N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1

Rule 8(e)(2) permits alternative claims even when a plaintiff may not ultimately prevail on both.

James River Equipment, Inc. v. Mecklenburg Utilities, Inc. · filed 2006-09-05Rule 8(e)(2)

It is well-established that “[ljiberal pleading rules permit pleading in the alternative,” and that theories may be pursued in the complaint even if plaintiff may not ultimately be able to prevail on both. ... N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 8(e)(2) (2003). We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s claims in quantum meruit.

Rule 8 requires a claim for relief to give notice of the occurrences the pleader intends to prove; a pleading cannot give notice of events that occur after it is filed.

Gordon v. Gordon · filed 1970-02-04Rule 8

Though the new rules of civil procedure which became eff-fective 1 January 1970 liberalize pleading requirements, they nevertheless require a claim for relief to be set forth sufficiently particular “to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, . . .” G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8. Suffice it to say that a pleading filed 16 January 1968 cannot give notice of occurrences that do not take place until a year later.

Rule 8(a)(1) requires a complaint to state the claim plainly and with enough detail to give the court and parties notice of the occurrences to be proved.

Hoover v. Hoover · filed 1970-08-26(a)(1)

Tested by the standard now provided by Rule 8(a) (1), it is pur opinion, and we so hold, that plaintiff’s amended complaint does contain a “plain statement of the claim sufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the . . . transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved,” showing that she is entitled to relief.

A complaint withstands a motion to dismiss when it gives the defendant sufficient notice of the claim and reveals no insurmountable bar to recovery on its face.

Cassels v. Ford Motor Company · filed 1970-12-16Rule 8(a)(1)

A complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss where no insurmountable bar to recovery on the claim alleged appears on the face of the complaint and where allegations contained therein are sufficient to give a defendant sufficient notice of the nature and basis of plaintiffs’ claim to enable him to answer and prepare for trial.

Rule 84, Form 4 permits a complaint to raise wilful and wanton conduct through allegations that give the defendant fair notice of the claim.

Brewer v. Harris · filed 1971-07-30Rule 84, Form 4

We hold that plaintiff’s complaint was sufficient to raise the issue of defendant’s intestate’s wilful and wanton conduct. ... Since we hold that the complaint meets the requirements of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 84, Form 4, we find no merit in this contention.

Rule 8 requires a pleading to give notice of the transactions supporting a claim; a bare assertion of third-party beneficiary status is insufficient.

FCX, Inc. v. Bailey · filed 1972-03-29Rule 8

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8, requires that a pleading shall contain a plain statement of the claim sufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of the transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Nowhere in the third-party complaint is there a statement which gives notice of transactions or occurrences from which the courts can reasonably conclude that Bailey has a claim against Southern on any legal theory. Bailey’s allegation of the mere conclusion that they are third-party beneficiaries is not sufficient.

Rule 8(c) requires a party pleading accord and satisfaction to give sufficiently particular notice of the transactions supporting that affirmative defense; alleging payment alone is insufficient.

FRUIT & PROD. PKG. CO., DIV. OF INLAND CONT. CORP. v. Stepp · filed 1972-06-28Rule 8(c)

Defendant’s answer, quoted in the facts of this case, fails to comply with the above conditions of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(c). Although defendant contends that his defense of accord and satisfaction is couched in the phraseology of his answer, we find, even with a liberal view, that the defendant only alleged that he was obligated to the plaintiff for an open account, that the account has been fully paid and satisfied, and no amount is owed. This clearly is not sufficient to give the court or the plaintiff notice of any transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences intended to prove accord and satisfaction.

Rule 8(f) requires pleadings to be construed to do substantial justice; a complaint’s facts may support declaratory relief even if it does not cite the Declaratory Judgment Act.

Langdon v. Hurdle · filed 1972-06-28Rule 8(f)

It is not error if an action instituted under the act fails to make specific reference to the statute in the complaint; the facts alleged determine the nature of the relief to be granted. Little v. Trust Co., 252 N.C. 229, 113 S.E. 2d 689 (1960). All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8 (f). We think the court had authority to make the adjudication challenged.

Section 1A-1, Rule 8(a) does not require detailed fact pleading.

Lewis v. Gastonia Air Service, Inc. · filed 1972-10-25Rule 8(a)

Under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(a), detailed fact-pleading is not required.

Rule 9(b) requires the circumstances of fraud to be pleaded with particularity but permits intent to be alleged generally.

Brantley v. Dunstan · filed 1972-12-20Rule 9(b)

While circumstances constituting fraud must be alleged with particularity, intent or other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.

Rule 8(c) requires a defendant relying on the plaintiff’s failure to perform a contract to plead that failure affirmatively as a defense.

Beachboard v. Southern Railway Company · filed 1972-12-20Rule 8(c)

If as a defense Champion intended to rely upon some asserted breach or failure to perform by Southern, it should have set forth affirmatively any such failure of consideration or “other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(c).

Rule 8(c) makes illegality an affirmative defense and places the burden of proving it on the party who pleads it.

Rose v. Vulcan Materials Company · filed 1973-02-14Rule 8(c)

Illegality is an affirmative defense, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(c), Rules of Civil Procedure, and the burden of proving illegality is on the party who pleads it. Thus defendant has the laboring oar on this question.

Rule 8(c) makes the statute of frauds an affirmative defense that must be pleaded in response to a counterclaim.

Chance v. Jackson · filed 1973-03-28Rule 8(c)

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure the statute of frauds is now an affirmative defense, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(c), and plaintiff failed to plead it as a defense to defendant’s counterclaim.

Rule 8(c) places the burden of pleading an affirmative defense on the defendant.

Gray v. Gray · filed 1972-12-20Rule 8(c)

However, the burden of pleading, as well as establishing such affirmative defense, is on the defendant.

A complaint that sufficiently alleges the events underlying a claim and shows no insurmountable bar to recovery on its face can withstand dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

Patterson Ex Rel. Patterson v. Weatherspoon · filed 1972-12-29Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6)

It is our opinion that when viewed in the light of these principles, the complaint in question is sufficient to withstand defendant’s motion to dismiss. ... The events and transactions which give rise to the claim are sufficiently alleged. Our attention has been directed to no insurmountable bar to recovery which appears on the face of the claim alleged.

Rule 8 permits a complaint that gives notice of the claim without detailed fact pleading.

Roberts v. Whitley · filed 1973-03-14

We find the complaint, although sparse in detail, sufficient to meet the requirements of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8. Fact pleading is no longer required.

Rule 8 permits relief supported by the pleaded facts and evidence even when the pleading names a different legal theory.

City of Kings Mountain v. Goforth · filed 1973-05-09Rule 8(a)(1)

Although the Goforths in their cross-complaint assert a right to recover on the ground of negligence, the claim which they allege is “sufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Rule 8, Rules of Civil Procedure, G.S. 1A-1. Their evidence tends to support their allegations. If defendants Goforth are entitled to relief under their allegations and evidence, Kings Mountain was not entitled to a directed verdict because defendants Goforth named “negligence” rather than “trespass” or “inverse condemnation” as the ground on which they were entitled to recover.

Rule 8 treats res judicata, estoppel, and accord and satisfaction as affirmative defenses that a defendant must plead.

Hamrick v. Beam · filed 1973-11-14Rule 8(c)

Defendant did not plead res judicata, estoppel, or, as above noted, accord and satisfaction, all of which are affirmative defenses. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8.

Rule 8(e)(2) permits a party to plead and prove inconsistent defenses without electing between them before trial.

Alpar v. WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, INC. · filed 1974-01-09Rule 8(e)(2)

Obviously, adherence to plaintiff’s viewpoint would render Rule 8(e) (2) meaningless, as we would be placed in the incongruous position of saying that you can plead inconsistent defenses but you cannot prove the same.

Rule 8(a)(1) requires allegations sufficient to give fair notice that a plaintiff intends to hold a defendant responsible for another person’s negligence; detailed agency facts are not essential.

Nolan v. Boulware · filed 1974-05-01Rule 8(a)(1)

Now, however, since the effective date of our new Rules of Civil Procedure, such a complaint need contain in this regard only a “short and plain statement of the claim sufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(a) (1). ... We hold that the complaints were sufficient to give defendant Boulware fair notice that plaintiffs intended to prove facts to establish that Boulware was legally responsible for the negligent acts of her codefendant Moxley.

Rule 9(b) requires a pleading alleging fraud, duress, or mistake to state the facts relied upon rather than mere conclusions.

Estate of Loftin v. Loftin · filed 1974-06-05Rule 9(b)

In order to comply with Rule 9(b), the pleadings must, state the facts to be relied upon to establish fraud, duress or mistake.

Rule 9(b) requires a party alleging mistake to state the circumstances with particularity; a bare claim of error, oversight, and mutual mistake is insufficient.

Ragsdale v. Kennedy · filed 1974-08-07Rule 9(b)

G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(b), requires that the circumstances constituting mistake shall be stated with particularity. The mere statement that something was or was not done through error, oversight and mutual mistake is not sufficient to satisfy the minimum requirements for seeking the revision of a contract because of mistake. Such an allegation does not raise an issue of fact for determination.

Rule 8 permits a complaint to support a last clear chance issue when its allegations give sufficient notice of the facts supporting that doctrine, even without using its exact name.

Thacker v. Harris · filed 1974-06-19Rule 8

This pleading was sufficiently particular to give notice that plaintiff intended to offer proof of occurrences giving rise to last clear chance, and under our new Rules of Civil Procedure the complaint here was sufficient under Rule 8 to justify submitting to the jury an issue as to last clear chance.

Rule 54(c) allows a final judgment to grant relief a party did not request in the pleadings, except in a default judgment; a complaint that may support other relief should not be dismissed solely because the requested relief is unavailable.

Fleming v. Mann · filed 1974-11-06Rule 54(c)

However, except in case of judgment entered by default, “every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.” G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(c). Therefore, if the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint are sufficient to show that he may be entitled to any relief in this action, even though not that which he requested, defendants’ motion to dismiss should not have been granted.

Usury must be pleaded as an affirmative defense unless the parties expressly or impliedly consent to try the issue at trial.

Wallace Men's Wear, Inc. v. Harris · filed 1975-12-17Rule 8(c); Rule 15(b)

Plaintiff correctly argues that usury is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(c). When not raised by the pleading the issue may still be tried if raised by the express or implied consent of the parties at trial. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(b). However, defendant not only failed to raise the issue of usury in his pleadings but the record reveals no showing that the issue was raised at the trial. Not having raised the issue in his pleadings or at trial defendant cannot now present this defense before this Court.

Rule 8(a) permits complaints to use broad and general terms when stating a claim for relief.

Smith v. State · filed 1976-03-02(a)

The allegations of the complaint are in the broad and general terms permitted by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8 (a), and we cannot say that it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief against the individual defendants.

Rule 8(a)(1) requires a pleading stating a claim for relief to provide a short and plain statement sufficiently particular to give notice of the transactions or occurrences intended to be proved, and it does not require detailed fact pleading.

Madigan v. Jenkins · filed 1976-11-03(a)(1)

Under the “notice theory” of pleading contemplated by Rule 8(a) (1) detailed fact pleading is no longer required.

Rule 8(a)(1) requires complaint allegations to give notice of the transactions and occurrences the plaintiff intends to prove to establish entitlement to relief.

Raccoon Valley Investment Co. v. Toler · filed 1977-03-02(a)(1)

These allegations in the body of plaintiff’s complaint were clearly sufficiently particular to meet the requirements of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(a)(1) that they give notice of the transactions and occurrences which plaintiff intended to prove to show that it was entitled to relief.

Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include a demand for relief and permits alternative theories of relief.

North Carolina State Ports Authority v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. · filed 1977-03-02(a)(2)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(a) (2) only requires that the complaint include: “A demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled.” The Ports Authority deems itself entitled to money damages, and money damages are appropriate. In addition, Rule 8 (a) (2) permits the pleading of alternative theories of relief, and plaintiff includes a prayer for all relief which is appropriate and just, which would support an award of money damages. Moreover, it is not a crucial error to demand the wrong relief.

Rule 8 requires a claim to provide notice of the transactions supporting relief, pleadings to be simple, concise, and direct, and pleadings to be construed to do substantial justice.

RGK, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1977-06-13(a)(1), (e)(1), and (f)

This principle of pleading, well established under the former Code, is not specifically set forth in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, G.S. Chapter 1A, but it is implicit in the present requirement of Rule 8 that the plaintiff's claim for relief be set forth in "a short and plain statement of the claim" and that "each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct."

Rule 8 requires a complaint to give the court and defendants sufficiently particular notice of the transactions or occurrences intended to be proved.

Acker v. Barnes · filed 1977-08-03Rule 8

Even under the liberal approach of notification pleading embodied in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8, plaintiffs’ complaint fails to contain any statement sufficiently particular to give the court and the defendants notice of any transactions or occurrences intended to be proved showing that the plaintiffs are entitled to any relief.

Rule 8(a)(1) requires a short and plain statement that gives notice of the claim; a general statement that a statutory notice was filed is insufficient.

Baumann v. Smith · filed 1979-05-15Rule 8(a)(1)

While we construe pleadings liberally, the “short and plain statement of the claim” required by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(a)(1) requires more than a general statement that a notice for relief has been filed pursuant to some statute.

Rule 8(a)(1) requires a complaint to give notice of the claim; detailed fact pleading is unnecessary.

Lupo v. Powell · filed 1979-11-20Rule 8(a)(1)

We conclude that the complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action against defendant Nationwide. It was “sufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(a)(1). Our Rules of Civil Procedure no longer require “fact pleading.” “Notice pleading” is all that is now required.

Rule 8(a)(1) follows notice pleading; a pleading need not detail the facts constituting the claim.

Munchak Corp. v. Caldwell · filed 1980-05-06Rule 8(a)(1)

Since the passage of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, in particular G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(a)(1), which took effect on 1 January 1970, the State has followed the concept of notice pleading. No longer must a pleading detail the facts which constitute the cause of action. ... It is clear that defendant’s counterclaim meets the requirements of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(a)(1).

Rule 8(a)(1)'s notice pleading standard allows allegations of latent defects to raise an issue of breach of implied warranty.

Southern of Rocky Mount, Inc. v. Woodward Specialty Sales, Inc. · filed 1981-06-16Rule 8(a)(1)

Under the notice pleading theory of Rule 8(a)(1), plaintiff’s allegations of latent defects sufficiently raised the issue of breach of implied warranty.

Rule 9(a) does not require a complaint to allege what type of legal entity the defendant is.

Rollins v. Junior Miller Roofing Co. · filed 1981-12-15Rule 9(a)

However, it is not necessary to allege in the complaint what type of legal entity the defendant is. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 9(a) (1969).

Rule 8(a)(1) requires a complaint to identify the transactions or occurrences it intends to prove; conclusory grievances are insufficient to state a claim.

Alamance County v. N.C. Department of Human Resources · filed 1982-09-07Rule 8(a)(1)

A complaint, to state a claim for relief, must refer to “the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved.” G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(a)(1).

Rule 18(a) permits a plaintiff to join claims on multiple promissory notes in one complaint.

WICKES CORPORATION v. Hodge · filed 1970-04-01Rule 18(a)

G.S. 1-123 was specifically repealed by Chapter 954 of the 1967 Session Laws and from and after 1 January 1970 the proposition under discussion is covered by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 18(a). Plaintiff’s complaint clearly would comply with the new rule.

Rule 18 permits a party to join as many legal or equitable claims as he has against an opposing party.

Gibbs v. Heavlin · filed 1974-07-17Rule 18

With respect to the joinder of claims, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 18, clearly provides that a party asserting a claim for relief may join as many claims, legal or equitable, as he has against an opposing party. We hold that there was no improper joinder of claims in the case at bar.

Rule 8(a)(2) bars a specific damages demand in a professional malpractice complaint; changing the prayer for relief does not cure a demand that remains in the body of the complaint.

Harris v. Maready · filed 1983-09-20Rule 8(a)(2)

From the wording of paragraphs 77 and 78 of the complaint, from a contextual reading of the complaint as a whole, and from both the original and amended prayer for relief, the complaint remains a pleading based upon professional malpractice, demanding monetary relief of five million dollars against each defendant. ... We hold that the trial judge abused his discretion by failing to allow the defendant’s motion to dismiss for a violation of Rule 8(a)(2).

Rule 8(a)(2) permits a court to keep the original amount demanded in a malpractice complaint from the jury before liability is established, even when the amended complaint was discussed on cross-examination.

Carter v. Carr · filed 1984-04-17Rule 8(a)(2)

Although this stated rationale for the rule speaks for protection prior to trial, we can find no reason on the facts in this case to allow the plaintiff during trial to expose to the jury the original amount demanded before liability has been established. Jurors, like other persons, after hearing of the amount may unfairly draw their own conclusions based on the money demanded. We hold the trial court properly limited the plaintiffs redirect examination of Mr. Carter to the fact that the complaint had been amended which had been discussed on cross-examination.

Rule 8(a)(1) requires a complaint to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds on which it rests.

Brad Ragan, Inc. v. Callicutt Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1985-02-19Rule 8(a)(1)

We hold that, judged by this standard, plaintiffs complaint satisfies the requirements of Rule 8(a)(1) in that it gives defendant fair notice of the claim against him and the grounds on which it rests.

The Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a complaint for malicious interference with contract to use the words “but for” when it otherwise sufficiently alleges that the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff’s damages.

Sides v. Duke University · filed 1985-05-07

While the words “but for” are in wide usage and undoubtedly meet the requirements for sufficiently pleading this cause of action, they are not the exclusive means of doing so. ... To hold otherwise would be to return to the type of hypertechnical pleading that our Rules of Civil Procedure, G.S. 1A-1, and Rule 1 et seq. replaced.

A plaintiff may raise last clear chance by filing a reply or by alleging sufficient facts in the complaint.

Meadows v. Lawrence · filed 1985-06-04Rule 7(a)

While the recommended pleading practice is to file a reply alleging last clear chance, see Rule 7(a), North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, if plaintiff's complaint contains factual allegations sufficient to give rise to the doctrine, these allegations alone will enable plaintiff to invoke the doctrine.

Rule 8(a)(1) sets a minimum pleading requirement; a complaint may include more detail than a short and plain statement.

Holley v. Burroughs Wellcome Co. · filed 1985-06-04Rule 8(a)(1)

This rule prescribes the minimum information that a pleading must contain; it does not require that a complaint contain only a "short and plain statement."

Section 1A-1’s notice pleading standard permits a complaint to withstand dismissal when it gives the defendant sufficient notice of the claim and shows no insurmountable bar to recovery.

Gatlin v. Bray · filed 1986-07-01

We find plaintiff’s complaint, judged by the notice pleading standard, sufficient to withstand defendants’ motions to dismiss. The facts alleged are adequate to give defendants sufficient notice of the nature and basis of plaintiff’s claim, and no insurmountable bar to recovery is presented on the face of the complaint.

Rule 8(f) requires liberal construction of pleadings, which may be rejected as insufficient only if fatally defective.

Smith v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1987-01-20Rule 8(f)

Pleadings must be liberally construed to do substantial justice, Givens v. Sellars, 273 N.C. 44, 159 S.E.2d 530 (1968); G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(f), and must be fatally defective before they may be rejected as insufficient.

Rule 8(a)(1) permits a mislabeled claim to proceed when the complaint pleads facts sufficient to give the opposing party notice.

Buchanan v. Hunter Douglas, Inc. · filed 1987-09-01Rule 8(a)(1)

If a plaintiffs claim is mislabeled in his complaint, that fact will not, in and of itself, prove fatal to the action if critical facts are sufficiently pled in the body of the complaint that will give the adverse party notice of the assertions against him.

Section 1A-1 uses notice pleading; conflicting allegations do not prevent a contributory negligence defense from reaching the jury when the pleadings give notice of the parties’ theories, claims, and facts.

Wentz v. Unifi, Inc. · filed 1988-03-01

North Carolina has since adopted the Rules of Civil Procedure, Chapter 1A-1 of the General Statutes (1967), which abolished the rigid and strict technical requirements of form pleading and replaced these requirements with the more liberal and flexible requirements of notice pleading. ... In the present case, the parties’ pleadings were sufficient to give notice of all theories, claims and facts sought to be proven by each party. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the issue of contributory negligence to the jury.

Rule 8(a)(2) does not require a pleading to cite the statute authorizing the damages sought.

Atkins v. Mitchell · filed 1988-11-01Rule 8(a)(2)

Rule 8(a)(2) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure requires only that a pleading contain “[a] demand for judgment for the relief to which [the party] deems himself entitled.” This language does not necessitate including the specific statute authorizing a particular measure of damages, nor does § 25-8-107 require by its own terms that it be specifically pleaded.

Rule 8(a)(1) is satisfied when a complaint gives defendants notice of the claimed violations.

Midgette v. Pate · filed 1989-07-05Rule 8(a)(1)

This portion of the complaint put the defendants on notice of the claim concerning violation of the covenants. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l)(2). In our view plaintiff’s complaint states a claim on the issue of whether there has been a violation of the covenants.

Rule 8(a)(1) requires enough detail to give notice of the claim, but does not require detailed factual pleading.

Fournier v. Haywood County Hospital · filed 1989-09-19Rule 8(a)(1)

Under the “notice theory” of pleading contemplated by Rule 8(a)(1), detailed fact pleading is no longer required.

Rules 20(a) and 8(e)(2) allow alternative claims against multiple defendants without requiring particular wording.

Oxendine v. Bowers · filed 1990-12-04Rule 20(a); Rule 8(e)(2)

Neither rule provides for any particular form of phrasing alternative claims.

Rule 8(a) permits a complaint to state a claim under a statute it does not cite when the allegations give defendants sufficient notice to answer and prepare for trial.

Lewis v. Blackman · filed 1994-09-20Rule 8(a)

Plaintiff responds that, under the notice pleading requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 8(a) (1990), his complaint adequately states a claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-15 because it gave sufficient notice of the claim to enable the defendants to answer and prepare for trial. We agree with plaintiff. We hold that the complaint was sufficient to put defendants on notice of plaintiffs claim, and the plaintiff will not be held to the more stringent requirements found under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-17.

Rule 8(a)(1) requires liberal construction of pleadings; allegations giving sufficient notice of a negligence claim may support recovery under either a common law or statutory standard of care.

Young v. Woodall · filed 1995-06-06Rule 8(a)(1)

Under Rule 8(a)(1), pleadings must be liberally construed to do substantial justice between the parties. ... We conclude that plaintiff’s allegations, liberally construed, provide sufficient notice of her intention to pursue a negligence theory of recovery at trial whether premised upon common law standards of care or the standard of care provided in section 20-145.

Rule 8 requires negligence claims exceeding $10,000 to state that damages exceed $10,000 rather than specify an amount.

Hoffman v. Vulcan Materials Co. · filed 1998-09-04Rule 8(a)(2)

This is because, under North Carolina pleading rules, in negligence actions, claims in excess of $10,000 may only so state.

Rule 10(c) makes a written instrument attached to a pleading part of the pleadings for all purposes.

Terrell v. Lawyers Mutual Liability Insurance · filed 1998-12-15Rule 10(c)

Pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, “any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading” is part of the pleadings in the case for all purposes.

Rule 7 defines pleadings and excludes a motion for leave to amend from the pleadings.

Lassiter v. Cecil · filed 2001-08-21Rule 7

We conclude that, regardless of whether a bare assertion of “personal injuries” would be adequate under McAllister to support a claim for damages due to emotional distress, plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint was not a pleading and was therefore inadequate to provide the requisite notice to defendants. ... N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 7 (1999).

Rule 8(f) requires pleadings to be liberally construed to do substantial justice.

Locust v. Pitt County Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 2002-11-19Rule 8(f)

The allegations in a pleading must be liberally construed so as to do substantial justice. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 8(f) (2001); Smith v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 84 N.C.App. 120, 123, 351 S.E.2d 774, 776, aff'd, 321 N.C. 60, 361 S.E.2d 571 (1987).

Rule 8(e)(2) permits alternative pleadings, and a complaint remains sufficient when one alternative states a viable claim.

Castle Worldwide, Inc. v. Southtrust Bank · filed 2003-05-06Rule 8(e)(2)

In dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint, the trial court ignored Rule 8(e)(2), which allows pleading in the alternative: ... By alleging in one of its alternative theories that the Wachovia defendants cashed checks payable to a third party and turned the proceeds over to Dr. Hayez, the complaint does state at least one viable cause of action.

Rule 8(f) requires liberal construction of pleading allegations to do substantial justice.

Winbush v. Winston-Salem State University · filed 2004-07-20Rule 8(f)

Under our liberal rules of construction for allegations raised in a party’s pleading, the petition thus alleges either a discharge or demotion. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 8(f) (2003) (the allegations in a pleading must be liberally construed so “as to do substantial justice”); Black’s Law Dictionary 444 (7th ed. 1999) (to “demote” is defined as “ [t] o lower in rank, position, or pay”).

Rule 8(f) requires liberal construction of pleadings; a petition and prehearing statement may be considered together to determine whether a claim was sufficiently alleged.

Lee v. N.C. Dept. of Transportation · filed 2006-02-07Rule 8(f)

The trial court concluded that petitioner sufficiently alleged a discrimination claim. Construing the pleadings liberally, including both the petition and the prehearing statement, we agree.

Rule 8(a)(1) requires a misappropriation of trade secrets complaint to identify the alleged secret with enough particularity to give the defendant notice of what it is accused of misappropriating.

Krawiec v. Manly · filed 2018-04-06Rule 8(a)(1)

This Court has not considered the requirements for pleading a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets previously, but we conclude that the reasoning of our Court of Appeals, which mirrors the notice-pleading standard set forth in North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 8,1 is persuasive on this topic. The Court of Appeals has stated, “To plead misappropriation of trade secrets, a plaintiff must identify a trade secret with sufficient particularity so as to enable a defendant to delineate that which he is accused of misappropriating and a court to determine whether misappropriation has or is threatened to occur.”

Rule 8(e)(2) permits a complaint to plead alternative and inconsistent claims.

Barnes v. Perry · filed 2018-07-30Rule 8(e)(2)

Despite the inherent inconsistency in pleading the existence and non-existence of a partnership within the same Complaint, our Rules permit alternative and inconsistent claims within the same Complaint.

Rule 8(e)(2) allows a plaintiff to plead alternative theories of recovery based on the same conduct or transaction.

Tumlin v. Tuggle Duggins P.A. · filed 2018-12-18Rule 8(e)(2)

North Carolina law allows a plaintiff to plead alternative theories of recovery based on the same conduct or transaction. See N.C. Gen Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 8(e)(2).

Rule 8(a)(1) permits evidence of unpleaded domestic violence allegations when the complaint gives sufficient notice of their nature and basis.

Martin v. Martin · filed 2019-07-16Rule 8(a)(1)

A trial court does not err by admitting evidence in support of unpleaded domestic violence allegations, so long as the allegations in the complaint provide sufficient notice of the nature and basis of any unpleaded allegations.

Rule 8(e)(2) permits a plaintiff to plead breach of contract and quantum meruit as alternative claims.

Clark v. Burnette · filed 2020-01-28Rule 8(e)(2)

A plaintiff is permitted to plead claims in the alternative in North Carolina. ... This rule applies to claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit. ... At this juncture, the Court concludes that the claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit are properly and expressly pleaded as alternative claims.

Rule 8 requires a short, plain statement giving notice of the transactions underlying a claim and a demand for relief.

New Hanover County Board of Education v. Stein · filed 2022-02-11Rule 8(a)

An analysis of the extent to which the Board of Education’s amended complaint states a claim for relief pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 147-76.1 must begin with an examination of N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 8, which provides that a pleading must contain (1) “[a] short and plain statement of the claim sufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and (2) “[a] demand for judgment for the relief to which [the plaintiff] deems himself entitled.”

Rule 50 applies the former nonsuit standard when assessing whether the evidence supports judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Musgrave v. Mutual Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1970-06-24Rule 50(b)(1)

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we are guided by the same principles that prevailed under our former procedure with respect to the sufficiency of evidence to withstand a motion for nonsuit under G.S. 1-183.

Rule 50(b)(1) requires reversal of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict when the plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient to go to the jury.

Horton v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Company · filed 1970-08-05Rule 50(b)(1)

Upon a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b) (1), the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the jury based its verdict is drawn into question. ... Applying this rule, if the plaintiffs have made out a case sufficient to go to the jury, then it was error to enter the judgment setting aside the verdict and granting a judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict.

Rule 50 requires a motion for a directed verdict before the verdict to preserve the right to move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

GLEN FOREST CORPORATION v. Bensch · filed 1970-10-21Rule 50

To sustain petitioner’s position on this appeal would in effect work an amendment to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50. That rule provides for a motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff’s evidence or at the close of all the evidence. It does not give a litigant the option of waiting until after the verdict is in to make the motion for a directed verdict to attempt to preserve his right to move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Rule 50(b)(1) requires a court deciding a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to view the evidence supporting the verdict in the opposing party’s favor, including reasonable inferences and conflicts in the evidence.

Coppley v. Carter · filed 1971-02-24Rule 50(b)(1)

Upon a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b) (1), the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the jury based its verdict is drawn into question. All of the evidence which supports defendant’s claim must be taken as true and considered in the light most favorable to defendant, giving him the benefit of every reasonable inference which may legitimately be drawn therefrom, and with contradictions, conflicts and inconsistencies being resolved in defendant’s favor.

Rule 50(b)(1) applies the same test for sufficiency of the evidence to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict that Rule 50(a) applies to a motion for a directed verdict.

Snellings v. Roberts · filed 1971-10-20Rule 50(b)(1)

The same test is to be applied on a motion under Rule 50 (b) (1) for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as is applied on a motion under Rule 50 (a) for a directed verdict.

Rule 51(a) prohibits giving unequal stress to a party’s contention in a jury charge, and Rule 50(b)(1) requires a timely directed-verdict motion to support a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Dean v. Nash · filed 1971-11-17

Under the facts of this case and considering the charge as a whole, we think the court gave unequal stress to this contention in violation of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51(a). ... Since plaintiff failed to move for a directed verdict as to the counterclaim at the close of all the evidence, the motion did not meet the requirement of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b) (1) that a motion for judgment NOV be supported by a timely made motion for directed verdict.

Rule 50(a) and (b) motions test whether the evidence is sufficient to go to the jury, viewing evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motions.

Kinston Building Supply Co. v. Murphy · filed 1971-12-29Rule 50(a) and (b)

Upon motion for a directed verdict and judgment non obstante veredicto, pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(a) and (b), the sufficiency of the evidence to take the case to the jury is drawn into question. All of the evidence which supports plaintiff’s claim must be taken as true and considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff giving him the benefit of every reasonable inference which may legitimately be drawn therefrom, and with contradictions, conflicts and inconsistencies being resolved in plaintiff’s favor.

A postverdict motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict preserves appellate review of the denial of a directed verdict motion made at the close of all the evidence.

Woodard v. Marshall · filed 1972-03-29Rule 50(b)(1)

By offering evidence, defendants waived their motions for directed verdicts made at the close of plaintiff’s evidence. However, by proceeding after verdict under Rule 50(b) (1) with motions for judgments notwithstanding the verdict, they have preserved for appellate review their exceptions to the denial of their motions for directed verdicts made at the close of all the evidence.

Rule 50(b)(1) permits a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when the movant’s directed-verdict motion was denied and the jury’s verdict was adverse to the movant.

Hathcock v. Lowder · filed 1972-10-25Rule 50(b)(1)

We think it clear that the language of the Rule presupposes that its provisions are applicable only to situations in which the party moving for a directed verdict has his motion denied and the verdict of the jury is adverse to his position.

A Rule 50(b) motion is properly denied when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, supports the verdict.

Clouse v. Chairtown Motors, Inc. · filed 1973-03-28Rule 50(b)

Defendant assigns as error the failure of the trial judge to grant its motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b). However, we are of the opinion that viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury and amply supported the verdict and that defendant’s motions were properly denied.

Rule 50(c)(1) requires the trial court to rule on an alternative motion for a new trial when it grants judgment notwithstanding the verdict; a party must appeal conditionally from an adverse ruling.

Hoots v. Calaway · filed 1973-01-26Rule 50(c)(1)

In future cases, the trial court must rule on an alternative motion for a new trial and a party must appeal conditionally from an adverse ruling thereon.

On a motion for a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court must accept the plaintiff’s witnesses’ testimony at face value.

Rayfield v. Clark · filed 1973-05-09Rule 50(a), (b)(1)

In passing upon a motion for a directed verdict and the subsequent motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict based upon it, we must accept the testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses at face value.

Rule 50(b)(1) requires the court to take evidence supporting the party opposing judgment notwithstanding the verdict as true, draw reasonable inferences in that party’s favor, and resolve conflicts in that party’s favor.

Dickinson v. Pake · filed 1973-08-29(b)(1)

Upon motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b) (1), all the evidence which supports plaintiffs’ claim must be taken as true and considered in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, giving them the benefit of every reasonable inference which may legitimately be drawn therefrom, with contradictions, conflicts and inconsistencies being resolved in plaintiffs’ favor.

Rule 50 permits judgment notwithstanding the verdict when a directed verdict should have been granted but the issue was submitted to the jury.

Hoffman v. Clement Bros. · filed 1975-11-19

Defendant was entitled to allowance of its motion for directed verdict with respect to the claim presented in the first issue. Since the court submitted the issue and it was answered in favor of plaintiff, defendant was entitled to an allowance of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50.

Rule 50(b) allows a party who moved for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence to seek judgment notwithstanding the verdict and permits entry of judgment accordingly.

Gray v. Gray · filed 1976-07-21(b)

Since defendant complied with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b) (1) by moving-for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in addition to moving for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, we direct entry of judgment in accordance with defendant’s motion as to the allegations of malicious prosecution.

Rule 50(b)(2) bars an appellate court from directing entry of judgment on a directed verdict motion unless the movant also sought judgment under Rule 50(b)(1) or the trial judge acted on the directed verdict motion under that rule.

Britt v. Allen · filed 1977-01-31(b)(2)

“An appellate court, on finding that a trial judge should have granted a motion for directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence, may not direct entry of judgment in accordance with the motion unless the party who made the motion for a directed verdict also moved for judgment in accordance with Rule 50(b) (1) or the trial judge on his own motion granted, denied, or redenied the motion for a directed verdict in accordance with Rule 50(b)(1).”

Rule 50(b)(1) requires a party seeking judgment notwithstanding the verdict to have previously moved for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence.

Gibbs v. Duke · filed 1977-03-02(b)(1)

We therefore hold that his motion did not meet the requirements of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b) (1) and hence could not be entertained by the trial court.

Rule 50(b) permits a party to seek judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on an earlier directed verdict motion, using the same evidentiary sufficiency standard.

Snider v. Dickens · filed 1977-10-11(b)

The motion for jugment notwithstanding the verdict under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b) is simply a motion that judgment be entered in accordance with the movant’s earlier motion for a directed verdict, notwithstanding the contrary verdict reached by the jury; therefore, we must utilize the same standard of sufficiency of the evidence in reviewing both motions.

Rule 50(c)(1) requires a party who obtains judgment notwithstanding the verdict to request a ruling on its motion for a new trial to preserve trial errors for appellate review.

Beal v. KH STEPHENSON SUPPLY CO., INC. · filed 1978-06-06Rule 50(c)(1)

A party gaining judgment notwithstanding the verdict should also ask for a ruling pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(c)(1), on the motion for a new trial if he wishes to allege any error in the trial or to preserve any question other than the sufficiency of the evidence for appellate review.

Rule 50 requires a judgment notwithstanding the verdict to be assessed under the same test as a directed verdict.

North Carolina National Bank v. Burnette · filed 1978-10-03Rule 50

The test for determining the appropriateness of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50 is the same as is applied on a motion for a directed verdict.

Under Rule 50, a party can obtain judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if it was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Chantos · filed 1979-10-03Rule 50

For plaintiff to be entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n. o. v.) on the first issue, it must first be determined that it was entitled to a directed verdict on that issue. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50. Having already held that plaintiff was not entitled to a directed verdict, we also hold that it was not entitled to a judgment n. o. v.

Under Rule 50, when a directed verdict motion was properly denied, the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict must also be sustained.

Woodard v. NC FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. CO. · filed 1979-12-18

Since the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the court's denial of defendant's motion for judgment NOV must also be sustained.

Under Rule 50, a court that properly denies a directed verdict motion may also deny the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Woodard v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance · filed 1979-12-18Rule 50

Since the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict the court’s denial of defendant’s motion for judgment NOV must also be sustained.

Rule 50(b)(1) permits a trial judge to set aside a jury judgment and enter judgment as if a requested verdict had been directed when the case should not have been submitted to the jury.

Wolfe v. Eaker · filed 1980-12-16Rule 50(b)(1)

No error can be found in the judge’s peremptory instructions to the jury since we hold as we do that the case should have never been submitted to the jury and since the trial judge had the authority under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b)(1) to set aside the judgment and direct theentry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed.

Rule 50(b)(1) permits a motion for judgment in accordance with a directed-verdict motion when submission to the jury withdrew an earlier grant and a mistrial left no final verdict.

Paccar Financial Corp. v. Harnett Transfer, Inc. · filed 1981-03-03Rule 50(b)(1)

While the court here initially granted plaintiffs motion for directed verdict on the issue of right to possession, its subsequent submission of the issue to the jury had the effect of withdrawing the initial grant. Although the jury, pursuant to the court’s peremptory instruction, answered the possession issue in favor of plaintiff, its inability to reach agreement on all other issues submitted resulted in a mistrial of the case and therefore in no verdict with final effect. Consequently, the Rule 50(b) motion was made when a motion for directed verdict had been denied and there was no verdict with final effect; and it thus was a proper motion.

Rule 50(b)(1) permits a judge after a verdict to set aside the judgment and enter judgment as if a directed verdict had been granted.

Housing, Inc. v. Weaver · filed 1981-07-07Rule 50(b)(1)

If a verdict was returned, the judge may allow the judgment to stand or may set aside the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b)(1).

Rule 50(b)(1) permits judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when a directed verdict could properly have been granted.

Sullivan v. Smith · filed 1982-04-06Rule 50(b)(1)

A motion for judgment NOV “shall be granted if it appears that the motion for directed verdict could properly have been granted.” G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b)(1). A directed verdict or a judgment NOV for a defendant is improper when a plaintiffs evidence, taken as true and considered in the light most favorable to him, with all inferences made and contradictions resolved in his favor, is sufficient as a matter of law to justify a verdict for plaintiff.

Rule 50(b)(1) permits judgment notwithstanding the verdict for a party that previously moved for a directed verdict.

Colony Associates Ex Rel. Watson v. Fred L. Clapp & Co. · filed 1983-02-15Rule 50(b)(1)

G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b)(1) allows the grant of a j.n.o.v. in favor of a party who has previously moved for a directed verdict. ... The defendant twice moved for a directed verdict at trial, including at the close of all the evidence. Thus, he met this requirement.

Rule 50(b)(1) allows judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when a directed verdict could properly have been granted; the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.

Spector Industries, Inc. v. Mitchell · filed 1983-08-02Rule 50(b)(1)

[T]he motion shall be granted if it appears that the motion for directed verdict could properly have been granted.

Rule 50(b) requires a party to move for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence to preserve the right to move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Wiseman v. Wiseman · filed 1984-05-01Rule 50(b)

In order to preserve the right to move for a judgment n.o.v. under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b), a party must move for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence.

On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court must view the evidence and reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor and resolve contradictions in that party’s favor.

Smith v. Price · filed 1986-02-18Rule 50(b)

In considering a motion for JNOV, the trial court is to consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion; the nonmovant is to be given the benefit of every reasonable inference that legitimately may be drawn from the evidence; and contradictions must be resolved in the nonmovant’s favor.

A Rule 50(b) motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is judged by the same evidence sufficiency standard as a motion for a directed verdict.

Allen v. Pullen · filed 1986-07-15Rule 50(b)

A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, made pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b), is a request that judgment be entered in accordance with the movant’s previous motion for a directed verdict, despite the contrary verdict of the jury. ... Hence, the same rules by which the sufficiency of the evidence is tested upon motion for a directed verdict pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(a), apply to the determination of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Rule 50(b) permits judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is legally insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff.

Perry v. Williams · filed 1987-03-03Rule 50(b)

A motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, like a motion for a directed verdict, will be granted only if the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is insufficient as a matter of law to justify a verdict for the plaintiff.

On review of a Rule 50 motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Abernathy v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware · filed 1987-12-02Rule 50

In reviewing a ruling upon a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict made pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 50, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant "deeming all evidence which tends to support his position to be true, resolving all evidentiary conflicts favorably to him and giving the non-movant the benefit of all the inferences reasonably to be drawn in his favor." Daughtry v. Turnage, 295 N.C. 543, 544, 246 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1978).

Rule 50(b) treats a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as a renewal of the directed verdict motion, bringing the grounds raised in that earlier motion before the reviewing court.

Presley v. Griggs · filed 1987-12-22(b)

Because a Motion for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict constitutes a renewal of defendants’ Motion for a Directed Verdict, the grounds asserted in support of the Motion for a Directed Verdict must be brought forth for review.

Rule 50(b) treats a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as a renewal of the directed verdict motion; it should be granted if the directed verdict motion could properly have been granted.

Thomas v. Dixson · filed 1988-01-05Rule 50(b)

A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b), is essentially a renewal of the motion for directed verdict; if the motion for directed verdict could have been properly granted, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted.

Rule 50(b) treats a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as a renewed motion for directed verdict and requires the evidence to be viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Walker v. Goodson Farms, Inc. · filed 1988-06-21Rule 50(b)

A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 50(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes a renewal of a motion for directed verdict and requires the trial court to view all the evidence and conflicts therein in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Rule 50(b) asks the same question as a directed verdict motion under Rule 50(a): whether the evidence, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, is sufficient to submit to a jury.

Williams v. Odell · filed 1988-07-19(b)

A motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict made pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b) and a motion for a directed verdict made pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(a) present essentially the same question: “whether the evidence, taken as true and considered in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff], is sufficient for submission to the jury.”

Rule 56(c) permits summary judgment when the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Proffitt v. Greensboro News & Record, Inc. · filed 1988-09-06Rule 56(c)

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” After reviewing the affidavits and trial transcript filed with the trial court, and after reviewing the applicable law, we find the trial court was correct in ruling that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Rule 56(c) calls for summary judgment when the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Truesdale v. University of North Carolina · filed 1988-09-06Rule 56(c)

A trial court should grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56(c); Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E. 2d 823 (1971).

Rule 56 permits summary judgment when no genuine issue of material fact exists and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Gentile v. Town of Kure Beach · filed 1988-09-06Rule 56

A motion for summary judgment should be allowed and is looked upon with favor when the evidence reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Rule 50(b)(1) requires a motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence before a party may seek judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Jansen v. Collins · filed 1988-12-30(b)(1)

A motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence is an absolute prerequisite to the post verdict motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Rule 50(b)(1) permits a party who moved for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence to seek judgment if the jury returns no verdict.

Kutz v. Koury Corp. · filed 1989-04-04Rule 50(b)(1)

Rule 50(b)(1) provides that if a party moved for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, he may move for judgment in accordance with his motion if a jury verdict is not returned.

Rule 50(b)(1) permits a trial court to deny a directed verdict motion and later grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Heath v. Craighill, Rendleman, Ingle & Blythe, P.A. · filed 1990-02-06Rule 50(b)(1)

For reasons of judicial economy, among others, a trial court may deny a motion for a directed verdict and then grant a motion for JNOV.

Rule 50(b)(1) requires a motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence before a party may seek judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Boone Lumber, Inc. v. Sigmon · filed 1991-08-20(b)(1)

Defendants failed to renew their motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence. “A motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence is an absolute prerequisite to the post verdict motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b)(1); Graves v. Walston, 302 N.C. 332, 338, 275 S.E.2d 485, 489 (1981).” Jansen v. Collins, 92 N.C. App. 516, 517, 374 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1988). Defendants cannot have the denial of their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict reviewed on appeal because they failed to renew the motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence.

Rule 50 permits a defendant whose directed verdict motion was denied at the close of all the evidence to seek judgment notwithstanding the verdict within ten days after entry of judgment.

Ace, Inc. v. Maynard · filed 1992-12-15Rule 50

When the trial court denies a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence, the court may, upon motion by the defendant made within ten days after entry of judgment, reconsider the sufficiency of the evidence and enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).

Rule 50(b) treats a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as a renewal of a motion for a directed verdict.

Griffin v. Price · filed 1993-01-05Rule 50(b)

A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) under Rule 50(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure is essentially a renewal of a motion for a directed verdict.

Rule 50(b)(1) permits judgment notwithstanding the verdict when a directed verdict could properly have been granted; the same test governs both motions.

Schwartzbach v. Apple Baking Co. · filed 1993-03-02Rule 50(b)(1)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 50(b)(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict “shall be granted if it appears that the motion for directed verdict could properly have been granted.” The test for allowing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is essentially the same as that for allowing a motion for directed verdict.

Rule 50(b)(1) requires a judgment notwithstanding the verdict motion to be granted when the motion for directed verdict could properly have been granted.

Abels v. Renfro Corp. · filed 1993-12-03(b)(1)

We first note that Rule 50 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict “shall be granted if it appears that the motion for directed verdict could properly have been granted.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 50(b)(1) (1990).

Rule 50(b) requires judgment notwithstanding the verdict when a directed verdict would have been proper.

Ace Chemical Corp. v. DSI Transports, Inc. · filed 1994-06-21Rule 50(b)

The motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict “shall be granted if it appears that the motion for directed verdict could properly have been granted.” G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b).

Rule 50(b) treats a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as a renewal of a directed-verdict motion; it should be granted only if a directed verdict could have been granted.

Newton v. New Hanover County Board of Education · filed 1996-02-09Rule 50(b)

A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 50(b), is essentially a renewal of the motion for directed verdict; if the motion for directed verdict could have been properly granted, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted.

Rule 50(b)(1) permits judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when a directed verdict could properly have been granted.

Kiousis v. Kiousis · filed 1998-08-18Rule 50(b)(1)

A motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is granted only if appears that the motion for a directed verdict could have been properly granted.

A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict cannot raise grounds omitted from the movant’s directed verdict motion.

Barnard v. Rowland · filed 1999-03-02Rule 50(b)

Notably, “[t]he movant cannot assert grounds [for the JNOV] not included in [his] motion for directed verdict.”

Rules 50 and 59 do not permit a court to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict on an issue and also submit that issue to a jury for a new trial.

Streeter v. Cotton · filed 1999-04-20

Accordingly, the trial court’s order is legally inconsistent and erroneous in that the question of defendant’s negligence may not be determined by the court as a matter of law and thereafter submitted to the jury for determination.

Rule 50(b) permits judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the movant’s earlier directed verdict motion.

Bahl v. Talford · filed 2000-05-16Rule 50(b)

A JNOV motion seeks entry of judgment in accordance with the movant’s earlier motion for directed verdict, notwithstanding the contrary verdict returned by the jury. See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 50(b); Northern Nat’l Life Ins. v. Miller Machine Co., 311 N.C. 62, 69, 316 S.E.2d 256, 261 (1984).

Rule 50 governs motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and permits review of whether the evidence supports the jury verdict.

Kaminsky v. Sebile · filed 2000-09-05Rule 50

In ruling on a motion for JNOV, “the [non-movants’] evidence must be taken as true and all the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to [them], giving [them] the benefit of every reasonable inference which may be legitimately drawn therefrom, with conflicts, contradictions, and inconsistencies being resolved in the [non-movants’] favor.’’Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 113 N.C. App. 1, 6, 437 S.E.2d 519, 522 (1993) (citation omitted). Our review of a denial of a motion for JNOV is “whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to [the non-movants] is sufficient to support the jury verdict.” Suggs v. Norris, 88 N.C. App. 539, 543, 364 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1988) (citation omitted).

Rule 50 treats a judgment notwithstanding the verdict motion as a renewal of a directed verdict motion and requires granting it when the directed verdict could properly have been granted.

Williamson v. Liptzin · filed 2000-12-19(b)(1)

A motion for JNOV is a renewal of a motion for directed verdict made after the jury has returned its verdict. As such, a JNOV “shall be granted if it appears that the motion for directed verdict could properly have been granted.”

Rule 50(b) treats a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as a renewal of an earlier motion for directed verdict.

Branch v. High Rock Realty, Inc. · filed 2002-07-02(b)

A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to G.S. § LA-1, Rule 50(b) is, in essence, a renewal of an earlier motion for directed verdict.

Rule 50(b) treats a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as a renewal of the directed verdict motion, with the same standard of review.

Zubaidi v. Earl L. Pickett Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2004-05-04Rule 50(b)

A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is essentially a renewal of the motion for directed verdict, and the same standard of review applies to both motions.

Rule 50(b) requires judgment notwithstanding the verdict when a directed verdict could properly have been granted.

Estate of Graham v. Morrison · filed 2005-01-18Rule 50(b)

The motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict “shall be granted if it appears that the motion for directed verdict could properly have been granted.”

Rule 50(b)(1) permits judgment notwithstanding the verdict when the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.

Maurer v. Slickedit, Inc. · filed 2005-02-03Rule 50(b)(1)

The Court may properly grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict where the evidence presented by the non-moving party is insufficient to support the verdict.

A party must move for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence to preserve the right to seek judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

City of Charlotte v. Hurlahe · filed 2006-06-20Rule 50(b)(1)

However, although plaintiff moved for directed verdict at the end of the defendants’ evidence, it failed to renew this motion at the close of all the evidence. ... “Plaintiff failed to move for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. Therefore, plaintiff failed to preserve [the] right to move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” ... This assignment of error is overruled.

When deciding a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50, the court resolves conflicts in the evidence in the nonmovant’s favor.

Jones v. Durham Anesthesia Associates, P.A. · filed 2007-08-21Rule 50

All contradictions, conflicts, and inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in the non-movant’s favor when the trial court decides whether to grant or deny a party’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Rule 50(b) does not permit judgment notwithstanding the verdict when the nonmoving party presents more than a scintilla of competent evidence supporting each element of its claim.

Weaver v. Sheppa · filed 2007-10-16Rule 50(b)

Accordingly, as plaintiffs offered competent evidence of proximate causation sufficient to withstand JNOV, the trial court erred by granting the same in favor of defendants.

Under Rule 50(b), a trial court’s factual findings and legal conclusions in an order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict have no legal significance on appeal.

Hodgson Construction, Inc. v. Howard · filed 2007-12-04Rule 50(b)

Rather, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law have no legal significance in an order granting JNOV.

Rule 50 does not permit judgment notwithstanding the verdict when genuine factual issues, including witness credibility, are for the jury to decide.

Henry v. Knudsen · filed 2010-04-20Rule 50

As plaintiff points out, the trial court was not presented with a question “exclusively of law [so] that the jury [had] no function to serve[;]” there were genuine issues of material fact, primarily the credibility of the witnesses’ oral testimony, that justify the trial court’s decision to send this case to the jury.

Rule 50(b)(1) permits judgment notwithstanding the verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, cannot support a verdict for that party.

Primerica Life Insurance v. James Massengill & Sons Construction Co. · filed 2011-04-19Rule 50(b)(1)

The propriety of granting JNOV is determined by the same considerations as that of the movant’s prior motion for directed verdict— whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a verdict for the non-moving party.

Judgment notwithstanding the verdict is improper when sufficient evidence supports submitting the issue to the jury.

Brissett v. First Mount Vernon Industrial Loan Ass'n · filed 2014-04-01Rule 50(b)(1)

Thus, “[o]n appeal the standard of review for a JNOV is the same as that for a directed verdict, that is whether the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury.” ... Upon review of the evidence, even without considering the transcript of Gonzales’ testimony in the Virginia State Bar proceedings, we hold there was sufficient evidence to present the jury with the issue of whether FMV acted with unclean hands. As a result, we hold the trial court erred in granting FMV’s motion for a JNOV following the jury’s impasse.

A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied when more than a scintilla of evidence supports each element of the nonmovant’s claim.

S. Shores Realty Servs., Inc. v. Miller · filed 2017-01-17Rule 50(b)(1)

“A motion for JNOV ‘should be denied if there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting each element of the non-movant’s claim.’ ‘A scintilla of evidence is defined as very slight evidence.’ ”

Rule 50(b)(1) permits JNOV only on grounds raised in the earlier motion for a directed verdict.

Town of Nags Head v. Richardson · filed 2018-07-03Rule 50(b)(1)

Because the trial court's entry of JNOV grants the Town's motion for JNOV "pursuant to Rule 50(b) [,]" it is proper only if it accords with the Town's earlier motion for directed verdict.

Rule 50(b)(1) requires a party to move for a directed verdict at the close of evidence to preserve the right to move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Boone Ford, Inc. v. IME Scheduler, Inc. · filed 2018-11-06Rule 50(b)(1)

North Carolina Civil Procedure Rule 50(b)(1) requires a party to move for a directed verdict at the close of evidence to preserve the right to move for JNOV.

Rule 50(b) requires a party to move for a directed verdict before seeking judgment notwithstanding the verdict; withdrawing that motion leaves no basis for the later motion.

Denver Prop. Partners, LLC v. Sisson · filed 2020-07-15Rule 50(b)

Rule 50(b) specifically states that only when a motion for directed verdict was “denied or for any reason is not granted[,]” can a motion for JNOV be brought. The Court did not have the opportunity to do either in this situation once Plaintiff withdrew its directed-verdict motion.

A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may rely only on grounds raised in the earlier motion for directed verdict.

Palmetto RTC · filed 2025-05-21Rule 50(b)(1)

A motion for JNOV must be based on grounds previously raised in the movant’s motion for directed verdict.

Rule 50 does not permit JNOV when, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, more than a scintilla of evidence supports each element of the claim.

Ponder v. Been · filed 2025-07-02Rule 50

Thus, in the light most favorable to Defendant, there was “more than a scintilla of evidence” that Plaintiff used the process to accomplish an ulterior motive which was not within the normal scope of the process. ... As Defendant presented sufficient evidence to support his claim for abuse of process, the trial court erred by granting Plaintiff’s motion for JNOV and setting aside the jury verdict.

Rule 50(b)(1) permits judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when the evidence supporting the nonmovant’s verdict is legally insufficient.

Maldon v. Scott · filed 2026-05-06Rule 50(b)(1)

We review Plaintiff’s Motion for JNOV to determine if there is “more than a scintilla of evidence” supporting Defendant’s allegations Plaintiff first materially breached the contract such that Defendant was legally excused from further performance.

Rule 50 requires a judge deciding a directed-verdict motion at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence to view that evidence in the plaintiff’s favor and give the plaintiff every reasonable inference.

Sawyer v. Shackleford · filed 1970-07-15Rule 50

When a motion for directed verdict is made under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50, at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence, the trial judge must determine whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and giving to it the benefit of every reasonable inference which can be drawn therefrom was sufficient to withstand defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.

Under Rule 50, proof of published false words actionable per se precludes a directed verdict on that ground, though a qualified privilege may still support judgment for the defendant.

Stewart v. Nation-Wide Check Corp. · filed 1970-08-05Rule 50

Proof of the publication of false words which are actionable per se precludes the entering of a directed verdict (or a nonsuit under the old civil practice).

Rule 50(a) does not authorize a directed verdict for the defendant when the evidence leaves a material question of liability unresolved.

Allied Concord Financial Corp. v. Lane · filed 1970-08-26Rule 50(a)

Thus, we find that the actual date that the plaintiff repossessed the leased property would be critical in determining the defendant’s liability, if any, to the plaintiff for the alleged breach of the agreement. The only evidence regarding the time that the plaintiff actually repossessed the property was to the effect that the property was reclaimed or repossessed in the fall of 1967. ... We hold, therefore, that under the evidence and under Rule 50 (a), Rules of Civil Procedure, the court was without authority to allow the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.

Rule 50(a) permits a directed verdict for a party bearing the burden of proof when no factual issue remains for the jury.

Smith Ex Rel. Smith v. Burleson · filed 1970-11-18Rule 50(a)

There was no factual issue of negligence remaining as a subject of inquiry, and on this issue there was no duty resting upon the jury. In a situation of this kind, it is no longer necessary for the jury to intervene, and the trial judge enters the answer to the issue.