Statute Annotations › North Carolina › N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1

Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
North Carolina
Case notes
1,120
Cited in passing
544
Citing cases indexed
2,047
Case dates
1975–2026
Screened through
2026-06-25
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-01
Courts' treatment: preempted in at least one context
A reviewed case holds this section preempted in at least one context. Courts have held that federal law displaces § 75-1.1 for specific federally regulated conduct, without holding the statute facially invalid. In Weber v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (2022-08-31), the court held: “Thus, the FCRA preempts Weber’s UDTPA claim based upon allegedly furnishing inaccurate information to the credit reporting agencies.”
More on this status

In Humana, Inc. v. Ameritox, LLC (2017-07-28), the court likewise granted preemption as to the plaintiff’s ERISA-based state-law claims while allowing non-ERISA claims to proceed. “Therefore, Ameritox’s motion will be granted to the extent ERISA preempts Humana’s State-law claims for its ERISA-based plans, and otherwise denied as to Huma-na’s non-ERISA-based plans.” “Thus, the FCRA preempts Weber’s UDTPA claim based upon allegedly furnishing inaccurate information to the credit reporting agencies.”

This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

1,664 citing cases reviewed of 2,047 in the citation index: 1,120 interpreted the section (annotated below), 544 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-25 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1977-04-14 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in State ex rel. Edmisten v. J. C. Penney Co. and held debt collection outside the then-applicable § 75-1.1. Source
  • 1983-10-01 Session Law 1983-417 changed § 75-16.1(1)'s attorney-fee condition from an unwarranted refusal to “pay the claim” to an unwarranted refusal to “fully resolve the matter”; no earlier note states the former condition. Source
  • 1992-01-27 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in Investors Title Insurance v. Herzig and held that § 75-1.1 unfair-practice claims cannot be assigned. Source

Unfair practices in or affecting commerce

Section 75-1.1 requires unfair or deceptive debt-collection practices to be in or affecting commerce; regular activities of a homeowners’ association, including collecting dues and assessments, are business activities, while learned-profession services are excluded.

Davis Lake Community Ass'n v. Feldmann · filed 2000-06-06(a), (b)

Next, the debt collector’s practices must be “in or affecting commerce.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). “Commerce” includes “all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b). ... Our Supreme Court has clarified that “business activities” are those normal, day-to-day activities regularly conducted by the business and for which the business was organized. ... Thus, one of plaintiff’s regular, day-to-day activities was collecting dues and assessments. Because the allegedly unfair acts committed by plaintiff were directly connected with these dues-collecting activities, we conclude that the debt-collection practices of plaintiff were business activities in or affecting commerce.
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Section 75-1.1 covers business activities in commerce and protects business entities, not only individual consumers, from unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Systems, Inc. · filed 1986-06-03

We think it is clear that the activities concerned herein fall within the intended scope of G.S. § 75-1.1. ... It is also clear that individual consumers are not the only ones protected and provided a remedy under G.S. §§ 75-1.1 and 75-16.
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In the debt-collection context, Article 2's specifically prohibited practices are examples within the broader scope of G.S. 75-1.1, and allegations of wrongful, intentional harm to credit and business prospects can state a claim under the statute.

Talbert v. Mauney · filed 1986-05-06

We interpret this provision to mean that, though in the area of debt collection, unfair or deceptive acts in commerce are limited to those acts set out in Article 2, those specific practices delineated as prohibited are examples of unfair practices within the broader scope of G.S. 75-1.1.
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Section 75-1.1 reaches business activity in or affecting commerce, including an attempted real-estate sale, and coercive tactics can constitute an unfair practice.

Wilder v. Squires · filed 1984-05-15(a), (b)

To come within the scope of G.S. § 75-1.1, the unfair or deceptive act or practice must be “in or affecting commerce.” ... We, therefore, hold that there was sufficient evidence that Squires’ conduct was “in or affecting commerce” to withstand a motion for directed verdict. ... Therefore, coercive tactics are within the definition of unfair practices. ... We conclude that there was sufficient evidence of Squires’ coercive conduct to constitute an unfair act or practice and withstand a motion for directed verdict.
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Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce, but a business-to-business claim generally requires a competitive or commercial relationship connected to protecting consumers.

Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. · filed 1999-10-20(a), (b)

North Carolina's UTPA prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" that are "in or affecting commerce." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a)."Commerce" is defined to include "all business activities, however denominated." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b). ... But one business is permitted to assert an UTPA claim against another business only when the businesses are competitors (or potential competitors) or are engaged in commercial dealings with each other. ... The UTPA, therefore, cannot be used here because there is no competitive or business relationship that can be policed for the benefit of the consuming public. The North Carolina statute has not been applied to a circumstance like this, and we believe the Supreme Court of North Carolina would hold that it should not be. We therefore reverse the district court's judgment that the ABC defendants, including Dale, were liable under the North Carolina UTPA.
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Section 75-1.1(a) requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce and proximate injury, and internal corporate governance matters do not satisfy the commerce requirement.

Maurer v. Slickedit, Inc. · filed 2005-05-15(a)

In order to state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices, plaintiff must allege facts to support a finding that (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) (“UDTPA”); Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc., 120 N.C. App. 650, 464 S.E.2d 47 (1995). ... Additionally, to the extent that plaintiff’s alleged UDTPA claims are not derivative, plaintiff must meet the requirement that a UDTPA claim must allege facts supporting a finding that the action in question was “in or affecting commerce.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. ... Plaintiff’s claims, to the extent that they are not derivative, attempt to create liability for matters of the internal operations of a corporation. These claims do not relate to the regular business activities of SlickEdit. Instead, plaintiff’s claims relate to the internal corporate affairs of SlickEdit. These matters involve internal governance rather than extramural commerce. The intent of UDTPA was to protect and benefit consumers, Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co. , 316 N.C. 461, 469, 343 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1986). Plaintiff fails to state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices.
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Section 75-1.1 makes unfair or deceptive acts affecting commerce unlawful; a mere breach of contract is not enough without aggravating factors such as fraud, deception, or an inequitable assertion of power.

Strategic Outsourcing, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co. · filed 2008-04-16

The North Carolina UDTPA makes unlawful unfair or deceptive acts affecting commerce. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. A mere breach of contract does not constitute an unfair or deceptive act, but additional aggravating factors -- like fraudulent or deceptive conduct, or conduct that amounts to an inequitable assertion of power -- can trigger the Act. ... The district court correctly found, as a matter of law, that SOI’s UDTPA and “insurance bad faith” claims fail because no reasonable jury could conclude that CNA’s conduct included sufficient aggravating behavior.
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Section 75-1.1 requires a private claimant to show that the challenged unfair or deceptive act occurred in or affected commerce; internal corporate-management disputes without a tangible marketplace effect do not satisfy that requirement.

Anderson v. Brokers, Inc. (In Re Brokers, Inc.) · filed 2008-10-17(a), (b)

To “affect commerce,” a defendant’s allegedly deceptive acts must have a tangible effect on the marketplace. ... Matters of internal corporate management do not affect commerce as defined by the UDTPA. ... As such, the court finds that Brokers has not met its burden of establishing a prima facie violation of the UDTPA because Brokers has not shown how the unfair and deceptive acts or practices affected commerce.
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Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, so a plaintiff must show that the matter was in or affecting commerce to prevail on an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim.

MacFadden v. Louf · filed 2007-04-17

“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (2005). Thus, to prevail on a cause of action for unfair and deceptive trade practices, a plaintiff must show that the matter was in or affecting commerce.
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Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act to be in or affecting commerce, and the marketplace-impact inquiry distinguishes internal partnership disputes from business activity that affects commerce.

White v. Thompson · filed 2009-05-05(a), (b)

The proper inquiry in an unfair or deceptive trade practices case is not on the nature of the contractual relationship between the parties; rather, it must be shown that the alleged unfair or deceptive acts had an impact in the marketplace. ... Nor did Defendant Andrew Thompson engage in any transactions, such as the sale of a business, that would inherently impact the marketplace. ... Instead, Defendant Douglas Thompson was engaged in the business activity of providing accounting services to the partnership, and his actions may be considered unfair practices “in or affecting commerce.”
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Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair or deceptive conduct in commerce; conduct is unfair if unethical or unscrupulous and deceptive if it tends to deceive.

Universal Furniture International, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc. · filed 2010-08-24

The UDTPA makes unlawful "unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. As used in the UDTPA, the words "unfair methods of competition" encompass "any conduct that a court of equity would consider unfair." Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1987). More specifically, a "practice is unfair if it is unethical or unscrupulous, and it is deceptive if it has a tendency to deceive." Id.
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Section 75-1.1(b) broadly defines commerce to include nearly all business activities, and creditor-borrower relationships and related activities affect commerce.

Bumpers v. Community Bank · filed 2011-09-06(b)

“Commerce” is broadly defined, and with few exceptions, “includes all business activities, however denominated . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b) (2009). The relationship between a creditor and borrower, and the activities appurtenant thereto, affect commerce.
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Section 75-1.1(a) covers an employee's egregious self-dealing outside assigned duties when it is in or affecting commerce, and subsection (b) defines commerce to include business activities.

Songwooyarn Trading Co. v. Sox Eleven, Inc. · filed 2011-06-21(a) (b)

Because there are multiple companies, including a North Carolina corporation, involved, we conclude that Ahn’s actions were “in or affecting commerce” and constituted unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
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Section 75-1.1 does not cover deceptive conduct occurring only in a personal relationship or within a single business because it is not in or affecting commerce.

Day Care-Sam Furr, LLC v. Ross (In re Ross) · filed 2012-09-11

Obviously, Ross’s fraud upon Day Care/McKinnell qualifies as a deceptive act under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1. ... The difficult question is whether Ross’s misconduct was “in commerce or affected commerce” within the meaning of the statute. ... Applying these principles to the current situation, Ross’s deceptive practices were either between himself and his longtime girlfriend, McKinnell, or they were with Day Care, an LLC for which he was legally an agent. The relationship is thus either personal or internal to a single business. Therefore Ross’s actions were not business activities within the General Assembly’s intended meaning of the term and thus are not “in or affecting commerce.”
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Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury; administrative filing interactions with a governmental recording office, without commercial activity, do not satisfy the commerce requirement.

Guilford Cnty. Ex Rel. Thigpen v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc. · filed 2013-05-29

To state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices under G.S. 75-1.1 and G.S. 75-16.1, a plaintiff must show that (a) the defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (b) the act or practice in question was in or affecting commerce and (c) it proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. ... The court is persuaded that the administrative interactions between Defendants and the Plaintiff Register of Deeds do not constitute "intercourse for the purpose of trade" and therefore are not appropriately considered "in or affecting commerce" as contemplated by Chapter 75. In the context of receiving public filings, the Register of Deeds is not a consumer, buyer or seller of mortgage-related documents. Further, the process of receiving and filing mortgage-related documents, standing alone, does not constitute a business transaction so as to give rise to liability under Chapter 75.
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Section 75-1.1 requires a transaction to be in or affecting commerce, and a private real-estate joint venture whose transactions did not affect consumers fails that requirement.

Jacobson v. Walsh · filed 2014-01-22

Like the parties in Carcano, Plaintiff and Defendants were involved in a joint venture to invest in and develop real estate. All transactions at issue occurred between the parties and did not affect any consumers in the real estate marketplace. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the transaction was not “in or affecting commerce” as required by N.C.G.S. §75-1.1, a fatal deficit for Plaintiff.
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Section 75-1.1 applies only when an unfair or deceptive act or practice is in or affecting commerce; internal conduct within a single business, without interaction with other market participants in its regular business activities, does not satisfy that requirement.

Powell v. Dunn · filed 2014-01-28

A Section 75-1.1 claim requires showing an unfair or deceptive act or practice, in or affecting commerce, that proximately caused plaintiff’s injury. ... Applying these North Carolina Supreme Court precedents, the court concludes that the allegations of the Complaint, accepted as true and construed in Plaintiffs’ favor, do not allege or imply that the unfair or deceptive conduct of which they complain is “in or affecting commerce” as required by Section 75-1.1. Rather, the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty owed to the common shareholders and the misrepresentations complained of were matters internal to Engineous and did not concern the company’s interaction with other market participants in its “regular, day-to-day activities.”
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Section 75-1.1 does not apply to misconduct occurring within the confines of a partnership because it is not “in or affecting commerce,” but it can apply to a separate independent contractor hired by the partnership.

Weaver Investment Co. v. Pressly Development Associates · filed 2014-07-01

We hold that, while the evidence in the record supports the trial court’s findings that defendants committed fraud, delayed in the sale of real property, and had a duty to provide an accounting to plaintiffs, it also clearly shows the status of David, Edwin, and PDA as partners within the Fourth Creek Limited Partnership joint enterprise. ... defendants’ misconduct within the confines of the partnership was not “in or affecting commerce,” and therefore does not invoke N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 or its trebling provisions. ... PDCI was a separate entity hired by Fourth Creek Limited Partnership. ... Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in trebling damages and awarding attorney’s fees with regard to PDCI.
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Section 75-1.1(b) reaches business conduct that is “in or affecting commerce,” and the employer–employee and internal-corporate-governance exceptions do not require dismissal at the pleading stage where the allegations sufficiently show conduct affecting commerce.

Hilco Transp., Inc. v. Atkins · filed 2016-01-15(b)

Conduct must be “in or affecting commerce” to fall within the scope of section 75-1.1. Commerce includes “all business activities, however denominated,” but not “professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b). ... Under the liberal pleading standard of Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is unable to conclude as a matter of law that the employer–employee exception removes this claim from the scope of section 75-1.1. ... In sum, the Court declines to apply the exceptions to section 75-1.1 liability for employer–employee relationships or for matters of internal governance, and concludes that Defendants have adequately alleged conduct that is “in or affecting commerce” under section 75-1.1.
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Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury, and may reach conduct that disparages real-estate property rights and affects the marketplace.

Kingsdown, Inc. v. Hinshaw · filed 2016-02-17(a), (b)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) regulates “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” Our courts have held that a claim under section 75-1.1 “requires proof of three elements: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, which (3) proximately caused actual injury to the claimant.” ... N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 broadly defines “commerce” to include “all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b). ... The Court concludes that these allegations may constitute unfair and deceptive conduct under section 75-1.1, and further, that Plaintiff’s alleged conduct was “in or affecting commerce,” based on Mr. Hinshaw’s allegations that Plaintiff’s actions “disparaged Mr. Hinshaw’s property rights,” including his ability to sell the Ocean Isle Property to others in the marketplace. ... The Court also concludes that Mr. Hinshaw has sufficiently pleaded damages resulting from Plaintiff’s alleged unfair and deceptive trade practices for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). As a result, the Court concludes that Mr. Hinshaw’s counterclaim for unfair trade practices should not be dismissed to the extent it is based on Mr. Hinshaw’s allegations concerning Plaintiff’s efforts to rescind the lease agreement and its filing of a notice of lis pendens.
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Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury, and the conduct must have a tangible effect on the marketplace.

Ivey v. ES2, LLC (In re ES2 Sports & Leisure, LLC) · filed 2015-12-23(a), (b)

To state a claim for relief under the UDTPA, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an unfair or deceptive practice or act (2) in or affecting commerce (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff. ... Furthermore, “[t]o ‘affect commerce,’ a defendant’s allegedly deceptive acts must have a tangible effect on the marketplace.”
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Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair or deceptive practices by any person when they occur in or affect commerce.

State v. Orion Processing, LLC · filed 2016-12-20

Section 75-1.1 prohibits any person from engaging in an unfair or deceptive practice in or affecting commerce.
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Section 75-1.1(a) requires an unfair or deceptive act to be in or affecting commerce and ordinarily requires business-related unlawful or deceptive conduct beyond an internal employer-employee dispute.

Hopkins v. Mwr Mgmt. Co. · filed 2017-05-31(a)

To succeed on a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices, a claimant must show: “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or his business.” ... A violation of the Trade Secrets Protection Act constitutes an unfair act or practice under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. ... In this case, Defendants’ claim fails on the second element. “[T]here is a presumption against unfair [or] deceptive practice claims as between employers and employees. . . . Ordinarily, in such a context, the claimant must make a showing of business–related conduct that is unlawful or deceptive acts that affect commerce beyond the employment relationship.” ... This exception arises from the rationale that internal employer-employee disputes are not sufficiently “in or affecting commerce.”
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Section 75-1.1(b) treats an insurer’s provision of insurance to a consumer as business activity affecting commerce.

Nash Hosps., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. · filed 2017-08-01(b)

We are satisfied that the activity in question here falls within the definition of “commerce” pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b) (2015)—“all business activities, however denominated, but [not including] professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” We note that “[o]ur courts have repeatedly defined the insurance business as affecting commerce, when an insurer provides insurance to a consumer purchasing a policy.”
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Section 75-1.1 prohibits any person from engaging in an unfair or deceptive practice in or affecting commerce.

State v. Orion Processing, LLC · filed 2017-03-07

The Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, prohibits any person from engaging in an unfair or deceptive practice in or affecting commerce. Defendants’ adjusting activities and provision of legal services to North Carolina consumers are activities in or affecting commerce in this State.
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Section 75-1.1 does not reach a defendant’s failure to pay a creditor a pro rata share of company assets while the company winds up, because that conduct is not an act in or affecting commerce.

Insight Health Corp. v. Marquis Diagnostic Imaging of N.C., LLC · filed 2018-06-05

The Court granted Defendants’ motion as to Insight’s claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices, holding that Defendants’ alleged failure to pay a creditor a pro rata share of MDI-NC’s assets while the company wound up did not fall within the scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. See White v. Thompson, 364 N.C. 47, 51–52, 691 S.E.2d 676, 679 (2010) (explaining that section 75-1.1 applies to acts “in or affecting commerce,” that commerce is defined as “business activities,” and that “business activities . . . connote[] the manner in which businesses conduct their regular, day-to-day activities, or affairs, such as the purchase and sale of goods, or whatever other activities the business regularly engages in and for which it is organized” (emphasis added)).
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Section 75-1.1 does not cover unfair or deceptive conduct confined to a single business or market participant rather than interactions between market participants.

Gao v. Sinova Specialties, Inc. · filed 2018-07-16(b)

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to the internal conduct of individuals within a single market participant. ... Rather, “the General Assembly intended [section 75-1.1] to apply to interactions between market participants. As a result, any unfair or deceptive conduct contained solely within a single business is not covered by [section 75-1.1].” ... As the alleged unfair or deceptive conduct concerns only the internal operations of a single market participant, the Court concludes that Sinova US fails to state a claim for UDTP, and this counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice.
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Section 75-1.1(b)'s broad definition of commerce does not extend the UDTPA to purely internal business operations; the conduct must be in or affecting commerce through meaningful interaction with other market participants.

Hampton v. Hanzel · filed 2018-06-29(b)

Notwithstanding § 75-1.1’s broad definition of “commerce” as “all business activities, however denominated,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b), “[o]ur Supreme Court has observed that the history of the [UDTP] Act [(the “UDTPA” or “Act”)] indicates that the General Assembly was targeting ‘unfair and deceptive interactions between market participants[,]’” Bickley v. Fordin, 811 S.E.2d 671, 674 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (emphasis omitted) (quoting White v. Thompson, 364 N.C. 47, 52, 691 S.E.2d 676, 679 (2010)). ... Our courts have repeatedly held that “[t]he General Assembly did not intend for the Act to regulate purely internal business operations.” ... These allegations demonstrate that any unfair or deceptive conduct had no meaningful impact on commerce, but rather was contained solely within a single market participant.
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Section 75-1.1(b) requires the alleged unfair or deceptive conduct to be in or affecting commerce; conduct confined to a single business relationship, without an impact on consumers or the marketplace, does not satisfy that requirement.

Barnes v. Perry · filed 2018-07-30(b)

Although the UDTPA broadly defines “commerce” as “all business activities, however denominated,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b), “the history of the Act indicates that the General Assembly was targeting unfair and deceptive interactions between market participants[,]” Bickley v. Fordin, 811 S.E.2d 671, 674 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted). “As a result, any unfair or deceptive conduct contained solely within a single business is not covered by the Act.” White v. Thompson, 364 N.C. 47, 53, 691 S.E.2d 676, 680 (2010). ... The Court agrees with Defendants that, on the facts alleged, Plaintiff may not pursue a claim under section 75-1.1. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for UDTP because, under either alternative theory presented by the Complaint, Perry’s alleged conduct was not in or affecting commerce. As a result, the Motion to Dismiss should be granted as to Plaintiff’s UDTP claim.
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Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, but does not reach conduct solely internal to a business or merely having indirect effects on other market participants.

Llg-Nrmh, LLC v. N. Riverfront Marina & Hotel, Lllp · filed 2018-10-09

By statute, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” are “unlawful.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. ... Each of these acts, even if accepted as true, was internal to LLG-NRMH or LLG-VW and therefore not in or affecting commerce. ... The tangential or “indirect involvement of other market participants” does not “trigger liability under [s]ection 75-1.1.” ... For these reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ section 75-1.1 claim.
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Section 75-1.1(b)'s “in or affecting commerce” requirement excludes unfair or deceptive conduct confined solely within an internal dispute among business co-owners.

Comput. Design & Integration, LLC v. Brown · filed 2018-12-10(b)

While the UDTPA broadly defines “commerce” to include “all business activities, however denominated,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b), our courts have held that the statute “is not intended to apply to all wrongs in a business setting,” ... Particularly at issue here, “any unfair or deceptive conduct contained solely within a single business is not covered by [the UDTPA].” ... Because Brown’s UDTPA claims arise from acts related to one member’s buyout of another member’s interest in an LLC, the Court concludes that the claims arise from an internal dispute between business co-owners. As such, the Court concludes that Brown cannot show that the acts underlying his section 75-1.1 claim were “in or affecting commerce” as a matter of law. Brown’s UDTPA claim therefore must be dismissed on this basis.
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Section 75-1.1 does not cover unfair or deceptive conduct confined to interactions among members of a single condominium association because that conduct is not in or affecting commerce.

Howe v. Links Club Condo. Ass'n, Inc. · filed 2018-12-18

Because defendants “unfairly and deceptively interacted only with” fellow members of the Condominium Association, plaintiffs cannot establish that defendants’ actions were “in or affecting commerce.” Id. at 54, 691 S.E.2d at 680. Accordingly, the allegations contained in Counts Six and Seven of plaintiffs’ amended complaint fall outside of the scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, and the trial court therefore properly granted defendants’ motions to dismiss those claims.
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Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice to be in or affecting commerce, and an employer-employee relationship alone generally does not satisfy that requirement.

Gupta v. Eli Glob., LLC · filed 2019-06-19

The basic elements of a UDTP claim include that “(1) defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) that plaintiff was injured thereby.” ... The “in or affecting commerce” element restricts the otherwise broad scope of the claim, so that the statute does not address all wrongs arising in a business setting, including most employer-employee disputes. ... However, “the mere existence of an employer-employee relationship does not in and of itself serve to exclude a party from pursuing an unfair trade or practice claim.” ... With no basis to satisfy the “in or affecting commerce” element, Gupta’s UDTP claim is not saved by his allegations of misrepresentations made to induce the employment relationship.
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Section 75-1.1(b) requires the unfair or deceptive conduct to be in or affecting commerce, and conduct confined to an internal dispute within a single business does not satisfy that requirement.

Kamel v. 5Church, Inc · filed 2019-08-23(b)

“‘Commerce’ includes all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” ... “‘Business activities’ is a term which connotes the manner in which businesses conduct their regular, day-to-day activities, or affairs, such as the purchase and sale of goods, or whatever other activities the business regularly engages in and for which it is organized.” ... “[W]hen the unfair or deceptive conduct alleged only affects relationships within a single business or market participant, and not dealings with other market participants, that conduct is not ‘in or affecting commerce’ within the meaning of Section 75-1.1, even if other market participants may be indirectly involved in the unfair or deceptive acts.” ... “The involvement of [Sophia’s Lounge] was merely incidental to what is, at bottom, an intra-company dispute,” ... “section 75-1.1 plays no role in resolving these internal corporate disputes,” ... Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Kamel’s claim under section 75-1.1.
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Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce and requires an unfair or deceptive act, a commerce nexus, and proximate injury; commerce includes all business activities and may be broadly construed as trade-related intercourse.

Gen. Fid. Ins. Co. v. WFT · filed 2020-01-07(a), (b)

Under North Carolina law, “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are . . . unlawful.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). To establish a prima facie case under the statute, the plaintiff must show: “(1) [the] defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” ... Chapter 75 of our General Statutes defines “commerce” as “all business activities, however denominated[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b). Our Supreme Court has also determined that “commerce” can be broadly read to include “intercourse for the purposes of trade in any form.” ... Accordingly, we confine our analysis to the facts of this case: Plaintiff obtained a significant award and judgment against WFT; Fleming transferred all of WFT’s assets to other companies, which either quickly failed or never conducted any business; the asset transfer prevented Plaintiff from enforcing its judgment against WFT; and all of this, in turn, had a harmful effect on commerce. Consequently, Defendants’ final argument fails.
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Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act to be in or affecting commerce, and does not cover contractual enforcement or debt-collection conduct of the kind alleged here.

Carlton v. First Tennessee Bank National Association · filed 2020-03-12(a), (b)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege a claim under section 75-1.1. As alleged, the challenged actions are not “in or affecting commerce.” The statute does not prohibit the Bank from exercising its contractual rights under the ACE loan or its rights related to the default judgment. ... Thus, Plaintiffs cannot maintain a section 75-1.1 claim based on the allegations of unfair debt collection practices. Further, to the extent Plaintiffs argue that the Bank committed an unfair trade practice in connection with the parties’ settlement discussions, the Court does not find that those settlement discussions are “in or affecting commerce.” Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ unfair and deceptive trade practices claims (claims 3 and 10).
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Section 75-1.1(a) makes unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce unlawful and provides a private cause of action for plaintiffs damaged by such conduct.

Nirav Ingredients, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2021-01-28(a)

In North Carolina, “unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). The UDTPA is meant to provide a private cause of action to plaintiffs damaged by unfair or deceptive acts or practices that affect commerce.
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Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce; the commerce requirement is not met by conduct confined to the internal operations of a single market participant.

Shriners Hospitals for Children v. The Paul F.M. Shaver, III, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan · filed 2021-02-18(a)

Under the UDTPA, “commerce” is limited to “business activities.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b). For purposes of the UDTPA, the term “business activities” connotes “the manner in which businesses conduct their regular, day-to-day activities, or affairs, such as the purchase and sale of goods, or whatever other activities the business regularly engages in and for which it is organized”, and it has been construed in light of the statute’s ultimate goal, to benefit consumers. ... As such, the statute does not apply to all wrongs committed in a business setting. Id. at 593. In particular, employer-employee relations, securities transactions, and the internal operations of a single market participant do not fall within the ambit of the UDTPA. ... The administration of a profit-sharing plan occurs within the confines of single market participant, and thus is not “in or affecting commerce.” ... In sum, because defendants Lee and PFMS, Inc.’s alleged conduct was not “in or affecting commerce”, plaintiff’s unfair and deceptive trade practices claims must be dismissed without prejudice.
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Section 75-1.1(a) makes unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce unlawful.

Manos v. Freedom Mortgage Corporation · filed 2021-03-09(a)

In North Carolina, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” are unlawful. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). ... Even if Plaintiffs’ NCUDTPA claim was not supplanted by the NCDCA, it would still fail for similar reasons as those already stated herein. By failing to post-date their payment when they attempted it between 11:00 PM and 12:00 AM, Plaintiffs explicitly did not authorize Freedom to draft their payment on the proper date, thus, the payment was never properly completed. This Court has found no caselaw suggesting that Freedom’s policy to require consumers to post-date their payments between 11:00 PM and 12:00 AM is unfair or deceptive. ... Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ NCUDTPA claim.
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Section 75-1.1(a) does not cover a loan used to raise capital for a company because the transaction is not in or affecting commerce.

Hale v. MacLeod · filed 2024-06-18(a)

Similarly, Hale’s loan to GF Co. was not “in or affecting commerce” within the meaning of the Act.
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Section 75-1.1(b) requires activity to be in or affecting commerce, and internal business operations do not satisfy that requirement.

Shannon v. Rouse Builders · filed 2024-08-06(b)

So although Defendant’s dumping may have harmed Plaintiffs, Defendant’s dumping was not “in or affecting commerce.” See Nucor Corp., 189 N.C. App. at 738, 659 S.E.2d at 488.
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Section 75-1.1 treats filing a proof of claim as not being an act in or affecting commerce, so that conduct cannot support a UDTPA claim.

Williams Land Clearing, Grading, and Timber Logger v. Apex Funding Source, LLC · filed 2025-05-16(a) (b)

Apex is correct that the act of filing a proof of claim is not “in or affecting commerce.” Winter v. Suddenlink (In re Winter), Adv. Pro. No. 15-00013-5-DMW, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 2839, at *8–9 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2015). Accordingly, the court determines as a matter of law that Williams Land cannot prevail on its UDTPA claim for the “act” of filing an inaccurate proof of claim.
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Section 75-1.1(b) does not reach unfair or deceptive conduct confined to a business’s internal operations because that conduct is not in or affecting commerce.

Castillo v. Rrd Fin., LLC · filed 2025-09-03(b)

Section 75-1.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. ... Thus, the phrase “business activities” does not include acts that relate solely to the “internal operations of a single business.” White, 364 N.C. at 52. ... If so, the conduct at issue is not in or affecting commerce and thus not within the scope of section 75-1.1. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ alleged conduct falls outside the scope of section 75-1.1, and the Court will grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiffs’ claim for purported violations of Chapter 75 against Defendants.
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Section 75-1.1 covers unfair or deceptive conduct in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury, including conversion accomplished through an inequitable use of power or position.

Faucette v. 6303 Carmel Road, LLC · filed 2015-07-21(a), (b)

To prevail on a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practice a plaintiff must show (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or to his business. ... Defendants abused their positions of power to withhold payment of the money Faucette legally was owed, solely to pressure Faucette to resolve several unrelated disputes between the parties, including an ongoing dispute involving payment of condominium association dues. This wrongful conduct is unfair or deceptive within the meaning of the statute. ... Withholding money owed from an insurance carrier's settlement payment in order to force the rightful recipient of those funds to resolve other, unrelated business disputes is conduct "in or affecting commerce" under Chapter 75.
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Section 75-1.1(a) permits an unfair competition claim when a business allegedly demonstrates a competitor’s product while falsely presenting it as its own.

Harrington Manufacturing Co. v. Powell Manufacturing Co. · filed 1978-11-07(a)

The allegation is that Harrington used Powell’s actual product in demonstrations to potential customers, at the same time falsely representing to the potential customers that the product had been manufactured by Harrington. Although such conduct may not fit the mold to which the term “passing off” has traditionally been applied, in our opinion it does constitute an unfair method of competition within the purview of G.S. 75-1.1.
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Section 75-1.1(a) covers a conspiracy to prevent a party from performing its part of a contract.

Pedwell v. FIRST UNION NAT. BANK OF NC · filed 1981-03-17(a)

If the jury should find that the defendants conspired to prevent the plaintiffs from performing their part of the contract, this would be an “unfair ... act ... affecting commerce” under G.S. 75-1.1(a).
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Section 75-1.1(b)'s commerce requirement covers leasing a single commercial lot for use as a restaurant parking lot.

Wilder v. Hodges · filed 1986-04-15(b)

G.S. 75-l.l(b) defines commerce to include “all business activities, however denominated,” and leasing a piece of real estate for use as a restaurant parking lot is certainly a business activity. Actually, this is no longer an open question, as we held earlier that the leasing of just one commercial lot satisfies the Chapter 75 requirement of being in or affecting commerce.
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Section 75-1.1 does not cover a mere purchase and sale of a residence, but it can cover transactions by people who buy, sell, or lease houses as a business.

Adams v. Moore · filed 1989-11-21

While the mere purchase and sale of a residence is not an act “in or affecting commerce” under G.S. 75-1.1, ... the law is otherwise as to persons who buy, sell, or lease houses as a business.
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Section 75-1.1 does not cover a private individual’s one-time sale of a residence through a realtor when the individual is not in the business of buying and selling residential real estate.

Bhatti v. Buckland · filed 1990-08-07

Rosenthal and Robertson control our decision in this case. Accordingly, we do not find that his actions were in or affecting commerce for purposes of G.S. § 75-1.1.
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Section 75-1.1 treats conduct amounting to an inequitable assertion of a party’s power or position as an unfair act or practice.

C.F.R. Foods, Inc. v. Randolph Development Co. · filed 1992-10-06

Finally, plaintiff’s claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 was appropriately dismissed. “In essence, a party is guilty of an unfair act or practice when it engages in conduct that amounts to an inequitable assertion of its power or position.” ... We find no such conduct here and hold that the trial court properly dismissed the unfair and deceptive tríade practices claim.
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Section 75-1.1 requires an act in or affecting commerce; payment of an entry fee alone does not make a fundraising golf tournament a business activity.

Malone v. Topsail Area Jaycees, Inc. · filed 1994-02-01(b)

We hold that, in the absence of any other evidence or allegations relating to the business activities of the Jaycees, the mere payment of an entry fee does not qualify a golf tournament as a business activity “in or affecting commerce” for the purposes of Chapter 75.
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Section 75-1.1 covers a business’s efforts to recover embezzled funds to protect its financial interests as conduct in or affecting commerce.

Adams v. Jones · filed 1994-04-05

For purposes of G.S. § 75-1.1, commerce “includes all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” Since defendants’ purpose in executing the contract, note, and deed of trust was to recover the money embezzled by Alfred Coats and thereby to protect the financial interests of Smithfield, defendants’ acts were “in or affecting commerce.”
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Section 75-1.1(b) treats the solicitation and procurement of commercial contracts as business activities in or affecting commerce.

Dalton v. Camp · filed 2000-06-06(b)

The solicitation and procurement of commercial contracts comprise business activities within the statutory definition. Based on this evidence, we hold that the conduct in question was “in or affecting commerce” and thus falls within the scope of Chapter 75.
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Section 75-1.1 does not cover a commission dispute that has no impact beyond the parties’ employment relationships because the conduct is not in or affecting commerce.

Durling v. King · filed 2001-10-16(a)

However, no evidence was presented that the subject transactions had any impact beyond the parties’ employment relationships. There is no indication that defendant’s behavior was “in or affecting commerce.” Accordingly, we find that the trial court was correct in its ruling that defendant’s actions did not amount to a violation of G.S. § 75-1.1.
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Section 75-1.1 does not cover a loan agreement used primarily to raise capital, even if it grants the lender a future right to purchase stock.

Oberlin Capital, L.P. v. Slavin · filed 2001-11-06

Because the loan agreement at issue here, which also granted Oberlin the right to purchase stock in Express Parts in the future, was primarily a capital-raising device, it was not “in or affecting commerce” for purposes of Chapter 75.
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Section 75-1.1(b)’s commerce requirement does not cover transactions used to raise capital for a new business.

Green v. Freeman · filed 2012-09-04(b)

Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to show that the transaction was “in or affecting commerce.” Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ Chapter 75-1.1 claims and plaintiffs’ argument is overruled.
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Section 75-1.1 requires conduct in or affecting commerce; conduct arising from employment and confined to internal business disputes does not satisfy that requirement.

Talisman Software, Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Atkins · filed 2015-11-18(a)

This conduct arises out of Atkins’s employment as President and CEO of Talisman Software and only implicates internal business disputes. Atkins has failed to allege in what manner Talisman Software’s alleged conduct affects commerce or how this conduct gives rise to a cognizable claim under G.S. § 75-1.1.
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Section 75-1.1 can cover the diversion of business to a separate company when the conduct affects commercial relationships with clients.

Duffy v. Camp · filed 2022-12-20(b)

Where “there are multiple companies . . . involved,” this Court has concluded that an individual defendant’s interruption of the commercial relationship between those companies is “in or affecting commerce” and may properly constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice under § 75-1.1. Songwooyarn Trading Co. v. Sox Eleven, Inc., 213 N.C. App. 49, 57, 714 S.E.2d 162, 168, disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 360, 718 S.E.2d 396 (2011).
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Section 75-1.1(b) broadly covers business activities, including conduct related to a medical group’s agreement to provide hospital services.

Mason v. Health Management Associates, Inc. · filed 2023-08-16(b)

Therefore, Defendants’ allegedly constant pressure on MEMA to commit fraud, wrongful termination of MEMA, and replacement of MEMA with another physicians group affected commerce, as broadly defined in the statute.
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Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act to affect commerce; conduct with no impact beyond an employment relationship does not satisfy that requirement.

Esposito v. Talbert & Bright, Inc. · filed 2007-02-20(a)

Assuming arguendo that defendants’ statements and actions were unfair or deceptive acts or practices that injured plaintiff, plaintiff has forecast no evidence that defendants’ statements and actions had any impact beyond his employment relationship with NCDOT.
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Section 75-1.1 does not cover removal of an LLC manager and capital calls when they concern internal governance rather than the LLC’s ordinary business.

Reid Pointe, LLC v. Stevens · filed 2008-08-18

In this case, Grimmer’s removal of CDC as manager and his demands for capital calls are primarily matters of internal corporate governance that do not relate to the day-to-day business activities of the LLCs.
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Section 75-1.1 does not cover capital raising dealings within a limited real estate venture when they have no effect on consumers or the marketplace.

Carcano v. JBSS, LLC · filed 2009-10-06

Any “marketing” of membership in order to raise capital for purchasing real estate was handled either directly between defendants and plaintiffs or involved Felix Carcano as an intermediary and had no impact on consumers or the marketplace.
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Section 75-1.1 covers a business’s dealings with other market participants, but excludes conduct confined within a single entity.

Olds v. Olds · filed 2026-06-25

However, Section 75–1.1 only regulates “a business's regular interactions with other market participants[,]” not “internal conduct of individuals within a single market participant.”
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What constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice

Section 75-1.1 treats conduct as unfair when it is unethical or unscrupulous and as deceptive when it tends to deceive; in a trademark case, the unfair-trade-practices claim turns on likelihood of confusion.

United States Hosiery Corp. v. Gap, Inc. · filed 1989-02-13

As used in [N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1], the words “unfair methods of competition, have not been precisely defined by the North Carolina courts, although it has been suggested that they encompass any conduct which a court of equity would consider unfair. A practice is unfair if it is unethical or unscrupulous, and it is deceptive if it has a tendency to deceive.
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Section 75-1.1 applies only when conduct, viewed in the circumstances, is an unfair or deceptive practice that offends established public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.

Goodrich v. Rice · filed 1985-07-02

We hold that G.S. 75-1.1 is inapplicable to the facts of the case before us. We cannot say that the evidence of defendant’s receipt of the payment violates the parties’ agreement, or that its receipt offends “established public policy,” or constitutes a practice which is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.”
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Section 75-1.1 does not make a mere breach of contract, even an intentional one, an unfair or deceptive trade practice by itself, and a prima facie claim requires an unfair or deceptive act or unfair method of competition affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury.

Harvey v. Taylor Country Farms, Ltd. · filed 1992-07-20

Even if the existence of a contract had been established, the mere breach of a contract, even if intentional, does not in itself constitute an unfair trade practice under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. See Bartolomeo v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 889 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1989). To establish a prima facie case under this section, Harvey must show (1) an unfair or deceptive act or unfair method of competition, (2) affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused an actual injury to Harvey or his business.
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Section 75-1.1(a) requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice (or unfair method of competition) in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury to support an unfair-trade-practice claim.

Wake County Hospital System, Inc. v. Safety National Casualty Corp. · filed 1997-08-05(a)

“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) (1994). To support an unfair trade practice claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or to his business.” ... Even if an unfair and deceptive practice was properly alleged, plaintiffs’ showing at summary judgment is insufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact and to survive entry of summary judg-ment in defendant’s favor. ... Accordingly, we find that summary judgment was properly granted in defendant’s favor as to the Hospital’s claim for unfair and deceptive practices.
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Section 75-1.1 covers unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce that injure plaintiffs, defining unfairness by specified oppressive or injurious conduct and deception by a capacity or tendency to deceive, with the court deciding as a matter of law whether proven facts meet those standards.

Edwards v. West · filed 1998-02-17

A claim pursuant to these statutes is typically known as an unfair and deceptive trade practice claim. An unfair and deceptive trade practice claim requires plaintiffs to show: (1) that defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) in or affecting commerce; and (3) plaintiffs were injured thereby. ... N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. states that a trade practice is unfair if it “is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” ... Furthermore, a trade practice is deceptive if it “has the capacity or tendency to deceive.” ... “[I]t is a question of law for the court as to whether these proven facts constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice.”
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Section 75-1.1 reaches conduct presenting a genuine factual issue as to whether it was an unfair or deceptive trade practice in commerce that proximately injured the plaintiff.

Martin Marietta Corp. v. Wake Stone Corp. · filed 1993-08-03

Thus, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants’ act constituted an unfair or deceptive trade practice which was in commerce and proximately injured the plaintiffs.
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Section 75-1.1 does not make a mere breach of contract, even an intentional one, an unfair or deceptive trade practice; substantial aggravating circumstances are required.

Gray v. North Carolina Insurance Underwriting Ass'n · filed 1999-01-19

A mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. ... Substantial aggravating circumstances attendant to the breach must be shown. ... In this case, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find that defendant violated the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, separate and apart from any violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-63-15(11).
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Section 75-1.1 covers unfair or deceptive conduct in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury; conduct is unfair if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive, and whether conduct is unfair or deceptive is a question of law for the court.

English Boiler v. WC Rouse & Son · filed 1999-02-23

Section 75-1.1 applies to unfair and deceptive conduct, and provides a right of action against defendants who "engage[ ] in an unfair or deceptive trade practice, in or affecting commerce, that proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff." Canady v. Mann, 419 S.E.2d 597, 602 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992). Under section 75-1.1, "[c]onduct is unfair if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive." Id. The court determines if conduct is unfair or deceptive by examining "the surrounding circumstances of the transaction and the impact on the marketplace ... and this determination is a question of law for the court." Id. ... Absent any additional evidence that the actions of Rouse and B&W were improper, unethical, or tortious, we find, as a matter of law, that Rouse's and B&W's actions were not unfair or deceptive.
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A private claim under § 75-1.1 requires proof of a violation and actual injury proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct.

Walker v. Branch Banking and Trust Co. · filed 1999-06-15

As part of an unfair trade practice claim, a plaintiff must prove not only that defendants have violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 in some respect, but that plaintiff has suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendants’ conduct.
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A finding of fraud constitutes a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.

State Properties, LLC v. Ray · filed 2002-12-31

Because a finding of fraud constitutes a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, we need not address either plaintiff’s contention that it has an independent claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices or that the trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s requested jury instruction on that claim.
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A finding of common-law fraud establishes that unfair or deceptive acts occurred in violation of § 75-1.1.

Godfrey v. Res-Care, Inc. · filed 2004-07-06

As the trial court correctly noted in the order awarding attorneys’ fees, a finding of common law fraud necessarily “establishes that unfair or deceptive acts have occurred in violation of [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 75-1.1.”
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Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury; fraud, bad faith, and actual deception are not required, because conduct with a tendency or capacity to mislead is sufficient.

RD&J Properties v. Lauralea-Dilton Enterprises, LLC · filed 2004-08-17

The elements of a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (2003) are: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice or an unfair method of competition; (2) in or affecting commerce; (3) that proximately causes actual injury to the plaintiff or to his business. ... To prevail on a Chapter 75 claim, a plaintiff need not show fraud, bad faith, or actual deception. Instead, it is sufficient if a plaintiff shows that a defendant’s acts possessed the tendency or capacity to mislead or created the likelihood of deception. ... Although it is a question of fact whether the defendant performed the alleged acts, it is a question of law whether those facts constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice.
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Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, with unfairness and deception determined by the facts, marketplace impact, and the capacity or tendency to deceive.

Lincoln v. Bueche · filed 2004-09-07(a)

“What is an unfair or deceptive trade practice usually depends upon the facts of each case and the impact the practice has in the marketplace.” The [Supreme] Court [defines] an unfair practice as one which “offends established public policy as well as . . . [one which] is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” A deceptive practice is one which has the “capacity or tendency to deceive;” proof of actual deception is not necessary. “In determining whether a representation is deceptive, its effect on the average consumer is considered.”
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Section 75-1.1 requires a determination and findings on whether the defendant’s conduct amounts to an unfair and deceptive trade practice before damages may be awarded under the statute.

Blankenship v. Town and Country Ford, Inc. · filed 2002-12-31

Here, there are no findings by the trial court regarding whether defendant’s conduct amounts to an unfair and deceptive trade practice under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, a failure to disclose damage to the vehicle in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-71.4 or an intent to defraud under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-348(a)(1). Without these findings, we are unable to determine whether defendant’s conduct entitles plaintiff to damages under the applicable statutes.
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Section 75-1.1 requires proof of an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury; conduct is unfair when unethical or unscrupulous and deceptive when it has a tendency to deceive.

Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head & Engquist Equipment, L.L.C. · filed 2005-10-18

Under North Carolina’s UDTPA a plaintiff must prove “(1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” ... A practice is unfair if it is unethical or unscrupulous, and it is deceptive if it has a tendency to deceive.
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Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury.

Jacobs v. Physicians Weight Loss Center of America, Inc. · filed 2005-10-18

“To prevail on a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practice a plaintiff must show (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintifff.]”
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A Chapter 75 claim requires an unfair or deceptive act in commerce that causes actual injury proximately resulting from the act; an illegal conspiracy alone does not create an automatic claim.

Strates Shows, Inc. v. Amusements of America, Inc. · filed 2007-07-03(a)

An unfair and deceptive trade practice claim requires plaintiffs to' show: (1) that defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) in or affecting commerce; and (3) plaintiffs were injured thereby.
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Federal trademark infringement constitutes an unfair and deceptive trade practice under § 75-1.1.

Marie Sharp’s USA, LLC v. Eve Sales Corp. and Marie Sharp’s Fine Foods, Ltd. · filed 2026-05-04

Federal trademark infringement constitutes an unfair and deceptive trade practice. ... Their Chapter 75 violation was willful and in bad faith.
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A violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-62 is also a violation of the UDTPA under § 75-1.1.

Fisher v. Commc'n Workers of Am. · filed 2008-10-30

Regardless, the General Assembly’s express and unambiguous declaration, that “[a] violation of [section 75-62 of the NCIPTA] is a violation of [the UDTPA],” necessarily defeats Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim. ... Because Plaintiffs have alleged valid claims under the NCITPA, they also have alleged valid claims under the UDTPA.
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Section 75-1.1 does not make conversion automatically an unfair or deceptive trade practice; sufficient aggravating or egregious circumstances are required.

Hancock v. Renshaw · filed 2009-12-11

At oral argument, however, counsel for Renshaw conceded, as he must, that conversion in and of itself does not necessarily constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice. Rather, there must be sufficient aggravating or egregious circumstances.
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A plaintiff must prove an unfair or deceptive act or practice, conduct in or affecting commerce, and proximate injury; a violation of the Trade Secrets Protection Act constitutes an unfair act or practice under § 75-1.1.

Medical Staffing Network, Inc. v. Ridgway · filed 2009-01-06

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, a plaintiff must prove “(1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” ... A violation of the Trade Secrets Protection Act constitutes an unfair act or practice under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.
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Section 75-1.1 reaches conduct that is either unfair or deceptive (not necessarily both), and intent to deceive is irrelevant; marketing a deceptively similar product under the circumstances described supported liability as a matter of law.

Belk, Incorporated v. Meyer Corporation, U.S. · filed 2012-05-08

To recover under the UDTPA, a party must show that (1) "the defendant engaged in conduct that was in or affecting commerce," (2) "the conduct was unfair or had the capacity or tendency to deceive," and (3) "the plaintiff suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendant’s deceptive statement or misrepresentation." ... "Either unfairness or deception can bring conduct within the purview of the statute; an act need not be both unfair and deceptive." ... Furthermore, based on the jury’s factual findings, Belk engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices as a matter of law. ... This conduct falls within the category of conduct that North Carolina courts have held possesses the tendency or capacity to mislead or creates the likelihood of deception.
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Section 75-1.1 requires proof of an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury, and unfairness includes conduct that offends public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.

Hedgepeth v. Lexington State Bank · filed 2013-06-18

To prevail on a UDTP claim under Chapter 75 of our General Statutes, a “ ‘[p]laintiff must show: (1) [the] defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.’ ”
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Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury, and advertising is actionable only if it is unfair or has a tendency to deceive.

Keister v. Nat'l Council of the Young Men's Christian Ass'n of the United States · filed 2013-07-18

To recover under Chapter 75, a plaintiff must show that (a) the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice or act, (b) in or affecting commerce and (c) such act proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff. ... The court concludes that those factual allegations of the Amended Complaint that are deemed to be admitted are insufficient to support a finding or conclusion that Y-USA's marketing efforts amount to an unfair or deceptive trade practice. ... The court does not read the Y-USA's marketing statements to constitute representations that consumers, as YMCA members, would never be subjected to behavior they might find unacceptable within the walls of a YMCA. ... Accordingly, the representations of Y-USA do not have a tendency to deceive consumers. ... Based on the facts of the Amended Complaint, the marketing efforts of Y-USA amount to advertising that is neither false nor misleading on its face and therefore cannot serve as the basis of Plaintiffs' Chapter 75 Claim. Accordingly, with respect to the First Claim, the Motion should be GRANTED.
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Section 75-1.1 does not support a claim based only on a vague promise to treat a customer fairly and a later account hold, without a sufficiently specific misrepresentation or qualifying unfair or deceptive conduct.

Bryant/Sutphin Props. v. Hale · filed 2014-04-15

We believe that Plaintiffs failed to support their “case within a case” by failing to allege exactly what misrepresentation SunTrust made that would have sustained Plaintiffs’ Chapter 75 counterclaim. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts to show that they had a valid claim for misrepresentation against SunTrust where Plaintiffs have merely alleged SunTrust’s representation that it would treat them fairly and the subsequent hold placed on Plaintiffs’ deposit accounts by SunTrust.
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Section 75-1.1(a) requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury, and a mere breach of contract does not support a claim without substantial aggravating circumstances.

Heron Bay Acquisition, LLC v. United Metal Finishing, Inc. · filed 2016-02-16(a)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) (2013) provides that “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” The elements of an unfair or deceptive trade practice are: “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice by [the] defendant, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to [the] plaintiff.” ... “some type of egregious or aggravating circumstances must be alleged and proved before the [Act’s] provisions may [take effect].” ... We conclude that plaintiff has failed to articulate any damages resulting from defendants’ breach of the no-shop clause. ... Because plaintiff failed to produce evidence that defendants engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice, that defendants’ violation of the no-shop clause was accompanied by aggravating circumstances, or that plaintiff was harmed by defendants’ breach of contract, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff’s UDTPA claim based on defendants’ violation of the no-shop clause.
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Section 75-1.1 requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately caused injury, and the court generally requires egregious or aggravating circumstances for a UDTPA claim.

Rogers v. Keffer, Inc. · filed 2017-03-17

As for the UDTPA claim in count one against Keffer, to state a UDTPA claim' under North Carolina law Rogers must plausibly allege that (1) Keffer committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the act or practice was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to Rogers. ... An act is deceptive if it has a tendency or capacity to deceive. ... An act is unfair “when it offends established public policy, ... is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers,” or “amounts to an inequitable assertion of ... power or position.” ... “[S]ome type of egregious or aggravating circumstances must be alleged” to make out a UDTPA claim. ... Thus, Keffer’s negligent failures were not unfair or deceptive trade practices.
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A mere breach of contract is not an unfair or deceptive trade practice under § 75-1.1, but fraud may constitute a § 75-1.1 violation, and a fraud claim that survives a Rule 12 motion states a § 75-1.1 claim at that stage.

Brown v. Secor · filed 2017-07-28

Defendants invoke the well-settled rule that a mere breach of contract does not constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. See Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 107 N.C. App. 53, 62, 418 S.E.2d 694, 700 (1992). Fraud, however, may constitute a section 75-1.1 violation. See, e.g., Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975) (fraud a deceptive practice); Forest2Market, Inc. v. Arcogent, Inc., 2016 NCBC LEXIS 3, at *14 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2016) (aggravating circumstances include “fraudulent inducements”). Having concluded that Brown’s fraud claim survives Rule 12, the Court also concludes that Brown has, at this stage, stated a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices.
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Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury; an intentional breach or ordinary business decision is not enough without substantial aggravating circumstances.

Topshelf Management, Inc. v. Campbell-Ewald Co. · filed 2017-11-28

To establish a UDTPA claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant. (1) committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) which was in or affecting commerce, and which (3) proximately caused it injury, Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (2001). ... A breach of contract, even if intentional, does not constitute ' a UDTPA violation unless- it is accompanied by substantial aggravating circumstances. Canady v. Crestar Mortgage Corp., 109 F.3d 969, 975 (4th Cir. 1997). ... CEC is also correct 'that evaluating the pros and cons of a subcontractor under these' circumstances is not a violation of the UDTPA. See S. Atl. Ltd. P’ship of Tennessee, L.P., 284 F.3d at 535 (noting that “only practices that involve ‘[s]ome type of egregious or aggravating circumstances’ are sufficient to violate the UDT-PA”) (quoting Dalton, 353 N.C. at 657, 548 S.E.2d at 711)). ... Thus, neither CEC’s representation to Showtime nor CEC’s decision to supply Sim 3 was an unfair or deceptive act.
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Section 75-1.1 does not support an unfair-competition claim based on statements that are opinions rather than factual representations.

Board of Forensic Document Examiners v. American Bar Association · filed 2018-02-22

The relevant counts are premised on the laws of Illinois, California, Ohio, New York, and North Carolina (depending on where each individual Plaintiff lives). But each unfair competition statute requires that the allegedly anti-competitive statement be a factual statement, not an expression of opinion.7 (Each state’s unfair-competition law has that same requirement, so no conflict of laws exists.) So, again, these claims (Counts 5 through 9) do not adequately state a claim because Vastrick’s statements are expressions of opinion, rather than fact.
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Section 75-1.1 treats a practice as unfair when it offends established public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.

Floyd v. On the Rox Entertainment LLC · filed 2020-10-13

“A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers[.]” ... Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that defendant Roldan knew when he signed the contract that he was not cleared to travel to the United States and fulfill his obligation to perform but did not disclose this information to plaintiff. ... Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to relief on this claim.
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Section 75-1.1(a) requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury, with whether conduct is unfair or deceptive decided as a question of law by the court.

Beach Mart, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc. · filed 2021-03-26(a)

In order to prevail on a claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: “(1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” ... “The determination of whether an act or practice is an unfair or deceptive practice that violates [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 75-1.1 is a question of law for the court.” ... “[A] practice is deceptive if it has the tendency to deceive.” ... “a practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.”
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Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury; in the insurance context, deliberately undervaluing a claim and seeking settlement for less than a reasonable person would believe was owed can plausibly satisfy that standard.

Rose Hill United Methodist Church v. Church Mutual Insurance Company, S.I. · filed 2022-07-12

To establish an UDTPA violation, the plaintiff must show “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury to plaintiffs.”
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A fraud committed in or affecting commerce is an unfair and deceptive trade practice that violates the Act.

Smith v. Race Engines Plus, LLC · filed 2022-12-28

A fraud committed in or affecting commerce is an unfair and deceptive trade practice that violates the Act.
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Section 75-1.1(a) requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately caused injury; an intentional breach of contract alone is insufficient.

Popper v. Hartford Financial Services Group Inc. · filed 2023-04-18(a)

The UDTPA provides that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). To state an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury to plaintiffs. ... However, a “mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not an unfair or deceptive act[.]” ... Thus, the court dismisses Popper’s UDTPA claim.
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Under § 75-1.1, adequately pleading fraud with sufficient particularity also adequately pleads an unfair or deceptive trade-practices claim.

ALLIANCE OPHTHALMOLOGY, PLLC v. ECL GROUP, LLC · filed 2023-03-06

Therefore, where, as here, a plaintiff adequately pleads fraud with sufficient particularity, that plaintiff also pleads unfair and deceptive trade practices with sufficient particularity. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have stated a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices and will deny Defendant’s motion with respect to this claim at this stage of the litigation.
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A false representation that a business will operate lawfully, followed by participation in illegal PCB dumping, can state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices under § 75-1.1.

United States v. Ward · filed 1985-09-09

The claim that Ward and WTC represented to Norry that it would conduct their joint business lawfully when in fact they participated in the illegal dumping of PCB oil on North Carolina highways does state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices. N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1.
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Section 75-1.1 covers practices that are unfair, oppressive, and deceptive.

Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. · filed 1997-03-06

Those findings, and the factual findings made by the Court below in connection with the Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, provide a firm factual basis for the Court’s legal determination that the Defendants violated § 75-1.1 in this ease, because the practices were unfair, oppressive, and deceptive.
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Section 75-1.1(a) requires a plaintiff to prove an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately caused injury, and unfairness includes conduct that offends public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.

Rice v. VITALINK PHARMACY SERVICES, INC. · filed 2000-08-22(a)

To recover under North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, a plaintiff must prove that the conduct in question was “unfair,” which is broader than and includes the concept of “deception.” ... “ ‘A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.’ ” ... Whether the conduct was unfair or deceptive is a legal issue for the court. ... After a thorough review of the record in this case, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff has failed to allege conduct which is unfair or deceptive. ... Viewed against this backdrop, the Court is not able to find that the alleged conduct was either unfair or deceptive. ... Consequently, the Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and will dismiss Plaintiffs claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices.
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Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce; a practice is deceptive if it tends to deceive and unfair if it violates public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.

Yellowbrix, Inc. v. Yellowbrick Solutions, Inc. · filed 2001-07-10(a)

North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“UDTPA”) provides a cause of action to competitors for “[u]n-fair methods of competition in or affecting commerce.” N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1(a). “What is an unfair or deceptive trade practice depends upon the facts of each case and the impact the practice has in the marketplace.” ... Generally speaking, a practice is “deceptive if it has the tendency to deceive ... ‘[and is] unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.’ ”
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Section 75-1.1(a) reaches conduct that is unfair or deceptive in commerce; either unfairness or deception is sufficient, but the conduct generally must involve egregious or aggravating circumstances, and even exercising a contractual right may qualify when used as an inequitable assertion of power.

South Atlantic Ltd. Partnership v. Riese · filed 2002-03-22(a)

The prohibition on unfair and deceptive trade practices in North Carolina is embodied in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1(a), which provides, in pertinent part, that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” Therefore, for a plaintiff to prevail on an UTPA claim, he “must prove (1) that the defendant was engaged in conduct that was in or affecting commerce, (2) that the conduct was unfair or ‘had the capacity or tendency to deceive,’ and (3) ‘that the plaintiff suffered actual injury as a proximate result of ” the defendant’s actions. ... As Judge Ervin noted in Gilbane, in assessing whether particular conduct violates the UTPA, “[e]ither unfairness or deception can bring conduct within the purview of the statute; an act need not be both unfair and deceptive.” ... For example, only practices that involve “[s]ome type of egregious or aggravating circumstances” are sufficient to violate the UTPA. ... It is clear, however, that conduct carried out pursuant to contractual relations rarely violates the UTPA. In fact, even an intentional breach of contract is normally insufficient to contravene the UTPA; a breach of contract must be particularly egregious to permit recovery under North Carolina’s UTPA. ... Although it may be rare that the exercise of a contractual right will meet this stringent standard, it is possible for such an exercise, when it involves egregious and aggravating-conduct, to constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice under North Carolina’s UTPA.
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Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair and deceptive acts that undermine ethical standards and good-faith dealings in business transactions.

Joiner v. Revco Discount Drug Centers, Inc. · filed 2006-12-12

North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act “prohibits unfair and deceptive acts which undermine ethical standards and good faith dealings between parties engaged in business transactions.”
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Section 75-1.1(a) requires a plaintiff to prove an unfair or deceptive act or practice, in or affecting commerce, that proximately caused injury.

McClendon v. Walter Home Mortgage (In re McClendon) · filed 2013-03-01(a)

Plaintiffs cite North Carolina consumer protection law, which states that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1(a). The prima facie case for a claim pursuant to this statute is outlined in Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 653 S.E.2d 393 (2007), whereby a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury to plaintiffs.” Id. at 71-72, 653 S.E.2d at 399 (quoting Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 68, 529 S.E.2d 676, 681 (2000)).
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Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury, and whether the conduct meets that standard is a question of law for the court.

Federated Mutual Insurance v. Williams Trull Co. · filed 2011-08-01

A party asserting an unfair or deceptive trade practice must show the following: ... (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice', (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury to plaintiffs. The determination of whether an act or practice is an unfair or deceptive practice that violates N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 is a question of law for the court. Gray, 352 N.C. at 68, 529 S.E.2d at 681 (citations omitted). Once the fact-finder has determined the facts of a case, i.e., that the party did what it is alleged to have done, the court then determines, as a matter of law, whether the facts establish an unfair or deceptive practice. Id.
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Under the 1969 version of § 75-1.1(a), knowing false representations that induce reliance constitute a violation.

Atlantic Purchasers, Inc., Stella Maris Inn, Ltd. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., Donald J. Anklin · filed 1983-04-14(a)

This finding encompasses the elements of the action of deceit or fraud, see Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (N.C.1976), and, as a matter of law, the commission of fraud in these circumstances constituted a violation of the Act.
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False representations in a sale can raise a jury question about whether the seller committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice under § 75-1.1.

Hardy v. Toler · filed 1975-02-19(a)

We also think that the admissions and evidence presented in this case were sufficient to raise a jury question as to whether the false representations allegedly made by defendants constituted unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.
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Knowingly false representations about a car’s ownership history and transferable warranty violate § 75-1.1(a).

Hardy v. Toler · filed 1975-10-07(a)

Based on these stipulated facts, we hold as a matter of law that the false representations made by defendants to plaintiff constituted unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce contrary to the provisions of G.S. 75-1.1, and treble damages should have been awarded as provided by G.S. 75-16 in the amount of $1,800.
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Section 75-1.1 does not require proof of bad faith or intent, and good faith is no defense to a claim under it.

Marshall v. Miller · filed 1981-04-07(a)

If unfairness and deception are gauged by consideration of the effect of the practice on the marketplace, it follows that the intent of the actor is irrelevant. Good faith is equally irrelevant. What is relevant is the effect of the actor’s conduct on the consuming public. Consequently, good faith is not a defense to an alleged violation of G.S. 75-1.1.
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Proven fraud constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice under § 75-1.1.

Kim v. Professional Business Brokers Ltd. · filed 1985-04-02

The second inquiry is whether the act or practice is unfair or deceptive. The Court in Hardy v. Toler, supra, stated that fraud, if proved, necessarily constituted a violation of the prohibition against unfair or deceptive practices. Plaintiff here obtained a jury finding of fraud. The trial court, therefore, had no choice but to treble plaintiff’s damages.
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False representations about a vehicle’s engine and readiness for use can violate § 75-1.1 without proof that the seller knew they were false.

Bernard v. Central Carolina Truck Sales, Inc. · filed 1984-05-01

The false representations here involved the size and year of the engine and the readiness of the tractor for long distance hauling. The court did not make a finding that defendant had knowledge of the falsity, although it did find that the misrepresentations were intentional. Knowledge of the misrepresentation is not essential, however, since our Supreme Court has held that plaintiff is not required to show bad faith. Marshall v. Miller, supra, 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E. 2d at 401. We thus agree with the trial court that defendants’ acts constituted unfair or deceptive acts or practices under G.S. 75-1.1.
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A breach of express or implied warranty alone does not violate § 75-1.1.

Coble v. Richardson Corp. of Greensboro · filed 1984-12-04

Furthermore, cases in this area have laid down a rule that breach of express and implied warranties alone do not constitute a violation of Chapter 75.
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Section 75-1.1 does not treat a misunderstanding between an insured and an insurance agent as a deceptive representation.

Cockman v. White · filed 1985-08-20

We do not believe the misunderstanding between plaintiff and defendant constituted a deceptive representation, and we hold that plaintiffs claim under Chapter 75 was subject to directed verdict for defendant.
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Section 75-1.1 forbids conduct intended to deceive creditors into extending credit.

Concrete Service Corp. v. Investors Group, Inc. · filed 1986-03-18

The trial court’s conclusion that Oates engaged in actions intended to deceive creditors into extending credit and that these practices are forbidden by G.S. 75-1.1 is amply supported by the findings of fact and the evidence before us.
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Proof of fraud necessarily establishes a violation of § 75-1.1’s prohibition on unfair and deceptive trade practices.

Webb v. Triad Appraisal & Adjustment Service, Inc. · filed 1987-02-17

Proof of fraud necessarily constitutes a violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive trade practices.
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Section 75-1.1 covers misrepresentations about an exclusive distributorship that cause injury.

Process Components, Inc. v. Baltimore Aircoil Co. · filed 1988-04-19(a)

The evidence of defendant’s misrepresentations clearly supports the court’s conclusion that defendant’s unfair or deceptive acts or practices caused injury to plaintiff.
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A transfer deemed fraudulent to give a creditor an equitable remedy does not violate § 75-1.1 without deceptive or oppressive conduct.

Budd Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co. · filed 1988-07-19

Here, plaintiffs action is merely to collect a debt owed under a contract by setting aside the sale of its debtor’s assets. The evidence shows no intent to defraud plaintiff; the transaction is merely deemed fraudulent to provide plaintiff an equitable remedy. Consequently, we find none of the kind of deceptive or oppressive conduct against plaintiff which would classify Sales’ actions as an unfair and deceptive trade practice.
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Section 75-1.1 does not make it an unfair trade practice for a utility to refuse to hire a competitor for installation and repair services when the utility is unregulated in those services and in the market where the parties compete.

Telephone Services, Inc. v. General Telephone Co. of the South · filed 1988-11-15

However, defendant is not a regulated utility in either the market in which the parties compete, customer premise equipment sales, or the areas of service plaintiff wishes to provide for defendant, installation and repair services. Thus, defendant’s election not to use plaintiff to perform its installation and repair service is not an unfair assertion of any power or position defendant might enjoy as a regulated utility. We hold that it is not unfair for defendant to refuse to employ its competitor.
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Section 75-1.1 does not treat a general contractor’s circulation of an optimistic work schedule to professional bidders as unfair conduct when they know construction deadlines may be missed.

Bolton Corp. v. T. A. Loving Co. · filed 1989-07-05

We hold that Loving’s circulation of the 930-day schedule as a basis for bids to other professional contractors did not rise to the level of unscrupulous, immoral conduct.
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Evidence sufficient to prove breaches of express and implied warranties may still be insufficient to prove an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim.

Russell v. Baity · filed 1989-09-05

While the evidence is clearly sufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding that defendants breached both express and implied warranties, we hold the evidence is not sufficient to support plaintiff’s claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices with respect to the sale and installation of the Aqua II water stove system.
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Section 75-1.1 allows a claim based on a seller’s alleged misrepresentation or failure to disclose land contamination that deceived the buyer.

Cameron v. Martin Marietta Corp. · filed 1990-01-30

Based on this standard, the court finds that plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices. The complaint alleges that defendant knew or should have known that the land was contaminated but did not disclose that fact to plaintiffs. The complaint further alleges that plaintiffs were deceived into purchasing the contaminated land by defendant’s misrepresentations.
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Section 75-1.1 covers representations about construction that have the capacity to mislead consumers, even without proof of actual deception.

Lapierre v. Samco Development Corp. · filed 1991-08-06

Here, defendant represented through its salesman, sales brochures, and blueprints that it would build the deck in a certain location and to certain dimensions. Defendant knew that it was impossible to build the deck in that location. Defendant relocated the site for the deck and built the deck smaller than represented. We think that these representations have the capacity to mislead consumers. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding that defendant violated G.S. 75-1.1.
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Section 75-1.1 does not make an auctioneer’s acceptance or recommendation of a bid unfair or deceptive when it fulfills the auctioneer’s duty to obtain the highest price for the seller.

Colvard v. Francis · filed 1992-05-19(a)

As it met his fiduciary obligation to obtain the highest price for plaintiff’s land, Mr. Reeves did not commit an unfair or deceptive act by either accepting the $600,000.00 bid or by recommending the sale of the entire tract at this price.
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A seller’s failure to disclose a known lien can violate § 75-1.1 even when the seller believes the lien is unenforceable.

Standing v. Midgett · filed 1993-03-04(a)

Application of these principles to the facts of this case would seem to lead inevitably to the conclusion that Midgett’s failure to disclose to plaintiffs the existence of the Kotarides lien constituted a violation of the Act, and the court so holds.
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Section 75-1.1 treats knowingly or recklessly false statements designed to injure a competitor’s business and eliminate competition as unfair.

Martin Marietta Corp. v. Wake Stone Corp. · filed 1995-02-10

Having reviewed the record, briefs and oral arguments of the parties, the Court concludes that the record contains a forecast of evidence from which a jury could find that defendants knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the truth, made and distributed statements which were both false and designed to injure or destroy plaintiffs’ business in Nash County, thereby eliminating competition in that area. ... They are “unfair” within the meaning and intent of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 and unlawful under the prohibitions contained in N.C.G.S. § 75-5(3).
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Section 75-1.1 requires evidence that the defendant engaged in unfair conduct or participated in deception; a borrower's deception alone does not establish a claim against the bank.

Carlson v. Branch Banking and Trust Co. · filed 1996-08-06

Under G.S. § 75-1.1, a “practice is unfair if it offends established public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers, (citation omitted)” and “is considered deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive.” ... There is no evidence in this case to sustain a finding that defendant BB&T engaged in conduct which was immoral, unethical, or oppressive, or that it participated with Schamens in his deception of plaintiffs.
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Section 75-1.1 does not prohibit a lawful commission sharing arrangement that is neither unfair nor capable of deception.

Furr v. Fonville Morisey Realty, Inc. · filed 1998-08-18

Neither can the acts of defendants KTR and Fonville in entering into the commission agreement be said to have been “immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous” conduct, nor was the commission arrangement injurious to customers or capable of deception. Therefore, defendants have met their burden of showing that an essential element of plaintiffs claim is nonexistent and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Section 75-1.1 can cover a misrepresentation without proof of deliberate deceit or bad faith.

First Atlantic Management, Corp. v. Dunlea Realty, Co. · filed 1998-11-03

A misrepresentation may constitute an unfair and deceptive trade practice under G.S. § 75-1.1, see Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 311, 218 S.E.2d 342, 347 (1975), but deliberate acts of deceit or bad faith need not be shown.
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Section 75-1.1 permits a claim based on allegations that mortgage fees were excessive and that the lender misrepresented what an origination fee covered.

Tomlin v. Dylan Mortgage Inc. · filed 2000-06-12

Plaintiffs’ allegations that the fees charged in connection with the loans were excessive and that defendants misrepresented the nature of the fees support plaintiffs’ claim for unfair trade practices.
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Section 75-1.1 treats a manufacturer’s or reseller’s failure to pass along required notice of a returned vehicle’s history and defects as an unfair and deceptive trade practice.

Alexander v. Daimlerchrysler Corp. · filed 2004-01-30

A manufacturer or reseller who takes title with notice of the nature of vehicle and the defects disclosed commits an unfair and deceptive trade practice when it resells the vehicle, either to a consumer or another wholesaler, without passing the notice along to the subsequent purchaser; such an act is both unfair and deceptive.
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Conversion may constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice under § 75-1.1, but conversion alone does not establish the additional misconduct needed for that claim.

Bartlett Milling Co., LP v. Walnut Grove Auction and Realty Co., Inc. · filed 2008-08-19

Our review of the stipulations and jury findings in this case lead us to the conclusion that they do little more than support the claim for conversion, which already had been decided by directed verdict, and do not establish the additional egregious, immoral, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious acts needed to impose the heightened penalty of unfair and deceptive trade practices.
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A § 75-1.1 claim based on conversion of escrowed sale proceeds fails when exhibits attached to the complaint show that no sale proceeds existed.

Highland Paving Co. v. First Bank · filed 2013-05-07

If there were no sales proceeds from the 26 October transaction to escrow, First Bank cannot have converted those funds to its own use by deceiving plaintiff about the existence of those funds. Thus, the exhibits directly contradict plaintiff’s allegation of an unfair or deceptive act.
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An insurer that did not initiate a malicious prosecution did not commit an unfair or deceptive practice on that basis.

North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Cully's Motorcross Park, Inc. · filed 2013-06-13

Consequently, Farm Bureau did not institute a malicious prosecution and its actions did not constitute an unfair and deceptive practice.
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Section 75-1.1 does not require proof of deliberate deceit or bad faith.

Woodson v. Allstate Insurance Co. · filed 2016-05-03

Section 75-1.1 does not require proof of deliberate acts of deceit or bad faith; however, in the instant matter, this higher standard has been met.
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Under § 75-1.1, allegations that an auditor colluded with officials and falsified audit data to disqualify a provider sufficiently plead unfair or deceptive acts.

Halikierra Cmty. Servs. LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. · filed 2021-03-25

Liberally construed, the complaint alleges that CCME colluded with Cox and Piggott, intentionally inflated the number of convicted felons employed by Halikierra, and falsified data while performing the prepayment review, all with an aim toward disqualifying Halikierra as a Medicaid provider. ... Taking these allegations as true, Halikierra has sufficiently alleged that CCME committed unfair or deceptive acts.
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Section 75-1.1 permits a claim to proceed when allegations of false insurance certificates, concealment, and resulting injury describe conduct beyond a mere breach of contract.

Loyd v. Griffin · filed 2021-09-01

All these allegations, when taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Defendants, point to more egregious activities than mere breach of contract. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants have sufficiently stated a Counterclaim against Loyd for UDTP under Section 75-1.1 and thus denies the Motion to the extent that it requests dismissal of this Counterclaim.
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Section 75-1.1 treats knowingly designing an app to exploit minors’ vulnerabilities and induce harmful compulsive use as an unfair practice when those allegations are taken as true.

State of N.C. v. Tiktok Inc. · filed 2025-08-19

As alleged, ByteDance designed TikTok to exploit the unique vulnerabilities that accompany youthful immaturity, inducing addictive, compulsive use and depriving minors of a free choice. Worse yet, ByteDance did so allegedly knowing that addiction causes social and psychological harms to minors. Taken as true, these allegations outline practices that are “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious” under section 75-1.1.
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Section 75-1.1 treats recording a memorandum that falsely claims a homeowner agreement contains covenants running with the land as an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

State Ex Rel. Jackson v. Mv Realty Pbc, LLC · filed 2026-01-16

For these reasons, the Court concludes that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendants committed an unfair or deceptive trade practice each time it filed a Memorandum that falsely claimed to contain covenants that ran with the land.
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Section 75-1.1 permits an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim based on computer trespass.

Matt Logan, Inc. v. Abitz · filed 2026-06-09(a)

Computer trespass may provide a sufficient basis for violation of the UDTPA.
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A jury's finding of fraud establishes a violation of § 75-1.1 when the defendant fails to prove an exemption.

SHAFMAN v. DONALD LARSON, INC. · filed 2004-12-21(a)

Because defendants did not prove that they were exempt from Chapter 75, the trial court should have concluded, following the jury's fraud verdict, that defendants violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 and trebled the fraud damages.
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Capacity to deceive; actual deception not required

A misleading act is not deceptive under § 75-1.1(a) without egregious or aggravating circumstances and harm that the plaintiff could not reasonably avoid.

Exclaim Marketing, LLC v. DirecTV, LLC · filed 2015-09-30(a)

A practice is deceptive if it has the “capacity or tendency to deceive” the average consumer. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 265-66, 266 S.E.2d 610. However, a misleading practice alone, although necessary, is not sufficient to prove a violation of the UPDA. To be “deceptive” within the meaning of § 75-1.1, a misleading act must occur under egregious or aggravating circumstances, and the harm resulting from the alleged deceptive practice must be such that the plaintiff could not reasonably avoid it. ... Accordingly, because defendant’s conduct occurred without egregious or aggravating circumstances, and because the negative effects of defendant’s conduct were reasonably avoidable, the court holds that under the facts of this case, defendant’s conduct was not deceptive within the meaning of § 75-1.1(a).
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For this type of claim, Section 75-1.1 turns on whether consumers are likely to be confused about a product’s source, origin, or sponsorship.

Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Conusa Corp. · filed 1989-04-14

For all of Plaintiffs’ claims, likelihood of success on the merits depends upon whether Plaintiffs can establish likelihood of confusion as to the source, origin, or sponsorship of the products involved. See Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145,148 (4th Cir.1987) (discussing similarity of tests under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125 and N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1). In the context of a trademark infringement dispute, several courts have held that where likelihood of confusion is established likelihood of success on the merits as well as risk of irreparable harm follow. ... Thus, Plaintiffs have made a strong showing of likelihood of confusion and a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim follows.
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In the trademark context, § 75-1.1 requires a tendency to deceive, which is not established when there is no likelihood of confusion.

Passport Health, LLC v. Avance Health System, Inc. · filed 2020-08-17

On this balance of factors, we agree with the district court that Avance is entitled to summary judgment on Passport’s claims of trademark infringement, passing off, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and unfair competition because there’s no likelihood of confusion as a matter of law. ... Polo Fashions, Inc., 816 F.2d at 148 (in the context of trademarks, requiring “imitation of another’s [mark] that would likely mislead prospective purchasers” for North Carolina unfair competition claims and “a tendency to deceive” for North Carolina unfair and deceptive trade practices claims).
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Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, but conduct supports liability only when the evidence permits an inference of deception.

Belmont Land & Investment Co. v. Standard Fire Insurance · filed 1991-05-07(1)

Plaintiffs allege that, even in the absence of a violation of § 58-63-15, the conduct of Watson Insurance and Campbell constituted a violation of § 75-1.1. ... The forecast of evidence, however, shows no factual dispute as to Campbell’s statements regarding Avon’s policy and nothing in those statements which, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, supports an inference of deception.
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Section 75-1.1 reaches an act that has the capacity or tendency to deceive even without proof of actual deception or falsity, with unfairness judged in context.

Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary Bros. Realty, Inc. · filed 1986-02-04

Defendants’ arguments that, because the statements in the letter were true, they could not have deceived anyone and that, in any event, they had no effect on the marketplace are rejected. Proof of actual deception is not necessary; it is enough that the statements had the capacity to deceive. ... A statement can have the capacity to deceive without being false, and that the letter in question had the capacity to deceive is obvious.
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Whether conduct violates § 75-1.1 is a legal question for the court, based on the facts found and the practice’s impact on the marketplace.

Dan King Plumbing Heating & Air · filed 2024-04-02

“Whether a trade practice is unfair or deceptive usually depends upon the facts of each case and the impact the practice has on the marketplace. Based upon the jury’s findings of fact, the court must determine as a matter of law whether a defendant’s conduct violates this section.”
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Section 75-1.1 treats an act as deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive; proof of actual deception is unnecessary.

Bailey v. LeBeau · filed 1986-02-18

An act is deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive, but proof of actual deception is not required.
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Section 75-1.1 does not require a purchaser of misrepresented goods to prove fraud, bad faith, or intentional deception.

Myers v. Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. · filed 1988-03-15

This contention has no ... legal basis, since to prevail in a Chapter 75 case, a purchaser of misrepresented merchandise does not have to prove fraud, bad faith or intentional deception as at common law; it is enough that the goods bought were misrepresented, ... assuming, of course, that the other requisites of the action are proved, about which no question is raised by this appeal.
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Notes 1–150 of 1,120, oldest cases first.

544 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Hester v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., the quoted ruling dismisses a derivative count after deciding conspiracy and publication policy; it states no § 75-1.1 rule. opinion →
Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Guzman, the opinion’s conclusion that all elements were met and that Sunbelt was entitled to summary judgment does not explain what § 75-1.1 means or requires; the proposed note’s claim about subsection (b) is unsupported by the quoted passage. opinion →
Musselwhite v. Mid-Atlantic Restaurant Corp., the statute is mentioned only to identify one of Musselwhite’s pleaded claims. The court did not construe § 75.1.1, state its requirements, or decide how it applies. opinion →
Singleton v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., the court merely noted that plaintiffs had not asserted a Chapter 75 claim; it did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 75.1.1. opinion →
Singleton v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., the statute is mentioned only in passing to identify a Chapter 75 claim that plaintiffs did not assert. The court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75.1.1. opinion →
Alphatec Spine v. NuVasive CA4/1, the court addressed whether the jury verdicts were inconsistent and whether JNOV could be based on a separate cause of action. Its discussion of the NCUDTPA concerned the wording of the jury question and instruction, which were not challenged, rather than the meaning, requirements, or scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75.1.1. opinion →
Kleinfelter v. Northwest Builders & Developers, Inc., the statute appears only in the opening description of plaintiffs’ claims. The court’s actual analysis concerns reasonable reliance and the fraud and punitive-damages claims; it does not interpret, state a rule about, or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Bryant v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing plaintiffs’ proposed but disallowed amendment. The court decided the Rule 15 amendment issue and the insurance-policy misrepresentation issue under other law; it did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Day v. Coffey, the court expressly assumed without deciding that an unfair-trade-practices claim was proper and dismissed the appeal as interlocutory; the § 75-1.1 citation was not construed or applied in a holding. opinion →
Gillis v. Whitley's Discount Auto Sales, Inc., the statute appears only as the basis of a claim pleaded below; the plaintiff abandoned that claim at the summary-judgment hearing, and the court made no ruling about the statute. opinion →
Southern Pride, Inc. v. Turbo Tek Enterprises, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify one of Southern Pride's claims. The court decides service of process and federal venue, and does not interpret, apply, or rule on the requirements of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Cohn v. Wilkes General Hospital, the statute is mentioned only to identify the plaintiff’s original state-law claim and the proposed amendment replacing it; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Richmar Development, Inc. v. Midland Doherty Services, Ltd., the court mentioned the North Carolina unfair trade practices statute only as one of the plaintiff’s claims and as a factor supporting personal jurisdiction. It did not construe, apply, or decide any issue under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Provident Finance Co. of North Carolina, Inc. v. Rowe, the appellate court did not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. It identified whether the alleged FTC violation constituted a § 75-1.1 violation as an unresolved issue for the trial court on remand. opinion →
Tomlinson v. Camel City Motors, Inc., the statute appears only in the surety's statement of an assignment of error and the court does not construe or decide any issue under § 75-1.1; the holding concerns surety liability and summary judgment under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-288. opinion →
Wade v. Jobe, the statute appears only in a footnote as a citation to Love v. Pressley, alongside citations to consumer-protection statutes from other jurisdictions. The Utah court did not interpret, apply, or adopt any rule about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Forsyth Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Contreras, the court mentioned § 75-1.1 only while describing the relationship between it and the Debt Collection Act. The decision construed and applied § 75-54, not § 75-1.1, and did not decide a claim under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Tools USA and Equip v. Champ Frame Straight, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to describe the parties' stipulation; the court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Occiden v. Sanders, the opinion reports that the district court entered judgment on a § 75-1.1 claim, but the appellate ruling does not construe or explain § 75-1.1. It addresses only the impermissible double recovery for the unfair-trade-practices and fraud claims and remands for an election of remedy. opinion →
Richardson v. BP Oil Co., the court did not decide whether the purchase was an unfair or deceptive practice under § 75-1.1; it declined to consider the theory because it was not raised in the trial court. opinion →
Helms v. Holland, the court merely rejected the plaintiffs’ unfair-and-deceptive-trade-practices claim without interpreting § 75-1.1 or explaining what the statute requires or how it applies. opinion →
Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., the statute is mentioned only as one of the causes of action in the underlying lawsuit. The court does not construe, explain, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Philson v. Goldsboro Milling Co, the opinion only reports the jury's verdict under § 75-1.1(a) in the procedural history; the appellate court does not construe, explain, or independently apply the statute. opinion →
DKH Corp. v. Rankin-Patterson Oil Co., the opinion cites § 75-1.1 only in general background about using federal decisions as guidance under Chapter 75. The court actually decides whether the gasoline arrangement falls under § 75-5(b)(2), not what § 75-1.1 means or requires. opinion →
Republic Industries v. Atlantic Veneer Corp, the statute appears only in the court's discussion of its prior ITCO decision and as a point of distinction; this case decides the effect of a contractual warranty waiver and choice-of-law clause on a Texas DTPA claim, not the meaning or application of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Delta Environmental Consultants of North Carolina, Inc. v. Wysong & Miles Co., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the basis for a proposed amendment that the trial court denied; the appellate court addressed Rule 15 and abuse of discretion, not the meaning or application of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Von Pettis Realty, Inc. v. McKoy, the opinion merely reports the trial court’s finding under § 75-1.1. The appellate court decided the proper measure of rent-abatement damages under the Residential Rental Agreements Act and did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Gaunt v. Pittaway, the opinion mentions the § 75-1.1 claim and reports the trial court’s dismissal, but the appellate court held that the dismissal order was not reviewable because it was omitted from the notice of appeal and plaintiffs failed to object. It expressly did not address the merits of the statutory claim. opinion →
Republic Western Ins v. Reflections Car Wash, the statute appears only in the description of Reflections' counterclaim; the court affirmed on the basis of the district court's opinion and did not independently construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Mills Pointe Homeowner's Ass'n v. Whitmire, the statute appears only in the procedural history as a citation identifying a claim alleged in the complaint; the court decided the appeal on interlocutory appealability and did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Vantage Marketing, Inc. v. De Amertek Corp., the court cited § 75-1.1 only through a parenthetical description of Olivetti and affirmed summary judgment because the underlying fraud and commission claims failed. It did not construe the statute or independently decide what it requires or covers. opinion →
S & D Land Clearing Ex Rel. Mitchell v. D'Elegance Management Ltd., the statute appears only in the procedural history to identify a claim Malaco asserted; this opinion does not decide that claim or construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Ramsey Group, Inc. v. EGS International, Inc., the opinion only identifies a § 75-1.1 claim in the pleadings and recounts that the claim was later dropped; it does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Game World, Inc. v. Olhausen Billiard Manufacturing, Inc., the statute is cited only to identify the unfair-trade-practices claim in the amended complaint; the court does not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Voelske v. Mid-South Insurance, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of plaintiffs' claims. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 75-1.1; it resolves the appeal based on ERISA preemption and summary judgment. opinion →
Fisher v. HOUSING AUTH. OF CITY OF KINSTON, the statute appears only as part of Plaintiff's pleaded claims and the opinion does not decide what § 75-1.1 means, requires, or how it applies; the appeal is resolved on sovereign immunity and whether the Housing Authority performed a governmental or proprietary function. opinion →
Continental Casualty Co. v. Physicians Weight Loss Centers of America, Inc., the statute appears only in the opinion's description of the claims Suggs alleged in a separate state-court action. The court did not interpret or apply § 75-1.1 and decided the appeal on insurance coverage and the duty to defend. opinion →
Tracker Marine, L.P. v. Ogle, Ken and Baccus, Randy as Class Representatives, the court mentions N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) only in footnote [35] as one example in a multi-state string cite for statutes with no apparent scienter requirement. The court did not construe or apply the North Carolina statute, and the citation was incidental to its discussion of differences among consumer-protection laws. opinion →
Talantis v. Paugh Surgical, Inc., the court mentioned § 75-1.1 only in a footnote while assessing whether possible treble damages affected the amount in controversy. It did not adjudicate a § 75-1.1 claim or independently decide the statute’s application; it found jurisdiction satisfied even if treble damages were unavailable. opinion →
Greene v. ROGERS REALTY AND AUCTION CO., the court only stated that the plaintiffs’ § 75-1.1 claim was without merit and provided no analysis of the statute’s meaning, requirements, coverage, or application; the citation is therefore incidental. opinion →
Faircloth v. Financial Asset Securities Corp. Mego Mortgage Homeowner Loan Trust, the statute is cited only as the basis of Faircloth's pleaded UDTPA allegations. The court did not decide what § 75-1.1 means or whether the alleged conduct violated it; it held the UDTPA claim time-barred under the separate four-year limitation in § 75-16.2. opinion →
Watts v. Slough, the court merely identified § 75-1.1 as the legal basis for one of the plaintiff's claims in the procedural background. It did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning the statute. opinion →
VF Jeanswear Ltd. Partnership v. Molina, the court merely recounts an uncontested party argument and enters summary judgment on the claim; it does not independently interpret, apply, or decide what § 75-1.1 requires. opinion →
Bryan v. BellSouth Communications Inc, the statute is identified only as the basis of Bryan’s state-law claim. The court decided federal-question jurisdiction and the filed-rate doctrine, not what § 75-1.1 means, requires, covers, or substantively requires in these circumstances. opinion →
DirecTV, Inc. v. Benson, the court merely recited the elements of the proposed § 75-1.1 claim while ruling on leave to amend; it did not decide the claim or construe the statute, and expressly left the merits for a later motion to dismiss or summary judgment. opinion →
Eubanks v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, the statute appears only in the plaintiff's description of her state-law claims and argument. The court did not construe or apply § 75-1.1; it held that the state-law claims were preempted by ERISA. opinion →
WMC, INC. v. Weaver, the statute appears in the procedural history as the basis of a claim and in descriptions of the arbitrators’ proceedings, but the court did not construe or decide what § 75-1.1 means, requires, or covers. The holdings concern arbitration authority over treble damages and waiver of objections to attorneys’ fees. opinion →
Reinhold v. Lucas, the court mentioned § 75-1.1 only while summarizing Mayton’s rule concerning attorney’s fees under § 75-16.1; it did not construe or apply § 75-1.1 in this case. opinion →
Moose v. VERSAILLES CONDOMINIUM ASS'N, the statute is mentioned only to describe a cause of action pleaded in the complaint. The court's decision concerns whether AMG waived arbitration by litigating and conducting discovery, and it does not interpret or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Envirosafe Paints, Inc. v. Conklin, the court mentioned § 75-1.1 only as part of its analysis of attorney's fees under § 75-16.1. It did not construe § 75-1.1 or decide a disputed issue about its meaning or application; the underlying violation was an undisputed trial-court finding that was not appealed. opinion →
Shepard v. Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB, the court expressly declined to reach the § 75-1.1 issue; its mention concerns the trial court’s dismissal and the plaintiffs’ stipulation, not an interpretation or application decided by this court. opinion →
Good Hope Hospital, Inc. v. North Carolina Department of Health & Human Services, the statute appears only in the opinion’s description of plaintiffs’ complaint as one legal theory asserted below. The court did not construe or apply § 75-1.1, and its dismissal ruling rested on Noerr-Pennington immunity and pleading requirements. opinion →
Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., the court cited § 75-1.1 only to identify the statutory claims and to explain attorney-fee availability under § 75-16.1 while deciding whether the class-action waiver made arbitration unconscionable; it did not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Brown v. Flowers, the substantive discussion of § 75-1.1 appears only in Judge Gregory’s dissent. The majority merely affirmed summary judgment on the state-law claims without adopting that statutory analysis, so the opinion is not this court’s holding. opinion →
Carroll v. Ferro, the court expressly declined to decide whether the arbitrator correctly applied the Act, including the § 75-1.1(a) requirement that conduct be “in or affecting commerce.” Its ruling concerned the limits of judicial review of an arbitration award, not the meaning or application of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Williamson v. Amrani, the opinion cites N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b) only as a comparative example of a state professional-services exemption; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the North Carolina statute. opinion →
Stott v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, the court recited standards from prior precedent but did not decide the merits or construe § 75-1.1; it dismissed the Chapter 75 assignment because plaintiff failed to argue or preserve it on appeal. opinion →
Williams v. HomEq Servicing Corp., section 75-1.1 appears only in a parenthetical citation to Shell Oil while the court discusses actual injury and treble damages under Chapter 75; the court does not construe or apply § 75-1.1 to the claims before it. opinion →
Blyth v. McCrary, the court mentions § 75-1.1 only to identify the UDTP claims and report their procedural disposition; it does not decide what the statute means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
Bruning & Federle Mfg. Co. v. D. MILLS, the court mentions § 75-1.1 only to identify one claim in the procedural history; its decision concerns attorneys’ fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 66-154(d) and 6-21 and does not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Kucan, the court merely reports the borrowers’ allegations under § 75-1.1 while analyzing Republic Bank’s standing and the possible effect of the state-court action. It does not decide whether the statute was violated, interpret the statute, or adopt the borrowers’ legal position. opinion →
CATAWBA VALLEY BANK v. Porter, the statute appears only in the trial court’s findings as part of the procedural history. The appellate court decided that Rule 60 was an improper mechanism to correct an alleged legal error and expressly did not reach the other appellate issue, so it did not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
United Leasing Corp. v. Guthrie, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the trial court’s finding; this appellate opinion does not interpret, explain, or independently decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Jefferies v. TitleMax of S. Carolina, Inc., the statute appears only in the opinion’s procedural-history description of claims Plaintiff brought; the Court of Appeals did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Hood v. TitleMax of Va., Inc., the statute is mentioned only as one of Plaintiff’s claims in the procedural history. The Court addressed vacatur and confirmation of the arbitration award and did not interpret, explain, or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Frazier v. TitleMax of Va., Inc., the statute is mentioned only as part of the procedural history describing Plaintiffs’ allegations. The Court decided the FAA vacatur and arbitration issues and did not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Microtech Knives, Inc. v. Northedc Ecom, LLC, Northedc, LLC, and John Doe, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the claims alleged in the complaint. The court decided whether to permit pre-Rule 26(f) subpoenas to identify anonymous defendants, not what § 75-1.1 means or requires. opinion →
Daedalus, LLC v. Mecklenburg Cnty., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the authority cited for the County’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs; the Court of Appeals does not construe or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Atkins v. Peek, the statute is mentioned only as the legal basis of claims alleged by the parties; the court decided the appeal on interlocutory-jurisdiction grounds and did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Persis Nova Construction, Inc. v. Edwards, the court mentions § 75-1.1 only in summarizing Investors Title as context for its separate interpretation of § 6-21.5; it does not decide what § 75-1.1 means or how it applies. opinion →
Panag v. Farmers Insurance, the Washington Supreme Court mentions N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 only in a footnote while reporting and analogizing to the federal court’s treatment of North Carolina law in DIRECTV; it does not construe or decide the meaning or application of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Bumpers v. COMMUNITY BANK OF N. VIRGINIA, the opinion merely describes the plaintiffs’ § 75-1.1 claims as part of the procedural background; it decides only that the appeal is from a non-appealable interlocutory order and does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Laws v. Priority Trustee Services of North Carolina, LLC, the statute is mentioned only while reporting the district court’s reason for dismissing the eighth count; the appellate court did not decide what § 75-1.1 means or independently apply subsection (b). opinion →
In Re Community Bank of Northern Virginia, the statute is cited only to identify the state-law claims in the opinion’s procedural history. The court does not construe, explain, or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Drennen v. PNC Bank National Ass'n, the statute is cited only to identify the claims asserted in an earlier North Carolina case; this opinion reports that procedural history and does not decide what § 75-1.1 means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
Lucas v. Lucas, the opinion mentions § 75-1.1 only while describing the Supreme Court’s decision in Bumpers on appellate finality and pending attorney-fee claims; Lucas does not construe or apply § 75-1.1 itself. opinion →
Hamilton v. MORTGAGE INFORMATION SERVICES, INC., the statute appears only in the description of Plaintiff’s complaint and alleged claims; the court decided the appeal on interlocutory-jurisdiction grounds and did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
SV International, Inc. v. Fu Jian Quanyu Industry Co., the statute appears only in the background as a description of Plaintiffs' allegation; the court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Hill v. StubHub, Inc., the court did not interpret or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; it merely reversed the trial court's related unfair-and-deceptive-trade-practices judgment as a consequence of its rulings under 47 U.S.C. § 230 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-344. opinion →
Ray Communications, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., the court merely identifies § 75-1.1 as the statutory basis for RCI's pleaded UDTPA claim. Its holding concerns trademark infringement and laches under the Lanham Act, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-1.1. opinion →
REV O, INC. v. Woo, the court recited the familiar elements of a § 75-1.1 claim, but did not construe or apply the statute; it rejected the plaintiff’s hypothetical argument for lack of record support, authority, and an explanation of a viable claim. opinion →
New Bar Partnership v. Martin, the statute appears only in a footnote explaining the opinion’s terminology; the court does not interpret or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Ramey Kemp & Associates, Inc. v. Richmond Hills Residential Partners, LLC, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the basis of a third-party claim asserted below; the appellate court did not analyze, interpret, or decide any issue under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
SCI N.C. FUNERAL SERVS., LLC v. McEWEN ELLINGTON FUNERAL SERV., INC., section 75-1.1 is mentioned as the statute underlying the UDTP claim, but the court's ruling concerns whether attorneys' fees were available under § 75-16.1 and whether the claims were frivolous or malicious. The court did not interpret or decide what § 75-1.1 means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
Hausle v. Hausle, the opinion merely recounts Bumpers's underlying claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 while analyzing whether an unresolved attorney-fee claim affected finality and interlocutory appealability; it does not construe or apply § 75-1.1 itself. opinion →
McCrann v. Pinehurst, LLC, the court mentioned § 75-1.1 in describing and resolving plaintiffs’ unfair-and-deceptive-practices claim, but it did not interpret the statute or establish any rule about its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application; it rejected the claim on the merits of Pinehurst, LLC’s authority and connection to the property. opinion →
McKinnon v. CV Industries, Inc., the opinion addresses attorney’s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.1 and only refers to the underlying Chapter 75 claim in deciding whether the fee award required remand. It does not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-1.1; the trial court’s underlying Chapter 75 ruling is merely reported. opinion →
Prospect Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Chasnan, Inc., the opinion merely identifies § 75-1.1 as one of the claims pleaded; the court decides the motion based on lack of personal jurisdiction and does not interpret, apply, or otherwise rule about the statute. opinion →
McMillan v. Ryan Jackson Properties, LLC, the statute is mentioned only as one of plaintiffs' claims in the procedural background. The Court did not construe or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; its holding concerns attorneys' fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55A-7-40(f). opinion →
Dale v. Alcurt Carrboro, LLC, the statute appears only in Plaintiff’s quoted complaint allegation. The Court did not interpret or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; it dismissed the related claims as moot after the assessment was withdrawn. opinion →
RLM Communications, Inc. v. Tuschen, section 75-1.1 appears only in a parenthetical string citation during the separate trade-secrets damages analysis. The court did not construe or apply the statute to decide the UDTP claim, which it resolved because the underlying claims lacked merit. opinion →
Taidoc Tech. Corp. v. Ok Biotech Co., Ltd., the citation to § 75-1.1 appears only in the procedural history describing claims asserted in the complaint. The court did not construe, apply, or decide any issue under the statute. opinion →
Stikeleather Realty & Invs. Co. v. Broadway, the court did not construe N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 or decide what conduct is unfair or deceptive; it merely rejected the derivative UDTP claim after finding no underlying RRAA breach. opinion →
Insight Health Corp. v. Marquis Diagnostic Imaging of Nc, LLC, the statute appears only in the procedural history as part of a list of claims alleged by the plaintiff. The court does not interpret, explain, or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
UDX, LLC v. Heavner, the statute is mentioned only to identify one of UDX’s claims in the procedural history. The court did not interpret, analyze, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Taidoc Tech. Corp. v. Ok Biotech Co., Ltd., the statute appears only in the procedural background as the legal basis for a claim TaiDoc brought. The court decided the release defense and did not interpret, apply, or otherwise hold anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Stikeleather Realty & Investments Co. v. Broadway, the opinion does not construe or independently apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; it merely refers to the UDTP claim and reverses its derivative damages and attorney’s fees after rejecting the underlying RRAA ruling. opinion →
Traber v. Bank of Am., the court merely recited plaintiffs’ contention that the allegations amounted to a § 75-1.1 claim and held that any such claim was barred by res judicata. It did not construe the statute, state its elements, or decide its substantive application. opinion →
Krawiec v. Manly, the statute is mentioned only to identify one claim in the procedural and factual background. The court decided plaintiffs’ motion to amend and dismissed the defendants’ motions to dismiss as moot; it did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Nc Bioremediation, LLC v. Sea Winds, LLC, the statute is mentioned only to identify a claim alleged in the complaint during the procedural background. The court does not construe, explain, or decide the application of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Gaylor, Inc. of N.C. v. Vizor, LLC, the court merely identifies § 75-1.1 as the basis for one of the plaintiff's claims; its rulings concern arbitration and stays under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-569.7, not the meaning or application of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court merely listed § 75-1.1 among the statutes underlying Variety’s claims. Its analysis applied the federal trademark infringement likelihood-of-confusion standard and did not construe, explain, or independently apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
In re TD Bank, N.A., the opinion merely lists N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 et seq. as one of twelve statutes supporting Count VI; it does not analyze, interpret, or rule on the North Carolina statute. opinion →
Bank of America, N.A. v. Rice, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify one of Rice’s counterclaims. The Court does not analyze, construe, or decide any issue under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
E. Brooks Wilkins Family Med., P.A. v. Wakemed, the court mentions § 75-1.1 only to describe the UDTP claim in the procedural history. The court did not construe or decide what § 75-1.1 means or requires; its statutory holding concerned attorney-fee awards under § 75-16.1. opinion →
McCrimmon v. Mariner Finance North Carolina, Inc., the court merely identified § 75-1.1 as the statute underlying McCrimmon’s state-law claim and declined supplemental jurisdiction over that claim; it did not interpret or decide how § 75-1.1 applies. opinion →
Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., the statute is mentioned as the source of possible treble damages, and the court discusses the parties' dispute over whether those damages are punitive. The court did not construe N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 or decide any issue under it; it held that the treble-damages issue was a matter of interpreting the arbitration agreement for the arbitrator. opinion →
Martin v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution, LLC, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify a claim in the complaint; this discovery order does not decide what § 75-1.1 means or how it applies. opinion →
Taidoc Tech. Corp. v. Ok Biotech Co., Ltd., the court merely denied summary judgment on the § 75-1.1 claim because the underlying civil-conspiracy, trade-secret, and tortious-interference claims survived. It did not construe § 75-1.1, analyze its elements, or decide how the statute applies independently. opinion →
Bb&t Boli Plan Tr. v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., the statute is mentioned only in a footnote summarizing the claims pleaded in the earlier action and the trial court's dismissal of that claim; this opinion does not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Degorter v. Capitol Wealth, Inc., the statute appears only in the procedural history, reporting that an earlier judge dismissed the plaintiff’s section 75-1.1 claim. This opinion does not construe, explain, or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Se. Auto., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., the statute appears only in the court’s description of the plaintiff’s pleaded third claim; the court neither interprets nor applies § 75-1.1 and decides only whether the case qualifies for mandatory complex-business-case designation. opinion →
Gay v. Peoples Bank, the statute is mentioned only to identify one of Plaintiff's claims in the procedural background. The court decides Defendant's motion for costs under Rule 68 and does not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Canon U.S.A., Inc. v. Cavin's Business Solutions, Inc., the court dismissed the NCUDTPA claim based on the contractual New York choice-of-law provision and did not interpret, define, or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 on the merits. opinion →
Insight Health Corp. v. Marquis Diagnostic Imaging of N.C., LLC, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as identifying one of Plaintiff’s claims; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Johnson & Morris Pllc v. Abdelbaky & Boes, Pllc, the statute appears only in the procedural history as a claim pleaded in the Verified Complaint. The court decided the preliminary-injunction motion on common-law trademark infringement and did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Lockerman v. S. River Electric Membership Corp., the court quoted § 75-1.1(a) only to identify the statutory basis of the UDTP claim. It did not interpret or decide any issue about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-1.1; the disposition concerned accrual and the statute of limitations. opinion →
Phillips & Jordan, Inc. v. Bostic; Yates Constr. Co. v. Bostic Am. Mech., Inc. v. Bostic, the court mentions § 75-1.1 only to identify the underlying claim and recount its procedural dismissal. The court's actual ruling was on attorneys’ fees under § 75-16.1, including whether the plaintiff knew or should have known that its claim was frivolous and malicious; it did not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Safety Test & Equip. Co. v. Am. Safety Util. Corp., the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the claims alleged; the court did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Raja v. Patel, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the basis of a claim plaintiffs purportedly asserted. The court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and expressly did not consider the merits, so it did not decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Williams v. Yamaha Motor Corp. USA, the North Carolina statute appears only in a footnote listing the many state consumer-fraud statutes asserted. The court did not construe § 75-1.1 or make a statute-specific ruling; its discussion addressed the pleading of consumer-fraud claims generally. opinion →
Scherer v. Steel Creek Property Owners Ass'n, the court cited § 75-1.1 as the source of generalized requirements incorporated into an NCDCA claim, but it did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the statute itself. opinion →
Du Phan v. Clinard Oil Co., the opinion mentions § 75-1.1 only as a claim asserted in the complaint and discusses treble damages in the procedural and res judicata analysis; it does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Next Advisor Continued, Inc. v. Lendingtree, Inc., the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of Plaintiff’s alleged claims. The court did not analyze, interpret, or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Burrell v. Bayer Corp., the court mentions § 75-1.1 only to identify one of the plaintiff’s causes of action, then dismisses the fraud and unfair-trade-practices claims on federal preemption and pleading grounds. It does not construe or otherwise decide what § 75-1.1 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Local Social, Inc. v. Stallings, the court merely identifies the complaint's UDTP claim under § 75-1.1 while deciding whether the claim falls within the Bylaws' arbitration provision; it does not interpret or decide what § 75-1.1 requires or how it applies. opinion →
PLS Investments, LLC v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, the court recited the UDTPA elements and cited § 75-1.1, but its affirmance rested on the absence of evidence that defendants listed the property and on causation and damages; it did not decide a question about the statute. opinion →
House v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., the statute is mentioned only to identify the claim dismissed by the district court; the appellate court affirms for the district court's stated reasons without construing or applying § 75-1.1 itself. opinion →
Sql Sentry, LLC v. Apexsql, LLC, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as a claim brought by the plaintiff; the court decided only the conversion claim and did not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Ke v. Zhou, the opinion reports the trial court’s Chapter 75 ruling in the procedural history and does not independently construe or decide what N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Addison Whitney, LLC v. Cashion, the court merely denied dismissal of the § 75-1.1 claim because related defamation and tortious-interference claims survived; it did not construe or decide what § 75-1.1 means or requires. opinion →
Red Valve, Inc. v. Titan Valve, Inc., 2018 Ncbc 31a, the statute appears only in a footnote listing claims asserted by the plaintiffs; the court does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Core Techs, Inc. v. Advanced Fraud Sols., LLC, the court merely recounts that AFS asserted a § 75-1.1 claim in a separate federal action; it does not interpret, apply, or rule on the statute. opinion →
Insight Health Corp. v. Marquis Diagnostic Imaging of N.C., LLC, the statute is cited only to identify one of the plaintiff’s asserted extra-contractual claims; the opinion does not construe or apply § 75-1.1, and its later statement that the claim was dismissed by directed verdict is procedural history. opinion →
Stone St. Partners, LLC v. the Estate of Richard C. Siskey, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote describing a claim asserted against the Estate in the procedural history. The Estate did not move to dismiss, and the court did not analyze or decide the § 75-1.1 claim. opinion →
U.S. Tobacco Cooperative Inc. v. Big South Wholesale of VA Inc, the statute appears only in the procedural description of claims Plaintiffs brought. The court decided a Westfall Act substitution issue and did not interpret or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Robinson v. E. Carolina Univ., the statute appears only in the court's summary of the plaintiff's asserted UDPA claim. The opinion does not construe § 75-1.1 or decide what it requires or how it applies. opinion →
Bucci v. Burns, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural background to identify one of the claims. The court's analysis and ruling concern justifiable reliance for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and the opinion does not interpret or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Global Textile All., Inc. v. Tdi Worldwide, LLC, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural background as the legal basis for one of the plaintiff’s claims. The court’s decision addresses personal jurisdiction and does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Wheeler v. Wheeler, the statute is mentioned only to identify a claim asserted in the complaint, and the footnote reports its prior dismissal. The opinion does not construe, explain, or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. PLL, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 appears only in a footnote string cite listing the consumer-protection statutes invoked in Count II. The court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and did not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Justice v. Mission Hosp., Inc., the court expressly declined to consider whether the learned profession exception to § 75-1.1 applied; the statute was mentioned only as an unresolved alternative issue after the UDTP claim failed on other grounds. opinion →
Unox, Inc. v. Conway, the opinion merely reports the Tecnoeka Defendants’ argument about the § 75-1.1 claim. The court decides whether the case qualifies for mandatory complex-business-case designation under § 7A-45.4 and does not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Presson v. Recovery Connections Community, the statute appears only in the background as a claim plaintiffs alleged in the complaint; the court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Sterling Title Company v. Martin, the court did not interpret or apply § 75-1.1; it merely described the plaintiff’s derivative argument and disposed of it because the underlying Trade Secrets Protection Act claim failed. opinion →
MC1 Healthcare LLC v. Mountainside Solutions, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify a claim the plaintiff proposed to add by amendment. The court ruled on leave to amend and did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the requirements or coverage of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
NORTH CAROLINA MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. STAMFORD BROOK CAPITAL, LLC, the opinion merely identifies an N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 claim in a footnote listing the claims against a defendant; it decides service of process and venue, not the meaning or application of the statute. opinion →
Wilkie v. Mitchell, the court mentions § 75-1.1 only in a footnote explaining the name of Chapter 75-1. It dismisses the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and expressly does not address the merits, so it makes no holding about the statute. opinion →
Knc Techs., LLC v. Tutton, the court did not decide whether the defendants violated § 75-1.1 or construe the statute. It merely denied dismissal because defendants argued only that the UDTPA claim depended on other claims, which the court had not dismissed, while citing general authority about when contract or tortious-interference conduct may support a UDTPA claim. opinion →
Ahern v. Apple Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as one of the causes of action selected for litigation; the opinion text does not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
STRANGE v. SELECT MANAGEMENT RESOURCES, LLC, the statute is mentioned only as the legal basis for one of the plaintiffs’ pleaded claims. The court decided whether the claims were subject to arbitration and whether Select was bound by the arbitration agreements; it did not interpret or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JUICE MAN LLC, the opinion only reports that the State asserted claims under § 75-1.1; it decides federal removal, preemption, remand, and attorneys’ fees, and does not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TINTED BREW, INC., the court addressed federal-question jurisdiction, complete preemption, remand, and fees. It did not interpret, define, or decide the requirements or application of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; the Chapter 75 reference identifies the state-law claim whose removal was being evaluated. opinion →
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. VAPECO DISTRIBUTION LLC, the statute is mentioned only to identify the state-law claims asserted in the complaint. The court decided remand and attorneys’ fees, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Akshar Distribution Co. v. Smoky's Mart, the court did not decide whether the complaint stated a claim under § 75-1.1; it held only that defendants had not raised that argument below and therefore could not make it on appeal. opinion →
Akshar Distribution Co. v. Smoky's Mart, the court only held that defendants had failed to preserve their argument that the complaint did not state a claim under § 75-1.1; it did not construe or decide the statute’s substantive requirements or application. opinion →
Sauer Brands, Inc. v. Duke Sandwich Productions, Inc., the court mentions § 75-1.1 only to identify one of the plaintiff’s state-law claims and to explain the court’s supplemental jurisdiction in deciding a motion to dismiss or transfer. It does not construe the statute or decide what it requires or how it substantively applies. opinion →
SHEN v. CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, the court merely recounts that Plaintiff pleaded an unfair-and-deceptive-trade-practices claim under § 75-1.1 while deciding remand based on the amount in controversy and aggregation of alternative theories; it does not decide any issue about what § 75-1.1 means or requires. opinion →
Morris v. All My Sons Properties of Raleigh, LLC, the court merely lists the statute-based claim while analyzing fraudulent joinder and whether to remand; it does not construe, explain, or decide the application of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Green v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the statute is mentioned only to identify claims dismissed without prejudice below; the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Green v. Brock & Scott, PLLC, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing the prior dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims; this order does not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
THORNE v. PEP BOYS-MANNY, MOE & JACK INC, the statute appears only in a footnote listing one of the complaint's counts. The court dismissed the case for lack of Article III standing and expressly declined to analyze the counts, so it did not decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Fairchild v. Kubota Tractor Corporation, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the label for a claim in the complaint. The opinion states that this claim was dismissed and that the New Motor Vehicles Warranties Act claim was the sole remaining claim; the court did not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
ELSAYED v. FAMILY FARE LLC, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying a claim in the complaint; the court expressly states that defendants did not seek judgment on that claim and does not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Medfusion, Inc. v. Greenway Health, LLC, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the basis of one state-law claim. The court decided federal-question jurisdiction and remand, without interpreting or applying § 75-1.1. opinion →
CS Technology, Inc. v. Horizon River Technologies, LLC, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as one of Horizon’s counterclaims. The court did not analyze, interpret, or rule on the § 75-1.1 claim; it decided only the RICO counterclaim. opinion →
Lugones v. Pete and Gerry's Organics, LLC, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural background as one of the claims alleged in the complaint. The court did not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; its merits analysis addressed the New York GBL claims, while the non-New York named plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. opinion →
Cummings v. Carroll, the statute appears only in the court’s description of the amended complaint’s causes of action. That procedural-history reference does not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Cummings v. Carroll, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one cause of action listed in plaintiffs’ amended complaint; the opinion text does not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Philips North America, LLC v. Zimmerman, the statute appears only in the procedural background as one of the claims asserted by the plaintiff. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Williams v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, the court addressed whether the UDTPA claim satisfied Rule 9(b) and alleged reliance, but it did not interpret or decide any issue concerning the meaning, elements, coverage, or application of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Lockerby v. Cross Point NC Partners, LLC, the court merely identifies § 75-1.1 as the statutory basis for one of Plaintiff's pleaded claims; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
ABC Phones of North Carolina, Inc. v. Yahyavi, the court merely identifies § 75-1.1 as the statutory basis for one of the plaintiff's claims. It does not construe the statute, state its requirements, or decide whether defendants violated it; the TRO is denied on irreparable-harm grounds. opinion →
NORTH CAROLINA MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. STAMFORD BROOK CAPITAL, LLC, section 75-1.1 is mentioned only in a footnote listing claims pleaded in the complaint; the court neither interprets nor applies the statute and decides the motion under arbitration principles and the Federal Arbitration Act. opinion →
DENC, LLC v. PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, the only express citation to § 75-1.1 appears in the factual account of DENC’s demand letter. The court did not construe or apply § 75-1.1; it addressed attorneys’ fees under § 75-16.1 and referred to its prior ruling under § 58-63-15(11)(n). opinion →
HONGDA CHEM USA, LLC v. SHANGYU SUNFIT CHEMICAL COMPANY, LTD., the opinion merely reports the court’s earlier conclusion that the conduct constituted unfair trade practices under § 75-1.1. The ruling here concerns attorneys’ fees under § 75-16.1 and does not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Robinson v. Williams, the statute appears only in the court's procedural-history summary of a claim plaintiff asserted; the court did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
On-Site Fuel Service, Inc., the statute is mentioned only while summarizing a claim asserted in the Mansfield Complaint. The court does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Higgins v. WNC Dermatological Associates, P.A., the statute appears only in a list of claims that Defendants asked the Court to dismiss. The Court did not interpret or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; it merely denied the motion at that time pending further development of the record. opinion →
Herrera v. Charlotte School of Law, LLC, the opinion merely reports that the consolidated complaint asserted a UDTPA claim; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, INC. V STEIN, the statute appears only in a footnote as an example of another law with broad elements of proof; the court did not decide what § 75-1.1 means or how it applies. opinion →
La Fosse v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify a North Carolina claim asserted by a plaintiff in the procedural background; the court does not interpret or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Lambert v. First Tennessee Bank National Association, the statute appears only in the background as the legal basis for a claim pleaded in the amended complaint. The court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1; it adopted a recommendation addressing only pleading specificity and a motion to strike. opinion →
Philips North America, LLC v. Zimmerman, the statute is mentioned only to identify the defendant’s counterclaim in the procedural background. The court ruled on pleading and federal-preemption issues without construing or deciding what § 75-1.1 means or requires. opinion →
THE INTERCOLLEGIATE WOMEN'S LACROSSE COACHES ASSOCIATION v. CORRIGAN SPORTS ENTERPRISES, INC., the statute is mentioned only to identify one cause of action pleaded in the amended complaint. The court does not analyze, interpret, or rule on the § 75-1.1 claim; the TRO ruling addresses other claims. opinion →
Kamel v. 5Church, Inc, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as a claim asserted by Kamel; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide what N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 requires. opinion →
Kiza v. Universal Insurance Company, the statute appears only in the background as the legal basis of a claim pleaded by the plaintiffs. The court does not construe or apply § 75-1.1; it dismisses the state-law claims because the insurance policy provides no coverage. opinion →
SensorRx, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Company, the statute is mentioned only in the background as one claim pleaded by SensorRx. The court dismissed Eli Lilly's separate anticipatory declaratory-judgment action and did not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Eli Lilly and Company v. SensorRx, the statute is mentioned only in the background to identify a claim asserted in SensorRx's amended complaint. The court dismissed Eli Lilly's anticipatory declaratory-judgment action on procedural grounds and did not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
German v. Bekins Van Lines, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify a claim pleaded in the complaint; the court’s ruling addresses federal Carmack Amendment preemption and does not construe or decide what § 75-1.1 means or requires. opinion →
PREMIER RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL, LLC v. MEDPACE, INC., the statute appears only in the court’s procedural listing of Plaintiff’s Claim Five; the court decided personal jurisdiction and did not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Boggs v. BMW of North America, LLC, the statute is mentioned only to identify one of Plaintiff’s pleaded causes of action. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Day v. BMW of North America, LLC, the opinion mentions § 75-1.1 only to identify one cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff. The court decided subject-matter jurisdiction based on the amount in controversy for the MMWA claim and did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
POWELL v. SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC., the statute is only identified as the basis for a count in the Zaback Complaint and is not construed or applied by the court; the opinion contains no holding about the statute. opinion →
Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as one claim Plaintiff asserted. The court did not construe or apply § 75-1.1; it decided the case under Connecticut law and the Connecticut Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act. opinion →
Barden v. Murphy-Brown Holdings, LLC, the statute appears only in a footnote reporting that plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
DERNOSHEK v. FIRSTSERVICE RESIDENTIAL, INC., the court merely identifies § 75-1.1 et seq. as one of the statutes asserted in the complaint and later repeats it when describing a similar class action. It decides only federal CAFA jurisdiction and the local-controversy exception, and does not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Belmont Ass'n, the statute appears only in the procedural history as one of the counterclaims asserted below; the Court does not analyze or decide the N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 claim. opinion →
Belmont Ass'n, the statute is mentioned only as one of Defendants' counterclaims in the procedural history. The Court does not analyze, interpret, or decide the merits of the § 75-1.1 claim; its holding concerns N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-20. opinion →
Barclay v. USAA General Indemnity Company, the court cited § 75-1.1 only to describe the claim in Elliott while deciding whether this case was a direct action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); it did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Carpenter v. William Douglas Management, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the background list of claims asserted in the amended complaint. The court does not interpret § 75-1.1, state its requirements, or decide its application. opinion →
Straub v. Ford Motor Company, the statute appears as the legal basis of Straub’s pleaded fourth claim, but the court did not interpret or apply § 75-1.1; it merely reported Straub’s concession and dismissed the claim. opinion →
MCDONALD v. AUTOMONEY, INC., the opinion only describes § 75-1.1 as one of the statutes underlying Plaintiffs’ pleaded claims and later recounts a similar allegation in Kellar. The court decided the motion to remand based on the amount-in-controversy requirement and did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Hatteras/Cabo Yachts, LLC v. M/Y Epic (official Number 747618, HIN: US-HATHR3021617), her engines, boilers, tackle, appa, the statute is mentioned only to identify a counterclaim and recount its procedural disposition. The court decides attorneys’ fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.1 and does not interpret or apply § 75-1.1’s substantive requirements. opinion →
Yacht Basin Provision Company, Inc. v. Bates, the statute appears only in the background as the legal basis for a claim alleged by the plaintiff. The court decided a motion for jurisdictional discovery and did not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Ospina v. Piedra, the statute is mentioned only in the list of claims that the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing and that the district court adopted without substantive analysis. The opinion does not decide what § 75-1.1 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Wheeler v. BMW of North America, LLC, the opinion only mentions § 75-1.1 in listing one of the plaintiff's claims. The court decided a discovery-objection issue and did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Renfinity, Inc. v. Jones, the court mentions the statute only as part of its personal-jurisdiction and state-interest analysis; it does not construe or decide anything about what § 75-1.1 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
HATCHETT v. FINANCIAL BUSINESS AND CONSUMER SOLUTIONS, INC., the court mentioned § 75-1.1 only in the procedural history as one of the statutes plaintiff alleged was violated; it did not decide or interpret the state-law claim. opinion →
BROWN v. ALLTRAN FINANCIAL, LP, the statute appears only in the procedural history as a claim alleged in state court. The court did not construe or apply § 75-1.1; it addressed standing under the FDCPA and remanded after declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. opinion →
Auto Money North LLC v. Brown, the court merely identified § 75-1.1 in a footnote listing North Carolina laws implicated by the parallel action; it abstained on federalism, efficiency, and comity grounds and did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Church Mutual Insurance Company v. Murfreesboro United Methodist Church, the opinion addresses the UDTPA claim only in deciding whether to permit an amendment and does not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1’s substantive requirements. opinion →
Renfinity, Inc. v. Jones, the statute appears only in a procedural-history sentence listing one of Plaintiff’s asserted claims. The Court does not analyze or decide what § 75-1.1 means, requires, or how it applies; its disposition addresses other claims. opinion →
Senderra RX Partners, LLC v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina, the court did not interpret or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; it only affirmed summary judgment on the NCUDTPA claim as derivative of the other claims. opinion →
Nallapati v. Justh Holdings LLC, the statute is mentioned only in the background to identify a claim asserted in the amended complaint; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Counts v. General Motors, LLC, the opinion text only lists the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Act claim in a table and marks it “Merits Not Addressed”; the court does not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Chesnutt v. QBE Specialty Insurance Company, the statute is cited only as support for a general recitation of the elements of a UDTPA claim. The court dismissed the claim because plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that QBE Specialty Insurance Company was involved in the insurance contract; it did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
DUNN v. ENHANCED RECOVERY COMPANY, LLC, the statute appears only in the procedural background as a claim alleged in the complaint; the court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Yacht Basin Provision Company, Inc. v. Bates, the statute appears only in the statement of the plaintiff’s allegations. The court decided personal jurisdiction, venue, and transfer, and did not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Troublefield v. AutoMoney, the statute appears only in the description of Plaintiff's claims in the procedural history. The Court does not construe § 75-1.1, decide its requirements or coverage, or rely on it in its holding. opinion →
Troublefield v. AutoMoney, section 75-1.1 is mentioned only in the procedural history as a claim pleaded by the plaintiff. The court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Wilson v. Mastercard Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify the plaintiff’s pleaded NCUTPA claim. The court dismissed for lack of Article III standing and expressly declined to reach the merits under Rule 12(b)(6), so it did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Rodriguez v. Riverstone Communities, LLC, the opinion identifies claims four and five as UDTPA claims and later rules on which portions survive based on reliance on a separate warranty claim, but it does not interpret, explain, or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 itself. opinion →
GUJRAL v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, the statute is cited to identify a pleaded NCUDTPA count. The court does not construe or apply § 75-1.1; its ruling concerns whether the separate limitations period could be tolled and declines dismissal as premature. opinion →
Church Mutual Insurance Company v. Murfreesboro United Methodist Church, the opinion mentions § 75-1.1 only in the procedural history to report a counterclaim asserted below; the court does not decide what the statute means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
Ross v. Financial Recovery Services, Inc., the statute appears only in the procedural history as a claim the Plaintiff alleged; the court did not interpret or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Ross v. Financial Recovery Services, Inc., the court only recites in the procedural background that the Plaintiff alleged a violation of the statute; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Jenkins v. LTD Financial Services, L.P., the court merely identifies § 75-1.1 as one of the statutes under which Jenkins asserted a claim; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Waters v. Pumphrey, the opinion merely reports that Defendant asserted a counterclaim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; the court does not construe, apply, or decide anything about that statute. opinion →
Waters v. Pumphrey, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the basis for a counterclaim Defendant filed; the Court of Appeals does not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Franklin v. Dominion Energy Incorporated, section 75-1.1 appears only in the procedural history as part of the claims Franklin asserted in her North Carolina counterclaim. This court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
W.M. Barr & Company, Inc. v. Dumond, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural background as part of the claims Plaintiff alleged; the court did not construe or apply § 75-1.1 and decided the matter on personal jurisdiction and venue. opinion →
W.M. Barr & Company, Inc. v. Dumond, Inc., the statute appears only in the court's description of the claims alleged in the complaint. The court did not interpret or apply § 75-1.1; it resolved personal jurisdiction and venue-transfer issues. opinion →
Williams v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural background to identify one of plaintiff’s claims; the court does not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company, the statute is mentioned only to identify one count in the complaint. The court decided the negligence claim and did not construe, apply, or rule on the merits of § 75-1.1. opinion →
SOLOMON v. ECL GROUP, LLC, the court mentions the Chapter 75 claim and holds only that it meets the pleading plausibility threshold; it does not interpret or decide what N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 requires or how it applies. opinion →
KING v. ETHICON, INC., the statute appears only in a string citation accompanying a recitation of the consumer-protection claim's elements. The court dismissed the claim for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b) and did not construe or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 itself. opinion →
CENTER FOR COMMUNITY SELF-HELP v. SELF FINANCIAL, INC., the statute appears only in the opinion's description of the claims pleaded in the complaint. The court decides personal jurisdiction, venue, and transfer, and does not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
O'Neal v. Burley, the statute appears only in the opinion’s procedural-history summary of the plaintiffs’ pleaded claim. The Court of Appeals did not construe or decide the § 75-1.1 claim; it addressed the partnership’s classification and the distribution of its assets and liabilities. opinion →
BERMAN v. PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE AGENCY, the statute is mentioned only to identify one of Plaintiff’s claims. The court resolved the case on derivative sovereign immunity and subject-matter jurisdiction, without deciding what § 75-1.1 means or how it applies. opinion →
HOOKER v. THE CITADEL SALISBURY LLC, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote describing claims in the original complaint and the trial court’s dismissal of the UDTPA claim; the opinion does not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Monroe Staffing Services, LLC v. Whitaker, the court mentions N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 only to describe a counterclaim asserted in Defendant's answer. The court applies New York law under the parties' choice-of-law clause and decides the claim under N.Y. GBL § 349(h), without interpreting or applying § 75-1.1. opinion →
Hutten v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, the opinion identifies a UDTPA claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 et seq., but the court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims after dismissing the federal claim and terminates the related motions as moot. It therefore does not decide anything about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-1.1. opinion →
M.D. Russell Construction, Inc. v. Consolidated Staffing, Inc., the court did not interpret or apply the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; it disposed of the claim because Virginia law governed and the challenge to the district court’s rejection was waived. opinion →
Philips North America LLC v. Little, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural background as the statute underlying one of Philips's pleaded claims. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Hayward Industries, Inc. v. BlueWorks Corporation, the opinion mentions N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 only in listing Plaintiff’s claims. Its state-law ruling merely denies summary judgment by reference to the Lanham Act analysis and does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Laboratory Corporation of America v. ASL-DEN, LLC, the statute is mentioned only as one of Labcorp's asserted claims in the procedural history. The court enters a stipulated permanent injunction without deciding what N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 means or how it applies. opinion →
Columbus Emergency Group, LLC v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina, the court recited the UDTPA’s prima facie elements only to determine that the state-law claim did not necessarily raise a federal question; it remanded on jurisdiction and did not decide the merits or construe § 75-1.1’s application. opinion →
Auto Money North LLC v. Walters, the court mentions § 75-1.1 only while assessing potential treble damages and attorney fees for the jurisdictional amount; it does not decide what the statute means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Eco Fiber Inc. v. Yukon Packaging, LLC, the court merely recited the elements of a pleaded § 75-1.1 claim while deciding whether the case presented a federal question; it did not decide, apply, or construe the statute. opinion →
Ace Funding Source, LLC v. Williams Land Clearing, Grading and Timber Logger, LLC, the statute appears only in a list of claims Williams Land Clearing sought to bring; the court did not interpret or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. NTE Carolinas II, LLC, the statute appears only in the opinion’s procedural-history account of NTE’s allegations; the court did not decide what § 75-1.1 means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
Mackler v. SME, Inc. USA, the opinion merely notes that the FAC asserts a claim under the Act while deciding a motion to transfer venue; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
MACKLER v. SME, INC. USA, the statute appears only as a footnote citation identifying the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim alleged in the complaint; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Beazley Insurance Company, Inc. v. Foster Poultry Farms, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote listing causes of action asserted in the underlying litigation; the court does not construe, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Speerly v. General Motors, LLC, the opinion mentions N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 only in a list of the plaintiffs’ asserted state-law claims; it does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Greer v. Strange Honey Farm, the court cited § 75-1.1 only in a footnote as one authority supporting the general proposition that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applies to claims under various state deceptive-business-practices statutes. It did not decide what § 75-1.1 means or how it independently applies. opinion →
Blue Sky Endeavors, LLC v. Henderson County Hospital Corporation, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the legal basis for one claim asserted in the Amended Complaint. The court does not analyze, construe, or apply § 75-1.1; it decides only the separate trademark-fraud counterclaim under 15 U.S.C. § 1120. opinion →
Oke v. ProntoWash LLC, the statute appears only in the procedural background as the label for a pleaded count. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Paul v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina, the opinion mentions N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 only when listing plaintiffs’ asserted UDTPA claim; the court does not analyze, construe, or decide anything about that statute. opinion →
Lewis v. EQUITYEXPERTS.ORG, LLC, the statute appears only in a footnote describing claims that were dismissed in an earlier order; this opinion does not decide what N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 means or how it applies. opinion →
Smith v. Devine, the statute appears only in the court’s description of the complaint’s allegations and requested damages; the Fourth Circuit decided the appeal on the propriety and amount of a discovery-sanction default judgment and did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
NOTASH v. TOTAL MILITARY MANAGEMENT, INC., section 75-1.1 is mentioned only to identify Plaintiffs’ pleaded unfair-and-deceptive-trade-practices claim. The court’s ruling concerns preemption under the Carmack Amendment and FAAAA, not the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Gross v. Dodson, the court merely identifies § 75-1.1 as the basis for Count Five and defers ruling on that count; it does not interpret, explain, or apply the statute. opinion →
Auto Money North LLC v. Walters, the court merely identifies § 75-1.1 as part of the UDTPA and reports the treble-damages provision in § 75-16; it does not interpret or apply § 75-1.1, and the ruling concerns whether a party may intervene. opinion →
Murdock Ready Mix Concrete v. Ironplanet, Inc., the court mentions § 75-1.1 only in a footnote while addressing a late objection and expressly says the issue could not affect the disposition; it does not decide what the statute means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Boykin v. The Procter & Gamble Company, section 75-1.1 appears only in a parenthetical string citation to Washington v. Trinity Industries. The court did not construe or apply the North Carolina statute; it addressed the plaintiffs’ multistate consumer-protection claims under other states’ laws. opinion →
Lewis v. EQUITYEXPERTS.ORG, LLC, Incidental: the statute appears only in a footnote recounting that the plaintiff’s UDTPA claim was dismissed in an earlier order; this opinion does not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
FRANCO v. PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, the court recited the elements of a Chapter 75 claim while deciding class certification and identified whether the alleged PSA practice violated Chapter 75 as an unresolved merits question. It did not construe or decide the statute’s application. opinion →
JSmith Civil, LLC v. Fourth Elm Construction, LLC, the court recounts JSmith’s argument that the contract waived potential treble damages under § 75-1.1, but it does not interpret or apply the statute; it rejects the argument because the complaint asserts only breach of contract and quantum meruit and no unfair-practices claim. opinion →
SPECTRUM SOUTHEAST, LLC v. FOOTHILLS CABLE CONNECTIONS, INC., the statute is mentioned only in a footnote reporting the plaintiff's dismissal of a cause of action; the court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
KIRWIN v. MARATHON MOVING COMPANY, INC., the court cited § 75-1.1 to identify Plaintiffs’ unfair-and-deceptive-trade-practices count and reported Plaintiffs’ allegation that the representations were deceptive under the statute, but it did not construe, apply, or decide liability under § 75-1.1. The count was dismissed on Carmack Amendment preemption grounds. opinion →
Vogel v. 1 Percent Lists Franchises, LLC, the statute appears only in the background's list of claims asserted by the plaintiff. The court did not analyze, construe, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Kavouklis v. Kings Row L.P., the court merely identifies the plaintiff's UDTPA claim and disposes of it after noting that the plaintiff abandoned the claim; it does not interpret, explain, or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Amiel v. EVO Brands, LLC d/b/a Puff Bar, and PVG2, LLC d/b/a Puff Bar, the statute appears only in a footnote list of state consumer-protection statutes for which default judgment was denied. The court did not construe or analyze N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; its substantive discussion concerned New York and New Jersey statutes. opinion →
COMBS, the opinion only identifies § 75-1.1 et seq. as the statutory basis for one of Plaintiffs’ pleaded causes of action in the background. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under the statute; it resolves the motions on default and procedural grounds. opinion →
JRM, Inc. v. The HJH Cos., Inc., the court only recounts that HJH brought a UDTPA claim under § 75-1.1 and that the trial court dismissed it. The appellate decision concerns attorney’s fees under § 75-16.1 and does not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
FORD, the court cited § 75-1.1 only as authority while reciting the general elements of a Chapter 75 claim in deciding class certification. It did not construe the statute or decide its merits-based application. opinion →
Ray v. TitleMax of Va., Inc., the court mentions § 75-1.1 only as one of the claims listed in the complaint. The opinion decides personal jurisdiction and does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Weaver v. AMV Holdings, LLC, the court merely noted the § 75-1.1 claim in a footnote and expressly declined to address it, deeming the claim abandoned for lack of appellate argument. It therefore decided nothing about the statute’s meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Viscosoft, Inc. v. Hangzhou Heliang Network Technology Co., Ltd., the court mentions § 75-1.1 only in the procedural history to identify a claim Plaintiff alleged. The court's analysis and ruling concern design-patent infringement, and it does not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
WILLIAMSON, the court mentioned § 75-1.1 only to identify the underlying UDTPA claim in deciding a request for attorney’s fees under § 75-16.1. It did not construe or decide the meaning, elements, coverage, or application of § 75-1.1; the fee request was denied because the plaintiff did not establish that defendants’ claim was frivolous and malicious. opinion →
Middleton, the statute appears only in a list of claims asserted in the complaint. The court does not construe, apply, or otherwise decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Hunte, the court only recounts the plaintiff’s allegation under § 75-1.1 in the procedural history; it does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
NWR Construction, LLC v. Schindler Elevator Corporation, the statute appears only in the background as part of Plaintiff’s pleaded claims; the Court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Equity Solutions of the Carolinas, Inc. v. North Carolina Department of State Treasurer, the opinion mentions § 75-1.1 only in the factual background while describing the Unclaimed Property Act; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Andrews & Lawrence v. Mills, the statute appears only in a footnote as an example of a blanket professional-services exemption in another state; the court does not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Ghazaly v. First National Collection Bureau, Inc., section 75-1.1 appears only in the statement of the claims asserted in the complaint. The court decided the motion to remand based on Article III standing and did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Thomas v. Petro-Wash, Inc., the statute appears only in the plaintiffs’ description of their pleaded claims. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Martin v. Pilot Industries, the statute appears only in the description of Martin's allegations. The court does not decide the § 75-1.1 claim or discuss what the statute means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Oma H. Hester, Jr. v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc. American Bar Association and North Carolina State Bar, the statute appears only as one of Hester’s pleaded claims and in the court’s account of the district court’s rejection of those claims. The appellate court’s own holding addresses concerted activity under federal antitrust law and does not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Vishay Intertechnology, Inc., a Delaware Corporation v. Delta International Corporation, a California Corporation, the statute appears only in Vishay’s description of its unfair-business-practices claim. The court decided personal jurisdiction under other North Carolina long-arm provisions and did not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Union Carbide Corp. v. Sunox, Inc., the court merely lists the plaintiff’s deceptive-trade-practices claim under § 75-1.1 among the claims asserted. It does not decide what the statute means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
John Lemmon Films, Inc. v. Atlantic Releasing Corp., the statute is mentioned only to identify one count in the complaint. The court analyzes the Lanham Act service-mark claim and the preliminary-injunction factors, but does not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Smith v. HBE Corp., the statute appears only in a question identifying an issue plaintiffs asked the court to decide. The court did not determine whether the conduct violated § 75-1.1; it decided the declaratory-judgment dispute on the lease, tax-ownership, and estoppel issues instead. opinion →
Austell v. Smith, the statute appears only in the plaintiffs’ allegations describing one of their claims. The court does not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 and decides the motions based on the appraisal statute and abstention principles. opinion →
Tryco Trucking Co. v. Belk Stores Services, Inc., the opinion mentions § 75-1.1 only as the basis of a state-law claim and dismisses that claim for lack of jurisdiction after the federal RICO claims failed; it does not interpret, apply, or decide what § 75-1.1 requires. opinion →
Dowless v. Warren-Rupp Houdailles, Inc., and Houdailles Industries, Inc., the opinion only identifies § 75-1.1 as one of Dowless's pleaded claims and later cites an alleged § 75-1.1 violation as an example of an injury for purposes of the separate long-arm statute. It does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Holiday Steel Rule Die Corp., the statute is mentioned only in the introductory description of the parties’ claims and counterclaims. The court decides the motion on copyright infringement and does not interpret or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Gabriel v. O'HARA, the opinion mentions § 75-1.1 only while describing and quoting the North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision in Holley; this Pennsylvania court decided the limitations period for Pennsylvania's UTPCPL and did not itself construe the North Carolina statute. opinion →
Hanes Companies, Inc. v. Ronson, the statute appears only in the procedural history as a claim Hanes alleged in its second complaint. The court decided personal jurisdiction, abatement, consolidation, and transfer, and did not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Simms Investment Co. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., the court cited § 75-1.1 only as an analogy in selecting a choice-of-law rule for a Colorado securities-fraud claim. It did not decide a § 75-1.1 claim or construe, apply, or determine the statute’s requirements or coverage. opinion →
Orkin Exterminating Company, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, the statute appears only in a case citation supporting Orkin’s argument that a state “little” section 5 statute requires more than a simple breach of contract. The court rejected reliance on state-statute interpretations and decided the case under the Federal Trade Commission Act, so it did not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
United States Hosiery Corp. v. Gap, Inc., the statute appears only in the description of Plaintiffs’ pleaded claims; the court decides discovery and scheduling motions and does not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Jeske v. Brooks, the court mentions § 75-1.1 only as one of the statutes underlying Jeske’s state-law claims. It does not interpret or apply the statute, and it dismisses the appeal concerning the district court’s order compelling arbitration of those state claims for lack of jurisdiction. opinion →
Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Industries, Inc., the court addressed § 75-1.1 only in deciding whether plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success sufficient for preliminary injunctive relief, and expressly stated that it expressed no opinion on the ultimate decision on the § 75-1.1 claim. opinion →
Nabisco Brands, Inc. Planters Lifesaver Company v. Conusa Corporation General De Confiteria, S.A., the statute is mentioned only as one of the claims alleged by the plaintiffs. The court does not analyze, interpret, or decide any issue under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; it affirms the preliminary injunction based on a federal trademark-infringement claim and expressly leaves the state unfair-competition/preemption issue undecided. opinion →
Dayton Progress Corporation v. Lane Punch Corporation, and Jerry W. Campbell James William Porter, the opinion mentions § 75-1.1 only in describing the district court’s conclusion below; the appellate court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
W.W. Enterprise, Inc. v. Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify Count Four of the complaint; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., the court expressly declined to reach the state-law unfair-competition issue, so its citation to § 75-1.1 was incidental rather than a holding about the statute. opinion →
Cohn v. Bond, the court merely reported that the district court had misidentified a § 75-1.1 claim that the plaintiff had dropped; it did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Cohn v. Bond, the statute appears only in the court's account of the district court's procedural error; the court explains that the plaintiff had dropped that claim and that the claim actually before the district court arose under § 90-153. The opinion does not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Coggin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In Re Coggin), the opinion mentions N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 only as the legal basis for the plaintiffs’ requested damages and in deciding class certification under Rule 23; it does not decide what the statute means, requires, covers, or whether Sears violated it. opinion →
Winant v. Bostic, the court mentions § 75-1.1 while explaining the statutory framework, but its actual holding construes § 75-16 and decides that restitution awarded after rescission is not subject to trebling. It does not decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-1.1. opinion →
BJT, INC. v. Molson Breweries USA, Inc., the opinion merely reports that the plaintiffs alleged a violation of § 75-1.1; the court decided removal and remand based on other state-law claims and did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Tools USA & Equipment Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equipment, Inc., the opinion only reports that the parties stipulated not to submit the § 75-1.1 claim to the jury; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any requirement of the statute. opinion →
McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Granutec, Inc., the court merely identifies § 75-1.1 as a claim alleged in the complaint and expressly declines to determine the plaintiff's likelihood of prevailing on the other claims after finding likely success on the first Lanham Act claim. opinion →
Tools USA and Equipment Company v. Champ Frame Straightening Equipment, Incorporated, the opinion only reports a stipulation and the district court’s resulting damages treatment; it does not construe, explain, or apply the requirements or scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company, a California Corporation v. Launeil Sanders, the opinion merely reports that the district court entered judgment on a § 75-1.1 claim. The appellate court does not construe, explain, or decide the scope or application of § 75-1.1; its damages ruling addresses duplicative recovery for the same conduct under fraud and unfair-trade-practices claims. opinion →
Regent Lighting Corp. v. American Lighting Concept, Inc., section 75-1.1 appears only as a pleaded cause of action and in a personal-jurisdiction discussion; the court did not construe or decide what the statute requires or how its substantive standard applies. opinion →
West v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., the opinion lists N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 among the North Carolina laws invoked in the complaint, but the court analyzes only the FDCPA and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-70-105; it makes no ruling about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Raad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court cited § 75-1.1(a) only while summarizing Fourth Circuit North Carolina authority as persuasive guidance for predicting the meaning of Nebraska’s Consumer Protection Act. It did not apply, construe, or decide a claim under North Carolina’s statute. opinion →
Schwartz v. American Medical Ass'n, the statute appears only in allegations quoted from the underlying complaint and in a footnote reproducing its text. The court did not construe or apply § 75-1.1; it resolved the case on defamation issues. opinion →
Werner v. Lawrence Transportation Systems, Inc., the court only identifies the N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 claim as one of the pleaded causes of action. It dismisses that claim as preempted by the Carmack Amendment and does not interpret or decide what § 75-1.1 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Republic Mortgage Insurance v. Brightware, Inc., the court mentions § 75-1.1 only as one of the claims alleged in the complaint, in its procedural history. The court decided a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Pickett v v. American Ordnance Preservation Ass'n, section 75-1.1 appears only in a footnote reporting the jury's award and the unchallenged judgment below. The court did not construe the statute or decide any issue about its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Bepco, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., the court merely identifies § 75-1.1 as a basis for Bepco’s state-law claims and denies summary judgment because of factual conflicts; it does not construe or apply the statute’s substantive requirements. opinion →
CHRISTIAN SCI. BD. OF DIRECTORS v. Robinson, the court refers to § 75-1.1 only in its discussion of North Carolina's interest and the reasonableness of exercising specific personal jurisdiction. It does not adjudicate the unfair-trade-practices claim or independently analyze, construe, or apply the statute. opinion →
Christian Science Board of Directors of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Robinson, the court mentions § 75-1.1 only while discussing North Carolina’s interest in exercising personal jurisdiction, identifying the plaintiffs’ unfair-trade-practices claim and citing general propositions. It does not decide the statute’s meaning, requirements, coverage, or application to the dispute. opinion →
Alpha International Trading Co. v. Maersk, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify one of the plaintiff's claims. The court dismissed that claim under COGSA's one-year limitations period and did not decide what § 75-1.1 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
MILLS POINTE HOMEOWNER'S v. Whitmire, the statute appears only in the procedural history as part of the complaint's listed causes of action. The Court of Appeals did not interpret or apply § 75-1.1; it dismissed the interlocutory appeal. opinion →
Basnight v. Diamond Developers, Inc., the opinion mentions § 75-1.1 only while deciding whether the defendant qualified for attorney’s fees under § 75-16.1 and whether the claim was frivolous and malicious; it does not construe or decide what § 75-1.1 means, requires, or covers. opinion →
Goleta National Bank v. Lingerfelt, the court mentions § 75-1.1 only in describing the state action’s purpose for purposes of Younger abstention; it does not decide what the statute means, requires, covers, or how it applies. opinion →
Charlotte Commercial Group, Inc. v. Fleet National Bank (In Re Charlotte Commercial Group, Inc.), the statute is mentioned only in the procedural description of one claim CCG asserted. The court did not construe, interpret, or decide any issue under § 75-1.1; it decided the jury-trial demand based on bankruptcy jurisdiction and contractual waiver. opinion →
Tracker Marine, L.P. v. Ogle, the statute appears only in a string cite listing examples of consumer-protection statutes with no apparent scienter requirement. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Emergency One, Incorporated, D/B/A American Eagle Fire Apparatus Company, Incorporated v. American Fire Eagle Engine Company, Incorporated, the citation appears only in the procedural history to identify a pending claim under the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The court did not construe, explain, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Precept Medical Products, Inc. v. Klus, the statute appears only in the complaint's allegations; the court decided personal jurisdiction and venue and did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Marker & Associates, Inc. v. J. Allan Hall & Associates, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the basis of a claim alleged in the complaint. The court did not analyze, construe, or decide anything under § 75-1.1; it resolved the case on licensing and commission-recovery issues under other statutes. opinion →
Tomi White Bryan, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Bellsouth Communications, Incorporated, the court merely identifies section 75-1.1 as the statutory basis for Count A. Its decision concerns federal-question jurisdiction and the filed-rate doctrine, and does not interpret or decide what section 75-1.1 means, requires, covers, or otherwise applies. opinion →
Gibson v. Total Car Franchising Corp., the court cited N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1.1 and 75-16 only as examples of statutes authorizing treble damages for deceptive conduct while evaluating whether a Tennessee punitive-damages award was excessive. It did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Ladd v. Fortis Benefits Insurance, the court mentioned § 75-1.1 only in describing the legal basis for Plaintiff’s dismissed treble-damages claim and did not decide its meaning, scope, or applicability. The court expressly declined to decide the related preemption issue concerning § 58-63-15. opinion →
GE Healthcare Financial Services v. EBW Laser, Inc., the statute appears only in the court’s description of a claim EBW asserted in its Third-Party Complaint. The court decided the third-party defendants were improperly impleaded under Rule 14 and dismissed the complaint without construing or applying § 75-1.1. opinion →
Accu-Sport International, Inc. v. Swing Dynamics, Inc., the statute is mentioned only as one of the plaintiff’s pleaded claims in the procedural background. The court decided whether personal jurisdiction existed and did not construe, explain, or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation, the statute appears only in a string cite identifying laws under which plaintiffs proposed class certification, with the citation attributed to plaintiffs' memorandum. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation, the court lists N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 among the state consumer-protection statutes under which the class claims were certified, but does not interpret or apply the statute's requirements or meaning. opinion →
Diamond Triumph Auto Glass, Inc. v. Safelite Glass Corp., the statute is cited as part of Safelite’s allegation and the court does not interpret or apply what § 75-1.1 means or requires. The court’s denial of summary judgment rests on evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact about damages, making the statutory reference incidental. opinion →
Time Warner Entertainment-Advance/Newhouse Partnership v. Carteret-Craven Electric Membership Corp., the statute is mentioned only in a footnote as an example of a statute creating a statutory cause of action. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1; it resolves the case under Chapter 117 and common-law principles. opinion →
Hovis v. General Dynamics Corp. (In Re Hovis), the opinion mentions § 75-1.1 only while quoting the Fourth Circuit’s discussion in ITCO Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp. The quoted statute was not applied to this case, and the court did not construe or decide any issue under the statute. opinion →
Kenai Chrysler Center, Inc. v. Denison, section 75-1.1 is mentioned only in a comparative authority footnote. The court decides claims under Alaska's UTPA and does not construe, apply, or adopt a holding about North Carolina's statute. opinion →
Beyers v. Richmond, the North Carolina statute appears only in a list of statutes containing express exemptions for attorneys; the court did not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, instead deciding whether Pennsylvania’s UTPCPL applies to attorney misconduct. opinion →
In Re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litigation, the statute is mentioned only as the law underlying Count XXX in a list of the plaintiffs’ pleaded state consumer-protection claims. The court does not interpret, define, or specifically apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Gita Sports Ltd. v. SG Sensortechnik GmbH & Co. KG, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote listing one of Plaintiff's causes of action. The court dismissed that claim as part of its venue ruling and did not construe, interpret, or decide what § 75-1.1 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Rose v. SLM Financial Corp., the court cited § 75-1.1 only as an illustrative example of individualized issues defeating commonality and typicality in a class-certification ruling. It did not decide whether the defendants’ conduct was unfair or deceptive, or otherwise construe or apply the statute on the merits. opinion →
Burns v. Duplin Land Development, Inc., the statute appears only in a footnote reporting that plaintiffs initially asserted a state-law claim that was later stipulated dismissed with prejudice; the court did not interpret or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, the opinion mentions N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 only while describing a federal court's discussion of North Carolina's UDTPA. The Washington Supreme Court did not construe or decide the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 75-1.1; its holding concerned Washington's Consumer Protection Act. opinion →
Philips Electronics North America Corp. v. Hope, section 75-1.1 is mentioned only as a claim listed in the procedural history, and the court expressly states that the claim was abandoned and would not be considered. The opinion does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Facility Wizard Software, Inc. v. Southeastern Technical Services, LLC, the court mentioned § 75-1.1 as one of the North Carolina claims dismissed because the contract’s Illinois choice-of-law provision governed; it did not construe, define, or apply the elements or scope of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Elkes Development, LLC v. Arnold (In Re Arnold), the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the legal basis of the plaintiffs’ pleaded unfair-trade-practices claim. The court decides bankruptcy jurisdiction over the claim, not what § 75-1.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
In Re WellNx Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation, the statute is mentioned only in footnote 11 as one item in a list of sixteen state consumer-protection statutes asserted by the plaintiff. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Couick v. Wyeth, Inc., the opinion only lists the § 75-1.1 claim as Count 9. It does not construe, apply, or decide any issue under the statute; the summary-judgment ruling rests on North Carolina product-liability law and the fact that defendants did not manufacture or sell the drug at issue. opinion →
Manley v. Air Canada, the statute is mentioned only to identify one of the plaintiff's claims in the procedural history; the court decided personal jurisdiction and did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
In Re Fedex Ground Package System, Inc., Employment Practices Litigation, the opinion mentions § 75-1.1(a) only as one of the drivers’ alleged claims. The court does not interpret, analyze, or decide anything about the statute; its ruling addresses employment status and summary judgment. opinion →
Misel v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, the statute appears only in a footnote describing the claims in the earlier Ross case. This court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Walter v. Freeway Foods, Inc. (In Re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc.), the court quoted § 75-1.1(a) and (b) while deciding the separate federal-law question whether the statutory claims were legal claims carrying a Seventh Amendment jury-trial right. It did not construe or decide the statute’s substantive elements, scope, coverage, or application. opinion →
High Point Bank v. Hoffman Builders, Inc., the statute appears only in a footnote listing one of Defendants' counterclaims. The court decided whether the interlocutory appeal affected a substantial right and did not address the merits, meaning, requirements, or application of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Precision Links Inc. v. USA Products Group, Inc., the court mentions § 75-1.1 only in describing the procedural history and the earlier dismissal of the plaintiff's unfair-and-deceptive-trade-practices claim; this fee order does not construe or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Com. v. TAP PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS, INC., the opinion mentions N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 only in a parenthetical string of cited authorities summarizing Carcano. The court's own holding concerns Pennsylvania's consumer-protection law, so it does not construe or apply the North Carolina statute. opinion →
Commonwealth v. Tap Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., the opinion cites § 75-1.1 only in a parenthetical string citation describing the holding of another case; it does not decide or adopt any interpretation of the statute. opinion →
Klopfer v. Queens Gap Mountain, LLC, the court mentions the § 75-1.1 claim only while deciding whether the claims against nonsignatories were subject to arbitration. It does not interpret, define, or otherwise decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Community State Bank v. Knox, the statute appears only in a footnote listing claims alleged in the underlying Knox Complaint; the court did not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Burns v. Dennis (In Re Southeastern Materials, Inc.), the statute appears only in the description of a claim asserted against Tony and in the order identifying that claim for proposed findings; the court does not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation, the statute is mentioned as part of the pleaded claims and in connection with standing and class-certification rulings. The opinion does not construe § 75-1.1 or decide what its elements require; the quoted discussion is procedural and does not establish a substantive statutory holding. opinion →
Marx Industries, Inc. v. Chestnut Ridge Foam, Inc., the statute appears only in the description of claims Marx asserted; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Mansfield v. Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance, Inc., the opinion identifies the UDTPA claim only as one of several claims subject to arbitration; it does not interpret, apply, or decide any requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Eli Global, LLC v. University Directories, LLC, the statute is mentioned only in a procedural-history list of claims brought by the debtors. The court did not interpret or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; its holding concerned mandatory withdrawal under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) based on the trademark-infringement claim and the Lanham Act. opinion →
Mkt. Am., Inc. v. Lin, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing the trial court's amended default judgment; the appellate court decided issues concerning default, excusable neglect, and appeal timing, and did not construe or apply § 75-1.1. opinion →
Greensboro Scuba Sch., LLC v. Robertson, the opinion mentions § 75-1.1 while reciting the elements and describing plaintiffs' allegations, but it does not decide liability under the statute or construe how it applies. The ruling concerns attorneys' fees under § 75-16.1. opinion →
Stikeleather Realty & Invs. Co. v. Broadway, the court did not construe or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1; it merely held that the UDTP claim and related remedies failed as a consequence of reversing the underlying RRAA violation. opinion →
SAS Institute, Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., the statute appears only in a footnote identifying a U.D.T.P.A. claim that remained pending for trial; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 75-1.1. opinion →
Pathfinder Software, LLC v. Core Cashless, LLC, the statute appears only in the description of Pathfinder’s pleaded claims. The court did not interpret or apply § 75-1.1; it dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. opinion →
LeCann v. Cobham (In re Cobham), the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the basis of a claim asserted in the underlying Business Court action. This opinion decides bankruptcy nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523 and does not interpret or apply N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. opinion →
Viza Electronics, LLC v. Paradigm Clinical Research Institute, Inc., the statute appears only in the background as the legal basis cited in Plaintiff’s amended complaint for seeking treble damages and attorneys’ fees. The court did not construe, apply, or decide any issue under § 75-1.1. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Morgan v. Dare to Be Great, Inc., the court describes a rule of G.S. 25A-44(4), but does not decide a rule of G.S. 75-1.1 itself. opinion →
Harrington Manufacturing Co. v. Powell Manufacturing Co., the court decides whether the customer list is discoverable under the discovery rules, not what § 75-1.1 requires or covers. opinion →
B. B. Walker Co. v. Ashland Chemical Co., the court applies the limitations period in § 1-54(2) to a Chapter 75 claim; it does not decide a rule of § 75-1.1 itself. opinion →
CF Industries, Inc. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., the citation describes a claim the plaintiffs alleged; the court did not decide that claim. The footnote reports that the district court dismissed it. opinion →
CF Industries, Inc. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., the opinion only reports the district court’s dismissal of the § 75-1.1 claim; this court does not decide it. opinion →
Mayton v. Hiatt's Used Cars, Inc., the court decides the requirements for attorney fees under G.S. 75-16.1 and expressly declines to decide whether G.S. 75-1.1 was violated. opinion →
Twin City Apartments, Inc. v. Landrum, the reference to § 75-1.1 reports an allegation in another lawsuit, not this court’s decision about the section. opinion →
Baylor v. Brown, this describes the plaintiff’s request; the court decided whether to set aside the default judgment, not a rule under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Kinnard v. Mecklenburg Fair, Ltd., the court decided whether denying leave to amend was an abuse of discretion under Rule 15(a), without deciding a rule of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Shields v. Bobby Murray Chevrolet, Inc., the equally divided court affirmed without precedential value and did not decide a rule under § 75-1.1. opinion →
North Carolina Utilities Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the reference reports a claim in a separate case; this court makes no decision under § 75-1.1. opinion →
Edmisten, Attorney General v. Challenge, Inc., the court cites § 75-1.1 as an analogy while deciding whether the program violates G.S. 14-291.2; it does not decide a rule of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Santana, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., the court decides that California law governs under North Carolina choice-of-law rules; it does not decide a rule of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Santana, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., the court reverses the claim because California law applies under choice-of-law rules; it does not decide any rule of § 75-1.1. opinion →
Gower v. Strout Realty, Inc., the court expressly declined to decide whether the allegations stated a claim under § 75-1.1. opinion →
North Carolina Department of Correction v. Gibson, the statement about § 75-1.1 is a ruling by another court, cited as an example; this court does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Leonard E. Warner, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., the section appears only as an allegation in the plaintiff’s complaint; this court decided recovery on the injunction bond under Rule 65. opinion →
Marshall v. Miller, the bad-faith ruling is attributed to the Court of Appeals; this court only allowed reconsideration to consider whether that ruling was erroneous. opinion →
…and 144 more.

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