N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4

Section 1-75.4(3) treats alienation of affections and criminal conversation as injuries to person or property for purposes of personal jurisdiction based on a local act.

Golding v. Taylor · filed 1973-08-22(3)

We hold that an action for alienation of affections and for criminal conversation is an action ex delicto and involves “injury to person or property” within the contemplation of the above quoted statute.

Section 1-75.4(3) covers an alimony claim based on abandonment in North Carolina as an injury to person or property.

Sherwood v. Sherwood · filed 1976-04-07(3)

We hold that an action for alimony on the ground of abandonment is a claim of “injury to person or property” under G.S. 1-75.4(3).

Section 1-75.4(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident principal based on an agent’s acts in North Carolina within the scope of the agent’s authority, even if the principal was never present in the state.

Sparrow v. Goodman · filed 1974-06-12(3)

Foreign corporations have been held subject to “long-arm jurisdiction” for acts of their agents under N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(4), Federal Insurance Co. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 341 F.Supp. 855 (W.D.N.C., 1972), aff’d, 473 F.2d 909 (C.A. 4, 1973), and no reason appears to differentiate in this regard between the “defendant” mentioned in N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(4) and the “defendant” mentioned in N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(3).

Section 1-75.4(3) permits personal jurisdiction for an injury arising from the defendant’s act in North Carolina and is construed liberally within due process limits.

Fungaroli v. Fungaroli · filed 1981-04-07(3)

Subject to the limitations imposed by due process, this section should be liberally construed in favor of finding personal jurisdiction. ... The presumed finding of fact ... that defendant participated in the alleged act of removing plaintiffs child from North Carolina is supported by both plaintiffs complaint and her affidavit. Therefore, we are bound by that finding of fact, and we think that there was no error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss based on these grounds.

Section 1-75.4(3) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident vehicle owner when an alleged injury arises from its agent’s act in North Carolina and ownership supplies prima facie evidence of agency.

DeArmon v. B. Mears Corp. · filed 1984-04-17(3)

Applying the provisions of G.S. 1-75.4(3) and the prima facie showing of agency afforded by G.S. 20-71.1 to the facts alleged, i.e., that the deceased was killed in North Carolina by a motor vehicle owned by the defendant B. Mears Corporation, a Florida ... corporation, we conclude that the trial court was correct in holding, for purposes of the Rule 12(b) motion, that North Carolina does have personal jurisdiction over the B. Mears Corporation.

Section 1-75.4 permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant engages in substantial activity in North Carolina or when an injury arises from the defendant’s act in the state.

Lane v. WSM, Inc. · filed 1983-12-30(1)(d), (3)

The court finds that by placing advertisements in a magazine calculated to reach a North Carolina audience; conducting a direct mail campaign in North Carolina; and broadcasting advertisements over North Carolina’s airwaves, defendant has engaged in substantial activity in this state, pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. § 1 — 75.4—(l)(d). Further, the court finds that the mailing by WSM to plaintiff of a clip-off ticket order form was an act from which plaintiff’s alleged injury “arose” for purposes of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-75.4(3).

Section 1-75.4(3) requires findings resolving disputed agency facts when jurisdiction depends on whether an in-state driver acted for the defendant.

DeArmon v. B. Mears Corp. · filed 1985-01-30(3)

The Court of Appeals reasoned that despite Mears’ evidence, which if believed would establish that the driver Canady was not its agent at the time of the accident, the prima facie case for agency created by N.C.G.S. § 20-71.1 upon a showing of registered ownership in Mears was sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that jurisdiction existed under the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(3). The Court of Appeals did not address whether the trial court’s findings of fact were sufficient to support its conclusion that jurisdiction existed. Believing that the findings were clearly insufficient, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 1-75.4(3) permits personal jurisdiction when an injury inside or outside North Carolina arises from a defendant’s act or omission in the state.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Kerr · filed 1986-06-13(3)

The North Carolina Long-Arm Statute provides for jurisdiction over the person where there is an injury to person or property within or without the State which arises out of an act or omission within North Carolina by the defendant. N.C.Gen.Stat. § 1-75.4(3). The Defendants argue that the FDIC’s claim arose in South Carolina, but the Court finds this argument unpersuasive in light of the allegations that the transaction complained of took place in Charlotte, North Carolina, ... These actions go to the heart of the FDIC’s claims and show that those claims arose here, not in South Carolina.

Section 1-75.4(3) permits personal jurisdiction for claims arising from a defendant’s act or omission in North Carolina, even if the defendant later leaves the state.

Tierney v. Garrard · filed 1996-11-05(3)

Clearly, as is shown on the face of plaintiffs’ complaint, defendant was amenable to personal jurisdiction pursuant to G.S. § 1-75.4(3), if not another subsection of that provision.

Section 1-75.4(3) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant distributes allegedly defamatory material in North Carolina, causing injury there.

Saxon v. Smith · filed 1997-01-21(3)

Accordingly, defendants’ alleged publication of defamatory material in North Carolina would constitute a “claim[] [for] injury to person . . . within this State arising out of an act. . . within this State by the defendant^],” thus conferring personal jurisdiction over defendants under G.S. § 1-75.4(3).

Section 1-75.4(3) treats an intentional tortious act directed at a plaintiff in North Carolina as an act within the state for personal jurisdiction purposes.

Peterson v. M.G. "Pat" Robertson · filed 1999-05-25(3)

Thus, the Court concludes that where an out of state defendant commits an intentional tortious act directed at a plaintiff within this state, that act is, for jurisdictional purposes, an act within this state under N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(3).

Section 1-75.4(3) permits personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from the defendant’s act or omission in North Carolina.

Fox v. Gibson · filed 2006-03-07(3)

Since the trial court’s findings of fact, ignoring finding of fact twelve, support its conclusion of law that “[t]his action arises directly out of Defendant’s activities within and to the state of North Carolina[,]” we hold that section 1-75.4(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes confers personal jurisdiction in North Carolina.

Section 1-75.4(3) requires an act or omission by the defendant in North Carolina to establish personal jurisdiction under its local-act provision.

State Ex Rel. Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands Manufacturing, LLC · filed 2008-01-15(3)

There being no “act or omission within this State by the defendant,” we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

Section 1-75.4(3) confers specific jurisdiction when the alleged tortious conduct and injury occurred in North Carolina.

Robinson v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 2014-04-23(3)

North Carolina is clearly a forum where this action could be brought and thus satisfies the threshold requirement of § 1404(a). That is because specific jurisdiction is conferred by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-75.4(3), as the allegedly tortious conduct and injury occurred there, and thus any question of general jurisdiction under Daimler AG, which might have to be dealt with in either New York or New Jersey (although, in fairness, it appears that Amtrak did not raise that defense for some reason, and it would have to amend its answer) would pose no impediment.

Section 1-75.4 permits personal jurisdiction in alienation of affections and criminal conversation claims when the defendant’s contacts with North Carolina are directly linked to the alleged injuries.

Willis v. Willis · filed 2015-07-21(3), (4)(a)

Based upon the evidence establishing a direct link between defendant’s contacts with North Carolina and plaintiff’s injuries caused by defendant, the trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusion that “[d]efendant’s activities are sufficient to permit the exercise of jurisdiction under North Carolina’s long arm statute (NC Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 (3) & (4)), in [plaintiff’s] claims against Defendant[.]”

Section 1-75.4(4) covers intangible financial injury in North Carolina and does not require the claim to arise from the defendant’s in-state solicitation activities.

Munchak Corporation v. Riko Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1973-12-21(4)

There is no requirement that the cause of action, pursuant to which the jurisdictional claim is raised, be related to the activities of the defendant which gives rise to the in personam jurisdiction. Further, defendant’s contention that G.S. § 1-75.4 was not intended to embrace “intangible injuries,” is rejected. Such a result would conflict with the clear wording and intent of the North Carolina long arm statute.

Section 1-75.4(4)(a) permits jurisdiction for an injury to property in North Carolina caused by an out-of-state act when the defendant carried on service activities in the state around the time of the injury.

Marion v. Long · filed 1985-02-05(4)(a)

Defendants admitted coming to North Carolina and discussing the repairs and then loading and transporting the car. Construing the statute liberally, we conclude that the statutory time and place requirements were met and that defendants carried on “service activities” in North Carolina. Accordingly, we hold that there were statutory grounds for exercise of jurisdiction.

Section 1-75.4(4)’s requirement that activities occur at or about the time of injury is satisfied by annual North Carolina transactions over the preceding five years.

Coastal Chemical Corp. v. Guardian Industries, Inc. · filed 1983-07-05(4)

Defendant’s principal contention with regard to the statutory prong of the jurisdictional inquiry is that the evidence did not show that its activities in North Carolina were “at or about the time of the injury,” as required by G.S. 1-75.4(4). ... This clearly sufficed to meet the “at or about the time of the injury” requirement.

Section 1-75.4(4)b permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer when its product is used in North Carolina in the ordinary course of trade at the time of a local injury.

Bush v. BASF Wyandotte Corp. · filed 1983-09-20(4)b

The allegation that products manufactured by CTC and Cor-onaverken were being used in North Carolina in the ordinary course of trade at the time of the injury was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements of G.S. 1-75.4(4)b.

Section 1-75.4(4)(b) provides a statutory ground for personal jurisdiction when a defendant services a product that the plaintiff uses in North Carolina in the ordinary course of trade.

Desoto Trail, Inc. v. Covington Diesel, Inc. · filed 1985-11-05(4)(b)

Construing the statute liberally, we find that the engine installed in plaintiffs truck by Penske was a product serviced by Penske and used within this State by plaintiff in the ordinary course of trade; therefore, there were statutory grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction.

Section 1-75.4(4)(a) permits personal jurisdiction for a claimed local injury arising from an out-of-state act when the defendant solicited or provided services in North Carolina, but the plaintiff must establish a basis for applying it to each defendant.

Uniprop Manufactured Housing Communities Income Fund II v. Home Owners Funding Corp. of America · filed 1990-12-14(4)(a)

The Court believes that the best argument to be made in invoking in personam jurisdiction under the long-arm statute is the provision found at N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1 — 75.4(4)(a). ... The Court believes that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Shea and Armstrong had any involvement in HOFCA’s decision to refuse to honor the draw request. ... Accordingly, the Court believes that Plaintiff has failed to establish that the North Carolina long-arm statute confers jurisdiction on this Court over Shea and Armstrong.

Section 1-75.4(4) permits personal jurisdiction over claims of emotional distress and loss of consortium suffered in North Carolina when the defendant carried on service activities in the state at or about the time of injury.

Godwin v. Walls · filed 1995-04-04(4)

Based on the foregoing, we hold plaintiffs have met their burden concerning the personal jurisdiction requirements of G.S. § 1-75.4(4) with respect to their claims against Walls for negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium and for any damages flowing therefrom.

Section 1-75.4(4) authorizes personal jurisdiction for an injury in North Carolina caused by conduct outside the state when the defendant’s products are used or consumed in the state in the ordinary course of trade.

Tart v. Prescott's Pharmacies, Inc. · filed 1995-04-18(4)

Here, plaintiff alleged that defendants, as the principal officers and directors and alter ego of Health Care, supplied Cal-Ban 3000 to defendant Prescott’s Pharmacies in this State and that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by his consumption of the product. The complaint also alleged that Health Care manufactured, marketed and distributed the drug. We hold that the trial court had statutory authority under G.S. 1-75.4(4) to exercise jurisdiction over defendants.

Section 1-75.4(4)(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a plaintiff claims injury in North Carolina from out-of-state conduct and the defendant solicits business in the state; solicitation does not require physical presence.

Med-Therapy Rehabilitation Services, Inc. v. Diversicare Corp. · filed 1991-06-26(4)(a)

Moreover, Section 1-75.4(4)(a) of the North Carolina General Statute also is applicable to this case. ... Plaintiff’s evidence also demonstrates that Defendant employed a North Carolina broker to assist in the sale of National — evidence of solicitation of business in this state. ... The Court believes the record demonstrates sufficient minimal contact exists between Defendant and North Carolina in order for jurisdiction to be found under the long arm statute. Accordingly, the Court will in the alternative deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the long-arm statute.

Section 1-75.4(4)(b) can confer jurisdiction when a defendant’s products are used in North Carolina in the ordinary course of trade, even if those products did not cause the claimed injury.

Regent Lighting Corp. v. American Lighting Concept, Inc. · filed 1997-02-10(4)(b)

Thus, Defendants’ unrelated products which ended up in North Carolina in the ordinary course of trade are sufficient for purposes of the long-arm statute.

Section 1-75.4(4)(b) permits personal jurisdiction for injury in North Carolina caused by out-of-state conduct when the defendant's materials are used or consumed in the state in the ordinary course of trade at or about the time of injury.

CHRISTIAN SCI. BD. OF DIRECTORS v. Robinson · filed 2000-10-04(4)(b)

Jurisdiction is also established under § 1-75.4(4)(b). ... However, the statute requires that "at or about the time of the injury," the Defendants sent into North Carolina information about "The Christian Science University," using Plaintiffs' marks, which Nolan created and it was offered both free of charge and through the purchase of books, seminars, etc., on the web site accessed through Robinson's web site having a North Carolina base.

Section 1-75.4(4)(a) permits personal jurisdiction when an out-of-state defendant solicits a spouse’s affections by telephone into North Carolina and the plaintiff alleges resulting injury there.

Cooper v. Shealy · filed 2000-12-05(4)(a)

The trial judge found that the alleged telephone contacts (including telephone calls and telephone transmitted e-mail) were “solicitations” within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(4) and we agree. Plaintiff alleged that defendant telephoned her husband in North Carolina in order to solicit his affections and entice him to leave his family. In addition, plaintiff claimed that she suffered injury, the destruction of her husband’s love and affection, as the direct result of defendant’s wrongful conduct. We conclude, therefore, that the North Carolina long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction since the plaintiff’s injury allegedly occurred within North Carolina and was allegedly caused by defendant’s solicitation of plaintiff’s husband’s love and affection by telephoning plaintiff’s home in North Carolina.

Section 1-75.4(4)(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a complaint alleges injury in North Carolina from out-of-state acts and the defendant conducted solicitation or services in North Carolina at or about the time of injury.

Carson v. Brodin · filed 2003-09-16(4)(a)

The allegations of the amended complaint are sufficient to bring plaintiffs’ claim within the terms of Section 1-75.4(4) (a). The amended complaint alleges injury in the form of losses to plaintiffs, residents of North Carolina, as a result of breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and negligence. Moreover, the complaint alleges that these local injuries were the result of acts or omissions by defendant outside of North Carolina. In addition, as required by the statute, the complaint alleges that defendant engaged in “[solicitation or services activities . . . carried on within this State,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1075.4(4)(a), where it indicates that defendant negotiated and contracted with plaintiffs to build a house and by repeatedly visiting, telephoning, and billing them in North Carolina to carry out that contract.

Section 1-75.4(4) authorizes personal jurisdiction when an out-of-state defendant’s sale and solicitation of allegedly infringing products cause injury in North Carolina.

Walter Kidde Portable Equipment Inc. v. Universal Security Instruments, Inc. · filed 2004-01-23(4)

In this case, personal jurisdiction is authorized by the long-arm statute because USI’s sale and solicitation of allegedly infringing products in North Carolina caused an in-state injury.

Section 1-75.4(4) permits personal jurisdiction for a claimed injury in North Carolina arising from an out-of-state act when the defendant or someone acting on its behalf conducts services activities in North Carolina at or about the time of injury.

Summit Lodging, LLC v. Jones, Spitz, Moorhead, Baird & Albergotti, P.A. · filed 2006-03-21(4)

We conclude that defendants’ activities regarding the loan, including correspondence and phone conversations with North Carolina counsel for Quality Oil and Reliable Tank, constitute “services activities” being carried on within North Carolina by or on behalf of defendants, within the meaning of the statute. Thus, we conclude that plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction pursuant to the long-arm statute.

Section 1-75.4(4)(a) does not authorize personal jurisdiction based on alleged solicitation when there is no evidence that the person solicited was in North Carolina.

Brown v. Ellis · filed 2007-07-03(4)(a)

After review of the record, we conclude that it contains no evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the State of North Carolina may exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to the long-arm statute. Even liberally construed, these facts offer no evidence that defendant solicited plaintiff’s wife while she was in North Carolina.

Section 1-75.4(4)(a) requires solicitation or service activities in North Carolina by or on behalf of a defendant; advertising that does not target North Carolina residents does not satisfy that requirement.

Burgess v. Vitola · filed 2008-02-26(4)(a)

As to subsection (a), the only evidence regarding solicitation is Moving Defendants’ affidavits wherein they deny soliciting North Carolina residents. Indeed, it makes absolutely no sense that Moving Defendants, all of whom operate law or dental practices in states far removed from North Carolina, would have any interest in soliciting Burgess, or any other North Carolina resident. Thus, Burgess has failed to show a statutory ground for asserting personal jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1-75.4(4)(a) can authorize personal jurisdiction when a complaint alleges an injury in North Carolina and frequent telephone and e-mail solicitation into the state by an out-of-state defendant.

Brown v. Ellis · filed 2009-06-18(4)(a)

We conclude plaintiffs complaint alleges sufficient facts to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. § l-75.4(4)(a).

Section 1-75.4(4)(b) covers materials incorporated into a product used in North Carolina in the ordinary course of trade.

Cambridge Homes of North Carolina Ltd. Partnership v. Hyundai Construction, Inc. · filed 2008-12-16(4)(b)

Construing the long-arm statute liberally, we conclude that the resins and the chemical compounds used to manufacture the vinyl siding constitute products, materials, or things processed, serviced or manufactured by HCC and HLCC which were used or consumed in North. Carolina in the ordinary course of trade.

Section 1-75.4(4)(a) allows personal jurisdiction when a plaintiff claims injury in North Carolina from an out-of-state act and the defendant’s conduct supports an inference of solicitation in the state.

Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. · filed 2009-04-29(4)(a)

In order to establish personal jurisdiction under this circumstance, a plaintiff first must claim that it suffered an injury in the state that arose by defendant’s acts outside the state. ... Therefore, the Court concludes that the affidavit satisfies the statutory requirement for a claim of injury. ... C-S Aviation’s alleged initial negotiations, inducements, and revisions to the TradeWinds’ agreement are facts from which their solicitation of TradeWinds may be inferred.

Section 1-75.4(4) authorizes personal jurisdiction for certain injuries in North Carolina arising from acts outside the state, but exercising that jurisdiction also requires sufficient minimum contacts.

Rauch v. Urgent Care Pharmacy, Inc. · filed 2006-07-18(4)

North Carolina's long-arm statute provides that personal jurisdiction over defendant Burns is proper under the following provisions: (4) Local Injury; Foreign Act.-In any action for wrongful death occurring within this State or in any action claiming injury to person or property within this State arising out of an act or omission outside this State by the defendant, provided in addition that at or about the time of the injury either: a. Solicitation or services activities were carried on within this State by or on behalf of the defendant; b. Products, materials or thing processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed, within this State in the ordinary course of trade; . . . . N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-75.4(4) (2005).

Section 1-75.4(3) does not authorize personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state asset transfer when no act in North Carolina caused the claimed injury.

Weisman v. Blue Mountain Organics Distrib., LLC · filed 2014-09-05(3)

Here, the asset transfer occurred within Virginia, between Virginia-based companies. There is no evidence of an act local to North Carolina that caused harm to Plaintiff. Thus, section 1-75.4(3) does not permit the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over BMOD or the Houchins.

An adequately alleged financial loss in North Carolina qualifies as a local injury under subsection (4), subject to due process.

Diamond Candles, LLC v. Winter · filed 2020-03-12(4)

Notwithstanding these arguments and guided by the mandate that the long-arm statute must be liberally construed, the Court concludes that Diamond Candles adequately alleged a “local injury” within the scope of N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(4), so that there is personal jurisdiction if it can be exercised consistent with due process.

Section 1-75.4(4)(a) requires evidence of the defendant’s solicitation in North Carolina at or about the time of the injury; a separate parent company’s advertising does not establish the defendant’s solicitation.

Speedway Motorsports International Ltd. v. Bronwen Energy Trading, Ltd. · filed 2011-02-15(4)(a)

Because SMIL has not made the showing required by Wyatt and Ash that would support treating BNPP France and BNPP Suisse collectively for purposes of the long-arm statute, we conclude that none of the evidence cited by SMIL constitutes solicitation for purposes of bringing BNPP Suisse within N.C. Gen. Stat. § l-75.4(4)(a).

Section 1-75.4(4) requires an injury in North Carolina caused by the defendant’s act outside the state, plus one of the subsection’s listed additional conditions.

Design Resources, Inc. v. Leather Industries of America · filed 2012-09-28(4)

Subsection (4) provides for jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where the plaintiff has suffered an “injury to person or property within [North Carolina]” as a result of “an act or omission [committed] outside [North Carolina] by the defendant,” provided that one of the following three other conditions is satisfied: (a) solicitation or service activities were carried on in North Carolina by or on behalf of the defendant; (b) products, materials, or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed in North Carolina in the ordinary course of trade; or (c) unsolicited bulk commercial electronic mail was sent into or within North Carolina by the defendant. ... Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the North Carolina long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction over Dr. Cory.

Subsection (4) permits personal jurisdiction when an out-of-state act causes injury in North Carolina and the defendant’s serviced product is used there.

Cohen v. Norcold, Inc. · filed 2021-09-03(4)

Although the refrigerator repair performed by Holiday Kamper allegedly occurred in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, the alleged defect caused injury within North Carolina and the product serviced by defendant was used or consumed within North Carolina.

Section 1-75.4(4)(a) requires findings supported by evidence of the defendant’s alleged solicitation in North Carolina before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction on that ground.

Ponder v. Been · filed 2020-12-31(4)(a)

Where the trial court’s findings of fact were insufficient to meet the threshold requirements to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant Stephen R. Been pursuant to our long-arm statute, General Statutes, section 1-75.4, we reverse the trial court’s 29 October 2019 order denying defendant’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 1-75.4(4)(b) supports specific personal jurisdiction when a defendant causes injury in North Carolina and products it processed or serviced were used there in the ordinary course of trade.

Vallen Distribution, Inc. v. The Barr Group of Nashville, Inc. · filed 2024-08-23(4)(b)

Defendant caused harm to Plaintiff in North Carolina by failing to remit payment as required under the Agreement and Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations demonstrate “[p]roducts, materials or thing[s] processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed within [North Carolina] in the ordinary course of trade.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(4)(b). For these reasons, this Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Section 1-75.4(4)(a) authorizes personal jurisdiction when solicitations within North Carolina accompany a local injury arising from the defendant’s out-of-state acts.

Greenhaus v. Goldstein · filed 2026-05-06(4)(a)

These communications constitute “solicitations” under the long-arm statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 (a)(4) (2025); Cooper, 140 N.C. App. at 731, 537 S.E.2d at 856. The trial court properly concluded the long-arm statue authorizes personal jurisdiction over Mr. Goldstein.

Section 1-75.4(5)d provides personal jurisdiction only when the action relates to goods or other things of value shipped from North Carolina by the plaintiff to the defendant on the defendant’s order or direction.

William R. Andrews Associates v. Sodibar Systems of D. C., Inc. · filed 1975-04-16(5)d

We agree with the defendant that the present action does not in any way relate to goods or other things of value “shipped from this State by the plaintiff to the defendant on his order or direction.”

Section 1-75.4(5) permits personal jurisdiction over nonresidents obligated to pay for services rendered to them in North Carolina for their benefit.

Duke University v. Chestnut · filed 1976-02-18(5)

In the case at bar, defendants’ obligation- is to pay plaintiff for services rendered to defendants within the State for defendants’ benefit."These, circumstances "permit the'acquisition of personal jurisdiction over defendants under the- authority of G.S. 1-75.4(5).

Section 1-75.4(5)(d) applies to an action concerning goods shipped from North Carolina by the plaintiff to the defendant at the defendant’s order or direction.

William R. Andrews Associates v. Sodibar Systems of D. C., Inc. · filed 1976-03-17(5)(d)

Accordingly, on the present record we find G.S. 1-75.4 (5) d applicable to this case, and we are thus brought to defendant’s second contention, that to apply the statute to impose in personam jurisdiction upon defendant under the facts of this case would violate defendant’s rights to due process under the Constitution of the United States.

Section 1-75.4(5)(d) provides a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction when a plaintiff ships goods from North Carolina to a defendant on the defendant’s order or direction, subject to due process limits.

Phoenix America Corp. v. Brissey · filed 1980-05-06(5)(d)

Here, the statute clearly affords grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction by our courts. Subsection (5)(d) of § 1-75.4 provides for jurisdiction in any action which “[r]elates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value shipped from this State by the plaintiff to the defendant on his order or direction.” It is not disputed that the goods in question were shipped from North Carolina. Thus, the initial inquiry in the determination whether jurisdictional grounds are present must be answered affirmatively.

Section 1-75.4(5)(c) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant when a claim arises from its promise to receive goods in North Carolina or ship them from the state.

Hardin v. DLF Computer Co., Inc. · filed 1985-09-13(5)(c)

The Plaintiffs’ contract action, therefore, arises out of Defendant’s promise to receive or ship goods within or from North Carolina, and to make payment to Plaintiffs in North Carolina. Accordingly, N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 1-75.4, and 55-145(a)(l) provide ample statutory ground for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Section 1-75.4(5)(e) confers personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff first takes actual possession of goods in North Carolina, regardless of where title passed.

W. Conway Owings & Associates, Inc. v. Karman, Inc. · filed 1985-07-02(5)(e)

We do not so read G.S. l-75.4(5)(e). We believe that the words “actually received by the plaintiff in this State from the defendant through a carrier without regard to where delivery to the carrier occurred” means that wherever title passed jurisdiction is conferred if the plaintiff does not take actual possession of the goods until they arrive in North Carolina.

Section 1-75.4(5)(d) permits personal jurisdiction over a buyer in an action concerning goods shipped from North Carolina on the buyer’s order.

Monroe Hardware Co. v. Robinson · filed 1985-11-19(5)(d)

The North Carolina Long-Arm Statute provides for jurisdiction over the parties under the following circumstances: ... (d) Relates to goods, documents of title or other things of value shipped from this state by plaintiff to the defendant on his order or direction; ... There is no question that for over a year the Plaintiff rendered a substantial amount of performance in this forum by regularly shipping to the Defendants the goods which they systematically ordered.

Section 1-75.4(5)(c) permits personal jurisdiction when a foreign corporation promises to deliver goods through a carrier and the parties contemplated shipment to North Carolina.

Collector Cars of Nags Head, Inc. v. GCS ELECTRONICS · filed 1986-08-19(5)(c)

G.S. 1-75.4(5)(c) confers jurisdiction when a foreign corporation promises to deliver goods to this State. G.C.S.’s promise to deliver the product through a carrier does not deprive North Carolina courts of jurisdiction when the parties to the contract contemplated shipment to North Carolina.

Refund credits and replacement goods can qualify as things of value or goods shipped on a defendant’s order or direction under the local goods provision.

Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Barnett · filed 1985-09-17(5)(d)

From the record we conclude that the refund credits and replacement goods (The record is silent as to whether the goods were actually shipped from North Carolina; but they were shipped under orders from plaintiffs home office in Greensboro.) shipped by plaintiff were “things of value” (or “goods”) as contemplated by G.S. l-75.4(5)d and that they were shipped “on [defendant’s] order or direction.” Accordingly we conclude that the court had jurisdiction under G.S. 1-75.4(5).

Section 1-75.4(5)(d) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant who orders goods shipped from North Carolina, subject to due process limits.

Henson v. Benckini · filed 1992-08-17(5)(d)

Goods were shipped from Henson to Benckini that comprised all of the supplies Henson could ship from the listed request made by Benckini. Therefore, Henson had the right under the North Carolina Long Arm Statute to bring an action against Benckini.

Section 1-75.4(5)(d) authorizes personal jurisdiction in an action related to things of value sent from North Carolina by the plaintiff to the defendant, including payments mailed or wired to an out-of-state defendant.

Strategic Outsourcing, Inc. v. Commerce Benefits Group Agency, Inc. · filed 1999-02-25(5)(d)

This is sufficient to invoke North Carolina's long-arm jurisdiction. ... N.C.Gen.Stat. § 1-75.4(5)(d) (invoking personal jurisdiction in any action which relates to things of value shipped from this state by the plaintiff to the defendant).

Section 1-75.4(5)(d) requires goods shipped from North Carolina to the defendant to have been shipped on that defendant’s order or direction; an intermediary’s order does not suffice.

Peter Millar, LLC v. Shaw's Menswear · filed 2020-12-01(5)(d)

In fact, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(5)(d) requires both that the action relate to goods shipped from our State and also that those goods were shipped to the defendant on the defendant’s order or direction.

Section 1-75.4(5)(c) covers an alleged agreement to ship parachutes from North Carolina because parachutes are goods and things of value.

XPX Armor & Equip., Inc. v. SkyLIFE Co., Inc. · filed 2021-07-23(5)(c)

We agree and find that N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-75.4(5)(c) was satisfied, given XPX’s claim that the parties agreed that the parachutes would be shipped from North Carolina. The parachutes qualify as both “goods” and “things of value.”

Section 1-75.4(6)(a) permits personal jurisdiction in an action arising from a promise to acquire or dispose of North Carolina real property.

Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz · filed 1974-07-01(6)(a)

We are of the opinion that the trial court has jurisdiction over the defendant by reason of the contract to convey land situated in North Carolina; that substituted service of process by registered mail, return receipt requested, was a proper means of acquiring personal jurisdiction over defendant; and that the requirements of due process and notice were afforded the foreign defendant by the substituted service of process in accordance with the North Carolina General Statutes.

Section 1-75.4(6)a permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident when a claim arises from a promise to acquire or dispose of real property in North Carolina.

Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz · filed 1974-10-10(6)a

This subsection requires three jurisdictional facts: (1) a claim arising out of a bargaining arrangement made,with the defendant by or on behalf of the plaintiff; (2) a promise made anywhere which .evidences the bargaining arrangement upon which suit is brought; and (3) the subject matter of the arrangement is real property situated in the state.

Section 1-75.4(6) provides grounds for personal jurisdiction when a complaint alleges a dispute over interests in North Carolina real property, provided service of process is sufficient.

Dowat, Inc. v. Tiffany Corp. · filed 1986-11-04(6)

We hold, pursuant to G.S. 1-75.4(6), that the allegations of this case involving local property would have provided sufficient grounds for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant if there had been sufficient service of process.

Section 1-75.4(6)(a) permits personal jurisdiction over an insurance broker whose promise to protect North Carolina real property gives rise to the claim.

Wells Fargo Bank, Na Ex Rel. Gmac v. Affiliated Fm Ins. · filed 2008-10-07(6)(a)

We, therefore, hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. § l-75.4(6)(a) can provide a basis for asserting long-arm jurisdiction over an insurance broker such as Knapp Schenck.

Section 1-75.4 does not authorize personal jurisdiction over an assignee trust whose limited North Carolina connections consist of mortgage notes secured by property in the state.

Skinner v. Preferred Credit · filed 2005-08-16

Trust 1997-1's connections to and contacts with North Carolina are even more tenuous than those asserted in Whitener. We hold these connections are not sufficient to satisfy North Carolina's long-arm statute.

Section 1-75.4 does not authorize personal jurisdiction over a nonresident trust whose only connection to North Carolina is holding mortgage loans secured by deeds of trust on property there.

Skinner v. Preferred Credit · filed 2006-12-20

Plaintiffs argue that three subsections of the long-arm statute grant jurisdiction over this action: N.C.G.S. § l-75.4(l)(d), (5)(d), and (6)(b). None of these provisions authorizes the exercise of our jurisdiction. ... We hold that North Carolina courts lack personal jurisdiction over a nonresident trust that has no connections to this state other than holding mortgage loans secured by deeds of trust on North Carolina property.

Section 1-75.4(5) permits personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from a defendant’s promise to pay for services performed in North Carolina or from services performed there for the defendant with its authorization or ratification.

Forman & Zuckerman, P.A. v. Schupak · filed 1976-10-06(5)(a), (5)(b)

Applying these rules to the case now before us, we are of the opinion that plaintiff’s claim arose out of a promise made by the defendants and involved services actually performed for the defendants which they authorized and ratified. Consequently, the contract between these parties falls within the provisions of G.S. 1-75.4 (5) a. and b.

Section 1-75.4(5)(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who promises to repay a loan made by a North Carolina lender because lending money is a service rendered in the state.

FIRST-CITIZENS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. McDaniel · filed 1973-07-11(5)(a)

We are of the opinion that clearly the lending of money to be repaid by the borrower is the rendering of a service by the lender to that borrower. It clearly follows therefrom that defendant’s promise to pay the loan made by plaintiff to defendant’s corporation is the promise to pay for a service rendered in this State, which payment also is to be made in this State. Defendant’s contract within this State comes within the provision of G.S. 1-75.4, and his connection with this State is sufficient to justify his being subjected to the jurisdiction of this State’s courts.

Section 1-75.4(5)(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident guarantor whose promise pays for services the plaintiff performs in North Carolina, including executing a lease and arranging equipment shipments.

Telerent Leasing Corp. v. Equity Associates, Inc. · filed 1978-06-20(5)(a)

Under a liberal construction of G.S. 1-75.4(5)(a), it is our opinion that by executing the personal guaranty, defendant Karam promised to pay for services to be performed in this State by plaintiff, to wit: the execution of the lease, ordering of televisions and causing them to be shipped to Texas, and the shipment of related equipment from Raleigh to Texas.

Section 1-75.4(5)a reaches a promise to pay for services the plaintiff performs in North Carolina, including a guaranty of payment for services supplied to a third party.

United Buying Group, Inc. v. Coleman · filed 1979-02-05(5)(a)

In effect, the Coleman brothers promised to pay for services, namely the acquisition of shoes from manufacturers, which Buying Group performed for one of its member retail stores, Coleman’s. These facts bring this case squarely within the scope of the quoted statute and thus confer upon the superior court in personam jurisdiction over Lawrence and Morton Coleman.

Section 1-75.4(5)(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant promises a third party to pay the plaintiff for services performed in North Carolina.

Delprinting Corp. v. C. P. D. Corp. · filed 1980-11-04(5)(a)

It is obvious that C. P. D. Corporation agreed with C. D. Stampley to pay its C. P. Directories Division’s obligations to plaintiff. Such conduct falls within that covered by G.S. l-75.4(5)(a).

Section 1-75.4(5)(a) and (c) does not confer personal jurisdiction over nonresident lessees whose lease was made and performed outside North Carolina merely because they mailed rental payments there.

Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Brown · filed 1973-08-29(5)(a) and (c)

We hold that the defendants do not have sufficient connection with North Carolina in the manner prescribed by G.S. 55-145 (a) (1) and G.S. 1-75.4(5) (a) and (c) to subject them to suit within this State.

Section 1-75.4(5) authorizes personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantors whose notes promise payment for services provided in North Carolina.

United Buying Group, Inc. v. Coleman · filed 1978-06-20(5)

The value of these services to defendants must have been substantial in view of the fact that one note on its face obligates Lawrence Coleman to pay up to $36,718.75 and the other obligates Morton to pay up to $25,000 if the buyer, Coleman’s, defaults. G.S. 1-75.4(5) certainly, therefore, provides statutory authority for the exercise of jurisdiction by this State over both these defendants.

Section 1-75.4(8) authorizes jurisdiction over nonresident directors to the constitutional limit.

Swenson v. Thibaut · filed 1978-12-19(8)

North Carolina’s legislature, by way of G.S. 1-75.4(8) and G.S. 55-33, has expressed a substantial interest in bringing non-resident directors before the North Carolina courts, and has given to the courts the fullest jurisdiction allowable under the Constitution.

Section 1-75.4(5) provides grounds for personal jurisdiction in actions arising from the listed connections involving services or goods in North Carolina.

North Brook Farm Lines, Inc. v. McBrayer · filed 1978-01-17(5)

The record and the facts found by Judge Bulwinkle establish that plaintiff fully complied with Rule 4(j)(9)b with respect to the alternate method of service of process by certified mail, and that the court had personal jurisdiction over defendant under the provisions of G.S. 1-75.4(5). We hold that the District Court of Lincoln County had personal jurisdiction over defendant.

Section 1-75.4(12) permits personal jurisdiction in a Chapter 50 action arising from a marital relationship in North Carolina when the other spouse continues to reside there after the defendant leaves.

Robinson v. Robinson · filed 1982-04-06(12)

G.S. 1-75.4(12) provides that North Carolina has personal jurisdiction “[i]n any action under Chapter 50 that arises out of the marital relationship within this State, notwithstanding subsequent departure from the State, if the other party to the marital relationship continues to reside in this State.” The present parties were married in North Carolina, and plaintiff continues to reside in the State. ... The court, therefore, properly concluded that North Carolina’s statute permits jurisdiction over defendant.

Section 1-75.4(5)(c) treats money payments due under a separation agreement as a “thing of value” for personal jurisdiction.

Pope v. Pope · filed 1978-10-17(5)(c)

Therefore, we hold that money payments are a “thing of value” within the meaning of G.S. 1-75.4(5)(c).

A guarantor of a contract for services to be performed in North Carolina is a defendant within § 1-75.4(5)(a), (b), and (c).

Johnston v. Gilley · filed 1981-01-06(5)(a), (b), and (c)

It is, therefore, clear, and we so hold, that as a guarantor of the contract with Johnston, Bagley is a defendant within the meaning of G.S. 1-75.4(5)(a), (b) and (c).

Section 1-75.4(5)a. and b. permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant when a claim arises from a promise to pay for services performed in North Carolina or from authorized services performed there for the defendant.

Harrelson Rubber Co. v. Dixie Tire & Fuels, Inc. · filed 1983-06-07(5)a. and b.

Because this action arose from defendant’s failure to pay the promised royalties, jurisdiction also is conferred over defendant under G.S. 1-75.4(5)a. and b.

Section 1-75.4(5)(a) permits personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state franchisee whose agreement requires payment for services performed in North Carolina.

Wiener King Systems, Inc. v. Brooks · filed 1986-02-20(5)(a)

Applying the pertinent North Carolina statute to the facts of this case, it is clear that North Carolina courts would assert jurisdiction over the franchise agreement at issue. The franchise agreement, by its terms and as performed by franchisor and franchisee, required that the defendant pay for services performed in North Carolina by the franchisor.

Section 1-75.4(5)(a) and (b) allows personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who contracts to pay for services when a substantial part of those services is performed in North Carolina.

Gualtieri v. Burleson · filed 1987-03-17(5)(a)-(b)

Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of G.S. 1-75.4(5) give the courts of this state personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who contracts to pay for services, any substantial part of which are performed in this state; and the most significant services that plaintiff performed for the defendant in Mrs. Kirby’s case were to analyze her medical records, arrive at an opinion concerning her condition, and report his findings and opinion to defendant, all of which were done in his office at Chapel Hill.

Section 1-75.4(5)(b) permits personal jurisdiction when a plaintiff performs services for a defendant in North Carolina and the defendant knows the work will occur there.

Taurus Textiles, Inc. v. John M. Fulmer Co. · filed 1988-10-18(5)(b)

It appears that defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction under N.C.G.S. § l-75.4(5)(b). Plaintiff performed services for defendant within this State by manufacturing certain textiles. The record indicates that defendant was well aware that the textiles ordered from Blue Ridge Fabrics were to be manufactured by plaintiff in North Carolina.

Section 1-75.4(5)(a) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident guarantor that promises to pay for services a plaintiff will perform in North Carolina.

Barclays Leasing, Inc. v. National Business Systems, Inc. · filed 1990-10-24(5)(a)

NBS Canada, as guarantor of NBS Delaware, promised to pay for the services Plaintiff was to perform. Therefore, the Court believes that this section of the long-arm statute provides it with in personam jurisdiction over NBS Canada.

Section 1-75.4(5) permits personal jurisdiction over claims arising from services promised or performed in North Carolina when the plaintiff establishes that connection for the claim.

Williams v. Institute for Computational Studies at Colorado State University · filed 1987-05-05(5)a and (5)b

G.S. l-75.4(5)a and b. Again we find that while the record supports a finding that plaintiff Williams’ alleged contract with ICS for consulting services was to be performed in this State or was in fact performed in this State, there is no support for such findings as to plaintiffs Aupperle and Pyle.

Section 1-75.4(5)(b) reaches defendants who accept and ratify services performed for them in North Carolina, while (5)(c) reaches promises to ship goods from the state.

Century Data Systems, Inc. v. McDonald · filed 1993-04-06(5)(b), (5)(c)

However, regardless of whether the plaintiff requested the defendants to attend, when we construe the provisions of G.S. § 1-75.4 liberally in favor of jurisdiction, as we must do, it becomes clear that each defendant accepted and ratified the ... rendition of services (meetings and training) provided by the plaintiff in this State. Accordingly, each defendant falls within reach of our long-arm statute. ... Accordingly, we hold that defendants McDonald and Perkins also fall within the reach of paragraph (5)c. of the North Carolina long-arm statute.

Section 1-75.4(5) permits personal jurisdiction when an action arises from promises to perform services in North Carolina or services actually performed there.

Starco, Inc. v. AMG Bonding & Insurance Services, Inc. · filed 1996-11-05(5)(a), (5)(b)

As such, defendant AMG’s activities clearly fall within section 1-75.4(5) of the General Statutes.

Section 1-75.4(5)(c) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent when a child support claim arises from promises made in a North Carolina separation agreement.

Taylor v. Head · filed 1991-08-23(5)(c)

Consequently, we hold that the North Carolina trial court acquired personal jurisdiction over Head in 1987 pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(5) when he was served with copies of Taylor’s Motion for Custody and Child Support by certified mail in accordance with Rule 4(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 1-75.4(5) authorizes personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who contracts within North Carolina or to perform services there, but the court must also determine whether exercising jurisdiction satisfies constitutional requirements.

Johnston County v. R. N. Rouse & Co. · filed 1992-03-05(5)

The mere fact that N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(5) authorizes the courts of North Carolina to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident contracting within the state or contracting to perform services within the state does not end the inquiry of whether the courts may constitutionally exercise in personam jurisdiction, however.

Section 1-75.4(5) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant promises to pay for services to be performed in North Carolina or authorizes services actually performed there.

Climatological Consulting Corp. v. Trattner · filed 1992-03-17(5)a. and (5)b.

From the facts presented in the record, we conclude that defendant made a promise to plaintiff to pay for services to be performed in North Carolina by plaintiff. Plaintiff actually performed services for the defendant within this state which performance was authorized by defendant. We find the transaction within §§ 1-75.4 (5)a. and (5)b.

Section 1-75.4(5) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant promises to pay for services performed in North Carolina or authorizes or ratifies services performed there on its behalf.

D.P. Riggins & Associates, Inc. v. American Board Co. · filed 1992-06-04(5)(a) & (b)

As such, Defendants are square within the provisions of § 1-75.4(5)(a) & (b), a statute that is to be liberally construed.

Section 1-75.4(5)(a) permits personal jurisdiction for claims arising from a promise to pay for services performed in North Carolina; truck leases and related guaranties can satisfy this statutory ground.

Centura Bank v. Pee Dee Express, Inc. · filed 1995-06-06(5)(a)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § l-75.4(5)(a) confers in personam jurisdiction upon the courts of this state over a person served pursuant to Rule 4(j) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, in any action which “[a]rises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff... by the defendant. . . to pay for services to be performed in this State by the.plaintiff.” ... Clearly, the leases and guaranty agreements executed by Pee Dee and the guaranty agreements signed by the individual defendants satisfy the first prong of the personal jurisdiction test.

Section 1-75.4(5)(a) permits personal jurisdiction when an organ procurer undertakes to provide a kidney for transplantation in North Carolina and delivers it there.

Slaughter v. Life Connection of Ohio · filed 1995-12-06(5)(a)

LCO’s direct billing of a North Carolina entity further evidences its commitment to provide the kidney for transplantation within North Carolina. Accordingly, the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. § 1-75.4(5)(a) is proper.

Section 1-75.4(5)(a) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant promises to pay for the plaintiff’s services performed in North Carolina.

Williamson Produce, Inc. v. Satcher · filed 1996-06-04(5)(a)

Specifically, defendant Satcher fulfills the requirements of G.S. 1-75.4(5) (a) in that he made “a promise . . . for the plaintiffs benefit ... to pay for services to be performed in this State by plaintiff. . . .” The promise was the contract between the parties and the services performed were plaintiffs marketing and sale here in North Carolina of defendant’s peaches grown in South Carolina.

Under § 1-75.4(5)(a), an unsupported allegation of a promise to pay for services in North Carolina does not establish prima facie jurisdiction when the defendant denies the promise by affidavit.

Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co. · filed 2000-07-05(5)(a)

For the reasons stated above, because defendants deny this allegation by means of Mr. Benjamin’s affidavit and plaintiffs made no attempt to support the allegation with affidavits or otherwise, we hold it insufficient to establish a prima facie showing of long-arm jurisdiction under G.S. § l-75.4(5)(a), thus obviating the necessity for a related due process inquiry.

Section 1-75.4(5)(a) and (c) provide personal jurisdiction over claims arising from promises to perform acts or deliver things of value in North Carolina.

Cornerstone Orthopedic Hospital, Ltd. Partnership v. Marquez · filed 1996-09-09(5)(a) and (5)(c)

Both National Orthopedies and Cornerstone are residents of North Carolina, so the evidence at this stage shows that Marquez’s promise to perform these acts and to deliver things of value falls within the purview of N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(5)(a) & (c).

Subsection (5)c provides a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction in an action on a promissory note for valuable consideration.

Corbin Russwin, Inc. v. Alexander's Hardware, Inc. · filed 2001-12-18(5)c

In this case, Alexander’s signed a promissory note for valuable consideration. A promissory note for valuable consideration is sufficient to bring the defendant under the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to North Carolina’s long arm statute.

Section 1-75.4(5)b permits personal jurisdiction when an action arises from services performed for a defendant in North Carolina that the defendant authorized or ratified.

North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Holt · filed 2002-11-19(5)b

We conclude that defendant’s conduct is covered by N.C. Gen. Stat. § l-75.4(5)b since the action arises out of services performed by plaintiff within North Carolina and such performance was authorized and ratified by defendant.

Section 1-75.4(5) provides a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction when the alleged facts support a promise to pay for services performed in North Carolina or authorization of those services.

Adams, Kleemeier, Hagan, Hannah & Fouts, PLLC v. Jacobs · filed 2003-06-17(5)

On appeal, plaintiff argues that statutory authority for the assertion of personal jurisdiction exists under N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(5), which, in pertinent part, confers jurisdiction on actions: ... Plaintiff alleges that it performed legal services for defendants, and that defendants either authorized or promised to pay for these services. We conclude plaintiff's have asserted sufficient facts to support a statutory basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants.

Section 1-75.4(4)(a) reaches an out-of-state owner whose medical practice carries on activities in North Carolina.

Acosta v. Byrum · filed 2006-12-19(4)(a)

North Carolina’s long-arm statute reaches defendants whose “[solicitation or services activities were carried on within this State by or on behalf of the defendant[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(4)(a) (2005). Dr. Faber was the owner of a medical practice whose activities were carried on within North Carolina. Thus, North Carolina’s long arm statute applies to Dr. Faber.

Section 1-75.4(5)(a) does not require that the promised services actually be performed in North Carolina.

Pan-American Products & Holdings, LLC v. R.T.G. Furniture Corp. · filed 2011-11-14(5)(a)

On its face, Section l-75.4(5)(a), unlike Section 1 — 75.4(5)(b), does not require that services have been "actually performed” in North Carolina.

Section 1-75.4(5)(a)–(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant for claims arising from services it promises to perform or actually performs for a plaintiff in North Carolina.

Usconnect, LLC v. Sprout Retail, Inc. · filed 2017-04-21(5)(a)–(b)

By entering into a contract with a North Carolina corporation and routinely sending representatives to North Carolina to perform contractual services, Sprout purposefully availed itself of “the privilege of conducting activities” in North Carolina. ... This conduct also falls squarely within the requirements of the long-arm statute. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(5)(a)–(b).

Section 1-75.4(5)(b) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant authorizes or ratifies services performed for it in North Carolina.

Embark, LLC v. 1105 Media, Inc. · filed 2014-01-07(5)(b)

These findings are more than enough to support the conclusion that Wheeler's performance of services in North Carolina for 1105 Media was authorized and ratified by 1105 Media.

Section 1-75.4(5) permits personal jurisdiction over parties to insurance contracts promising benefits in North Carolina.

Forshaw Industries, Inc. v. Insurco, Ltd. · filed 2014-03-04(5)

The North Carolina long-arm statute accords personal jurisdiction over parties involved in insurance contracts promising to provide benefits in North Carolina. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-75.4(5). ... Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants purposefully availed themselves to North Carolina by soliciting, negotiating, and entering into contracts to provide to Plaintiff insurance against liability from actions occurring at its place of business in North Carolina. Accordingly, Defendants are subject to suit by the courts of North Carolina and this Court has jurisdiction over them.

Section 1-75.4(5)(b) permits personal jurisdiction when a claim arises from services the plaintiff performed in North Carolina for an out-of-state defendant with that defendant's authorization.

Teague & Glover, P.A. v. Kane & Silverman, P.C. · filed 2019-02-05(5)(b)

These findings properly support the trial court's conclusion that personal jurisdiction over Defendants is proper under Section 1-75.4(b).

Section 1-75.4 does not confer personal jurisdiction over a downstream insurance policy purchaser when the purchaser made no qualifying promise and the claim does not arise from an insurance contract it entered into.

Columbus Life Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2021-09-02(5)(c), (10)(b)

Here, however, Columbus Life has not alleged the existence of any promise made by LSH to Columbus Life or to a third party for Columbus Life’s benefit. ... Here, even assuming LSH’s acts in becoming the beneficial owner of the Policy constitute entering into a “contract of insurance,” the current action does not “arise out of” any contract entered into by LSH. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that neither of Columbus Life’s asserted grounds for personal jurisdiction under North Carolina’s long-arm statute apply.

Section 1-75.4 authorizes personal jurisdiction when out-of-state acts injure a North Carolina business during qualifying in-state services activity, or when a claim arises from services the plaintiff performed in North Carolina with the defendant’s authorization or ratification.

Dmarcian, Inc. v. BV · filed 2023-02-14(4)(a), (5)(b)

Jurisdiction is thus authorized by Sections 1-75.4(4)(a) and (5)(b) of the North Carolina long-arm statute.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits North Carolina courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant engaged in substantial activity in the state to the extent allowed by due process.

Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp. · filed 1977-01-31(1)(d)

Thus, we hold that G.S. 1-75.4(1) (d) applies to defendant and, statutorily, grants the courts of North Carolina the opportunity to exercise jurisdiction over defendant to the extent allowed by due process.

Subsection (4)'s product-use requirement is satisfied when a defendant's products are sold and used in North Carolina in the ordinary course of trade to a substantial extent.

Hankins v. Somers · filed 1979-02-06(4)

With respect to defendants Hann and Greenway, plaintiff alleged in his affidavit opposing the motion to dismiss that from 1974 through the time of his lawsuit the defendants were engaged in the business of selling wire art products, and that such products were sold and used in North Carolina in the ordinary course of trade to a substantial extent. This allegation is sufficient to satisfy G.S. 1-75.4(4).

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by federal due process.

Parris v. Garner Commercial Disposal, Inc. · filed 1979-03-20(1)(d)

In the enactment of G.S. 1-75.4(1)(d), our Legislature intended to make available to our courts the full jurisdictional powers permissible under federal due process.

Section 1-75.4(6)(b) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on an interest in a note secured by North Carolina property when the suit concerns how the defendant used payments on the note.

Whitener v. Whitener · filed 1982-04-06(6)(b)

In light of the serious constitutional problems that would arise were we to hold otherwise, we hold that G.S. l-75.4(6)(b) does not give the District Court of Henderson County in per-sonam jurisdiction in this case.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident engaged in substantial activity in North Carolina when jurisdiction accords with due process.

Southern Case, Inc. v. Management Recruiters International, Inc. · filed 1982-07-08(1)(d)

Since the Court concludes that § l-75.4(l)d provides sufficient basis for its exercise of jurisdiction, it need not consider other jurisdictional statutes.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) authorizes personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s North Carolina contacts satisfy the due process minimum contacts requirement.

Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. v. Mohasco Corp. · filed 1977-12-15(1)(d)

Accordingly, the question of whether there exists statutory authority for the exercise of jurisdiction over Pickering-England collapses into the question of whether Pickering-England has the minimum contacts with North Carolina necessary to comport with due process.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant engaged in substantial activity in North Carolina, a standard the court applies through the due process minimum contacts test.

Gemini Enterprises, Inc. v. WFMY Television Corp. · filed 1979-05-01(1)(d)

N.C.Gen.Stat. § 1-75.4(1)(d) provides for personal jurisdiction over all persons who are “engaged in substantial activity within this state.” ... Accordingly, the question of whether there exists statutory authority for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over NAB collapses into the question of whether NAB has the minimal contacts with North Carolina necessary to meet the requirements of due process.

Section 1-75.4 permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s contracts and performance establish sufficient contacts with North Carolina.

Park v. Sleepy Creek Turkeys, Inc. · filed 1983-02-01

The evidence pertaining to the contract and its performance clearly demonstrates sufficient contacts with North Carolina to satisfy both the statutory requirements of G.S. 1-75.4 and the constitutional requirements of due process.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits jurisdiction based on substantial activity in North Carolina only to the extent federal due process allows.

Georgia Railroad Bank & Trust Co. v. Eways · filed 1980-05-06(1)(d)

The legislative intent in the enactment of G.S. 1-75.4(1)(d) was to extend to the North Carolina courts the full jurisdictional powers permissible under federal due process.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) authorizes personal jurisdiction over a defendant engaged in substantial activity in North Carolina when served, to the extent due process permits.

Mabry v. Fuller-Shuwayer Co., Ltd. · filed 1981-01-06(1)(d)

The first of these considerations is easily met. G.S. 1-75.4 (1) (d) grants jurisdiction over any defendant who, at the time of service of process upon him, “[i]s engaged in substantial activity within this State....” ... We agree with defendant that the intent of the legislature was to assert personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowed by due process.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits North Carolina courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation to the extent allowed by due process.

HV Allen Co., Inc. v. Quip-Matic, Inc. · filed 1980-06-03(1)(d)

Therefore, the first step of the requisite “two-fold determination” has been met; the statutes of North Carolina permit courts of this jurisdiction to entertain this action against defendant.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant engaged in substantial activity in North Carolina without requiring a connection between the claim and the defendant’s contacts with the state.

Fiber Industries, Inc. v. Coronet Industries, Inc. · filed 1982-12-07(1)(d)

G.S. § l-75.4(l)(d) does not, by any of its terms, require a finding of a nexus between a plaintiffs claim and a defendant’s contacts with the state, but applies to “any action” against a defendant “engaged in substantial activity” in North Carolina.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits personal jurisdiction over a corporation whose alter ego carried on substantial activity in North Carolina.

Rose's Stores, Inc. v. Padgett · filed 1983-06-07(1)(d)

In this case, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 and § 55-145 set forth the applicable statutory requisites. ... Thus, Padgett functioned as the alter ego of Futures while he was a resident of North Carolina. Since Padgett was a North Carolina resident during the period of the illegal activities alleged, he is clearly subject to personal jurisdiction in North Carolina, and since he acted as the alter ego of Futures, Futures is likewise subject to the jurisdiction of North Carolina courts.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) requires substantial activity in North Carolina when the defendant is served to support personal jurisdiction.

Thompson v. National Grange Mutual Insurance · filed 1985-10-29(1)(d)

As- the Defendant has noted, the Plaintiff must prove that the Defendant was “engaged in substantial activity” in North Carolina “when service of process [was] made upon such party” for this Court to have personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. N.C.Gen.Stat. § 1-75.4(l)(d). Service of process was made on the Defendant in late March 1985. As the Court has determined that any contacts the Defendant may have had with independent adjusters in North Carolina are insufficient to form a basis for personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, and as the Plaintiff has failed to show any other substantial activity by the Defendant in North Carolina as of March 1985, the Court is of the opinion that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction should be granted.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) requires the defendant to be engaged in substantial activity in North Carolina when served with process.

Combs v. Bakker · filed 1988-08-08(1)(d)

Plaintiffs completely ignore the plain language of § l-75.4(l)(d) that requires that the defendant over whom jurisdiction is asserted be engaged in the predicate substantial activity “when service of process is made upon such party.” The activity Plaintiffs cite was carried on before the Complaint was filed. Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of showing that Defendants were engaged in substantial activity in the state when they were served.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits personal jurisdiction based on substantial activity in North Carolina when process is served, with earlier and current contacts considered together.

Fraser v. Littlejohn · filed 1989-12-05(1)(d)

N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(1) allows jurisdiction against a defendant who is engaged in “substantial activity” within North Carolina “when service of process is made upon such party” (emphasis added). ... Viewed together over the period 1983 to 1988, we find the quantity and nature of contacts appellant had with North Carolina warrant the assertion of personal jurisdiction over him here.

Section 1-75.4 permits personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants through their alter ego corporation’s contacts with North Carolina.

Copley Triangle Associates v. Apparel America, Inc. · filed 1989-11-07

Under our long arm statute, G.S. 1-75.4, the contacts that the appealing defendants had with this State through their alter ego subjected them to the jurisdiction of this State and exercising that jurisdiction will not violate due process of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 90 L.Ed. 95, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945).

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation engaged in substantial activity in North Carolina to the full extent due process allows.

Glaxo Inc. v. Genpharm Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 1992-06-19(1)(d)

This provision has been liberally construed by the North Carolina courts to permit the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations to the full extent allowed by due process under the United States Constitution.

Section 1-75.4 permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident engaged in substantial activity in North Carolina; the plaintiff must establish sufficient contacts with the state.

Honeycutt v. Tour Carriage, Inc. · filed 1996-03-18

Because none of the negligent acts alleged by Plaintiff in her complaint occurred in North Carolina, the only provision of the North Carolina Long-Arm Statute relevant to the instant case is § 1-75.4, which provides for in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who “Is engaged in substantial activity within this State, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.” N.C.Gen.Stat. § 1-75.4. ... The undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish this court’s jurisdiction over Tour Carriage.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant’s activities in North Carolina satisfy the substantial activity test.

Plant Genetic Systems, N v. v. Ciba Seeds · filed 1996-06-25(1)(d)

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing the most favorable inferences for the existence of jurisdiction, the court finds that Defendant MPSI’s activity in this forum is sufficient to find jurisdiction based on the “substantial activity” test of the long-arm statute.

Section 1-75.4(1) does not treat ownership of North Carolina property alone as substantial activity sufficient for personal jurisdiction.

Hernandez v. Santiago · filed 2001-03-01(1)

Thus, this court may not exercise jurisdiction over defendant Santiago unless she was engaged in substantial activity in North Carolina at the time of service of process. It is true that at the time of service of process, Santiago, with her husband, owned a house in the state. However, ownership of property, without more, does not constitute “substantial activity” upon which an exercise of personal jurisdiction can be predicated.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) requires facts supporting substantial activity in North Carolina when process is served; a bare assertion of jurisdiction does not establish a prima facie statutory basis.

Golds v. Central Express, Inc. · filed 2001-04-03(1)(d)

Although the complaint cites our long-arm statute as providing personal jurisdiction over defendants, the complaint does not state the section of this statute under which jurisdiction is obtained nor does it allege any facts as to activity being conducted in this State at the time of service of process. ... A review of the record and plaintiff’s complaint shows he failed to meet his burden of proving prima facie a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for a lack of personal jurisdiction.

Subsection (1)(d) authorizes personal jurisdiction to the extent federal due process permits, so statutory authorization turns on the defendant’s minimum contacts with North Carolina.

Murphy v. Glafenhein · filed 1993-07-06(1)(d)

In other words, when personal jurisdiction is alleged to exist pursuant to Section l-75.4(l)(d), “the question of statutory authorization ‘collapses into the question of whether [the defendant] has the minimum contacts with North Carolina necessary to meet the requirements of due process.’ ” ... Thus, we proceed directly to the constitutional issue.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) requires contacts amounting to substantial activity in North Carolina; an encounter with North Carolina residents outside the state does not suffice.

Bullard v. USAir, Inc. · filed 1994-05-17(1)(d)

Because the record lacks evidence that defendant had the minimum contacts necessary to constitute substantial activity in North Carolina and satisfy due process, we find no basis for personal jurisdiction over defendant in North Carolina.

Section 1-75.4 permits personal jurisdiction based on continuous and systematic business transactions in North Carolina under a franchise agreement.

Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. · filed 1996-10-09

To be sure, the Plaintiffs’ contacts, through the numerous continuous and systematic business transactions with the Defendants in the forum, all pursuant to the FTA, warrant this Court exercising personal jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs under the North Carolina long-arm statute.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits jurisdiction when a defendant’s commercial Internet contacts, considered together, amount to substantial activity in North Carolina related to the claim.

Superguide Corp. v. Kegan · filed 1997-10-08(1)(d)

The North Carolina long-arm statute specifically requires “substantial activity” within the state. N.C. Gen.Stat. Section 1-75.4(l)(d) (1989). ... Viewed together, the Internet contacts amount to substantial activity within the State of North Carolina, and the nature of those contacts is related to the Declaratory Relief Act claim asserted by plaintiff.

Section 1-75.4 permits personal jurisdiction based on payments sent from North Carolina over four years, together with the defendant’s mortgage banker registration and continuing surety bond in the state.

First Union National Bank of Delaware v. Bankers Wholesale Mortgage, LLC · filed 2002-10-01(1)(d), (5)(d)

Here, the trial court found all payments made to defendant were mailed or wired from plaintiff’s Charlotte, North Carolina offices during the four years that defendant did business with the plaintiff. The trial court further found that defendant registered with the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks in North Carolina, allowing it to both broker and fund mortgage loans within the state of North Carolina. As a prerequisite for obtaining this registration as a mortgage banker, defendant posted a $25,000 surety bond which remains in full force and effect in North Carolina. Based on the findings of fact in the record, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over BWM met the requirements of North Carolina’s long-arm statute.

Section 1-75.4(1)d permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant engaged in substantial activity in North Carolina when served; activity before service may establish that the activity was ongoing.

Lang v. Lang · filed 2003-05-20(1)d

The long-arm statute requires a defendant to be “engaged in substantial activity” in the State “when service of process is made.” N.C.G.S. § l-75.4(l)d. ... Thus, the trial court properly considered defendant’s activity prior to the service of process for purposes of determining whether defendant was engaged in substantial activity within the State.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits personal jurisdiction over a company whose agent and contract activities in North Carolina establish substantial activity and sufficient minimum contacts.

Jaeger v. Applied Analytical Industries Deutschland GMBH · filed 2003-07-15(1)(d)

Based on the foregoing evidence, we find that AAID maintains sufficient minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4 and due process. AAID maintains a continuous and systematic presence within this state by and through its agent in Wilmington, North Carolina. AAID holds itself out as engaged in substantial activity within North Carolina by employing a managing director and negotiating and signing agreements in Wilmington, North Carolina, and by denoting Wilmington, North Carolina as the point of correspondence on its letterhead and in the escrow agreement.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) requires a defendant to be engaged in substantial activity in North Carolina at the time of service.

Prospect Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Chasnan, Inc. · filed 2013-10-10(1)(d)

The statute plainly requires that the defendant be engaged in such substantial activity at the time of service. ... As a result, based on the plain language of G.S. 1-75.4(1)(d), the exercise of jurisdiction is improper.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) authorizes personal jurisdiction over a defendant who engages in substantial activity in North Carolina when exercising jurisdiction comports with due process.

Soma Tech. Inc. v. Dalamagas · filed 2017-03-24(1)(d)

Based on the Court’s findings of fact, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Desai has engaged in substantial activity within this State, N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-75.4(1)(d), and has sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina “such that the maintenance of [this] suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,’” Skinner, 361 N.C. at 122, 638 S.E.2d at 210 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316).

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) requires substantial activity in North Carolina; post-accident correspondence and unrelated personal visits do not satisfy that requirement.

Parker v. Pfeffer · filed 2020-10-20(1)(d)

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant’s mere correspondence satisfies the “substantial activity” requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75(1)(d). ... Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant’s few vacations to North Carolina, which have no relation to the traffic accident in Texas, constituted as “substantial activity” to satisfy the purpose of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(1)(d).

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant engaged in substantial activity in North Carolina, whether that activity is interstate or intrastate.

Button v. Level Four Orthotics & Prosthetics, Inc. · filed 2022-03-11(1)(d)

Beginning with North Carolina’s long-arm statute, the record makes clear that both Level Four Holdings and Ellis are “engaged in substantial activity within [North Carolina],” and it is irrelevant “whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.” N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(1)(d).

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident whose contacts with North Carolina satisfy due process.

Ziegler v. Ziegler · filed 2025-03-05(1)(d)

“[W]hen evaluating the existence of personal jurisdiction pursuant to [N.C.]G.S. § 1–75.4(1)(d), the question of statutory authorization collapses into the question of whether the defendant has the minimum contacts with North Carolina necessary to meet the requirements of due process.” ... Upon de novo review, we conclude the trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of law, and Defendant established sufficient minimum contacts with the State to confer personal jurisdiction of the trial court over Defendant, thus satisfying due process.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) authorizes personal jurisdiction to the extent due process allows, so statutory authorization turns on whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina.

Carter v. Home2 Suites by Hilton Charlotte I-77 S. · filed 2025-05-07(1)(d)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(1)(d) “grants the courts of North Carolina the opportunity to exercise jurisdiction over [a] defendant to the extent allowed by due process.” Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 676 (1977). “In other words, when evaluating the existence of personal jurisdiction pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 1-75.4(1)(d), the question of statutory authorization collapses into the question of whether the defendant has the minimum contacts with North Carolina necessary to meet the requirements of due process.” Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co., 138 N.C. App. 612, 617 (2000) (cleaned up). Accordingly, we proceed directly to the due process inquiry.

Section 1-75.4(2) preserves grounds for personal jurisdiction established by special statutes.

Gro-Mar Public Relations, Inc. v. Billy Jack Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1978-06-20(2)

G.S. 1-75.4(2), however, makes clear that special statutes conferring grounds for personal jurisdiction retain their vitality.

Section 1-75.4(2) permits personal jurisdiction when another North Carolina statute specifically provides a ground for it.

Mony Credit Corp. v. Ultra-Funding Corp. · filed 1990-11-20(2)

A special jurisdiction statute is applicable to this case and confers jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for any claim arising out of a contract to be performed in North Carolina.

Section 1-75.4(2) confers personal jurisdiction whenever a special personal jurisdiction statute applies.

Butler v. Butler · filed 2002-08-06(2)

A determination that statutory jurisdiction exists pursuant to UIFSA is likewise a determination that statutory jurisdiction exists pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(2) (2001), which confers personal jurisdiction whenever any special personal jurisdiction statute applies.

Section 1-75.4 requires a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a domestic violence protective order action.

Mannise v. Harrell · filed 2016-09-06

The facts asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint do not comply with any provision set forth in the long-arm statute to enable the trial court to invoke personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Section 1-75.4 permits specific personal jurisdiction only to the extent allowed by due process, which requires purposeful contacts with North Carolina.

Bartlett v. Burke · filed 2022-09-06

North Carolina’s Long Arm Statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 (2021), grants North Carolina’s courts specific personal jurisdiction “over defendant[s] to the extent allowed by due process.” ... When considering whether AHD’s alleged contacts “related to” North Carolina, beyond mere “stream of commerce,” AHD has not “purposefully availed” itself of our forum, and these contacts are not sufficient to support the trial court’s assertion of specific personal jurisdiction.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) extends specific personal jurisdiction as far as due process permits, so the statutory and constitutional inquiries merge.

Public Impact, LLC v. Boston Consulting Group, Inc. · filed 2015-08-03(1)(d)

The Fourth Circuit recently confirmed its interpretation of North Carolina’s long-arm statute, holding that the issue of specific jurisdiction under N.C. Gen.Stat. § l-75.4(l)(d) “merges”- the two-prong test “into the single question” of whether a defendant has “sufficient contacts with North Carolina to satisfy constitutional due process.” Universal Leather, 773 F.3d at 558-59. Thus, the single inquiry here is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over BCG “is consonant with the strictures of due process.” Tire Eng’g & Distribution, LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 301 (4th Cir.2012) (per curiam).

Section 1-75.4 authorizes personal jurisdiction to the full extent due process permits and is construed liberally in favor of jurisdiction.

Kaplan School Supply Corp. v. Henry Wurst, Inc. · filed 1982-04-06

G.S. § 1-75.4, commonly referred to as the “long-arm” statute, is a legislative attempt to allow the courts of this State to assert in personam jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, and is accorded a liberal construction in favor of finding personal jurisdiction, subject only to due process limitations.

Section 1-75.4 extends North Carolina personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the full extent federal due process permits.

Bailey v. London Marina, Inc. · filed 1979-09-04(1)(d)

This section has been interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme Court as a legislative attempt to assert in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted under federal due process. Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N. C. 674 (231 SE2d 629) (1977). Thus, the basic question in this case is whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction over appellant by the North Carolina court satisfied due process requirements.

Section 1-75.4 is construed liberally in favor of personal jurisdiction, subject to due process limits.

Green Thumb Industry of Monroe, Inc. v. Warren County Nursery, Inc · filed 1980-04-15

It is generally accepted that North Carolina’s long-arm statute (G.S. 1-75.4) should be liberally construed in favor of finding personal jurisdiction, subject, of course, to due process limitations.

Section 1-75.4(1)(d) authorizes personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by federal due process.

Hanes Companies, Inc. v. Ronson · filed 1988-06-07(1)(d)

Thus, when a plaintiff relies on Section 1-75.4(1)(d), the question of statutory authorization “collapses into the question of whether [the defendant] has the minimum contacts with North Carolina necessary to meet the requirements of due process.”

A defendant’s North Carolina contacts can satisfy Section 1-75.4 when they include fathering a child there and signing a paternity acknowledgment and voluntary support agreement.

Moore v. Wilson · filed 1983-06-21

In our opinion the trial court’s findings of fact support the conclusion that defendant’s contacts with North Carolina were substantial enough to meet both the statutory requirements of G.S. 1-75.4 and due process standards.

Section 1-75.4 provides no ground for personal jurisdiction when the defendant has no shown presence or contacts in North Carolina.

McMahan v. McMahan · filed 1984-06-05

Thus, none of the grounds for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction under G.S. 1-75.4 are present; and exercise of such jurisdiction would violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.