N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2

Section 97-2(6) treats a heart injury caused by overexertion as an injury by accident when the extent and nature of the exertion warrant it, even if the activity was not unusual.

King v. Forsyth County · filed 1980-03-04(6)

We hold that under such circumstances, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the overexertion which was the cause of his injury occurred while he was engaged in some unusual activity. It was the extent and nature of the exertion that classifies the resulting injury to the plaintiff’s heart as an injury by accident within the meaning of G.S. 97-2(6).

Section 97-2(6) treats a heart attack following unusual exertion outside the worker’s normal routine as an injury by accident when the work caused the attack.

Wall Ex Rel. Wall v. North Hills Properties, Inc. · filed 1997-02-18(6)

Mr. Wall’s heart attack followed a period of unusually high exertion. The period of overexertion occurred when Mr. Wall placed chains around the logs and then operated the bulldozer. Mr. Wall’s operation of the bulldozer was unusual and not a normal part of his work routine. We hold that there is competent evidence to support the findings of the Commission and in turn these findings support their legal conclusions. Therefore, Mr. Wall’s death by heart attack was an accident within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury to result from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment to be compensable; a heart attack during ordinary work does not qualify absent an accident such as unusual or extraordinary exertion or extreme conditions.

Smith v. Pinkerton's Security & Investigations · filed 2001-09-18(6)

Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an injury must result from an “accident arising out of and in the course of the employment” to be compensable. ... When an employee is conducting his work in the usual way and suffers a heart attack, the injury does not arise by accident and is not compensable. However, an injury caused by a heart attack may be compensable if the heart attack is due to an accident, such as when the heart attack is due to unusual or extraordinary exertion ... or extreme conditions.

A heart attack is an injury by accident under § 97-2(6) only if unusual or extraordinary exertion precipitated it.

Lineberry v. H W Trucking Co. · filed 2005-05-20(6)

In order for an injury caused by heart disease to be compensable, the Supreme Court has held a heart attack must be precipitated by unusual or extraordinary exertion. ... Because plaintiff's heart attack was not due to unusual or extraordinary exertion, it did not result from an injury by accident arising out and in the course of his employment on 15 January 2003.

A fatal heart attack is an injury by accident arising out of employment under § 97-2(6) only when precipitated by unusual or extraordinary exertion or occupational exposure to excessive heat or cold.

Reaves v. Industrial Pump Service · filed 2007-06-22(6)

The courts have also held that in order to be compensable, injuries caused by a heart attack must be precipitated by unusual or extraordinary exertion or by occupational exposure to heat or cold. ... Therefore, decedent's death, which occurred on April 1, 2004, was not the result of an injury by accident arising out of decedent's employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Under § 97-2(6), unusual or extraordinary exertion can constitute an accident in a heart-attack claim.

Ragsdale v. Lamar Outdoor Advertising · filed 2008-10-23(6)

The competent and credible evidence of record fails to establish that plaintiff suffered a heart attack in the course and scope of his employment on November 17, 2003 or that plaintiff was engaged in any unusual or extraordinary exertion on November 17, 2003 that would constitute an accident under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.

Section 97-2(6) treats a heart injury caused by unusual or extraordinary work exertion as an injury by accident when the evidence establishes a causal link.

Weaver v. Swedish Imports Maintenance, Inc. · filed 1983-04-19(6)

We believe that the Commission correctly concluded from the evidence presented that the extent and nature of plaintiff’s exertion in lifting the wheel resulted in injury to the plaintiff’s heart by accident within the meaning of G.S. 97-2(6), as that statute has been interpreted and applied in Gabriel v. Newton, supra and King v. Forsyth County, supra.

Section 97-2(6) does not treat a heart attack suffered while an employee performs work in the usual way as an injury by accident.

Cody v. Snider Lumber Co. · filed 1991-01-10(6)

When an employee is conducting his work in the usual way and suffers a heart attack, the injury does not arise by accident and is not compensable.

An employer with only two employees is outside the Workers' Compensation Act's coverage.

Ashley v. Brown, D/B/A Brown Trucking · filed 1995-11-02(1)

On the date of the injury by accident, Brown Trucking employed only two employees, and thus was not subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.

Section 97-2(3) includes a corporation within the definition of an employer.

Harrelson v. Soles · filed 1989-07-05(3)

A corporation is a type of employer under the terms of N.C.G.S. § 97-2(3), and a corporation is a legal entity “distinct from its ... members or stockholders.”

Section 97-2(1) makes an employer that regularly employs three or more employees in the same business or establishment subject to the Workers' Compensation Act.

Colvin v. Gardner · filed 1997-08-18(1)

On 19 April 1994, defendant-employer regularly employed three or more employees in the same business or establishment, and therefore is subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.

Section 97-2(1) requires a private employer to regularly employ three or more employees in the same business or establishment to be subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Williams v. ARL, INC. · filed 1999-06-15(1)

Assuming, arguendo, that the rule in Brown applies so that plaintiff could be considered an employee of defendant ARL, Inc., as well as B.J. Transportation, there is no evidence in the record from which this Court can find that defendant ARL, Inc., regularly employs three or more employees so as to be subject to the provisions of the Act.

Section 97-2 covers an employer that regularly employs three or more people under the Workers' Compensation Act.

North Carolina Ind. Comm. v. Herbie's Place · filed 2001-11-16(1)

From 1 January 1998 through 15 January 2000, defendant-employer regularly employed three or more persons and was therefore subject to and bound by the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 .

Section 97-2(2) counts leased workers who are jointly employed by a staffing company and its client toward the client’s three-employee threshold for coverage under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Hughart v. Dasco Transp. · filed 2003-05-01(2)

The Full Commission finds that the leased employees (15 in number in June of 1999) were co-employees of Dasco and SOT and that Dasco therefore had more than 3 employees within North Carolina in June of 1999 and thus was subject to the Workers' Compensation Act. ... On June 25, 1999, Dasco and SOI employed three or more persons within North Carolina and were therefore subject to and bound by the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2).

Section 97-2(a) makes the number of regularly employed workers a jurisdictional fact in deciding whether a hospital’s employment falls under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Powers v. Robeson County Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 1955-05-25(a)

At the outset let it be noted that the admissions made by plaintiff in her pleading are sufficient to bring plaintiff’s employment by defendant Hospital, Inc., within the provisions of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, save and except as to the matter of the number of the employees regularly employed by defendant Hospital, Inc., in the operation of its hospital. G.S. 97-2 (a). ... Moreover, the case on appeal shows that upon trial in Superior Court the uncontradicted evidence is that defendant Hospital, Inc., had not only as many as five, but had many more than five employees regularly employed by it in the operation of its hospital. ... Whether the hospital had the required number of employees is a jurisdictional fact to be found by the court.

Section 97-2(1) does not treat separate enterprises as the same business or establishment merely because an employee occasionally works in more than one of them.

Crawford v. Pressley · filed 1969-12-17(1)

While there was evidence that the deceased employee had on isolated occasions performed services for his employer unrelated to the timber business, in which he was primarily employed, these were minimal, and there was no evidence tending to show that the employees in any of the employer’s several enterprises ever performed sufficient services in two or more of such enterprises as to require a conclusion that these enterprises had, by virtue of having a common set of employees, become in law the “same business or establishment.”

A worker may count as regularly employed under § 97-2(1) despite working only eight days and holding another full-time job when the employment was expected to continue.

Cousins v. Hood · filed 1970-05-27(1)

In the instant case Earl had been working regularly eight days. There was no indication at the time of Albert’s accident that the employment of Earl was to be terminated. His job was to keep the station open at night beyond the regular hours to see if this practice would result in more business at that station. The fact that Earl was also employed full time for the State of North Carolina is inconsequential. It did not prevent him from being one of the 5 regular employees of Hood.

Section 97-2(1) requires an employer to regularly employ at least three employees for the Workers’ Compensation Act to apply and for the Commission to have jurisdiction.

Jones v. Pettit · filed 2001-09-18(1)

On June 19, 1998 defendant did not employ three (3) or more regular employees and therefore was not subject to and bound by the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (1).

Section 97-2(1) requires an employer to have three or more regular employees for the Workers’ Compensation Act to apply; that threshold is jurisdictional.

Wren v. Ashe Street Automotive · filed 2001-11-16(1)

Having three (3) or more regular employees is a jurisdictional prerequisite.

Section 97-2(l) requires an employer to have three or more regular employees for coverage under the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act and Commission jurisdiction.

Wren v. Federal Mogul Corp. · filed 2001-10-29(l)

On September 2, 1999, defendant did not employ three (3) or more regular employees and therefore was not subject to and bound by the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (l).

An employer with no more than two regular employees falls outside the Industrial Commission’s workers’ compensation jurisdiction.

Peace v. Zachary Trucking Co. · filed 2002-07-26(1)

Because joint employer Zachary Trucking Company did not at any time employ more than two regular employees, the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction over Zachary Trucking Company. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (1).

Section 97-2(1) requires an employer to regularly employ at least three employees for coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act; that threshold is jurisdictional.

Harris v. Henry · filed 2005-03-17(1)

Having three (3) or more regular employees is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Consequently, since this prerequisite is not met in the instant case, defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.

An employer that regularly employs three or more workers is covered even if it has fewer than three workers on the day of injury.

Britt v. Durden Home Improvement Ptr · filed 2006-08-04(1)

During calendar year 2003, Durden Home Improvement PTR regularly employed three or more employees and, therefore, was required to carry workers' compensation insurance. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (1). The fact that Durden Home Improvement PTR may have employed fewer than three employees on the actual day of plaintiff's injury by accident does not preclude coverage.

Section 97-2 requires a claimant to prove that the employer had three or more employees to establish coverage under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Franklin v. Wise Landscaping Tree Service · filed 2006-09-01(1)

The plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendants J. Travis Wise and E. Sean Wise d/b/a Wise Tree Service had three or more employees and were subject to the Workers' Compensation Act.

Section 97-2 requires a private logging business to regularly employ three or more employees to be covered by the Workers' Compensation Act.

Bryant v. Spruill · filed 2007-05-30(1)

Defendant Marty Spruill did not have three or more regular employees and is not subject to the Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 .

Section 97-2(1) includes private employment under the Workers’ Compensation Act only when the business regularly employs three or more employees.

Woodliff v. Fitzpatrick · filed 2009-07-27(1)

Plaintiff has failed to prove that Defendant had three or more employees on the date of plaintiff's injury or that Defendant regularly employed three or more employees. As such, Defendant is not an employer subject to the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. Cousins v. Hood , 8 N.C. App. 309 , 174 S.E.2d 297 (1970); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (1).

Section 97-2(1) makes an employer subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act when it regularly employs three or more employees.

Contillano v. Dunn · filed 2009-09-01(1)

To be subject to the Act, an employer must regularly employ three or more employees.

Section 97-2(1) subjects an employer with three or more regularly employed employees to the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act.

Hunt v. Hunt · filed 2010-02-24(1)

On July 19, 2007, Lenwood Hunt, d/b/a Hunt Hammonds Used Cars, employed three or more individuals, and is therefore subject to and bound by the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (1).

Section 97-2(1) covers employment in which three or more employees are regularly employed in North Carolina.

Rios v. Reid · filed 2010-03-22(1)

On 20 December 2007 Defendant Reid regularly employed three or more employees in North Carolina and therefore subject to liability under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (1).

Section 97-2(1) requires a claimant to prove that an employer regularly employed at least three employees with some constancy for the Workers’ Compensation Act to apply.

WOODLIFF v. Fitzpatrick · filed 2010-07-06(1)

Where the burden of proving “employment” under the Act unquestionably fell upon Plaintiff, we conclude that he failed to meet his burden of presenting sufficient evidence to show Defendant regularly employed three or more employees with some constancy throughout the period.

Section 97-2(1) requires three or more regularly employed employees for an employer to be covered by the Workers' Compensation Act.

McGriff v. Janiyah Shoe Forum · filed 2010-11-29(1)

Based upon the greater weight of the testimony, Defendant Janiyah Shoe Forum, LLC d/b/a Jumpstart Tax Services did not have three or more employees regularly employed at the time of Plaintiff's injury on March 19, 2008. Accordingly, Defendant is not subject to the Workers' Compensation Act and the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction over this Defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (1).

Section 97-2(1) excludes a business that does not regularly employ three or more employees from the Workers' Compensation Act.

Woodward v. Chuck Smith D/B/A the Roof Company · filed 1995-01-19(1)

Inasmuch as Smith did not regularly employ three or more employees in 1991, he is neither subject to the Workers' Compensation Act nor liable for the injury by accident giving rise hereto.

Section 97-2 brings a sole proprietorship that regularly employs three or more employees within the Workers' Compensation Act and determines whether an employment relationship exists.

Hulin v. Dudek Roofing · filed 2001-10-29

At the time of the injury, defendant-employer was a sole proprietorship, which regularly employed three or more employees. Accordingly, the parties are subject to and bound by the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. N.C.G.S. § 97-2.

Section 97-2(1) requires a claimant to show that the employer regularly employed three or more employees in North Carolina for the Industrial Commission to have jurisdiction.

Knight v. Nat. Food Express · filed 2003-12-12(1)

Since plaintiff has failed to establish that National Food Express, Inc. regularly employed three (3) or more employees pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 97-2(1), her claim must be denied for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Under § 97-2, employee status turns chiefly on the employer’s right to control how the work is done, whether or not that right is exercised.

Youngblood v. North State Ford Truck Sales · filed 1987-09-01

The dominant factor in determining whether a hired hand is an employee or an independent contractor is the employer’s authority to control how the person hired accomplishes the task to *39be done; and if that right to control exists it makes no difference that it is not exercised.

Section 97-2(2) makes the right to control the details of a worker’s work central to deciding whether the worker is an employee or an independent contractor.

Denton v. South Mountain Pulpwood Co. · filed 1984-07-03(2)

The foregoing circumstances lead to the conclusion that South Mountain did not retain the right of control or superintendence over the plaintiff in the execution of this work. Plaintiffs testimony that he had never worked for South Mountain under circumstances such as those present on the date in question is not itself sufficient to establish an employer-employee relationship at the time of his injury under either the test of Hayes or the test of Lloyd and Durham. Although it is evident that neither plaintiff nor defendant had had an arrangement with each other quite like this in the past, plaintiffs employment status on 7 February 1981 remained that of an independent contractor.

Section 97-2(2) covers an hourly worker whose employer can direct and discharge him, despite the absence of tax withholding and the worker’s description of himself as self-employed.

Lloyd v. Jenkins Context Co. · filed 1980-05-20(2)

We hold that under this statutory definition, as interpreted by the cases in this jurisdiction, the plaintiff was an employee of defendant Jenkins Context Company at the time of his injury.

Section 97-2(2) excludes independent contractors from the definition of employee and from workers’ compensation coverage.

Kersey v. Sure Pack Relocation Service · filed 1997-12-17(2)

An independent contractor is not an employee under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, and therefore is not covered by the Act.

Section 97-2 requires an employer-employee relationship for workers’ compensation coverage; limited restrictions on a cab driver’s work do not establish that relationship when the company lacks an employer’s degree of control.

FULCHER BY WALL v. Willard's Cab Co. · filed 1999-01-19(3)

The Commission's findings do not show that defendant had the right to exert an employer's degree of control over Wall. Because an employer-employee relationship is a prerequisite to coverage by, and recovery under, the Workers' Compensation Act, see N.C. Gen.Stat. § 97-2 (Cum.Supp.1997), § 97-3 (1991); Lucas, 289 N.C. at 218, 221 S.E.2d at 261, and because that relationship is lacking in this case, we need not reach defendant's remaining assignment of error.

Section 97-2(2) classifies a worker as an employee by balancing the circumstances of the work relationship, including the employer’s right of control; no single factor determines the result.

Steury v. Springfield Communications · filed 1999-02-26(2)

Giving due regard to the evidence and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom, on 12 June 1996, when the plaintiff was injured, he was an employee of Springfield Communications. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (1) and § 97-2 (2). ... In analyzing the case of Mr. Steury, and considering all factors, as no one factor is determinative, there is compelling evidence that he was an employee and not an independent contractor.

Section 97-2(2) excludes an independent contractor from employee status and workers’ compensation benefits.

Reynolds v. M M Contr. · filed 2003-05-05(2)

On June 6, 2001, plaintiff was either a single independent contractor or a co-independent contractor with Terry King and therefore is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2).

Employee status under § 97-2(2) turns on the overall employment relationship; no single independent-contractor factor is determinative.

Sessoms v. Arrow Group Ltd. · filed 2004-04-14(2)

While all of these factors are important in considering plaintiff's employment status, they are not determinative and do not collectively create a presumption that plaintiff was an independent contractor. ... Plaintiff was an employee of defendant on December 1, 2000 at the time of his injury by accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2); Durham v. McLamb , 59 N.C. App. 165 , 296 S.E.2d 3 (1982); and McCown v. Hines , 140 N.C. App. 440 , 537 S.E.2d 242 (2000).

Section 97-2(2) determines employee status from the whole working relationship; no single independent-contractor factor controls, and the factors together do not necessarily create a presumption of independent-contractor status.

Estrada v. Repairs · filed 2005-07-07(2)

While all of these factors are important in considering plaintiff's employment status, they are not determinative and do not collectively create a presumption that plaintiff was an independent contractor. ... Based on the totality of the evidence of record, plaintiff was an employee of defendant CGR on August 27, 2003, at the time of his injury by accident.

Section 97-2 treats a worker paid and directed as an employee as an employee despite the employer’s independent-contractor label.

Hoover v. All Seasons, Inc. · filed 2005-10-05(2)

There is nothing in the record before the Commission to support the defendant's allegation that the plaintiff was an independent contractor while working on the house where he was injured. ... The plaintiff was a regular employee of the defendant within the meaning of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, and the defendant employed three or more employees at the time of the plaintiff's injuries by accident on February 8, 2001, and February 15, 2001.

Section 97-2(2) does not make workers independent contractors merely because the employer issues them 1099s and does not withhold taxes.

McGee v. Jacobs · filed 2006-06-14(2)

The fact that Defendant paid his employees under a 1099 and did not take taxes out on them is not enough, in and of itself, to find Defendant's employees to be independent contractors. ... Plaintiff is an employee pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2) and Defendant employed three or more employees on the date of Plaintiff's injury by accident.

Section 97-2(2) excludes independent contractors from its definition of employee.

Pait v. World Custom Homes · filed 2008-05-12(2)

Plaintiff is an independent contractor and not an employee of defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2).

Section 97-2(2) excludes independent contractors from the definition of employee.

Smith v. World Custom Homes · filed 2008-05-13(2)

Plaintiff is an independent contractor and not an employee of defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2).

An employment relationship under § 97-2(2) depends on the actual degree of control over the worker’s methods, rather than the parties’ contract label.

Guardado v. Trade Pro · filed 2009-02-25(2)

Applying the Hayes analysis to the facts in this case, Trade Pro exercised sufficient control over the way decedent accomplished the work tasks to be completed such that an employment relationship was established.

Section 97-2(2) excludes independent contractors from employee status under the Workers' Compensation Act.

Capps v. Southeastern Cable · filed 2010-03-08(2)

Based on the above findings and conclusions that plaintiff was an independent contractor at the time of his injury by accident on August 13, 2007, plaintiff does not come within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2).

Section 97-2(2) excludes an independent contractor from employee status when the hiring party does not sufficiently control how the work is done.

Ramirez v. Rodriguez · filed 2010-04-06(2)

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2), Plaintiff was not an employee of Defendant.

Section 97-2(2) excludes independent contractors from employee coverage under the Workers’ Compensation Act, leaving the Industrial Commission without jurisdiction over their claims.

Lee v. City Cab of Tarboro · filed 2010-04-08(2)

An independent contractor is not a person included within the terms of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, and the Industrial Commission has no jurisdiction to apply the Act to a person who is not subject to its provisions. ... Under the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, the Industrial Commission has no jurisdiction to apply the Act in this case.

Section 97-2(1) covers a worker as an employee when the employer retains the right to control and direct the manner and details of the work.

Archie v. Kirk · filed 2010-12-15(1)

The Industrial Commission has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim because Defendant-Employer Edward Kirk, d/b/a Kirk Contracting had three or more regular employees at the time of Plaintiff's injury and an employer-employee relationship existed at the time of Plaintiff's injury by accident on October 10, 2006. The Defendant-Employer Edward Kirk d/b/a Kirk Contracting retained the right to control and direct the manner in which the details of the work were to be executed. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (1); Carter v. Frank Shelton, Inc. , 62 N.C. App. 378 , 303 S.E.2d 184 (1983), cert. denied , 310 N.C. 476 , 312 S.E.2d 883 (1984).

Section 97-2(2) determines employee status by considering the independent-contractor factors together with all other circumstances; every factor need not be present.

Bell v. Everything but Grannies Panties · filed 2011-06-20(2)

The Supreme Court further held that the presence of all the factors is not necessary but should be considered along with all other circumstances. Id. Considering these factors along with the particular circumstances in the case at hand, Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant-Employer. Thus all the parties to this action are subject to and bound by the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2).

Under § 97-2(2), tax forms, a requirement to obtain workers’ compensation insurance, and a subcontractor label carry little weight in determining employee status when they merely reflect how the hiring party wants the relationship characterized.

Capps v. SOUTHEASTERN CABLE · filed 2011-08-02(2)

Although Defendant provided Plaintiff with the tax forms that are appropriate for use by an independent contractor, required Plaintiff to obtain his own workers’ compensation insurance, and informed him that he was being hired as a subcontractor rather than an employee, we do not give significant weight to this evidence since all that this evidence tends to show is the manner in which Defendant wished to have the relationship characterized.

Section 97-2(b) distinguishes an employee from an independent contractor by whether the worker controls the method of work and is subject to the hiring party only as to the result.

Cooper v. Colonial Ice Co. · filed 1949-03-02(b)

It is well settled as a general rule that an independent contractor is one who exercises an independent employment and contracts to do certain work according to his own judgment and method, without being subject to his employer except as to the results of his work.

Section 97-2 excludes independent contractors from employee coverage; when statutory definitions do not resolve a worker’s status, ordinary common-law tests apply.

Richards v. Nationwide Homes · filed 1965-01-15

In the absence of pertinent statutory definitions, whether a person is an independent contractor, or a subcontractor who is an independent contractor, or an employee within the meaning of our Workmen’s Compensation Act is to be determined by the application of the ordinary common law tests.

Section 97-2(2) treats a worker as an employee when the hiring party retains the right to control the work; an independent contractor agreement is not dispositive.

Gilreath v. Yellow Cab of Charlotte · filed 2002-10-04(2)

In Hayes v. Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E.2d 137 (1944), affirmed in McCown v. Hines, 353 N.C. 683, 549 S.E.2d 175 (2001), the North Carolina Supreme Court laid out an eight factor test to determine whether a claimant is an employee as defined by the Workers' Compensation Act in N.C.G.S. § 97-2(2). ... No one factor by itself is controlling; instead, the decisive factor is whether the hiring party retained the right of control or superintendence over the worker. ... The totality of the evidence giving no greater weight to any factor than another indicates that defendant exercised a very large degree of control over plaintiff's actions in carrying out his job duties of driving vehicles for defendant; therefore, plaintiff was not an independent contractor and was an employee of defendant.

Section 97-2(1) does not cover work performed by an independent contractor outside an employment relationship.

Crumpler v. Simmons Simmons Mgmt. · filed 2003-07-31(1)

On June 9, 2000 when plaintiff sustained the injury giving rise to this claim, he was not an employee of defendant Simmons and Simmons Management but rather was an independent contractor. Consequently, his injury by accident did not arise out of and in the course of an employment relationship with defendant Simmons.

Section 97-2 does not treat an independent contractor as an employee when the hiring company lacks control over the method and means of the work.

Kirk v. Spell Constr. Inc. · filed 2003-08-22

On March 30, 2001, when plaintiff sustained the injury giving rise to this claim, he was not an employee of defendant-employer, but rather was an independent contractor. Consequently, his injury by accident on that date did not arise out of and in the course of an employment relationship with the company.

Section 97-2(10) covers a death resulting from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of employment.

Morris v. Triad Masonry Materials, Inc. · filed 1999-04-21(10)

On 8 September 1997, Robert Lewis Morris, Jr. sustained a fatal injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment with the defendant-employer, and he was killed as a result of that accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (10).

Section 97-2(6) requires a death-benefits claimant to show an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment; when the causal connection to work is unknown, the Pickrell presumption of compensability can apply even if the medical cause of death is known.

Wooten v. Newcon Transportation, Inc. · filed 2006-08-01(6)

In order for plaintiff to recover workers’ compensation benefits for the death of the decedent, she must prove that he died from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. ... We conclude that the Commission’s findings of fact support these conclusions of law and that the Commission correctly applied the Pickrell presumption here.

An injury by accident does not establish disability under § 97-2(9) unless the worker shows disability resulting from that injury.

Shuford v. Regal Manufacturing Co. · filed 2007-04-12(9)

However, plaintiff has failed to show that she has sustained any disability as a consequence of this injury by accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (9). Thus, defendant Wausau Insurance is not liable for any indemnity compensation due plaintiff.

Section 97-2(6)’s injury-by-accident requirement may be satisfied by the Pickrell presumption when an employee dies at work and the work-relatedness of the death remains unknown, even if the immediate medical cause is known.

Reaves v. INDUSTRIAL PUMP SERVICE · filed 2010-07-20(6)

The Commission’s findings, which indicate that decedent, after being exposed to extreme heat in the course of his employment, was found dead in his work truck and that there was an unknown cause of the dysrhythmia which ultimately resulted in his death, support its conclusion that “the circumstances regarding the work-relatedness of decedent’s death are unknown and that the death occurred as the result of an injury by accident sustained in the course of decedent’s employment.” ... As a result, we hold that the Commission did not err by applying the Pickrell presumption.

Section 97-2(6) requires a claimant to prove that a work-related injury was sustained.

Shearin v. Shearin · filed 1999-09-08(6)

Plaintiff has failed to show by the greater weight of the evidence that he sustained a work-related injury on July 17, 1997 while employed with the defendant-employer. October N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

Section 97-2 requires a compensable death to result from an accidental injury arising out of and occurring in the course of employment.

Horton v. Powell Plumbing & Heating of N.C., Inc. · filed 1999-10-05(6), (10)

In order for a claimant to recover workers’ compensation benefits for death, he must prove that death resulted from an injury (1) by accident; (2) arising out of his employment; and (3) in the course of the employment.

An injury from an idiopathic fall does not arise out of employment under § 97-2(6) when the employment creates no hazard increasing the risk of injury from the fall.

Simmons v. Landfall Associates · filed 1999-07-02(6)

In that plaintiff's fall on November 21, 1996 was due to an idiopathic condition which caused his knee to give way and in that his employment did not create a hazard which increased his risk of injury from a fall on that occasion, his injuries on that date did not result from an accident arising out of his employment.

Section 97-2(6) excludes injuries from an idiopathic fall when employment created no hazard that increased the risk of injury from the fall.

Watkins v. Trogdon Masonry, Inc. · filed 2009-03-23(6)

As plaintiff's fall on 8 May 2007 was due to an idiopathic condition or physical infirmity which caused his leg to give way and as his employment did not create a hazard which increased his risk of injury from a fall on that occasion, plaintiff's injuries on 8 May 2007 did not result from an accident arising out of his employment with defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6); Cole v. Guilford County and Hartford Accident Indem. Co. , 259 N.C. 724 , 727 , 131 S.E.2d 308 , 311 (1963).

An injury arises out of employment under § 97-2(6) when an idiopathic loss of consciousness while driving for work combines with the hazards of that driving to cause an accident.

Touchberry v. Toyota · filed 2010-05-18(6)

In that plaintiff was driving a shuttle for defendant-employer at the time he lost consciousness, special hazards attributable to, or incidental to, plaintiff's employment existed and were a contributing proximate cause of plaintiff's accident and resulting injuries. Therefore, plaintiff's injury arose out of plaintiff's employment, even though an idiopathic condition may have contributed to the accident and resulting injury. ... On June 12, 2008, plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6); Billings v. General Parts , supra .

Section 97-2(19) covers treatment for psychological injury caused by a compensable accident when the treatment may reasonably effect a cure, give relief, or tend to lessen the period of disability.

Bardel v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Company · filed 1999-10-13(19)

As a result of the 22 July 1993 injury by accident, plaintiff suffered psychological injury and is entitled to medical treatment to the extent such treatment may reasonably be required to effect a cure or give relief or tend to lessen the period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-25 , 97-2 (19).

Section 97-2(19) covers psychiatric treatment for depression resulting from a compensable injury when the treatment is reasonably designed to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Bowen v. Carolina Freight · filed 2005-05-12(19)

Dr. McKean's treatment of the plaintiff was reasonably designed to tend to effect a cure, provide needed relief from or lessen the period of disability associated therewith, therefore defendants shall pay all reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the injury by accident and related depression. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-25 ; 97-2 (19).

Medical compensation includes treatment that relieves pain from a compensable injury, including prescribed medication, a TENS unit, and psychological services for pain management.

Price v. napce/phillips Consumer Electronics · filed 1996-09-23(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to medical compensation reasonably necessary to effect a cure, give relief or shorten the period of plaintiff's disability resulting from plaintiff's compensable injury of October 20, 1988, specifically including those noted in Finding of Fact #12, the bills of Dr. Chapman and Ravenscroft Family Health Clinic to the extent they relate to treatment of plaintiff's back and not her heart condition, medications and a TENS unit as prescribed for her back pain, any future psychological services recommended for the management of back pain, and such other further treatment as determined by her treating physician until further orders of the Commission, when the bills for same have been approved in accordance with the Rules of the Commission.

Section 97-2(19) includes physical therapy and psychological treatment within continuing medical compensation for a compensable injury.

Ring v. Hillcrest Foods · filed 1997-02-10(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to continuing medical compensation at defendants' expense including, but not limited to, physical therapy and psychological treatment. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19) and 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers medically necessary treatment for depression resulting from a compensable injury, including ongoing psychiatric care.

Jones v. Candler Mobile Village, Inc. · filed 1997-07-22(19)

The treatment rendered by Dr. Jolley was reasonably necessary to treat plaintiff's depression that has resulted from his injury by accident. Defendants are responsible for payment for treatment rendered or to be rendered in the future by Dr. Jolley so long as is medically necessary. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) includes reasonable and necessary psychiatric treatment for PTSD and depression caused by a compensable injury when the treatment tends to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen disability.

Price v. Summitville-Carolina, Inc. · filed 1998-07-14(19)

As a result of her compensable injury by accident of 6 April 1994, plaintiff developed PTSD and depression, for which plaintiff received psychiatric treatment. Defendants are responsible for all such reasonable and necessary psychiatric treatment rendered or to be rendered to plaintiff as tends to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen any period of disability, including the treatment by Dr. Cutting, Dr. Ahsanuddin, and treatment rendered at Grace Hospital in February and March 1995.

Section 97-2(19) covers reasonably necessary treatment for depression when a compensable injury significantly contributed to its development.

Stecker v. Associated Response Service · filed 2002-03-18(19)

Plaintiff's compensable injury by accident was a significant contributing factor to the development of his depression. Therefore, defendants are responsible for payment for reasonably necessary medical treatment of his depression. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) allows medical expenses for treatment of chronic shoulder pain resulting from a compensable injury when needed to provide relief, effect a cure, or lessen disability, but does not cover treatment for depression on these facts.

Yelton v. Baxter International, Inc. · filed 2002-06-04(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendant pay for medical expenses incurred or to be incurred as a result of the compensable injury as may be required to provide relief, effect a cure or lessen the period of disability, including treatment for the chronic shoulder pain. Defendant is not responsible for paying for treatment for plaintiff's depression.

Section 97-2(19) covers medical and psychological treatment, including pain management, needed to relieve or cure a compensable condition or lessen the period of disability.

Eagle v. Lowe's Home Center, Inc. · filed 2002-06-20(19)

Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to have defendant pay for medical and psychological expenses previously incurred, and continuing medical and psychological treatment, including pain management, as may be necessary to provide relief, effect a cure, or lessen the period of disability of plaintiff's neck condition and psychological condition.

Section 97-2(19) includes psychological treatment for depression resulting from a compensable injury as medical compensation when it is required to provide relief, effect a cure, or lessen disability.

Roberts v. Burnett Co. · filed 2003-10-15(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants pay for medical expenses incurred or to be incurred as a result of the compensable injury as may be required to provide relief, effect a cure or lessen the period of disability, including psychological treatment for depression. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19).

Section 97-2(19) covers treatment for the shoulder and psychological effects of a compensable injury when the treatment would cure, relieve, or lessen disability.

Anders v. North Carolina Baptist Hosp. · filed 2004-02-09(19)

Plaintiff should continue to receive all medical treatment as directed by her treating physician, Dr. Ruch, including treatment for her right shoulder and for a psychological evaluation and counseling, so long as said treatment would effectuate a cure, provide relief or lessen plaintiff's period of disability.

Section 97-2(19) includes reasonably necessary psychiatric care related to a compensable physical injury when the care tends to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Moran v. Turnamics · filed 2004-06-03(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to reasonably necessary medical expenses including reasonably necessary psychiatric and counseling expenses, incurred or to be incurred for treatment related to the May 16, 2000, injury to plaintiff's right hand and arm, which tends to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability, including the Copestone Psychiatric Hospital admissions, as well as care provided by Dr. Hudson and Sara Mimms.

Section 97-2(19) covers medical treatment for a compensable injury when it provides relief, effects a cure, or lessens the period of disability, including treatment for resulting depression.

Bricker v. Rhoney Furniture House · filed 2004-08-05(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants pay for medical expenses incurred or to be incurred in the future as a result of her compensable injuries for so long as such treatment is required to provide relief, effect a cure or lessen the period of disability, including referral to a chronic pain specialist and treatment for depression. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19).

Section 97-2(19) includes psychological treatment in medical compensation when it is required to provide relief, effect a cure, or lessen disability resulting from a compensable injury.

McKinna v. Iredell Cty. Schools · filed 2005-02-16(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendant pay for medical and psychiatric treatment expenses incurred or to be incurred as a result of the compensable injuries as may be required to provide relief, effect a cure or lessen her period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 , 97-25.1 . This medical treatment includes psychological treatment by Dr. Allen Romeo who is approved as plaintiff's treating psychologist.

Section 97-2(19) covers treatment for psychological conditions proximately caused by a compensable injury when the treatment is reasonably required to cure, relieve, or lessen the period of disability.

Chand v. North State Telephone Co. · filed 2005-02-25(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants pay for her medical expenses incurred or to be incurred, including treatment for plaintiff's psychological conditions that are a proximate result of her August 25, 1998, injury by accident, for so long as such evaluations, examinations, and treatments may reasonably be required to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of plaintiff's disability.

Section 97-2(19) covers medical care for back and psychological conditions arising from a compensable injury when the care is reasonably required to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen disability.

Fox v. Dme · filed 2005-03-16(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have Defendants provide medical care for his back and his psychological conditions arising from his injury for so long as such examinations, evaluations and treatments may reasonably be required to effect a cure, give relief and will tend to lessen Plaintiff's period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-25 ; 97-2 (19).

Section 97-2(19) includes psychiatric care and hypertension treatment in medical compensation when they are causally related to a compensable injury and required to provide relief, effect a cure or lessen disability.

Estate of Quesenberry v. Big Creek Underground · filed 2005-08-09(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants pay for medical expenses incurred by decedent as a result of the compensable injury as were required to provide relief, effect a cure or lessen the period of disability, including psychiatric treatment and medications provided by Dr. Griffin, and for treatment of decedent's hypertension. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 , and 97-25.1 .

Section 97-2(19) covers treatment of pain, depression, and anxiety caused by a compensable injury when the treatment may reasonably effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen disability.

Escalera v. Lancome · filed 2006-03-10(19)

The plaintiff is entitled to payment of medical expenses incurred or to be incurred as a result of her compensable injury as may reasonably be required to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability, including ongoing treatment for neck, arm, back and leg pain, depression, and anxiety as recommended by Dr. Henderson-Hines and Dr. Charya.

Section 97-2(19) covers reasonably necessary treatment that effects a cure, gives relief, or lessens the period of disability, including pain management and psychological counseling.

Burnette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2006-03-29(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to payment by defendant of all reasonably necessary medical expenses incurred by plaintiff for treatment of her injuries so long as said treatment effects a cure, gives relief, or tends to lessen plaintiff's period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19); 97-25 . The approved medical treatment includes pain management and psychological counseling.

Once a worker proves disability under § 97-2(9), the worker receives a rebuttable presumption of continuing total disability.

Hylton v. bridgestone/firestone, Inc. · filed 1999-11-18(9)

Having met his initial burden of proving his disability, plaintiff is entitled to the rebuttable presumption of continued total disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (9 ); Watson v. Winston-Salem Transit Authority , 92 N.C. App. 473 , 374 S.E.2d 483 (1988). Defendants have failed to produce evidence to rebut this presumption.

Section 97-2(6) provides that disability is presumed to continue until the employee returns to work at wages equal to those received at the time of injury.

Bullins v. Abitibi-Price Corporation · filed 1996-06-13(6)

Disability is presumed to continue until the employee returns to work at wages equal to those he was receiving at the time of his injury.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability under the Workers’ Compensation Act; after an approved Form 21 agreement, the employee is presumed disabled unless the employer proves otherwise.

King v. Yeargin Construction Co. · filed 1996-11-05(9)

However, a recent opinion of this Court has clarified that, upon execution of a Form 21 agreement and subsequent approval by the Commission, the employee enjoys a presumption of disability.

Under § 97-2(5), lodging furnished as part of a wage contract counts as earnings; employer records and admissions supported valuing that lodging at $100 per week.

Shah v. Johnson · filed 2000-09-19(5)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5) (1999) provides in pertinent part that “[w] her ever allowances of any character made to an employee in lieu of wages are specified part of the wage contract they shall be deemed a part of his earnings.” ... Although defendant obtained new counsel and subsequently sought to amend its Form 33R and interrogatories to deny that lodging was a part of plaintiff’s employment package, there was ample evidence to support a finding that lodging was furnished to plaintiff as part of his employment contract, and that such lodging had a value of $100.00. ... We hold there is substantial competent evidence to support the Commission’s finding that the value of plaintiff’s lodging was $100.00, and overrule this assignment of error.

Section 97-2(5) includes lodging and per diem allowances in average weekly wages when they are part of the wage contract and paid in lieu of wages.

Rogers v. Intl. Tech. Corp. · filed 2004-04-02(5)

Shah was decided based on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5), which provides in pertinent part that "[w]herever allowances of any character made to an employee in lieu of wages are specified part of the wage contract they shall be deemed a part of his earnings." ... We therefore distinguish Shah and hold that plaintiff's correct average weekly wage, including overtime and all allowances is $1,834.50.

Section 97-2 covers disabling depression that is a direct and natural consequence of a compensable work injury.

Terry v. Ppg Industries, Inc. · filed 2001-08-01(6)

As a result of her injury by accident, plaintiff suffers from disabling depression which is a direct and natural consequence of her work injury and is therefore compensable. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 .

A condition causally resulting from an admittedly compensable injury is itself compensable.

Bostick v. Kinston Neuse Corporation · filed 2002-07-17(6)

Plaintiff's left salvage tennis elbow condition is causally related to plaintiff's admittedly compensable right salvage tennis elbow, and so is compensable.

Section 97-2(6) covers reflex sympathetic dystrophy that develops as a consequence of a compensable injury by accident.

Barton v. Stroh Companies · filed 2002-07-22(6)

As a consequence of her admittedly compensable injury by accident of December 16, 1996, Plaintiff sustained a Colles fracture to her left wrist and developed reflex sympathetic dystrophy of the left upper extremity.

Section 97-2(6) covers an infection caused by a diagnostic procedure necessitated by a compensable workplace injury as a direct and natural result of that injury.

Lawrence v. Brevard Electric Company · filed 2002-08-22(6)

On 18 December 1997, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). The disc space infection, or discitis, contracted by plaintiff was a direct and natural result of and was causally related to the discogram performed on 24 February 1998, which in turn was necessitated by plaintiff's 18 December 1997 injury by accident.

Section 97-2(6) covers a later injury that is the direct and natural result of a compensable injury by accident.

Stever v. Premier Cable Communications · filed 2003-01-27(6)

On April 17, 2000, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). As a direct and natural result of, and causally related to his April 17, 2000 injury by accident, plaintiff sustained an injury to his right knee on July 9, 2001 that required surgery. Id.

Section 97-2(6) covers the worsening of a pre-existing condition caused by medication taken for a compensable injury when proved by the greater weight of the evidence.

Edmonds v. Fresinius Med. Care · filed 2003-05-05(6)

Plaintiff has proved by the greater weight of the evidence that the non-steroidal medications taken by plaintiff because of her compensable back injury worsened or exacerbated her pre-existing kidney problems. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

An injury that is a natural and probable consequence of an earlier compensable injury is also compensable.

Williams v. Lucent Technologies · filed 2003-06-26(6)

Plaintiff's cervical spine injury, occasioned by her participation in stressful physical therapy and exacerbated by a fall in the shower, was a natural and probable consequence flowing from her initial compensable lumbar spine injury.

Section 97-2 permits compensation for depression that flows directly and naturally from a compensable occupational disease.

Rogers v. Elite Furniture Mfg. · filed 2003-09-12

Plaintiff's depression flowed directly from and is a direct and natural consequence of her compensable occupational disease, and so is compensable under the Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 .

A later fall and its resulting injuries are compensable when the fall is the direct and natural result of an earlier compensable injury by accident.

Brown v. Kroger Co. · filed 2003-12-02(6)

Plaintiff's subsequent fall at home on August 28, 2001 as the result of her degenerative knee condition is the direct and natural result of plaintiff's June 9, 2001 injury by accident.

Section 97-2(6) treats a condition in the other hand as compensable when increased use caused by an original compensable injury aggravates that condition.

Hiatt v. Wal-Mart Stores · filed 2004-01-09(6)

As a result of her compensable injuries of March 13, 2000, and her overuse of her right hand as a result of said accident, plaintiff's pre-existing conditions in her hands were aggravated to the extent that further medical treatment was necessary. In that the conditions in her right hand are causally related to the original compensable injury, they are therefore also compensable. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers post-surgical leg problems and worsened psychological conditions that naturally result from or are causally related to a compensable work injury.

D'Uva v. Lake Somers · filed 2004-03-31(6)

Plaintiff's post surgical lower extremity problems and the exacerbation of his psychological problems and depression are the natural result of or causally related to his June 29, 2001 injury by accident.

A medical condition is compensable as a consequence of a workplace injury only when the employee proves that the injury caused the condition.

Baker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2004-04-30(6)

Plaintiff has failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that her cardiac problems and high blood pressure are causally related to her compensable injuries by accidents, and, therefore, she is not entitled to payment by defendants for this treatment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6); Click v. Freight Carriers, 41 N.C. App. 458 , 255 S.E.2d 192 (1979).

Section 97-2(6) covers musculoskeletal conditions that are causally related to and directly result from a compensable injury by accident.

Hughes v. Frito Lay · filed 2004-08-27(6)

3. Based on the greater weight of the evidence, plaintiff's musculoskeletal problems, including pain in her back, right knee, right hip, right arm, and right shoulder are causally related to and the direct and natural result of her 28 August 2001 injury by accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

A condition that develops as a direct result of a compensable injury by accident is compensable.

Hoffman v. Volvo Constr. Equip. North · filed 2005-02-03(6)

As a direct result of the compensable injury by accident to plaintiff's right arm, plaintiff developed left cubital tunnel syndrome and therefore plaintiff is entitled to payment by defendants of all medical treatment incurred or to be incurred by plaintiff for this condition, including the treatment by Dr. Westly. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (6), 97-25 .

An injury by accident includes a later condition that develops as a direct and natural result of the compensable injury.

Berry v. Holiday Inn Select · filed 2005-02-15(6)

As a direct and proximate result of plaintiff's compensable injury to his right lower extremity, plaintiff sustained right peroneal neuropathy that developed into complex regional pain syndrome as a direct and natural result of his compensable injury.

Section 97-2(6) covers later medical problems that are a direct and natural result of a compensable injury by accident.

Eudy v. Snyder Packaging · filed 2005-02-15(6)

The left wrist problems for which plaintiff was treated on and after September 26, 2002, were a direct and natural result of the injury by accident giving rise to this claim.

Section 97-2(6) covers deterioration or aggravation of an accepted work-related shoulder injury as an injury by accident.

Deluca v. Cost-Cutters · filed 2005-01-28(6)

The plaintiff sustained a deterioration and/or aggravation of her accepted occupational disease/injury by accident to her left shoulder arising out of and in the course and scope of her employment on February 26, 2002. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers later physical injuries and psychological conditions that are the direct and natural result of an injury by accident at work.

Cox v. Westvaco Corp./mebane Packaging Group · filed 2005-09-29(6)

On October 11, 2000, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). As the direct and natural result of and causally related to his October 11, 2000 injury by accident, plaintiff sustained a right ankle fracture that required surgical intervention. Id. Additionally, plaintiff's depression and related psychological problems as diagnosed by Dr. Steiner are the direct and natural result of and causally related to his October 11, 2000 injury by accident. Id.

Section 97-2(6) covers a later injury that is a direct and natural consequence of a compensable injury by accident.

Everette v. Well Care Nursing Services · filed 2005-10-05(6)

The plaintiff's left ankle injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment in that the incident was a direct and natural consequence that flowed from her December 12, 2000, compensable injury by accident.

Section 97-2(6) covers conditions that are the natural and probable result of a compensable injury by accident.

Haley v. Abb · filed 2005-11-04(6)

On January 29, 2001, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident to his right ankle and knee arising out of and as a result of this compensable injury by accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). As the natural and probable result of the admittedly compensable ankle and knee injury, plaintiff now suffers from severe and disabling CRPS, arthrofibrosis in his right knee, back pain, depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder.

An overuse condition that is a natural and direct consequence of a compensable injury is itself compensable.

Barber v. Triangle Brick Company · filed 2006-11-28(6)

As a natural and direct consequence of that compensable injury, Plaintiff developed a compensable over-use condition in his right shoulder in July 2003.

Section 97-2(6) covers a subsequent injury that is the direct and natural result of a compensable injury by accident.

McCall v. Ivy Hill Health Retirement · filed 2006-08-02(6)

2. On December 9, 2003, plaintiff sustained an admittedly compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer resulting in her experiencing ongoing left neck, shoulder, low back, hip, leg, and foot pain as well as left leg, knee, and foot weakness. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). 3. As the direct and natural result of, and causally related to her December 9, 2003, injury by accident and related symptoms, plaintiff fell at work on June 7, 2004, resulting in further injury to her lower back and her left and right knees. Id.

A condition that is the direct and natural result of a compensable injury by accident is also compensable under § 97-2(6).

Maldonado v. Overcash Electric · filed 2007-02-02(6)

On February 8, 2000, Plaintiff-Employee sustained a compensable injury by accident to her right knee. Her left knee condition is a direct and natural result of the injury by accident giving rise to this claim. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6); Heatherly v. Montgomery Components , 71 N.C. App. 377 , 323 S.E.2d 29 (1984).

Section 97-2(6) covers psychological conditions and severe deconditioning that directly result from a compensable physical injury and its pain.

Meany v. Wakemed · filed 2007-04-03(6)

As a direct and proximate result of plaintiff's compensable injuries to her neck and right upper extremity and the resulting intractable pain, plaintiff has developed depression, anxiety and other psychological conditions and has become severely deconditioned and functionally bed ridden. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers neurocognitive changes, anxiety, and depression that directly result from a compensable workplace injury.

Camarena v. Sears Contract, Inc. · filed 2007-04-26(6)

As a direct and proximal result of his compensable injuries, plaintiff developed neurocognitive changes, anxiety and depression. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

A condition following treatment for a compensable injury is not compensable under § 97-2(6) without a causal connection to that injury or its treatment.

Lewis v. Beachview Exxon Serv. · filed 2007-04-27(6)

Consequently, based on the greater weight of the competent medical evidence, plaintiff's pulmonary condition is not a result of plaintiff's hernia surgery and therefore is not compensable.

Section 97-2(6) covers musculoskeletal conditions that are causally related to and directly and naturally result from a compensable injury by accident.

Hughes v. Frito Lay, Inc. · filed 2007-09-07(6)

Based on the greater weight of the evidence, plaintiff's musculoskeletal problems, including pain in her back, right knee, right hip, right arm, and right shoulder are causally related to and the direct and natural result of her 28 August 2001 injury by accident.

Section 97-2(6) covers conditions that are the direct and natural result of a compensable injury by accident.

Rivera v. Morris Associates Inc. · filed 2008-03-11(6)

Based upon the credible evidence of record, the undersigned conclude that plaintiff's right knee and back conditions are the direct and natural result of and causally related to his November 16, 2000 left knee injury by accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers neck and cervical conditions that directly result from an admittedly compensable injury.

Ramer v. Arvin-Meritor · filed 2008-04-14(6)

Plaintiff's neck and cervical problems as treated by Dr. Gilpin, Dr. White, and Dr. Martin are a direct and proximal result of her admittedly compensable injury of November 29, 2004.

Section 97-2(6) covers an injury that directly and naturally follows from a compensable workplace injury.

Marshall v. N.C. Department of Correction · filed 2009-03-26(6)

In this case, plaintiff's left foot injury is a direct and natural consequence that flows from her compensable April 10, 2005 injury. Therefore, plaintiff suffered a compensable left foot injury arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant during an FCE on October 9, 2006. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers a subsequent injury when it is the direct and natural result of a compensable primary injury; complex medical causation must be established through expert medical testimony.

Nale v. ALLEN · filed 2009-09-01(6)

Plaintiff had the burden of establishing that the right knee injury was the direct and natural result of the compensable left knee injury. This had to be shown through expert medical testimony.

An injury that is a direct and natural consequence of a compensable injury by accident is itself compensable under Section 97-2(6).

Powell v. City of Raleigh · filed 2010-01-06(6)

The competent evidence of record establishes that plaintiff sustained his motor vehicle accident as a direct and natural consequence of his compensable June 28, 2007 injury by accident due to yellow jacket stings.

Section 97-2(6) covers a condition that is the direct and natural result of, and causally related to, a compensable injury by accident.

Raynor v. N.C. Department of Correction · filed 2010-04-30(6)

Plaintiff has met her burden of proof by the credible lay and medical evidence of record that her left knee condition was the direct and natural result of, and causally related to, her April 13, 2005, admittedly compensable injury by accident.

Section 97-2(6) covers a seizure caused by a prior workplace head injury, even when the employer later disputes the seizure’s compensability.

Flow v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. · filed 2010-06-02(6)

The greater weight of the evidence of record establishes that plaintiff's seizure on June 6, 2007 was a result of the head trauma she sustained on May 24, 2007, and thus plaintiff's seizure on June 6, 2007 is compensable.

Section 97-2(6) covers post-traumatic seizures caused by a compensable injury by accident.

Morgan v. John Wieland Homes, Inc. · filed 2010-05-10(6)

Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident on January 8, 2004, which resulted in injuries to his back and ribs, including post-traumatic seizures. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers a condition caused or contributed to by a compensable work injury, including a condition that is its direct and natural consequence.

Staley v. Pike Electric, Inc. · filed 2010-08-30(6)

Based upon the opinions of Dr. William Stephen Furr and the other competent and credible evidence of record, the Full Commission concludes that Plaintiff proved that his May 17, 2006 work injury either caused or contributed to his left shoulder injury and left carpal tunnel syndrome, and that Plaintiff's right shoulder condition was a direct and natural consequence of Plaintiff's May 17, 2006 work injury.

Section 97-2(6) covers a condition that is the direct and natural result of an admittedly compensable injury.

Krutch v. Wake Medical Center · filed 2010-12-09(6)

The greater weight of the evidence of record establishes that Plaintiff's right knee condition is a direct and natural result of her admittedly compensable left knee injury, and thus Plaintiff's right knee condition is compensable. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

An injury caused by immobilization prescribed to treat a compensable work injury is compensable as a direct and natural consequence of that injury.

Trotta v. Lincoln County Ems · filed 2010-12-13(6)

As a result of Plaintiff's February 28, 2008 work injury, he developed ulnar nerve entrapment of his right upper extremity which was either caused by the injury, or was a direct and natural consequence of the immobilization of his right upper extremity as part of the prescribed treatment after surgery. As a result of Plaintiff's February 28, 2008 work injury, he also developed carpal tunnel syndrome, which is causally related to the injury to his right upper extremity. Plaintiff proved that his right ulnar nerve entrapment and right carpal tunnel syndrome are compensable injuries.

Section 97-2(6) covers conditions that naturally flow from a compensable workplace injury.

Burns v. Consolidated Personnel Corp. · filed 2010-11-29(6)

In this case, plaintiff's post-injury conditions, including but not limited to, his chronic pain, rhabdomyolysis, renal problems, and psychological conditions experienced subsequent to November 2, 1999 are compensable because they are natural consequences that flowed from his admittedly compensable November 2, 1999 injury.

Section 97-2(6) covers a later back condition that is the direct and natural result of a compensable injury by accident.

Jackson v. Unc Hospitals · filed 2010-11-29(6)

Assuming, arguendo, that the Parsons' presumption had been rebutted, there is sufficient medical evidence of record upon which to independently conclude that plaintiff's ongoing low back condition for which she underwent surgery was the direct and natural result of and causally related to her 26 January 2005 injury by accident.

Section 97-2(6) covers an aggravated condition caused by a later fall when the condition is the direct and natural result of a compensable injury by accident.

Daniel v. Furr Transport · filed 2011-03-09(6)

There is sufficient medical evidence of record upon which to find that plaintiff's aggravated left knee condition for which he seeks treatment is the direct and natural result of and causally related to his February 4, 2008 compensable injury by accident.

Section 97-2(6) covers later symptoms and surgery that are the direct and natural result of a compensable injury by accident.

Johnson v. Americredit Corp. · filed 2011-03-04(6)

Assuming, arguendo , that the Parsons' presumption has been rebutted by defendants, there is sufficient medical evidence of record upon which to independently find that plaintiff's need for the second surgery performed on March 3, 2009, her ongoing symptoms, and her need for a third surgical procedure as recommended by Dr. Paul, are the direct and natural result of, and causally related to her admittedly compensable March 20, 2008 injury by accident and initial surgery of April 17, 2008.

A later condition is compensable as an injury by accident under § 97-2(6) when sufficient evidence shows it is the direct and natural result of or causally related to the workplace injury.

Hubbard v. South Haven Assisted Living · filed 2011-05-13(6)

Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence upon which to conclude that her bilateral knee problems or ambulatory issues are the direct and natural result of or causally related to her June 3, 2005 injury by accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6); Click v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. , 300 N.C. 164 , 265 S.E.2d 389 (1980); Holley v. ACTS, Inc. , 357 N.C. 228 , 581 S.E.2d 750 (2003); Young v. Hickory Bus. Furn. , 353 N.C. 227 , 538 S.E.2d 912 (2000).

A cervical condition caused by the lasting effects of a compensable back injury is a related condition for which medical compensation is available.

Peacock v. Associates Housing Finance · filed 2011-11-18

Plaintiff's cervical condition is related to his compensable lumbar spine injury and the resulting bowed posture as a result of the multi-level fusion at L3-4, L4-5, and L5-S1, and Plaintiff is entitled to medical compensation for his related cervical condition. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 .

Section 97-2(6) covers subsequent injuries or diseases that result naturally and unavoidably from a compensable injury.

Roper v. J. P. Stevens & Co. · filed 1983-11-15(6)

A compensable injury is defined by G.S. 97-2(6) as being “only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, and shall not include a disease in any form, except where it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident.” ... Whether plaintiffs complications are considered subsequent injuries or diseases, they are compensable under the Act as they were the natural and unavoidable result of the primary injury to plaintiffs hip and upper leg.

An injury sustained during an ordinary commute generally does not arise out of and in the course of employment unless an exception applies.

Hancock v. American Threshold · filed 2001-10-30(6)

An injury sustained by an employee while going to or from work generally does not arise out of and in the course of employment. Plaintiff's motor vehicle accident of November 17, 1998 is not compensable as it does not fall within any of the exceptions to this principle.

Section 97-2(6) generally excludes injuries sustained while an employee travels to or from work because they do not arise in the course of employment.

Hunt v. Tender Loving Care Home Care Agency, Inc. · filed 2003-09-09(6)

To be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, an injury must arise out of and in the course of employment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). Ordinarily, an injury occurring while an employee travels to or from work does not arise in the course of employment and is not compensable.

Under § 97-2(6), a routinely performed bank deposit is not a special errand, and an accident during the trip home after the employee completes regular duties does not arise out of and in the course of employment.

Gillette v. Dollar Tree Stores · filed 2003-10-23(6)

Plaintiff's trip to the bank to make the night deposit did not constitute a special errand because the night deposits occurred with such frequency and regularity that this duty was an established part of her regular job. Therefore, the coming and going rule applies because the accident occurred after plaintiff completed her regular job duties and was on her way home.

Section 97-2(6) does not cover an injury sustained during an ordinary commute to work when no exception to the coming and going rule applies.

Mills v. Sprint Mid Atlantic · filed 2004-02-05(6)

The facts in the case at bar establish that plaintiff's accident does not fall under any recognized exception to the coming and going rule. Plaintiff's injury by accident occurred while he was traveling from home to work and is therefore not compensable.

Section 97-2(6) generally excludes injuries sustained while an employee travels to or from work because they do not arise in the course of employment.

Powers v. Pac carolina/barrus Constr. Co. · filed 2004-03-16(6)

Plaintiff must prove by the greater weight of the evidence that he sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). An injury occurring while an employee is traveling to and from work does not arise in the course of employment and is not compensable.

Section 97-2(6) generally excludes injuries sustained while going to or coming from work, but an injury on the employer’s premises may qualify for a limited exception.

Burton v. Logic Software, LLC · filed 2007-07-31(6)

Because plaintiff's injuries did not occur on the employer's premises, plaintiff is not entitled to the limited exception to the "coming and going" rule that applies when an employee is injured when going to or coming from work on the employer's premises.

Section 97-2(6) generally excludes injuries sustained while traveling to or from work from compensable injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, subject to recognized exceptions for premises, special errands, traveling employees, and contractual duties.

Lopez v. Shear Investments · filed 2008-10-27(6)

To be compensable under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, an injury must arise out of and in the course of employment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). The general rule in this state is that an injury by accident that occurs while an employee travels to and from work is not one that arises out of or in the course of employment. ... Recognized exceptions to this rule include the premises exception, the special errands exception, the traveling salesman exception, and the contractual duty exception.

An injury on property outside the employer’s ownership, control, and maintenance is barred by the coming and going rule and does not arise out of and in the course of employment.

Quiroz v. Metropol's Statuary, Inc. · filed 2010-12-17(6)

In the present case, plaintiff's injury occurred while on property that was not owned, controlled, or maintained by defendant-employer and is, thus, barred by the "coming and going" rule.

An injury sustained while leaving the employer’s premises for lunch arises out of and in the course of employment under the premises exception to the coming and going rule.

Pavlik v. New Hanover County Board of Education · filed 2011-10-20(6)

In this case, inasmuch as plaintiff was injured while in the process of leaving defendant-employer's premises for his lunch break, but while still on defendant-employer's premises, the "premises exception" to the "coming and going" rule applies and plaintiff's 23 June 2009 fall arose out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer and is compensable.