N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27

Section 7A-27 permits appeals of right from certain interlocutory orders in civil proceedings but provides no appeal of right from interlocutory orders in criminal actions.

State v. Henry · filed 1968-06-12(d)

Subsection (d) permits appeals from certain interlocutory orders in civil actions or proceedings, but there is no provision for an appeal as a matter of right from interlocutory orders in criminal actions.

Section 7A-27 does not provide an appeal as of right from an interlocutory order in a criminal case.

State v. Lance · filed 1968-07-10

In G.S. 7A-27 there is no provision for an appeal as a matter of right from interlocutory orders in criminal cases.

Section 7A-27 provides no appeal as a matter of right from an interlocutory order in a criminal case.

State v. Smith · filed 1969-04-30

The denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges contained in the bills of indictment is an interlocutory order. From the entry of such an order under the circumstances of this case, there is no appeal as a matter of right.

Section 7A-27 does not provide an appeal as of right from an interlocutory order in a criminal case.

State v. Black · filed 1970-02-25

In a crimina? case there is no provision in the statute for an appeal to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right from an interlocutory order entered therein.

Section 7A-27(d) does not provide an appeal as of right from an interlocutory order in a criminal action.

State v. Bryant · filed 1971-10-20(d)

G.S. 7A-27(d) makes no provision for an appeal as a matter of right from an interlocutory order in a criminal action.

Section 7A-27 does not provide an appeal of right to the Court of Appeals from an interlocutory order in a criminal case.

State v. Thompson · filed 1982-03-16

In a criminal case there is no provision in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27 for an appeal to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right from an interlocutory order entered therein.

Section 7A-27 ordinarily gives a criminal defendant an appeal of right only from a final judgment, so a pretrial suppression order is not appealable as of right.

State v. Turner · filed 1982-03-30

Ordinarily, a defendant in a criminal action may appeal to the appellate division as a matter of right only from a final judgment. G.S. 7A-27. An order dealing with a pretrial motion to suppress is clearly an interlocutory order.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an appeal from an interlocutory order granting a new trial only in a civil action.

State v. Monroe · filed 1991-04-16(d)

Except as otherwise provided by statute, “[t]here is no provision for appeal to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right from an interlocutory order entered in a criminal case . . . .” State v. Henry, 318 N.C. 408, 409, 348 S.E.2d 593, 593 (1986); Joseph, 92 N.C. App. at 206, 374 S.E.2d at 134; see N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(d) (1989) (appeal from interlocutory order granting new trial limited to civil actions); N.C.G.S. § 15A-979(c) (1988) (appeal by state prior to trial of a superior court order granting motion to suppress); N.C.G.S. § 15A-1432(d) (1988) (defendant may appeal interlocutory order entered by superior court finding error in district court’s dismissal of criminal charges).

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that determines or discontinues the action, grants or refuses a new trial, or affects a substantial right.

Plummer v. Kearney · filed 1992-12-15(d)

Second, an interlocutory order may be appealed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(d) or N.C.G.S. § 1-277 if it: (1) determines the action; (2) discontinues the action; (3) grants or refuses a new trial; or (4) affects a substantial right of the appellant.

Section 7A-27 permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order only when it affects a substantial right; avoiding one trial does not qualify.

McNeil v. Hicks · filed 1993-07-20

As such, it is not immediately appealable unless it affects a substantial right of defendant Allstate. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277 (1983); G.S. § 7A-27 (1989). The avoidance of one trial is not a substantial right entitling a party to an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order.

Section 7A-27(d)(1) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order when delaying review would cause the appellant to lose a substantial right.

Tinch v. Video Industrial Services, Inc. · filed 1996-11-05(d)(1)

Second, an appeal is permitted under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(l) if the trial court’s decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review. ... Because Hendon’s claim was not certified for immediate appeal and because no substantial right will be lost or prejudiced, we grant plaintiff appellant’s motion to dismiss Hendon’s appeal.

Section 7A-27 allows an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order only when it affects a substantial right that would be lost before final judgment.

Hart v. F.N. Thompson Construction Co. · filed 1999-02-02

Appeal flows from either a final judgment or an interlocutory order which affects a substantial right which will be lost if the appeal is not considered prior to a final judgment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § l-277(a); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27. ... Therefore, defendant’s appeal is premature and must be dismissed.

Section 7A-27(d) does not permit an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that neither affects a substantial right nor finally determines the action.

Lang v. Lang · filed 1999-03-16(d)

“An interlocutory decree is immediately appealable only if permitted by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277 (1996), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (1990), or N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(d) (1995).” ... In keeping with this policy of discouraging fragmentary appeals, we conclude that the present order does not affect a substantial right or finally determine the action.

Section 7A-27 permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order when the order affects a substantial right that cannot be protected by an appeal after final judgment.

Turner v. Norfolk Southern Corp. · filed 2000-03-21

There are only two means by which an interlocutory order may be appealed: (1) if the order is final as to some but not all of the claims or parties and the trial court certifies there is no just reason to delay the appeal pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. R 54(b) or (2) “if the trial court’s decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review.” ... N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27 (1999). ... In summary, plaintiff fails to establish, and we do not discern, a substantial right which cannot be protected by timely appeal from the trial court’s ultimate disposition of the entire controversy.

Section 7A-27(d) does not permit an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that affects no substantial right.

Fairfield Mountain Property Owners Ass'n v. Doolittle · filed 2002-03-19(d)

Moreover, the order does not affect a substantial right. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(d) and 1-277 (1999); Blackwelder v. State Dep’t of Hum. Res., 60 N.C. App. 331, 335, 299 S.E.2d 777, 780-81 (1983). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

Section 7A-27 permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that affects a substantial right.

Van Engen v. Que Scientific, Inc. · filed 2002-08-06(d)(1)

There are, however, two circumstances in which a party may appeal an interlocutory order: (1) if the order of the trial court is final as to some but not all of the claims or parties, and the trial court certifies the case for immediate appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (1999), or (2) where the order appealed from affects a substantial right of the parties. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(d)(1) (1999) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277 (1999). ... Rather, the proper methods for appealing an underlying interlocutory order are to argue the interlocutory order affects a substantial right, or to petition our Court for a writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 21(b). We therefore dismiss plaintiff’s appeal of the 27 March 2001 order of the trial court.

Section 7A-27(d)(1) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order when delaying review would irreparably impair a substantial right.

Joyce v. Bruce · filed 2004-07-20(d)(1)

Thus, plaintiff's right to an immediate appeal, if one exists, depends on whether the order affects a substantial right. ... Accordingly, because there was no final judgment in this case, nor were there any substantial rights of the parties affected, we hold that this appeal is premature and therefore, dismiss it as interlocutory.

Section 7A-27(d)(2) permits an interlocutory appeal when an order effectively determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal may be taken.

Lyles v. Turner · filed 2010-03-02(d)(2)

Because "[a] grant of partial summary judgment . . . is an interlocutory order from which there is ordinarily no right of appeal[,]" Liggett Group, 113 N.C. App. at 23, 437 S.E.2d at 677, and Defendants have failed to show that the order "in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which appeal might be taken[,]" N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(d)(2), we must dismiss their interlocutory appeal.

Section 7A-27 does not govern the State’s right to appeal an expunction order that is part of a criminal proceeding; section 15A-1445 governs that right.

State v. J.C. · filed 2017-11-07

We conclude that the trial court’s order of expunction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-145.5 is part of a “criminal proceeding,” and, therefore, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1445 – and not N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27 – is the relevant statute in determining the State’s right to appeal in this case.

Section 7A-27 does not govern the State's right to appeal an expunction order that is part of a criminal proceeding; section 15A-1445 governs.

Cnty. of Onslow v. J.C. · filed 2017-11-07

Here, the State argues that our Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27 (2015). However, we conclude that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1445 is the statute which determines our jurisdiction in this matter because the trial court's order of expunction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-145.5 is part of a criminal proceeding.

Section 7A-27(b) applies to interlocutory orders in civil cases and does not authorize an interlocutory criminal appeal.

State v. Doss · filed 2019-12-03(b)

However, the authority he uses to support this argument is N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b). This statute, though, only ... applies to interlocutory orders in civil cases.

Section 7A-27(b)(1) permits an appeal from a superior court’s final judgment, including a recommendation that leaves nothing further for the trial court to decide.

State v. Dawson · filed 2024-08-06(b)(1)

Further, a defendant has the right to appeal to our Court from a decision that is a “final judgment of a superior court[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2023). ... We, therefore, construe a trial court’s recommendation to the Parole Commission under the Statute to be a final judgment, as it “disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial court.” Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361–62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to a review of the trial court’s action for an abuse of discretion.

Section 7A-27(b)(2) permits an immediate appeal from an order determining that a custody order is permanent, even when a motion to modify custody remains pending.

Lawrence v. Lawrence · filed 2024-06-18(b)(2)

Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, the October 2022 Order is immediately appealable because “an appeal of right does lie from the final, permanent custody order reflecting the trial court’s ultimate disposition.” Brown v. Swarn, 257 N.C. App. 417, 422-23, 810 S.E.2d 237, 240 (2018) (citation omitted). ... The pendency of a motion to modify custody does not affect whether this court has jurisdiction over the appeal on the underlying permanent custody order.

Section 7A-27(b)(2) allows an appeal of right from a final district court judgment in a civil action; an order that leaves the appointment of a parenting coordinator for later is interlocutory and does not qualify.

Shebalin v. Shebalin · filed 2022-06-21(b)(2)

“[A]ppeal lies of right directly to the Court of Appeals . . . [f]rom any final judgment of a district court in a civil action.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(2) (2021). ... Despite plaintiff’s assertions to the contrary, the 2020 Order is not a final order, and thus we dismiss this appeal as interlocutory.

Section 7A-27 permits an appeal from an attorney’s fee order that resolves the sole remaining issue because the order is final.

Alexander v. NC State Bd. of Elections · filed 2022-02-01(b)(1)

As such, the order is not interlocutory, and is therefore appealable as a final order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27.

Section 7A-27(c) does not allow an appeal of right from an order that leaves counterclaims unresolved because the order is interlocutory.

LYNN-CLIFF, INC. v. Poole · filed 2009-04-07(c)

Furthermore, we disagree with the assertion advanced by both plaintiff and defendants in their briefs that this appeal is properly before us pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(c) as an appeal of right from a final judgment of the district court in a civil action. ... Because all of defendants' counterclaims against plaintiff remain outstanding, the trial court's order is not a final judgment but, rather, is interlocutory.

Section 7A-27(c) treats a divorce judgment that reserves remaining issues for later determination as nonfinal.

Muter v. Muter, 24323 (12-23-2008) · filed 2008-12-23(c)

The Court of Appeals of North Carolina has held that a judgment of absolute divorce which reserves the remaining issues in the cause for later determination is not a final judgment within the meaning of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A-27 (c)(1995). ... Accordingly, the North Carolina judgment of absolute divorce, on the authority of Stafford , is not a final judgment.

Section 7A-27(b) does not provide an appeal of right from a summary judgment order that leaves claims against another party unresolved.

Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure · filed 2008-07-15(b)

Appellant asserts that the 8 March 2007 summary judgment order is a final judgment and that appeal lies to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b). We disagree. ... We hold that the trial court’s granting of summary judgment was not a final order and appellant has not established any right of appeal of the 8 March 2007 order.

Section 7A-27(b) does not authorize an appeal from an order denying post-conviction DNA testing because the order is not a final judgment in a criminal proceeding.

State v. Brown · filed 2005-06-07(b)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b) allows an appeal “[f]rom any final judgment of a superior court.” A denial of a motion for post-conviction DNA testing does not, however, constitute a “final judgment” as defined in criminal proceedings.

Section 7A-27 allows an appeal as of right from a final judgment; an Industrial Commission award that leaves the amount of compensation unresolved is interlocutory.

Watts v. Hemlock Homes of the Highlands, Inc. · filed 2003-08-19

Parties have a right to appeal any final judgment of a superior court. G.S. § 7A-27 (2001). Therefore, an appeal as of right can arise only from a final order of the Industrial Commission.

Section 7A-27(b) limits appeals in criminal proceedings to those taken from a final judgment.

State v. Shoff · filed 1995-05-16(b)

Chapter 7A limits appeals in criminal proceedings to those taken from a final judgment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b) (1989).

Section 7A-27 does not permit an appeal from a Superior Court order ancillary to federal habeas proceedings because that order is not final.

State v. Lentz · filed 1969-06-18

Judge Bailey’s order was ancillary to the habeas corpus proceedings in the Federal District Court and is not a final order of the Superior Court within the purview of G.S. 7A-27.

Section 7A-27(b) does not permit an appeal as of right from a superior court’s denial of certiorari to review a district court criminal proceeding because that denial is not a final judgment.

State v. Flynt · filed 1970-05-27(b)

We hold that the “judgment” of the superior court from which defendant attempts to appeal is not a final judgment within the meaning of G.S. 7A-27(b), therefore, defendant is not authorized to appeal therefrom as a matter of right.

Section 7A-27(b) permits an appeal of right from a superior court judgment disposing of all of a plaintiff’s causes of action, even when a counterclaim remains pending.

Whalehead Properties v. Coastland Corp. · filed 1980-02-01(b)

Thus the order is a final judgment as to all of plaintiff’s causes of action and affects a substantial right of plaintiff. The order is therefore appealable under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(b).

Section 7A-27(b) permits an appeal of right from a final superior court order requiring lifetime satellite-based monitoring.

State v. Singleton · filed 2010-01-05(b)

The 29 August 2008 order disposes of the State's petition for judicial findings as to satellite-based monitoring of defendant and leaves nothing further to be judicially determined. As the SBM order is a final judgment from the superior court, we hold that this Court has jurisdiction to consider appeals from SBM monitoring determinations under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14-208.40B pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A-27.

Section 7A-27(b) does not permit an appeal of right from an order when an equitable distribution claim remains pending.

Bezzek v. Bezzek · filed 2019-02-19(b)

In the “STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW” in her brief, Wife claims simply that “Judge Buckner’s February 27, 2018 Order is a final judgment from a district court in a civil action, and appeal therefore lies to the Court of Appeals pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b).” But the order is not a final order, since the equitable distribution claim is still pending before the trial court.

Section 7A-27(b)(1) gives a defendant the right to appeal a final civil judgment for attorney’s fees entered after a guilty plea.

State v. Corpening · filed 2021-02-16(b)(1)

Though the State contends that Defendant did not have a statutory right to appeal the civil judgment, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) provides a defendant the right to appeal “from any final judgment of a superior court, other than one based on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” (emphasis added). ... Defendant indeed had a statutory right to appeal the civil judgment against him.

Section 7A-27(b)(1) allows an appeal of right from a superior court’s final judgment; an order establishing an easement while leaving its location unresolved is interlocutory.

Moore v. Trout · filed 2022-02-01(b)(1)

N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(1) provides that “appeal lies of right directly to the Court of Appeals . . . [f]rom any final judgment of a [S]uperior [C]ourt . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2019). ... The location of the easement remains outstanding. The Trouts’ arguments on appeal do not evince sufficient grounds for an interlocutory appeal. We have no jurisdiction to hear this matter at this time.

A trial court cannot limit or stay a party’s right to appeal under § 7A-27.

Myers v. Smoky Mountain Country Club Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2026-05-06(b)(3)(a)

Entry of the Second Stay Order was also improper because the trial court cannot purport to limit or stay a party’s right to appeal from a final order. The Association is entitled by law to appeal from the dismissal of the foreclosure proceeding. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(a) (2025); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(3)(a) (2025).

Section 7A-27(b)(3)(b) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that effectively determines the action and prevents a later appeal.

Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Lindberg · filed 2023-12-05(b)(3)(b)

In other words, unless we conclude the challenged orders effectively determine this case, Defendant must either comply with potentially invalid orders in order to appeal or be held in contempt in order to appeal. If these orders do not “in effect determine the action,” no order will. See id. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under subsection 7A-27(b)(3)(b).

Section 7A-27(b)(3)(e) permits interlocutory appeals from claims prosecuted under section 50-19.1, subject to its 23 August 2013 effective date.

Murrelle v. Murrelle · filed 2014-05-06(b)(3)(e)

Our General Statutes have recently been amended to permit appeals from interlocutory orders or judgments from any “claim[s] prosecuted under G.S. 50-19.1.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A- 27(b)(3)(e) (2013). However, this provision became effective 23 August 2013, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 411, s. 1, and thus is inapplicable to the appeal in this matter.

Section 7A-27(c) directs appeals from final district court judgments in civil actions to the Court of Appeals.

State v. Miller · filed 2011-02-01(c)

An appeal from a final judgment in a civil action in district court lies in this Court, rather than in the superior court. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(c) (2009). Because the district court’s 15 September 2009 order purporting to order Defendant to enroll in SBM was from a civil proceeding, the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s appeal from it.

Section 7A-27(b) does not provide a direct appeal from a superior court order denying a minor’s petition for waiver of parental consent under § 90-21.8.

Matter of Doe · filed 1997-06-03(b)

Finally, we do not believe the general statutory provision providing for direct appeal to this Court, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b) (1995), is applicable here. As noted previously, the General Assembly struck language providing for appeal to this Court before ratifying House Bill 481. We read that action as manifesting an intent to preclude appeal under the provisions of § 7A-27(b).

Section 7A-27 directs civil appeals from District Court to the Court of Appeals.

Cline v. Cline · filed 1969-11-19

Civil proceedings are appealable directly from the District Court to the Court of Appeals. G.S. 7A-27. Since the instant civil action was brought in the court designated as the one with exclusive original jurisdiction, the District Court, appeal would properly lie to the Court of Appeals.

Section 7A-27 provides for district court appeals to the Court of Appeals in civil actions; criminal appeals must go first to the superior court.

State v. Killian · filed 1975-03-19

G.S. 7A-27 provides for appeals from the district court to the Court of Appeals from final judgments and certain interlocutory orders or judgments in civil actions. ... We perceive the constitutional and statutory structure of our General Court of Justice to provide that, generally, appeals from the district court in civil causes go to the Court of Appeals, while appeals in criminal causes must go first to the superior court.

Section 7A-27(a) directs appeals involving death or life sentences to the Supreme Court, and the court applies that forum rule by analogy to habeas corpus certiorari petitions involving those sentences.

State v. Niccum · filed 1977-10-11(a)

By analogy, however, G.S. 7A-27(a), G.S. 15-180.2 and App. R. 21(b) are logically applicable to petitions for certiorari to review judgments in habeas corpus proceedings involving the restraint of prisoners under sentences of death or life imprisonment, and we make that application, G.S. 7A-32(b) (1969).

Section 7A-27(b) directs appeals from final superior court judgments reviewing decisions of the Board of Medical Examiners to the Court of Appeals, despite an earlier statute directing them to the Supreme Court.

In Re Guess · filed 1989-02-09(b)

We now hold that the later enacted statute (N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)) controls in the instant case. The Court of Appeals is the proper court to determine appeals taken from decisions of the superior court in proceedings for judicial review of decisions of the Board of Medical Examiners.

Section 7A-27 does not give the State an appeal of right from an order granting expunction under section 15A-145.5 because the order arises in a criminal proceeding.

State v. J.C. · filed 2019-05-10(b)(1)

It is not the Court’s role to now expand N.C.G.S. § 15A-145.5 to include this right, or to construe N.C.G.S. § 7A-27 as governing procedure in a criminal matter not clearly brought under that statute’s provisions authorizing appeals of right from the trial courts.

Section 7A-27(b) does not allow an immediate appeal from an order remanding a permit decision for further proceedings when the appellant has not shown that delaying review would jeopardize a substantial right.

Coates v. Durham Cty. · filed 2019-07-16(b)

Consequently, because the trial court’s Order reversed the BOA’s grant of the Permit and remanded the case to the BOA for further proceedings, this appeal is interlocutory. Further, Respondent has failed to show that a substantial right would be lost absent appeal. Therefore, we must dismiss this appeal.

Section 7A-27(b)(4) permits an appeal from a superior court order authorized by another statute even when the order is interlocutory.

Reynolds v. Devotion Fam., LLC · filed 2025-12-03(b)(4)

Unlike subsections 7A-27(b)(1) and (2), subsection 7A-27(b)(4) does not require that the order or judgment being appealed be a “final judgment.”

Section 7A-27(a) directs appeals from first-degree murder convictions with life sentences to the North Carolina Supreme Court.

State v. Marr · filed 1996-02-09(a)

The defendant in this case was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. The statute and the rule provide that in such a case, appeal lies directly to this Court.

Section 7A-27(a) allows a direct appeal to the Supreme Court for a determinate life sentence, but not for an indeterminate sentence whose maximum is life imprisonment.

State v. Ferrell · filed 1980-05-06(a)

We therefore hold that the term “imprisonment for life” as it is used in G.S. 7A-27(a) means only a determinate life sentence and does not include an indeterminate sentence merely because the stated maximum is a life term.

Section 7A-27(a)(1) does not provide a direct appeal to the Supreme Court after the Governor commutes a defendant’s death sentence to life imprisonment without parole.

State v. Robinson · filed 2026-05-22(a)(1)

For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the Governor’s commutation of defendant’s death sentence to life imprisonment without parole foreclosed defendant’s appeal of right to this Court under both N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a)(1) and N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(d).

Section 7A-27 places an appeal in the Court of Appeals after the Governor commutes a death sentence to life imprisonment, even if no court has altered the death judgment.

State v. Barden · filed 2026-05-22(a)(1)

On 16 May 2025, this Court lifted the stay and issued a special order requesting briefing on the following question: “When the Governor commutes a defendant’s death sentence to life imprisonment but no court has vacated, altered, or amended the judgment that includes a sentence of death, does initial appellate jurisdiction now rest with the Court of Appeals under N.C.G.S. § 7A-27?” ... For the reasons explained in State v. Robinson, No. 142A12 (N.C. May 22, 2026), defendant’s appeal is remanded to the Court of Appeals.

Section 7A-27(a) gives no appeal of right to the Supreme Court from a sentence imposed on a guilty plea, even if the sentence is life imprisonment; absent a granted bypass motion, the appeal goes to the Court of Appeals.

State v. Reynolds · filed 1979-11-06(a)

G.S. 7A-27(a) provides that there is no appeal of right to this Court when a sentence is based on a plea of guilty even when that sentence is life imprisonment. The proper court to hear this appeal, if motion to bypass is not made and granted, is the Court of Appeals.

Section 7A-27(a) does not provide an appeal of right directly to the Supreme Court when the judgment is based on a guilty or no-contest plea.

State v. Taylor · filed 1983-04-05(a)

Defendant has no appeal of right since he entered pleas of guilty and no contest pursuant to a plea bargain. His purported appeal is therefore subject to dismissal.

Section 7A-27(a) allows an appeal as of right in a murder case with a life or death sentence when the trial court denies a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.

State v. Handy · filed 1990-05-10(a)

We note as an initial matter that there is no conflict between N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(e) (“except when a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest has been denied, the defendant is not entitled to appellate review as a matter of right when he has entered a plea of guilty or no contest . . .”) and N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) (appeal as of right in murder cases where the sentence is life imprisonment or death). Defendant may appeal as of right since the trial judge denied his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty.

Section 7A-27(b) does not provide a route for appeals from guilty pleas.

State v. Mungo · filed 2011-07-19(b)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b) does not provide a route for appeals from guilty pleas, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b) (2007), we thus turn to defendant’s next basis for appeal N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444.

Section 7A-27(b)(1) does not provide an appeal of right from a final judgment entered on a guilty plea, including an Alford plea.

State v. Sale · filed 2014-03-04(b)(1)

First, section 7A-27(b) explicitly excludes from its right of appeal those cases where a final judgment is entered based on a guilty plea.

Section 7A-27(b) does not provide an appeal of right from a final judgment entered after a guilty plea.

State v. Watkins · filed 2016-04-05(b)(1)

As an initial matter, defendant contends that he has a right to appeal the trial court’s order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b). We disagree. ... Because this Court did not state the procedure for review, because the trial court did not enter an appealable order, and because defendant did not seek entry of such an order by mandamus, it appears defendant is not entitled to appeal as a matter of right.

Section 7A-27(d) does not allow an immediate appeal from a temporary alimony order that does not affect a substantial right.

Prevatte v. Prevatte · filed 1991-12-17(d)

After careful review of the lengthy record in this case, we have been unable to find any order which has finally determined the issue of wife’s entitlement to an award of permanent alimony. “[0]rders and awards pendente lite are interlocutory decrees which necessarily do not affect a substantial right from which lies an immediate appeal pursuant to G.S. § 7A-27(d).” Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1981). Accordingly, we dismiss husband’s last assignment of error as it is premature.

Section 7A-27(d) does not allow an immediate appeal from pendente lite orders and awards because they do not affect a substantial right.

Stephenson v. Stephenson · filed 1981-12-15(d)

We hold, therefore, that orders and awards pendente lite are interlocutory decrees which necessarily do not affect a substantial right from which lies an immediate appeal pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(d).

Section 7A-27(d) does not permit an immediate appeal from an interlocutory alimony pendente lite award because it does not affect a substantial right.

Browne v. Browne · filed 1991-02-19(d)

“[AJwards pendente lite are interlocutory decrees which necessarily do not affect a substantial right from which lies an immediate appeal pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(d).” ... Accordingly, the defendant’s appeal of the pendente lite award of alimony is dismissed as interlocutory.

Section 7A-27(d)(1) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order terminating temporary alimony because the order affects the dependent spouse’s substantial right to support pending a permanent alimony hearing.

Brown v. Brown · filed 1987-05-05(d)(1)

While we agree with defendant that the appeal is interlocutory, the order entered below affects a “substantial right” within the meaning of G.S. 1277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) and is, therefore, immediately ap-pealable.

Section 7A-27(d) does not permit an immediate appeal from a temporary child support order entered pending a final determination because the order is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right.

Berry v. Berry · filed 1987-11-17(d)

In Stephenson we held that orders awarding child support, alimony, and attorney’s fees pendente lite are “interlocutory decrees which necessarily do not affect a substantial right from which lies an immediate appeal pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(d).” ... Nevertheless here, as in Stephenson, the support order appealed from was a temporary one, entered provisionally pending a final determination to be made at a later date. It is the non-finality of the support order that brings the present case within the reach of Stephenson.

Section 7A-27(d) does not permit an immediate appeal from an order denying alimony pendente lite because the order does not affect a substantial right.

Wilson v. Wilson · filed 1988-05-08(d)

In Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. at 252, 285 S.E. 2d at 282, this Court held, in an opinion in which all the members of this court concurred, “that orders and awards pendente lite are interlocutory decrees which necessarily do not affect a substantial right from which lies an immediate appeal pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(d).”

Section 7A-27 permits an interlocutory appeal when an order deprives the appellant of a substantial right that would be lost without review before final judgment.

A.E.P. Industries, Inc. v. McClure · filed 1983-05-31

Pursuant to G.S. § 1-277 and G.S. § 7A-27, no appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order or ruling of a trial judge unless such order or ruling deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose absent a review prior to final determination.

Section 7A-27 permits an immediate appeal from a preliminary injunction only when the order adversely affects a substantial right.

Dixon v. Dixon · filed 1983-06-21

For defendant to have a right of appeal from a mandatory preliminary injunction, “substantial rights” of the appellant must be adversely affected.

Section 7A-27(d)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal when an order deprives the appellant of a substantial right that would be lost without review before final judgment.

Robins & Weill, Inc. v. Mason · filed 1984-10-02(d)(1)

Of course, no appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order unless the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose absent a review prior to final determination. G.S. 1-277; G.S. 7A-27(d)(1). ... In the present case, we hold that the granting of the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction deprived the defendants of a substantial right.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an appeal from a preliminary injunction only when the order deprives the restrained party of a substantial right.

GLYK v. Winston-Salem Southbound Railway Co. · filed 1981-12-15(d)

A preliminary injunction is a temporary order from which no appeal lies unless the order deprives the restrained party of a substantial right. G.S. l-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d). ... GLYK having failed to show that the preliminary injunction deprived it of any substantial right, the appeal is dismissed.

Section 7A-27 permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order when delaying review would cause the appellant to lose a substantial right.

Masterclean of North Carolina, Inc. v. Guy · filed 1986-07-15

Pursuant to G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27, no appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order or ruling of a trial judge unless such order or ruling deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose absent a review prior to final determination. ... We hold that defendant would be deprived of a substantial right, absent a review prior to a final determination, to wit: the right to work and earn a living in the states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, and Alabama.

Section 7A-27(d) allows an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order affecting a substantial right, but an order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is reviewable after final judgment and does not qualify.

Travco Hotels, Inc. v. PIEDMONT NAT. GAS CO., INC. · filed 1992-09-04(d)

N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(d) (1989) provides that: ... From any interlocutory order or judgment of a superior court or district court in a civil action or proceeding which affects a substantial right . . . appeal lies of right directly to the Court of Appeals. ... The order denying the motion to disqualify counsel fails the second prong of the two-part “substantial right” test.

Section 7A-27(d) allows an immediate appeal from an order disqualifying a party's chosen counsel when the order affects a substantial right and may cause injury before final judgment.

Goldston v. American Motors Corp. · filed 1990-06-13(d)

As we have previously stated, for an interlocutory order to be immediately appealable, it must: (1) affect a substantial right and (2) work injury if not corrected before final judgment. Wachovia, 292 N.C. 93, 232 S.E.2d 667. Here, these requirements have been met by plaintiff. The trial court's order is appealable, and the Court of Appeals was in error in dismissing plaintiff's appeal without first passing on the merits thereof.

Section 7A-27(b)(3) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order denying a statutory right to venue because that right is substantial.

I.B.S.A., Inc. v. Builder's Supply Inc. · filed 2014-01-07(b)(3)

Although parties generally have “no right of immediate appeal from interlocutory orders and judgments[,]” Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 725, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990), Defendants have an appeal of right under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(3) because they appeal from an “interlocutory order or judgment of a superior court or district court in a civil action or proceeding which . . . [a]ffects a substantial right.”

Section 7A-27(d)(4) allows an immediate appeal from an order granting or refusing a new trial, but an order setting aside entries of default under an appellate mandate does not qualify.

Decker v. Homes, Inc. · filed 2009-06-16(d)(4)

Thus, instead of constituting an exercise of the trial court's authority to grant a new trial, which would be subject to immediate appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(a) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(d)(4), the trial court's order represented nothing more than compliance with this Court's mandate, which is not an action that is subject to immediate appeal. As a result, we conclude that the trial court's order setting aside the entries of default is not immediately appealable as tantamount to an order granting or denying a new trial.

Section 7A-27(d)(4) does not provide an automatic immediate appeal from the denial of a new trial limited to liability while damages remain unresolved; the appellant must show that a substantial right is affected.

Land v. Land · filed 2010-01-05(d)(4)

There is no automatic right of appeal under either N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-277 or 7A-27(d) in the absence of a showing of a substantial right from the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion for a new trial.

Section 7A-27(d) requires an appellant seeking an appeal of right from a nonfinal order to establish one of its listed grounds.

Culton v. Culton · filed 1990-12-05(d)

As this order was not a final judgment, for plaintiff to have been entitled to appeal of right from the order, plaintiff was required to establish that it either: ... N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(d) (1989). ... Plaintiff was not an aggrieved party, nor did he argue, much less establish, that he was entitled to an appeal of right from the interlocutory order entered below. The Court of Appeals should have dismissed this attempted appeal.

Section 7A-27 allows an appeal from an interlocutory order when waiting until final judgment would cause the appellant to lose a substantial right.

Heavner v. Heavner · filed 1985-03-05

No appeal lies from an interlocutory order or ruling of a trial judge unless the order or ruling deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose if the order or ruling is not reviewed before the final judgment. ... G.S. 1-277; G.S. 7A-27. ... Judge Bulwinkle’s order requiring plaintiff, defendant and Jeffrey to submit to a blood grouping test is an interlocutory order and is not appealable as it does not affect a substantial right.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal when denial of a motion to amend an answer to allege a compulsory counterclaim affects a substantial right.

Hudspeth v. Bunzey · filed 1978-02-07(d)

We therefore conclude that the denial of a motion to amend the answer to allege a compulsory counterclaim affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that affects a substantial right.

McGinnis v. McGinnis · filed 1980-01-08(d)

Since the order granting plaintiff-wife’s claim for $4,225.00 in arrearages and granting full faith and credit to a decree imposing a continuing support obligation affects a “substantial right” of defendant, it is reviewable by virtue of G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27(d).

Section 7A-27(d) permits immediate appeal of an interlocutory judgment that affects a substantial right.

Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Myers · filed 1980-04-15(d)

In the case sub judice, however, we believe we are bound by Investments to hold that the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for a monetary sum against defendant Harold Myers affects a “substantial right” of this defendant. Accordingly, we must treat the judgment as immediately appealable under G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27.

Section 7A-27(d)(1) permits an appeal from an order requiring a party to vacate premises because the order affects a substantial right.

Musten v. Musten · filed 1978-06-06(d)(1)

At the outset, we hold that the order requiring the defendant to vacate the premises affects a substantial right and is ap-pealable to this Court. G.S. 7A-27(d)(1).

Section 7A-27(d)(1) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that affects a substantial right that would be lost if review waited until final judgment.

Sims v. Ritter Construction, Inc. · filed 1983-05-03(d)(1)

A party has a right to appeal an interlocutory order only if the order affects some substantial right claimed by appellant which will work an injury to him if not corrected before an appeal from final judgment. G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1); Atkins v. Beasley, 53 N.C. App. 33, 279 S.E. 2d 866 (1981). We hold that this case falls within the “substantial right” exception since the defendants’ right to have the matters in controversy settled by arbitration would be lost by delaying the appeal until after final judgment by the trial court.

Section 7A-27(d)(1) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that affects a substantial right and would cause injury if left uncorrected until final judgment.

Adair v. Adair · filed 1983-06-07(d)(1)

An interlocutory order is appealable if it affects some substantial right claimed by the appellant and if it will work injury if not corrected before final judgment. G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1); Atkins v. Beasley, 53 N.C. App. 33, 279 S.E. 2d 866 (1981). We believe that a “substantial right” is involved here, since the dismissal of defendant’s answer and counterclaim deprived her of the assertion of affirmative defenses and counterclaims against the claims asserted by plaintiff in his complaint for absolute divorce.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal from a judgment resolving fewer than all claims when it affects a substantial right, including a party’s only remaining rights in the action.

Porter v. Matthews Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1983-07-05(d)

Under such circumstances, an appeal will not lie unless the judgment affects a “substantial right” under either G.S. 1-277 or 7A-27(d). ... Under these circumstances, third-party plaintiffs’ only remaining rights in this action are at stake in this appeal and the entry of summary judgment against them is therefore appealable under G.S. l-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d).

Section 7A-27(d)(1) permits an immediate appeal from a judgment resolving claims against fewer than all defendants when the judgment affects a substantial right.

Johnston County v. McCormick · filed 1983-11-15(d)(1)

Since summary judgment was allowed for fewer than all defendants and the trial court’s judgment did not contain a certification pursuant to G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure that there was “no just reason for delay,” plaintiffs appeal is premature unless the summary judgment for defendant Farm Bureau affected a substantial right under G.S. § l-277(a) and G.S. § 7A-27(d)(l). For reasons which will be stated in this opinion, we hold that a substantial right of plaintiff was affected and that the appeal is not premature.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal when an interlocutory order affects a substantial right that would be harmed before final judgment; a risk of inconsistent verdicts in separate trials can qualify.

Perry v. Aycock · filed 1984-06-05(d)

Plaintiffs appeal is therefore premature unless the order affected a substantial right claimed by the appellant, and will work an injury to him if not corrected before an appeal from the final judgment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277 (1983); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(d) (1981); ... A distinct possibility of inconsistent verdicts in separate trials arises, and the order allowing summary judgment therefore affects a substantial right, the denial of which will work an injury to the appellant if not corrected before an appeal from a final judgment. ... We hold that this appeal is properly before this Court.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order when waiting for final judgment would substantially injure a right affected by the order.

Jenkins v. Wheeler · filed 1984-06-19(d)

However, since multiple trials against different members of the same allegedly collusive group could result from dismissal of this appeal, we hold that the order affected a substantial right claimed by the appellant and will work a substantial injury to her if not corrected before an appeal from the final judgment. It is therefore immediately appealable. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277 (1983); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(d) (1981); Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E. 2d 405 (1982).

Section 7A-27(d) allows an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that affects a substantial right, including when separate trials of closely related claims risk inconsistent verdicts.

Estrada v. Jaques · filed 1984-10-16(d)

Therefore, the only way these orders may be reviewed is if they affect a substantial right and are appealable of right. G.S. § l-277(a) (1983); G.S. § 7A-27(d) (1981). ... Accordingly, we hold that a substantial right is affected and this portion of the appeal is before this Court of right.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that affects a substantial right, including an order that forecloses a possible remedy against the current property owner.

Jenkins v. Maintenance, Inc. · filed 1985-07-16(d)

Under G.S. 7A-27(d), appeal to this Court lies from an interlocutory order which affects a substantial right, or in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which appeal might be taken, or discontinues the action, or grants or refuses a new trial. ... The summary judgment in favor of Maintenance precluded plaintiffs from electing this remedy, thereby affecting a substantial right. The interlocutory order is, therefore, appealable.

Section 7A-27 allows an appeal from an interlocutory order without Rule 54(b) certification only if the order affects a substantial right.

County of Dare v. R. O. Givens Signs, Inc. · filed 1986-06-17

No G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), certification of “no just reason for delay” is contained in the 12 November 1985 order. The appeal is clearly interlocutory; it does not dispose of all the claims of the parties. Therefore, in this case the order is appealable only if it affects a substantial right. G.S. 1-277; G.S. 7A-27.

Section 7A-27 permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order when the order affects a substantial right.

In Re Watson · filed 1984-08-21

Accordingly, since the trial court did not certify that there was no just reason for delay, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), no appeal would lie unless the order affected a substantial right. G.S. 1-277; G.S. 7A-27; Blackwelder, supra. The “substantial right” exception does not apply unless the appellant would lose some substantial right if the ruling or order is not reviewed before final judgment in the trial division. Id. No substantial right appears to be affected by continuing petitioner as administrator.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that affects a substantial right, including the right to resolve related claims against multiple defendants in one proceeding.

Fox v. Wilson · filed 1987-04-21(d)

We hold that the dismissal of Count II of the amended complaint, resulting in dismissal of plaintiffs claim against defendant professional corporation, affects a substantial right to have determined in a single proceeding the issues of whether she has been damaged by the actions of one, some or all defendants, especially since her claims against all of them arise upon the same series of transactions.

Section 7A-27(b)(3)(d) permits an appeal of right from an order refusing a new trial.

Helbein v. Helbein · filed 2019-03-19(b)(3)(d)

N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(3)(d) specifically permits Bobby to appeal an order refusing a new trial.

Section 7A-27(b)(3)(a) permits an immediate appeal of a sanctions order affecting a substantial right when a substantial sum is immediately payable.

Porters Neck Ltd., LLC v. Porters Neck Cty. Club · filed 2021-03-02(b)(3)(a)

An order for sanctions may be immediately appealed if it affects a substantial right under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-277 or 7A-27(b)(3)(a) (2019). A substantial right is invoked when the sanction ordered is a substantial sum and is immediately payable. ... Defendant has sufficiently established the order affects a substantial right and that interlocutory review is appropriate. Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s appeal is denied.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal of an interlocutory order affecting a substantial right; an order setting aside an entry of default does not qualify when no such right is shown.

Sullivan v. Pender Cty. · filed 2022-07-05(d)

Thus, Plaintiff’s appeal in this case is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right. Therefore, we are without jurisdiction to review this matter on immediate appeal.

Section 7A-27 does not permit an immediate appeal from an order fixing the date of separation when equitable distribution issues remain unresolved.

Hatmaker v. Hatmaker · filed 2008-07-01(b), (d)(2)

Here, defendant contends the only issue for judicial determination in the equitable distribution claim was the date of separation, and thus the order at issue constitutes a final judgment pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b). Alternatively, defendant argues that if this Court considers the order at issue as interlocutory, she has an appeal of right pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(d)(2), because the order in effect determines the parties' equitable distribution claims as the date of separation was the only triable issue to be legally determined by the trial court. However, the record contains no indication of any order or stipulation which addresses the classification of property, the value of marital property, or the distribution of marital property. All of these issues must be addressed by an equitable distribution order. See Stone v. Stone, 181 N.C. App. 688, 640 S.E.2d 826 (2007). Defendant's claim for an unequal distribution of the marital property also remains to be decided by the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court's order setting the date of separation of the parties is not a final order disposing of the case and we dismiss defendant's appeal because it is from an interlocutory order.

Section 7A-27(d)(2) permits an immediate appeal only when the ruling effectively determines the entire action.

Perry v. North Carolina Department of Correction · filed 2006-02-21(d)(2)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(d)(2), also cited by DOC, permits an immediate appeal only when the ruling being appealed has effectively determined the entire action. The interlocutory order being appealed in this case, however, merely temporarily determines a portion of the action before further proceedings come about that may negate that order and does not, therefore, justify an interlocutory appeal.

Section 7A-27(b) does not permit an immediate appeal from an order remanding an administrative matter for rehearing unless delaying review would impair a substantial right.

Heritage Pointe Builders, Inc. v. North Carolina Licensing Board of General Contractors · filed 1995-10-17(b)

Because the order requires further action to settle the controversy, it is interlocutory, ... and this Court has jurisdiction only if “the order affects some substantial right and [the loss of that right] will work injury to appellant if not corrected before appeal from final judgment.” ... N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b) (1989) (only final orders of administrative agency appealable). Assuming the existence of a substantial right in this case, the record does not support a determination that the Board’s right to pursue the contentions made in this appeal would be impaired or prejudiced if it were forced to delay presentation of these contentions until entry of a final order in the trial court. ... The appeal must therefore be dismissed.

Section 7A-27 does not authorize an appeal as of right from orders that resolve only defenses to certiorari petitions while judicial review remains pending.

Little v. City of Locust · filed 1986-11-04

Which means, of course, that respondents’ appeal is fragmentary, premature and unauthorized. G.S. 1-277; G.S. 7A-27; Rule 54, N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 7A-27 does not allow an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss when no substantial right is affected; labeling the order a final judgment does not make it appealable.

Kirkman v. Wilson · filed 1987-08-04

It is from an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ action and a substantial right is not affected. ... That the trial judge amended the order to state that it is a “final Judgment” did not change its nature, ... and make appealable what is clearly not appealable under the provisions of G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27.

Section 7A-27 does not permit an immediate appeal from interlocutory orders when no substantial right would be lost by waiting for final judgment.

Bromhal v. Stott · filed 1991-01-15

The appeal is unauthorized and we dismiss it. All the orders are interlocutory; none will deprive defendant of a substantial right that would be lost if the orders are not reviewed before final judgment.

Section 7A-27 does not permit an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that does not affect a substantial right that may be injured by delayed review.

Telerent Leasing Corp. v. Barbee · filed 1991-03-05

The appeal is premature because it is from an interlocutory order that does not affect a substantial right that may suffer injury if appeal is delayed until final judgment is entered. G.S. 1-277; G.S. 7A-27; Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 57 S.E.2d 377, reh’g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950).

Section 7A-27 does not provide an appeal of right from an interlocutory order that does not affect a substantial right.

Kimzay Winston-Salem, Inc. v. Jester · filed 1991-05-21

Though defendant’s appeal is dismissible since it is from an interlocutory order that does not affect a substantial right, G.S. 1-277; G.S. 7A-27; Veasey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 354, 57 S.E.2d 375 (1950), to prevent manifest injustice to the appellant, and to expedite the end of this overly litigated matter, which was legally set at rest more than nineteen months ago when the default judgment was satisfied, we suspend the rules under the provisions of Rule 2 of our appellate rules and treat the appeal as a petition for certiorari made pursuant to Rule 21(a) and grant it.

Section 7A-27(d) does not allow an immediate appeal from an injunction that preserves the status quo while the trial court decides whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists, when the order does not meet the grounds for interlocutory appeal.

Lee County Board of Education v. Adams Electrical, Inc. · filed 1992-04-21(d)

This order only maintains the status quo pending a determination of whether the parties have entered into a contract providing for arbitration of their disputes. It does not determine the action, N.C.G.S. § l-277(a); N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(d)(2), it does not discontinue the action, N.C.G.S. § l-277(a); N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(d)(3), and it does not grant or refuse a new trial.

Section 7A-27(d) does not allow an immediate appeal from an order compelling arbitration when the order does not affect a substantial right requiring review before final judgment.

Bluffs, Inc. v. Wysocki · filed 1984-05-01(d)

An order compelling the parties to arbitrate is an interlocutory order. We do not believe it affects a substantial right and works an injury to the appellant if not corrected before an appeal from a final judgment. It is not appealable under G.S. l-277(a) or G.S. 7A-27(d).

Section 7A-27(d)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order denying class certification when waiting until final judgment could leave absent class members with an injury that cannot be corrected.

Perry v. Cullipher · filed 1984-08-07(d)(1)

The plaintiff argues that he is entitled to appeal under the substantial right exception of G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27(d)(l). An interlocutory order is appealable if it affects a substantial right and will work injury to the appellants if not corrected before final judgment. ... If Virgin Perry recovers after the trial court has refused to certify the action, the other members of the class will suffer an injury which could not be corrected if there were no appeal before the final judgment. The judgment in his favor could be affirmed and they would not recover anything. We hold that the order is appealable.

Section 7A-27(d) does not authorize an interlocutory appeal when delaying review would not cost the appellant a substantial right; the possibility of a second trial alone is insufficient.

Jackson v. Lundy Packing Co. · filed 1985-01-15(d)

Nor is the appeal authorized by the provisions of G.S. 1-277 or G.S. 7A-27(d), because no substantial right of ... the defendant’s would have been lost if the appeal had been delayed until the case is litigated. The only possible harm that defendant could have suffered by delaying its appeal was having to try the case twice, which by itself, contrary to defendant’s contention, does not justify an interlocutory appeal.

Section 7A-27(d)(1) allows an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that affects a substantial right; resolving liability while leaving damages for trial does not qualify when any error can be reviewed after final judgment.

Tridyn Industries, Inc. v. American Mutual Insurance · filed 1979-02-05(d)(1)

The decree, furthermore, is not appealable on the theory that it affects a substantial right of defendant and will work injury to it if not corrected before an appeal from the final judgment. If this partial summary judgment is in error defendant can preserve its right to complain of the error on appeal from the final judgment by a duly entered exception.

Section 7A-27(d)(1) permits an interlocutory appeal from an order allowing intervention only when the order adversely affects a substantial right that may be lost before final judgment.

Wood v. City of Fayetteville · filed 1978-04-04(d)(1)

Although the rule is not absolute, ordinarily no appeal will lie from an order permitting intervention of parties unless the order adversely affects a substantial right which the appellant may lose if not granted an appeal before final judgment. ... Both the general rule and the exception have been approved in substance and adopted by the General Assembly in G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) and G.S. 1-277.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal from an order affecting a substantial right; the possibility of a second trial ordinarily qualifies only when both trials involve the same issues and risk inconsistent verdicts.

Green Ex Rel. Downs v. Duke Power Co. · filed 1982-05-04(d)

Both G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27 (d) provide for immediate appeal of a judicial order or determination that affects a substantial right. ... Ordinarily the possibility of undergoing a second trial affects a substantial right only when the same issues are present in both trials, creating the possibility that a party will be prejudiced by different juries in separate trials rendering inconsistent verdicts on the same factual issue. This not being the case before us, we hold the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of Duke’s appeal was without error.

Section 7A-27 does not allow an immediate appeal from a discretionary, interlocutory order granting a new trial.

Elks v. Hannan · filed 1984-06-05

At the threshold of this appeal, we are confronted with the fact that whether the order appealed from is deemed to be an order of mistrial, as the record states, or an order for a new trial, as we believe, it was certainly a discretionary order, interlocutory in nature, that was not immediately appealable. G.S. 1-277; G.S. 7A-27.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order only when one of its listed exceptions applies.

Buchanan v. Rose · filed 1982-11-02(d)

We do not find that a substantial right of the defendants will be irreparably damaged if we do not allow this appeal. ... Here, the case can proceed to trial with the loser there having a right of appeal to this Court. None of the other three exceptions in G.S. 7A-27(d) is applicable here.

Section 7A-27(d)(1) does not allow an appeal as of right from denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a Rule 12(f) motion to strike.

Raines v. Thompson · filed 1983-06-21(d)(1)

No appeal lies as a matter of right from the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a motion to strike portions of pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(f).

Section 7A-27(d) does not allow an immediate appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss merely to avoid trial.

Howard v. Ocean Trail Convalescent Center · filed 1984-05-15(d)

The avoidance of a trial is not a “substantial right” that would make such an interlocutory order appealable under G.S. 1-277 or G.S. 7A-27(d).

Section 7A-27 does not allow an appeal of right from an interlocutory order that does not affect a substantial right.

Shelton v. Morehead Memorial Hospital · filed 1986-08-29

As to the appealability of Judge Morgan’s rulings, we conclude his orders are interlocutory, do not affect a substantial right of the plaintiffs, and are not appealable of right. N.C.G.S. § 7A-27 (1986); First Union Nat’l Bank v. Olive, 42 N.C. App. 574, 257 S.E. 2d 100 (1979).

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order only when the order affects a substantial right that would be harmed without review before final judgment; having to prove a claim does not qualify.

First American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Satterfield · filed 1987-09-15(d)

Interlocutory orders are immediately appealable only if they affect a substantial right and will work injury to the appellant if not corrected before an appeal from a final judgment. G.S. l-277(a), G.S. 7A-27(d), Bailey v. Gooding, supra. ... Under the facts of this case, we do not consider the avoidance of having to affirmatively prove one’s claim to be a substantial right.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an interlocutory appeal based on a substantial right only when delaying review could cause injury before final judgment.

Donnelly v. Guilford County · filed 1992-08-18(d)

Although a money judgment may involve a substantial right, see Wachovia Realty Investments v. Housing, Inc., 292 N.C. 93, 232 S.E.2d 667 (1977), we do not find that payment of the $1.00 will “potentially work injury to plaintiff if not corrected before appeal from the final judgment.” Therefore, plaintiff does not have a statutory right to appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-277 or 7A-27.

Section 7A-27 permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that affects a substantial right which would be lost before final judgment.

Jenkins v. Choong · filed 2001-12-18

A litigant is entitled to appeal either from a final judgment or from an interlocutory order which affects a substantial right. ... The trial court’s order denying plaintiffs motion for sanctions does not implicate a substantial right of plaintiff which will be lost if this particular case moves forward to a final judgment.

Section 7A-27(d)(1) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order when delaying review would jeopardize a substantial right.

Ward v. WAKE CO. BD. OF EDUC. · filed 2004-11-02(d)(1)

Although ordinarily a party may not appeal an interlocutory order, appeal is allowed where denial of immediate review would jeopardize a "substantial right" of the appellant. N.C.G.S. § 7A-27 (d)(1) (2003) (allowing appeal of right to this Court from "any interlocutory order or judgment" that "[a]ffects a substantial right[.]"). ... We also conclude that no substantial right will be lost by delaying appeal until final resolution of plaintiff's claims.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that affects a substantial right or meets another listed criterion.

Reeves v. Yellow Transportation, Inc. · filed 2005-06-07(d)

However, N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(d) (2003) permits immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that: ... In the case sub judice, we conclude the order in Docket 03(UI)7400 neither affects a substantial right, nor meets any other criteria for immediate appeal, and thus should be dismissed as interlocutory.

Section 7A-27(b)(3) does not permit an immediate appeal from the denial of summary judgment based on statutory reporting immunity when factual issues prevent the defendants from establishing immunity as a matter of law.

Delgado v. Petruk · filed 2015-10-06(b)(3)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(3) (2013) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(a) (2013) provide exceptions to the general rule for orders or judgments that affect a substantial right. ... Therefore, the denial of defendants’ summary judgment motion did not affect a substantial right entitling them to an immediate right of appeal.

Section 7A-27(b)(3)(d) allows an immediate appeal from an order granting or refusing a new trial, but an order to rehear evidence before judgment is not an order for a new trial.

Regency Lake Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Regency Lake, LLC · filed 2018-04-03(b)(3)(d)

Here, the trial court has not rendered a verdict nor entered a judgment. The trial court’s order to rehear evidence is not tantamount to an order for a new trial. Because the trial court did not order a new trial, Appellants are not entitled to an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(3)(d).

Section 7A-27 permits an eligible interlocutory appeal but does not require the party to take it before final judgment.

Ingle v. Allen · filed 1984-11-06

However, plaintiff might have appealed under G.S. 7A-27 and G.S. 1-277 if she so elected. ... Although plaintiff in the case before us could have appealed the entry of summary judgment as to W. A. Johnson, she was not required to do so.

Section 7A-27 does not allow an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that neither affects a substantial right nor effectively determines the action.

Harris v. Jim Stacy Racing, Inc. · filed 1981-09-01

It does not affect a substantial right of defendant or in effect determine the action. G.S. 1-277, G.S. 7A-27. The appeal, then, as to this portion of the judgment and order, is properly dismissed as interlocutory.

Section 7A-27 does not allow an appeal as of right from an interlocutory order that does not affect a substantial right.

Fraser v. Di Santi · filed 1985-07-02

This finding by the trial court must be construed in light of G.S. 7A-27 and our well-settled case law concerning interlocutory appeals. Further, this appeal does not affect defendants’ substantial rights. The appeal cannot lie as of right to this court.

Section 7A-27(d) does not permit an interlocutory appeal when the order affects no substantial right and falls within none of its other categories.

National Home Life Assurance Co. v. Ingram · filed 1974-06-05(d)

The order appealed from is interlocutory, does not affect a substantial right of the respondent appellant, and does not otherwise fall within any of the subsections of G.S. 7A-27 (d). The appeal is premature and accordingly will be dismissed.

Section 7A-27 permits an appeal from an interlocutory order only when the order threatens a substantial right that would be lost without review before final judgment.

Funderburk v. Justice · filed 1975-05-07

G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27 in effect provide that no appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory ruling or order of the trial court unless such ruling or order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose if the ruling or order is not reviewed before final judgment.

Section 7A-27 does not permit an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that does not deny a substantial right.

Bridges v. Bridges · filed 1976-04-21

The appeal from the order dated 24 July 1975 is subject to dismissal since the order is clearly interlocutory, and even if invalid, does not deny defendant a substantial right. G.S. 1-277; G.S. 7A-27; Funderburk v. Justice, 25 N.C. App. 655, 214 S.E. 2d 310 (1975).

Section 7A-27 does not permit an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss when waiting for final judgment will not injure a substantial right.

Williams v. East Coast Sales, Inc. · filed 1981-02-03

The threshold question in this case is whether the order denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss is appealable. We hold that it is not. ... These cases interpret G.S. 1-277, G.S. 7A-27, and G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b). They hold that unless an interlocutory order affects some substantial right claimed by the appellant and will work an injury to him if not corrected before a final judgment, the order is not appealable.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order only when the order affects a substantial right.

Helms v. Griffin · filed 1983-09-20(d)

An interlocutory order is immediately appealable only when it affects a substantial right of the appellant. ... See G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27(d). Since the sale was stayed pending appeal, we find that the order does not affect a substantial right of the plaintiff.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order only when the order affects a substantial right and delaying review until final judgment would injure the appellant.

Ball v. Ball · filed 1981-12-01(d)

While final judgments are always appealable, interlocutory decrees are immediately ap-pealable only when they affect some substantial right of the appellant and will cause an injury to him if not corrected before an appeal from final judgment. ... See G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27(d). ... We hold that the order does not affect any substantial right of defendants. ... The interlocutory order, therefore, is not appealable.

Section 7A-27(d) allows an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order only when waiting for final judgment would cause the appellant to lose a substantial right.

Smart v. Smart · filed 1982-11-16(d)

We hold that the order is interlocutory and the immediate temporary emergency relief granted by the order does not affect any substantial right of the defendant which cannot be protected by timely appeal from the trial court’s ultimate disposition of the entire controversy on the merits.

Section 7A-27(d)(1) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that affects a substantial right; a pleading violation causing no apparent prejudice does not qualify.

Coastal Chemical Corp. v. Guardian Industries, Inc. · filed 1983-07-05(d)(1)

It does not affect a substantial right belonging to defendant, see G.S. l-277(a), 7A-27(d)(l), in that at this juncture in the litigation no prejudice to defendant from the violation in question appears.

Section 7A-27(d) allows an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order only when the order affects a substantial right that would be injured without review before final judgment.

Howell v. Howell · filed 1988-03-01(d)

There is no right to appeal from an interlocutory order unless it affects a substantial right and will result in injury if not reviewed before final judgment. G.S. 1-277(a); G.S. 7A-27(d); ... In this case, the orders from which appellant seeks to appeal are interlocutory and do not affect a substantial right of appellant.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order only when waiting for final judgment would cause the appellant to lose a substantial right.

Shuping v. NCNB National Bank of North Carolina · filed 1989-04-04(d)

The appeal is unauthorized and we dismiss it. Fragmentary, piecemeal appeals from interlocutory orders are not usually permitted in this state; they are authorized only when it appears that a substantial right of the appellant will be lost if the order is ... not reviewed before the case has finally run its course in the trial court. G.S. 1-277; G.S. 7A-27(d); Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 57 S.E. 2d 377 (1950).

Section 7A-27 allows an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order only when the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right that would be lost without review before final determination.

Automated Data Systems v. Myers · filed 1989-12-19

Pursuant to G.S. § 1-277 and G.S. § 7A-27, no appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order or ruling of a trial judge unless such order or ruling deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose absent a review prior to final determination. ... For the reasons stated, defendant’s appeal is dismissed as interlocutory.

Section 7A-27(d) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order only when the order affects a substantial right and delaying review will cause injury.

Horne v. NOBILITY HOMES, INCORPORATED · filed 1988-01-19(d)

No appeal lies from an interlocutory order unless it affects a substantial right and will result in injury if not reviewed before final judgment. G.S. 1-0277(a); G.S. 7A-27(d); Waters v. Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E. 2d 338 (1978).

Section 7A-27(b)(3)(b)-(c) does not permit an immediate appeal when an interlocutory order leaves the action pending and allows a later appealable judgment.

Blackrock Equestrian Ranch, L.L.C. v. Hardin · filed 2025-12-17(b)(3)(b)-(c)

We hold this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s appeal because the trial court’s order is an interlocutory order that does not effectively determine the action, prevent an appealable judgment, or discontinue the action.

Section 7A-27(b) does not permit an immediate appeal from a superior court order remanding a matter to a municipal board for further proceedings when the appellant has not shown that delaying review would affect a substantial right.

Middle Sound Lookout v. New Hanover Cnty. · filed 2026-02-18(b)

Defendant contends this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b) because the appeal “arises from a final judgment resolving all claims as to all parties[.]” We disagree. ... Thus, this appeal is interlocutory, and Defendant has failed to show that a substantial right would be lost absent immediate appeal. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review this matter on the merits.

Section 7A-27(b)(3) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order affecting a substantial right, including when separate trials could produce inconsistent findings on the same facts.

Shannon v. Rouse Builders · filed 2024-08-06(b)(3)

Therefore, the Order affects a substantial right, and we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(3).

Section 7A-27(b)(3) permits an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order striking a claim of lien when the potential loss of lien priority affects a substantial right.

RM Contractors · filed 2024-06-04(b)(3)

To limit the possibility of Plaintiff improperly losing its priority position, we conclude that the Order affects a substantial right. See id. at 608, 831 S.E.2d at 889. Accordingly, despite the interlocutory nature of the Order, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(3).

Section 7A-27(b)(3)(a) does not make an order denying intervention immediately appealable as a matter of law; the appellant must show why the order affects a substantial right in the particular case.

Cape Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. S. Destiny · filed 2024-02-20(b)(3)(a)

However, unlike a trial court’s ruling on sovereign immunity, the denial of a motion to intervene does not affect a substantial right essentially as a matter of law.

Section 7A-27(b)(3) permits an interlocutory appeal when a party shows a substantial right that would be lost without immediate review; the defendants’ claimed right to prior notice of a records request did not qualify.

Fore v. The Western N.C. Conf. of the United Methodist Church · filed 2022-06-21(b)(3)

Appellate review is proper pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(3) if the party proves one of the requirements therein. ... Defendants’ arguments are without merit asserting prior notice of a records request to public entities concerning non-joined third parties as a substantial right to an immediate appeal.

Section 7A-27(a)(3)a permits an immediate appeal of an interlocutory order affecting a substantial right; transferring a constitutional challenge without changing venue does not affect such a right.

Cryan v. Nat'l Council of Young Men's Christian Ass'n of the United States of Am. · filed 2021-11-16(a)(3)a

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(a) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(a)(3)a create an exception to the rule against interlocutory appeals for appeals challenging an interlocutory order affecting a “substantial right.” ... However, the order did not grant, deny, change, or otherwise affect venue, and therefore did not affect a substantial right.

Section 7A-27(b)(3)(a.) allows an immediate appeal from a district court interlocutory order in a civil case when the order affects a substantial right.

Willis v. Hamilton · filed 2016-12-30(b)(3)(a.)

Moreover, appeal of right lies directly to the Court of Appeals "[f]rom any interlocutory order or judgment of a ... district court in a civil action or proceeding that ... [a]ffects a substantial right." Id. § 7A-27(b)(3)(a.) (2015). ... However, plaintiff does not reveal how this affects a substantial right of his or how it will potentially work an injury if not corrected prior to a final judgment.