N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2

Section 97-2(5) permits use of its fifth method to calculate average weekly wage when the other methods would be unfair; that method should approximate what the employee would have earned without the injury.

Crutchfield v. Carolina Football Enterprises · filed 2007-01-05(5)

Calculating plaintiff's average weekly wage by any of the foregoing methods would be unfair; therefore, for these exceptional reasons the fifth method of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) must be used to calculate the method for plaintiff's average weekly wage that most accurately approximates the amount which plaintiff would be earning were it not for the injury he sustained.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage when it is fair and just to both parties and most nearly approximates what the employee would have earned without the injury.

Midgett v. Built by Dwayne, Inc. · filed 2007-01-17(5)

Therefore in this matter it is fair and just to both parties to use the fifth method to compute Plaintiff's average weekly wage because it most nearly approximates the wages Plaintiff would be earning were it not for the injury.

Section 97-2(5) requires use of the fifth method to calculate average weekly wage when the other methods would be unfair, selecting an amount that most accurately approximates what the employee would earn but for the injury.

Crutchfield v. Carolina Football Enterprises · filed 2007-03-22(5)

Calculating plaintiff's average weekly wage by any of the foregoing methods would be unfair; therefore, for these exceptional reasons the fifth method of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) must be used to calculate the method for plaintiff's average weekly wage that most accurately approximates the amount which plaintiff would be earning were it not for the injury he sustained.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage when exceptional circumstances make the preceding methods impractical, using the method that most closely approximates what the employee would have earned absent the injury.

Cherry v. Poteat · filed 2007-04-03(5)

By reason of the shortness of time and casual nature and terms of his employment with defendant-employer, it is impractical to compute plaintiff's average weekly wage according to the preceding methods; therefore, as an exceptional circumstance, the Full Commission may resort to the method that most closely approximates the amount which plaintiff would be earning were it not for his injury.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage to use earnings from before a temporary reduction in hours when the usual 52-week period would be unjust and the earlier period yields a result fair to both parties.

Owens v. Rutherford Management · filed 2007-07-23(5)

The Full Commission concludes that a "fifth-method" calculation of the plaintiff's average weekly wage based upon the income she was making during the fifty-two weeks prior to May 15, 2000 (when she began a reduced schedule to care for her terminally ill husband) provides a result that is fair and just to both parties.

Section 97-2(5) allows the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage when the other methods are inapplicable or unfair, using hours worked, the hourly compensation the worker would have earned, and weeks worked.

May v. First at Blue Ridge · filed 2007-10-31(5)

As methods one through four are not applicable to this case, method five pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) is the most fair and just method to determine plaintiff average weekly wage. Pursuant to method five, plaintiff average weekly wage is determined by multiplying the number of hours plaintiff was employed by defendant by the hourly compensation rate plaintiff would have been entitled to divided by the number of weeks plaintiff worked for defendant.

Section 97-2(5) allows the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage when exceptional circumstances make the other methods unavailable or unfair, aiming to approximate what the employee would have earned absent the injury.

Barrett v. All Payment Services · filed 2008-02-15(5)

Plaintiff was not employed by Defendant-Employer for the 52 weeks preceding his injury. Thus, Methods 1 and 2 of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) are not available for calculating Plaintiff's average weekly wage. Method 3, dividing the earnings of Plaintiff by the weeks worked for Defendant-Employer, will not result in the most fair and just result to both parties considering the casual nature of his employment and Plaintiff's prior employment history. Method 4, determining the wages of a similar employee is not available as there is no employee with employment similar to Plaintiff. Because exceptional circumstances exist in this case Method 5 is the most fair and just method to use to compute Plaintiff's average weekly wage at the time of injury in order to reach a result that would most nearly approximate the amount Plaintiff would be earning were it not for the injury.

Section 97-2(5) permits use of its fifth method to calculate average weekly wages in exceptional circumstances when that method most fairly approximates the wages the employee would have earned without the injury.

Welch v. Forsyth County · filed 2008-04-23(5)

Based on the exceptional circumstances of this case, the Full Commission concludes that the fifth method outlined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) is the only method which is fair and which would result in a calculation of plaintiff's average weekly wage that most nearly approximates the amount of wages she would be earning were it not for her injury.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method for calculating average weekly wage when the other methods do not fairly approximate what the employee would have earned without the injury.

Conyers v. New Hanover Schools · filed 2008-06-30(5)

The fifth method of determining plaintiff's average weekly wage under exceptional circumstances where methods one through four would not be fair and just states that plaintiff's average weekly wage must be calculated to most nearly approximate the amount which plaintiff would be earning were it not for her injury.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage when the first four methods would be unfair because an earlier compensable injury kept the worker from earning wages during part of the calculation period.

Locklear v. Palm Harbor Homes · filed 2008-08-01(5)

The first, second, third and fourth methods of determining plaintiff's average weekly wage do not produce a result that is fair and just to the parties given the fact that plaintiff did not earn any wages between January 9, 2006 and March 9, 2006 as he was out of work pursuant to surgery on his right knee as a result of his January 10, 2004 injury by accident and was paid temporary total disability benefits by defendant-carrier St. Paul Fire Marine Insurance Company. ... The use of the fifth method by calculating plaintiff's weekly wages from the time of his return to work on March 9, 2006 until he stopped working on October 6, 2006 is the most fair.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage when exceptional reasons make the first four methods unfair, including short-term contractual work with alternating high earnings and periods without work.

Barrett v. All Payment Services · filed 2008-11-26(5)

The Full Commission concludes that exceptional reasons exist to utilize Method five (5) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) to compute Plaintiff's average weekly wage. Plaintiff's work was contractual in nature and he would have periods of very high earnings, followed by periods where he did not work at all. The Full Commission therefore concludes that it is fair to both parties to compute Plaintiff's wages based upon his earnings over the previous year from all of his jobs.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage when exceptional circumstances make the first four methods unfair to the employer or employee.

Ledford v. Luther · filed 2009-02-03(5)

The undersigned have considered the methods for calculating average weekly wages set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) and finds that there are exceptional reasons that make the first four methods of calculating plaintiff's average weekly wage unfair to either the employer or the employee. Due to the short period of time plaintiff worked, computation of his average weekly wage is done based upon actual hours worked over the period of time he had the ability to participate in work.

When the first four methods for calculating average weekly wage are unavailable or unfair, the fifth method approximates what the employee would have earned without the injury.

Woodin v. Scoggins Construction Co. · filed 2009-02-24(5)

The first two methods of calculating deceased employee's average weekly wage pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) are unavailable in this matter as deceased employee was only employed for approximately fourteen weeks prior to his compensable injury by accident and only for one day for Myrick at the time of his accident. As deceased employee had only been working for Myrick for one day at the time of his injury, method three is also unavailable for the calculation of deceased employee's average weekly wage. As there is no evidence of the wages of a similarly situated employee, method four is unavailable to calculate deceased employee's average weekly wage. Since the use of the above four methods is either unavailable and/or would be unfair to either the employee or employer, using the fifth method of computing deceased employee's average weekly wage would most nearly approximate the amount of compensation he would be earning were it not for his compensable injury.

Section 97-2(5) permits using its fifth method to calculate average weekly wage when the first four methods cannot be used; under that method, actual earnings are divided by weeks worked after excluding a period with more than seven consecutive days missed.

Golden v. House · filed 2009-06-15(5)

In the case at bar, methods one (1) through four (4) under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) cannot be used for the reasons set forth above. Applying method five (5) under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5), plaintiff worked a span of 31 weeks for defendant, but missed more than seven (7) consecutive days during a period and earned a gross income of $7,282.54. Dividing his earnings by 30 weeks yields an average weekly wage of $242.76, and a corresponding compensation rate of $161.84.

Section 97-2(5) permits use of the fifth method to calculate average weekly wage when the other methods are unsuitable and the available evidence makes that method fair and just.

Monroe v. Solache · filed 2009-08-14(5)

The Full Commission has considered the methods for calculating average weekly wages set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) and finds the fifth method to be applicable in this case given the evidence available. ... Therefore, the fifth method is the most fair and just method to determine plaintiff's average weekly wage, given the evidence available.

Section 97-2(5) permits a fair average weekly wage based on all the evidence when the first four methods would be unfair.

Ensley v. Fmc Corporation · filed 2009-12-29(5)

Due to the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's time since his employment with defendant-employer, methods one through four for determining the average weekly wage would not be fair. Therefore, considering all the evidence in the case, the most fair average weekly wage is the maximum average weekly wage for the year in which plaintiff was diagnosed with asbestosis. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5).

Section 97-2(5) permits use of its fifth method to estimate average weekly wages when the employee worked for the employer only briefly and the record lacks earnings of comparable workers.

Lovette v. Carolinas Roofing · filed 2010-03-22(5)

Given plaintiff's very short time working for defendant-employer, and lack of evidence in the record about the earnings of comparable workers, it is appropriate to use the fifth method of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) to approximate plaintiff's average weekly compensation he would have earned, but for his injury.

Section 97-2(5) permits the Commission to use its fifth method to calculate average weekly wages from net earnings when deducting work-related expenses produces a result fair to both employer and employee.

Edgerton v. WYTHE ADVANTAGE · filed 2010-04-06(5)

Further, while the Commission is not required to deduct expenses incurred by an employee in determining average weekly wage under method five, it may do so in order to produce a result which is fair to both the employer and employee.

Section 97-2(5) permits use of the fifth method for calculating average weekly wage only upon a finding that another method would produce unjust results.

McGhee v. Food Lion · filed 2010-04-14(5)

The fifth method in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) cannot be used unless there is a finding that unjust results would occur using one of the other methods.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage when the first four methods would be unfair, using a figure that most nearly approximates what the employee would have earned but for the injury.

Denning v. N.C. Department of Agriculture · filed 2010-10-01(5)

In the case at bar, it would not be fair and just to the parties to use any of the first four methods under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) for the reasons set forth above. However, it would be fair and just to the parties to use the fifth method under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) in order to most nearly approximate the amount which Plaintiff would have earned but for his October 15, 2007 work injury.

Section 97-2(5) permits the fifth method of calculating average weekly wage when short employment and absences make the third method unfair and comparable employee wages are unavailable for the fourth method.

Wallace v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. · filed 2011-04-14(5)

With respect to calculating Plaintiff's average weekly wage, the Full Commission finds the fifth method under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (5) should be utilized due to the short period of time Plaintiff worked prior to his disablement and the fact that Plaintiff missed 19 days during his short period of employment making method three not fair and just to both parties, and there is no evidence of the wages of a similar employee to allow use of method four.

Employer contributions to a health plan are not allowances in lieu of wages under § 97-2(5) when the employee cannot choose wages instead.

Kirk v. State Department of Correction · filed 1995-12-19(5)

There is nothing in the conditions of employment that permits a State employee to refuse this allowance and receive wages in its place. Therefore, contributions by the State to insure an employee under a health plan is not an allowance made “in lieu of wages” within the meaning of this statute.

Section 97-2(5) excludes employer contributions to health, dental, and pension benefits from average weekly wage when they are not specified allowances under the employee’s wage contract in lieu of wages.

Turner v. the Bibb Company · filed 1996-05-31(5)

For the reasons stated in the above Findings of Fact, the value of the employer's contribution to the employee's health and dental benefit plan and pension fund are not includable in the average weekly wage of the deceased employee because they were not allowances made to an employee as a specified part of his wage contract in lieu of wages.

Employer contributions to an employee’s retirement accounts are fringe benefits rather than earnings included in average weekly wage under § 97-2(5).

Shaw v. U.S. Airways, Inc. · filed 2006-09-13(5)

In the case at bar, defendant-employer's contributions to plaintiff's retirement accounts did not constitute earnings, but rather were a fringe benefit of his employment with defendant-employer that should not be included in the calculation of his average weekly wage.

Medical compensation under § 97-2(19) extends to examination and treatment resulting from the compensable accident, but not to further care that the claimant fails to link to that accident.

Pressley v. Intimates · filed 1997-04-18(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to examination and treatment rendered as a result of the accident in December 1990 through February 1991. Otherwise, plaintiff is not entitled to the further medical compensation claimed. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (6), 97-2 (19), and 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers medical compensation arising from a compensable injury but excludes treatment for unrelated health problems.

Baker v. Design Workshop, Inc. · filed 2001-10-04(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants provide all medical compensation arising from this injury by accident. However, she is not entitled to have defendants provide medical treatment for her unrelated health problems, including her alleged cataracts and osteoporosis.

Section 97-2(19) does not provide compensation for treatment of a condition that is not causally related to the compensable injury.

Burton v. Southern Cold Storage, Inc. · filed 2002-12-19(19)

Plaintiff is not entitled to additional compensation as a result of the herniated disc at L3-4 for which plaintiff was treated and had surgery in the year 2000 and which is not causally related to the compensable injury by accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19); 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers aquatic therapy and causally related physician services as medical compensation when they effect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Phillips v. Angelo's Shoes · filed 2005-03-24(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have all of her medical expenses incurred or to be incurred as a result of her injuries by accident, including aquatic therapy, and the services rendered by Dr. Samuel T. Bowen, which are causally related to plaintiff's injury by accident on February 8, 1992, paid for by defendants for so long as these treatments effect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Medical compensation includes causally related treatment necessary to provide relief, effect a cure, or lessen disability.

Hendrix v. Wilkes Telephone Membership Corp. · filed 2005-03-24(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants pay for causally related medical treatment which may be necessary to provide relief, effect a cure or lessen his disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19); 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers medical care arising from a compensable injury, including evaluations needed to determine whether injury-related surgery is appropriate, but excludes treatment for unrelated conditions.

Sellers v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co. · filed 2008-02-05(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants provide all medical compensation arising from this injury, including the treatment by Dr. Derian, except for the urological evaluation and the evaluation and treatment for his osteoporosis except insofar as Dr. Derian ordered such evaluation(s) in order to determine whether plaintiff was a surgical candidate.

Section 97-2(19) does not cover medical expenses for surgery that is not causally related to a compensable work injury.

Denning v. Interstate Brands Corporation · filed 2008-10-06(19)

Plaintiff is not entitled to payment of medical expenses incurred or in any way related to the reconstructive surgery performed by Dr. Reeg. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19); 97-25 (2007).

Section 97-2(19) covers reasonably necessary treatment for chronic back pain and depression causally related to a compensable work injury.

Stottlemyer v. City of Charlotte · filed 2009-01-06(19)

The treatment provided by Dr. Wesley Lee Marquand and the psychological evaluation provided by Dr. Brian Simpson for Plaintiff's chronic lower back pain and manic depression were reasonably necessary to effect a cure, to give relief, and/or to lessen the period of her disability, and Plaintiff is entitled to have Defendant pay for the same, including, but not limited to, ongoing treatment for chronic lower back pain and manic depression by either Dr. Marquand or any other health care provider to which he refers Plaintiff.

Section 97-2(19) covers treatment reasonably required to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen disability for conditions causally related to a compensable injury.

Walker v. New Hanover County · filed 2009-01-07(19)

The medical treatment Plaintiff has received as more fully described above and in stipulated medical records, including her SI joint dysfunction, back and leg pain and weakness, neurological problems, and L-5 radiculopathy symptoms was reasonably required and tended to effect a cure provide relief and/or lessen her disability. Defendant is obligated to pay for such treatment. Defendant is not obligated to pay for treatment for trochanteric bursitis. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-25 ; 97-2 (19).

Section 97-2(19) covers medical expenses reasonably related to a compensable injury and incurred to lessen disability, effect a cure, or give relief; it excludes expenses for an unrelated condition.

Sealey v. Smith · filed 2010-01-15(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have Defendants pay for all medical expenses reasonably related to his compensable injury that were incurred to lessen the period of disability, effect a cure, or give relief. However, medical expenses related to Plaintiff's osteochondral defect are not reasonably related to Plaintiff's compensable injury. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) includes medical treatment for a neck condition causally related to a compensable injury, including treatment by the treating physician.

Little v. N.C. State Veteran's Home · filed 2010-11-23(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to payment by defendants of medical expenses incurred or to be incurred for the treatment for her neck condition which is causally related to her May 22, 2007 compensable fall. The approved medical expenses include treatment by Dr. Sullivan. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 .

Medical compensation under § 97-2(19) covers treatment reasonably required to cure or relieve a compensable injury or lessen the period of disability; treatment unrelated to the injury does not qualify.

Pomeroy v. MASONRY · filed 2004-07-06(19)

"The term `medical compensation' means medical, surgical, hospital, nursing, and rehabilitative services, and medicines, sick travel, and other treatment, including medical and surgical supplies, as may reasonably be required to effect a cure or give relief and for such additional time as, in the judgment of the Commission, will tend to lessen the period of disability. . . ." N.C.G.S. § 97-2(19) (2003). ... As such, the Commission did not err in finding that the presumption that plaintiff's medical treatment was related to his compensable injury had been rebutted and that the medical treatment provided by Drs. Sadrieh and Sportelli was not causally related to plaintiff's compensable injury.

Section 97-2(19) covers treatment only when the condition being treated is directly related to the workplace injury through causation, aggravation, or a new need for treatment caused by the injury.

Kluttz-Ellison v. Noah's Playloft Preschool · filed 2024-03-22(19)

Under the “directly related” test, treatment for a medical condition is directly related to a workplace injury, and therefore compensable, if there is a sufficiently strong causal relationship between the condition that requires treatment and the workplace injury. Perez, 174 N.C. App. at 133. This requires a showing that the condition for which treatment is sought (1) was caused by the workplace injury; (2) was aggravated by the workplace injury; or (3) did not require medical treatment or intervention of any kind before the workplace injury but now requires treatment solely to remedy the workplace injury.

Section 97-2(19) covers medical expenses for occupational disease while examinations, evaluations, and treatments tend to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Williams v. Dorothea Dix Hospital · filed 1996-10-31(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to payment of all medical expenses incurred as a result of her carpal tunnel syndrome for so long as such examinations, evaluations and treatments tend to effect a cure, give relief or will tend to lessen her period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25 .

Medical compensation covers expenses connected to a compensable occupational disease and its interaction with another medical condition.

Demery v. Perdue Farms, Inc. · filed 1999-11-19(19)

The plaintiff is entitled to have the defendant pay for medical expenses incurred, or to be incurred, in connection with her compensable carpal tunnel syndrome and its interaction with fibromyalgia. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), -25.

Section 97-2(19) covers medical expenses for a compensable occupational disease when treatment is required to provide relief, effect a cure or lessen the period of disability.

Carnahan v. Wal-Mart Stores · filed 2002-03-11(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants pay all medical expenses incurred or to be incurred as a result of the compensable occupational disease as may be required to provide relief, effect a cure or lessen the period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19) and 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers medical treatment reasonably required because of an occupational disease to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen disability.

Thomas v. Goodrich · filed 2003-05-21(19)

Defendants are obligated to provide plaintiff such medical treatment as is reasonably required as a result of plaintiff's occupational disease to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen plaintiff's disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(19) and 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers related medical treatment for a compensable occupational disease when reasonably necessary to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Moore v. Borg Warner, Inc. · filed 2003-07-23(19)

As a result of plaintiff's compensable occupational disease, defendant is liable for related medical treatment that was reasonably necessary to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen plaintiff's period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(19) and 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers medical expenses for a compensable occupational disease when reasonably required to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Sorrell v. Stn Cushion Co. · filed 2004-03-18(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to payment of medical expenses incurred or to be incurred as a result of the compensable occupational disease as may reasonably be required to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(19), -59.

Section 97-2(19) covers medical expenses caused by a compensable occupational disease when they are required to provide relief, effect a cure, or lessen the period of disability.

Moore v. Premium Standard Farms · filed 2004-08-04(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants pay for medical expenses incurred or to be incurred as a result of the compensable occupational diseases as may be required to provide relief, effect a cure or lessen the period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19).

Section 97-2(19) covers medical expenses for a compensable occupational disease when treatment is reasonably required to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Bumgardner v. Cibola Furniture Intl. · filed 2005-01-26(19)

3. Defendants are obligated to pay Plaintiff's medical expenses resulting from her compensable occupational disease for so long as such treatment may be reasonably required to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers medical treatment for a compensable occupational disease while it is reasonably required to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Towery (Ledford) v. Kroehler Furniture Mfg. Co. · filed 2005-01-26(19)

Defendants are obligated to pay plaintiff's medical expenses resulting from her compensable occupational disease for so long as such treatment may be reasonably required to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers medical treatment for a compensable occupational disease when reasonably required to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Taylor v. Henderson Cty. Public Library · filed 2005-02-08(19)

Defendants are obligated to pay Plaintiff's medical expenses resulting from her compensable occupational disease for so long as such treatment may be reasonably required to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers medical treatment for a compensable occupational disease when it tends to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Thomas v. Cumberland Cty. Schools · filed 2005-09-06(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have Defendants pay for the medical treatment necessitated by his compensable occupational disease. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19) and 97-25 . ... Defendants shall pay all medical expenses incurred or to be incurred by plaintiff as a result of his compensable occupational disease so long as such medical treatment tends to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen his period of disability.

Section 97-2(19) covers reasonably necessary treatment related to a compensable occupational disease that tends to cure, relieve, or lessen disability, but excludes surgery to repair a noncompensable injury.

Ward v. Floors Perfect · filed 2005-10-28(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to reasonably necessary medical treatment, related to his compensable occupational disease which tends to effect a cure, provide relief or lessen the period of plaintiff's disability. Plaintiff is not entitled to arthroscopic surgery as the purpose of that surgery is to repair the non-compensable tear to plaintiff's medial meniscus. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 , 97-25.1 .

Section 97-2(19) covers medical and other treatment reasonably intended to cure, give relief, or lessen disability related to a compensable occupational disease.

Lathon v. Cumberland County · filed 2006-04-07(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to all medical and other treatment that is reasonably intended to either effect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of her disability that is related to her compensable occupational disease. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19); 97-59 .

Section 97-2(19) includes a vocational rehabilitation assessment to determine whether an employee’s current job is suitable within medical care for a compensable occupational disease.

O'Neal v. Duke University · filed 2007-08-23(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendant provide such medical care and treatment as is reasonably required to provide relief, effect a cure or lessen plaintiff's period of disability caused by her compensable occupational disease, including but not limited to, a vocational rehabilitation assessment to determine whether plaintiff's current job is suitable employment.

Section 97-2(19) covers medical compensation arising from an occupational disease, including an independent medical evaluation of a tremor that developed after surgery for the disease.

Jones v. Food Lion · filed 2007-12-12(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants provide all medical compensation arising from this occupational disease, including an independent medical evaluation by a motion disorder specialist regarding the tremor, which developed in his right hand after the second operation.

Section 97-2(19) covers reasonably necessary treatment for a compensable occupational disease that tends to cure, relieve, or lessen disability, but excludes surgery to repair a noncompensable injury.

Ward v. Floors Perfect · filed 2008-10-10(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to reasonably necessary medical treatment, related to his compensable occupational disease which tends to effect a cure, provide relief or lessen the period of plaintiff's disability. Plaintiff is not entitled to arthroscopic surgery as the purpose of that surgery is to repair the non-compensable tear to plaintiff's medial meniscus. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 , 97-25.1 .

Section 97-2(19) includes medical care and treatment reasonably required to provide relief, effect a cure, or lessen the period of disability caused by a compensable occupational disease.

Williams v. City of Wilmington · filed 2010-11-01(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendant provide such medical care and treatment as is reasonably required to provide relief, effect a cure or lessen plaintiff's period of disability caused by plaintiff's compensable occupational diseases of right carpal tunnel syndrome and right trigger finger or tenosynovitis, including but not limited to, further medical treatment with Dr. Moore and a possible revision of her trigger finger release or a tenosynovectomy.

Section 97-2(19) covers medical expenses caused by an occupational disease when reasonably necessary to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen disability.

Womble v. Aeroquip, Inc. · filed 2011-08-15(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to payment of all medical expenses incurred, or to be incurred as a result of his lung cancer that are reasonably necessary to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen his period of disability.

Medical compensation includes reasonably necessary surgery for a compensable injury when it tends to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen disability.

Gillikin v. Hermitage House Rest Home · filed 1997-04-25(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants provide all medical compensation reasonably necessary as a result of the subject injury by accident to the extent it tends to effect a cure, give relief or lessen her disability, including the surgery offered by Dr. Lestini. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-25 ; 97-2 (19).

Section 97-2(19) covers examinations, surgery, and treatment reasonably required to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen disability resulting from a compensable injury.

Boyd v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc · filed 2002-01-17(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendant pay for her medical expenses incurred or to be incurred as a result of her admittedly compensable injury by accident, including all examinations, surgical procedures, and other treatments by Drs. Branch and Moody, for so long as such evaluations, examinations, and treatments may reasonably be required to effect a cure, give relief and will tend to lessen plaintiff's disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), -25, -25.1.

Section 97-2(19) covers medical treatment, including surgery, reasonably necessary to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of disability from a compensable injury.

Lee v. Party Reflections · filed 2003-06-06(19)

As a result of his compensable injury by accident to his back, and in light of the foregoing, plaintiff received reasonable medical treatment, including Dr. Etikerentse's treatment relating to plaintiff's back pain, and Dr. Getter's treatment and surgery, that was reasonably necessary to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of his disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(19) and 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) does not cover exploratory or nerve resection surgery that is not medically necessary to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Healey v. Waldt Constr. Co. · filed 2003-09-10(19)

Plaintiff's desired exploratory and nerve resection surgery is not medically necessary to affect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of plaintiff's disability.

Section 97-2(19) covers treatment for a preexisting condition materially aggravated by falls resulting from a compensable injury, including surgery when the falls accelerate the need for it.

Clark v. Sanger Clinic · filed 2005-02-15(19)

As a result of the compensable injury by accident, plaintiff sustained falls that resulted in a material aggravation of the pain and loss of function related to her preexisting right hip arthritis and accelerated any potential need for hip replacement surgery such that treatment for that condition, including hip replacement, is compensable and shall be provided by defendants. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) requires requested surgery to be reasonably necessary to effect a cure or provide relief before it qualifies as medical compensation.

Lankford v. DREAMS UNLIMITED, INC. · filed 2009-10-20(19)

The Commission's unchallenged finding in turn supports its conclusion under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(19) and § 97-25 that "Plaintiff has failed to prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that the surgical fusion he has requested is reasonably necessary to effect a cure or to provide relief from his back pain."

Section 97-2(19) covers medical treatment reasonably required to cure or relieve a compensable injury or lessen the period of disability, including future evaluations, a muscle stimulator, and possible surgery.

Franklin v. Broyhill Furniture Industries, Inc. · filed 2010-07-09(19)

As a direct and proximate result of Plaintiff's compensable injuries by accident on October 4, 2007, Plaintiff is entitled to all medical expenses incurred or to be incurred for his lumbar spine injury, including but not limited to periodic evaluations with Dr. Fleck and Dr. Stephen David to monitor Plaintiff's spinal condition, the RS-4i stimulator, and possibly an L4/5 and L5/S1 fusion, for so long as such examinations, evaluations, and treatments may reasonably be required to effect a cure, give relief or tend to lessen Plaintiff's period of disability.

Section 97-2(19) covers medical treatment reasonably necessary to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of disability, including necessary future surgery.

Ferguson v. Centimark Corporation · filed 2010-09-24(19)

The medical treatment Plaintiff received with respect to his January 31, 2008 work injury was reasonably necessary in order to effect a cure, to give relief, and/or to lessen his period of disability, and Defendants are obligated to pay for such treatment, and the future treatment recommended by Dr. Daniel James Albright and Dr. Thomas Craig Derian, including additional surgery, is also reasonably necessary. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 , 97-25.1 (2009).

Section 97-2(19) covers surgery for a compensable injury when reasonably required to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen disability.

Stevens v. Britthaven of Madison · filed 2011-01-19(19)

As a direct and proximate result of plaintiff's compensable injuries by accident on January 7, 2009, plaintiff is entitled to payment of all medical expenses incurred or to be incurred for her right hip and right knee, including the total right knee arthroplasty recommended by Dr. Aluisio, for so long as such examinations, evaluations and treatments may reasonably be required to effect a cure, give relief or tend to lessen plaintiff's period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 .

An LLC member actively engaged in the business may elect to be included as an employee under its workers’ compensation policy if the insurer has notice of the election.

Shea v. Sdr Services · filed 2011-11-22(2)

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2), a member of a limited liability company can elect to be included as an "employee" under the workers' compensation policy of his business, if he is actively engaged in the operation of the business and if the insurer has notice of such election.

Section 97-2(19) covers reasonable and necessary nursing expenses, medicines, sick travel, medical and hospital treatment, and rehabilitative services for a compensable injury.

Inman v. Wilson Tree Company · filed 1997-03-18(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to the reasonable and necessary nursing expenses, medicines, sick travel, medical, hospital and other treatment or course of rehabilitative services at defendants' expense for the remainder of plaintiff's life or until further Order of the Industrial Commission, whichever first occurs. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-29 ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19).

Section 97-2(19) includes medication that primarily treats a preexisting condition when it also mitigates pain associated with a compensable injury.

Clark v. Wal-Mart · filed 2006-05-26(19)

The medical treatment shall include medication which primarily treats the osteoporosis but also mitigates the pain associated with compression fractures, such as Miacalcin or Fosamax. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers medical treatment and protective prescription glasses reasonably required to relieve a compensable eye injury.

Pennington v. Raco, Inc · filed 2007-03-29(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to all medical expenses incurred or to be incurred as a result of his compensable injury, for so long as such examinations, evaluations and treatments may reasonably be required to effect a cure, give relief or tend to lessen plaintiff's period of disability, including treatment by Drs. Oliver, Walter, Spillman, Martin and Atkins, and treatment at the emergency room. Treatment may include diagnostic testing, referrals, and prescription and over-the-counter medications and drops. Plaintiff is also entitled to have defendants pay for tinted prescription high-impact protective safety glasses with side shield protection. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19); 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) requires an employer to pay for medication that reasonably gives relief from a compensable condition even when it also treats a non-work-related condition.

Bolick v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc. · filed 2008-01-15(19)

Even if the medical treatment will not lessen the period of disability, the statute requires employers to pay for medical expenses, as long as they are reasonably required to (1) effect, a cure or (2) give relief. ... Based on this testimony, there is competent evidence in the record to support the Commission’s finding that plaintiff’s prescription medications provide some relief to plaintiff by improving his overall lung functioning. Thus, it was proper for the Commission to order defendant to pay for these medications.

Section 97-2 treats travel and prescription expenses for treatment by an authorized provider as medical compensation.

Manley v. Tcwh Auto Parts · filed 2009-03-06(19)

Plaintiff's requests for reimbursement for travel and prescription expenses incurred by plaintiff for treatment with Dr. Gulley, an authorized treating provider, is medical compensation to which the plaintiff is entitled, and the same should be paid by defendants.

Section 97-2(19) covers treatment for compensable physical and mental injuries, including counseling, psychiatric treatment, prescriptions, and mileage, when reasonably required to cure, relieve, or lessen disability.

Brown v. N.C. Department of Correction · filed 2010-08-05(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have Defendant pay for the treatment incurred or to be incurred for her compensable physical and mental injuries, including but not limited to counseling, psychiatric treatment, prescriptions and mileage, for so long as such treatment is reasonably required to either effect a cure, provide relief or lessen her disability.

Section 97-2(19) covers psychiatric treatment for a depression and mood disorder that directly result from a compensable injury, including prescriptions, consultations, diagnostic testing, and mileage reimbursement.

Smith v. Century Link · filed 2010-11-03(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants pay for the psychiatric treatment he has received from Drs. Verrilli and Sabanayagam, including, but not limited to, prescriptions, consultations, diagnostic testing and mileage reimbursement. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19) and 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers medical treatment for compensable conditions, including diagnostic testing, surgeries, prescriptions, physical therapy, and mileage.

Polston v. Ingles Markets · filed 2011-12-06(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have Defendant pay for the medical treatment she has previously received for her compensable cervical, left shoulder, left arm, and left hand conditions, with and/or at the direction of Drs. So, Broadhurst and/or Fowler, including but not limited to diagnostic testing, surgeries, prescriptions, physical therapy and/or mileage. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19) and 97-25 .

Section 97-2(5) bases average weekly wages on earnings from the employment in which the worker was injured and excludes wages from concurrent employment.

Tunell v. Resource Mfg/Prologistix · filed 2012-08-07(5)

In interpreting “average weekly wages” pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5), it is clear from our case law that a plaintiff cannot aggregate or combine his wages from more than one employment in calculating his compensation rate.

Section 97-2(5) does not permit wages from a separate job to be combined with wages from the job in which the employee was injured when calculating average weekly wages.

Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Company · filed 1966-02-04(5)

We hold that, in determining plaintiff’s average weekly wage, the Commission had no authority to combine his earnings from the employment in which he was injured with those from any other employment.

Section 97-2(9) measures disability by the worker’s incapacity to replace wages lost from the job in which the injury occurred.

Collins v. Biltmore Oil Company · filed 1995-02-16(9)

The Act compensates for the "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury," and while, unfortunately, the parties were distracted somewhat from plaintiff's condition, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that he was physically incapable of replacing the wages lost due to the compensable injury during the period covered by the evidence.

A temporary worker is not a special employee of the business receiving the worker when the staffing agreement expressly excludes an employment relationship with that business.

Gregory v. Pearson · filed 2012-12-31(2)

Similarly, because the Staffing Vendor Agreement expressly states the temporary workers are not County employees, we conclude the circumstances do not satisfy the first prong of the Collins test.

Section 97-2(2) can encompass a worker as a special employee of a second employer, but disputed evidence of that status prevents summary judgment based on workers’ compensation exclusivity.

Taft v. Brinley's Grading Services, Inc. · filed 2013-02-05(2)

We agree that the evidence in the record gives rise to genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Mr. Paul, who was actually employed by a company other than Brinley’s Grading, amounted to a “special employee” subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision.

A worker can be an employee of a special employer under § 97-2(2) when the worker has an express or implied contract of hire with that employer, performs its work, and is subject to its right to control the work.

Solis-Santos v. Lester · filed 2025-11-05(2)

The Act defines the term “employee” as including “every person engaged in an employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(2). ... Having satisfied the three prongs of the Collins test, we conclude that the court’s findings of fact as to Prime Demolition’s special-employer status are supported by competent evidence of record. The trial court did not err in determining that “Prime [Demolition] was Plaintiff’s special employer,” or that Plaintiff’s remedies were limited to those provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act.

A special employment relationship under § 97-2(2) requires the employee’s express or implied consent to a contract of hire with the special employer.

Collins v. James Paul Edwards, Inc. · filed 1974-05-15(2)

As noted above, entering into any such special employment relationship would result in Collins losing certain rights while gaining others, and such a relationship could not arise without his express or implied consent. ... In our opinion the facts in this case do not show such acceptance by Collins of control and direction by Wooten employees over his activities as a truck driver for Edwards as to warrant the conclusion that he impliedly consented to enter into a new and special employment relationship with Wooten.

A special errand ends when the employee returns to his property; an injury there is outside the course of employment.

Powers v. Lady's Funeral Home · filed 1982-05-04(6)

The journey ended when plaintiff returned to his property, however, and the deputy commissioner, with proper regard for the “portal to portal” nature of the special errand rule, accurately found plaintiff to be outside the scope of his employment when misfortune befell him.

Section 97-2(7) defines an insurer as a person or fund authorized under § 97-93 to insure workers’ compensation, including a self-insurer; an employer and individuals without that status do not qualify.

Allred v. Exceptional Landscapes, Inc. · filed 2013-05-21(7)

The term “insurer” is defined as “any person or fund authorized under G.S. 97-93 to insure under this Article, and includes self-insurers.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(7) (2011). ... In the instant case, none of the defendants are “insurers” as defined by statute.

Section 97-2(19) includes necessary medical case management services that secure appropriate treatment within medical compensation.

Miller v. Carolinas Medical Center · filed 2014-04-01(19)

While it is true that A&A did not provide “treatment” or “rehabilitative services” to Plaintiff in the conventional sense, its role as an administrative intermediary was necessary to ensure that Plaintiff received the treatment determined to be appropriate by the Commission in order to “effect a cure or give relief for” Plaintiff’s compensable back injury. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(19). We, therefore, hold that Defendant last provided “medical compensation” for Plaintiff’s 2006 injury when it tendered its payment to A&A on 20 January 2009.

Section 97-2(17) makes singular terms include the plural unless context requires otherwise; the context of § 97-84 requires one deputy commissioner to handle a dispute through the award.

Bentley v. Jonathan Piner Constr. · filed 2016-09-20(17)

We recognize that, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, we are to read the singular to include the plural unless the context requires otherwise. ... We believe the context in which “a deputy,” “said deputy,” and “the deputy” are used requires that the entire process be handled by a single deputy commissioner, and that a contrary interpretation would contravene the manifest intent of the General Assembly.

An employee may be jointly employed by two employers for workers’ compensation purposes when an employment contract, simultaneous control, and overlapping work connect the employee to both.

McGuine v. Nat'l Copier Logistics · filed 2020-04-07(2)

We hold that Plaintiff was employed both by NCL and National Copier and that both are therefore liable for Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation; we therefore need not reach Plaintiff’s second argument.

Section 97-2(2) permits a worker to be an employee of two employers at once, making both liable for workers’ compensation when joint employment is established.

McGuine v. Nat'l Copier Logistics · filed 2020-04-07(2)

An employee can, under some circumstances, operate as an employee of two employers at the same time, in which case both employers can be liable for workers’ compensation. ... Thorough consideration of the facts, law, and the parties’ arguments therefrom makes plain Plaintiff was jointly employed by NCL and National Copier.

Section 97-2(2) permits a worker to be an employee of two employers at the same time, making either or both liable for workers’ compensation.

Henderson v. Manpower of Guilford County, Inc. · filed 1984-09-18(2)

G.S. 97-2(2) defines an employee as “every person engaged in an employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written. . . .” Nevertheless, it is fundamental that under some circumstances a person can be an employee of two different employers at the same time, in which event either employer or both may be liable for Workers’ Compensation.

Section 97-2(11) defines general compensation as a money allowance that excludes medical and hospital expenses.

Hyler v. GTE Products Co. · filed 1993-02-12(11)

Medical and hospital expenses which employers must provide pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 97-25 are not a part of “compensation” as it always has been defined in the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Section 97-2(11) defines compensation to encompass death benefits payable to dependents and funeral benefits.

McAuley v. NC A&T State Univ. · filed 2021-12-07(11)

While death benefits are not specifically mentioned in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97- 24(a), the text of the statute refers to “compensation,” a term defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 as encompassing “the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this Article, and includes funeral benefits provided herein.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(11) (2019). We therefore agree with the Full Commission in its conclusion the timeliness of death claims is contemplated and governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-24(a).

Section 97-2(11) includes burial expenses in the definition of compensation, but burial expenses alone do not constitute compensation.

Ivey v. North Carolina Prison Department · filed 1960-06-10(11)

To be sure, the definition includes burial expenses, but it takes the whole to constitute compensation and not one of its parts.

Section 97-2(11) defines “compensation” as money payable to an employee or dependents under the Workers’ Compensation Act, including funeral benefits.

Blackmon v. North Carolina Department of Correction · filed 1996-05-10(11)

The Workers’ Compensation Act defines “compensation” as “the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this Article, and includes funeral benefits provided herein.” N.C.G.S. § 97-2(11) (Supp. 1995).

For a death claim under § 97-2(6) and (10), the Pickrell presumption of work-relatedness does not require the employee to have been “found dead.”

Frye v. Hamrock · filed 2022-09-20(6), (10)

However, careful review of Pickrell and subsequent case law shows that being “found dead” is not, in and of itself, a necessary condition for application of the presumption as articulated by our Supreme Court.

When an employee dies in the course of employment and the cause is unknown, the claimant may rely on a rebuttable presumption that the death resulted from a work-related injury.

Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc. · filed 1988-06-02(6), (10)

In order for a claimant to recover workers’ compensation benefits for death, he must prove that death resulted from an injury (1) by accident; (2) arising out of his employment; and (3) in the course of the employment. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6), (10) (1985). ... In cases, therefore, where the circumstances bearing on work-relatedness are unknown and the death occurs within the course of employment, claimants should be able to rely on a presumption that death was work-related, and therefore compensable, whether the medical reason for death is known or unknown.

Section 97-2(6) covers an accidental injury that occurs during work and has a causal connection to the employment, even when the employee participated in horseplay.

Bare v. Wayne Poultry Co. · filed 1984-08-21(6)

The Act applies to all injuries sustained by covered employees, with certain exceptions irrelevant to this case, which occur by accident “arising out of and in the course of the employment,” G.S. 97-2(6), and in our judgment plaintiffs award was not erroneously made. ... And that the plaintiffs participation in the horseplay that led to her injuries was both foolish and negligent is beside the point, we think, since fault is not a factor under the Workers’ Compensation Act and it does not exclude workers otherwise covered because they were engaged in foolishness or horseplay when injured.

Section 97-2(6) can cover an injury sustained during workplace horseplay in which the employer participated.

McCall v. Gordon Brothers Elec. Serv., Inc. · filed 2002-10-14(6)

On September 1, 1999, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant-employer, resulting in back pain. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

Section 97-2(6) allows compensation when an employment-related risk causes injury, even if an idiopathic condition contributed.

Ross v. Young Supply Co. · filed 1984-12-04(6)

Where an injury is associated with any risk attributable to the employment, compensation should be allowed, even though an employee may have suffered from an idiopathic condition which precipitated or contributed to the injury.

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury caused by an accident; a work condition that has become part of an employee’s normal routine does not qualify.

Trudell v. Seven Lakes Heating & Air Conditioning Co. · filed 1981-12-01(6)

The injury must result from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. G.S. 97-2(6). ... We agree with the Commission that by that time, the low crawl space had become part of plaintiffs normal work routine. There was, therefore, no accident causing his back injury.

Section 97-2(6) covers an injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Rich v. Staley Hosiery Mill, Inc. · filed 1995-04-25(6)

As plaintiff did suffer an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of the employment, she is entitled to benefits under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

Section 97-2(6) covers an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Creel v. Town of Dover · filed 1995-09-21(6)

On 3 September 1993 plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

An injury may qualify as an injury by accident under § 97-2(6) even if it causes no ongoing disability.

McNair v. Superior Construction Co., Inc. · filed 1996-09-19(6)

Plaintiff did sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. However, such injury did not result in any on-going disability which Plaintiff may now be experiencing. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment for a claim to be compensable.

Brinson v. Winston-Salem Transit. Auth. · filed 1997-09-09(6)

Plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

Section 97-2(6) covers an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

McCracken v. U.S. Airways, Inc. · filed 1999-10-28(6)

On January 7, 1997, the plaintiff sustained a right knee injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with the defendants, and as a result thereof was temporarily totally disabled from January 8, 1997 until August 12, 1997, entitling her to compensation at the weekly rate of $512.00.

Section 97-2(6) covers an accidental back injury arising out of and in the course of employment.

Crisco v. Land Transportation, LLC · filed 2001-11-20(6)

On 27 December 1996, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident to his back arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury arising out of employment to result from an accident, such as an unusual interruption of the employee’s work routine.

Calderwood v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority · filed 1999-09-21(6)

In this case, there is a complete lack of competent evidence to support the findings that Plaintiff’s injuries “occurred while performing her usual employment duties in the usual way,” and were “not a result of any unforeseen or unusual event.”