N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2

A later medical condition is compensable under § 97-2(6) when competent evidence ties it to an initial workplace injury and subsequent work-related aggravations.

Cawthorn v. Mission Hospital, Inc. · filed 2011-04-19(6)

The Commission’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s current medical condition was causally related to her compensable injuries is likewise supported by these findings of fact.

Section 97-2(6) does not cover a claimed neck condition when the claimant fails to prove it was causally related to a compensable back injury and arose out of or in the course of employment.

Cleary v. Gardner Glass Products, Inc. · filed 2011-07-01(6)

Plaintiff has not proven that his neck condition is causally related to his July 10, 2009 lower back injury, and that the neck condition arose out of or in the course and scope of his employment with Employer-Defendant.

Section 97-2(6) requires a condition to be causally related to a compensable injury to qualify as a resulting injury.

Shoffner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2002-11-26(6)

The plaintiff's myofascial pain syndrome is not the direct and natural result of, or causally related to her 26 February 1996 injury by accident, and she is therefore not entitled to medical treatment for that condition.

Section 97-2(6) requires proof that a later condition was causally related to a compensable workplace injury.

Horne v. Carroll's Foods · filed 2003-04-30(6)

Plaintiff failed to show by competent medical authority and/or by the greater weight of the evidence any causal relationship between her July 19, 1995 compensable back injury and her herniated disk discovered on March 26, 1996, which resulted in her surgery on April 4, 1996. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

An off-duty deputy's injury while attempting to arrest a robber is a compensable injury by accident when he acts in accordance with sheriff's office regulations.

Teasdale v. Cherokee Cty. · filed 2005-07-08(6)

Plaintiff suffered a compensable injury by accident on 27 January 2001 when plaintiff was seriously injured as he acted in accordance with Cherokee Sheriff's Office regulations and attempted to arrest a robber while off-duty. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

An employer at the time of an employee’s accident remains subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction despite a later sale of the business.

Goodson v. P. H. Glatfelter Co. · filed 2005-07-19(3)

However, the subsequent sale of the Ecusta Division to RFS does not, standing alone, divest the Commission of jurisdiction over Glatfelter as plaintiff’s employer at the time of the accident.

Section 97-2(2) requires a claimant to prove that he was an employee of the defendant at the time of the alleged injury.

King v. Capital of Cary · filed 2011-09-27(2)

Plaintiff has failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that he was an employee of Defendant-Employer at the time of the alleged injury on November 6, 2009. N.C. Gen. Stat § 97-2 (2).

Section 97-2 requires an employment relationship with the insured employer for its carrier to owe workers’ compensation benefits.

Vega v. Fenix Renovations · filed 2005-07-21(2)

At the time of the injury by accident giving rise to this claim, plaintiff was not employed by Fenix Renovations and was therefore not entitled to workers' compensation benefits from Fenix Renovations' workers' compensation carrier.

Section 97-2 requires a claimant to have been employed by the insured employer at the time of injury to receive workers’ compensation benefits from that employer’s carrier.

Vargas v. Fenix Renovations · filed 2005-07-21(2)

At the time of the injury by accident giving rise to this claim, plaintiff was not employed by Fenix Renovations and was therefore not entitled to workers' compensation benefits from defendant-carrier, the workers' compensation carrier for Fenix Renovations.

Section 97-2 applies the Workers’ Compensation Act only where an employer-employee relationship exists.

Morse v. Curtis · filed 1970-03-11

If this conclusion was correctly reached, then defendant’s pleas in bar were correctly overruled because the statute expressly provides that the Workmen’s Compensation Act only applies where the employer-employee relationship exists.

Section 97-2(12) does not presume that a stepchild is dependent on a deceased employee.

Walters v. Lance, Inc. · filed 1995-02-10(12)

In the case of a step-child, it is not presumed as a matter of law that she or he is a dependent of the step-father under the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act as interpreted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Winstead v.Derreberry, 73 N.C. App. 35 (1985).

Section 97-2(12) includes a stepchild as a child when the stepchild was substantially dependent on the deceased employee for support for at least three months before the accident.

Lanaux-Jennings v. Slay Transp. · filed 2005-09-01(12)

Ryan Lanaux, decedent's stepchild, also qualified as a child in that he was substantially dependent upon decedent for support for at least three months prior to the date of the accident giving rise to this claim.

A stepchild qualifies as a child under § 97-2(12) only if the stepchild was substantially dependent on the deceased employee.

Capps v. Standard Trucking Co. · filed 1985-10-15(12)

This appeal concerns whether the deceased employee’s stepchild, Robby Wayne Evans, is a “child” of the deceased within the meaning of G.S. 97-2(12) so as to clothe him with the conclusive presumption under G.S. 97-39 that he is “wholly dependent for support upon the deceased employee” and, therefore, entitled to an equal share of the compensation under G.S. 97-38. In light of Winstead v. Derreberry, 73 N.C. App. 35, 326 S.E. 2d 66 (1985), we must remand this case for a determination of whether Robby Wayne Evans was “substantially” dependent upon the deceased at the time of his death.

Section 97-2(19) requires an employer to provide medically necessary home modifications that effect a cure, give relief, or lessen a worker’s disability.

Clark v. Sanger Clinic · filed 2005-10-18(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants provide appropriate modifications to her house as previously ordered by the Full Commission. Such modifications are reasonably required to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen plaintiff's disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19).

Section 97-2(19) requires payment for home modifications only when they are medically necessary or reasonably required to give an injured worker relief.

Pair v. Amerlink, Ltd. · filed 2008-12-02(19)

The recommendations made by Holtvedt for home modifications for a 20' x 20' carport, a front rain gutter and a ramp for plaintiff's relative's home and plaintiff's request that Defendant's pay for extermination of home and yard are not medically necessary or reasonably required to give plaintiff relief. Thus, Defendants are not required to pay for these modifications. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19).

Section 97-2(19) includes home modifications necessary to accommodate an injured worker’s disability within medical compensation.

Schalesky v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber · filed 2007-05-04(19)

"Medical Compensation" is defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19) as "medical . . . and other treatment . . . as may be reasonably required to effect a cure or give relief . . ." The "other treatment" provision of the Act has been interpreted by our courts as requiring the employer to pay for home modifications necessary to accommodate an injured employee's disabilities. ... Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to a walk-in shower, but not to the additional home modifications requested.

Section 97-2(12) includes acknowledged illegitimate children within the definition of children.

Evans v. South Lubes, Inc. · filed 2005-10-27(12)

Avery Allen Evans, Devin John Muller, Justin Lamar Muller and Carnell Antonio Muller are the acknowledged illegitimate children of decedent as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (12).

An acknowledged illegitimate child qualifies as a child under § 97-2(12) for workers’ compensation death benefits only if dependent on the deceased employee; acknowledgment need not be a formal declaration but requires satisfactory evidence that the employee recognized paternity.

Smith v. Flatfoot Concrete Construction · filed 2009-12-11(12)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (12) defines a child, in pertinent part, as an ". . . acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased. . . ." (Emphasis added.) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (12) (2008). Only such a child that meets that definition may receive workers' compensation death benefits. Although a formal declaration before an authorized official is not necessary to demonstrate acknowledgment of paternity of an illegitimate child, evidence in the form of a written agreement, verbal declarations or statements, the life, acts, and conduct of the parties to the proceedings, or any other satisfactory evidence that the deceased employee recognized and admitted paternity is required.

An acknowledged illegitimate child qualifies under § 97-2(12) without proof of actual support from the deceased employee because dependency is conclusively presumed under § 97-39.

Hewett v. Garrett · filed 1968-05-15(12)

We recognize that there is a possible ambiguity between G.S. 97-2(12) which defines the term “child” as including an acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased, and the language of G.S. 97-39 which provides that a “child shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon the deceased em*237ployee.” Exactly the same ambiguity existed, however, at the time the North Carolina Supreme Court decided the case of Lippard v. Express Co., supra, and the Supreme Court resolved it in favor of the conclusive presumption created by the latter section of the statute. ... In view of the holdings in the Lippard and Martin cases, supra, the opinion and award of the Industrial Commission in the case before us was in error, and the cause is remanded to the Industrial Commission with the direction that judgment be entered in accordance with this opinion.

Section 97-2(12) includes an acknowledged illegitimate child under 18 based on the father’s legal duty of support, even if he stopped providing support.

Hewett Ex Rel. Wilson v. Garrett · filed 1968-10-09(12)

It should be noted the wholly dependent provision applies only in case of married children. It does not apply to acknowledged illegitimates or other children who are unmarried and who are under 18. The statute recognizes a distinction between actual and legal dependency. A legal dependence is sufficient and the law fixes that type of responsibility on the father of an illegitimate.

Section 97-2(12) does not require a formal declaration to acknowledge an illegitimate child; recognition of the parental relationship through words or conduct can suffice.

Carpenter v. Hawley · filed 1981-09-15(12)

Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, the word “acknowledged” is not a term of art meaning requiring a formal declaration before an authorized official. In regard to paternity actions, the term “acknowledgment” generally has been held to mean the recognition of a parental relation, either by written agreement, verbal declarations or statements, by the life, acts, and conduct of the parties, or any other satisfactory evidence that the relation was recognized and admitted.

An illegitimate child can be acknowledged for purposes of § 97-2(12) without a written instrument or judicial proceeding.

Dove v. Triangle Paving, Inc. · filed 1996-03-19(12)

It is not necessary for an illegitimate child's status to be established by written instrument or judicial proceeding in order for the Industrial Commission to be able to find that an illegitimate child has been acknowledged.

Under § 97-2(6), an injury during travel for both business and personal purposes arises in the course of employment when the work creates the need for that travel.

Fuller v. Clear Channel Communications · filed 2005-11-03(6)

It was the work of decedent for the benefit of defendant-employer that created the necessity for travel on Thursday, May 16, 2002. As such, decedent was in the course of his employment at the time of the accident, even though he was serving at the same time some purpose of his own.

Section 97-2(6) covers an employment accident that aggravates a pre-existing condition as an injury by accident.

Conrad v. City of Winston-Salem · filed 1995-01-26(6)

On April 12, 1988, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer which resulted in an aggravation of a pre-existing condition, which was plaintiff's asthma.

Section 97-2(6) covers the natural consequences of a compensable back injury, including deconditioning and aggravation of preexisting COPD, anxiety, and depression.

Triplett v. City of Hickory · filed 2006-07-12(6)

As a direct and natural result of the back pain and leg pain caused by plaintiff's compensable injury, the resulting medication, and immobility, plaintiff has become deconditioned and has had an exacerbation of her COPD, as well as an aggravation or exacerbation of her anxiety and depression.

An injury by accident under § 97-2(6) includes a workplace accident that permanently aggravates a preexisting degenerative condition.

Perkins v. Pitt County Memorial Hospital · filed 2007-10-03(6)

The Full Commission finds, based on the greater weight of the evidence, including medical records from treating physicians and the opinions expressed by those physicians either through their notes or through deposition, that the severe spinal stenosis for which Dr. Davidson provided surgery in December 2003 was a progressive degenerative condition that was permanently aggravated or exacerbated by Plaintiff's July 27, 2002, workplace accident.

Aggravation of preexisting symptoms without aggravation of the underlying condition is insufficient to establish a causal connection between a compensable injury and the preexisting condition.

Fields v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp. · filed 2008-03-17(6)

Plaintiff's aggravation of preexisting symptoms, with no aggravation of the underlying condition is insufficient to establish a causal connection between the compensable injury and plaintiff's pre-existing and on-going left knee difficulties.

An injury by accident under § 97-2(6) includes the aggravation and acceleration of a preexisting condition caused by the workplace accident.

Perritt v. Southern Corrosion · filed 2008-12-11(6)

On July 7, 2006, plaintiff sustained an admittedly compensable injury to his right knee, right arm, head, neck, left eye, and teeth by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on July 7, 2006. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). Plaintiff's compensable condition includes an aggravation and acceleration of his underlying rheumatoid arthritis.

Section 97-2(6) covers psychological conditions caused by a compensable head injury and a conversion reaction that directly or naturally results from those conditions.

Willett v. Charles R. Underwood, Inc. · filed 2009-02-04(6)

Plaintiff's compensable head injury caused his behavioral dyscontrol disorder, which includes disabling, uncontrollable anger outbursts and anxiety. Plaintiff also developed a conversion reaction initially directly from the compensable head injury and later as a direct and natural result of his compensable behavioral dyscontrol disorder. The conversion reaction manifested itself in symptoms like balance, speech and vision problems. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

A specific traumatic incident at work that aggravates a preexisting spinal condition can be a compensable injury under § 97-2(6).

Pulley v. City of Wilson · filed 2009-04-07(6)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the above findings, together with the record evidence of plaintiff's increased pain and neck problems after his attempt to walk through the combat course on 29 November 2004, support the Commission's finding that plaintiff's preexisting neck condition was aggravated by a specific traumatic incident.

A work injury that materially aggravates a previously non-disabling condition and makes it disabling is a compensable injury under § 97-2(6).

Dalton v. Waters of Hickory · filed 2010-02-03(6)

As a result of Plaintiff's April 1, 2005 work injury, she sustained a lower back injury which materially aggravated her pre-existing, non-disabling lumbar degenerative disc disease to such an extent that her resulting lower back condition became disabling.

An injury by accident includes a material aggravation of a preexisting, non-disabling condition when the aggravation results from a work injury.

Simpson v. Schenker Logistics, Inc. · filed 2010-04-13(6)

Regardless of the burden of proof, as the direct and natural result of and causally related to her April 15, 2008 admittedly compensable injury by accident, plaintiff's pre-existing, non-disabling degenerative left knee arthritis was materially aggravated for the worse to the extent that a total knee replacement procedure is required.

Section 97-2(6) covers an accidental workplace injury that materially aggravates a preexisting condition.

Taylor v. City of Durham · filed 2010-09-22(6)

The Full Commission finds that the greater weight of the medical evidence of record indicates that the plaintiff's pre-existing wrist condition was materially aggravated for the worse by his January 25, 2008, injury by accident. ... On January 25, 2008, the plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers a later fall caused by a compensable injury when the fall materially accelerates or aggravates a preexisting, nondisabling condition.

Barnhardt v. N.C. Department of Transportation · filed 2011-03-11(6)

On May 11, 2009, plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant-employer when she fell after her left knee gave way, causing a material acceleration or aggravation of a preexisting but non-disabling right shoulder condition, leading to disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers a work injury that aggravates a preexisting, nondisabling condition and causes the need for surgery.

Darnell v. Surry Community College · filed 2011-06-20(6)

Regardless of the burden of proof, plaintiff has proven that as the direct and natural result of and causally related to her January 31, 2008 admittedly compensable injury by accident, plaintiff's pre-existing, non-disabling cervical condition was aggravated for the worse to the extent that the cervical laminectomy was required. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6); Holley v. ACTS, Inc. , 357 N.C. 228 , 581 S.E.2d 750 (2003).

Section 97-2(6) treats a work injury that materially aggravates a preexisting condition as a compensable injury by accident.

Smith v. Cape Fear Valley Health System · filed 2011-10-07(6)

Plaintiff has shown by the preponderance of the evidence that on February 15, 2010, he sustained a compensable injury to his left shoulder arising out of and in the course of his employment, which resulted in the material aggravation of his preexisting left clavicle nonunion.

Section 97-2(6) permits compensation when a natural reflex to a workplace accident causes or aggravates a disabling condition, even if the worker was predisposed to that condition.

Jackson v. L.G. DeWitt Trucking Co. · filed 1986-08-05(6)

The Commission may award compensation in this case if it finds that the burning and itching caused Mr. Jackson, through a natural reflex, to vigorously rub his eyes and that the rubbing caused, aggravated, accelerated, or precipitated the hemorrhagic vein occlusion, even if Mr. Jackson were to have a predisposition toward developing this condition.

Section 97-2(6) covers an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment that significantly aggravates a pre-existing condition.

Gresham v. Freeway Foods, Inc. · filed 1997-10-17(6)

On October 5, 1995, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant-employer when her right hand slipped from an ice bucket which significantly aggravated her pre-existing adhesive capsulitis. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

Section 97-2(6) treats an injury as compensable when a work-related accident materially aggravates a preexisting condition and proximately contributes to disability.

Grobluskey v. Crossmark Holdings, Inc. · filed 2011-12-06(6)

North Carolina courts have held that an injury is compensable if it is caused by an accident that arises out of employment, materially accelerates or aggravates a pre-existing condition, and proximately contributes to disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 9 7-2(6); Brown v. Family Dollar Distrib. Ctr. , 129 N.C. App. 361 , 364 , 499 S.E.2d 197 , 199 (1998).

An injured worker may remain disabled under § 97-2(9) despite being able to do some work when injury-related physical limits and limited training leave her needing vocational assistance to find suitable employment.

Williams v. Law Companies Group, Inc. · filed 2006-07-19(9)

Although Plaintiff may be able to do some work, she must have vocational assistance to help her locate suitable employment considering her severe physical limitations due to her compensable injury and her limited education and training. ... As a result of her chronic leg pain caused by her injury by accident of September 21, 2000, Plaintiff has been temporarily totally disabled from September 21, 2000 through the date of hearing before the Deputy Commissioner and continuing and is entitled to temporary total disability compensation during said period. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (9); 97-29 .

Section 97-2(19) covers a diagnostic work-up that reasonably tends to effect a cure, even when the testing does not establish the suspected condition.

James v. New Hanover Regional Medical Center · filed 2007-01-05(19)

In that Dr. Grieb had good reason to believe that the symptoms plaintiff was experiencing as a result of her December 23, 2003 injury by accident were coming from a hip condition, the hip work-up he ordered, which was performed by Dr. Sutton, reasonably tended to effect a cure for the injury giving rise to this claim. Consequently, plaintiff is entitled to have defendants pay for such diagnostic work-up, to include MRI, injections, and arthrograms as necessary for diagnosis.

Section 97-2(14) recognizes a spouse who remained married to the employee through his death as a widow under the Workers' Compensation Act.

Brown v. Jason Brown Grading · filed 2007-01-17(14)

Kathy Fraley Brown is a "widow" under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, and is therefore conclusively presumed to have been dependent upon deceased-employee at the time of his death. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (14) and 97-39 .

Section 97-2(14) defines a widow as the decedent’s wife who lived with him or depended on him for support at death, or lived apart for justifiable cause or because he deserted her.

Williams v. Schneider National Carriers · filed 2010-12-08(14)

"Widow," as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (14), "includes only the decedent's wife living with or dependent for support upon him at the time of his death; or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of his desertion at such time." Plaintiff meets the definition of Widow under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act and survived Deceased Employee at the time of his death.

Section 97-2(14) defines a widow as a wife who was living with or dependent on the employee when he died, or who lived apart for justifiable cause or because he deserted her.

Easley v. TLC Cos. · filed 2015-08-04(14)

To be a "widow" under the Act, the decedent's wife must be "living with or dependent for support upon him at the time of his death; or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of his desertion at such time." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 97-2(14) (2013). ... The Industrial Commission's findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and those findings, in turn, support the Commission's conclusion that Mrs. Easley does not qualify as a widow under the Workers' Compensation Act.

Section 97-2(14) requires a claimant seeking widow's death benefits to prove that she qualifies as a widow under the Act.

Littlefield v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. · filed 2003-01-28(14)

Even if decedent's death was compensable, plaintiff in this action has not proved that she is a widow as defined by the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(14).

Section 97-2(19) does not cover the costs of heating and maintaining a home therapy pool merely because using it is beneficial; the worker must prove entitlement to those costs.

Winders v. Edgecombe County Home Health Care · filed 2007-02-05(19)

Plaintiff failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that she is entitled to medical compensation for the gas, electricity and supplies used to heat and maintain her pool at home, except for the limited purposes authorized herein. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19).

Section 97-2(2) excludes a worker from the definition of employee only when the work is both casual and outside the usual course of the employer’s business; sporadic work within that business remains covered.

Crawford v. Phillips · filed 2007-05-04(2)

Additionally, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2), the term "employee" excludes persons "whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of his employer" (emphasis added). ... In the present case, although the work plaintiff performed for defendant was sporadic and occasional, the work was in the usual course of defendant's trade, business, profession, or occupation.

Workers who perform occasional work in the usual course of an employer’s business are employees under § 97-2(2), rather than excluded as casual workers.

Crawford v. Phillips · filed 2008-02-12(2)

In the present case, although the work plaintiff performed for defendant was sporadic and occasional, the work was in the usual course of defendant's trade, business, profession, or occupation. ... Thus, plaintiff was a regular employee of defendant within the meaning of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act and defendant employed three or more employees at the time of plaintiff's injury by accident on February 19, 2005.

Section 97-2(2) excludes a worker as a casual employee only when the work is also outside the employer’s trade or business.

Crawford v. Phillips · filed 2009-06-11(2)

Additionally, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2), the term "employee" excludes persons "whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of his employer" (emphasis added).

Section 97-2(2) treats a brief, chance job with no reasonable prospect of recurring work as casual employment.

Clark v. Waverly Mills, Inc. · filed 1971-10-20(2)

We hold that under these circumstances, the Commission correctly determined plaintiff’s employment to have been “casual” within the meaning of G.S. 97-2(2).

Casual work is covered when it is incident to the operation of the employer’s business.

Boyd v. Mitchell · filed 1980-08-05

He concluded from this that the work although casual was incident to the warehouse business and was covered by workmen’s compensation. Based on these findings of fact, we hold this conclusion was correct.

Under § 97-2(6), an insect sting is compensable only if it is an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Adams v. Becton Dickinson Company · filed 2007-05-15(6)

To be compensable, an insect sting must be an injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of the employment.

Section 97-2(12) defines a grandchild as a child of a child within the statute’s definition of child.

Reynolds v. Britt Tilson Glass Company · filed 2007-06-28(12)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (12) defines "child" to include a child born after decedent's death, a child legally adopted prior to decedent's injury, and a stepchild or acknowledged illegitimate child dependent on decedent. "Grandchild" is a child of a child, as previously defined. In the case at bar, Jeffrey Lee Reynolds and Sara Louise Roberts are the minor grandchildren of decedent.

Section 97-2(6) treats damage to a breast implant as a compensable injury because a breast implant is a prosthetic device that functions as part of the body.

Richardson v. MAXIM HEALTHCARE/ALLEGIS · filed 2007-11-06(6)

We believe that the weight of authority supports a determination that breast implants satisfy the statutory requirement as a compensable prosthetic device that functions as part of the body.

Section 97-2(2) treats North Carolina National Guard and State Guard members as employees while on State active duty under orders of the Governor, including active duty beyond special duty.

Baccus v. N.C. Department of Crime Control · filed 2007-11-27(2)

The amendment clarifies that members of both the North Carolina National Guard and the North Carolina State Guard are considered employees under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act while on State active (not just special) duty under orders of the Governor.

Section 97-2(2) excludes a National Guard member injured during federally funded Title 32 training from its definition of employee because that training is not State active duty.

Baccus v. N.C. Department of Crime Control & Public Safety · filed 2009-01-20(2)

In the instant case, it is undisputed that plaintiff was injured while training pursuant to Title 32 and that she was paid with federal and not state funds. As a result, plaintiff was not on “State active duty” pursuant to section 97-2(2) when she sustained her injuries. Because plaintiff was not an employee as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(2), the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 97-2(2) excludes a claimant from the definition of “employee” when fraud in the inducement voids the employment contract.

Freeman v. Rothrock · filed 2008-03-04(2)

Therefore, fraud in the inducement of employment would render the employment contract void. In the absence of a valid employment contract, a claimant would fail to meet the statutory definition of an “employee” and therefore would lack standing under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Section 97-2(2) treats a truck driver as the employee of the company that controls his work rather than the company that owns the truck when the evidence establishes that employment relationship.

Hojnacki v. Last Rebel Trucking, Inc. · filed 2008-11-13(2)

The greater weight of the credible evidence proves that plaintiff was not an employee of Last Rebel, but rather was an employee of Comtrak at the time of plaintiff's injury.

Section 97-2(2) requires a claimant to establish employee status at the time of injury to recover workers’ compensation benefits.

Preisach v. Andy's Fence Co., L.L.C. · filed 2010-03-24(2)

Because Plaintiff failed to establish that he was an employee of Defendant-Employer at the time of the injury, Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2).

Section 97-2(1) excludes a treatment-program resident whose work serves the program’s therapeutic purposes rather than an employment arrangement.

Thayer v. Trosa · filed 2010-10-21(1)

In the instant case, the greater weight of the evidence shows that plaintiff did not enter into an employment arrangement with defendant, but rather entered into a therapeutic program in an attempt to end drug addictions. Further, the work performed by plaintiff while in defendant's program did not constitute job duties but instead were regimens designed to facilitate the treatment of his drug addictions. Accordingly, the Full Commission concludes as a matter of law that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties; therefore, the Industrial Commission lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim.

Section 97-2(2) does not require a worker to verify that the person apparently authorized to hire on an employer’s behalf has actual hiring authority.

Campos-Brizuela v. Rocha Masonry, L.L.C. · filed 2011-10-04(2)

Any decision on our part to adopt the approach advocated by Defendants would require every job applicant to ascertain, at the risk of losing the ability to obtain workers’ compensation benefits, whether the person who hired him on behalf of an employing entity is acting within the scope of his actual authority. The statutory definition of an “employee” set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(2) contains no such requirement, and we see no basis in the applicable rules of statutory construction for imposing one as a matter of judicial fiat.

Section 97-2 permits compensation only when the injured person was an employee of the party from whom compensation is sought at the time of injury or death.

Scott v. Waccamaw Lumber Co. · filed 1950-05-24

An injured person, or his dependent or next of kin, is entitled to compensation under the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act only if he is an employee of the party from whom compensation is claimed at the time of his injury or death. G.S. 97-2. For this reason, the injured employee of an independent contractor, or his dependent or next of kin, cannot recover compensation from the employer of the independent contractor.

Section 97-2 limits compensation to people who were employees of the party from whom they claim compensation when injured.

Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc. · filed 1956-05-09

An injured person is entitled to compensation under our Workmen’s Compensation Act only if he is an employee of the party from whom compensation is claimed at the time of his injury.

Section 97-2(2) includes people working under a contract of hire and qualifying corporate executive officers in its definition of employee.

Newton v. United States Fire Insurance · filed 1990-06-05(2)

G.S. 97-2(2) defines “employee” as “every person engaged in an employment under any appointment or contract of hire .... [and e]very executive officer elected or appointed and empowered in accordance with the charter and bylaws of a corporation shall be considered as an employee of such corporation under this Article.” Riley and Newton were co-employees under the Act.

Section 97-2(2) covers a worker who becomes a contractor’s employee after previously performing independent subcontract work.

Rountree v. Bond Hedgepeth D/B/A Rb Constr. · filed 2003-03-07(2)

Plaintiff was an employee of Bond Hedgepeth d/b/a RB Construction at the time he sustained an injury by accident to his right hand and leg. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(2).

Section 97-2(5) permits the exceptional-reasons method to calculate a school-year employee’s average weekly wages by dividing the preceding year’s earnings by 52 when the other methods would produce an unfair result.

Conyers v. New Hanover County Schools · filed 2008-01-15(5)

Consequently, as in Joyner and Barber, Plaintiff’s average weekly wages should be calculated by dividing the wages she earned in the 52-week period prior to her accident by 52, the number of weeks in the year.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wages when the first four methods would be unfair or cannot be applied, as with a professional football contract lacking comparable-worker wage evidence.

Crutchfield v. CAROLINA FOOTBALL ENTERPRISES, INC. · filed 2008-04-01(5)

In the case sub judice, the Full Commission found that calculating plaintiff's average weekly wages under any of the first four methods of section 97-2(5) would produce unfair and unjust results to the parties. We agree. Plaintiff worked fewer than fifty-two weeks prior to his compensable injuries; therefore, his weekly wages cannot be calculated under the first or second methods of the statute. We also agree with the Full Commission's finding that due to the nature of professional football contracts and how they are negotiated, fair and just results cannot be produced from the third method of payment in the statute. Moreover, since no evidence was presented as to the average weekly wages of an employee of the same grade and character as plaintiff in the same locality or community, plaintiff's average weekly wages cannot be calculated by the fourth method provided in the statute. Therefore, to produce just results, the Full Commission utilized the fifth calculation method listed in section 97-2(5), which allows for a recovery that approximates the amount which the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury.

Section 97-2(5) establishes an order of preference for calculating average weekly wages, and the first applicable method must be used.

Gentry v. Reaves Construction Co. · filed 2008-07-03(5)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) provides five possible methods of determining average weekly wages. This statute establishes a clear order of preference for calculating average weekly wages such that when the first method can be used, it must be used.

Section 97-2(5) provides five methods for calculating average weekly wages and requires use of the first method when it can be used.

Gentry v. Reaves Construction Co. · filed 2008-09-16(5)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) provides five possible methods of determining average weekly wages. This statute establishes a clear order of preference for calculating average weekly wages such that when the first method can be used, it must be used.

Section 97-2(5) requires findings that the first four methods for calculating average weekly wages would be unfair before the Commission may use the fifth method.

Pope v. Manville · filed 2010-09-21(5)

With respect to that issue, we conclude that the Commission erred by failing to adopt one of the first four methods for calculating claimant’s average weekly wage set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5) without making sufficient findings and conclusions to allow use of the fifth method for calculating a claimant’s average weekly wage set out in that statutory provision.

The Commission must make specific findings explaining why the usual 52-week method of calculating average weekly wages would be unjust before using an alternative method.

Johnson v. Covil Corp. · filed 2011-06-07(5)

Based on the foregoing reasons, we remand the case to the Industrial Commission for more specific findings as to why the first method of section 97-2(5) would be unjust and to recalculate plaintiff’s compensation in accordance with this opinion.

Section 97-2(5) counts all time worked for the employer when applying the fewer-than-52-weeks wage method, even after a promotion, and permits the exceptional-reasons method only upon a finding that the first four methods would be unfair.

James v. Carolina Power & Light · filed 2011-06-07(5)

While our Court answered in the negative, its formulation of the issue indicates that, notwithstanding the employee’s promotion to a new position and pay raise, he had still been employed, as “employment” is defined, for a continuous fifty-two weeks. Accordingly, the Commission’s finding that Plaintiff worked less than fifty-two weeks for Employer, triggering method three of the statute, was erroneous. ... And while it would have been proper for the Commission to decline using method one, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s employment of over fifty-two weeks, and calculate Plaintiff’s average weekly wages as it did pursuant to method five for exceptional circumstances, such is permissible only in conjunction with a finding that the first four methods would be unfair, either to the employer or employee.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method to calculate average weekly wages by dividing wages earned from the employer where the injury occurred during the preceding 52 weeks by 52 when the earlier methods would not produce fair and just results.

Thompson v. STS Holdings, Inc. · filed 2011-06-21(5)

We hold that the Commission did not err by calculating wages earned by Plaintiff while in the employ of STS in a fifty-two week period, then dividing that amount by fifty-two in order to obtain Plaintiff’s average weekly wage for his employment with STS.

When the first four methods for calculating average weekly wages yield unfair and unjust results, § 97-2(5) permits a method that most nearly approximates what the employee would earn absent the injury.

Pope v. Manville · filed 2011-07-21(5)

The Full Commission finds that the utilization of the first four methods for determining average weekly wages enunciated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) would produce unfair and unjust results. The Full Commission further finds that based on the exceptional reasons and circumstances of the unfair and unjust results, the Full Commission must use such other method of computing average weekly wages that will most nearly approximate the amount which Plaintiff would be earning were it not for the injury.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method for calculating average weekly wages only after a finding that the other four methods would produce unjust results.

Mauldin v. A.C. Corp. · filed 2011-11-15(5)

While the parties assert that the Commission must have used the fifth method, the Commission made no finding that unjust results would occur if the other four methods were used instead, contrary to McAninch.

Section 97-2(5) permits use of its fifth method to calculate average weekly wages from the last full year of employment when an occupational disease is diagnosed after retirement and the Commission finds the first four methods unfair or inapplicable.

Lipe v. Starr Davis Co., Inc. · filed 2014-07-01(5)

Guided by Pope, we hold that these findings are sufficient to support the Commission’s calculation method and, moreover, that the Commission correctly determined Decedent’s average weekly wages to be $606.36, yielding a corresponding weekly compensation rate of $404.24.

For temporary positions, § 97-2(5) requires the Commission to account for the weeks the employee would have worked in the position relative to a 52-week period when calculating average weekly wages.

Tedder v. A and K Enterprises · filed 2014-12-16(5)

In light of Joyner, Conyers, and Thompson, we hold that in calculating average weekly wages for employees in temporary positions, the Commission must consider the number of weeks the employee would have been employed in that temporary position relative to a 52-week time period.

Under § 97-2(5), Form 22 aids the calculation of average weekly wages when indemnity compensation is awarded and is unnecessary when indemnity compensation is denied.

Patillo v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 2016-12-20(5)

A Form 22 (Statement of Days Worked and Earnings of Injured Employee) is an aid in calculating average weekly wages, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5), when indemnity compensation is granted. ... Thus, a Form 22 was not necessary pursuant to the Commission’s Award, and Plaintiff was not entitled to a specific finding regarding Defendants’ failure to submit a Form 22.

Section 97-2(5) requires a fair and just average weekly wage calculation that accounts for proven post-injury increases in hours and pay when using pre-injury earnings alone would understate what the employee would have earned.

Ball v. Bayada Home Health Care · filed 2017-08-15(5)

We hold that only taking into account Plaintiff’s pre-injury compensation, through use of Method 3, is unfair to Plaintiff, as it ignores the months of increased hours and pay Plaintiff worked after her 10 February 2011 injury, and would effectively treat Plaintiff as if she had never worked increased hours at a higher rate of pay.

Section 97-2(5) permits its second method of calculating average weekly wages only when the employee was employed for the 52 weeks preceding the injury.

Frank v. Symphony · filed 2017-09-05(5)

The application of method two requires the employee to have been employed for a period of 52 weeks preceding the injury, which Plaintiff stipulated she was not.

Section 97-2(5) requires the fifth method of calculating average weekly wages to approximate what the injured employee would be earning without the injury, based on actual earnings rather than earning capacity.

Penegar v. United Parcel Serv. · filed 2018-05-01(5)

Section 97-2 explicitly provides that the weekly calculation using the fifth method should “most nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury[,]” not what the injured employee could be earning.

Section 97-2(e) permits average weekly wages to be based on the parties’ compensation agreement when it most nearly approximates what the employee would have earned without the injury and is fair to both parties.

Harris v. ASHEVILLE CONTRACTING COMPANY · filed 1954-10-13(e)

Therefore, it would seem that tbe contract existing between tbe parties with respect to plaintiff’s compensation, at tbe time of bis injury, would most nearly approximate tbe amount which be would be earning bad be not been injured. G.S. 97-2 (e). There is nothing in tbe record to indicate that tbe finding of tbe Commission, with respect to tbe wages of tbe plaintiff, is not fair and just to both parties. Tbe exception is overruled.

For employment lasting less than fifty-two weeks, § 97-2(e) computes average weekly wages from actual earnings divided by the weeks or parts of weeks in which wages were earned, if that method produces results fair and just to both parties.

Liles v. FAULKNER NEON & ELECTRIC COPANY · filed 1956-10-31(e)

The said first method does not apply when as here the period of employment prior to injury is less than fifty-two weeks. In such case the prescribed (second) method is to divide the employee's earnings over the period of employment by the number of weeks or parts thereof during which the employee earned wages, subject to the proviso that by such method results fair and just to both parties will be obtained.

Section 97-2(e) bases average weekly wages on the employee’s earnings in the employment held at the time of injury, rather than earning capacity.

Purvis ex rel. Liles v. Faulkner Neon & Electric Co. · filed 1956-10-31(e)

Under G.S. 97-2 (e), “average weekly wages” of the employee “in the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury” must be related to his earnings rather than to his earning capacity.

Section 97-2(5) ordinarily bases average weekly wages on actual earnings; when that calculation is impractical or unjust, it uses the earnings of comparable workers in the same locality.

Lovette v. Reliable Manufacturing Company · filed 1964-06-12(5)

The purpose of the statute is to base compensation upon the normal income which the employee derived from his employment. To provide for situations in which, because of the shortness of time during which the employee has worked for his employer or the casual nature or terms of his employment, it would be impractical or unjust to compute the average weekly wages as above defined, the statute requires that “regard shall be had to the average weekly amount which during the fifty-two weeks previous to the injury was being earned by a person of the same grade and character employed in the same class of employment in the same locality or community.”

Section 97-2(5) permits average weekly wages for intermittent work to be calculated from a typical year’s earnings when the shorter employment period would omit slack weeks and produce an unfair result.

Joyner v. AJ CAREY OIL COMPANY · filed 1966-02-04(5)

The dominant intent of G.S. 97-2(5) is that results fair and just to both employer and employee be obtained. ... Fairness to the employer requires that we take into consideration both peak and slack periods. ... This is the result which defendants contend the Commission should have reached under the “exceptional reasons” method, and we are constrained to agree that it is the proper one.

Section 97-2(5) permits average weekly wages to be based on a comparable worker’s earnings when the employee’s short period of employment makes the earlier methods impractical and the result is fair to both parties.

Cobb v. Eastern Clearing & Grading, Inc. · filed 1968-06-12(5)

Upon this record, we are constrained to hold that the hearing •commissioner’s use of method three was authorized and does not •obtain results unfair or unjust to either party.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fourth method of calculating average weekly wages only after a finding that the second method would be unfair and unjust to the employee or employer.

Wallace v. Music Shop, II, Inc. · filed 1971-05-26(5)

The fourth prescribed method may not be used unless there has been a finding that use of the second method would produce results unfair and unjust to either the employee or employer.

Average weekly wages under § 97-2(5) must reflect the employee’s own earnings rather than all proceeds from work shared with others.

Allred v. PIEDMONT WOODYARDS, INC. · filed 1977-03-16(5)

In its finding number 7, it found that Dewey’s average weekly wage was $137 and made that determination by dividing $7,123.71 by 52. We hold that these findings are not supported by the evidence. ... The evidence showed that Dewey was assisted in his work part of the time by his son Larry and at other times by his son David and that they received part of the proceeds from the sale of the pulpwood for their labor.

Section 97-2(5) requires average weekly wages for a worker in a distributive education program to reflect the contemplated full-time and part-time weeks.

Mabry v. Bowers Implement Co. · filed 1980-08-05(5)

The facts in this case require the Commission to average the eleven weeks of full-time with the forty-one weeks of part-time employment of Clay Daniel Mabry contemplated in his distributive education job with Bowers Implement Company, at the undisputed hourly rate of $2.65.

Section 97-2(5) permits an average weekly wage calculation using earnings from an earlier period of steady employment when that fairly approximates the worker’s wages and is fair to both parties.

Hyatt v. Waverly Mills · filed 1982-02-16(5)

Due to the circumstances, the Commission considered plaintiffs earnings at Waverly Mills during the period between 7 September 1976 and 6 May 1977, when plaintiff was able to maintain steady employment. The Commission found an average weekly wage based on plaintiffs earnings from both of these periods of employment. We find that the Commission’s methodology fairly approximated plaintiffs “average weekly wages”, as that term is used in the statute and was fair and just to both parties.

When average weekly wages are computed from a worker’s business receipts, expenses incurred to produce that revenue should be deducted.

Baldwin v. Piedmont Woodyards, Inc. · filed 1982-08-03(5)

We agree with the Full Commission that by the method it used in determining income from Piedmont, expenses incurred in producing revenue should be deducted. We believe, however, that depreciation on business equipment, interest on business debts and the purchase price of a saw should have been included as business expenses.

Section 97-2(5) permits calculating average weekly wages from an employee’s earnings over fewer than 52 weeks when the result is fair and just to both parties.

Prevette v. Clark Equipment Co. · filed 1983-05-17(5)

However, the method used by the Commission, dividing the earnings by the shorter number of weeks, also is authorized “provided, results fair and just to both parties will be thereby obtained.” The Commission specifically found as a fact that the wage chart of decedent’s actual wages for weeks worked was fair and just.

Section 97-2(5) defines average weekly wages using the employee’s earnings in the employment where the employee was working at the time of injury.

Moore v. Standard Mineral Co. · filed 1996-05-07(5)

The definition of “average weekly wages,” found at G.S. § 97-2(5), utilizes the earnings of the employee “in the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury” to ascertain the proper benefit amount.

Section 97-2(5) provides methods for calculating an injured employee’s average weekly wages, including a method that most nearly approximates the employee’s earnings without the injury.

McAninch v. Buncombe County Schools, Self-Insured · filed 1996-06-18(5)

The language of the fifth calculation method creates no specific mathematical formula to be applied; instead it directs that the average weekly wage calculated must “most nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury.” G.S. 97-2(5).

Section 97-2(5) calculates average weekly wages for an employee who worked less than 52 weeks by dividing earnings during that period by the weeks and parts of weeks in which the employee earned wages.

Craft v. Bill Clark Construction Co. · filed 1996-09-17(5)

Our Workers’ Compensation Act provides several methods for determining an employee’s “average weekly wages.” N.C.G.S. § 97-2(5) (1991). If an employee has worked for an employer for less than fifty-two weeks, as in this case, the average weekly wages are to be determined by “dividing the earnings during that period by the number of weeks and parts thereof during which the employee earned wages.”

Section 97-2(5) defines how an employee’s average weekly wages are determined.

Swain v. C & N Evans Trucking Co., Inc. · filed 1997-05-20(5)

The determination of the plaintiff’s “average weekly wages” requires application of the definition set forth in the Workers’ Compensation Act, N.C.G.S. § 97-2(5) (1991), and the case law construing that statute and thus raises an issue of law, not fact.

Section 97-2(5) defines average weekly wages and excludes wages or income from work other than the employment in which the employee was injured.

McAninch v. Buncombe County Schools · filed 1997-09-05(5)

Accordingly, we hold that the definition of “average weekly wages” and the range of alternatives set forth in the five methods of computing such wages, as specified in the first two paragraphs of N.C.G.S. § 97-2(5), do not allow the inclusion of wages or income earned in employment or work other than that in which the employee was injured.

Section 97-2(5) permits the Commission to use its fifth method for calculating average weekly wages when a supported finding shows that an enumerated method would produce an unjust result.

Boney v. Winn Dixie, Inc. · filed 2004-03-16(5)

However, where the Commission makes a finding that the result of using such a method would be unjust, and that finding is supported by the evidence, the Commission may calculate the average weekly wage under the fifth method in N.C.G.S. § 97-2(5).

Section 97-2(5) defines average weekly wages, which are used to calculate a worker's compensation rate.

Drumgold v. Perdue Farms, Inc. · filed 2002-01-30(5)

At that time plaintiff earned an average weekly wage of $274.77, yielding a compensation rate of $183.19. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-53 (13); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5).

Section 97-2(6) treats an unexplained fall at work as an injury by accident when no independent or idiopathic condition caused the fall.

Israel v. Jean Coutu Group · filed 2008-05-22(6)

Applying the reasoning set forth in Robbins , supra , the Plaintiff's fall was an "accident," although there is an absence of evidence of any unusual or untoward condition or occurrence that caused the fall.

Under § 97-2(6), an unexplained fall may be inferred to arise out of employment when the Commission finds no independent cause of the fall.

Hedges v. Wake County Public School System · filed 2010-09-07(6)

When a fall is unexplained, and the Commission has made no finding that any force or condition independent of the employment caused the fall, then an inference arises that the fall arose out of the employment.

Section 97-2 gives “injury” and “disability” distinct meanings: injury concerns an employment accident, while disability concerns incapacity to earn wages.

Kelly v. Duke University · filed 2008-06-03

Thus, it is clear that under § 97-2, “injury” and “disability” do not have the same meanings.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability by an injury’s effect on earning capacity; admitting that an injury is compensable does not itself create a presumption of disability.

Clark v. Wal-Mart · filed 2005-10-07(9)

“Disability,” within the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act, “means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9). ... Contrary to the decisions of the Commission and the Court of Appeals in the instant case, the law in North Carolina is well settled that an employer’s admission of the “compensability” of a workers’ compensation claim does not give rise to a presumption of “disability” in favor of the employee.

Under § 97-2(9), an economic layoff that causes lost wages does not establish disability when the worker can still earn wages despite the compensable injury.

Carter v. Lexington Furniture Industries, Inc. · filed 2008-07-03(9)

Plaintiff's failure to earn wages with Defendant-Employer after October 15, 2003 is not due to disability, but is the result of her lay-off from her employment due to a reduction in work force resulting from a decrease in Defendant-Employer's business.

Under § 97-2(9), an employee’s ability to perform a specially created job unavailable in the competitive labor market does not establish an ability to earn wages.

Clegg v. Alcoa · filed 2008-08-12(9)

The fact that Plaintiff is capable of performing employment tendered by Defendant is not, as a matter of law, an indication of Plaintiff's ability to earn wages. In this case, Plaintiff's "make work" job does not prove that he has the ability to earn wages.

Section 97-2(19) excludes ordinary lawn care expenses from medical compensation, even when an injured worker should refrain from mowing.

Scarboro v. Emery Worldwide Freight Corp. · filed 2008-09-02(19)

These factual findings support the conclusion that the lawn care services are an ordinary expense of life, which is not included in medical compensation, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(19) and N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 97-25.

Section 97-2(19) excludes ordinary expenses of life, including yard work and household chores, from medical compensation even when family members perform those tasks for an injured worker.

Burroughs v. Laser Recharge of Carolinas, Inc. · filed 2014-06-03(19)

It is clear that some of the activities identified by the Full Commission as being performed by plaintiff’s family members on his behalf, specifically yard work and other household chores, fall under the definition of “ordinary expenses of life” and are therefore not compensable.

Section 97-2(19) covers reasonably necessary future medical monitoring for a compensable injury even after the worker reaches maximum medical improvement.

Tanner v. Columbus McKinnon Corp. · filed 2008-09-11(19)

Although Plaintiff is at MMI, it is reasonably necessary for him to have future medical monitoring of his condition and therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to ongoing medical treatment for his right shoulder, and Dr. Jeffrey Daily is hereby designated as Plaintiff's treating physician. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 .

Section 97-2(9) defines disability by injury-caused loss of earning capacity; reaching maximum medical improvement alone does not end disability.

Watson v. Winston-Salem Transit Authority · filed 1988-12-30(9)

G.S. 97-2(9) defines disability as an “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” ... A finding of maximum medical improvement is not, however, the equivalent of a finding that the employee is able to earn the same wage earned prior to injury, and accordingly does not, by itself, dispose of plaintiffs claim.

Section 97-2(6) covers an injury sustained while an employee performs a required special errand, with the risk of that errand continuing until the employee reaches the car.

Renzi v. Starbucks Coffee Co. · filed 2008-12-11(6)

In the case at hand, plaintiff was performing a special errand for defendant-employer when he took a detour from his normal path to his car to take the trash to the dumpster, a task he was required to perform as part of his duties. The risk of performing the errand lasts from portal to portal, meaning the time from which plaintiff left defendant-employer's premises and arrived at his car in the parking lot. Powers v. Lady's Funeral Home . 306 N.C. 728 , 295 S.E.2d 473 (1982). Therefore, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on February 6, 2007. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Under § 97-2(6), an injury during travel for a prospective employer’s physical examination does not arise out of or occur in the course of temporary-agency employment when the trip is on the worker’s own time and her duties do not require driving.

Floyd v. EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL GROUP · filed 2008-12-16(6)

Thus, the Commission properly concluded that plaintiff’s automobile accident did not arise out of or in the course or her employment with EPG, and plaintiff’s injuries are, therefore, not compensable under the Act.

Section 97-2(6) does not cover a later accident as a compensable aggravation of a work injury when the worker had returned to his baseline condition before the later accident.

Evans v. Dilmar Oil Company · filed 2009-03-16(6)

In the case at bar, however, Defendants established through competent medical evidence that Plaintiff sustained no compensable aggravation of his February 22, 2006 work injury.

Section 97-2(6) treats an allergic reaction to hazardous materials encountered during employment as an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Duckworth v. Sgl Carbon · filed 2009-04-17(6)

Plaintiff sustained an injury by accident stemming from his initial reaction to hazardous material(s) arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer on July 12, 2001. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Unusual working conditions that interrupt an employee’s normal work routine can constitute an injury by accident under § 97-2(6).

Huffman v. Miller Brewing Company · filed 2009-05-07(6)

Plaintiff's assignment to train as an operator beginning May 21, 2007, machine operator work on a production line, and performance of the "pile off" duties and other operator duties on May 21, 2007, introduced unusual working conditions for plaintiff. These circumstances interrupted plaintiff's normal work routine and introduced conditions likely to result in an injury. ... On May 21, 2007, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) treats an injury as an injury by accident when an unusual work assignment interrupts the employee’s normal routine and introduces conditions likely to cause injury.

Huffman v. Miller Brewing Company · filed 2009-07-10(6)

Plaintiff's assignment to train as an operator beginning May 21, 2007, machine operator work on a production line, and performance of the "pile off" duties and other operator duties on May 21, 2007, introduced unusual working conditions for plaintiff. These circumstances interrupted plaintiff's normal work routine and introduced conditions likely to result in an injury.

Section 97-2(19) covers reimbursement for medically necessary travel by an injured worker’s parents to assist with his hospital care.

Price v. Palace · filed 2009-05-26(19)

As part of these expenses, plaintiff is also entitled to reimbursement for his parents' medical travel in the amount of $1,311.56. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19); 97-25 ; North Carolina Workers' Compensation Rule 407(6).

Section 97-2(19) limits medical expenses to treatment required to cure or relieve a condition related to a compensable injury.

Hawkins v. General Electric Co. · filed 2009-08-18(19)

Further, because defendants are obligated to pay only for treatments “required to effect a cure or give relief’ for conditions related to a compensable injury, the Commission’s conclusion of law that plaintiff is entitled to medical expenses for plaintiff’s asthma also fails.

Section 97-2(19) includes reimbursement for parents’ medical travel when a parent’s care is reasonably required to effect a cure or give relief.

Price v. PIGGY PALACE · filed 2010-07-20(19)

Because we conclude that under the facts of this case, Plaintiff’s mother’s care was “reasonably... required to effect a cure or give relief,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(19), we hold that Plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement for his parents’ “medical travel” as such travel was a necessary medical cost incurred as a result of Plaintiff’s injuries.

Section 97-2(19) treats medically necessary pharmacy travel and reasonable lodging during surgery as medical expenses.

Stevens v. United States Cold Storage, Inc. · filed 2011-05-02(19)

Defendants shall reimburse Plaintiff for mileage to and from the pharmacy for the dates set forth in Plaintiff's Motion for Medical Expense Reimbursement dated June 2, 2008, and for his wife's hotel expenses of $89.00 per night, plus applicable taxes and fees, for two nights in Charlotte in April 2008, when Plaintiff had surgery, as reasonable and necessary medical expenses. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 .

Section 97-2(2) treats a worker as an employee when an express or implied contract of hire gives the employer control over aspects of the worker’s work in exchange for compensation.

Hojnacki v. LAST REBEL TRUCKING INC. · filed 2010-01-05(2)

Accordingly, we conclude that Last Rebel did in fact enter into an implied contract for hire with plaintiff whereby plaintiff agreed to, and did in fact, surrender control of certain aspects of his work to Last Rebel in exchange for just compensation, making Last Rebel plaintiff's employer under N.C.G.S. § 97-2(2).

Section 97-2(2) requires an express or implied employment contract, including a right to demand pay from the alleged employer, for a worker to qualify as that employer’s employee.

Wiley v. Armstrong Transfer & Storage Co. · filed 2018-05-01(2)

In other words, without a right to payment, no contract for employment has been created.

Section 97-2(2) recognizes employment under an implied contract of hire; hiring authority, direct payment, and supervision can establish that relationship.

Lassiter v. Robeson Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't · filed 2023-12-19(2)

An employment contract may be “express or implied, oral or written[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(2). ... In considering this record evidence, we hold there existed an implied contract of employment between Truesdell and Plaintiff as Truesdell, while not responsible for training Plaintiff, maintained a level of supervision and control over the Plaintiff’s work for them, had independent hiring authority, and paid Plaintiff directly for his services.

Section 97-2(2) allows an employment contract to be express or implied; an implied contract of hire may be inferred from the parties’ circumstances and conduct.

Lassiter v. Robeson Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't · filed 2025-12-12(2)

An employment contract may be “express or implied.” N.C.G.S. § 97-2(2) (2023). ... Accordingly, plaintiff has established an implied contract for hire between Truesdell and himself.

Section 97-2(2) requires an appointment or contract of hire, express or implied, for a worker to qualify as an employee of a special employer.

Anderson v. Demolition Dynamics, Inc. · filed 2000-02-15(2)

These actions standing alone do not conclusively satisfy the contract for employment prong of the special employer test.

Section 97-2(19) includes the added cost of leasing or purchasing handicapped accessible housing as medical compensation when needed for a workplace injury, but ordinary housing remains an employee expense.

Arce v. MOUNTAIN WOOD FORESTRY, INC. · filed 2010-01-05(19)

We conclude that Derebery, read in conjunction with Timmons, suggests that while the provision of ordinary housing is an expense of daily life to be paid out of the employee's substitute wages, the added cost in leasing or purchasing handicapped accessible housing is not and thus is proper "other treatment or care" to be provided by the employer.

Medical compensation may include the full rental cost of reasonable accessible housing when the worker has no dwelling to renovate, the employer has paid for facility housing, and the Commission finds facility living medically unsuitable.

Tinajero v. Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, Inc. · filed 2014-05-06(19)

Applying Derebery v. Pitt Cnty. Fire Marshall, 318 N.C. 192, 347 S.E.2d 814 (1986), and Espinosa v. Tradesource, Inc., ___ N.C. App. ___, 752 S.E.2d 153 (2013), we hold that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in making this award given that (1) Mr. Tinajero had no dwelling of his own that could be renovated to provide handicapped accessible housing, (2) defendants had continuously paid the full cost of housing for Mr. Tinajero since his injury by accident so long as he resided in a skilled nursing home or long-term care facility, and (3) the Commission found that living in such facilities was not in Mr. Tinajero's medical best interest.

Medical compensation includes a consultation with a life care planner to determine whether a life care plan is appropriate for an injured worker.

Purdy-Bilcheck v. IBM Corp. · filed 2010-03-23(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have Defendants pay for consultation with a life care planner for the limited purpose of determining whether a life care plan is appropriate for Plaintiff at this time.

Section 97-2(9) encompasses disability caused by depression when the depression prevents the employee from working.

Rudisill v. Commoscope, Inc. · filed 2010-03-24(9)

The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Plaintiff has been disabled by his depression since October 24, 2005. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to receive temporary total disability compensation as of that date and continuing until further Order of the Commission. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (9).

Section 97-2(6) treats the back as including the cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine.

Salvie v. Medical Center Pharm. of Concord, Inc. · filed 2010-07-12(6)

The Act uses the term "back" as a term of art, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (6), 97-31 97-40.1 , which the Full Commission has further defined to include the cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine.

A back injury is compensable under § 97-2(6) when it arises out of employment and directly results from a specific traumatic incident of assigned work.

Carter v. a Child's World Learning Center · filed 2011-11-01(6)

Plaintiff's back injury is compensable in that it arose out of an admittedly compensable work related accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6) (2001) defines a back injury as one arising "out of and in the course of the employment, and is the direct result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned."

Section 97-2(6) treats a back injury caused by a specific traumatic incident at work as an injury by accident; without such an incident, a claimant may still qualify under the ordinary injury-by-accident definition.

Caskie v. R. M. Butler & Co. · filed 1987-04-07(6)

If the injury arises out of and in the course of employment and is the result of a “specific traumatic incident,” then the statute as amended mandates that the injury be construed to be “injury by accident.” However, if there is no “specific traumatic incident,” a claimant should still be provided coverage if he or she meets the definition of “injury by accident” contained in the first sentence of G.S. 97-2(6), as interpreted by our courts.

Under § 97-2(6), a back injury from a specific traumatic incident is compensable only if the incident causes a disabling physical injury to the back.

Lettley v. Trash Removal Service · filed 1988-10-18(6)

Even if a specific traumatic incident occurs, to constitute a compensable “injury by accident” there must be a “disabling physical injury to the back arising out of and causally related to such incident.” G.S. 97-2(6). Thus, plaintiff is not entitled to compensation based upon the events of March 1985 unless they caused a disabling injury.

Section 97-2(6) covers a disabling back injury caused by a specific traumatic incident in the course of employment.

Johnson v. Herbie's Place · filed 2003-04-15(6)

In the factual context of the present case, the Industrial Commission’s findings of fact should be sufficient to establish: (1) that plaintiff fell, suffering a “specific traumatic incident,” in the course of his employment; (2) that he injured his back as a result of the fall; and (3) that, as a result of the injury to his back, plaintiff was unable “to earn the wages which [he] was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.”

Section 97-2(5) guarantees volunteer firefighters minimum compensation equal to two-thirds of the maximum weekly benefit, including when they had no other employment on the injury date.

Murray v. Town of Pine Knoll Shores · filed 2010-09-09(5)

The Full Commission finds that based on this express language and the liberal construction, whenever appropriate, afforded the Statute, the language and intent of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5), as amended in 1985, provide minimum compensation to all volunteer firefighters in the amount of sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of the maximum weekly benefit established in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-29 .

Section 97-2(5) permits an alternative method of computing average weekly wages when exceptional circumstances make the prescribed methods unfair.

Postell v. B&D Construction Co. · filed 1992-01-07(5)

Finally, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5) includes a “catch-all” provision, to be used when warranted by “exceptional circumstances.”

Section 97-2(5) permits an alternative method of computing average weekly wages when the worker’s income is difficult to calculate, but the method must be fair to both employee and employer.

Christian v. Riddle & Mendenhall Logging · filed 1994-12-06(5)

In the present case, due to the unique nature of Christian’s employment, it is difficult to make a precise calculation of his income, and the Commission was therefore justified in resorting to an alternative method of determining his average weekly wage as provided by G.S. § 97-2(5). In doing so, however, the statute requires fairness to both employee and employer.

Section 97-2(5) permits use of its fifth method to calculate average weekly wages for retirees first diagnosed with asbestosis or silicosis after employment, using their earnings in the last year of employment when the preferred methods would be unfair.

Austin v. General Tire · filed 1998-12-18(5)

The first four preferred methodologies used to calculate the average weekly wage under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) would not be fair to the parties. Disability and thus earnings under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-60 et seq., like those under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31 , are conclusively presumed lost, whether actually earned or not. The best evidence of those earnings conclusively presumed lost for retirees suffering from asbestosis and silicosis is the earnings in the last year of employment. The fifth methodology under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) is for these exceptional reasons invoked for purposes of calculating average weekly wages for retirees first diagnosed post employment as having asbestosis and silicosis.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage when the first four methods are inapplicable or would be unfair to the parties.

Williams v. Neuville Industries · filed 1999-06-17(5)

Plaintiff's average weekly wage for purposes of this claim should be based upon the wages earned and the salary supplement received during the 52 weeks preceding September 11, 1995, the date of the onset of the diminution of her wage earning capacity due to carpal tunnel syndrome. This method of calculation yields an average weekly wage of $403.86, and a compensation rate of $269.24. This fifth method of computing average weekly wages is fairer to both parties. Methods one through four under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) are rejected as these calculation methods are either inapplicable or would not produce results which are fair to both parties.

Section 97-2(5) permits an alternative average weekly wage calculation in exceptional circumstances when it most nearly approximates what the employee would have earned absent the injury, and the Commission’s supported choice of method binds the appellate court.

Larramore v. Richardson Sports Ltd. Partners · filed 2000-12-29(5)

In the present case, the Commission likewise concluded that under the circumstances, the only appropriate method, and that which would "most nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury," would be to divide plaintiff's $86,000.00 contract amount by fifty-two. We hold this determination to be supported by at least some competent evidence in the record, and thus, binding upon this Court. Plaintiff's contract and the circumstances of this appeal are indeed exceptional, and we therefore will not substitute our judgment for that of the Commission.

Section 97-2(5) permits use of its fifth method to calculate an average weekly wage for a retiree first diagnosed after employment with asbestosis, silicosis, or asbestos-related lung cancer when the first four methods would be unfair.

Guerin v. Sodyeco · filed 2002-03-27(5)

The fifth method under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) is for those exceptional cases including calculating average weekly wages for retirees first diagnosed post employment as having asbestosis, silicosis or asbestos-related lung cancer.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage when sporadic employment makes the first four methods unfair and unjust to the employer or employee.

Loch v. Entertainment Partners · filed 2002-07-12(5)

Because of the sporadic nature of plaintiff's employment, plaintiff's average weekly wage must be calculated under the fifth method under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) in order to ensure results which are fair and just to both employer and employee.

Section 97-2(5) permits use of its fifth method to calculate average weekly wages in exceptional circumstances when the other methods would be unfair and would fail to approximate the employee’s likely earnings.

Estate of Ramirez-Miranda v. Jake Taylor Farms · filed 2004-01-12(5)

Based on the exceptional circumstances of this case, the Full Commission finds that the fifth method outlined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) is the only method which is fair to both parties and would result in a calculation of the decedent's average weekly wage that most nearly approximates the amount of wages he would have earned were it not for his death.

Section 97-2(5) uses its fifth method to calculate average weekly wages when the first four methods yield an unfair and unjust result because employment lasted only a short time.

Barnhill v. Ideal Homes of Rockingham · filed 2004-02-19(5)

Given the very short duration of plaintiff's work for the defendant-employer, calculation of plaintiff's average weekly wage under the first four calculations of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) results in an unfair and unjust calculation. Therefore, plaintiff's average weekly wage must be calculated under the fifth method under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) in order to ensure results which are fair and just to both employer and employee.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage when the earlier methods would be unfair, so the calculation can approximate the wages the worker would have earned but for the injury.

Hincher v. Kamco Enter. · filed 2004-12-29(5)

The fifth method authorized in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) is the only method which is fair and results in a calculation of decedent's average weekly wage which most nearly approximates the wages he would have earned if not for his injury and resulting death.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage when exceptional circumstances make the preceding methods unfair, using an amount that most nearly approximates what the employee would have earned but for the injury.

Whisnant v. Collier · filed 2005-01-06(5)

For the forgoing exceptional reasons it would be unfair to calculate plaintiff's average weekly wage using the above-mentioned methods. Therefore, using the fifth method to compute plaintiff's average weekly wage to most nearly approximate the amount for which the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury is fair and just to both parties.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wages when exceptional circumstances make the usual methods unjust, to approximate what the employee would earn without the injury.

Duncan v. Guilford Cty. B.O.E. · filed 2005-08-19(5)

Because of the exceptional reasons in this claim, the fifth method specified in the statute should be utilized to use a method which will yield average weekly wages which "will most nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury."

Section 97-2(5) permits another method of computing average weekly wages when exceptional reasons make the first four methods unfair to either party; the chosen method should most nearly approximate what the employee would have earned without the injury.

Shepherd v. Nat'l Federation of Independent Bus. · filed 2006-08-22(5)

Where for exceptional reasons, the manner of calculating plaintiff's average weekly wage according to the first four methods under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) would be unfair, either to the employer or employee, such other method of computing average weekly wages may be resorted to as will most nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage when including earlier, lower wages would be unfair and would not reflect what the employee would earn but for the injury.

Freeman v. Sharpe · filed 2007-01-05(5)

Therefore, it is unfair to plaintiff to establish her average weekly wage by encompassing the lesser wages earned by driving other routes during the 52 weeks prior to the date of injury. For this reason, plaintiff's average weekly wage is determined pursuant to the fifth method set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5), thereby providing a method of calculation which is most fair to both parties and gives the result that most reflects what plaintiff would be earning but for the accident.