Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414

Once a guardian ad litem report is admitted into evidence in a permanent-custody proceeding under section 2151.414, the parent must be allowed to cross-examine the guardian.

In Re Hoffman, Unpublished Decision (11-28-2001) · filed 2001-11-28(C)

We find once the trial court admitted the guardian's report into evidence, the trial court was required to permit mother to cross-examine the guardian.

Section 2151.414(C) does not require consideration of a second guardian ad litem report submitted after the hearing without a court order requesting it.

In Re Matter of Sears, Unpublished Decision (1-31-2002) · filed 2002-01-31(C)

While Hendrickson's report may have demonstrated the wishes of Sherell and Rickia, the report was not evidence which the court was statutorily required to consider because it was submitted after the date of the hearing and in the absence of any order from the court to submit a second report.

Section 2151.414(C)’s prohibition on submitting the guardian ad litem’s report under oath does not bar the guardian from testifying under oath.

In the Matter of Sypher, Unpublished Decision (3-11-2002) · filed 2002-03-11(C)

The statute does not state that the guardian ad litem herself shall not testify under oath, only that the report shall not be submitted under oath. Accordingly, the court properly permitted Skorich to testify.

Failure to object to the missing guardian ad litem report required by Section 2151.414(C) waives the error on appeal.

In Re Michael A., Unpublished Decision (3-21-2002) · filed 2002-03-21(C)

Likewise, as for the guardian ad litem's failure to file an expert report, we have held that "[t]he failure to object to this procedural irregularity is a waiver of error."

Section 2151.414(C)'s direction that a guardian ad litem's report not be submitted under oath applies only to the written report and does not bar sworn guardian testimony clarifying or expanding on it for the best-interest inquiry.

In the Matter of Rayl, Unpublished Decision (9-25-2002) · filed 2002-09-25(C), (D)(2)

The phrase, "shall not be submitted under oath," refers specifically to the report itself, not to the findings of the guardian ad litem or any testimony that the guardian may provide during the course of the trial. The purpose of the guardian's report is to provide an informed, professional opinion of the child's circumstances and needs in order to the aid the court in making its decision. The statute states that the report itself cannot be submitted under oath, but it does not bar further testimony that may be admitted for the purposes of clarifying or expanding on the contents of the report. ... Since the testimony of the guardian ad litem furthered the objectives stated in the Revised Code and cannot be properly classified as hearsay, the trial court acted properly in allowing it to be admitted under oath.

Although § 2151.414(C) requires the guardian ad litem's written report before or at the permanent-custody hearing, a parent waives a late-report error by failing to object, and the statute does not require the guardian to testify or face cross-examination.

In Re Bowers, Unpublished Decision (9-26-2002) · filed 2002-09-26(C)

R.C. 2151.414 (C) states that "[a] written report of the guardian ad litem of the child shall be submitted to the court prior to or at the time of the [permanent custody] hearing * * *." The record reflects that the guardian ad litem did not submit his report at or before the time of the final hearing. ... This court has stated, however, that while it is error to fail to submit a report as required under R.C. 2151.414 (C), such error is waived if there is no objection. ... There is nothing in the Revised Code or case law that requires a guardian ad litem to testify as a witness and be cross-examined at a final hearing regarding permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(C) requires a guardian ad litem's report to be submitted to the court before the hearing, but does not require the clerk to file and time-stamp it before the hearing.

In the Matter of Kramer, Unpublished Decision (5-6-2003) · filed 2003-05-06(C)

Second, on its face, the rule does not require that the report be filed and time-stamped by the court's clerk's office prior to the hearing; rather, only that it be submitted to the court prior to the hearing.

Under subsection (C), a guardian ad litem's report should be filed before or at the dispositional hearing, but a party waives an objection to a later filing by failing to object in juvenile court.

In Re K.W., Unpublished Decision (10-6-2005) · filed 2005-10-06(C)

Although R.C. 2151.414 (C) directs that the report of a GAL should be filed either before or at the time of the dispositional hearing, this court consistently has held that an appellant waives any objection to a later submission of the GAL's report if he or she fails to object in the juvenile court. In re: CH.O., Cuyahoga App. No. 84943, 2005-Ohio-1013, ¶ 36; In the Matter of Cooper (Aug. 28, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 78848, citing In re Benoit (Nov. 2, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76128; In the Matter of Nicholson (Jan. 27, 2000), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 75533-39.

Section 2151.414(C)'s requirement that a guardian ad litem report be submitted before or at the permanent-custody hearing does not permit hearsay in the report to be considered as substantive evidence.

In Re Hilyard, Unpublished Decision (4-13-2006) · filed 2006-04-13(C)

R.C. 2151.414 (C) requires that a written report of the guardian ad litem "shall be submitted to the court" before or at the time of the permanent custody hearing, and provides that the report not be submitted under oath. ... But it specifically acknowledges the requirements of Juv.R. 34(I) that the Rules of Evidence "shall apply" in hearings on motions for permanent custody. ... Thus, we conclude to the extent that the court admitted the Guardian Ad Litem's report and considered it as substantive evidence, it erred.

Section 2151.414(C) requires a child's guardian ad litem to submit a written report before or at the permanent-custody hearing; a late filing is generally harmless if it causes no prejudice.

In Re Kangas, Unpublished Decision (6-30-2006) · filed 2006-06-30(C)

"A written report of the guardian ad litem of the child shall be submitted to the court prior to or at the time of the hearing" on a motion for permanent custody. ... When no prejudice results from the late filing of the guardian ad litem's report, it generally is harmless error.

Section 2151.414(C) requires the child's guardian ad litem to submit a written report to the court before or at the permanent-custody hearing.

In Re J.M., 08-Ha-1 (12-5-2008) · filed 2008-12-05(C)

{¶ 12} The guardian ad litem (GAL) of the subject child is required to submit a written report to the court prior to or at the time of the hearing. R.C. 2151.414 (C).

A guardian ad litem's statutorily required written report provides additional information for the court's consideration rather than ordinary evidence.

In re K.W. · filed 2014-10-17(C)

A GAL report, then, “‘is merely submitted as additional information for the court’s consideration, similar to a pre-sentence investigation report in a criminal proceeding.’” Pettit at ¶ 80, quoting In re Daneasha Sherman at ¶ 29.

A guardian ad litem's permanent-custody report is not evidence but is an independent source of information the juvenile court may consider, subject to the parties' due-process right to cross-examine the guardian.

In re K.S. · filed 2015-10-02(C)

The GAL's recommendation is contained within a written report, which “shall be submitted to the court * * * but shall not be submitted under oath.” R.C. 2151.414(C). The purpose of the report is “to give the court information, in addition to that elicited at the hearing, to assist it in making sound decisions concerning permanent custody placements.”

Failure to object to a procedural irregularity under subsection (C), including the timing of a guardian ad litem's written report, waives all but plain error.

In re D.T. · filed 2020-07-20(C)

Failure to object to a procedural irregularity under R.C. 2151.414(C) is a waiver of error.

Section 2151.414(C) requires a written guardian-ad-litem report before or at the permanent-custody hearing, but the report supplies additional information for the court rather than sworn evidence.

In re N.J. · filed 2020-08-21(C)

A GAL report, then, “ ‘is merely submitted as additional information for the court's consideration, similar to a pre-sentence investigation report in a criminal proceeding.’ ”

Section 2151.414(C) requires the guardian ad litem to file a written report before or at the permanent-custody hearing, but failure to do so is not reversible absent demonstrated prejudice.

In re T.C.R. · filed 2024-10-08(C)

R.C. 2151.414(C) requires that a GAL file a written report prior to or at the time of the permanent custody hearing. ... Upon review, father has failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the GAL’s failure to file a report prior to the hearing.

Section 2151.414(C) requires the guardian ad litem to submit a written report by the permanent custody hearing but does not require the guardian ad litem to testify.

In the Matter of Krems, Unpublished Decision (5-14-2004) · filed 2004-05-14(C)

R.C. 2151.414 (C) requires the guardian ad litem to submit a written report to the court prior to or at the time of the permanent custody hearing. Absent is a requirement that the guardian ad litem present testimony at the permanent custody hearing.

Section 2151.414(C) requires the guardian ad litem’s written report to be submitted by the hearing, but does not require it to be submitted under oath.

In Re robinson/brooks, Unpublished Decision (11-15-2004) · filed 2004-11-15(C)

R.C. 2151.414 (C) provides a written report of the guardian ad litem of the child shall be submitted to the court prior to or at the time of hearing held pursuant to Division A of the section, but shall not be submitted under oath. ... We find the trial court did not err in finding the guardian ad litem report was submitted to it, and it had reviewed it.

Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires a court to find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when, despite reasonable case planning and diligent agency efforts, the parent continuously and repeatedly fails to substantially remedy the conditions that led to removal.

Matter of mcwhorter/wiley, Unpublished Decision (5-11-1998) · filed 1998-05-11(E)(1)

However, in addition to the best interest determination, the trial court must also consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1). Section (E) provides as follows: (E) In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 * * * of the Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents, the court shall consider all relevant evidence. ... The trial court found the following factor present under R.C. 2151.414 (E): (1) Following the placement of the child outside the child's home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child's home. * * * The evidence discussed above clearly supports the conclusion that appellant has failed to remedy the situation that originally caused the children to be removed from her custody.

Section 2151.414(E) requires a trial court granting permanent custody to a state agency to find that a listed factor applies, after which it must find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

Matter of Branam, Unpublished Decision (3-8-1999) · filed 1999-03-08(E)(2), (E)(12)

When granting permanent custody to a state agency, the trial court must also find that one of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exist. ... If any of the factors apply, "the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent." Id.

Section 2151.414(E)(4) permits a court to find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when the parent shows a lack of commitment by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home.

Matter of H., Unpublished Decision (9-17-1999) · filed 1999-09-17(E)(4)

The existence of the predicate condition in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4) can be established in one of two ways. First, a court may conclude that the parent "has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so." Second, a court may conclude that the parent demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child "by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child."

Section 2151.414(E)(1) requires reasonable case-planning efforts, a case plan, and an opportunity to remedy post-removal conditions when it is the basis for an initial permanent-custody award.

In the Matter of Ward, Unpublished Decision (8-2-2000) · filed 2000-08-02(E)(1)

However, when R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) is a basis for granting permanent custody as the initial disposition, an agency must have given the parent a case plan and an opportunity to correct the situation that caused the removal. ... R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) by its own terms requires reasonable case planning efforts. The focus of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) is on the efforts made to remedy the problems after the child is removed from the home. The plain language of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) precludes an interpretation that it refers only to conditions existing at the time of the child's removal.

If any subsection (E) factor is present, the court must find that the children cannot or should not be placed with their parents.

In Re M.H., Unpublished Decision (12-24-2003) · filed 2003-12-24(E)

If any factor is present, the court is required to enter a finding that the children cannot or should not be placed with the parents.

Under § 2151.414(E)(2) and (11), clear and convincing evidence of a parent's severe chronic mental conditions preventing an adequate permanent home within one year, together with a prior involuntary termination concerning a sibling, requires a conclusion that the child cannot or should not be placed with that parent within a reasonable time.

In Re Sadie R., Unpublished Decision (1-28-2005) · filed 2005-01-28(E)(2), (E)(11)

The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence was presented to meet the condition of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(2). As to the condition of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11), no one disputes that the mother has had her parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to Sadie's sibling. Thus, the court had to conclude that Sadie cannot or should not be placed with her mother within a reasonable amount of time. R.C. 2151.414 . Weighing the evidence and testimony such as to make every reasonable inference in favor of upholding the trial court's findings of fact, the trial court did not err in finding that the conditions of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(2) and (11) were met.

Section 2151.414(E) requires only one enumerated factor to support a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time, and evidence of a parent's failure to remedy placement conditions and inability to parent within one year can satisfy divisions (E)(1) and (E)(2).

In Re Spangler · filed 2005-07-05(E)(1), (E)(2)

The evidence in the record supports these findings. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding that Spangler had failed to comply with the terms of the case plan, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), and that Spangler would not be able to parent the children within one year, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(2). Since the trial court need find only one factor to enter a finding that the children should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable period of time, any error of the requirement that Spangler have no contact with Norris is harmless.

Section 2151.414(E) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time when clear and convincing evidence establishes any one listed factor.

In Re Steward, Unpublished Decision (7-12-2005) · filed 2005-07-12(E)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) sets forth the factors a trial court must consider in determining whether a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. See R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a). If the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of any one of the following factors, "the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent": ... A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time upon the existence of any one of the above factors. The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(E) requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one listed factor before a court may find that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In Re K.M., Unpublished Decision (7-14-2005) · filed 2005-07-14(E)

The court must determine by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exist in order to find that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

Section 2151.414(E) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when any one of the enumerated circumstances is established.

In Re G.B., Unpublished Decision (8-31-2005) · filed 2005-08-31(E)

{¶ 16} As to the first prong of the permanent custody test, Appellant argues that the finding by the trial court that Appellant failed to remedy problems which necessitated removal of the child is not supported by the evidence. Even assuming Appellant's argument is correct, the trial court made several additional determinations pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E) in support of its conclusion that the child could not or should not be placed with the parents. None of the other determinations are challenged. Any one of these determinations requires the trial court to enter a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with Appellant. R.C. 2151.414 (E). Consequently, Appellant's argument as to the first prong of the permanent custody test is without merit.

Only one factor listed in R.C. 2151.414(E) is necessary to support a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent, so evidence supporting an (E)(4) finding makes a challenge based on (E)(1) immaterial.

In Re S.T., V.T., P.T., Unpublished Decision (9-14-2005) · filed 2005-09-14(E)(1), (E)(4)

In the present case, the trial court did not rely solely on R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1). The existence of evidence on only one of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414 (E) is necessary to support a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent. In re Patterson, 134 Ohio App.3d at 125 . Even assuming merit in Appellant's argument, we conclude that the evidence nevertheless supports finding on another supportive factor listed in R.C. 2151.414 (E). The evidence reveals that Paul has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward P.T. by failing to support, visit and communicate with the child for several months. See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4). In addition, the evidence also supports a finding that Appellant's failure to separate herself from Paul along with her failure to take any meaningful steps towards independence demonstrate an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child. See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4). Because the evidence supports a finding pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4), Appellant's argument, which relies on R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1), is without merit.

Section 2151.414(E) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent when clear and convincing evidence establishes any one enumerated factor, including failure to remedy removal conditions, allowing neglect, lack of commitment, or unwillingness to provide an adequate home and prevent neglect.

In Re Daniel D., Unpublished Decision (10-14-2005) · filed 2005-10-14(E)(1), (E)(3), (E)(4), and (E)(14)

If any one of these predicate findings is supported by the evidence, the court's decision must be sustained. ... Couple all of this with appellants' marginal performance in learning parenting skills and the reintroduction of the children into the maternal grandmother's house, suggests that appellants have not remedied the condition which caused the children to be removed from the home; that they have allowed the children to suffer neglect, and that they have demonstrated an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home and prevent neglect. {¶ 25} Consequently, there was competent, credible evidence in the record by which the court could have properly found the factors articulated in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1), (3), (4) and (14).

Section 2151.414(E) requires a court to find only one listed factor, and a parent's continuous failure to remedy the conditions that caused removal despite reasonable case planning and diligent agency efforts satisfies subsection (E)(1).

In Re E.H., Unpublished Decision (1-27-2006) · filed 2006-01-27(E)(1)

Notably, R.C. 2151.414 (E) requires the court to find only one of the listed factors. Therefore, if clear and convincing evidence supports any of the above factors, the trial court would have been justified in finding that E.H. and S.H. could not be placed with Michelle within a reasonable time, or should not be placed with Michelle. ... In view of the above facts, there was clear and convincing evidence that despite reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by CCDJFS, Michelle failed to remedy the problems that caused the twins to be placed outside her home. R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1).

A finding by clear and convincing evidence of any one factor in subsection (E), including a parent's continuous failure to substantially remedy the conditions that caused out-of-home placement, requires a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

In Re King, Unpublished Decision (2-15-2006) · filed 2006-02-15(E)(1)

Revised Code 2151.414(E) sets forth the factors a trial court must consider in determining whether a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time. See R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a). If the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of any one of the factors, "the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with [the] parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent". R.C. 2151.414 (E). Thus, the existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time. See In re: William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95 , 661 N.E.2d 738 ; In re: Hurlow (Sept. 21, 1998), Gallia App. No. 98 CA 6; In re: Butcher (Apr. 10, 1991), Athens App. No. 1470. ... For the foregoing reasons, this court concludes that the trial court's finding that the children cannot be placed with appellant within a reasonable time is supported by competent credible evidence. While appellant may have complied with some aspects of the case plan, appellant did not successfully complete the case plan or remedy the problems identified by the Agency. See In re: Swisher, Tuscarawas App. No. 2003 APO 40028, 2003-Ohio-3747.

Section 2151.414(E) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time when clear and convincing evidence establishes any one of its listed factors.

In Re Gallion, Unpublished Decision (6-12-2006) · filed 2006-06-12(E)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) sets forth the factors a trial court must consider in determining whether a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. ... A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time upon the existence of any one of the above factors. The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(E) requires a court to find that a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent when clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one listed factor as to each parent.

In Re P.B., Unpublished Decision (10-18-2006) · filed 2006-10-18(E)

Concerning the first prong, when the trial court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the factors in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exists as to each of the child's parents, it must enter a finding that the child could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

Section 2151.414(E) permits a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent when clear and convincing evidence establishes any one listed factor.

In Re M.T., 90249 (2-7-2008) · filed 2008-02-07(E)

To find that the child should not be placed with either parent, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence one or more of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (E). "The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time." In re Pettiford , Ross App. No. 06CA2883, 2006-Ohio-3647 . ... As six of the factors proffered in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exist, we find competent, credible evidence existed to support the trial court's finding that M.T. cannot and should not be returned to either parent within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(E) requires only one statutory predicate factor to support a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In Re R. B., 07ca009307 (4-28-2008) · filed 2008-04-28(E)

Leslie has argued that the trial court's reliance on R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) was erroneous because that statute is premised upon "reasonable case planning and diligent efforts" by the agency towards reunification, and that, because of the "reasonable efforts bypass," there was no case planning in this case. Leslie has made no argument, however, contesting the trial court's alternative predicate finding based on R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11), the fact that Leslie's parental rights had been terminated as to siblings of R.B. Because the trial court was only obligated to make a finding on one of the predicate factors in R.C. 2151.414 (E) in order to conclude that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent and because Leslie has not challenged the finding based on R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11), any error regarding R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) is harmless.

Section 2151.414(E) directs courts to consider enumerated factors when deciding whether a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, and a finding supported by clear and convincing evidence will withstand a weight-and-sufficiency challenge.

In Re Pihlblad, 2008ca0019 (6-9-2008) · filed 2008-06-09(E)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) sets out the factors a court should look to in determining whether the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent: ... We have reviewed the record and we find the trial court's determination the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time is supported by the weight and sufficiency of clear and convincing evidence.

Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (E)(4), persistent failure to correct unsafe home conditions after agency assistance, together with sporadic visitation and lack of support or contact, can establish that children cannot or should not be placed with a parent.

In Re shepard/lane Children, C-080229 (7-9-2008) · filed 2008-07-09(E)(1), (E)(4)

The juvenile court, relying upon the factors in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) and (E)(4), concluded that Leavitt's children could not be placed with her within a reasonable time, and should not be placed with her, due to her failure to substantially remedy the conditions that had originally caused the children to be placed outside her home, and because she had demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the children by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with them when she was able to do so. ... Given these circumstances, we cannot say that the juvenile court's finding under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) was against the manifest weight of the evidence. ... Consequently, the record supports the trial court's finding that she did not regularly support, visit, or contact the children.

Section 2151.414(E) requires the court to find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when clear and convincing evidence establishes any one enumerated factor.

In Matter of H. K., Wm-08-021 (2-19-2009) · filed 2009-02-19(E)

If one of the factors of R.C. 2151.414 (E) exists and is supported by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court is required to enter a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with the parent pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a).

Section 2151.414(E) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time when clear and convincing evidence establishes any one enumerated factor.

In Matter of Strader, 2008 Ca 00255 (3-16-2009) · filed 2009-03-16(E)

Revised Code 2151.414 (E) sets forth the factors a trial court must consider in determining whether a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time. If the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of any one of the following factors, "the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with [the] parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent": ... A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time upon the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414 (E) factors. The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(E) requires a court that finds by clear and convincing evidence any one of the statute's listed factors to find that the child cannot or should not be placed with the parent.

In Re S. B., L-08-1453 (5-15-2009) · filed 2009-05-15(E)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) additionally provides that if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that any one of 16 factors listed in the statute exist, the court must find that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the parent.

Section 2151.414(E) requires a court to find that a child cannot or should not be placed with the parents within a reasonable time when any one of the enumerated factors is present.

In re J.D. · filed 2011-03-28(E)

Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the Revised Code requires a trial court to enter a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with his parents within a reasonable time if it finds that any one of factors in R.C. 2151.414(E) are present.

A finding that children cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time may rest on evidence satisfying § 2151.414(E)(1) and (16), even when the evidence does not establish the separately cited repeated-incarceration factor in (E)(13).

In re A.C.H. · filed 2011-10-19(E)(1), (E)(13), and (E)(16)

R.C. 2151.414(E) requires the trial court to consider “all relevant evidence” and sets forth the factors a trial court must consider in determining whether a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. ... As relevant in the case at bar, if the court finds the existence of any one of the following factors, “the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent”: ... Although the trial court cited R.C. 2151.414(E)(13)–a parent’s repeated incarcerations–in support of its finding, the record, however, is not clear regarding appellant’s prior incarcerations. Nevertheless, the record, does contain clear and competent evidence regarding the other two factors that the trial court cited–R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (16). Consequently, we disagree with appellant that the evidence fails to show that the children cannot or should not be returned to either parent within a reasonable time.

Section 2151.414(E) requires a court that finds any one enumerated factor by clear and convincing evidence to find that the child cannot or should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

In re O.J. · filed 2012-06-13(E)

Revised Code 2151.414(E) sets forth the factors a trial court must consider in determining whether a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time. If the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of any one of the following factors, “the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with [the] parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with [the] parent:” ... A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time upon the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors. The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time. ... Based on the parties’ history of drug abuse, domestic violence, lack of stable housing, lack of completing case plans, financial instability and the prior termination of their parental rights, we find that the trial court did not err in making such a finding.

Section 2151.414(E)(14) permits a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent who, for any reason, is unwilling to provide basic necessities or prevent abuse or neglect.

In re S.S. · filed 2013-03-04(E)(14)

Persinger is unable to set aside her own need for male companionship even when those male companions cause her children to suffer physically, emotionally, and sexually. R.C. 2151.414(E)(14).

When the child is neither abandoned nor orphaned, the court must consider all relevant evidence and make a cannot-or-should-not-be-placed finding if clear and convincing evidence establishes one or more subsection (E) factors as to each parent.

In re K.J. · filed 2014-05-12(E)

If the child is not abandoned or orphaned, the focus turns to whether the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents. Under R.C. 2151.414(E), the trial court must consider all relevant evidence before making this determination. The trial court is required to enter such a finding if it determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) through (16) exist with respect to each of the child's parents.

If clear and convincing evidence establishes any one subsection (E) factor, the court must find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re N.C.1 · filed 2014-06-06(E)

If a court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that any one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors exists, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

Under R.C. 2151.414(E), clear and convincing proof of any one listed factor requires a finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In re J.L. · filed 2014-06-11(E)(1)

Revised Code 2151.414(E) sets forth the factors a trial court must consider in determining whether a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time. If the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of any one of the following factors, “the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with [the] parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent”: ... The court’s finding that the children could not be placed with appellant within a reasonable period of time was not against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence.

Before determining whether a child cannot or should not be placed with the parents, the court must consider all relevant evidence.

In re M.P. · filed 2014-04-16(E)

Under R.C. 2151.414(E), the trial court must consider all relevant evidence before making this determination.

When clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) through (16) factor as to each parent, the trial court must find that the child cannot or should not be placed with the parents within a reasonable time.

In re J.C. · filed 2014-06-23(E)

Under R.C. 2151.414(E), the trial court must consider all relevant evidence before making this determination. The trial court is required to enter such a finding if it determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) through (16) exist with respect to each of the child's parents.

If clear and convincing evidence establishes one or more R.C. 2151.414(E) conditions as to each parent, the court must find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re Kai.F. · filed 2015-10-06(E)

In granting a motion for permanent custody, the trial court must find that one or more of the conditions listed in R.C. 2151.414(E) exist as to each of the child’s parents. If, after considering all relevant evidence, the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the conditions exists, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

A parent's continuous and repeated failure to substantially remedy the conditions causing removal supports a finding that the children cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re N.H. · filed 2017-05-19(E)(1)

Based on the foregoing, we find that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that appellant had continuously and repeatedly failed to substantially remedy the conditions causing the children to be placed outside the home and that the children could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

A finding of any one factor under subsection (E) supports a conclusion that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In re T.H. · filed 2025-02-03(E)

As an initial matter, we note that a finding as to any one of the factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) supports the conclusion that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

A juvenile court needs to find only one subsection (E) factor to find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.

In re A.M. · filed 2025-03-06(E)

Moreover, “[a] juvenile court is only required to find that one of [the R.C. 2151.414(E)] factors is met in order to properly find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.”

A juvenile court needs to find only one subsection (E) factor to find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.

In re J.D. · filed 2025-05-22(E)

Specifically, a juvenile court “is only required to find that one of [the R.C. 2151.414(E)] factors is met in order to properly find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.”

If clear and convincing evidence establishes one or more subsection (E) factors as to each parent, the court must find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In re J.C. · filed 2025-06-02(E)

The trial court is required to enter such a finding if it determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) through (16) exist with respect to each of the child's parents.

If clear and convincing evidence establishes one or more subsection (E) factors, the court must find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re N.C. · filed 2025-06-05(E)

Under R.C. 2151.414(E), if the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the (E)(1)-(16) factors exist, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

Any one supported subsection (E) factor is sufficient to conclude that the children cannot or should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

In re J.H. · filed 2025-09-18(E)

While mother argues other factors demonstrate her efforts to remedy the conditions, the juvenile court’s finding as to any one of the factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) is sufficient to support the conclusion that the children cannot or should not be placed with mother within a reasonable time.

The existence of one subsection (E) factor alone supports a finding that the child cannot be placed with a parent within a reasonable time.

In re J.L. · filed 2026-03-10(E)

The existence of one factor alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.

Any one subsection (E)(1) through (15) finding is sufficient to require a finding that the children cannot or should not be placed with the parent.

In re N.K. · filed 2026-03-26(E)

The statute further provides that, if the trial court makes a finding under any of R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)-(15), it shall enter a finding that the children cannot or should not be placed with the parent. The existence of any one factor is sufficient to support such a finding.

Section 2151.414(B), read together with related custody provisions, does not unconstitutionally distinguish permanent-custody proceedings involving orphans from those involving abused, neglected, or dependent children.

Matter of Gary M., Unpublished Decision (5-22-1998) · filed 1998-05-22(B)

As to whether R.C. 2151.414 (B) is unconstitutional, this court has determined that, when read in pari materia with R.C. 2151.353 (A)(2) 1 and R.C. 2151.412 (G), no unconstitutional distinction exists "between the statutes governing permanent custody between orphans or abused, neglected and dependant [ sic ] children."

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(d) does not violate substantive due process by omitting an express unfitness finding because twelve months of temporary agency custody creates an implicit presumption of parental inability, unsuitability, or unfitness and gives the parent time to demonstrate fitness.

In the Matter of Workman, Unpublished Decision (4-30-2003) · filed 2003-04-30(B)(1)(d)

R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d) thus contains an implicit presumption that the parent is unable, unsuitable, or unfit to care for the child.

Constitutional challenges to section 2151.414's permanent-custody provisions have consistently been rejected.

In re B.S. · filed 2025-09-15(C)

Indeed, constitutional challenges to R.C. 2151.414 have been consistently rejected.

Section 2151.414(E) permits a trial court deciding permanent custody to consider all relevant evidence showing statutory factors, including pre-complaint evidence of the parent's efforts to remedy the conditions leading to removal.

In the Matter Of: Brookover, Unpublished Decision (6-8-1998) · filed 1998-06-08(E)

R.C. 2151.414 (E) permits a trial court to consider all relevant evidence, which establishes the existence of one or more of the factors set forth in the statute. This would include evidence of a parent's attempts to remedy the conditions which caused the removal of the children from the home. Consequently, the trial court could consider evidence of the family's extensive history with the Morrow County Department of Human Services and how the services provided to appellant and her children were improving, or not, the problems within the family. Despite the extensive and long-term involvement of county agencies, appellant failed to substantially remedy the conditions which caused the children to be placed outside her home. A review of pre-complaint evidence was necessary for the trial court to make such a determination.

Section 2151.414(D) and (E) require consideration of all relevant evidence, including parental patterns and family history introduced at an earlier permanent-custody hearing.

In Re Vaughn, Unpublished Decision (12-6-2000) · filed 2000-12-06(D), (E)

Furthermore, under R.C. 2151.414 (D) and (E), the court is required to look at all relevant evidence in determining whether permanent custody is in the children's best interests and whether the children cannot be placed with their parents within a reasonable time period or should not be placed with their parents. To further the interests of the children, the court must consider any evidence available to it, including a parent's pattern of conduct. Some of the most reliable evidence for the court to consider is the past history of the children and the parents.

A juvenile court may consider a parenting program's evidence without delegating its Section 2151.414(B) permanent-custody decision when the court independently makes extensive findings and applies the statutory law.

In re A.M. · filed 2020-08-21(B)

The trial court, rather than those at Goodwill Parenting, made the legal determination pursuant to the relevant statutes as to whether there was clear and convincing evidence to grant permanent custody to SCDJFS. Further, the trial court did not solely consider or rely on the testimony and reports of Kiggans.

Section 2151.414(E) requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one statutory factor showing that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent, after which the court must consider the child's best interest under subsection (D).

Matter Of: Estep, Unpublished Decision (8-10-1998) · filed 1998-08-10(D), (E)

Appellant is correct that a "best interests" finding alone is insufficient for termination of parental rights. A trial court shall grant permanent custody to an agency only when it finds by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the specifically enumerated factors in R.C. 2151.414 (E) are present. In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95 , syllabus. If the trial court determines that one or more of the statutory factors exists, it must also, as required by R.C. 2151.414 (D), consider whether permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. Id. at 99.

Section 2151.414 permits a trial court to award permanent custody to an agency upon clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest and the child meets specified placement criteria, using the listed best-interest and parental-placement factors.

Matter of Hines, Unpublished Decision (11-1-1999) · filed 1999-11-01(D), (E)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 , a trial court may grant permanent custody of the child to DHS if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the agency, and the child is orphaned, abandoned, or cannot be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time, or should not be placed with his parents. The statute also outlines factors the court considers in determining the best interest of the child. The court must consider the reasonable probability the child could be adopted, and whether an adoption could positively benefit the child. The court must consider the interaction and relationship of the child with the parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents, and significant others. The court must consider the wishes of the child, the custodial history of the child, and whether the child's need for a legally secure placement can be achieved without granting permanent custody to the agency, see R.C. 2151.414 (D). Finally, R.C. 2151.414 (E) sets forth the factors the court reviewed in determining whether the child cannot or should not be placed with his parents within a reasonable time.

In a permanent-custody proceeding involving multiple children, the court must independently determine the Section 2151.414(B) criteria and consider all other relevant evidence for each child, while evidence about treatment of another child may remain relevant.

In the Matter of Burd, Unpublished Decision (3-8-2000) · filed 2000-03-08(B)

While we agree with Burd that the law requires the trial court to make an independent determination of the relevant criteria in R.C. 2151.414 (B) and all other relevant evidence in a permanent custody suit involving multiple children, "this should not be construed to require courts to consider permanent custody decisions in a vacuum, i.e., how a parent mistreats another child in the household can be very relevant to the permanent custody determination of a child that is not mistreated in the same manner." In Re Hiatt (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 716 , 725 .

Section 2151.414(E) requires clear and convincing evidence that at least one enumerated statutory factor exists before permanent custody may be granted.

In the Matter of Davis, Unpublished Decision (6-29-2000) · filed 2000-06-29(E)

Permanent custody may not be granted unless the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the eight enumerated factors in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exist. ... Upon consideration of the law and the entire record of the proceedings in the trial court, this Court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's findings.

Although a juvenile court may consider other relevant evidence, division (D) expressly requires consideration of every enumerated best-interest factor.

In Re B. B., Unpublished Decision (6-25-2003) · filed 2003-06-25(D)

"Although the trial court is not precluded from considering other relevant factors, the statute explicitly requires the court to consider all of the enumerated factors."

Evidence focused on case-plan compliance cannot establish best interest when it overlooks the mandatory factors in subsection (D).

In Re C.M., Unpublished Decision (9-24-2003) · filed 2003-09-24(D)

In this case, CSB devoted all of its attention to evidence concerning Amanda's compliance with the case plan and overlooked the mandatory best interest factors. After reviewing the evidence presented at the permanent custody hearing, this Court finds that CSB failed to present clear and convincing evidence that permanent custody was in C.M.'s best interest.

Section 2151.414(E) requires proof of at least one of its sixteen predicate findings before a court may conclude that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent.

In the Matter of Isaac M., Unpublished Decision (11-14-2003) · filed 2003-11-14(E)

The statute sets forth a list of 16 predicate findings, one of which must be established prior to a judicial conclusion that a child cannot or should not be placed with the child's parent.

A parent's unexplained failure to attend a known permanent-custody hearing may be considered as another relevant factor under Section 2151.414(E)(16).

In re Ke.R. · filed 2017-09-07(E)(16)

Based on appellant’s counsel statement that appellant knew of the important hearing yet failed to attend, we find there is support for the trial court’s finding. … Such a failure to appear reflects poorly on appellant’s desire to regain custody, to display responsibility and, further, is evidence she lacked care in supporting her legal position. … Consequently, we find clear and convincing evidence supports the finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(16), and weighing the above-mentioned factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) provides sufficient grounds for us to determine that K.P., Ki.R., and Ke.R. cannot be placed with appellant within a reasonable time.

Under Section 2151.414(E), one listed factor must exist as to each parent before the court must find that a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In re E.-J. Children · filed 2019-04-24(E)

Under R.C. 2151.414(E), the juvenile court must find that a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent if it determines that one of the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) through (16) exists as to each of the child’s parents.

When permanent custody is requested in the original complaint, the court must consider the relevant factors under subsection (E), and its entry must show that it did so.

In re J.H. · filed 2021-08-25(E)

The trial court’s entry fails to show that the court considered the appropriate factors under R.C. 2151.414(E) as required by R.C. 2151.353(A)(4).

Section 2151.414(A)(2) sets a 200-day deadline for filing the permanent-custody order, but failure to meet it carries no sanction and does not invalidate the order.

In the Matter Of: Goodwin, Unpublished Decision (8-17-1998) · filed 1998-08-17(A)(2)

Appellant argues that in regard to Elizabeth, the order granting the motion for permanent custody was not filed within the 200-day deadline, as required by R.C. 2151.414 (A)(2). The statute specifically provides that there is no sanction for failure to comply with the time restraints, and the validity of an order cannot be attacked on this basis.

Section 2151.414(A)(2) allows the court until two hundred days after filing to dispose of a permanent-custody motion, rather than requiring a decision immediately when the hearing concludes.

In Re Dowers, Unpublished Decision (4-16-2001) · filed 2001-04-16(A)(2)

BCDHS contends that immediately upon the conclusion of the permanent custody hearing, the trial court was required to determine whether permanent custody is appropriate. R.C. 2151.414 provides that "[t]he court shall issue an order that grants, denies, or otherwise disposes of the motion for permanent custody, and journalize the order, not later than two hundred days after the agency files the motion." R.C. 2151.414 (A)(2). This two hundred-day deadline had not expired at the time that the March 24, 2000 entry was filed.

Issuing a permanent-custody judgment after the section 2151.414(A)(2) deadline does not invalidate the judgment or require dismissal.

In Re Austin, Unpublished Decision (12-19-2001) · filed 2001-12-19(A)(2)

Given that the trial court's failure to timely issue its judgment has no effect on the validity of its judgment, trial counsel did not err in failing to move to dismiss the complaint based upon the lack of timeliness.

Missing § 2151.414(A)(2)'s deadlines for a permanent-custody hearing and judgment does not invalidate the judgment or provide a basis for attacking the court's jurisdiction.

In Re Joseph P., Unpublished Decision (5-2-2003) · filed 2003-05-02(A)(2)

However, the statute, itself, makes clear that the failure of a trial court to comply with the time limitations does not affect the validity of any judgment issued pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2151.

Failure to meet subsection (A)(2)'s time limits does not invalidate a permanent-custody judgment.

In Matter of James, Unpublished Decision (9-30-2003) · filed 2003-09-30(A)(2)

This court has agreed with other appellate districts that a failure to meet the time periods set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (A)(2) does not violate the statute or provide a basis for attacking the validity of a judgment on a motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(A)(2)'s 120-day hearing and 200-day disposition deadlines are directory, and delay does not affect the juvenile court's jurisdiction or the validity of its order.

In Re Hilton, 06ca106 (8-7-2007) · filed 2007-08-07(A)(2)

{¶ 50} R.C. 2151.414 provides a permanent custody proceeding should occur within certain time frames. For instance, a hearing on the motion should be scheduled "not later than one hundred twenty days after the agency files the motion for permanent custody", and the motion should be disposed of "not later than two hundred days after the agency files the motion." R.C. 2151.414 (A)(2). However, these time limits do "not provide any basis for attacking the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of any order of the court." Id. {¶ 51} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated similar time limits are directory, not mandatory, and such do not provide a basis for attacking the validity of the trial court's judgment. See, In re Davis , 84 Ohio St.3d 520 , 522-523 , 1999-Ohio-0419. A litigant must seek a writ of procedendo against the juvenile court if it does not comply with statutory time limits. Id. at 523-524. If a party does not seek such a writ, then he is estopped from complaining on appeal the delay by the juvenile court violated that party's due process rights. Id. at 524.

Section 2151.414(A)(2) preserves the trial court's authority and jurisdiction over a permanent-custody motion even when the statutory hearing and decision deadlines are missed.

White v. Gormley, Ct07-0068 (1-15-2008) · filed 2008-01-15(A)(2)

The statute relied upon by Petitioner expressly provides for continued jurisdiction for the trial court even where the trial court fails to meet the deadlines imposed. Petitioner has an adequate remedy at law to raise this issue on direct appeal should the trial court rule against her. Therefore, we decline to order the trial court to dismiss the motion for permanent custody.

Section 2151.414(A)(2)'s time limits for a permanent-custody hearing and order do not deprive the juvenile court of authority or jurisdiction to rule after those deadlines.

In re M.W. · filed 2012-11-01(A)(2)

The final paragraph of R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) establishes that the statutory time limits set forth in the first paragraph do not deprive the juvenile court of authority or jurisdiction to issue an order beyond those time frames. The trial court is expressly directed to issue an order “not later than two hundred days after the agency files the motion.” However, the legislature has explicitly provided that the trial court’s failure to comply with the time limits “does not affect the authority of the court to issue any order * * * and does not provide any basis for attacking the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of any order of the court.”

Section 2151.414(A)(2)'s 120-day permanent-custody hearing deadline weighs against another continuance after the deadline has already been substantially exceeded.

In re K.J. · filed 2018-02-06(A)(2)

The trial court had already extended the time frame for the PCC hearing to accommodate the pretrial hearings, and by the time of the June 5, 2017 hearing, the PCC motion had been pending for more than 200 days. See In re J.C., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-766, 2011-Ohio-715, ¶ 46 (a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for a continuance when the PCC hearing is already past the 120-deadline contained in R.C. 2151.414(A)(2)).

Section 2151.414(A)(2) permits a permanent-custody hearing to be continued beyond its 120-day deadline for good cause shown.

In re L.J. · filed 2019-12-13(A)(2)

R.C. 2151.414(A)(2), however, provides that the court for “good cause shown” may continue the hearing beyond the 120-day deadline.

Division (A)(2) ordinarily requires a permanent-custody hearing within 120 days, allows a reasonable continuance for good cause, and requires disposition within 200 days.

In re Z.J. · filed 2020-02-06(A)(2)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(A)(2), the trial court is to hold the permanent-custody hearing no later than 120 days after the agency files its motion except for “good cause shown” for a reasonable continuance, and the court is to dispose of the motion for permanent custody no later than 200 days after the agency files its motion.

Failure to meet division (A)(2)'s decision deadline does not invalidate the resulting permanent-custody order.

In re B.F. · filed 2020-05-26(A)(2)

R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) expressly states that a trial court’s failure to operate within the specified timeframe does not provide grounds for challenging the validity of the resulting order of the trial court.

A juvenile court does not abuse its discretion by refusing a further continuance when a permanent-custody motion has already been pending beyond subsection (A)(2)'s 200-day disposition deadline.

In re R.P. · filed 2021-11-16(A)(2)

Given the statutory deadlines, a juvenile court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to continue a hearing on a motion for permanent custody where that motion has been pending for over 200 days.

Subsection (A)(2) imposes a timeframe for deciding a permanent-custody motion, but missing that timeframe neither removes the court's authority nor invalidates its order.

In re R.A. · filed 2021-11-18(A)(2)

The failure of the court to comply with the time periods set forth in division (A)(2) of this section does not affect the authority of the court to issue any order under this chapter and does not provide any basis for attacking the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of any order of the court. ... Thus, Mother’s contention that the juvenile court had no time requirement to complete and adjudicate the permanent custody motion is not well taken. The court did have a time framework within which to dispose of the motion.

A court does not abuse its discretion by denying a same-day continuance when the permanent-custody hearing is already well beyond subsection (A)(2)'s 120-day deadline and no good cause is shown.

In re J.J. · filed 2022-03-22(A)(2)

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(A)(2), the trial court is to hold the PCC hearing no later than 120 days after the agency files the PCC motion except for "good cause" shown for a reasonable continuance. By the time of the January 7, 2021 trial date, the PCC motion had been pending for more than 390 days.

Subsection (A)(2)'s hearing deadline is directory rather than jurisdictional, so noncompliance does not invalidate a permanent-custody order.

In re N.S. · filed 2022-11-17(A)(2)

Despite the time limitation, however, R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) expressly states that the trial court’s failure to comply with the time period “does not affect the authority of the court to issue any order under this chapter and does not provide any basis for attacking the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of any order of the court.” ... Because of this expressive language, this court has determined that the time limitation language in R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) is “directory” rather than mandatory — the language exists “for the assurance of the prompt resolution of child custody matters,” rather than as a jurisdictional perquisite.

Section 2151.414 requires courts to apply its statutory best-interest and parental-placement factors to the facts, but does not require them to expressly identify each factor.

Matter Of: Brock, Unpublished Decision (8-31-1998) · filed 1998-08-31

The trial court is not required to specifically cite the applicable statutory factors of R.C. 2151.414 . ... Instead, the relevant inquiry is if the trial court applied the statutory factors of R.C. 2151.414 to the facts of the case.

Section 2151.414(E) is satisfied by a finding mirroring the failure-to-remedy language of division (E)(1) or a finding of lack of independent and stable housing paralleling division (E)(4).

In Re McClardy, Unpublished Decision (4-12-2001) · filed 2001-04-12(E)(1), (E)(4)

The trial court found [Gaffney] has failed continuously and repeatedly for a period of six (6) months or more to substantially remedy the conditions causing the children to be placed outside the home. This finding mirrors the language of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1). Further, the trial court found, [Gaffney] * * * lack[s] independent and stable housing. This finding closely parallels the language of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4). Either of these two findings gives the trial court sufficient basis to hold that Cathy cannot be placed with Gaffney.

An unspecified “other factor” supplies no basis for appellate analysis of a finding under Section 2151.414(E)(16).

In the Matter of Crystal C., Unpublished Decision (3-1-2002) · filed 2002-03-01(E)(16)

The court does not specify what "other factor" it considers relevant; therefore, we have no basis to analyze an R.C. 2151.414 (E)(16) finding.

A trial court need not enumerate every best-interest factor, but it must state findings showing that it analyzed the statutory factors and any other relevant factors.

In the Matter of Brooks, Unpublished Decision (10-7-2003) · filed 2003-10-07(D)

Although this court has held that a trial court need not specifically enumerate each best interest factor in its decision and entry, the court must state findings on the record so that it is clear to the parties that the decision is supported by the facts. ... On remand, the trial court must analyze the best interest factors and any additional relevant factors, and must state findings to indicate that such an analysis was conducted.

Section 2151.414(A)(2) requires a permanent-custody hearing within 120 days after the agency files its motion, subject to a reasonable continuance for good cause.

In re J.E. · filed 2017-10-23(A)(2)

We also consider, as a unique factor relevant to this case, that R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) provides that “[t]he court shall hold the hearing * * * not later than one hundred twenty days after the agency files the motion for permanent custody, except that, for good cause shown, the court may continue the hearing for a reasonable period of time beyond the one-hundred-twenty-day deadline.” In re J.C. at ¶ 46, quoting R.C. 2151.414(A)(2). Here, the Agency filed its motion for permanent custody on April 26, 2016. (Doc. No. 48). Thus, the trial court had already significantly exceeded the deadline imposed by the statute by the time Steele filed the pertinent motion to continue; therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. In re J.C. at ¶ 46.

After a permanent custody order terminates the natural parents' parental rights, a grandparent has no legal right to intervene in the permanent custody case.

In the Matter of Jasper, Unpublished Decision (10-19-1998) · filed 1998-10-19(F)

Once the trial court terminated the mother's parental rights and granted permanent custody of Corena to BCCSB, the mother ceased to be a party, except for purposes of an appeal. ... The permanent custody statute does not provide that a grandparent has a legal right to intervene in a permanent custody case after the natural parents' parental rights have been terminated. ... Since a permanent custody order was subsequently entered, appellant had no legal right to intervene.

Section 2151.414(F) bars a parent whose parental rights have been terminated by a permanent-custody order from participating as a party in the child’s juvenile-court case after that order is issued.

In re McBride · filed 2006-07-19(F)

On its face, R.C. 2151.414(F) bars Fugate from participating as a party in her daughter’s juvenile court case after the permanent custody order was issued.

A parent whose rights were terminated may have standing to file a new abuse, neglect, or dependency complaint, but may not use that procedure to circumvent Section 2151.414(F)'s bar on participation after permanent custody.

In re A.G. · filed 2020-05-01(F)

We find that a parent of a child whose parental rights have been terminated may have standing to file a complaint for neglect and dependency with respect to that child under R.C. 2151.27(A)(1) and under the first paragraph of Juv.R. 10(A). Having said this, R.C. 2151.27(A)(1) may not be used as a mechanism for circumventing R.C. 2151.414(F) and 2151.353(F)(2).

Section 2151.414(A)(2)’s deadline for issuing a permanent custody order is directory; missing it does not deprive the juvenile court of authority to rule.

In re D.B. · filed 2014-08-15(A)(2)

Because the time provisions of R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) are directory and not mandatory, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a litigant must seek a writ of procedendo against the juvenile court if it does not comply with these time limits.

R.C. 2151.414(E)(13) imposes no minimum incarceration length and applies when a parent's repeated incarcerations prevent the parent from providing care for the child.

In Re M.T., Unpublished Decision (8-8-2007) · filed 2007-08-08(E)(13)

Furthermore, the trial court did not err in finding support in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(13). That provision makes no reference to the length of the incarceration of the parent, but rather to the repeated nature of the jailing and the fact that such detention has prevented the parent from providing care for the children. ... There is no error by the trial court in concluding, therefore, that Mother had been "repeatedly incarcerated" and that such "repeated incarceration prevents the parent from providing care for the child." R.C. 2151.414 (E)(13).

Section 2151.414(E)(8) allows a court to consider all of a parent's past incarcerations when deciding whether repeated incarceration prevents the parent from providing care for the child.

In Re: Huddleston, Unpublished Decision (8-23-1999) · filed 1999-08-23(E)(8)

Specifically, appellant claims that R.C. 2151.414 (E)(8) entitles the trial court to evaluate only appellant's actions since Zachary has been born. We find the plain meaning of the statute allows the trial court to consider all of appellant's past incarceration. R.C. 2151.414 (E)(8) allows the trial court to consider whether "repeated incarceration prevents the parent from providing care for the child." ... The trial court properly evaluated whether appellant's past incarceration demonstrated that he would not be able to provide care for Zachary in the future.

Section 2151.414(E)(8) requires a finding that a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent when the parent is repeatedly incarcerated and the repeated incarceration prevents the parent from providing care for the child.

State v. McTheny, Unpublished Decision (12-15-1999) · filed 1999-12-15(E)(8)

O.R.C. 2151.414 (E)(8) states that a trial court shall enter a finding that a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent if "[t]he parent is repeatedly incarcerated, and the repeated incarceration prevents the parent from providing care for the child." While the trial court did not specifically cite to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(8) in its April 13, 1999, Judgment Entry, we find that there was clear and convincing evidence that would support a finding that appellant, due to his numerous incarcerations, was unable to care for Mark, James and Brandon.

Section 2151.414(E)(13) requires a permanent-custody court to consider a parent's repeated incarceration when deciding whether the child cannot or should not be placed with that parent within a reasonable time.

In the Matter of Morales, Unpublished Decision (4-12-2000) · filed 2000-04-12(E)(13)

R.C. 2151.414 directs the court to consider all relevant factors which relate to the adequacy of parental care in making a determination of permanent custody. Evidence of a parent's criminal convictions are directly relevant to the issue of permanent custody. Indeed, R.C. 2151.414 (E)(13) requires the court to consider a parent's repeated incarceration as a factor in determining whether a child cannot or should not be placed with the parent within a reasonable period of time. ... Since R.C. 2151.414 (E)(13) requires the court to consider such information in making a determination of permanent custody, the trial court did not err in allowing such testimony and could reasonably conclude that the prior conviction of theft was relevant.

The repeated-incarceration factor permits consideration of incarceration before the child's birth in assessing the parent's future ability to provide a stable home.

In Re Grant, Unpublished Decision (2-8-2001) · filed 2001-02-08(E)(8)

While appellant's repeated incarceration since DeJuan's birth is, of course, the most probative aspect of his criminal history, we do not find that the trial court should be barred from considering incarceration prior to the child's birth as a basis for appellant's future ability to provide a stable home for DeJuan.

Former Section 2151.414(E)(8) focuses on the effect of multiple incarcerations on parental care, and two incarcerations can qualify as repeated incarceration.

In Re Young, Unpublished Decision (3-20-2001) · filed 2001-03-20(E)(8)

Moreover, contrary to appellant's argument, we believe that the focus of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(8) is on the effect that multiple incarcerations have on a parent's ability to care for a child, rather than the number of incarcerations per se . ... Here, there was clear and convincing evidence that appellant's two incarcerations have prevented her from caring for her children.

Section 2151.414(E)(13) supports a finding against parental placement when repeated incarceration prevents the parent from caring for the child.

In Re Williams, Unpublished Decision (4-2-2001) · filed 2001-04-02(E)(13)

In addition, appellant's repeated incarcerations prevent him for caring for Jordan. See R.C. 2151.414 (E)(13). Appellant missed the first six months of Jordan's life, in part, because he was incarcerated. At the time of the permanent custody hearing, appellant was again incarcerated for violating a condition of his parole.

Section 2151.414(E)(12) requires a court to find that a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent when a parent is incarcerated at the dispositional hearing and will be unavailable to care for the child for at least eighteen months.

In Re E.C., Unpublished Decision (4-6-2005) · filed 2005-04-06(E)(12)

{¶ 7} The first prong of the test was satisfied pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(12). That section provides that the trial court "shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent" if the court finds that the parent is incarcerated at the time of the dispositional hearing and will not be available to care for the child for at least eighteen months. R.C. 2151.414 (E)(12). The trial court found that the first prong of the test was satisfied because the father was incarcerated at that time and would continue to be incarcerated for more than another two years and, therefore, E.C. and S.C. cannot be placed with him within a reasonable time. That finding is clearly supported by the record.

Repeated incarceration that prevents a parent from providing care is by itself sufficient to support a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with that parent.

In Re Nuzum, 08-Ca-31 (9-12-2008) · filed 2008-09-12(E)(13)

R.C. 2151.414 (E)(13) provides: "The parent is repeatedly incarcerated, and the repeated incarceration prevents the parent from providing care for the child". This factor alone is sufficient to support the trial court's finding Brittany and Shyann could not or should not be placed with Mother.

A parent's repeated incarceration may support finding under Section 2151.414(E)(13) that the parent is prevented from caring for the child.

In re J.D. · filed 2024-01-26(E)(13)

Finally, clear and convincing evidence supported the court R.C. 2151.414(E)(13) finding that father’s repeated incarceration prevents him from caring for J.D. Accordingly, the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(E) are supported by clear and convincing evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

A long pattern of repeated incarceration that has kept a parent imprisoned for most of adulthood supports finding that incarceration prevents care for the child.

In re H.V.F. · filed 2024-12-13(E)(13)

By his own account, he had spent 33 years in prison on nine different occasions dating back to 1984. Father testified that three years was the longest period of time he had been out of prison since he was 15 years old.

Repeated incarceration that prevents a parent from caring for a child satisfies one condition for finding that the child cannot or should not be placed with that parent.

In the Matter of Deshanna R., Unpublished Decision (3-30-2001) · filed 2001-03-30(E)(13)

A thorough review of the record of this case reveals clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court's factual findings and also discloses that appellant's repeated incarcerations prevented him from providing care for or making a commitment to his two very young children. Accordingly, and as expressly stated by the trial court, clear and convincing evidence supports the existence of the condition in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(13). Because only one of the conditions enumerated in R.C. 2151.414 (E) is necessary to sustain a finding that Kesuan and Kendalle cannot be placed with their father within a reasonable time or should not be placed with him, failure, if any, to demonstrate either of the conditions described in R.C. 2151.414 (E)(1) and R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4) is not prejudicial to appellant.

When clear and convincing evidence establishes that a parent abandoned the children, the trial court need not make the determinations required by subsection (B)(1)(a).

In Re Hackmann, 07-Ca-25 (10-31-2007) · filed 2007-10-31(B)(1)(b)

Based on the trial court's finding that Appellant abandoned her children, which is supported by competent and credible evidence, there is no requirement that the trial court make any R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) determinations.

A parent who fails to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than ninety days has abandoned the child for purposes of section 2151.414(E)(10).

In the Matter of Van Allen, Unpublished Decision (6-12-2002) · filed 2002-06-12(E)(10)

Appellant had failed to visit or maintain contact with Destiny for more than ninety days, thereby abandoning the child.

Section 2151.414(E)(10) treats parental abandonment as a placement factor incorporated into best interest by division (D)(5), and a complete lack of contact may establish abandonment despite incarceration when the parent missed an available visit and repeatedly returned to jail.

In Re King, Unpublished Decision (1-27-2004) · filed 2004-01-27(D)(5), (E)(10)

Further, Angela had no contact with Jonathon after July 13, 2001, in spite of the fact that she was afforded visitation rights. 4 It is true that Angela was unable to exercise her visitation rights because she was in jail except for one occasion. On that occasion, she failed to visit. It is apparent that Angela was simply unable to stay out of jail long enough to establish a relationship with Jonathon. Jonathon King, Sr., had no contact with the child. Therefore, there was clear and convincing evidence that Jonathon's parents had abandoned him. ... As discussed above, there was also clear and convincing evidence to establish that the parents had abandoned Jonathon. R.C. 2151.414 (D)(5); R.C. 2151.414 (E)(10).

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(b) permits permanent custody upon proof that a child was abandoned without requiring findings that the agency made reasonable reunification efforts or that the child could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.

In the Matter of Oliver Children, Unpublished Decision (1-22-2007) · filed 2007-01-22(B)(1)(b)

In the case sub judice, the trial court found the parents to have abandoned the children. See, Findings of Fact Nos. 6 and 7 filed July 7, 2006. Both appellant and the alleged father had not visited the children in well over ninety days. T. at 12-13. ... However, in the case sub judice, there was no requirement for a R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) finding, based on the court's finding of abandonment (Judgment Entry at 1), which is not herein challenged by appellant. See In re Willis , Coshocton App. No. 02CA15, 2002-Ohio-6795, ? 30. See, also, In re Starkey (1999), 150 Ohio App.3d 612 , 617 : `Hence, because the agency proved and the court found that the children were abandoned, the court was not required to determine whether the agency used reasonable efforts to reunify or whether the child could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time.' ... We find the reasoning in Bender is applicable in this case.

Section 2151.414 treats abandonment as a permanent-custody ground distinct from inability to place the child with a parent, so an abandonment finding makes findings under division (B)(1)(a), including the division (E) reasonable-case-planning factors, unnecessary.

In Re Stafford, Unpublished Decision (3-5-2007) · filed 2007-03-05(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(b), (E)

While certainly case plans are mandated pursuant R.C. 2151.412 , Ohio's statutory scheme does not require a trial court to refer to the R.C. 2151.414 (E) factors, specifically "reasonable case planning," in cases where, as here, the parents have statutorily abandoned the child. ... The statutory determination of whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents, outlined under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a), is distinct from an "abandonment" determination under R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(b). ... Thus, in the case sub judice, although the court sought to go the extra mile, there was no requirement for any R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) determinations, based on the court's finding of abandonment.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(b) permits an agency to seek permanent custody on presumed-abandonment grounds only after the parent has gone ninety days without visiting or maintaining contact; testimony describing contact only by month, without specific dates, was insufficient to prove abandonment clearly and convincingly.

In Re Williams Children, Unpublished Decision (3-12-2007) · filed 2007-03-12(B)(1)(b)

{¶ 31} Recently, in In re: Scullion Children (March 2, 2007), Stark App. No. 2006CA00308, unreported, this Court held the logical extension of In re: C.W. requires a finding a parent failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for a period of ninety days before an agency can move for permanent custody on the ground of presumed abandonment. R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(b). Although Singleton did not testify as to specific dates of visits, her statement mother had no contact with the children between November, 2005, and March, 2006, failed to provide the trial court with clear and convincing evidence mother abandoned Dontrez and Jay'mere.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(b) is satisfied when clear and convincing evidence establishes that a parent abandoned the child by failing to visit or maintain contact for more than ninety days.

In Matter of Robert J., L-07-1034 (6-7-2007) · filed 2007-06-07(B)(1)(b)

{¶ 45} With regard to the evidence presented, LCCS contends that Robert J., II was abandoned by appellant as a matter of law, and therefore, R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(b) was proved and satisfied. LCCS is referring to appellant's lack of contact since making his last scheduled visitation on August 4, 2006 before the December 18, 2006 permanent custody hearing. For purposes of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(b), "abandoned" is defined by R.C. 2151.011 (C), which provides that "a child shall be presumed abandoned when the parents of the child have failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than ninety days, regardless of whether the parents resume contact with the child after that period of ninety days." In re Donnell F. , 6th Dist. No. L-04-1308, 2005-Ohio-4175 , ¶ 35 . We agree with the trial court that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that appellant had abandoned Robert J., II as a matter of law.

A finding that a child is abandoned under subsection (B)(1)(b) eliminates the need for a determination under subsection (B)(1)(a) that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent.

In Re Rohrbaugh, 2006 Ca 00354 (7-23-2007) · filed 2007-07-23(B)(1)(a)-(b)

Moreover, the court found James III had abandoned his child pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(b). There was thus no requirement for any R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) determinations, based on the court's finding of abandonment.

Seven months without seeing the child supports an abandonment finding under Section 2151.414(E)(10).

In re A.I. · filed 2024-05-23(E)(10)

The record demonstrates that Mother went AWOL in March 2023, and in June 2023, moved from Cleveland to Columbus. Mother had not seen her child for the seven months preceding the trial date. The weight of the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court’s “abandonment” finding.

A parent may demonstrate lack of commitment by refusing for two years to pursue sobriety and case-plan goals, despite a few months of sobriety achieved through incarceration and court-ordered treatment before the hearing.

In re L.R. · filed 2017-08-16(E)(4)

Father was eventually forced to engage in drug treatment. After Father was charged with heroin possession and domestic violence with Mother, he was incarcerated. He first became involved in drug treatment while serving a five-month period of incarceration, followed by 90 days of court-ordered residential drug treatment. By the time of the hearing, Father had maintained sobriety outside of an institutional setting for only a few months and was still under orders of two courts to do so. The trial court reasonably concluded that Father had demonstrated a lack of commitment to his children by demonstrating an unwillingness to work toward reunification with his children.

Section 2151.414(E)(4) requires a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent when clear and convincing evidence shows the parent is unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home, and proof of one condition under subsection (E) is sufficient.

In Re Zane S., Unpublished Decision (11-2-2007) · filed 2007-11-02(E)(4)

Accordingly, we find that clear and convincing evidence of Jailyn's actions (or inactions) was offered at the permanent custody hearing to show that she was unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for Zane. Because a juvenile court is required only to determine that one of the conditions in R.C. 2151.414 (E) exist, we will not address Jailyn's arguments with regard to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(14) and (16). Accordingly, the juvenile court judgment finding that Zane could not be placed with Jailyn within a reasonable time or should not be placed with Jailyn within a reasonable time is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

A parent's failure to contact the children services agency about the child's welfare despite being able to do so may support a clear-and-convincing finding of lack of commitment under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4).

In Re Danielle E., Unpublished Decision (5-13-2005) · filed 2005-05-13(E)(4)

Upon review, we conclude that the court's finding under R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4) is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Appellant admitted that once he was released from CTF and on work release, he failed to contact LCCS regarding the welfare of Danielle despite his ability to do so.

A parent's poverty alone does not establish lack of commitment, but failure to regularly visit the child and attend the child's medical appointments may demonstrate lack of commitment under subsection (E)(4).

In Re Shifflet, Unpublished Decision (7-10-2006) · filed 2006-07-10(E)(4)

While the court did consider Father's lack of income, it also determined that Father's failure to regularly exercise visitation and failure to attend the child's physical therapy appointments demonstrated Father's lack of commitment to the child in accordance with R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4).

Section 2151.414(E)(4)'s lack-of-commitment factor requires unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home; inability alone does not satisfy it.

In Matter of Heaven G., L-06-1362 (6-29-2007) · filed 2007-06-29(E)(4)

Finally, we can find nothing in the record that shows that appellant was unwilling to provide an adequate home — unable, perhaps, but not unwilling. Inability to provide a home does not satisfy the statutory factor.

A parent demonstrates a lack of commitment to the child under Section 2151.414(E)(4) by failing to visit the child, begin case-plan goals, and maintain contact with counsel, the agency, or the juvenile court.

In Re T.K., 24006 (4-9-2008) · filed 2008-04-09(E)(4)

The evidence established that Moss had not visited her child, had not begun working on any of the goals of her case plan, and had failed to maintain contact with her attorney, her caseworker, or the juvenile court. Consequently, the trial court did not err in finding that she had demonstrated a lack of commitment toward T.K., within the meaning of R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4).

Section 2151.414(E)(4) permits a finding that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a reasonable time when the parent demonstrates a lack of commitment through inconsistent visitation and other actions showing unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home.

In Re G. K., 24276 (10-22-2008) · filed 2008-10-22(E)(4)

{¶ 17} R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4) provides: "The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child[.]" In factual support of its finding pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4), the trial court found that both parents had failed to visit G.K. consistently and that they had failed to satisfy other case plan requirements. The court particularly noted that Father made no effort to maintain contact with the agency or with the guardian ad litem regarding his son while he was incarcerated. Upon review, we conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence in support of this finding. ... {¶ 20} We conclude that the trial court's determination that the child could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, as a result of the parents' lack of commitment to their child pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4), is amply supported by the evidence before the trial court.

Under § 2151.414(E)(4), a parent’s failure to visit consistently, maintain adequate housing, and complete parenting classes can demonstrate a lack of commitment and an inability to provide an adequate permanent home.

In re K.B.F. · filed 2012-04-27(E)(4)

When considering a motion for permanent custody, a trial court must apply R.C. 2151.414(E), which identifies factors for determining whether a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. If a court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that any one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors exists, “the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.” * * *. In re H.T. & Z.T., 2d Dist. Greene Nos. 10-CA-29, 10-CA-30, 2011-Ohio-1285, ¶ 22-23. {¶ 52} R.C. 2151.414(E) sets forth the following as a factor justifying such a finding: ... (4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child. ... maintain adequate housing, and her failure to complete parenting classes undermine her assertion that she is fully committed to her child. The record supports a conclusion that K.B.’s behavior establishes an inability to provide an adequate, permanent home for K.B.F.

Section 2151.414(E)(4) permits a finding that a parent lacks commitment when repeated refusal to cooperate with services and failure to sustain progress show unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home.

In re K.C. · filed 2013-08-05(E)(4)

In addition, there was substantial evidence that Wright lacked commitment to provide an adequate home for K.C. Wright frequently would not work with the Agency workers or with the school employees to try and help K.C. When the workers would offer assistance, she would decline it. When the caseworkers wanted to view the home, she refused. Even when Wright allowed the workers into the home, she refused to give them access to all the rooms. At times, she even refused the workers access to the children. She also admitted that she did not always give K.C. his medicine for ADHD because she did not believe it helped. When it came to counseling, Wright would decide to discontinue her therapy if she believed the therapist was reporting to the Agency. Over the multiple years she worked on her case plan, she did not make much progress and most of the progress she did make disappeared over time. Given this evidence, the trial court could conclude by clear and convincing evidence that Wright lacked the commitment to providing an adequate home as set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(4).

An incarcerated parent's failure to visit, support, or communicate does not establish lack of commitment under Section 2151.414(E)(4) unless the agency proves that the parent was able to do so.

In re G.D. · filed 2014-08-13(E)(4)

R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) required CSB to prove that Father had demonstrated a lack of commitment by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the children “when able to do so” or by “other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child[ren].” Father does not dispute that, since his incarceration before the adjudicatory hearing, he has not visited, supported, or communicated with his children. He correctly argues, however, that his failure to maintain that contact with his children did not establish a lack of commitment under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) because CSB failed to prove that he had the ability to visit, support, or communicate with his children.

An out-of-state parent's inability to afford travel does not prevent the parent from demonstrating commitment through letters to foster parents and the agency inquiring about the child and custody case.

In re AJ · filed 2016-01-25(E)(4)

Notably, even if Brittany’s claim were true, there was nothing preventing Schultow from demonstrating a commitment to A.J. from Pennsylvania. See In re Willis, 3d Allen No. 1-02-17, 2002-Ohio-4942, ¶ 30 (recognizing active involvement where father continually wrote letters to child’s foster parents and the children services agency inquiring as to child’s well-being and the progression of the child-custody case).

A court may find lack of parental commitment under section 2151.414(E)(4) despite the parent's incarceration and a no-contact order when the parent's earlier visits were unproductive and showed little attention to the child.

In re I.W. · filed 2016-12-08(E)(4)

The trial court also found that the parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the children by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with them when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child. R.C. 2151.414(E)(4). It is true that Mother was incarcerated and had a no-contact order against one of the children. However, prior to her incarceration, the social worker testified that Mother’s visits with A.W. were not “productive” because she gave no attention to the child during the visitation. Instead, she focused her attention on her cell phone or A.W.’s father.

A lack-of-commitment finding under subsection (E)(4) does not require proof that the agency made reasonable and diligent reunification efforts.

In re R.H. · filed 2017-05-26(E)(4)

Further, the trial court made a finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) that D.H. had demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child. This conclusion, contrary to D.H.’s argument, does not require a finding that the agency made reasonable and diligent efforts.

A parent's failure to communicate with the caseworker about case-plan objectives and to provide current contact information can demonstrate unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home under subsection (E)(4).

In re L.H. · filed 2017-11-08(E)(4)

Finally, clear and convincing evidence of Father’s lack of communications with the caseworker regarding his case plan objectives and his failure to keep her informed of his current address and other contact information demonstrated Father’s unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child.

An erroneous finding about delayed paternity does not require reversal when substantial other evidence shows actions demonstrating unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home.

In re P.M. · filed 2022-04-27(E)(4)

The trial court’s incorrect conclusion that there was a delay in Father establishing paternity, however, did not constitute reversible error because the trial court had substantial other evidence of Father’s “actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child[ren].” R.C. 2151.414(E)(4).

Section 2151.414(E)(4)'s lack-of-commitment factor was supported when a mother refused to stop using marijuana or explore legal medication despite being advised that substance use prevented reunification.

In re E.J. · filed 2023-04-27(E)(4)

The record shows that Mother was advised that she needed to stop using mind-altering substances in order to have a chance at reunification with E.J. Mother told caseworker Flynn that she was not going to stop using marijuana because she needed it, in particular to sleep. She rejected exploring legal medication to help her with her issues. This evidence supports the trial court’s finding of Mother’s lack of commitment.

Section 2151.414(E)(4)'s lack-of-commitment factor may rest on both missed visits and other actions showing inability to provide a safe permanent home, including failure to attend to children's medical needs and protect them from another parent's harmful behavior.

In re Y.H. · filed 2023-12-15(E)(4)

Given Father’s spotty visitation history, inattention to Y.H.’s and B.H.’s medical needs, and inability to provide a safe permanent home for the children, the juvenile court’s finding that permanent custody was appropriate under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Section 2151.414(E)(4) allows a lack-of-commitment finding when a parent disregards a potential risk to the children and continues a relationship that jeopardizes reunification, even if the allegations underlying that risk remain unproven.

In Re Pernell C., Unpublished Decision (11-1-2004) · filed 2004-11-01(E)(4)

Whether they were proven or not, the allegations themselves caused LCCS to be concerned enough about him to put the safety plans into place and to seek a no-contact order from the court. By allowing her children to come into contact with Fred and by later marrying him, appellant showed a cavalier disregard for the potential risk that Fred posed for her children. Even if appellant disbelieved the allegations, she knew that continuing her relationship with Fred would jeopardize reunification with her children. She chose to continue the relationship anyway, even though reunification was imminent. When plans for reunification were derailed, the children suffered. One might say that appellant chose Fred, a man she had known for a short time, over her children. All of this shows a lack of commitment to her children and "an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child[ren]." R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4).

Section 2151.414(E)(4) permits a lack-of-commitment finding when a parent fails to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able, or shows an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home.

In re A.W. · filed 2023-01-20(E)(4)

We further conclude there is sufficient and substantial competent evidence in the record that appellant demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so, or ... by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child.

Section 2151.414(F) provides that, once a permanent-custody order is issued, the child's parents cease to be parties to the action except that they retain the right to appeal the permanent-custody decision.

In Re T. C., Unpublished Decision (12-19-2007) · filed 2007-12-19(F)

R.C. 2151.414 (F) further provides that, other than retaining their right to appeal the permanent custody decision, "[t]he parents of a child for whom the court has issued an order granting permanent custody pursuant to this section, upon the issuance of the order, cease to be parties to the action."

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) does not authorize terminating one parent's parental rights when permanent custody is denied and the agency retains only temporary custody.

In re M.B. · filed 2013-02-25(B)(1)(a)

First the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), under which the trial court proceeded, does not provide for termination of parental rights when one parent is awarded placement and temporary care and custody remains with CSB. ... In this case, like in Matthews, the motion for permanent custody was denied and temporary custody continued with the Agency. Since the Agency lacks permanent custody, the termination of one parent’s rights without terminating the others is not necessary. It has no effect on the placement of the child. Termination of parental rights should not be ordered if it is not necessary.

Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) does not authorize terminating one parent's rights when the child is placed with the other parent and the agency retains temporary custody.

In Matter of Matthews, 9-07-28 (1-28-2008) · filed 2008-01-28(B)(1)(a)

First, the plain language of R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a), under which the trial court proceeded, does not provide for termination of parental rights when one parent is awarded placement and temporary care and custody remains with CSB. ... Thus, when the trial court failed to follow R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a) by ordering that Matthews' parental rights be terminated, it failed to provide her with the law's substantive protections and due process of law.

Section 2151.414(A)(1) requires a best-interest hearing on an agency's request to terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody, because termination of parental rights must be accompanied by permanent custody.

In Re Webster, Unpublished Decision (4-21-2006) · filed 2006-04-21(A)(1)

There is only one mechanism for a public children services agency or a private child placing agency to obtain an order for the permanent termination of parental rights and that is by filing a motion for permanent termination of parental rights and permanent custody. See R.C. Sec. 2151.413 and 2151.414 . The second paragraph of R.C. 2151.414 (A)(1) states that the court shall conduct a hearing . . . to determine if it is in the best interest of the child to permanently terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to the agency that filed the motion.

Section 2151.414 permits permanent custody when clear and convincing evidence establishes the child's best interest and that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent, and a prior involuntary termination of the parent's rights to a sibling is a factor in that determination.

In Re Simmons, 2007 Ca 00062 (7-23-2007) · filed 2007-07-23(B)(1)(a), (D), (E)(11)

In determining whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents (see R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a), supra), a trial court is to consider the existence of one or more factors under R.C. 2151.414 (E)... Another subsection for the court's consideration is R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11), which states as a factor whether "[t]he parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated pursuant to this section or section 2151.353 or 2151.415 of the Revised Code with respect to a sibling of the child."... Moreover, it is undisputed that the trial court had previously terminated appellant's parental rights as to Isabelle's sibling, James. R.C. 2151.414 (E)(11), supra. ... Upon review, we find the trial court's conclusions pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1) were supported by the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.

Under the former version of § 2151.414(E)(11), a parent's prior involuntary termination of parental rights to a sibling, standing alone, required a finding that the child could not or should not be placed with that parent within a reasonable time.

In re D.K. · filed 2009-10-13(E)(11)

Here, the particular statutory provision in effect did not require anything but a prior termination of parental rights before the trial court was required to enter a finding that D.K. could not be placed with Knief within a reasonable period of time.

Section 2151.414 does not require a court to review a parent’s rights when the parent acknowledges only that the children cannot presently return to her care.

In re K.E. · filed 2020-09-23

At this stage the trial court is guided by Juv.R. 34 and R.C. 2151.414 to consider all relevant and material evidence, including, but not limited to, hearsay, opinion, and documentary evidence to determine whether permanent custody is in the best interest of the children. ... We find that the trial court did not err by not engaging in a review of Karlea’s rights after she offered a limited stipulation as the Revised Code, the Juvenile Rules and the relevant precedent do not require such a colloquy in the context of this case.