithstanding the prior termination, she could provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the Child.

A voluntary surrender of parental rights does not establish subsection (E)(11), which requires a prior involuntary termination of rights to a sibling.

In re C.H. · filed 2021-08-16(E)(11)

As Mother correctly asserts, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that her parental rights to any of her other children had been terminated “involuntarily.” ... The evidence at the hearing demonstrated that Mother voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to the three other children who had been parties to this case. ... Consequently, the trial court erred in determining that these facts satisfied the factor set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).

Subsection (E)(11) applies to a prior involuntary termination of parental rights even when that termination occurred before the child at issue was born.

In re B.F. · filed 2021-12-06(E)(11)

Furthermore, R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) is applicable with respect to both of Billie’s other children even though her rights to one of them were involuntarily terminated prior to B.F.’s birth.

After prior involuntary terminations concerning siblings are established, subsection (E)(11) requires the parent to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she can provide the child a safe and secure home.

In re W/H Children · filed 2022-05-27(E)(11)

{¶15} The record shows that mother’s parental rights had been terminated with respect to two of her children, and that a third child had been placed in the legal custody of a relative. Therefore, under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), mother had to show by clear and convincing evidence that she could provide a safe and secure home for D.W.

Once prior involuntary terminations concerning siblings are established, subsection (E)(11) shifts to the parent the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she can provide a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re W.M. · filed 2022-06-10(B)(1)(a), (E)(11)

{¶ 48} Mother does not dispute that she has previously had her parental rights terminated with respect to the children’s older siblings. Therefore, under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), the burden shifted to mother to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that she could provide the children with a legally secure permanent placement and adequately care for their health, welfare, and safety.

Prior involuntary terminations support a subsection (E)(11) finding when the parent fails to resolve the same mental-health and substance-abuse problems that caused those terminations.

In re A.M. · filed 2022-06-29(E)(11)

The evidence before the trial court demonstrated that Mother had not resolved any of the same problems that caused her to lose custody of her two older children. Consequently, the trial court did not err in finding that A.M. could not or should not be returned to Mother’s custody based on the grounds set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).

A prior involuntary termination concerning a sibling creates a rebuttable presumption of parental unfitness and places on the parent the burden to prove a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re A.W. · filed 2022-10-19(E)(11)

{¶23} Relevant to our purposes here, R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) requires the trial court to consider whether a parent previously had his or her parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of the child and, if so, whether the parent failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child. ... R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) allows a parent to rebut the presumption—created by the previous involuntary termination—that he or she is an unfit parent. See In re X.N., 9th Dist. Medina No. 21CA0016, 2021-Ohio-3633, ¶ 26; In re G.L.S., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 28874 and 28893, 2018-Ohio-1606, ¶ 19.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) supports a finding that a child cannot or should not be returned to parents whose rights to a sibling were terminated and who fail to prove they can now provide secure placement and adequate care.

In re O.A. · filed 2023-03-15(E)(11)

The trial court found that the first prong of the permanent custody test was satisfied in this case for alternative reasons, including that O.A. could not be returned to the parents’ custody within a reasonable time or should not be returned to them because they had parental rights terminated to K.A. (a sibling of O.A.) and Mother and Father “failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, [they] can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.” R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). Neither parent disputes this finding, which was fully supported by the record.

After parental rights to a sibling were previously terminated, Section 2151.414(E)(11) places on the parent the burden to prove an ability to provide a legally secure placement for the child now.

In re K.R. · filed 2023-03-23(E)(11)

R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) puts the burden of proof on the parent to establish that they can now provide a legally secure placement for a child, after a previous grant of permanent custody for a sibling.

Once a prior involuntary termination triggers section 2151.414(E)(11), the parent bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the parent can now provide secure placement and adequate care.

In re N.J. · filed 2023-09-08(E)(11)

A finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) places “the burden is on the parent to provide clear and convincing ... evidence to prove that he or she can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.”

A prior involuntary termination creates a presumption of parental unsuitability that the parent must rebut, and the prior termination applies to both the parental-placement and best-interest prongs.

In re M.M. · filed 2023-10-24(E)(11), (D)(1)(e)

R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) places “a burden on the parent to essentially rebut a presumption that, because her parental rights were involuntarily terminated as to her other children, she is not a suitable parent for additional children.” In re E.A., 9th Dist. Medina No. 12CA0059-M, 2012-Ohio-5925, ¶ 14. See also In re N.J., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-23-1114, 2023-Ohio-3190, ¶ 44. Moreover, “[a] finding that a parent has lost parental rights to another child applies to both prongs of the permanent custody analysis - whether a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent, R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), and whether permanent custody to the agency is in the child’s best interest, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e).” In re N.J. at ¶ 44, citing In re W.M., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-1016, 2022-Ohio-1978, ¶ 52.

Since the 2009 amendment, a prior involuntary termination creates a rebuttable presumption of parental unfitness under Section 2151.414(E)(11), which the parent must rebut by clear and convincing evidence.

In re A.H. · filed 2024-02-12(E)(11)

Effective April 7, 2009, however, Section 2151.414(E)(11) now permits “the parent to essentially rebut a presumption that, because her parental rights were involuntarily terminated as to her other children, she is not a suitable parent for additional children.” In re E.A., 9th Dist. Medina No. 12CA0059- M, 2012-Ohio-5925, ¶ 14. Mother had the burden to rebut the presumption of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.

To rebut section 2151.414(E)(11)'s presumption after a prior involuntary termination, a parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence a current ability at the time of the hearing to provide an appropriate home, not an ability to do so someday.

In re M.J. · filed 2024-04-03(E)(11)

Furthermore, this Court has consistently interpreted this provision to require a parent to present clear and convincing evidence of his or her current ability, at the time of the hearing, to provide an appropriate home for the child.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) applies when both parents previously had their parental rights involuntarily terminated as to siblings of the children.

In re W.R. · filed 2024-07-03(E)(11)

Finally, R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) is applicable to these cases, as the juvenile court previously involuntarily terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights as to three siblings of W.R. and R.R.

A prior involuntary termination under section 2151.414(E)(11) must be considered both as a first-prong placement ground and again under section 2151.414(D)(1)(e) in the best-interest determination.

In re D.S. · filed 2024-08-21(E)(11), (D)(1)(e)

As explained above, the trial court found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) applied to the facts of this case and it was required to consider the prior involuntary terminations of Mother’s parental rights again in its best interest determination.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) was established where the parent previously lost rights to a sibling and presented no clear and convincing evidence that she could now provide secure placement and adequate care.

In re Jaz. M. · filed 2024-11-06(E)(11)

The record supports these findings. In addition, mother did not testify at trial or present any evidence that she can provide a legally secure permanent placement for Child 2 or Child 3 or adequately care for their health, welfare, and safety. We find that the record supports the trial court’s determination by clear and convincing evidence of the existence of factor R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) in this case.

A prior involuntary termination shifts to the parents the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they can now provide a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re Ka.W. · filed 2024-12-09(E)(11)

This finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), moreover, placed the burden on father and mother to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that “he or she can legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.”

Section 2151.414 requires the court to consider a parent's prior involuntary termination of rights to a sibling and permits consideration of the circumstances surrounding that termination.

In Re Elliott, Unpublished Decision (7-6-2004) · filed 2004-07-06(E)(11)

The statute specifically requires the court to consider not only the prior termination of parental rights, but also all relevant factors. The circumstances surrounding a prior termination of a parent's parental rights are highly relevant in a hearing to terminate the rights of the same parent regarding another child.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent whose parental rights to the child’s sibling were involuntarily terminated.

In Re Jared C., Unpublished Decision (9-17-2004) · filed 2004-09-17(E)(11)

Further, the trial court indicated that its finding that permanent custody was in Jared's best interest was also based on division (E)(11) of R.C. 2151.414 , which states that the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent if "[t]he parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated pursuant to this section * * * with respect to a sibling of the child." As the evidence summarized above indicates, appellant's parental rights to eight of Jared's siblings had been terminated prior to the hearing in this case. ... Based on a thorough review of the record in this case and the law, we find that the trial court thoroughly considered the evidence presented as it related to Jared's best interest and properly applied all relevant law. The trial court's findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) requires a parent whose rights to a sibling were involuntarily terminated to present clear and convincing evidence of a current ability to provide an appropriate home.

In re K.G. · filed 2024-06-26(E)(11)

“[T]his Court has consistently interpreted this provision to require a parent to present clear and convincing evidence of his or her current ability, at the time of the hearing, to provide an appropriate home for the child.”

A supported finding that a parent's rights to a sibling were involuntarily terminated under § 2151.414(E)(11) can satisfy the first prong of the permanent custody test.

In Re P.T., 24207 (9-17-2008) · filed 2008-09-17(E)(11)

Because Mother has not disputed that the court's finding under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11) was supported by the evidence presented at the permanent custody hearing and was sufficient to support the court's finding on the first prong of the permanent custody test, she cannot demonstrate reversible error.

A parent whose rights to a sibling were involuntarily terminated may rebut the presumption of unfitness with clear and convincing evidence that the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care.

In re X.N. · filed 2021-10-12(E)(11)

“As amended effective January 9, 2009, however, Section 2151.414(E)(11) allows a parent to rebut the presumption that [she is] unfit by presenting ‘clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, [she] can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.’” Id., citing R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). Mother failed to present evidence to rebut the presumption of her continued unfitness to parent a child.

When a parent's rights to a sibling were previously involuntarily terminated, Section 2151.414(E)(11) shifts the burden to the parent to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they can provide a legally secure placement and adequate care for the child.

In re Z.S. · filed 2021-06-16(E)(11)

As to subsection (E)(11), once the agency has proved that a parent’s parental rights were previously involuntarily terminated as to a sibling of the subject child, the statutory burden then ... shifts to the parent to prove that she is able to provide a legally secure placement for the child. ... Mother failed to do so.

Section 2151.414(D) does not expressly require a juvenile court to consider a child’s probability of adoption when determining the child’s best interest.

In re T.R. · filed 2008-10-14(D)

First, while a juvenile court reviewing a motion for permanent custody was at one time required to consider the child’s probability of being adopted, former R.C. 2151.414(D), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 89, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 198, 240, the current statutory framework does not expressly require the court to consider this information in making a best-interest determination, R.C. 2151.414(D).

R.C. 2151.414(D) does not expressly require a juvenile court to consider a child's probability of adoption when making the best-interest determination on a motion for permanent custody.

In Re D.T., 91384 (10-23-2008) · filed 2008-10-23(D)

"First, while a juvenile court reviewing a motion for permanent custody was at one time required to consider the child's probability of being adopted, former R.C. 2151.414 (D), Am. Sub. S.B. No. 89 , 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 198, 240, the current statutory framework does not expressly require the court to consider this information in making a best-interest determination, R.C. 2151.414 (D). Thus, allowing a children-services agency to update the case plan after the decision to grant permanent custody is issued does not prevent the juvenile court from making the requisite best-interest determination."

Section 2151.414(D) does not require a court to consider the probability that a child will be adopted before granting permanent custody, although adoption considerations may be pertinent under division (D)(4).

In the Matter of A.S., Unpublished Decision (10-18-2005) · filed 2005-10-18(D)

Nothing appears in the current version of R.C. 2151.414 (D) that would indicate the trial court must consider the probability that the child will be adopted before granting permanent custody. See In re A.B., Summit App. No. 22659, 2005-Ohio-4936, at ¶ 16; In re Bentley, Ashtabula App. No. 2004-A-0075, 2005-Ohio-1257, at ¶ 39; In re Liston (Aug. 27, 1999), Portage App. No. 98-P-0040. Notwithstanding, considerations regarding the adoption of the child may be pertinent under R.C. 2151.414 (D)(4).

Section 2151.414(D) does not require a court determining a child's best interest to consider the child's prospects for adoption.

In the Matter of Baby C, Unpublished Decision (4-27-2006) · filed 2006-04-27(D)

Nothing in R.C. 2151.414 (D) requires or even suggests that the court take into account a child's prospects for adoption in determining whether a permanent custody order is in that child's best interest.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d) does not require a court to consider the probability that a child will be adopted before granting permanent custody.

In re N.Q. · filed 2013-07-19(D)(1)(d)

Although the statute has since been amended, the reference in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) to a “need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency,” has remained unchanged. The legislature has not chosen to add a requirement of probability of adoption before granting custody.

Subsection (D) does not require a court to consider the child's probability of adoption in the best-interest analysis.

In re M.W. · filed 2017-11-16(D)

As stated in In re T.R., “the court is not required to factor adoption possibilities into its analysis, and the agency will be bound to seek adoption for the child if permanent custody is granted[.]”

Division (E)(8) may not be considered when there is no evidence that the parent repeatedly withheld medical treatment from the child, although improper consideration may be harmless when other supported findings justify permanent custody.

In Re B.H., Ca2008-06-019 (1-26-2009) · filed 2009-01-26(E)(8)

FCDJFS agrees that the juvenile court should not have considered this factor, as there is no evidence in the record that appellant repeatedly withheld medical treatment from the children. See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(8). However, given the other findings made by the court and the evidence in support of those findings, we find this error to be harmless.

Section 2151.414(E)(7)'s withholding-medical-treatment factor was supported where children had not seen a physician in roughly four years and had unmet vision, dental, speech, and behavioral-health needs.

In re E.H. · filed 2023-11-21(E)(7)

When removed from Parents’ custody in August of 2021, Minor Children had not seen a physician in roughly four years. Two of the children needed eyeglasses. A.H. required substantial treatment for dental problems resulting from Parents’ neglect. The boys’ speech was unintelligible. N.H. was prescribed medication for his ADHD. Consequently, the record reflects Parents had repeatedly withheld medical treatment from Minor Children.

Section 2151.414(E)(8)'s withholding-medical-treatment factor applied where the parent repeatedly withheld treatment despite having the means and sought no care after the children were kidnapped for thirty-five days.

In re J.C. · filed 2024-10-24(E)(8)

Upon review, we agree with the trial court that (E)(8) applies as N.H. repeatedly withheld medical treatment when she had the means to do so, and she never sought care or treatment for the children after their kidnapping for 35 days by a Mexican drug cartel.

Section 2151.414(E)(8)'s withholding-medical-treatment factor was supported where medical records showed the parents failed to follow providers' recommendations and the children's needs were not met.

In re S.C. · filed 2025-01-27(E)(8)

The trial court determined that medical records established that the parents failed to follow through with recommendations of medical providers and the children’s needs were not being met. ... After considering all of the evidence in the record, we find that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s decision.

Section 2151.414(D)(3) requires the court to consider the child's wishes and concerns, as expressed directly by the child or through the guardian ad litem, with due regard for the child's maturity.

In Re Peoples, Unpublished Decision (3-25-1999) · filed 1999-03-25(D)(3)

Appellant bases her claim upon the seemingly inadequate report by the Guardian ad Litem which does not specifically deal with the wishes of the children. However, the court's journal entry states in part: "considering all factors set forth in section 2151.414 (D), and upon further consideration, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the children to grant permanent custody to Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services. Moreover, a review of the hearing transcript of September 8, 1997, establishes that the court was informed that the two children "have become attached to [their current caretakers]". From this we can only infer that the children were contacted concerning this issue and that their wishes, as best a seven and five year old can articulate, were presented to the court. This representation, coupled with the presumption that the trial court did consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (D) as it had stated in its journal entry, leads this court to conclude that the court properly considered the statutory factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (D) in making its determination of permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) requires reliable evidence of a child’s wishes when the child can express them, and an attorney’s ambiguous testimony mixing those wishes with personal best-interest opinions does not suffice.

In Re Williams, Unpublished Decision (3-20-2001) · filed 2001-03-20(D)(2)

In light of the ambiguity in his testimony, Cody's attorney failed to provide the judge with clear evidence about Cody's own wishes. ... Our conclusion regarding the court's erroneous failure to consider Cody's wishes is dispositive of this appeal and forms the basis for our decision to reverse and remand this case.

Section 2151.414(D) requires consideration of children’s wishes but permits overriding those wishes when their best interests warrant it.

In Re Redrick Children, Unpublished Decision (04-09-2001) · filed 2001-04-09(D)(2)

The fact the trial court did not place great weight on mother's testimony regarding the children's wishes does not equate to the trial court's failure to consider those wishes. Furthermore, the children's wishes is one of five enumerated factors a trial court must consider. R.C. 2151.414 (D) does not bind the trial court to the children's wishes or prevent the trial court from overriding those wishes if it is in the best interests of the children.

Section 2151.414(D)’s inquiry into the child’s wishes permits reliance on a treating social worker’s intensive interactions over a guardian ad litem’s limited observations.

In Re Et Corrigall, Unpublished Decision (4-19-2001) · filed 2001-04-19(D)

Because the guardian's opportunities for observation were so limited and because Ms. Steepleton's testimony arose from her treatment of the younger boy and is based upon more intensive interactions with the boys, the lower court could properly rely on her testimony to determine the younger boy's wishes.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) does not require consideration of the wishes of a child too young to express them.

In Re Parker, Unpublished Decision (4-25-2001) · filed 2001-04-25(D)(2)

The trial court could not consider the wishes of the child as provided by in R.C. 2151.414 (D)(2) because of the age of the child.

A court may appropriately decline to expressly ascertain a three-and-one-half-year-old child's wishes when determining best interest under section 2151.414(D)(2).

In Re Smith, Unpublished Decision (5-17-2001) · filed 2001-05-17(D)(2)

First, Zonisha was only three and one-half years old at the time of the permanent custody hearings. Given her tender age, the trial court's failure to expressly take into account Zonisha's wishes was appropriate.

A child's wish to return to a parent is one best-interest factor, and section 2151.414(D) assigns it no prescribed weight over other relevant factors.

In Re Bunting, Unpublished Decision (5-23-2001) · filed 2001-05-23(D)(2)

The child's wishes are just one of the factors the court must consider, however. See R.C. 2151.414 (D). The statute requires the trial court to consider all relevant factors and does not assign particular weight to any factor.

Section 2151.414(D)(2) requires consideration of the child’s wishes when deciding whether a planned permanent living arrangement under Section 2151.415(C) serves the child’s best interests.

In Re Matter of Moody, Unpublished Decision (6-28-2001) · filed 2001-06-28(D)(2)

The trial court must consider the wishes of the child in determining the best interests of the child when making a determination pursuant to R.C. 2151.415 (C). R.C. 2151.414 (D)(2).

An agency caseworker's observations cannot replace the guardian ad litem report as the expression of a young child's wishes under section 2151.414(D)(2).

In Re Smith, Unpublished Decision (01-02-2002) · filed 2002-01-02(D)(2)

While the caseworker's testimony may be considered as evidence of the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the foster family, it cannot be considered as an expression of the child's wishes in lieu of the guardian ad litem 's report. R.C. 2151.414 (D)(2) authorizes only the guardian ad litem to express the desires of the child.

A court does not err by declining to consider the direct custody wishes of children too young to express a meaningful preference.

In the Matter of Colaner, Unpublished Decision (6-18-2002) · filed 2002-06-18(D)(2)

Appellant argues that the court erred in granting permanent custody without considering the wishes of the children. The children were age 2 years old and 16 months old at the time of the permanent custody hearing. The court did not err in refusing to consider their wishes as to custody.

For children too young to express their own wishes, section 2151.414(D)(2) permits the guardian ad litem to express their wishes with due regard for their maturity.

In Re Ingram, Unpublished Decision (7-3-2002) · filed 2002-07-03(D)(2)

Because of the children's young age at the time of the trial, their wishes were expressed through the guardian ad litem. A trial court may view the children's wishes "as expressed * * * through the children's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the children." R.C. 2151.414 (D)(2).

Section 2151.414(D)(2) gives the juvenile court a choice to learn a child's wishes directly, including through an in-camera interview or testimony, or through the guardian ad litem, so declining an interview is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.

In Re Funk, Unpublished Decision (9-20-2002) · filed 2002-09-20(D)(2)

However, R.C. 2151.414 (D)(2) clearly provides that a child's wishes may be "expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem * * *[.]" (Emphasis added.) That is to say, a juvenile court has the option of either having the child assert his or her opinion, through, for example, an in-camera interview or testimony, or the court may rely upon the guardian ad litem's representations with respect to the child's desires. Because the juvenile court has a choice, the decision not to conduct an in camera interview will be reversed only if the court abused its discretion in declining to do so.

When a child consistently seeks reunification, subsection (D)(2)'s due-regard-for-maturity requirement calls for the juvenile court to investigate the child's maturity and understanding and decide whether counsel is needed to represent the child's wishes.

In Re Williams, Unpublished Decision (11-29-2002) · filed 2002-11-29(D)(2)

{¶ 24} ... A juvenile court need only consider a child's wishes regarding a motion for permanent custody after giving due regard to the child's maturity. R.C. 2151.414 (D)(2). Similarly, there is no need to consider the appointment of counsel based upon a child's occasional expression of a wish to be with a parent or because of a statement made by an immature child. ... {¶ 26} ... However, when a child consistently expresses a desire to be with a parent, then a juvenile court should investigate, giving due regard to the child's maturity and understanding of the proceedings, and make a ruling about whether an attorney should be appointed to represent the child's interest and expressed wishes. {¶ 27} The record is replete with evidence that Malcolm wanted to be with appellant. Nevertheless, the guardian ad litem recommended that the motion for permanent custody be granted. The trial court erred by not at least considering Malcolm's level of maturity and whether Malcolm's repeated desire for reunification required the appointment of counsel to represent his interests and then ruling on the issue.

A child's expressed desire concerning custody is one best-interest factor and does not by itself determine whether permanent custody should be granted or denied.

In the Matter of McKinley, Unpublished Decision (6-9-2003) · filed 2003-06-09(D)(2)

However, the child's desire is not the sole factor to consider. Rather, it is just one of four factors in R.C. 2151.414 (D) that guide courts in determining the best interest of the child. Therefore, when considering that factor in light of all the evidence presented, it is clear that the child's wishes are not determinative of whether a motion for permanent custody should be granted or denied.

A child's wish to reunite with a parent cannot alone determine best interests when the other statutory factors support permanent custody.

In Re Lattimer, Unpublished Decision (7-14-2003) · filed 2003-07-14(D)(2)

It is natural and expected that the Huffman children would miss and want to reunite with their parents. But this alone cannot be the sole basis on which to determine the best interest of the children. The trial court judge did consider the wishes of the children, however, the other factors present in this case clearly support the trial court's decision.