Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414

Section 2151.414(E)(1) supports a reasonable-time placement finding when offered services have failed to substantially remedy the conditions that brought the children into agency care.

In re W.M. · filed 2017-04-14(E)(1)

Following our review of the record, we conclude that competent and credible evidence supported the magistrate’s finding that the services offered to the family had failed to remedy the issues that brought the children into the care of HCJFS, and that the children could not and should not be placed with a parent … within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) focuses on whether a parent substantially remedied the conditions that caused removal, not merely whether the parent adhered to a case plan.

In re T/R/E/M Children · filed 2019-04-17(E)(1)

While Mother asserts that she did everything asked of her under the case plan, R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) concerns itself not with adherence to a case plan, but with the parents’ ability to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed from their home in the first place.

A parent who engages only sporadically in mental-health and parenting services and does not apply learned parenting skills may be found to have failed continuously and repeatedly to remedy the conditions causing removal.

In re X.H. · filed 2022-03-16(E)(1)

This Court concludes that CSB proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal. See R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). ... Mother engaged sporadically in mental health therapy. She refused to allow her assigned parenting education behavioral health specialist into her home. ... While Mother could recite the textbook answers when questioned regarding appropriate parenting behaviors, the behavioral specialist testified the Mother never demonstrated that she understood how to apply those skills during interactions with the children.

Section 2151.414(E)(1)'s failure-to-remedy factor was satisfied where a mother received reunification services for more than two years but did not consistently use them or progress on any case-plan goal.

In re M.C. · filed 2024-02-28(E)(1)

The evidence CSB presented at the permanent custody hearing clearly established that Mother had not substantially remedied the parenting problems that caused her children to be removed and remain placed outside her home. ... By the time of the hearing, Mother had been provided with reunification services for more than two years but had failed to consistently avail herself of those services and had not made progress on any of the reunification goals of the case plan.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires an agency seeking permanent custody to develop a reasonable case plan and use diligent efforts to help a parent remedy the conditions that led to the child's removal.

In Re Conklin, Unpublished Decision (10-16-2000) · filed 2000-10-16(E)(1)

Before granting permanent custody, R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) requires an agency to develop a reasonable case plan and to use diligent efforts to assist the parent to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires reasonable case planning and diligent agency efforts to remedy the problems that initially caused removal; it does not impose a separate good-faith standard.

In the Matter of Shchigelski, Unpublished Decision (10-20-2000) · filed 2000-10-20(E)(1)

While a requirement of a good faith effort has been implied from the applicable statutes, technically, the applicable standard requires the DHS to exercise reasonable case planning and to make diligent efforts to remedy the problems that initially caused the removal of the child from the home.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires reasonable case planning and diligent agency efforts to help parents remedy the problems that caused a child’s removal, but does not require the agency to do everything it could have done.

In Re La'nece Hughley, Unpublished Decision (10-26-2000) · filed 2000-10-26(E)(1)

The agency must undertake "* * * reasonable case planning and diligent efforts * * * to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home * * *." R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1). The issue is not whether the agency could have done more, but whether it did enough to satisfy the reasonableness standard under the statute. ... Given these circumstances, we cannot say the agency failed to make reasonable efforts to assist mother in meeting the special needs of her children, when mother's own needs required her primary focus.

An agency's failure to supply financial assistance for domestic-violence counseling does not excuse a parent's separate failures to complete parenting classes and maintain steady employment and housing under section 2151.414(E)(1).

In Re Davis Children, Unpublished Decision (1-22-2001) · filed 2001-01-22(E)(1)

However, while such may be the case, appellee cannot be faulted for appellant's failure to successfully complete Goodwill parenting classes, to maintain steady employment, and to maintain stable housing.

A permanent-custody complaint alleging lack of parental commitment under Section 2151.414(E)(4) does not require a case plan as a prerequisite to relief on that ground.

In Re Anderson, Unpublished Decision (3-22-2001) · filed 2001-03-22(E)(4)

Because the agency's complaint also alleged grounds for permanent custody under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4) that the mother had failed or refused to provide basic necessities, regular support, visit, or communicate with the children when able to do so, or by other actions had shown an unwillingness to provide a permanent home for the children no case plan was necessary.

A finding under section 2151.414(E)(1) requires a case plan and time to remedy the conditions causing removal, while the other subsection (E) factors do not impose those requirements.

In Re Wingo · filed 2001-06-01(E)(1)

When R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) forms the basis for the court's finding, the agency must have provided a case plan and time to remedy the situation that led to the removal of the children from the household. However, the other factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 (E) do not require application of a case plan nor time to remedy the situation.

Section 2151.414 does not expressly require a finding of good-faith reunification efforts, though agency efforts may be relevant in deciding whether permanent custody is appropriate.

In the Matter of Rudolph, Unpublished Decision (6-19-2001) · filed 2001-06-19(E)

A plain reading of R.C. 2151.414 reveals no language explicitly requiring a trial court to make a finding that an agency such as FCCS demonstrate a "good faith effort" toward reunification. We agree with appellees, however, that notwithstanding the absence of such express language, FCCS's efforts to reunify the family can be a relevant factor to be considered in determining whether PCC is appropriate in some cases. ... Given the facts of this case, after appellant pled guilty and was sentenced to prison for four years, continued efforts aimed at reunification could have been deemed futile.

A reasonable-efforts determination is not a prerequisite to an award of permanent custody under section 2151.414.

In Re Cook a Dependent Child, Unpublished Decision (2-27-2003) · filed 2003-02-27

Although an agency in temporary custody of a child generally bears a duty to employ diligent efforts toward family reunification, agencies may be relieved of that duty under several circumstances, and a determination as to whether the agency made reasonable efforts is not necessary for an award of permanent custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 .

The reasonable-and-diligent-efforts inquiry asks whether the agency's case planning and reunification efforts were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances, not whether the agency could have done more.

In Re Leveck, Unpublished Decision (3-18-2003) · filed 2003-03-18(E)(1)

Nevertheless, the issue is not whether there was anything more that CPSU could have done, but whether the agency's case planning and efforts were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances of this case.

The agency's reunification efforts satisfy subsection (E)(1)'s reasonableness standard when it does enough to assist the parent, even if more services theoretically could have been offered.

In Re Howard, Unpublished Decision (10-24-2002) · filed 2002-10-24(E)(1)

{¶ 10} Given the complaint filed in this case, the agency was required to prove that, with the ultimate goal of reuniting the family, it made diligent efforts to remedy the problems that initially caused the removal of the child from the home. ... When considering the extent to which the county tried to reunite Howard and her children, the court is to consider "parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and rehabiliative services and material resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental duties." See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1). ... "The issue is not whether the agency could have done more, but whether it did enough to satisfy the reasonableness standard under the statute." ... {¶ 12} The total number of referrals made convinces us that the county did make a good faith effort to assist Howard in implementing the case plan. All of the case plan goals were designed to ensure that Howard could safely resume her parenting duties, and there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the county acted with anything less than good faith.

Section 2151.414(C) prevents a court from denying permanent custody solely because an agency failed to implement a particular aspect of the child's case plan, so the statutory scheme requires reasonable rather than flawless case planning.

In Re Willis, Unpublished Decision (12-10-2002) · filed 2002-12-10(C)

Ohio's statutory scheme for permanent custody matters calls for reasonable, not flawless, case planning, and R.C. 2151.414 (C) mandates that "[t]he court shall not deny an agency's motion for permanent custody solely because the agency failed to implement any particular aspect of the child's case plan."

Reasonable case planning and diligent reunification efforts are necessary to sustain a failure-to-remedy finding under division (E)(1), but not a permanent-custody finding based on another division (E) factor such as extended parental incarceration under division (E)(12).

In Re T.K., Unpublished Decision (5-21-2003) · filed 2003-05-21(E)(1), (E)(12)

The agency does not have that same obligation, however, when custody is terminated due to one of the other factors under R.C. 2151.414 (E). ... Pipher's parental rights were terminated because he is currently incarcerated, has been throughout T.K.'s lifetime, and will continue to be incarcerated for several more years.

The agency made diligent efforts to help remedy the conditions causing removal by facilitating the mother's placement in two residential treatment programs, where her own misconduct prevented completion.

In Re Raisor, Unpublished Decision (7-2-2003) · filed 2003-07-02(E)(1)

The record indicates that the department facilitated Raisor's placement in two different residential treatment programs but that it was Raisor's misconduct that led to her failure to complete them.

An agency had no further obligation to provide reunification services during a parent's incarceration where it had already provided extensive services and invited the parent to report qualifying prison programs.

In Re Vance, Unpublished Decision (12-22-2003) · filed 2003-12-22(E)(1)

Given the significant involvement with CPSU both prior to the children's removal and thereafter, Kelli's demonstrated lack of commitment to using the resources offered to her by CPSU, her refusal to consistently put into action the parenting education provided to her, her continuous criminal activity, and the opportunity given to her to inform her caseworker about any programs in which she was involved while incarcerated and to provide information about the nature of these programs, CPSU had no further obligation to provide services to Kelli while she was incarcerated.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) cannot support permanent custody as an initial disposition unless the agency gives the parent a reunification case plan and time to remedy the conditions that caused removal in the current proceeding.

In re B.S. · filed 2018-11-09(E)(1)

In the case sub judice, the trial court incorrectly determined that R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) applied. The agency sought permanent custody as the initial disposition, but it did not develop a case plan aimed at reunification and did not give the mother time to correct the situation that led PCCSB to remove the children from the grandparents’ legal custody.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) permits permanent custody before a child has spent twelve consecutive months in agency custody when it serves the child's best interest and the child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In Re M.L., Unpublished Decision (11-9-2006) · filed 2006-11-09(B)(1)(a)

Because CCDCFS did not have custody of the child for a consecutive twelve months, in addition to determining the child's best interest, the court also had to determine whether the child could be placed with the father within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(A) requires the trial court to conduct the specified hearing before terminating parental rights and awarding permanent custody to an agency.

In Re Redrick Children, Unpublished Decision (10-30-2000) · filed 2000-10-30(A)

In both of those cases, we held that "* * * based upon a reading of R.C. 2151.414 , a trial court must conduct the hearing provided for in section (A) of the statute before it can terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to the Agency." Lewis at 2, citing Wallace at 5.

When an agency holding temporary custody files for permanent custody, the court must schedule a hearing and provide notice of it.

In re G.S. · filed 2025-08-15(A)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) mandates the trial court schedule a hearing and provide notice thereof when a motion for permanent custody of a child is filed by a public children services agency or private child placing agency that has temporary custody of the child or has placed the child in long term foster care. The trial court satisfied this mandate.

A parent's denial of serious abuse and refusal even to begin the case plan can establish both failure to remedy the causes of removal under § 2151.414(E)(1) and a high likelihood of recurring abuse under subsection (E)(16).

In Re C.F., Unpublished Decision (8-22-2002) · filed 2002-08-22(D), (E)(1), (E)(16)

We conclude it was not error for the judge to find that, by clear and convincing evidence, the children should not be placed with their mother because she failed to remedy the problems causing their removal and failed to even begin, much less complete, her assigned case plan. ... Additionally, under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(16), it was not error to find that, considering her denial of a problem and effort to remedy it, the likelihood of recurrence of abuse to Ch, or any of his siblings, was high.

A court deciding whether a child can be placed with a parent must consider all relevant evidence, including the parent's pattern of conduct.

In re L.G. · filed 2026-02-09(E)(1)

A court must consider “all relevant evidence” when determining if a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable period of time. ... Under R.C. 2151.414, the court is required to look at all relevant evidence, including a parent’s pattern of conduct.

In deciding whether a child can or should be placed with a parent, the court must consider all relevant evidence.

In re A.W. · filed 2026-06-24(E)

A court must, according to R.C. 2151.414(E), consider “all relevant evidence” when determining if a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time period.

Section 2151.414(E)(15) does not require likely recurring abuse when the seriousness or nature of the existing abuse itself makes placement with the parent a threat to the child's safety.

In Re Baby Girl Doe · filed 2002-08-30(E)(15)

However, R.C. 2151.414(E)(15) also provides that a finding that a child cannot or should not be reunified with the parents is to be made if the trial court determines that the seriousness or nature of the abuse or neglect makes placement with the parents a threat to the child’s safety. In regard to Natalie, given where and in what condition the baby was found, this court cannot find that the trial court erred in its reliance upon R.C. 2151.414(E)(15).

Expert testimony that a child's fracture was inconsistent with an accidental fall, conflicting caregiver accounts, and a child-endangering conviction supported treating the injury as abuse rather than accident under Section 2151.414(E)(15).

In re Na.S. · filed 2015-10-28(E)(15)

Given the expert testimony outlined above, the conflicting versions of the incident provided to detective Hahn by P.K. and T.K., and T.K.’s subsequent conviction ... for attempted child endangering, we find no merit to counsel’s proposed argument that the incident was merely an accident.

When a guardian ad litem's report will factor into a permanent-custody decision, the parties have a due-process right to cross-examine the guardian about the report and the basis for the recommendation, notwithstanding subsection (C).

In re Hoffman · filed 2002-10-23(C)

{¶25} Due process necessitates that appellee should have had the right to cross-examine the guardian ad litem, since the trial court relied upon the report. As such, notwithstanding R.C. 2151.414(C), we hold that in a permanent custody proceeding in which the guardian ad litem’s report will be a factor in the trial court’s decision, parties to the proceeding have the right to cross-examine the guardian ad litem concerning the contents of the report and the basis for a custody recommendation. Without these safeguards, there are no measures to ensure the accuracy of the information provided and the credibility of those who made statements.

Despite subsection (C), due process gives parties the right to cross-examine the guardian ad litem when the report will be a factor in the permanent-custody decision.

In Re Dunikowski, Unpublished Decision (12-11-2002) · filed 2002-12-11(C)

As such, notwithstanding R.C. 2151.414 (C), we hold that in a permanent custody proceeding in which the guardian ad litem's report will be a factor in the trial court's decision, parties to the proceeding have the right to cross-examine the guardian ad litem concerning the contents of the report and the basis for a custody recommendation.

Subsection (C) requires the guardian ad litem's report to be submitted to the court, but does not require filing it with the clerk.

In Re R.K., Unpublished Decision (11-26-2003) · filed 2003-11-26(C)

R.C. 2151.414 (C) does not require that the guardian ad litem's report be filed with the court's clerk, only that the report be submitted.

A party waives a guardian ad litem's failure to provide the written report required by subsection (C) by not objecting at the permanent-custody hearing.

In Re R.C., Unpublished Decision (12-24-2003) · filed 2003-12-24(C)

This court has historically held the failure of a guardian ad litem to adhere to the requirement of R.C. 2151.414 (C) is waived unless raised at the trial court level.

Section 2151.414(C) permits a court to consider a guardian ad litem's written report, including hearsay in the report, when the guardian is available for direct and cross-examination.

In Re Sherman, Unpublished Decision (11-7-2005) · filed 2005-11-07(C)

The GAL's recommendation is contained within a written report, which "shall be submitted to the court * * * but shall not be submitted under oath." R.C. 2151.414 (C). ... In order to protect the parties' due process rights, the trial court must make the guardian ad litem available for direct and cross-examination. ... Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the GAL report because the guardian was available for cross-examination by both parties.

A parent's involuntary-manslaughter conviction involving the child's sibling, coupled with an ongoing danger finding, satisfies subsection (E)(6), while a prior involuntary termination of the other parent's rights to a sibling satisfies subsection (E)(11).

In the Matter of Miriah W., Unpublished Decision (11-22-2002) · filed 2002-11-22(E)(6), (E)(11)

{¶ 15} In the case before us, the evidence showed and the trial court found that appellant father had pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and that the victim was Miriah's brother. The trial court found that appellant father poses an ongoing danger to Miriah. The conditions of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(6) therefore were met and the trial court clearly was justified in basing its decision in part on appellant father's prior conviction for the involuntary manslaughter of Miriah's brother. {¶ 16} Further, as to appellant mother, the trial court found that her parental rights were involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of Miriah. See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11). Based on those two findings, which were supported by clear and convincing evidence, we find appellants' first claim without merit.

Once a qualifying conviction under section 2151.414(E)(7) applies, the court must find that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

In the Matter of Goff, Unpublished Decision (11-14-2003) · filed 2003-11-14(E)(7)

As such, the court was required to, "enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent[.]" R.C. 2151.414 (E).

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(e) permits a court determining a child’s best interest to consider the parent’s convictions listed in (E)(7)-(9) regardless of how much time has elapsed since the offenses.

In re T.C. · filed 2012-05-24(D)(1)(e), (E)(7)-(9)

Also, the father’s past violent history with T.C.’s brother cannot be ignored. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) refers to factors listed under (E)(7)-(9) in considering the best interest of the child. These sections include convictions for felonious assault, domestic violence, or child endangerment regarding the child or sibling. Although the father contends his convictions were committed five years ago, the statute does not indicated that these offenses cannot be considered after a certain amount of time has elapsed.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) makes a parent's prior involuntary loss of parental rights to the child's siblings a predicate for finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with that parent.

In re S.C. · filed 2012-07-17(E)(11)

R.C. 2151.414(E) sets forth a list of 16 possible predicate findings. One of those findings must be established prior to a judicial conclusion that a child cannot or should not be placed with the child's parent. R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) states that, in determining whether a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with a parent, the court shall determine if the following exists: “The parent has had parental rights involuntary terminated pursuant to section or sections 2151.343 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code with respect to a sibling of the child.” R.C.2151.414(E)(11). ... As stated above, the parental rights as to the Parents’ eight prior children have been involuntarily terminated. The children are siblings of S.C. ... The trial court’s findings that the child could not be placed with the Parents within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents and that the best interests of the child would be served by granting permanent custody to TCJFS were supported by clear and convincing evidence.

R.C. 2151.414(D) does not disqualify a parent from legal custody merely because she previously committed robbery and carried a concealed weapon, although those offenses remain highly relevant to the child's best interest.

In re H.A.I. · filed 2012-08-23(D)

Also, these offenses, though extremely relevant to the consideration of the best interest of the child, do not disqualify the mother from having legal custody of her daughter pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D).

A parent whose rights to a sibling were previously terminated must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent can provide the child a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re S.B. · filed 2025-07-31(E)(11)

Further, because Mother has had her parental rights terminated in respect to several of S.B.’s siblings, Mother was required to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that “notwithstanding the prior termination, [she] can provide a legally secure placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of [S.B.].”

Proof of an involuntary termination concerning a sibling shifts the burden to the parent to prove by clear and convincing evidence an ability to provide a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re E.W. · filed 2025-11-06(E)(11)

Upon such a showing, the burden shifted to Mother “to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that he or she can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.” ... Mother did not demonstrate her ability to provide a legally secure permanent placement or adequate care for E.W.

Abandonment and prior involuntary terminations weighed in favor of permanent custody where the parents failed to prove they could now provide a legally secure home.

In re P.B. · filed 2026-05-13(E)(10) and (11)

Both parents abandoned P.B. by failing to visit or maintain contact with him for a period of more than 90 days. ... In addition, both parents had their parental rights involuntarily terminated with regard to at least one sibling of the child, and they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, notwithstanding those prior terminations, they can now provide a legally secure permanent home for the child.

A prior involuntary termination shifts the burden to the parent to rebut presumed unfitness with clear and convincing evidence of a current ability to provide a safe and stable home.

In re M.D. · filed 2026-05-26(E)(11)

The factor set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) applied in this case because Mother’s parental rights to her fourth child were involuntarily terminated before M.D. was born. ... Mother previously had her parental rights involuntarily terminated to her fourth child and failed to present clear and convincing evidence that, despite that prior termination, she was then able to provide M.D. with a safe and stable home.

A prior involuntary termination shifts to the parent the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence an ability to provide a legally secure placement and adequate care.

In re D.D. · filed 2026-05-28(E)(11)

Because Mother previously had her “parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling” of the children, Mother had the burden under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, notwithstanding the prior termination, she could “provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety” of the children. ... The record supports the juvenile court’s determination that Mother failed to meet her burden.

A parent's prior sex-offense conviction and both parents' prior involuntary terminations are proper factors in the permanent-custody best-interest analysis.

In re R.E.A. · filed 2026-06-25(D)(1)(e)

We conclude that each of these findings were supported by the evidence presented at trial.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) may support permanent custody at the initial disposition only if the agency made reasonable reunification efforts after removal by giving the parent a case plan and an opportunity to remedy the removal conditions, although erroneous reliance is harmless when another division (E) factor independently supports the placement finding.

In the Matter of Nibert, Unpublished Decision (1-22-2004) · filed 2004-01-22(E)(1)

In the present case, the trial court found that R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) and (4) existed so as to mandate a finding that Mary could not be placed with her mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her mother. However, we conclude the court erred in relying on R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) to support its finding. Where R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) serves as the basis for granting permanent custody as the initial disposition, the agency has a duty to exercise reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and child after the child's removal from the home. ... Thus, the agency must have given the parent a case plan and an opportunity to remedy the situation that initially caused the child's removal. Ward ; Lewis. Here, GCCS made no effort to reunite Mrs. Nibert and Mary after March 2003. Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it based its finding on R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1). However, the error is harmless because there is competent, credible evidence to support the trial court's finding that R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4) exists.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) does not require an agency to prove that it made reasonable and diligent reunification efforts; it addresses those efforts only in evaluating a parent's failure to remedy the conditions that caused removal.

In Matter of Moses, 2007 Ap 08 0052 (12-11-2007) · filed 2007-12-11(E)(1)

"[Although R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) does refer to `reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency[,]' it addresses those efforts within the context of the parent's failure to remedy the circumstances causing the child's removal from the home. `R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) places no duty on the agency to prove that it exerted reasonable and diligent efforts toward reunification."

Despite the amendment to subsection (A), an agency must still make a good-faith effort to reunify the parent and child.

In Re A.B., 22351 (3-14-2008) · filed 2008-03-14(A)

We have held, despite the amendment to R.C. 2151.414 (A), that the agency must still make a good faith effort to reunify parent and child. ... The agency, for its part, had made a good-faith effort to help A.F. meet her parenting responsibilities for A.B.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires reasonable case planning and diligent efforts to help the parent and prevent the child's removal when the court relies on that factor, but does not require a reasonable-efforts finding on every permanent-custody motion.

In Re T.B., 2008-L-055 (8-29-2008) · filed 2008-08-29(E)(1)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1), Job and Family Services is required to conduct reasonable case planning and use diligent efforts to assist the parent and prevent the child from being removed from the home. Thus, "[a]t various stages of the child-custody proceeding, [Job and Family Services] may be required * * * to prove that it has made reasonable efforts toward family reunification. To the extent that the trial court relies on R.C. 2141.414(E)(1) at a permanency hearing, the court must examine the `reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the parents' when considering whether the child cannot or should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time. However, the procedures in R.C. 2151.414 do not mandate that the court make a determination whether reasonable efforts have been made in every R.C. 2151.413 motion for permanent custody."

Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires an agency to prove that it engaged in reasonable case planning and made diligent efforts to help the parents remedy the problems that caused the child's removal.

In re G.P. · filed 2013-08-16(E)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) requires proof that DCDJFS engaged in reasonable case planning and made diligent efforts to assist the parents in remedying the problems which caused the removal of the children.

Overlapping treatment requirements from different courts do not defeat the agency's reasonable efforts when the parent had sufficient time to complete the case-plan services but failed to pursue them diligently.

In re I.P. · filed 2015-09-30(E)(1)

Although there were scheduling issues in beginning treatment following her assault conviction, and complications caused by the overlap in services required of her by LCCS, the drug court, and the common pleas court, B.P. had sufficient time in which to complete the case plan services had she been diligent. The consequences of failing to complete the case plan were made clear to B.P. by her caseworker.

An agency is not at fault for failing to complete an interstate home study when the out-of-state parent does not want the study performed and says the home lacks room for the children.

In re C.O. · filed 2015-10-16(E)(1)

An agency cannot be faulted for failing to force a home study on a party who does not want the study to be done.

When a juvenile court relies on Section 2151.414(E)(1), it must examine the agency's reasonable case planning and diligent efforts to help the parent remedy the conditions preventing placement.

In re E.F. · filed 2017-09-06(E)(1)

Further, where, as here, the juvenile court relies on R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) to support an award of permanent custody to the agency, the court must examine the “reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents” when considering whether the child cannot be placed with the parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents. See id.; R.C. 2151.414(E)(1).

Section 2151.414(E)(1)'s reasonable-efforts inquiry asks whether the agency did enough to satisfy a reasonableness standard, not whether it could have done more.

In re D.R. · filed 2018-02-09(E)(1)

The issue in a reasonable-efforts determination is not whether the agency could have done more, but whether it did enough to satisfy the reasonableness standard in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). In re A.B., 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-12-1069 and L-12-1081, 2012-Ohio-4632, ¶ 25. “A ‘reasonable effort’ is an ‘honest, purposeful effort, free of malice and the design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.’” Id., quoting In re Weaver, 79 Ohio App.3d 59, 63, 606 N.E.2d 1011 (12th Dist.1992).

Section 2151.414(E)(1)'s reasonable-efforts inquiry asks whether the agency did enough to satisfy a reasonableness standard, not whether it could have done more.

In re C.P. · filed 2018-07-13(E)(1)

The issue in a reasonable-efforts determination is not whether the agency could have done more, but whether it did enough to satisfy the reasonableness standard in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). In re A.B., 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-12-1069 and L-12-1081, 2012-Ohio-4632, ¶ 25. “A ‘reasonable effort’ is an ‘honest, purposeful effort, free of malice and the design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.’” Id., quoting In re Weaver, 79 Ohio App.3d 59, 63, 606 N.E.2d 1011 (12th Dist.1992).

Section 2151.414(E)(1)'s reasonable and diligent case-planning requirement is satisfied by sustained agency efforts to provide a parent opportunities to establish parental fitness within a reasonable time.

In re J.K. · filed 2018-11-20(E)(1)

We note that the record reflects compliance with R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) reasonable and diligent case plan effort requirements occurring within the requisite reasonable timeframe. Specifically, the record reflects that appellee attempted over the course of several years to work with appellant in numerous ways in an effort to give appellant the ability to establish his fitness as a parent, if appellant chose to do so.

When a trial court relies on subsection (E)(1), it must examine whether the agency’s case planning and efforts to assist the parents were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances.

In re L.J.R. · filed 2022-09-27(E)(1)

While the agency did not have to show reasonable efforts at the permanent custody hearing, to the extent that the trial court relied on R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) at the permanent custody hearing, the court must examine the reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents when considering whether the child cannot and should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time. In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 852 N.E.2d 816. The issue is not whether there was anything more the agency could have done, but whether the agency's case planning and efforts were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances of the case. In re J.D., 3rd Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-10-34, 2011-Ohio-1458.

Subsection (E)(1)’s reasonable-efforts inquiry asks whether the agency’s planning and efforts were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances, not whether it could have done more.

In re M.K. · filed 2023-01-12(E)(1)

The issue is not whether there was anything more the agency could have done, but whether the agency's case planning and efforts were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances of the case.

Section 2151.414 does not require a reasonable-efforts determination on every permanent-custody motion, but reliance on subsection (E)(1) requires the court to examine the agency's reasonable case planning and diligent efforts to assist the parents.

In re B.P. · filed 2023-04-27(E)(1)

To the extent that the trial court relies on R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) at a permanency hearing, the court must examine the “reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents” when considering whether the child cannot or should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time. However, the procedures in R.C. 2151.414 do not mandate that the court make a determination whether reasonable efforts have been made in every R.C. 2151.413 motion for permanent custody.

Because section 2151.414(D)(1)'s best-interest factors are nonexclusive, a court may reconsider the agency's reunification efforts as an additional relevant factor and is not bound by reasonable-efforts findings made earlier in the case.

In re B.F. · filed 2023-11-20(D)(1)

We find that the trial court was permitted to reconsider reasonable efforts as part of its best-interest analysis, and it was not bound by its previous reasonable-efforts findings made over the duration of the case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Sections 2151.414(C) and (D)(4) make the child's need for a legally secure, stable placement paramount and prohibit considering the effect of permanent custody on a parent, so the availability of legal custody with a caregiver does not preclude permanent custody to facilitate adoption.

In the Matter of Kierra D., Unpublished Decision (1-22-2004) · filed 2004-01-22(C), (D)(4)

According to R.C. 2151.414 (D), the court is allowed to consider, among other things, the child's relationship with relatives and her caregiver, the "custodial history" of the child, and the child's need for a "legally secure placement." ... The court is correct that the statute forbids the court from considering "the effect the granting of permanent custody to the agency would have upon any parent of the child." R.C. 2151.414 (C). The needs of the child are paramount. In this case, though granting legal custody to Kiffany was a possibility, the court apparently believed that granting permanent custody to LCCS to facilitate Kiffany's adoption of Kierra was the better choice. Kierra has lived with Kiffany much of her life, and Kiffany has cared for her and provided for her. For the sake of stability, permanency, and consistency, the trial court was correct in making that placement legally secure. It is unclear what sort of inconsistency and upheaval could occur in the future if this placement were not made permanent. We find that the court's conclusion that a grant of permanent custody to the agency is in Kierra's best interests is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Under division (D), a child's ability to feed and bathe herself does not establish that returning her to a home with known felons serves her need for a legally secure permanent placement.

In Re Jones, Unpublished Decision (6-29-2006) · filed 2006-06-29(D)

In the case sub judice, appellant argues the best interest factors, under R.C. 2151.414 (D), establish that the two younger children, Opel and Alexis, should be returned to her custody. The factors a juvenile court is to consider when making a best interest determination are as follows: ... "(4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; ... Although at nine years of age Mercedes may be able to feed and bathe herself, there is no competent and credible evidence in the record that Mercedes would be able to protect herself from the known felons that appellant has residing in her residence. Further, there was no evidence in the record that appellant intended to stop residing with known felons. ... Based upon the above, we find the trial court's decision to deny GCCSB's motion for permanent custody, as to Mercedes Jones, is against the manifest weight of the evidence and is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 2151.414(D)(4) requires a juvenile court assessing a child's best interests to consider the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether it can be achieved without permanent custody; the court need not expressly discuss a planned permanent living arrangement when it finds that no alternative to permanent custody exists.

In Re A.T., Unpublished Decision (8-2-2006) · filed 2006-08-02(D)(4)

As part of its best interest determination, it is true that the juvenile court is obligated to consider "[t]he child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency." R.C. 2151.414 (D)(4). In the present case, the trial court specifically found that "[n]o alternatives to permanent custody exist to assure the minor children a safe, secure permanent placement." In so doing, the trial court, implicitly determined that alternative dispositions, such as PPLA, were not appropriate. The failure of the trial court to mention PPLA in its decision, does not mean that the trial court did not consider that as an option, nor does it constitute error.

Section 2151.414(D) requires the court to consider the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that placement can be achieved without granting permanent custody.

In Re Graham · filed 2006-06-23(D)

We agree with the trial court that the children were in need of a legally secure placement and that that type of placement could not be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to HCJFS.

Section 2151.414(D)(4) makes the availability of a legally secure placement without permanent custody one component of the best-interest balancing test, but does not require the agency to investigate every known relative who has not expressed interest in caring for the child.

In Re C.W., Unpublished Decision (10-30-2006) · filed 2006-10-30(D)(4)

When determining whether a grant of permanent custody is in the child's best interest, the juvenile court must consider several factors, including "[t]he child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency[.]" R.C. 2151.414 (D)(4). ... Mother cites no authority, and this Court knows of none, that requires an agency to prove that it investigated and ruled out potential placement of the child with every known relative, including those who have not approached the agency to express an interest in caring for the child. ... Moreover, even if Mother could raise a successful challenge to the evidence on this best interest factor, this Court must stress that no one best interest factor is controlling. Rather, the best interest test is a balancing test.

Section 2151.414(D)(4) permits a court assessing best interest to consider the harm caused by an impermanent living situation and repeated placement changes.

In re C.B. · filed 2012-06-18(D)(4)

In contrast, there was ample evidence presented at the permanent custody hearing demonstrating that the lack of permanency in the children’s living situation and the constant roller coaster of being shuffled from one person’s home to another, which was done at Latoya’s and James’ requests, were beginning to have a detrimental effect on them. See R.C. 2151.414(D)(4). ... Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that the determinations of the magistrate and the trial court that it is in the best interest of the children to grant permanent custody to the Agency were supported by clear and convincing evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Under subsection (D)(1)(d), a prior planned permanent living arrangement does not preclude a later finding that permanent custody is needed, and unchanged circumstances may strengthen the basis for finding that children need a legally secure permanent placement.

In re B.E.S. · filed 2014-02-03(D)(1)(d)

The judgment was neither premised upon appellant’s deviation or disregard of his case plan nor was it based upon appellant’s lack of interest in the children. Rather, it was premised upon appellant’s inability to provide proper and stable care for children with specialized needs; i.e., it was based upon the children’s best interests. That the circumstances had not changed since the children were placed into the PPLA, arguably provides a stronger foundation for the trial court’s judgment regarding the children’s need for a legally secure, permanent placement. ... Further, the children were in the temporary custody of a state agency for three years from the inception of the case through the final order of termination. A significant period of time when, as here, the children require a stable, permanent living arrangement. Viewing these points together, we hold that the magistrate’s decision that granting permanent custody to TCCSB is not against the weight of the evidence.

Under subsection (D)(1)(d), a parent's home is not a legally secure permanent placement when the parent continues using drugs and refuses recommended treatment.

In re R.S. · filed 2013-12-11(D)(1)(d)

With respect to the child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that placement can be achieved without granting HCCS permanent custody, the evidence shows that appellant has a history of drug use and has refused the treatment recommended pursuant to her case plan. Her drug use and refusal to obtain appropriate treatment renders her unable to provide the child with a legally secure permanent placement. She may have a home, but unless appellant stops using drugs, that home is not legally secure. No evidence was presented that the child could be placed in another legally secure permanent placement without granting HCCS permanent custody.

The legally secure placement factor supports permanent custody when a parent has completed parenting classes and visited regularly but otherwise did little to remedy the circumstances preventing custody and is unlikely to become able to assume custody in the near future.

In re R.E. · filed 2014-06-02(D)(1)(d)

Although the father completed a parenting class as required by the case plan and visited R.E. regularly, he did little else to remedy his circumstances in the 18 months following the child's removal. ... The father is not in a position to take custody of R.E., nor does it appear from the record that he will be in a position to do so in the near future. ... Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's decision to grant permanent custody of R.E. to the agency.

The legally-secure-placement factor favors permanent custody when a parent's untreated mental-health issues, unstable housing, failed drug screens, unsafe relationship with a child, and disregard of another child's medical needs show the parent cannot provide a secure placement while adoptive foster families can.

In re G.F. · filed 2014-06-16(D)(1)(d)

We agree with the juvenile court that based on appellant's own mental health issues and failure to consistently seek treatment, her inability to maintain stable housing, her failure in numerous drug screenings, her relationship with A.R. and apparent indifference to protect A.R. from future abuse, and her disregard for T.F.'s medical condition, she is unable to provide a legally secure permanent placement. Conversely, the foster families, having bonded with the children and expressed a willingness to adopt them and facilitate contact between the children, will provide legally secure permanent placement for the children. ... In light of the foregoing, having found that the juvenile court's decision was in the best interests of the children and supported by the manifest weight of the evidence, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.

A relative who neither files for legal custody nor completes a home study, and whose home is crowded and in foreclosure, need not be treated as an available legally secure placement under Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d).

In re Z.C. · filed 2014-07-28(D)(1)(d)

Finally, although appellant argues permanent custody should not have been granted because the grandmother is an appropriate placement, we find the court's decision to the contrary is supported by the evidence. The grandmother failed to file a motion for legal custody or to have a home study completed. She is living in a home with several other people and multiple pets. In addition, the grandmother does not have any proprietary rights to the home which is in foreclosure. We find no error in the trial court's determination on this issue.

The legally secure placement factor supports permanent custody when a parent has never had custody and has not shown an ability to care for the child's autism and special needs.

In re E.G. · filed 2014-05-12(D)(1)(d)

Father has never had custody of the child and has not established that he can care for E.G.'s autism and special needs.

The legally secure placement factor supports permanent custody when parents remain unable after more than two years to overcome addiction, incarceration, unemployment, and unstable housing sufficiently to provide a stable home in the near future.

In re D.F. · filed 2014-09-18(D)(1)(d)

Thus, the children could not achieve the secure, permanent placement they need without granting custody to appellee.

Stable housing and income do not overcome the legally secure placement factor when a parent has not addressed significant ongoing substance abuse or learned to meet the child's specialized medical-care needs.

In re L.W. · filed 2014-10-10(D)(1)(d)

Specifically, the record establishes that while Mother maintained stable housing and income, she has a significant, ongoing substance abuse problem that she failed to properly address. Mother admitted to taking Vicodin, a powerful pain medication, without a prescription, and she relapsed into drug use numerous times during her treatment. As a result, Mother has failed to complete drug and alcohol treatment at Project Cure. Lastly, Mother failed to attend any of the educational classes designed to help her address L.W.’s medical care which was necessary due to his opiate addiction at birth.

The legally secure placement factor favors permanent custody when additional reunification time produces no stable home or visitation and the children's need for stability grows as foster care continues.

In re M.C. · filed 2014-10-13(D)(1)(d)

However, even given more time, appellant failed to establish that the children could be returned to her home and instead, the children's need for stability increased as further time in foster care passed. Appellant failed to visit, evidencing an indifference to the emotional needs of the children where the relationship with their parents was concerned. In addition, the family moved several times, and as mentioned by the trial court failed to establish a safe home environment for the children.

The legally-secure-placement factor may favor permanent custody when repeated instruction and agency support have not enabled a parent to understand and provide for a child's developmental, nutritional, and emotional needs.

In re M.B. · filed 2014-11-10(D)(1)(d)

There was also substantial, credible evidence that appellant was unable to understand and provide for the child's developmental, nutritional and emotional needs, despite repeated instruction and support by the agency. Although appellant argues that her daughter is older and there is less of a need to understand cues to the child's needs, the evidence shows appellant was unable to even properly care for an older child in basic areas like hygiene, education and nutrition. Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.

The legally-secure-placement factor supports permanent custody when that disposition is the only way to achieve a legally secure permanent placement in the child's best interests.

In re M.H. · filed 2014-12-15(D)(1)(d)

Consequently, the trial court reasonably concluded that a legally secure permanent placement would only be achieved by placing the children in the permanent custody of CSB and that such a disposition was in the children’s best interests.

A repeated pattern of engaging in services temporarily and then stopping them, accompanied by recurrent housing instability, supports the conclusion that the parents cannot provide legally secure permanent placement.

In re T.G. · filed 2014-12-19(D)(1)(d)

The history of the parties reveals that they will engage in services for a time, and then stop maintaining the services. This inconsistency has continued since the first case was initiated by the agency in the beginning of 2011. This pattern is also demonstrated in their housing situation. The caseworker testified the parents lived at 14 different residences since she became involved in the case and father admitted to living in at least nine.

The legally secure placement factor supports permanent custody when no parent or relative is suitable and the parent has not shown an ability to meet the multiple needs of children who have spent years in foster care.

In re M.J. · filed 2015-08-19(D)(1)(d)

The evidence of record supports the conclusion that the only way to provide these children with a legally secure permanent placement is through permanent custody. The trial court properly found that Mother had not made substantial progress on her case plan and had not remedied the problems that caused removal. None of the fathers were interested or suitable for placement. Several relatives were considered for placement, but none were determined to be suitable.

A parent's continued inability to find suitable housing despite agency assistance with rent, furniture, and case-plan services supports finding that permanent custody is necessary for legally secure placement.

In re A.B. · filed 2015-09-22(D)(1)(d)

As the juvenile court noted, mother demonstrated that even when FCCS assisted her with rental payments, furniture, and case plan services, she was still unable to find any suitable housing options.

The legally secure placement factor supports permanent custody when issues causing removal remain unresolved after years of agency involvement and a proposed custodian filed late, lacked an approved interstate home study, and had never met the children.

In re J.P. · filed 2016-01-04(D)(1)(d)

Considering this evidence, the juvenile court found that the issues leading to the removal of the children had not been rectified over the nearly three years of BCDJFS involvement with Mother and the children's need for permanent placement could only be achieved through a grant of permanent custody to the agency.

A parent's failure to maintain stable housing may weigh in favor of permanent agency custody as necessary to provide the child a legally secure permanent placement.

In re I.C. · filed 2016-02-11(D)(1)(d)

This court has previously concluded that a parent's failure to maintain stable housing may weigh in favor of granting permanent custody to the agency to ensure that a child has a legally secure permanent placement.

A parent who follows techniques only under observation but repeatedly fails to protect children when unsupervised cannot provide the legally secure placement required by Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d).

In re I.J. · filed 2016-03-15(D)(1)(d)

It was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the trial court to have found S.C. not to be a suitable caregiver for her children, I.J. and D.C.

A child's need for a legally secure placement may justify permanent custody even when it severs the child's bonds with a parent and sibling.

In re D.A. · filed 2016-03-22(D)(1)(d)

While the award of permanent custody to FCCS severed D.A.'s familial bonds to his mother and half-brother, D.A.'s need for a legally secure placement justified the juvenile court's decision.

The court need not prolong children's uncertainty to give a parent more chances to attain employment and housing.

In re M.B. · filed 2015-12-10(D)(1)(d)

To deny Appellee permanent custody would only prolong these children’s uncertainty.

A recent period of parental stability does not outweigh a cyclical history of unstable housing, homelessness, arrest, and relapse risk when children need predictability and a legally secure placement.

In re J.E. · filed 2016-04-08(D)(1)(d)

Although appellant was more stable at the time of trial than she had been throughout the case, her progress was relatively recent. ... had exhibited a cyclical pattern during appellee’s involvement with her, and during the pendency of the case she lived in five different places, was homeless for a period of twelve months, and was arrested four times, spending time in jail.

The legally secure placement factor supports permanent custody when a parent has not shown an ability to correct serious medical, dental, and developmental neglect and continues using drugs without acknowledging or treating possible addiction.

In re A.S. · filed 2016-04-18(D)(1)(d)

While Mother claims to be busy working and has the ability to care for the children, she has not demonstrated that she can rectify the very serious medical, dental, and developmental concerns that necessitated WCCS involvement. ... Nevertheless, Mother fails to acknowledge any possibility of drug addiction or seek help to resolve those issues.

Permanent custody may be the only legally secure placement when the parent cannot provide a suitable home and no willing and able relative exists.

In re J.H. · filed 2016-06-01(D)(1)(d)

Consequently, the trial court reasonably concluded that a legally secure permanent placement would only be achieved by placing J.H. in the permanent custody of CSB.

Permanent custody may be the only viable legally secure placement where addicted parents cannot provide care and grandparents are unwilling or unable to protect the children.

In re L.T. · filed 2016-06-30(D)(1)(d)

Thus, we agree with the juvenile court that an award of permanent custody to JFS is the only viable option for ensuring the children are given a legally secure permanent placement.

Children's age, health problems, mental conditions, and maturity may establish a great need for legally secure placement obtainable only through permanent agency custody.

In re V.L. · filed 2016-07-08(D)(1)(d)

As to this factor, the evidence in the record overwhelmingly shows that these children are in great need of a legally secure placement given their age, various health problems and mental conditions, and level of maturity, and that such a legally secure placement cannot be achieved without awarding the agency permanent custody.

Permanent custody may be the only legally secure placement when no suitable relative is available and the parent and child need years of therapy before safe reunification is possible.

In re R.H. · filed 2016-07-27(D)(1)(d)

Permanent custody is the only means to provide this child with a legally secure permanent placement.

A child's long agency custody, parental failure to progress despite extra time, absence of available relatives, and bond with foster parents support a finding that legally secure placement requires permanent custody.

In re J.B. · filed 2016-08-05(D)(1)(d)

Given the evidence presented at the permanent custody hearings, we find that there was sufficient, credible evidence presented that J.B. was in need of legally secure permanent placement and that such placement could not be obtained without a grant of custody to the agency.

A child's need for a legally secure permanent placement supports permanent agency custody when the child has spent years in temporary placements and neither a parent nor a suitable relative can provide an appropriate home.

In re D.D. · filed 2016-10-26(D)(1)(d)

During this case, they had spent almost two years living in temporary placements and were in need of a legally secure permanent placement. The parents were not able to provide them with a suitable home at the time of the hearing and CSB had been unable to find a suitable relative who was able to do so. Consequently, the trial court reasonably concluded that a legally secure permanent placement would be achieved by placing the children in the permanent custody of CSB.

The legally-secure-placement factor supports permanent agency custody when a medically vulnerable child has spent years in multiple temporary placements and neither parent nor a suitable relative can provide an appropriate permanent home.

In re D.S. · filed 2016-11-16(D)(1)(d)

During this case, he had spent almost two years outside of his parents’ custody and had lived in three different temporary placements, so he was in need of a legally secure permanent placement. Neither parent was able to provide him with a suitable permanent home and CSB had been unable to find a suitable relative who was able to do so. Consequently, the trial court reasonably concluded that a legally secure permanent placement would be achieved by placing D.S. in the permanent custody of CSB.

A theoretical possibility that a parent may improve does not defeat permanent custody when years of treatment have not resolved behavior that prevents a stable home.

In re K.A. · filed 2016-11-28(D)(1)(d)

Accordingly, the juvenile court concluded that it was unlikely that Mother could resolve her issues in the foreseeable future.

The need for a legally secure permanent placement supports permanent custody under section 2151.414(D) when neither parent can provide an appropriate home and no willing and able relative has been found.

In re O.P. · filed 2016-12-19(D)

The children were in need of legally secure permanent placements and neither parent was able to provide them with an appropriate home at that time. CSB also had been unable to find any relatives who were willing or able to provide them with a suitable home. Consequently, the trial court reasonably concluded that a legally secure permanent placement would only be achieved by placing the children in the permanent custody of CSB.

A child's need for specialized structure and accountability, together with a parent's inability to provide a home or the required supervision, may support a finding that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re W.B. · filed 2017-12-04(D)

W.B. was in need of a legally secure ... permanent placement with a high level of structure and layers of accountability to prevent him from reoffending. The trial court reasonably concluded that W.B. had found such a placement in the foster home and that permanent custody was in his best interest.

A legally secure permanent placement under subsection (D)(1)(d) is a safe, stable, and consistent environment in which the child's needs will be met.

In re: H.M. · filed 2018-07-30(D)(1)(d)

A legally secure permanent placement is a safe, stable, consistent environment where a child’s needs will be met.

A legally secure permanent placement is more than a physical house; it is a stable environment where dependable adults keep the child safe and meet the child's needs.

In re B.J.L. · filed 2019-02-06(D)(1)(d)

Thus, "[a] legally secure permanent placement is more than a house with four walls. Rather, it generally encompasses a stable environment where a child will live in safety with one or more dependable adults who will provide for the child's needs."

The legally secure placement analysis under subsection (D)(1)(d) is not limited to a parent's current compliance with case-plan objectives concerning housing and income.

In re K.R. · filed 2019-06-04(D)(1)(d)

However, a court is not limited to considering only current compliance with case plan objectives related to housing and income in its analysis of the child's need for a legally secure, permanent placement.

A children-services agency need not present concrete proof that the child will be adopted to establish the need for a legally secure permanent placement.

In re A.R. · filed 2021-05-25(D)(1)(d)

However, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) does not require a children services agency "to present concrete proof that the child will be adopted if the court awards the agency permanent custody."

Permanent custody is not supported when a legal-custody arrangement can safely preserve the child's established family relationships while treatment continues.

In re L.H. · filed 2021-10-01(D)(1)(d)

Returning L.H. to Mother’s legal custody while he completed the program in Arkansas would not have endangered L.H.’s siblings, whereas granting MCCS permanent custody while the child remained in the program unnecessarily precluded the possibility of Mother reuniting with him.

Newly obtained housing does not by itself establish a stable and legally secure permanent placement after repeated housing instability.

In re V.G. · filed 2021-10-04(D)(1)(d)

Although Cheyenne argues that the new apartment indicates that she has stable and secure housing for her and V.G., we disagree.

An interstate compact denial that legally bars placement with a parent supports finding that a legally secure placement cannot be achieved without agency permanent custody.

In re K.S. · filed 2022-01-05(D)(1)(d)

Therefore, the court could not place K.S. with mother. K.S. is in need of a legally secure permanent placement and that placement cannot be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to HCJFS.

A parent's genuine hope to provide a legally secure permanent placement does not satisfy the factor without evidence of the ability to do so.

In re D.P. · filed 2022-12-19(D)(1)(d)

We agree and find that while Father may genuinely hope to care for the twins and to provide them with a legally secure permanent placement, the record does not demonstrate that he has the ability to do so.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d) favored permanent custody where the parent could not meet the child's basic needs, the child required secure placement, and no such placement could be achieved without agency custody.

In re R.M.A.L.O. · filed 2023-10-10(D)(1)(d)

Therefore, credible evidence in the record supported the trial court’s conclusions that appellant was unable to meet the basic needs of R.M.A.L.O., that R.M.A.L.O. needs a legally secure permanent placement as required by statute, and that such a placement cannot be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to FCCS. Thus, the factor set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) weighs in favor of awarding permanent custody to FCCS.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d)'s secure-placement factor favored permanent custody where the parents had not remedied their parenting problems, no appropriate relatives could provide a home, and incarceration prevented a timely parental placement.

In re B.G. · filed 2023-12-20(D)(1)(d)

The children’s custodial history had included more than two years living in temporary placements. Prior to this case, they lived with their parents and were exposed to ongoing trauma in the home. They needed a legally safe and secure environment and CSB had been unable to find any appropriate relatives who were willing and able to provide a home for the children. ... Moreover, at the time of the final hearing, Mother was incarcerated, and Father was facing a six-month period of incarceration.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d)'s secure-placement factor favored permanent custody where the child needed permanence, the parents could not effectively parent without assistance, and the caregivers were willing to adopt.

In re I.C., S.C. · filed 2023-12-26(D)(1)(d)

Here, I.C.’s caseworker indicated he was in need of legally secure placement and the two psychologists testified that I.C.’s parents would simply never have the ability to effectively parent him without some type of assistance. In addition, we note that I.C.’s caregivers indicated that they were willing to adopt I.C. Based on the evidence presented the trial court determined that this factor weighed in favor of granting permanent custody.

A legally secure permanent placement under section 2151.414(D)(1)(d) means more than a physical house; it is a safe, stable, and consistent environment with dependable adults who meet the child's needs.

In re S.R. · filed 2024-02-22(D)(1)(d)

A legally secure permanent placement is more than a house with four walls. Rather, it generally encompasses a stable environment where a child will live in safety with one or more dependable adults who will provide for the child’s needs.

A legally secure placement under section 2151.414(D)(1)(d) requires more than shelter; it encompasses a stable, safe environment with dependable adults who meet the child's needs.

In re J.L. · filed 2024-03-08(D)(1)(d)

A legally secure placement refers to more than just a roof over one’s head. Rather, a legally secure placement “ ‘encompasses a stable environment where a child will live in safety with one or more dependable adults who will provide for the child’s needs.’ ”

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d)'s secure-placement factor favored permanent custody where five siblings had a stable adoptive foster home and the recently released parent lacked approved housing and a demonstrated ability to maintain a home meeting their needs.

In re J.H. · filed 2024-07-24(D)(1)(d)

The foster parent, who had demonstrated the ability to meet the children’s needs in a safe and stable home for more than two years, was willing to adopt them as a sibling group if CSB received permanent custody. The trial court reasonably concluded that a legally secure permanent placement would be achieved by placing the children in the permanent custody of CSB. ... Given the evidence before the trial court concerning the children’s best interest, Father has failed to demonstrate that the court lost its way by terminating parental rights and placing the children in the permanent custody of CSB.

A legally secure permanent placement means a safe, stable, consistent environment where the child's needs will be met.

In re R.T. · filed 2025-05-22(D)(1)(d)

The Ohio Revised Code does not define “legally secure permanent placement,” but Ohio courts “have generally interpreted the phrase to mean a safe, stable, consistent environment where a child’s needs will be met.”

A legally secure permanent placement is a stable environment where a child lives safely with dependable adults who provide for the child's needs.

In re A.J. · filed 2025-12-17(D)(1)(d)

“[A] legally secure placement, ‘encompasses a stable environment where a child will live in safety with one or more dependable adults who will provide for the child’s needs.’”

A legally secure placement means more than having a house, and permanent custody may be necessary when a parent cannot safely meet the children's needs.

In re L.D. · filed 2026-02-18(D)(1)(d)

Further, and most importantly, Mother cannot satisfy the children’s need for a legally secure placement. ... While Mother insists that she has a home for the children to live in, secure placement is “more than a house with four walls.”

Section 2151.414(D)(4) requires the court to consider the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that placement can be achieved without granting permanent custody to the agency.

In Re Matter of Hollon, Unpublished Decision (5-27-2004) · filed 2004-05-27(D)(4)

R.C. § 2151.414 (D)(4) requires the trial court to consider the child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. {¶ 18} Based upon an entire review of the trial transcript, we believe the trial court properly determined that the minor children needed a legally secure permanent placement. We also believe the evidence suggested that that type of placement could not be achieved without the grant of permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D)(4) requires the court to consider whether a legally secure permanent placement can be achieved without granting permanent custody to the agency.

In Re King, Unpublished Decision (6-4-2004) · filed 2004-06-04(D)(4)

While Traci Page, Grace's paternal aunt, initially expressed some interest in custody, she later indicated that she was unwilling to pursue custody. No other relative pursued custody despite the department's efforts. Nothing in the record would support a determination that Angela would be ready to parent Grace in the foreseeable future. Jonathan had never had any contact with Grace and refused to work on the case plan. Therefore, clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's determination that a legally secure permanent placement could be achieved only by granting the department's motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(D)(4) requires courts assessing a child's best interest to consider whether a legally secure permanent placement can be achieved without granting permanent custody to the agency.

In Re Bailey, Unpublished Decision (6-7-2004) · filed 2004-06-07(D)(4)

One of the five factors the trial court must consider in determining whether it is in a child's best interest to terminate parental rights is whether a "legally secure permanent placement" can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. R.C. 2151.414 (D)(4). ... Here, competent, credible evidence in the record supports the trial court's finding that a legally secure placement cannot be achieved without granting permanent custody to ACCS.

Section 2151.414(D)(4) requires consideration of whether a legally secure permanent placement can be achieved without granting permanent custody to the agency.

In Re M.B., Unpublished Decision (10-27-2004) · filed 2004-10-27(D)(4)

If a legally secure permanent placement could be accomplished without terminating parental rights, the agency should have explored it and the trial court should have considered this less drastic alternative to permanently severing a family relationship.

Section 2151.414(D) requires courts deciding permanent custody to consider all relevant best-interest factors, including whether the child needs a legally secure permanent placement that cannot be achieved without granting custody to the agency.

In re C.B. · filed 2024-04-02(D)

R.C. 2151.414(D) directs a trial court to consider “all relevant factors,” as well as specific factors, to determine whether a child’s best interest will be served by granting a children services agency permanent custody. ... In the case at bar, the evidence shows that the children need a legally secure permanent placement and that they cannot achieve this type of placement without granting appellee permanent custody.

A legally secure permanent placement is a safe, stable, consistent environment where a child’s needs will be met.

In re W.V. · filed 2024-09-03(D)(1)(d)

The Revised Code does not define the phrase “legally secure permanent placement,” but “this court and others have generally interpreted the phrase to mean a safe, stable, consistent environment where a child’s needs will be met.”

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d) requires a court to consider a child’s need for legally secure permanent placement and whether that placement can be achieved without granting an agency permanent custody.

In re K.B. · filed 2024-09-10(D)(1)(d)

Therefore, credible evidence in the record supports the trial court’s conclusions that the children should not be returned to appellant’s care, that the children need a legally secure permanent placement as required by statute, and such a placement cannot be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to FCCS.

A child's need for a legally secure permanent placement supports granting permanent custody when the parent lacks suitable housing and has generally untreated mental health issues.

In re D.D. · filed 2024-12-16(D)(1)(d)

The juvenile court's decision to grant permanent custody in this case does just that. This is because, as the juvenile court found, granting BCDJFS permanent custody of D.D., Jr. was the only way ... that D.D., Jr. could be provided with a legally secure permanent placement given Mother's generally untreated mental health issues, lack of suitable housing, and status as an unemployed individual who subsists of limited SSI benefits.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d) requires consideration of whether a child’s need for a legally secure placement can be met without granting permanent custody to the agency.

In re M.D. · filed 2026-04-17(D)(1)(d)

As for the best-interest finding, the trial court considered the relevant factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and determined that permanent custody in favor of JFS was in the children’s best interest. ... Despite much effort, JFS could not find an appropriate relative who was willing and capable of caring for the children. Accordingly, the record supports finding that the children were in need of a legally secure placement that could not have been achieved without granting permanent custody to JFS.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d) requires courts to consider a child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether it can be achieved without granting an agency permanent custody.

In re M.W. · filed 2011-08-08(D)(1)(d)

LCCS had made extensive efforts to place the children together with relatives, but there were no suitable relatives who were willing and able to provide a stable permanent home for them. Consequently, the trial court reasonably concluded that a legally secure permanent placement could only be achieved by granting permanent custody to LCCS.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d) requires the court to consider whether a child needs a legally secure permanent placement and whether that can be achieved without granting permanent custody to an agency.

In re M.C. · filed 2013-10-23(D)(1)(d)

Consequently, the court reasonably concluded that M.C. was in need of a legally secure permanent placement, which could only be achieved by placing her in the permanent custody of CSB.

Section 2151.414(D)(4) requires a juvenile court to consider whether a child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement can be met without granting permanent custody to the agency.

In Re G.N. · filed 2007-01-16(D)(4)

Rather, the statute requires a juvenile court to consider whether the children’s need for legally secure permanent placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency.

Section 2151.414(D)(4) requires a juvenile court to determine whether granting permanent custody is the only way to achieve a legally secure permanent placement for the child.

In Re G.N. · filed 2008-04-14(D)(4)

We reiterate that because R.C. 2151.414(D)(4) requires a juvenile court to consider whether a child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement “can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody,” the juvenile court must specifically determine that granting permanent custody is the only way the child’s need for such placement can be achieved to satisfy this statutory factor.

Section 2151.414(D)(4) does not treat proposed long-term foster care as an available legally secure placement when the foster parents contemplate adoption rather than care until the parent's release and no willing, able relatives exist.

In Re R.K., Unpublished Decision (2-4-2004) · filed 2004-02-04(D)(4)

Jason suggests that this means the child already has a stable long-term placement without granting permanent custody to LCCS. But, Jason misapprehends the nature of the statement by the foster parents. The statement was premised upon the adoption of the child, and did not convey a willingness to provide long-term foster care until Jason is released from prison. ... Jason also contends that a legally secure placement may be provided by relatives. However, no relatives were found to be willing and able to assume the care of the child at the time of the permanent custody hearing. ... These facts support a finding that R.K. deserves a legally secure permanent placement that could only be achieved by a grant of permanent custody to LCCS.

Section 2151.414 requires the trial court to expressly state its findings on both prongs of the permanent-custody test, and a best-interest finding cannot be inferred from the judgment or made initially by the appellate court.

In Re M.B., Unpublished Decision (2-11-2004) · filed 2004-02-11(B)(1), (B)(2), and (D)

The trial court must explicitly state on the record its findings on each prong of the permanent custody test. ... As to the best interest prong of the permanent custody test, however, the judgment entry includes no such finding by the trial court. Although one might conclude that such a finding is implicit in the trial court's judgment, this Court should not speculate as to what the trial court found or did not find. ... Because the trial court failed to make the requisite statutory findings, this case must be reversed and remanded to the trial court to make such findings.

Section 2151.414(E)(16)'s catchall factor requires the trial court to identify the other factor with specificity and explain how it is comparable to one of the factors enumerated in divisions (E)(1) through (15).

In the Matter of Tashayla, Unpublished Decision (2-27-2004) · filed 2004-02-27(E)(16)

Concerning the R.C. 2151.414 (E)(16) "any other factor" finding, we have held that for this catchall provision to pass scrutiny, the trial court must explain with specificity what other factor the court deems comparable to one of those enumerated in sections (E)(1) through (15) of R.C. 2151.414 . In re Alyssa Nicole, 153 Ohio App.3d 10 , 17 , 2003-Ohio-2673 , at ¶ 32 . Here, the trial court has failed to make such an explanation, so we need not consider this issue.

Section 2151.414(E)(16) permits a juvenile court to consider any other relevant factor when determining whether a child can or should be placed with a parent.

In Re I.K., Unpublished Decision (4-6-2005) · filed 2005-04-06(E)(16)

{¶ 20} Following the inclusion of this general factor in the statute, this Court observed: "The obvious import of this amendment is to clearly express the General Assembly's intent to give the trial court the very same discretion that was rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court in William S. " In re Burmeister (June 16, 1999), 9th Dist. No. 19200, at 8. In general, citation to a relevant "E factor" upon which the trial court relies in reaching its determination that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent is the better practice in order to ensure proper appellate review. In re S.C. , 9th Dist. No. 04CA008469, 2004-Ohio-4570, at ¶ 30. However, the amendment gives the trial court discretion to consider "any other factor" that it considers relevant to the issue of whether the child can or should be placed with a parent. In re Burmeister, supra. {¶ 21} Thus, a juvenile court has the discretion to consider all relevant factors in making its determination that clear and convincing evidence exists to establish that a child could not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent.

Section 2151.414(E)(16) permits a court to consider any other relevant factor, and a single finding under that provision may support a determination that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In Re Barnes, Unpublished Decision (12-27-2005) · filed 2005-12-27(E)(16)

Based on this record, the trial court's finding as to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(16) is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We note that this finding by itself is adequate to support a termination of parental rights based on a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. See R.C. 2151.414 (E).

Section 2151.414(E)(13) and (16) support a finding that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time when the parent has been incarcerated for most of his adult life and has not changed the behavioral patterns that repeatedly led to incarceration.

In Re Bodenheimer, Unpublished Decision (6-20-2006) · filed 2006-06-20(E)(13), (E)(16)

However, appellee is still required to establish that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child and the child cannot be placed with appellant within a reasonable time because of at least one of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (E). {¶ 24} Specifically, we find R.C. 2151.414 (E)(13) and (16) to apply sub judice. Both appellant and Ms. Berry admitted they were unable to care and provide for the child at this time. T. at 145, 189. Appellant has been in jail most of his adult life and at twenty-three years of age, the longest period of time he has gone without being incarcerated is one year. T. at 184.

A parent's inability to protect a child from abuse may be considered as another relevant factor under subsection (E)(16), and clear and convincing evidence of that factor may support an award of permanent custody to an agency.

In Matter of T. S., Unpublished Decision (2-16-2007) · filed 2007-02-16(E)(16)

Additionally, the record demonstrates that Vandervest is so dependent upon his relationship with Horrocks and Schlickman, that he would tend to downplay or even ignore evidence of abuse. The evidence shows that Vandervest feels the need to be liked to the extent that he does not take any action that could damage his relationship with Horrocks and Schlickman. Therefore, even though Vandervest may profess a willingness to prevent T.S. from suffering physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or physical, emotional, or mental neglect, as required by R.C. 2151.414 (E), we conclude that the trial court could have reasonably concluded that he was unable to do so, which is another relevant factor. See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(16). {¶ 15} We conclude that the trial court's findings with respect to the above-cited factors are supported by clear and convincing evidence, justifying its decision to award permanent custody to the agency.

Section 2151.414(E)(16)'s catchall permits severe and ongoing domestic violence to establish parental unfitness when the factor is comparable to the enumerated factors and supported by clear and convincing evidence.

In Re Joshua C., L-06-1350 (8-3-2007) · filed 2007-08-03(E)(16)

This subsection is the "catchall" portion of section (E), which permits a finding that the child cannot or should not be reunited with his or her parents for "any other factor." ... Ongoing domestic violence can be a factor comparable to other R.C. 2151.414 (E) subsections which require a finding of parental unfitness. ... While severe and ongoing domestic violence between the parents is an articulable factor pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(16), the factor must be comparable to the other enumerated factors determining parental unfitness, and LCCS must advance clear and convincing evidence that the factor is comparable to factors demonstrating parental unfitness. In re Sean B. , supra.

Section 2151.414(E)(16) permits a court to consider abuse similar to torture as another relevant factor even when the parent was not convicted of the enumerated child-endangering offense involving torture or cruel abuse.

In Re J.H., Ca2007-07-016 (12-28-2007) · filed 2007-12-28(E)(16)

The list of factors under R.C. 2151.414 (E) are inexhaustive, as the statute requires the court to consider "any other factor the court considers relevant." R.C. 2151.414 (E)(16). The court could properly consider the fact that although appellant was not convicted under this section, the abuse she inflicted on her child was similar to torture.

Neglect of a child's siblings does not itself satisfy R.C. 2151.414(E)(15), which refers to abuse or neglect of the child at issue, but the sibling neglect may be considered as another relevant factor under subsection (E)(16).

In re T.P. · filed 2015-09-10(E)(15), (E)(16)

The trial court’s finding of neglect related to the siblings instead. As we have pointed out earlier, however, section (E)(16) of the statute permits the trial court to consider any factor the court deems relevant.

Section 2151.414(E)(16)'s other-relevant-factor provision may include a parent's having several other children outside his care because of concerns mirroring those in the current case.

In re M.F. · filed 2024-06-13(E)(16)

Finally, with respect to R.C. 2151.414(E)(16), other relevant factors, the court found that Father had seven children not in his care, largely due to concerns that mirrored those at issue in this case. ... In light of the foregoing findings, all of which were supported by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court was required by statute to conclude that M.F. cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

Subsection (E)(16)'s all-relevant-factors inquiry permits consideration of a parent's conduct predating the child's birth.

In re A.Y. · filed 2025-09-15(E)(16)

The juvenile court has a duty to consider all relevant factors in its permanent custody determination. R.C. 2151.414(E)(16). While the magistrate agreed that the termination of Mother and Father's parental rights in Tyler's case would not be a factor in the termination of their custody of Jane, Father's history of domestic violence and flouting of protection orders (including when he attended Jane's birth) remained extremely relevant. The clock did not "reset to zero" when Jane was born.

Unlike subsections (E)(1) and (E)(4), subsection (E)(16)'s other-relevant-factor ground does not require proof of repeated failure to remedy or lack of commitment.

In re I.F. · filed 2026-03-11(E)(16)

Importantly, this factor does not have any requirement that a parent "failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child's home" like (E)(1), nor the "lack of commitment" or "unwillingness" elements found in (E)(4).

Under section 2151.414(D)'s best-interest inquiry, a guardian ad litem's recommendation is useful and should receive full consideration, but it does not bind the trial court.

In Re D.B., Unpublished Decision (3-3-2004) · filed 2004-03-03(D)(2)

In determining the best interest of the child, the court must consider all relevant factors including, but not limited to, those contained in R.C. 2151.414 (D). These factors include the interaction of the child with the child's parents, siblings and foster parents, the wishes of the child, the custodial history of the child, and the child's need for legal secure permanent placement. ... While the GAL felt reunification was a possibility with S.B. and Dw.B., and though a GAL recommendation is useful and should be allotted full consideration, a trial court is not bound by the recommendation. In re Bunch (Aug. 3, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76493.

A juvenile court may consider the guardian ad litem's recommendation when children are too young to express their wishes, but the recommendation is not binding.

In re A.M. · filed 2026-05-28(D)(1)(b)

Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), it is proper for the juvenile court to consider the GAL’s recommendation where the children are too young to express their wishes. ... Upon review, however, we find the juvenile court acted within its discretion in choosing not to follow the oral recommendation of the GAL based on the totality of Mother’s conduct during this case, including her pattern of noncompliance.

Section 2151.414(D)(4)'s legally secure placement inquiry may support permanent custody when relatives could assist the parent but no relative sought custody and the relative previously providing care can no longer supervise the child.

In Re Boring-Myers, Unpublished Decision (3-4-2004) · filed 2004-03-04(D)(4)

The record further shows that no relative sought custody of Carol during the pendency of this case. This includes relatives that Mother claims Carol has a good bond with, i.e. "her grandmother, her sister Desiree, her Aunt Mary, and her nephew Jonathan." ... Based on the above record, we find that competent, credible evidence supports the trial court's finding that Carol's need for a legally secure placement cannot be achieved without a grant of permanent custody. Hence, the trial court did not err when it made this finding. Consequently, we reject Mother's third and final argument.

Relative placement is a relevant Section 2151.414(D) factor, but the statute neither requires finding that no suitable relative exists nor gives relative availability controlling or greater weight.

In re Dor.B. · filed 2018-07-09(D)

The availability of relative placement options is one of “all relevant factors” a trial court must consider when deciding if granting permanent custody to a children services agency is in a child’s best interest under R.C. 2151.414(D). In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 63. The statute does not require the trial court to find that no suitable relative was available for placement. Id. Indeed, “[t]he statute does not make the availability of a placement that would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor. The statute does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors.” Id.

A juvenile court need not consider placing children with a relative before granting permanent custody, and a relative's willingness does not alter the statutory best-interest inquiry.

In re RA.E. · filed 2018-11-21(D)(1)

First, the trial court was not required to consider placing children with a relative prior to granting permanent custody to CCDCFS. The willingness of a relative to care for a child does not alter what the court must consider in determining permanent custody. In re L.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104881, 2017-Ohio-657, ¶ 38-39; see also In re Patterson, 134 Ohio App.3d 119, 129, 730 N.E.2d 439 (9th Dist.1999) (concluded that a juvenile court is not required to find by clear and convincing evidence that a grandparent is an unsuitable placement option).

Section 2151.414(D)(1) does not require termination to be the only possible placement option or give a nonterminating relative placement controlling or greater weight.

In re V.M. · filed 2018-12-04(D)(1)

We also observe that a trial court that is evaluating a child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether the child can achieve that type of placement need not determine that terminating parental rights is “not only a necessary option, but also the only option.” Schaefer, supra, at ¶ 64. Rather, once the court finds the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) factors, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires the court to weigh “all the relevant factors * * * to find the best option for the child.” Id. “The statute does not make the availability of a placement that would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor. The statute does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors.” Id.

Section 2151.414(D)(1)(d) permits permanent custody without additional delay to investigate grandparents who waited nearly two years to express interest, had not contacted the children, and had not moved for legal custody.

In re L.S. · filed 2019-04-29(D)(1)(d)

Rather than allowing the children to continue to languish in the temporary custody of ACCSB, the trial court concluded that, consistent with the best interests of the children, a legally secure permanent placement could only be achieved with a grant of permanent custody to ACCSB. The evidence relied on in support of this conclusion is clear and convincing.

A relative's availability is not controlling in the best-interest analysis and need not receive greater weight than the other statutory factors.

In re A.D. · filed 2019-05-14(D)

As the Ohio Supreme Court has instructed, in deciding what is in a child's best interests, R.C. 2151.414 does not make the availability of a relative placement an all-controlling factor; the statute does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors.

Section 2151.414(D)(1) requires selection of the child's best option after weighing all relevant factors; an available placement that avoids terminating parental rights is neither controlling nor entitled to extra weight.

In re T.H. · filed 2019-07-25(D)(1)

Rather, R.C. 2151.414 requires the court to find the best option for the child upon a weighing of all the relevant factors. ... “The statute does not make the availability of a placement that would not require a termination of parental rights an all-controlling factor. The statute does not even require the court to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors.”