Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414

When a child has been in an agency's temporary custody for twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, § 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits the court to proceed to the best-interest analysis without finding that the child cannot be returned to the parent within a reasonable time.

In Re ball/butler, Unpublished Decision (4-14-2003) · filed 2003-04-14(B)(1)(d)

As noted by this Court in In re: Whipple Children, Stark App. No. 2002CA00406, 2003-Ohio-1101, the Court, therefore, was not required to make a finding that the children could not be returned to appellant within a reasonable time.

Under § 2151.414(B)(1)(d), twelve months of agency custody within a consecutive twenty-two-month period eliminates the need to decide whether the child can be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or whether the parent remedied the conditions causing removal.

In Re C. N., Unpublished Decision (4-24-2003) · filed 2003-04-24(B)(1)(d)

When this factor exists, therefore, under the current version of the statute, it obviates a determination required by R.C. 2151.414 (E) of whether the parent has remedied the conditions which caused the removal of the children.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month calculation under § 2151.414(B)(1)(d), temporary custody begins on the earlier of the dependency adjudication or sixty days after removal from the home.

In the Matter of Workman, Unpublished Decision (4-30-2003) · filed 2003-04-30(B)(1)(d)

For purposes of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), a child is considered to enter "the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated [dependent] * * * or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from the home."

When permanent custody is sought under the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground in division (B)(1)(d), the court need determine only the child's best interest and need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In Re Joshua B., Unpublished Decision (6-13-2003) · filed 2003-06-13(B)(1)(d)

When an agency seeks permanent custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) the court need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time as required by R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a). The only consideration is the best interest of the child.

Under the plain language of division (B)(1)(d), once the twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody ground is met, the court need decide only best interest and need not conduct the reasonable-time placement analysis required by division (B)(1)(a).

In the Matter of Beasley, Unpublished Decision (6-25-2003) · filed 2003-06-25(B)(1)(d)

Pursuant to the plain language of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), when a child has been in an agency's temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999, a trial court need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. ... Thus, when considering a permanent custody motion brought pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), the only other consideration becomes the best interests of the child.

When a child has been in agency custody for twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, subsection (B)(1)(d) eliminates the need to find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In the Matter of Riley, Unpublished Decision (7-25-2003) · filed 2003-07-25(B)(1)(d)

Pursuant to the plain language of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), when a child has been in a children services agency's temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999, a trial court need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month calculation, the court subtracted sixty days from the child's total time in agency custody before determining that subsection (B)(1)(d) was satisfied.

In Re Bounds, Unpublished Decision (9-8-2003) · filed 2003-09-08(B)(1)(d)

Thus, at the time that ACCSB filed for permanent custody, Michael had been in temporary custody for seventeen months. However, the trial court was then required by statute to subtract a period of sixty days from this time in making its determination as to whether Michael was in the continuous custody of ACCSB for a twelve-month period. See R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). The trial court properly followed this statutory section and found by clear and convincing evidence that the child had been in the temporary custody of ACCSB for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period in accordance with R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d).

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody condition is met, the court need not separately find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In Matter of Large, Unpublished Decision (9-29-2003) · filed 2003-09-29(B)(1)(d)

R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) permits a trial court to grant permanent custody of a child to an agency if the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child's best interest would be served by the award of permanent custody and that the child has been in the temporary custody of the agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999. The court need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. See In re Decker , Athens App. No. 00CA42, 2001-Ohio-2380 ; In re Moody (Aug. 7, 2000), Athens App. No. 99CA63. Such a finding is implicit in the time frame established by the statute.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month calculation, temporary custody begins on the earlier of the child's adjudication date or sixty days after removal from the home.

In Re Sessoms, Unpublished Decision (10-6-2003) · filed 2003-10-06(B)(1)(d)

This code section mandates that "a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from the home." In the present case, the date of the adjudication, May 2000, is earlier than the date falling 60 days after the children were removed from the home. Thus, the statutory calculation begins in May 2000.

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month condition in section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applies, subsection (B)(1)(a) does not apply and the court need not analyze whether the child can or should be placed with a parent.

In the Matter of Damron, Unpublished Decision (10-30-2003) · filed 2003-10-30(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

The plain language of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) reveals that this subsection is only triggered when none of the remaining three subsections are triggered. In the present case, subsection (d) was triggered because, as appellant does not dispute, the Damron children had been in FCCS' custody for the requisite time period. Because the facts trigger subsection (d), they cannot and do not trigger subsection (a). As such, it was unnecessary for the court to analyze whether or not the Damron children could be placed with either of their parents within a reasonable time, or should be placed with either parent, under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a). Id. Accordingly, the court did not err in failing to consider the factors contained in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(7) to (11).

The conditions in sections 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, and either independently supports the non-best-interest component of a permanent-custody award.

In Re the Matter of Wilcoxen, Unpublished Decision (11-3-2003) · filed 2003-11-03(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

These are alternate findings pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). (R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) and (d) respectively. Either of those findings, if supported by the evidence, would have been sufficient in and of itself to base a grant of permanent custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1).

Once a child has been in agency custody for twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) requires the court to inquire only into the child's best interests.

In the Matters of Julia G., Unpublished Decision (11-12-2003) · filed 2003-11-12(B)(1)(d)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), if a child has been in the temporary custody of the agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period ending on or after March 18, 1999, the trial court is required only to inquire into what placement is in the best interests of the child.

Under subsection (B)(1)(d), once the twelve-of-twenty-two-month requirement is met, the court need only decide the child's best interest and need not make a reasonable-reunification-efforts finding.

Matter of Stillman · filed 2003-11-19(B)(1)(d)

When considering a motion for permanent custody brought pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), other than the 12-month time requirement, the only other consideration that the trial court needs to address is the best interest of the child. Accordingly, whether or not the trial court was correct in concluding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify the child with her father is irrelevant.

When children have been in temporary custody for more than twelve months, the trial court need only find by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in their best interest.

In Re Antonio C. Angelica C., Unpublished Decision (1-9-2004) · filed 2004-01-09(B)(1)(d)

However, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), because the children were in temporary custody for more than 12 months, the trial court was only required to find by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody was in the children's best interest.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) allows permanent custody when a child has spent twelve of twenty-two consecutive months in agency custody without a separate determination that the child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In Re Nelson, Unpublished Decision (1-23-2004) · filed 2004-01-23(B)(1)(d)

Under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), when a child has been in the custody of MCCS for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period, the trial court may award permanent custody to the agency without determining whether the child can be placed with a parent within a reasonable period of time. In re McKinley, Montgomery App. No. 19716, 2003-Ohio-2828. The trial court's decision to award permanent custody to MCCS must be supported by clear and convincing evidence establishing the statutory requirements of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1).

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) does not authorize an agency to file a permanent-custody motion on the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground until the child has actually spent a full twelve months in temporary agency custody.

In Re K.G., Unpublished Decision (3-24-2004) · filed 2004-03-24(B)(1)(d)

This case presents an issue of first impression for this Court: whether a children services agency has authority to file a motion for permanent custody that alleges the so-called "12 of 22" grounds before the children have been in the temporary custody of the agency for a full 12 months. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the agency lacks authority to file for permanent custody on this basis until the children have been in its temporary custody for a full 12 months.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) treats a child as entering temporary agency custody on the earlier of the dependency adjudication date or the date sixty days after removal from the home.

In Re Strychalski, Unpublished Decision (3-26-2004) · filed 2004-03-26(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) provides that "[f]or the purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home." Anastasia was removed from her home on August 12, 2002. Sixty days after this date is October 11, 2002. The court adjudicated her on October 4, 2002, which is earlier than 60 days after the date of removal and is therefore the date used to determine the length of time in temporary custody.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes that custody is in the child's best interest and the child has spent twelve of twenty-two consecutive months in temporary agency custody.

In the Matter of K.S., Unpublished Decision (5-3-2004) · filed 2004-05-03(B)(1)(d)

In the present case, the trial court found that it was in the child's best interest that CCCSB be awarded permanent custody, and that the child has been in the temporary custody of CCCSB for twelve or more months of a consecutive 22-month period ending on or after March 18, 1999. See R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d). The trial court further found that K.S. could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. Review of the record demonstrates that there was clear and convincing evidence presented to support these findings.

Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and the child has spent at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period in agency custody; the best-interest inquiry must consider all relevant subsection (D) factors.

In Re D.R., Unpublished Decision (11-29-2004) · filed 2004-11-29(B)(1), (D)

When a state agency seeks permanent custody of a dependent child, the trial court is required to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). In making such a determination, the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to the following factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (D): ... Once a trial court does find by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the children to grant permanent custody to the agency, R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) provides that the court may grant permanent custody to an agency if it determines that the children have been in the temporary custody of the agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period ending on or after March 18, 1999.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits an agency to seek permanent custody on the 12-of-22-month ground only if the child has already spent the required 12 months in agency custody when the motion is filed; time between filing and the hearing does not count.

In re C.W. · filed 2004-12-08(B)(1)(d)

Accordingly, we hold that before a public children-services agency or private child-placing agency can move for permanent custody of a child on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) grounds, the child must have been in the temporary custody of an agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period. In other words, the time that passes between the filing of a motion for permanent custody and the permanent-custody hearing does not count toward the 12-month period set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) does not require a court to determine whether a child can or should be placed with either parent within a reasonable time when the child has been in agency temporary custody for at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period; the remaining consideration is the child’s best interest.

In Re Flemings, Unpublished Decision (12-23-2004) · filed 2004-12-23(B)(1)(d)

However, under the plain language of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), when a child has been in a children services agency's temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999, a trial court need not make this determination. When considering a permanent custody motion brought pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), the only other consideration is the best interest of the child.

When a child has been in an agency's temporary custody for at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, permanent custody requires a best-interest finding but not a finding under subsection (E) that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.

In Re Smith, Unpublished Decision (1-18-2005) · filed 2005-01-18(B)(1)(d)

Thus, pursuant to the enumerated factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), a R.C. 2151.414 (E) determination, as to whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable amount of time or should not be placed with the parent, is only required under subpart (a) of that section of the Revised Code. Under subparts (b) through (d), the Revised Code only requires the court to make a best interest determination. It is unnecessary for the court to make any further findings. ... Accordingly, Justin had been in the MCCS's temporary custody for well over twelve consecutive months prior to the permanent custody hearing, which falls under subpart (d) of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). That finding is clearly supported by the record. Accordingly, the trial court's review of MCCS's motion for permanent custody did not require the additional findings pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E).

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is constitutional, and a supported finding that a child was in agency custody for 12 of 22 consecutive months independently satisfies the statutory ground for permanent custody.

In Re Unger Children, Unpublished Decision (5-12-2005) · filed 2005-05-12(B)(1)(d)

The trial court found that the minor child could not be placed with either parent at this time or within a reasonable period of time and that the children had been in the temporary custody of SCDJFS for 12 of the past consecutive 22 months. These are alternate findings pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) and (d) respectively. Either of those findings, if supported by the evidence, is sufficient as a basis to grant of permanent custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). {¶ 46} Appellant does not challenge the trial court's finding that the minor child was in the temporary custody of the agency for 12 of the past 22 months. Such a finding is enough to satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1). ... This Court, in In re: Villaneuva/Hampton Children, Stark App. No. 2004CA00120, 2004-Ohio-4609, likewise concluded that 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is constitutional. {¶ 67} In this case, Appellant has failed rebut the presumption of constitutionality regarding R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d). Appellant's Second Assignment of Error is therefore overruled.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) allows a juvenile court that finds a child has spent at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period in agency temporary custody to proceed directly to deciding the child's best interests.

In Re McLean, Unpublished Decision (5-26-2005) · filed 2005-05-26(B)(1)(d)

After making the finding that the children had been in the temporary custody of Trumbull Children Services "12 out of 22 months," the court could have moved directly to examining the best interests of the children.

When children have been in an agency's temporary custody for more than twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the court need not make the reunification findings listed in § 2151.414(E)(1)-(16).

In Re S.B., Unpublished Decision (6-23-2005) · filed 2005-06-23(E)(1)-(16)

However, because CCDCFS moved to modify temporary custody to permanent custody after the children had been in its custody for more than 12 months in a 22-month period, the trial court was not required to make any findings set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1)-(16) for purposes of determining reunification.

Once a child has been in state temporary custody for at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the court need not determine that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time; permanent custody still requires clear and convincing evidence that it serves the child's best interests.

In Re Brown, Unpublished Decision (8-16-2005) · filed 2005-08-16(B)(1)

{¶ 47} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), a court may grant permanent custody to the state if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child's best interests and one of the four factors listed applies. The four choices are: (1) the child is orphaned; (2) the child is abandoned; (3) the child has been in the state's temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period; or (4) if none of the above apply, the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable amount of time or should not be placed with either parent. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a)-(d). ... {¶ 49} Regardless, the court found that the children had been in the temporary custody of the state for more than twelve of a consecutive twenty-two-month period. There is thus no need to delve any further into the aforesaid alternative ground. In re Hardy, 7th Dist. No. 04MA11, 2004-Ohio-4542 , ¶ 21. This does not appear to be disputed in appellant's brief. The only remaining issue is whether there was clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody was in the children's best interests.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that custody serves the child's best interest and the child was in an agency's temporary custody for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period before the agency moved for permanent custody.

In the Matter of S.S., Unpublished Decision (8-18-2005) · filed 2005-08-18(B)(1)(d)

The Supreme Court of Ohio has instructed that "R.C. 2151.414 sets forth the procedures a juvenile court must follow and the findings it must make before granting a motion filed pursuant to R.C. 2151.413." ... First, a trial court must determine whether any of the circumstances in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) apply. ... After a trial court has found that one of the circumstances in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) through (d) applies, then the trial court must determine by clear and convincing evidence that a grant of permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. ... Thus, applying R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), we find that D.S. had been in the temporary custody of FCCS for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period prior to FCCS's motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits an agency to move for permanent custody after the child has been in its continuous custody for at least twelve months; the agency need not wait until a full twenty-two months have passed.

In Re Vann, Unpublished Decision (8-22-2005) · filed 2005-08-22(B)(1)(d)

{¶ 18} In the case of In re: C.W., 104 Ohio St. 3d 163 , 2004-Ohio-6411 , 818 N.E.2d 1176 , the supreme court found the statute is intended to give parents twelve full months to work on reunification before an agency can file for permanent custody. Parents have a basic civil right to raise their children, and must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law allows, Id., citations deleted. Thus, an agency can file for permanent custody any time after the child has been in the agency's continuous custody for at least twelve months, but may not file its motion until after at least twelve months have passed. {¶ 19} We find the agency was not required to wait until twenty-two months had passed before filing its motion for permanent custody.

When a child has been in agency temporary custody for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, permanent custody requires clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child's best interest, without further consideration of whether the parent remedied the conditions causing removal or whether the child can or should be placed with the parent.

In Re A.F., Unpublished Decision (9-26-2005) · filed 2005-09-26(B)(1)(d)

Under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), when a child has been in temporary custody for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, a juvenile court is only required to find by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest. In re L.D., Clinton App. No. CA2004-03-007, 2004-Ohio-4000, ¶ 14-15. The finding that the child has been in temporary custody for this period obviates consideration of whether the parent has remedied the conditions which caused the removal of the child, and whether the child could not, or should not be placed with the parent. Id., citing In re Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d 445 , 459 , 2001-Ohio-3214 .

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s twelve-of-twenty-two-month period runs only through the filing date of the permanent-custody motion, with temporary custody deemed to begin sixty days after removal.

In Re E.T., Unpublished Decision (11-16-2005) · filed 2005-11-16(B)(1)(d)

{¶ 10} In weighing a motion for an extension of temporary custody, the trial court was necessarily obligated to measure the progress of Dorothy and Christopher towards reunification with their children. Inherent in that process is proper consideration of the length of time that Dorothy and Christopher have been working towards the reunification of the family. In this case, the trial court erroneously found that E.T. and C.D. had been in the temporary custody of the agency for more than 12 of the previous 22 months when CSB's motion for permanent custody was filed. This finding reflected an error in calculation. While the trial court correctly stated the legal principle that permanent custody is measured to the time when the motion for permanent custody is filed, the court calculated the time incorrectly. The children had actually been in the temporary custody of CSB for only nine months when the motion for permanent custody was filed. See R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) and In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163 , 2004-Ohio-6411 , at ¶ 26 . In other words, pursuant to relevant Ohio law, E.T. and C.D. had been in the temporary custody of CSB from December 24, 2003 (60 days after the children were removed from the home) until September 8, 2004 (the day the motion for permanent custody was filed), a matter of less than nine months. See id.

Once a child has been in an agency's temporary custody for at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the court need not decide whether the child can or should be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, and the parent's case-plan progress is irrelevant to that stage of the permanent-custody analysis.

In the Matter of S.M., Unpublished Decision (5-23-2006) · filed 2006-05-23(B)(1)(d)

After the trial court found that S.M. had been in the temporary custody of FCCS for more than 12 months of a continuous 22-month period, it was unnecessary for the trial court to determine whether S.M. could or should be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. In re Sunderman, Stark App. No. 2004CA00093, 2004-Ohio-4608 , at ¶ 48 (findings made under R.C. 2151.414 [B][1][a] and [B][1][d] are in the alternative; either will support a grant of permanent custody); see, also, In re C.C., Franklin App. No. 04AP-883, 2005-Ohio-5163, at ¶ 52; In re Katrina T., Sandusky App. No. S-03-024, 2004-Ohio-3164 , at ¶ 14. Appellant's progress toward completion of her case plan is relevant only in determining whether S.M. could or should be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. See R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a). Therefore, the trial court did not need to address appellant's compliance with her case plan in this portion of its analysis, and appellant's argument concerning that finding is moot. In re Sunderman, at ¶ 48.

Once a child has been in an agency's temporary custody for 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, the court need not also determine whether the child could or should be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In Re J.J., Unpublished Decision (6-15-2006) · filed 2006-06-15(B)(1)(d)

After the juvenile court found that appellant's daughters had been in the temporary custody of BCCSB for more than 12 months of a continuous 22-month period, it was unnecessary for the juvenile court to determine whether the children could or should be placed with appellant within a reasonable period of time.

Section 2151.414 requires the twelve-of-twenty-two-month period in (B)(1)(d) to be complete before the permanent-custody motion is filed; otherwise, custody under (B)(1)(a) requires clear-and-convincing findings that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent, with an (E) factor found as to each parent.

In Re Esparza, Unpublished Decision (1-16-2007) · filed 2007-01-16(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d), (E)

When determining whether a child should not or cannot be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time, the trial court is required to find one or more of the sixteen factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 (E) present as to each parent by clear and convincing evidence. ... In interpreting R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the child must have been in the custody of the agency for at least twelve of the previous twenty-two months prior to the filing of the motion for permanent custody in order for the trial court to grant permanent custody based on R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) grounds. ... Accordingly, the trial court could not have proceeded to grant permanent custody of the boys to MCCSB under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d); instead the trial court must have proceeded under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a). Accordingly, under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a), the trial court must determine by clear and convincing evidence that (1) it is in the best interest of the boys to grant permanent custody of them to MCCSB, and (2) the boys cannot be placed with either of the boys' parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with their parents. ... However, the trial court failed to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, that the boys cannot be placed with either of the boys' parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with their parents. Accordingly, the trial court erred and Mother's third and Feliciano's first, second, and fourth assignments of error are well taken.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) does not apply when a child has been in agency custody for more than twelve months, because that circumstance falls under (B)(1)(d).

In Re Lambert, 2007-G-2751 (6-8-2007) · filed 2007-06-08(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

Nevertheless, the Lambert minors were in the custody of GCJFS for more than 12 months and, therefore, the trial court's determination under "(B)(1)(a)" must be disregarded as that subsection was not applicable to the instant case.

When a child has been in agency temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the court need not also find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In Matter of Sowers, 06ca68 (4-17-2007) · filed 2007-04-17(B)(1)(d)

Where the juvenile court finds pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) that the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999, the court need not find that the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) and 2151.414 (E).

When a child has been in an agency's temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the court need only find by clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and need not consider the factors in subsection (E).

In Matter of T.L., 07ap-326 (9-18-2007) · filed 2007-09-18(B)(1)(d)

It is undisputed in the case sub judice that R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) has been satisfied by clear and convincing evidence. Because the trial court properly determined by clear and convincing evidence that T.L. has been in the custody of FCCS for the requisite period of time under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), we need not consider its findings with respect to the R.C. 2151.414 (E) factors. See, e.g., R.L. , supra.

When a child has been in agency temporary custody for at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the court need not determine whether the child can be placed with either parent within a reasonable time and proceeds to decide whether permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In Re D.R., Unpublished Decision (11-1-2007) · filed 2007-11-01(B)(1)(d)

In the instant case, Appellant stipulated to a finding under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(b), acknowledging that the child had been in the temporary custody of CCDCFS for twelve months or more of a consecutive twenty-two month period. Therefore, the court did not need to determine that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time because the child had been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies for more than twelve of the last twenty-two months. See R.C. 2151.414 (B); see, also, In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95 , 99 ; In re M.H. , Cuyahoga App. No. 80620, 2002-Ohio-2968. The only consideration at this point is whether permanent custody is in the best interest of the child pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (D). In re: R.K. , Cuyahoga App. No. 82374, 2003-Ohio-6333 .

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody condition in subsection (B)(1)(d) applies, the court need not separately determine under subsection (E)(4) whether the child cannot or should not be returned to a parent within a reasonable time.

In Matter of Scott, 13-07-18 (12-3-2007) · filed 2007-12-03(B)(1)(d)

Although Mother contends that R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4) requires that SCDJFS prove her ability to support, visit, or communicate with Skye, we note that, given R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) applies, the trial court was not required to make such determination or consider such factor. Esparza , 2007-Ohio-113 , at fn. 3, citing In re William S ., 75 Ohio St.3d 95 , 99 , 1996-Ohio-182 . Therefore, the trial court's additional findings under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4) were superfluous and we need not address Mother's argument challenging those findings.

When a child has been in a children services agency's custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period when the permanent-custody motion is filed, the court need only decide whether permanent custody is in the child's best interest and need not decide whether the child can or should be placed with a parent.

In Re A.D., 2007 Ca 23 (5-2-2008) · filed 2008-05-02(B)(1)(d)

R.C. 2151.414 (B) then sets forth the circumstances under which a court may grant permanent custody of a child to a children services agency. If the child has been in the custody of the children services agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period at the time the motion for permanent custody is filed, the court need only determine whether permanent custody is in the child's best interest. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d). The court need not consider whether the child can be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents, as would be required under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a).

When a child has been in an agency's temporary custody for at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the agency need not prove that the child cannot or should not be returned to the parents, and the court need only determine whether permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In Re M.P., 22343 (2-15-2008) · filed 2008-02-15(B)(1)(d)

Furthermore, after the "addition of the `12 of 22' provision to R.C. 2151.414 , an agency need no longer prove that a child cannot be returned to the parents within a reasonable time or should not be returned to the parents, so long as the child has been in the temporary custody of an agency for at least 12 months." Id. at ¶ 21. ... All four of the children had been in temporary custody for well over twelve months at the time that MCCS filed its motion for permanent custody. Thus, it was only necessary for the court to determine whether permanent custody was in their best interests.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits a court to proceed to the best-interest test once a child has spent twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period in an agency's temporary custody, without also requiring the findings specified in subsection (B)(1)(a).

In Matter of Minton, Ct2007-0050 (6-6-2008) · filed 2008-06-06(B)(1)(d)

A clear interpretation of the statute sets forth that once the "magic" time limits of subsection (B)(1)(d) have passed, a trial court may move to a best interest test. Under subsection (B)(1)(a), the child must not have been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999. In the case sub judice, the trial court specifically found the children had been in appellee's temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period, therefore R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) is applicable to the facts of this case, and appellant did not challenge the trial court's finding under said subsection. See, In re Canterucci Children , Stark App. No. 2006CA00144, 2006-Ohio-4969 .

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) does not require a court to find that a child cannot be placed with the child's parents within a reasonable time before granting permanent custody on the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground.

In re Z.S. · filed 2010-10-04(B)(1)(d)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), unlike R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), does not require the court to make a finding of whether the child can be placed with the child’s parents within a reasonable period of time.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permits termination of parental rights when a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period and termination is in the child’s best interest.

In re N.C. · filed 2011-11-21(B)(1)(d)

Thus, appellant's parental rights can lawfully be terminated upon a finding that the child has been in the temporary custody of SCJFS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, and upon a finding that it is in the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

When a child has been in a public children’s services agency’s temporary custody for at least twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, subsection (B)(1)(d) is satisfied and the remaining question is whether permanent custody serves the child’s best interests.

In re M.H. · filed 2012-11-09(B)(1)(d)

It is undisputed that at the time of the permanent custody hearing before the magistrate that the children had been in the custody of MCCS for over twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two month period. Accordingly, because R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is satisfied, the only issue before the trial court was whether it was in the best interests of the children to grant permanent custody to MCCS.

When a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, the court need not determine whether the child can or should be placed with either parent within a reasonable time; the remaining consideration is the child’s best interests.

In re NAP · filed 2013-02-13(B)(1)(d)

Pursuant to the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child has been in a children services agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period, a trial court need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month temporary-custody condition in subsection (B)(1)(d) is satisfied, subsection (B)(1)(a) is inapplicable and findings under subsection (E) are unnecessary.

In re A.B. · filed 2013-09-05(B)(1)(d)

The record reflects that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is satisfied because at the time of the trial court’s hearing, A.B. had been in the temporary custody of CCDCFS for 12 or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period. ... Because R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) was plainly satisfied, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) was inapplicable and the trial court’s findings under that provision were unnecessary.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is satisfied when children have been in agency care for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period.

In re K.L. · filed 2017-04-07(B)(1)(d)

As the Agency asserts, A.L., C.L., and K.L.2 had been in Agency care for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22 month period at the time of trial. The children were adjudicated neglected and dependent by the Magistrate on September 11, 2014, and the Agency was granted interim temporary custody on September 26, 2014. On October 30, 2015, the Agency filed its motion for permanent custody, and by the time of trial, the three children had been in the temporary custody of the Agency for 16 consecutive months. In other words, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is satisfied.

A supported Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding makes inconsistent alternative findings about abandonment harmless because any one Section 2151.414(B)(1) ground is sufficient.

In re E.B. · filed 2017-05-04(B)(1)(d)

Because it is undisputed that on the date FCCS filed its second motion for permanent custody, A.B. and J.B. had been in the temporary custody of FCCS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, G.B. cannot establish any prejudice arising from the juvenile court's alternative findings regarding abandonment for purposes of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (b). ... In other words, the subjective finding of abandonment for purposes of subsections (a) and (b) is unnecessary where the juvenile court properly finds that grounds for custody exist under the objective standard set forth in subsection (d). Id.

A prematurely filed permanent-custody request is harmless when a later amended motion supersedes it after Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s statutory time has elapsed.

In re M.B. · filed 2017-08-21(B)(1)(d)

While appellant is correct that the September 12, 2014 motion for review was premature, to the extent it sought to terminate her parental rights, the error was harmless as a matter of law. The hearing was continued and, on June 9, 2015, ACCSB filed an amended motion seeking permanent custody asserting, inter alia, M.B. had been in the temporary custody for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period. The amended motion, which was filed well beyond the 12-month statutory window, effectively supplanted the premature motion. Thus, because the motion was amended after the statutory time had passed, any error in ACCSB’s original filing is harmless.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s first prong is satisfied when a child has been in agency temporary custody for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period.

In re T.G. · filed 2018-02-08(B)(1)(d)

The juvenile court found that the first prong of the permanent custody test was satisfied because T.G. had been in the agency's temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. Mother did not dispute that finding. Thus, the agency satisfied the first part of the two-part test the juvenile court applies to decide whether to grant permanent custody of a child to a public children services agency.

Sections 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are alternative grounds, each independently sufficient to support permanent custody.

In re I.S. · filed 2018-02-14(B)(1)(d)

Findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, and each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the Agency's motion for permanent custody. In re Langford, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2004CA00349, 2005-Ohio-2304, ¶ 17, citing In re Whipple Children, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2002CA00406, 2003–Ohio–1101, ¶ 26; see also, In re Celano, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2007 CA 00141, 2007-Ohio-5645. Upon review, we agree with the trial court's finding that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is applicable to the facts of this case.

Sections 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are alternative grounds, each independently sufficient to support permanent custody.

In re B.S. · filed 2018-02-14(B)(1)(d)

Findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, and each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the Agency's motion for permanent custody. In re Langford, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2004CA00349, 2005-Ohio-2304, ¶ 17, citing In re Whipple Children, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2002CA00406, 2003–Ohio–1101, ¶ 26; see also, In re Celano, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2007 CA 00141, 2007-Ohio-5645. Upon review, we agree with the trial court's finding that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is applicable to the facts of this case.

For Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d), a child enters agency custody on the earlier of the shelter-care adjudication date or 60 days after removal from the home.

In re D.H. · filed 2018-02-20(B)(1)(d)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a child is considered to have entered the custody of an agency for assessing the 12 out of the 22-month provision, on the earlier date of his or her shelter care adjudication or 60 days after the removal from the home. Thus, between March 28, 2015 and the date of the Agency’s motion, August 16, 2016, more than 19 months passed. Thus, the Agency established that all three children were in its custody for 12 of the 22 months prior to the Agency’s motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s first prong is satisfied when a child has remained in agency custody for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period.

In Re S.S. · filed 2018-06-29(B)(1)(d)

The juvenile court’s decision was based upon the two-prong test of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). The first prong was satisfied based upon the fact that the minor child had been in Appellee’s custody in excess of 12 months of a 22-month consecutive period. As such, the relevant appellate review turns to whether permanent custody was in the best interest of the minor child.

A Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding, together with a best-interest finding, is independently sufficient to support permanent custody.

In re: M. H. · filed 2018-07-27(B)(1)(d)

In the case sub judice, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that M.H. had been in the temporary custody of a public children services agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period pursuant to R.C. §2151.414(B)(1)(d). ... This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody. In re Calhoun, 5th Dist. No. 2008CA00118, 2008–Ohio–5458, ¶ 45.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) requires 12 months of temporary custody within a 22-month period, not 22 months of agency involvement before a permanent-custody motion may be filed.

In re N.M.P. · filed 2018-12-10(B)(1)(d)

By construing “a consecutive twenty-two-month period” to require 22 months of agency involvement, the Sixth District added language to the statute, altering its plain and unambiguous meaning. See J.C., supra, at ¶11-13; In re H.M., 2d Dist. Greene No. 2017-CA-42, 2018-Ohio-989, ¶14-18. We decline to adopt the Sixth District’s interpretation of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). ... Accordingly, “[i]f, at the time the agency moves for permanent custody, the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more children services agencies for a total of 12 months out of a 22-month time period, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is satisfied.” J.C., supra, at ¶11.

A finding under Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d), together with a best-interest finding, is sufficient to support permanent custody without addressing an alternative subsection (B)(1)(a) finding.

In re A.M.S-J. · filed 2019-03-28(B)(1)(d)

In the case sub judice, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence the child had been in the temporary custody of a public children services agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). Appellant does not challenge the trial court's finding. This finding alone, in conjunction with a best-interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody.

Once the twelve-of-twenty-two-month condition in division (B)(1)(d) is established, the court need only determine whether permanent custody is in the children's best interest.

In re M.R.J. · filed 2019-05-01(B)(1)(d)

Because the juvenile court found that one of the five conditions in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) applies, the court was only required to determine whether an award of permanent custody is in the best interest of the children before ruling on the motion.

Once the twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody condition is established, the court need only decide whether permanent custody is in the children's best interest.

In re J.N. · filed 2019-05-10(B)(1)(d)

Here, the record establishes that the children had been in temporary custody for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22 month period at the time that MCCS filed its motion for permanent custody. Accordingly, the trial court only had to consider whether permanent custody was in their best interest.

Division (B)(1)(d) requires twelve months of temporary agency custody within a consecutive twenty-two-month period, not custody for all twenty-two consecutive months.

In re S.W. · filed 2019-05-28(B)(1)(d)

However, a plain reading of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) does not require JW and SW to have been with MCCS for twenty-two consecutive months in order for permanent custody to be granted. The statute requires that the children were “in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies * * * for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period.”

An undisputed Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) finding satisfies the statutory-ground prong and makes challenges to alternative abandonment and reasonable-placement findings moot.

In re E.A. · filed 2019-07-22(B)(1)(d)

Since that finding is undisputed, we conclude that Father's remaining arguments with respect to abandonment and placement within reasonable time ... are moot. As noted above, the juvenile court need only make one of the five findings enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).

Sections 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) are alternative, independently sufficient statutory grounds for permanent custody when accompanied by a best-interest finding.

In re M.S. · filed 2019-07-29(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody. ... This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody.

Once an unchallenged Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) finding establishes the statutory ground for permanent custody, review may focus on whether the best-interest determination is supported.

In re J. F. · filed 2019-08-07(B)(1)(d), (D)(1)

Father does not challenge the juvenile court's finding that J.F. was in the agency's temporary custody for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period. Accordingly, this court will review whether the court committed plain error in determining that a grant of permanent custody to the agency was in J.F.'s best interest.

Once the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is established, the remaining permanent-custody question is whether custody is in the child's best interest under division (D).

In re M.D. · filed 2019-09-12(B)(1)(d), (D)

There is no dispute in this matter that M.D. and A.D. had been in the temporary custody of FCCS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). Consequently, the merit of FCCS's motion in this case resolves to a determination of the best interest of M.D. and A.D.

Division (B)(1)(d) requires twelve months of agency custody within a consecutive twenty-two-month period regardless of the total duration of agency involvement.

In re H.M. · filed 2019-09-16(B)(1)(d)

Eleventh District determined that the plain and unambiguous language refers to twelve months in a consecutive twenty-two-month period, irrespective of the total length of an agency’s involvement. The Eleventh District’s interpretation is consistent with our own application of the statute, and our view regarding the statute at issue.

Division (B)(1)(d) does not require a separate parental-unfitness finding before parental rights are terminated.

In re E.C. · filed 2019-09-19(B)(1)(d)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the authority under which the trial court granted FCCS permanent custody of E.C. and D.C., Jr., does not require a finding of parental unfitness prior to the termination of parental rights.

Division (B)(1)(d)'s twelve-of-twenty-two-month condition does not require the twenty-two-month period to consist entirely of agency involvement.

In re K.H. · filed 2020-03-04(B)(1)(d)

Mother makes a legal argument, that this Court has previously rejected, that the “12 of 22” provision is satisfied only if the child has been in temporary custody of a children services agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period of agency involvement. This Court explicitly rejected this legal interpretation of the language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) in In re J.C., 9th Dist. Summit No. 28865, 2018-Ohio-2555, ¶ 10-13.

Once the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground in Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is established, the remaining permanent-custody issue is whether clear and convincing evidence supports the child's best interest under subsection (D)(1).

In re I.W. · filed 2020-04-24(B)(1)(d), (D)(1)

Initially, we note that at the time first evidentiary hearing on April 2, 2019, I.W. had been in the custody of DJFS for approximately 24 months, which is clearly more than 12 months out of a consecutive 22-month timeframe. Accordingly, the only issue before the court was whether the State presented clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that it was in I.W.’s best interest to be placed in the permanent custody of DJFS.

The twelve-month period in division (B)(1)(d) must exist when the permanent-custody motion is filed; time between filing and the hearing does not count.

In re R.G. · filed 2020-05-21(B)(1)(d)

Further, “the time that passes between the filing of a motion for permanent custody and the permanent-custody hearing does not count toward the 12-month period set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).” ... The “motion for permanent custody ‘must allege grounds that currently exist.’”

When division (B)(1)(d)'s twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is established, the court need not separately find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re B.D. · filed 2020-05-26(B)(1)(d)

Under the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child has been in an agency's temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, a trial court need not find that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents.

An undisputed Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding makes any error in an alternative subsection (B)(1)(b) abandonment finding harmless.

In re C.S. · filed 2020-09-14(B)(1)(b), (B)(1)(d)

Therefore, because only one of the findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) thru (e) must be met before the second prong of the two-part permanent custody test is satisfied, any error the trial court may have made by finding Mother had abandoned C.S. under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) would be, at worst, harmless.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a)'s reasonable-time placement ground applies only when none of the other subsection (B)(1) grounds, including the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground, applies.

In re H.L.R. · filed 2021-01-29(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

In other words, “[t]he plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) reveals that the subsection is only triggered when none of the remaining three subsections are triggered.”

Once Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d)'s twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is undisputed, the remaining permanent-custody question is whether the award serves the child's best interest under subsection (D).

In re C.P. · filed 2021-02-05(B)(1)(d), (D)

Here, there is no dispute that the children were in the custody of MCCS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. As a result, the only issue to consider was whether awarding permanent custody to MCCS was in the children’s best interests.

For the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground, custody time begins on the earlier of adjudication or sixty days after removal, and the ground must exist when the agency files its permanent-custody motion.

In re A.L. · filed 2021-06-14(B)(1)(d)

{¶17} According to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the children’s time in temporary custody began on the earlier of the trial court’s adjudication of the children or 60 days after their removal from the home. For ease of discussion, this Court will use the date of November 19, 2018, because all children had been adjudicated by that date. CSB filed its motion for permanent custody on July 27, 2020, more than 20 months later. See In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411, syllabus (the “12 of 22” must exist at the time the agency moves for permanent custody). To the extent that the parents argue about how COVID-19 restrictions affected reunification services after the permanent custody motion was filed, that period was not relevant to this argument because it was outside the relevant “12 of 22” time frame. See id.

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month condition in subsection (B)(1)(d) is satisfied, the court need not separately find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re T.S. · filed 2021-06-18(B)(1)(d)

{¶37} It was not necessary for the trial court to consider R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) or make a determination whether the children could not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with their parents. The trial court did not make a determination under R.C. 2151.419(A)(2) that reasonable efforts were not required, ACCS did not file its motion for permanent custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.413(D)(2), and ACCS did not request permanent custody under R.C. 2151.414(B)(2). Moreover, we have already determined that the trial court properly granted permanent custody under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). “It is well-established that under the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child has been in a children services agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, a trial court need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.” In re N.S.N., 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 15CA6, 15CA7, 15CA8, 15CA9, 2015-Ohio-2486, ¶ 52. Therefore, any error the trial court made in finding T.S., Jr. could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time was harmless.

The reasonable-time placement ground and the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground are alternative, independently sufficient bases for satisfying the first prong of permanent custody.

In re S.L. · filed 2021-07-09(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

{¶34} As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody. In re Daltoni, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2007 AP 0041, 2007-Ohio-5805. This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody. In re Calhoun, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008CA00118, 2008-Ohio-5458.

A finding that a child remained in agency custody may address custodial history under subsection (D)(1)(c) rather than establish the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground for permanent custody.

In re A.R. · filed 2021-07-28(D)(1)(c)

However, the court made no express finding that A.R. had been in the agency’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period for purposes of Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d). Accordingly, the juvenile court did not make that finding as a first-prong basis, but instead made the finding pursuant to Section 2151.414(D)(1)(c), relevant to a best interest consideration.

When a child has been in agency custody for twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, permanent custody under subsection (B)(1)(d) does not require a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent; the remaining issue is the child's best interest.

In re J.F. · filed 2021-08-03(B)(1)(d)

“It is well-established that under the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child has been in a children services agency’s temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, a trial court need not find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.” ... “Consequently, when considering a R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) permanent custody motion, the only other consideration becomes the child’s best interests.”

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month condition is met, a trial court need not also find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re E.B. · filed 2021-10-12(B)(1)(d)

{¶20} Because it is dispositive, we will only address the trial court’s determination under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). Under the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, a trial court need not find that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents. In re I.G., 3d Dist. Marion Nos. 9-13-43, 9-13-44, and 9-13-45, 2014-Ohio-1136, ¶ 30, citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) and comparing it with R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a); In re A.M., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-14-46, 2015-Ohio-2740, ¶ 14 citing In re I.G. at ¶ 30, citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

The reasonable-time placement ground and the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground are alternative and independently sufficient bases for the first prong of permanent custody.

In re O.S. · filed 2021-10-19(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

{¶69} As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody. In re Daltoni, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2007 AP 0041, 2007-Ohio-5805. This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody. In re Calhoun, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008CA00118, 2008-Ohio-5458.

Once the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is established, the trial court need not make additional findings under subsection (E).

In re S.D. · filed 2021-10-27(B)(1)(d), (E)

{¶ 20} Having made this finding, the trial court was not required to make findings under subsection (E). Nevertheless, the trial court additionally found the children "cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time and should not be placed with the parents," and made findings consistent with several factors under subsection (E). See, In re DA.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110393, 2012-Ohio-3102, ¶ 61.

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground applies, the trial court need make no other first-prong finding and may proceed directly to best interests.

In re D.H. · filed 2021-10-28(B)(1)(d)

Accordingly, the trial court properly found that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applied. When R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applies, the trial court is not required to make any other finding and can immediately proceed to the best interest determination. In re L.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107708, 2019-Ohio-1343, ¶ 26, citing In re T.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100852, 2014-Ohio-2985, ¶ 18; J.C. at id.

The twelve-of-twenty-two-month condition satisfies the first prong of permanent custody when supported by clear and convincing evidence.

In re S.L.C. · filed 2021-11-04(B)(1)(d)

The record supports that the first prong of the two-part test was satisfied where the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the children have “been in the temporary custody of the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services which is for twelve (12) or more months of consecutive twenty-two (22) month period.” Journal entry Nos. 0914624631 and 0914624634 (Apr. 9, 2021).

The first prong of permanent custody requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one enumerated subsection (B)(1) ground, including twelve months of agency custody within a consecutive twenty-two-month period.

In re J.L. · filed 2021-11-08(B)(1)(d)

{¶10} Before a juvenile court can terminate parental rights and award permanent custody to the requesting agency, the court must conduct a hearing and apply a two-pronged analysis. First, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) applies. The factor applicable here, which is not in dispute, is that the children have been in the custody of the Department for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

The reasonable-time placement and twelve-of-twenty-two-month grounds are alternative findings, each independently sufficient with a best-interest finding to support permanent custody.

In re D.H. · filed 2021-11-08(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

{¶44} As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody. In re Daltoni, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2007 AP 0041, 2007-Ohio-5805. This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody. In re Calhoun, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008CA00118, 2008-Ohio-5458.

The twelve-of-twenty-two-month factor asks only whether the child was actually in agency custody for the required period, not whether the child could have been placed elsewhere during that period.

In re R.W.H. · filed 2021-11-12(B)(1)(d)

The factor under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), however, does not invite the court to speculate as to whether R.W.H. could have been placed in another’s custody during the relevant time frame. The requirement is simply that the child was in the temporary custody of a public services agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period.

Once the twelve-of-twenty-two-month condition in subsection (B)(1)(d) is established, the court need not make additional findings under subsection (E).

In re J.P. · filed 2021-11-16(B)(1)(d)

As found by the trial court, the children have been in appellee's custody for over twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). ... Having made this finding, the trial court was not required to make findings under subsection (E).

Once subsection (B)(1)(d)'s twelve-of-twenty-two-month condition is satisfied, no additional first-prong ground is required to grant permanent custody.

In re KA.R. · filed 2021-11-18(B)(1)(d)

Because the juvenile court found that subsection (d) was satisfied, no further grounds were required to grant permanent custody.

The reasonable-time placement and twelve-of-twenty-two-month grounds are alternatives, each independently sufficient with a best-interest finding to support permanent custody.

In re S.A. · filed 2022-01-31(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(d)

{¶41} We first note that the trial court determined, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the child has been in the temporary custody of the agency for a period of time in excess of twelve of the prior twenty-two consecutive months. As the Agency points out, Mother does not dispute this finding. Findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings and each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody. In re Daltoni, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2007 AP 0041, 2007-Ohio-5805. This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody. In re Calhoun, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008CA00118, 2008-Ohio-5458.

When the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is satisfied, the trial court need not also find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re S.P. · filed 2022-02-28(B)(1)(d)

{¶20} Because it is dispositive, we will only address the trial court’s determination under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the time requirements of the “12 of 22” ground. See In re E.B., 3d Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-21-09 and 5-21-10, 2021-Ohio-3641, ¶ 20 (finding dispositive trial court’s determination under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d)). “Under the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, a trial court need not find that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents.” Id. citing In re I.G., 3d Dist. Marion Nos. 9-13-43, 9-13-44, and 9-13-45, 2014-Ohio-1136, ¶ 30, citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) and comparing it with R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a); In re A.M., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-14-46, 2015-Ohio-2740, ¶ 14, citing In re I.G. at ¶ 30, citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

Once subsection (B)(1)(d)'s twelve-of-twenty-two-month condition is established, no additional first-prong ground is required for permanent custody.

In re J.G. · filed 2022-03-17(B)(1)(d)

As we have already noted, having found that subsection (d) was satisfied, no further grounds were required under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).

An unchallenged twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding and an unchallenged best-interest finding are independently sufficient to satisfy the two-part permanent-custody test.

In re D.S. · filed 2022-03-28(B)(1)(d)

The juvenile court's unchallenged findings that Dean and Diana were in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a 22-month period and that it was in the children's best interests to be placed in the permanent custody of the agency are, by themselves, sufficient to meet the two-part test for permanent custody in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).

A twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding, together with a best-interest finding, is sufficient to support permanent custody.

In re R.L. · filed 2022-04-06(B)(1)(d)

The 12 of 22 finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent custody.

Evidence that children were in agency custody for twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period satisfies the first prong of the permanent-custody test.

In re T.G. · filed 2022-04-07(B)(1)(d)

The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the Children had been in temporary custody of the Agency for a period of twelve or more of the past twenty-two-month period. The Agency presented testimony showing the Agency met the burden of R.C. §2151.414(B)(1)(d).

An undisputed twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding alone establishes the first statutory requirement because only one subsection (B)(1) condition need apply.

In re R.A. · filed 2022-05-25(B)(1)(d)

Importantly, however, Mother does not dispute the juvenile court’s finding, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), that the children have been in the temporary custody of the Agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. As the first prong of the permanent custody test is satisfied where “one or more” of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies, the juvenile court’s undisputed finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is sufficient to establish the first requirement of the statute.

A child's removal and placement in agency-directed foster care under a voluntary care agreement starts the twelve-of-twenty-two-month custody period.

In re S.L. · filed 2022-06-24(B)(1)(d)

However, a voluntary agreement for the child’s removal and placement in agency-directed foster care would qualify as a removal under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

Once the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is clearly and convincingly established, alternative abandonment and reasonable-time placement findings are unnecessary.

In re C.P. · filed 2022-09-21(B)(1)(d)

Because the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the "12 of 22" provision had been satisfied under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), its abandonment and "reasonable period of time" findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (b) were unnecessary to grant permanent custody. Id.

Separate periods of agency temporary custody within the relevant twenty-two-month window count toward the twelve-month permanent-custody ground even when the children were returned to their parents between placements.

In re H.H. · filed 2022-10-07(B)(1)(d)

The record establishes that H.H. was returned to the custody of Mother and Father on October 26, 2020, and C.G. and N.G. were returned to the custody of their parents on December 15, 2020. All of the children were again removed from their parents’ custody on August 12, 2021, and placed in the temporary custody of CCDJFS, where they remained until the trial court’s decision. Therefore, from the adjudication of dependency through CCDJFS’s filing of its motion for permanent custody, H.H. was in the temporary custody of CCDJFS for 12 of 22 months. C.G. and N.G. were in the temporary custody of CCDJFS for approximately 14 of 22 months. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it found that the children had been in the custody of CCDJFS for 12 of 22 months as required pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

Once the twelve-of-twenty-two-month ground is established, the trial court need not make additional subsection (E) reasonable-time placement findings.

In re L.R.-R. · filed 2022-10-20(B)(1)(d), (E)

Having found that the Children had been in CCDCFS’s custody for “twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period” under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the juvenile court was not required to make further findings to determine whether the Children cannot or should not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time under subsection (E) of the statute.

The twelve-of-twenty-two-month period begins on the earlier of adjudication or sixty days after removal, so subsection (B)(1)(d) may be satisfied even if temporary custody was formally granted less than twelve months before the motion.

In re M.J. · filed 2022-11-17(B)(1)(d)

Although not more than 12 months had passed between the time the children were placed in the temporary custody of the agency and the time the complaint for permanent custody was filed, because more than 12 months had passed between 60 days after the children were removed from their home and the date the complaint was filed, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is satisfied.

Proof that a child was in agency custody for twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period supplies the statutory ground for permanent custody.

In re J.J. · filed 2022-11-22(B)(1)(d)

This Court has adopted the position that proof of temporary custody with an agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period alone is sufficient to award permanent custody.

Proof that a child was in agency custody for twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period supplies the statutory ground for permanent custody.

In re D.J. · filed 2022-11-22(B)(1)(d)

This Court has adopted the position that proof of temporary custody with an agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period alone is sufficient to award permanent custody.

Children who have been in agency custody for more than twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period satisfy subsection (B)(1)(d)'s first-prong condition.

In re G.H. · filed 2023-02-10(B)(1)(d)

As found by the trial court, the children have been in Appellee's custody for over twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

The twelve-of-twenty-two-month calculation includes all nonconsecutive periods of agency temporary custody within the look-back period preceding the permanent-custody motion.

In re M.S. · filed 2023-02-15(B)(1)(d)

Because the “12 of 22” calculation is not limited to contiguous periods of custody, the juvenile court correctly determined that M.S. had been in the temporary custody of the agency for more than 12 months during the 22-month-look-back period. ... Adding together the nonconsecutive periods of temporary custody, we determine that M.S. was in the temporary custody of HCJFS for over 16 months during the 22 months before the filing of the September 3, 2019 motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody.

Subsection (B)(1)(d)'s twelve-of-twenty-two-month condition independently supports the first prong, making review of an alternative reasonable-time placement finding unnecessary.

In re S.P. · filed 2023-02-15(B)(1)(d)

As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion for permanent custody.

Proof that a child was in agency custody for twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period independently satisfies the threshold for permanent custody.

In re G.S. · filed 2025-08-13(B)(1)(d)

This court has adopted the position that proof of temporary custody with an agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, standing alone, is sufficient to award permanent custody. ... Thus, whether or not Father was given an opportunity to complete the classroom-based Goodwill Parenting program would make no difference in the trial court's decision or this court's decision.

Where the twelve-of-twenty-two-month threshold is uncontested, appellate review may proceed directly to the statutory best-interest factors.

In re C.F. · filed 2025-10-30(D)(1)

Because father does not contest the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) (the temporary custody factor of 12 or more of 22 months), we turn to the best interest factors.

Proof of twelve months in agency custody during a consecutive twenty-two-month period independently satisfies the permanent-custody threshold.

In re E.A. · filed 2026-05-11(B)(1)(d)

This court has adopted the position that proof of temporary custody with an agency for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, standing alone, is sufficient to award permanent custody.

A supported twelve-of-twenty-two-month finding establishes the first permanent-custody prong.

In re K.T. · filed 2026-05-21(B)(1)(d)

Thus, the first prong of R.C. 2151.414(B) is established by clear and convincing evidence.

When a child has been in agency custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period under (B)(1)(d), the court need not make findings under division (E).

In re Da.J. · filed 2021-09-09(B)(1)(d)

Having found that the Children had been in CCDCFS’s custody for “twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period” under 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the trial court was not required to make findings under subsection (E).

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is satisfied when a child has been in an agency’s custody for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period.

In re O.D.- L. · filed 2021-01-15(B)(1)(d)

O.D.-L. had therefore remained in the custody of MCCS throughout this time period, which clearly exceeded 12 months of the 22-month period and satisfied R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing proof that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that a statutory ground supports the award, including a parent's continuous and repeated failure for at least six months to substantially remedy the conditions that caused removal despite reasonable case planning and diligent agency efforts.

In the Matter of Dunning, Unpublished Decision (8-10-2000) · filed 2000-08-10(B)(1), (E)(1)

A juvenile court holding a hearing on a motion for permanent custody of a child who has been previously determined to be neglected, dependent, or abused must follow the statutory guidelines set forth in R.C. 2151.414 , R.C. 2151.414 (B) provides, in relevant part: "[T]he court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at the hearing * * *, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply: "(1) The child is not abandoned or orphaned and the child cannot be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with his parents." ... The condition enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (E) (1) states, in relevant part: "Following placement of the child outside his home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parent[s] to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly for a period of six months or more to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child's home * * *." (Emphasis added). ... Given the foregoing, we find that the court had sufficient, credible evidence to find that appellant continuously and repeatedly failed to substantially remedy the condition which caused the minor child to be placed outside his home.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires the court to find that a child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time when clear and convincing evidence shows the parent continuously and repeatedly failed to substantially remedy the conditions that led to temporary custody.

In the Matter of Moore, Unpublished Decision (9-14-2000) · filed 2000-09-14(E)(1)

If it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has continuously and repeatedly failed to substantially remedy the conditions which led to the grant of temporary custody of the parent's child to CCDCFS, the court must find that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time. R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1).

Under § 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (E)(1), a parent’s repeated failure to complete significant case-plan requirements despite opportunities to do so can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot or should not be placed with that parent within a reasonable time.

In Re M.B., Unpublished Decision (3-8-2005) · filed 2005-03-08(B)(1)(a), (E)(1)

In determining whether a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, the court must consider all relevant evidence, including the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) through (16). R.C. 2151.414 (E). If the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the enumerated factors in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) through (16) exists, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent. Id. One factor alone will support a trial court's decision that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. ... Here, competent credible evidence supports the trial court's decision that M.B. could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a). Appellant failed to successfully complete significant elements of his case plan, despite opportunities to do so. Such failure is grounds for terminating appellant's parental rights.

When deciding under § 2151.414(B)(1)(a) whether a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent, a court must consider one or more of the factors in § 2151.414(E), including a parent's continuous and repeated failure to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the child's removal despite reasonable case planning and diligent agency assistance.

In Re Rollison Children, Unpublished Decision (12-19-2005) · filed 2005-12-19(B)(1)(a), (E)(1)

Ohio's present statutory scheme requires a court, in determining whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents (see R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a), supra), to consider the existence of one or more factors under R.C. 2151.414 (E), including whether or not "[f]ollowing the placement of the child outside the child's home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child's home." See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1); In re Bender, Stark App. No. 2004CA00015, 2004-Ohio-2268 . ... In the case sub judice, upon review of the record and the findings of fact and conclusions of law therein, we conclude the trial court's grant of permanent custody to LCDJFS was made in the consideration of the children's best interests and did not constitute an error or an abuse of discretion.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) permits permanent placement with an agency when reasonable case planning and diligent agency efforts have not led the parents to remedy the problems that caused the child's removal.

In Re I.M., 21977 (9-4-2007) · filed 2007-09-04(E)(1)

Pursuant to R.C. § 2151.414 (E)(1), a child may be permanently placed with the agency when, notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency, the parent or parents fail to remedy the problems that caused the removal of the child. ... From the record, it is abundantly clear that MCCSB made every reasonable effort to help Zuri get her life back in order so that she could regain full custody of I.M. and the rest of her children.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) permits a juvenile court to grant permanent custody to a children services agency only upon clear and convincing evidence that doing so is in the child's best interest.

In Re A.S., Ca2007-07-032 (11-13-2007) · filed 2007-11-13(B)(1)

First, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), a juvenile court may grant permanent custody of a child to a children services agency only if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that granting permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) permits permanent custody only upon clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest, and an incomplete evidentiary record cannot support that determination.

In Re Needom, C-080107 (5-9-2008) · filed 2008-05-09(B)(1)

A juvenile court may grant permanent custody of a child to the state if the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the child's best interest. ... But the trial court could not have concluded that it was in the children's best interest to grant permanent custody to HCJFS, because the court did not have all the evidence before it.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) authorizes permanent custody upon clear and convincing evidence that custody serves the child's best interest and a listed condition applies, while subsection (D)(1) supplies nonexclusive factors for determining the child's best interest.

In re J. B. · filed 2012-02-13(B)(1), (D)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) enables a trial court to grant permanent custody if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child. ... "Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, the court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply: ... "(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period***." ... R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) sets out the factors relevant to determining the best interests of the child. Said section states relevant factors include, but are not limited to, the following: ... The child is very bonded to the foster family and is very comfortable there. T. at 155. The foster family wishes to adopt the child. T. at 157-158. The child does have a bond with the maternal grandmother. T. at 161, 240, 317. The foster family is willing to have a relationship with the maternal grandmother for visitation. T. at 380-381. The child was placed into shelter care for more than twelve months. T. at 158. ... After independently reviewing the record, we agree with counsel's conclusion that no arguably meritorious claims exist upon which to base an appeal.

Section 2151.414(B)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re K.C. · filed 2012-03-19(B)(1)

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) enables a trial court to grant permanent custody if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child. ... Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the best interests of the child would best be served by granting appellee permanent custody of the child.

Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes both that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time and that permanent custody is in the child's best interest.

In re N.G. · filed 2013-01-16(B)(1)(a), (D), (E)(1), (E)(4), and (E)(16)

{¶34} In this case, the trial court made its permanent custody findings pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (4) and /or (16). The trial court further found that N.G. could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her. {¶35} As set forth above, we find the trial court’s findings are based upon competent credible evidence. The record includes the recommendation of the Guardian Ad Litem for the children, and the testimony of the witnesses at trial. The trial court was in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses. {¶36} N.G. loves her Mother and her Mother loves her and has developed a bond. The evidence demonstrated the successful efforts Mother had made on two occasions in the past to regain custody of N.G. On that point, the evidence demonstrates any improvement Mother has made in her life is tentative and, perhaps, temporary, and she is at risk of relapse. The trial court found, regardless of Mother’s compliance with aspects of her case plan, she was still not able to be a successful parent to N.G. {¶37} In the case of In re: Summerfield, 5th Dist. No. 2005CA00139, 2005-Ohio- 5523, this court found where, despite marginal compliance with some aspects of the case plan, the exact problems that led to the initial removal remained in existence, a court does not err in finding the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time. {¶38} Based upon the foregoing, as well as the entire record in this case, the Court properly found N.G. could not or should not be returned to Mother within a reasonable time. Despite offering numerous services, Mother was unable to mitigate the concerns that led to the child's removal.

Section 2151.414 requires the court to assess the child's best interests under division (D) and permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence shows that a parent has continuously and repeatedly failed to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the child to be placed outside the home under division (E)(1).

In Re Moore, Unpublished Decision (8-31-2000) · filed 2000-08-31(D), (E)(1)

The record before this court clearly establishes that the trial court considered the appropriate statutory factors in reaching its determination. This court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the appellant had failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child's home, as to each of her three children involved in the present case and that it was in the best interest of each individual child that permanent custody be awarded to CCDCFS. R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1).

Section 2151.414 requires clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child's best interest and that the child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time, based on the statute's listed factors.

In Re Ajaye Jones, Unpublished Decision (9-25-2000) · filed 2000-09-25(A)(1), (B), (B)(1), (D), and (E)(1)-(2), (12)

The court made findings for each of the statutorily required factors to determine the best interests of Ajaye and Davia. ... Clear and convincing evidence supports the court's determination that permanent custody would be in the children's best interest. ... Likewise, the court's determination that Ajaye and Davia could not be placed with appellant within a reasonable time is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its application of R.C. 2151.414 . Accordingly, appellant's assignment of error is overruled.

Section 2151.414(B) requires a separate best-interests determination for each child but permits consideration of a parent's treatment of other children, while subsection (C) requires a guardian ad litem's timely written report subject to waiver without objection or harmless-error treatment absent prejudice.

In Re Vactor, Unpublished Decision (10-5-2000) · filed 2000-10-05(B), (C)

Appellant is correct that a court must make an independent determination with regard to permanent custody of more than one child in a multi-child family. ... Thus, it was not error for the court to consider appellant's interactions, or lack thereof, with her other children in determining whether permanent custody was in Destiny's best interests. ... This Court has previously held that a guardian ad litem's failure to submit a written report is error. ... The error is deemed waived, however, if it is not objected to or otherwise brought to the attention of the trial court. ... Moreover, appellant did not establish in what manner she was prejudiced from the failure of the guardian ad litem to submit a timely written report. When a parent cannot establish any prejudice arising from the misfeasance, or nonfeasance, of a guardian ad litem, it is harmless error. ... Consequently, though it was error for the guardian not to submit a timely written report, any error is either harmless or waived.

Section 2151.414's permanent-custody factors may be applied or at least considered when a juvenile court determines permanent custody of a child in a legal guardian's care.

In Re Davis, Unpublished Decision (10-12-2000) · filed 2000-10-12

While the different subsections of R.C. 2151.414 establish factors that mostly concern the conduct of the parent and/or the interrelationship between the parent and child, this court finds no reason why such standards should not be applied or at least considered to situations where the juvenile courts are determining the permanent custody of a child in the care of a legal guardian. This is not to say that a legal guardian should be afforded the same latitude and presumptive rights that a natural parent receives as a matter of law. Whether the juvenile court applies the above enumerated factors to the care giver as a legal custodian or parent is irrelevant, what is in the best interest of the child is always of paramount concern and should be the overriding theme in any custody hearing.

Section 2151.414 requires notice of a permanent-custody motion and hearing, and requires the court to find that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parents before awarding permanent custody.

In Re Kincaid, Unpublished Decision (10-27-2000) · filed 2000-10-27(A), (B)(1)

In permanent custody proceedings, R.C. 2151.414 requires the court to schedule a hearing and notify all parties to the action "of the filing of the motion [requesting permanent custody] and of the hearing, in accordance with section 2151.29 of the Revised Code." R.C. 2151.414 (A). ... We agree with the reasoning of Ciara B. , and we hold that the notice requirement of R.C. 2151.414 (A) involves the juvenile court's personal jurisdiction over the parents, not its subject matter jurisdiction to decide a motion for permanent custody. ... The statute specifically requires the juvenile court to find that "the child cannot be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with his parents." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1).

Section 2151.414(D)'s best-interest determination may favor permanent custody when, despite repeated assistance and opportunities, a parent has not remedied basic problems such as an unsafe home environment.

In Re Elliott, Unpublished Decision (11-3-2003) · filed 2003-11-03(D)

Considering all of the above evidence, we find that the trial court did not err in determining that it was in Anna Marie's best interest for BCCSB to be granted custody. Despite being given numerous opportunities and assistance, appellant has failed to remedy even the most basic problems that prevent him from having custody of Anna Marie, including providing a safe home environment.

Section 2151.414(D)'s best-interest inquiry may support permanent custody despite the current foster caregiver's concerns about adoption when evidence shows that the child is adoptable and other adoptive homes are under consideration.

In the Matter of Robinson, Unpublished Decision (4-5-2004) · filed 2004-04-05(D)

Mother argues the trial court's granting permanent custody of Noah to the Department was not in his best interest due to the foster mother's concerns about adopting the child, as well as Noah's health problems. ... Elizabeth Parsons testified despite Noah's Downs-Syndrome he is adoptable. Parsons described Noah as a "very open and very friendly child", who is doing "very, very well". She added Noah is a high functioning Downs-Syndrome child and will function well in society. Parsons noted the Department was considering two or three homes at the time of the hearing. ... We find the aforementioned testimony provided competent, credible evidence to support the trial court's conclusion the best interest of Noah would be served by granting permanent custody to the Department. Accordingly, we find the trial court's decision was not against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence.

Under § 2151.414(E)(1) and (4), incomplete housing, employment, therapy, and visitation objectives supported findings that the parent failed to remedy the causes of removal and showed a lack of commitment; the children’s need for a legally secure placement supported the best-interest finding under subsection (D).

In re D.H. · filed 2012-10-05(E)(1), (E)(4), and (D)

R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) directs the court to consider whether: the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home. * * * [T]he court shall consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental duties. ... Having reviewed Mother’s case plan objectives and her progress, we agree with the trial court that she has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the problems that caused the children to be removed from her care. ... R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) directs the court to consider whether the “parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child.” ... Accordingly, we conclude that Mother has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward her children and an unwillingness to provide an adequate, permanent home for them. ... Since Mother failed to satisfy her case plan objectives and moved to Columbus, and since there are no relatives able to care for them, the trial court correctly concluded that the children, all of whom are adoptable, have an immediate need for a legally secure permanent placement.

Section 2151.414(E)(11) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent when clear and convincing evidence shows that the parent abused the child and a sibling was previously permanently removed because the parent abused that sibling.

In the Matter of Harmon, Unpublished Decision (9-25-2000) · filed 2000-09-25(E)(11)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) (11) requires the trial court to find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent if clear and convincing evidence exists that the parent committed abuse as defined in R.C. 2151.031 against the child and a sibling of the child previously has been permanently removed from the parent's home because the parent abused the sibling. ... We note that a finding that a child is an abused child within the meaning of R.C. 2151.031 does not require a specific finding of parental fault. ... Rather, a child may be considered an abused child within the meaning of R.C. 2151.031 regardless of who is responsible. ... We believe that the foregoing evidence is sufficient to satisfy R.C. 2151.414 (E) (11).

Subsections (D)(5) and (E)(7) through (11) must be read with the rest of Chapter 2151 as part of the legislature's comprehensive protection of siblings of abused children.

In Re Darling, Unpublished Decision (12-31-2003) · filed 2003-12-31(D)(5), (E)(7)-(11)

These sections of the statute are to be read in pari materia with the whole of the chapter. Statutory enactments that relate to the same general subject matter must be read in pari materia. United Tel. Co. of Ohio v. Limbach (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 369 , 372 . When doing so, it is apparent that the legislature intended to trigger comprehensive protection to siblings when a child is found to be abused.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires the court to consider a parent's use of available medical, psychiatric, psychological, social, rehabilitative, and material services when deciding whether the parent substantially remedied the conditions that led to removal.

In Re Flory Children, Unpublished Decision (10-2-2000) · filed 2000-10-02(E)(1)

In determining whether the parents have substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental duties. ... Finally, we find the trial court did consider appellant's utilization of services offered by SCDHS. The trial court detailed not only the services appellant utilized in this intervention, but also the services provided to appellant in previous SCDHS interventions.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) permits a failure-to-remedy finding where parents attend parenting classes without benefiting and refuse available psychiatric or psychological services needed to change their conduct.

In the Matter of Gulla, Unpublished Decision (11-22-2000) · filed 2000-11-22(E)(1)

In the case at bar, the evidence showed that both parents failed to obtain the psychiatric/psychological services required in the case plan. Neither parent saw any need to use these services, and both were completely resistant to any counseling or change. Similarly, both parents failed to benefit from the parenting classes offered by the county. ... In sum, both parents failed to use the resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental duties.

Failure to complete drug testing required by a reunification plan may constitute clear and convincing evidence that a parent failed to use available rehabilitative resources under section 2151.414(E)(1).

In Re Ezekiel M.T. Jones, Unpublished Decision (12-28-2000) · filed 2000-12-28(E)(1)

The trial court easily could find that mother's failure to comply with the drug testing specified in the case plan was clear and convincing evidence of her failure to use the rehabilitative resources available to her.

Working a case plan does not establish that a parent remedied the conditions causing removal under section 2151.414(E)(1) when the parent cannot or will not use what the plan taught.

In Re Howard, Unpublished Decision (1-29-2001) · filed 2001-01-29(E)(1)

The Agency concedes that arguably appellants worked their case plan, however, the record indicates appellants were either unable or unwilling to use what they learned from the case plan to remedy the problems that existed in the home.

Substantial attendance at parenting classes does not establish progress toward reunification under section 2151.414 when the parent cannot apply the training.

In the Matter of Bennett Children, Unpublished Decision (6-18-2001) · filed 2001-06-18(E)(1)

Although appellants were able to make partial progress towards the case plan, the fact that the mother, Carolyn Bennett, substantially complied with attendance at parenting classes is insufficient, if no progress was made, as the best interests of the children is paramount.

A child’s refusal to participate in counseling or visitation does not defeat a failure-to-remedy finding under Section 2151.414(E)(1) when the parent also neglected available mental-health services despite diligent agency efforts.

In Re Jenkins, Unpublished Decision (6-28-2001) · filed 2001-06-28(E)(1)

As discussed in connection with assignments of error one and two, despite diligent efforts by FCCS, there was ample, credible, competent evidence that appellant did not comply with the case plan and failed to remedy the conditions that caused her children to be removed. While it is true that some of appellant's efforts to engage in counseling and visitation with her children were thwarted by the children's adamant refusal to attend, the record also contains evidence that appellant did not avail herself of opportunities to work with mental health professionals.

Completion of parenting classes does not satisfy a case-plan requirement when the parent cannot assimilate and use the skills needed to care for the child.

In Re Jones, Unpublished Decision (12-27-2001) · filed 2001-12-27(E)(1)

It is undisputed that appellant completed a certain number of parenting classes designed to equip her with skills necessary to care for her child. ... Despite appellant's best efforts to acquire parenting skills, the record reflects that she was not able to do so. Because the court's duty was to determine what was in the best interest of Gregory, the trial court did not err in determining that appellant had failed to satisfy this element of her case plan.

Refusal to acknowledge mental-health problems or pursue offered counseling supports a failure-to-remedy finding under section 2151.414(E)(1).

In Re A.S., Unpublished Decision (1-31-2002) · filed 2002-01-31(E)(1)

Accordingly, the record reflects that appellant neither acknowledged her mental health issues nor attempted to address them in any way in order to regain custody of her children. ... In short, the evidence adduced at the permanent custody hearing clearly and convincingly established that appellant had continuously and repeatedly failed to substantially remedy the conditions that led to the removal of her children from her custody.

A parent's complete cooperation with a case plan does not preclude a section 2151.414(E)(1) finding when years of agency involvement produce no improvement in the parent's ability to protect the child.

In Re Lambert, Unpublished Decision (5-28-2002) · filed 2002-05-28(E)(1)

Upon review, we cannot say the trial court erred in determining appellee had expended a reasonable amount of time and effort on reunification given appellee's involvement with the family over a three years time span and the lack of progress, regardless of appellant's total cooperation with the case plan.

Compliance with some case-plan objectives does not defeat section 2151.414(E)(1) when the parent fails over years to remedy the other conditions that led to removal.

In Re Lansberry, Unpublished Decision (6-5-2002) · filed 2002-06-05(E)(1)

That appellant maintained adequate housing and a regular job in satisfaction of the first prong of the case plan does not obviate her remaining failures. The record demonstrates that though appellant had over two and a half years to comply with the case plan and meet the needs of her children, appellant failed to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of her children excepting adequate housing.

In deciding whether a parent substantially remedied the conditions causing removal, subsection (E)(1) directs the court to consider the parent's use of available medical, psychiatric, psychological, social, rehabilitative, and material services.

In Re Berry, Unpublished Decision (1-13-2003) · filed 2003-01-13(E)(1)

The Revised Code directs the court to consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and rehabilitative services and material resources available to the parents for purpose of changing parental conduct which would allow them to resume and maintain their parental duties. ... Our review of the above, and the record, leads us to conclude the trial court was correct in finding there was competent and credible evidence upon which the trial court could determine by clear and convincing evidence that Gabriella could not and should not be returned to the custody of her mother within a reasonable time.

Partial compliance with a case plan does not preclude permanent custody when the parent remains unable to provide a safe environment addressing the conditions that prompted removal.

In Re Williamson, Unpublished Decision (11-1-2002) · filed 2002-11-01(E)(1)

{¶ 29} The telling factor in this case is despite appellant's adherence to part of the case plan, she is unable to control her resident children. The placement of Jeff and Heather, given their respective anger and sexually acting out issues, into such an uncontrolled environment would not be in their best interests. Like the trial court, we believe appellant made a sincere effort to comply with the case plan, but has been unable to accept the truth about the issues involving her children. She is unable to provide an environment that would be in the best interests of Jeff and Heather. {¶ 30} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in awarding permanent custody of the children to appellee.

Subsection (E)(1) asks whether the parent substantially remedied the conditions that caused removal, so completing the case plan does not preclude permanent custody.

In the Matter of Mraz, Unpublished Decision (12-30-2002) · filed 2002-12-30(E)(1)

Consequently, the issue is not whether the parent has substantially complied with the case plan, but "whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child's removal." In re Shchigelski (Oct. 20, 2000), Geauga App. No. 99-G-2241, quoting In re McKenzie (Oct. 18, 1995), Wayne App. No. 95CA0015. It is well-established in Ohio that the completion of case plan requirements does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a social services agency.

A parent's substantial compliance with a case plan, by itself, does not establish that an award of permanent custody is erroneous.

In Re C.P., Unpublished Decision (8-20-2003) · filed 2003-08-20(E)

Substantial compliance with a case plan by a parent, in and of itself, does not prove that a grant of permanent custody to an agency is erroneous .

Under section 2151.414(E)(1), the operative issue is whether the parent remedied the condition that caused removal, not whether the parent complied with some case-plan requirements.

In the Matter of Zorns, Unpublished Decision (10-23-2003) · filed 2003-10-23(E)(1)

Initially, we note that the operative issue here is whether appellant has substantially remedied the condition resulting in the removal of Brandalynn and James from her home. Although appellant has complied with some of the case plan's requirements, she has not addressed the abuse that resulted in the children's removal from the home.

Under section 2151.414(E)(1), the dispositive question is whether the parent substantially remedied the condition causing removal, not whether the parent substantially complied with a case plan.

In the Matter of Thomas, Unpublished Decision (11-3-2003) · filed 2003-11-03(E)(1)

Second, the dispositive issue is not whether the parent has substantially complied with the case plan, but whether the parent has substantially remedied the condition that caused the child's removal.

Compliance with a reunification case plan does not by itself entitle a parent to custody because the ultimate statutory issue is the child's best interest.

In Re West, Unpublished Decision (11-19-2003) · filed 2003-11-19(B), (D)

However, a parent's compliance with a reunification plan, without more, does not entitle a parent to custody.

In deciding whether a parent repeatedly failed to substantially remedy the conditions causing removal, the court must consider the parent's use of available services, but limited and ineffectual progress does not require the agency to delay pursuing permanency.

In re R.F. · filed 2014-03-03(E)(1)

In light of appellant's ineffectual progress in this matter, we concur with the agency's assertion that it should not be required to have R.F., Jr. wait out a lengthier time period before moving toward a permanency goal in the child's best interest. We find the trial court's decision in this regard did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

In deciding whether conditions were substantially remedied, subsection (E)(1) requires consideration not only of the agency's efforts but also of the parent's utilization of the services and resources made available.

In re N.G. · filed 2016-01-19(E)(1)

In addition to the obligation of LCCS to make reasonable efforts to provide Mother with appropriate reunification services, Mother must be held accountable for failing to participate in the services provided.