N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2

An injury during an employee’s trip home after work does not arise out of and occur in the course of employment when no exception to the coming and going rule applies.

Luse v. Battelle Memorial Institute · filed 2011-12-06(6)

Given the foregoing, because plaintiff was injured after work on the way home and no exception to the "coming and going" rule applies, plaintiff has not proven that she suffered an injury arising out of and occurring in the course of her employment on September 19, 2008. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

An injury sustained while commuting off the employer’s premises generally does not arise out of and in the course of employment, unless the employer provides transportation as an incident of the employment contract.

Harris v. Jack O. Farrell, Inc. · filed 1976-10-20(6), (10)

Generally, injuries sustained in accidents occurring off the employer’s premises while the employee is going to or returning from work are not covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, since in those cases there is not such a causal connection between the employment and the accident that the latter can properly be considered as “arising out of and in the course of” the former. ... An exception to this general rule is made, however, and “[s]uch an injury is compensable when it is established that the employer, as an incident of the contract of employment, provides the means of transportation to and from the place where the work of the employment is performed.”

Section 97-2(6) generally excludes injuries sustained while going to or from work; transportation furnished as a right under the employment contract may fall within employment, but gratuitous transportation does not.

Travelers Insurance v. Curry · filed 1976-01-07(6)

Under G.S. 97-2(6) this is dependant upon whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. ... We think the foregoing is a correct statement of the law governing this appeal. Thus, as found by the trial judge, Curry would not expose himself to liability for workmen’s compensation purposes by gratuitously furnishing transportation for his employees.

Section 97-2(6) excludes an injury during a personal trip from compensation when the trip has no legitimate business purpose.

Dunn v. Marconi Communications, Inc. · filed 2003-12-16(6)

All of the exceptions relied upon by plaintiff can be eliminated from consideration based upon a finding that plaintiff was on a personal errand at the time of his accident and that the trip did not serve a dual business purpose.

An injury during travel to work is not compensable under § 97-2(6) merely because the worker leaves early to ensure timely arrival in bad weather; that trip is not a special errand for the employer.

Schmoyer v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints · filed 1986-06-03(6)

In order for a covered worker’s injury to be compensable, it must be shown that the injury was caused by an accident arising out of the worker’s employment and occurring in the course of the employment. ... We cannot agree that this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, was sufficient to establish that Harmon was on a special errand for his employer when he met his death, but at most shows that he may have exercised his discretion to go to the church in advance of the time he was required to be there.

Section 97-2(2) includes undocumented aliens as employees, and immigration status alone does not bar them from receiving workers’ compensation benefits.

Ruiz v. Belk Masonry Co., Inc. · filed 2002-02-19(2)

N.C.G.S. § 97-2(2) does not preclude plaintiff from receiving workers’ compensation benefits based solely on his status as an illegal alien.

Prisoners are not employees under § 97-2(b) because they do not work under an appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship.

Lawson v. North Carolina State Highway & Public Works Commission · filed 1958-04-30(b)

A prisoner is not an employee as defined by G.S. 97-2 (b). He is not a person “engaged in an employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written.”

Section 97-2(19)'s definition of medical compensation includes future prosthetic devices needed to provide relief from a compensable injury.

Battle v. New Southern of Rocky Mount · filed 1995-02-16(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants provide such medical compensation as may be necessary to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen his period of disability. N.C.G.S. § 97-25; N.C.G.S. § 97-2(19). Plaintiff is therefore entitled to ongoing medical compensation; including the provision of future prosthetic devices, pursuant to Hyler v. GTE Products,333 N.C. 258, 425 S.E.2d 698 (1993).

Section 97-2(19) includes necessary replacement prostheses in medical compensation when they effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability; the 1994 amendment clarified this coverage.

Totten v. Keyston Foods Corporation · filed 2002-05-16(19)

The legislative intent in adopting the language allowing replacement of artificial members was to clarify that an award of medical compensation for a prosthesis reasonably includes any necessary replacements in order to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Section 97-2(19), as amended in 1994, requires replacement of an artificial member when reasonably necessitated by ordinary use or medical circumstances for claims pending on or filed after July 5, 1994.

McDaniel v. Farr Co. · filed 2003-03-25(19)

Senate Bill 906 was ratified on July 5, 1994, and the effective date for the changes to Section 97-2 (19) is July 5, 1994, for claims pending on or filed after July 5, 1994. Plaintiff's claim for the myoelectric arm was pending on July 5, 1994. Pursuant to the version of § 97-2 (19) applicable to plaintiff's claim, defendants are required to pay for the replacement of the myoelectric arm "when reasonably necessitated by ordinary use or medical circumstances."

Section 97-2(19) includes necessary changes and replacements to a prosthesis as medical compensation when a compensable injury creates the need for them.

Outland v. Superior Indus. Maintenance Co. · filed 2004-07-27(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants provide all medical compensation arising from this injury by accident, including past and necessary future treatment rendered by Dr. Vance, Dr. Valentini and by Dr. Dempsey. In addition, plaintiff is entitled to have defendants provide the necessary changes and replacements to his prosthesis until such time as his stump is stable and he has a properly fitting prosthesis. However, he is not entitled to have defendants provide treatment for his depression. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(19); 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) includes replacement artificial members in medical compensation when ordinary use or medical circumstances reasonably necessitate replacement.

Hulslander v. Nat. Spinning Co. · filed 2005-02-15(19)

Because he is permanently and totally disabled, plaintiff is entitled to lifetime medical compensation, which is defined in the Workers Compensation Act to include "replacement . . . artificial members when reasonably necessitated by ordinary use or medical circumstances." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19). The expert testimony in this case overwhelmingly establishes that the C-Leg prosthetic system, with Comfort Flex sockets and Luxon Max feet, is at this point in the rehabilitation of plaintiff reasonably and medically necessary.

Section 97-2(6) treats breast implants as compensable prosthetic devices that function as part of the body.

Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Group · filed 2008-02-05(6)

We believe that the weight of authority supports a determination that breast implants satisfy the statutory requirement as a compensable prosthetic device that functions as part of the body.

An injury sustained while undergoing physical therapy for a compensable injury is itself compensable.

Payne v. Continental General Tire · filed 2002-07-15(6)

Plaintiff's injury while undergoing physical therapy for a compensable injury is itself compensable under the Workers Compensation Act.

Section 97-2(6) covers a lower-back injury arising out of and in the course of employment as a compensable injury.

Barbour v. Raj Rathore D/B/A Luxury Inn · filed 2003-03-11(6)

On 3 May 1999 plaintiff sustained a compensable injury to her lower back arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers a back injury, leg weakness, pain, and a herniated disc that directly and proximately result from a compensable injury.

Lemery v. Piedmont Corrugated Specialty · filed 2004-01-15(6)

As a direct and proximate result of plaintiff's March 28, 2000 compensable injury, plaintiff sustained a compensable injury to her back, leg weakness, pain and a herniated disc on July 18, 2001.

Section 97-2(6) covers a severe closed head injury sustained as a direct result of assigned work.

Barnwell v. Cornerstone Prop. · filed 2004-05-27(6)

Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of his employment and as a direct result of the work assigned on October 9, 2002. As the direct and natural result of, and causally related to his injury, plaintiff sustained a severe closed head injury. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment; a condition without a proven causal link to the work incident is not compensable.

Cram v. Dana Corp. · filed 2005-03-07(6)

For an injury to be compensable, it must be an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). ... Accordingly, the medical evidence of record fails to establish a causal relation between plaintiff's back condition and the incident at work on October 22, 2001.

A claimant bears the burden of proving a compensable injury sustained while working for the employer.

Dula v. Lighthouse Superscreens · filed 2005-03-07(6)

Plaintiff has not carried his burden to prove that he sustained a compensable injury on July 11, 2002 while working for defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires a specific traumatic incident of assigned work or an accident arising out of and in the course of employment for a compensable injury.

Moore v. Bay Mech. · filed 2005-07-08(6)

Plaintiff did not sustain a compensable injury as the result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned or an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with The Industrial Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers a lower-back injury caused by an accident or specific traumatic incident as a compensable injury.

Coup v. Tradesmen Intl. · filed 2005-10-26(6)

Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident or specific traumatic incident to his lower back on March 11, 2003. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires proof of an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment or, for a back injury, a specific traumatic incident of assigned work.

Lee v. Getrag Corporation · filed 2006-03-21(6)

The plaintiff failed to prove that he sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment or a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned with defendant-employer on January 20, 2004.

Section 97-2(6) requires a compensable injury to be proximately caused by an accident arising out of the course and scope of employment.

Shepherd v. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESSES · filed 2008-01-15(6)

Pursuant to the North Carolina Worker's Compensation Act, a compensable injury must be proximately caused by an accident arising out of the course and scope of employment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6) (2003).

Section 97-2(6) requires a compensable injury to result from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Bonilla v. Rdh Tire Retreading · filed 2008-03-25(6)

In order for an injury to be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, it must be the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires proof of a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of employment; skin discoloration and minor irritation alone do not prove a compensable work injury or exposure.

Jones v. Tradesmen International, Inc. · filed 2009-12-18(6)

Plaintiff failed to prove that he sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment with Defendant on either July 14, 2005 or July 15, 2005. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6) (2008).

Section 97-2(6) does not cover pain chiefly attributable to a noncompensable condition rather than to a compensable injury.

Spears v. Betsy Johnson Memorial Hospital · filed 2009-12-21(6)

Plaintiff's right upper extremity pain is most significantly related to her non-compensable RSD, rather than her compensable neck pain, and is thus not compensable. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6); Click v. Freight Carriers , 300 N.C. 164 , 265 S.E.2d 389 (1980).

Section 97-2(6) requires a compensable injury by accident to arise out of and in the course of employment, with evidence linking the injury to a work incident.

Ivey v. Bright Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2010-03-05(6)

For an injury to be compensable, it must be an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). ... In the present case, the greater weight of the competent medical evidence of record fails to establish that Plaintiff suffered any injury that is causally related to an incident occurring at work on October 3, 2007.

A condition causally resulting from an admitted compensable work injury can itself be a compensable injury.

Jones v. Edgecombe County Schools · filed 2011-04-06(6)

In this case, the greater weight of the competent expert evidence establishes that Plaintiff's diagnosis of radiculitis for her arms is casually related to nerves injured in her neck on November 14, 2007. Therefore, Plaintiff also sustained a compensable injury to her neck and right arm as a result of admittedly compensable injury on November 14, 2007. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires the claimant to prove a compensable injury by the greater weight of the evidence.

Stinson v. Wal-Mart · filed 2011-07-22(6)

Plaintiff has not shown by the greater weight of the evidence that he sustained a compensable injury to his left knee in January 2009. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires a claimed condition or aggravation to be causally related to the work accident for compensation.

Simmons v. Cardinal State Bank · filed 2011-09-21(6)

Plaintiff has not shown that her cervical and lumbar conditions were caused and/or aggravated by the August 10, 2007 incident, and, as such, she is not entitled to compensation related to her these conditions. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) treats a back injury arising out of and in the course and scope of employment as a compensable injury.

Weaver v. Moore's Wholesale Co. · filed 1995-02-10(6)

Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury to his back on December 5, 1991, arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment with defendant-employer.

Section 97-2(6) covers an injury by accident or specific traumatic incident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Lee v. Thomas Transport System, Incorporated · filed 1994-12-15(6)

Plaintiff sustained an injury by accident or specific traumatic incident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer on November 19, 1991. Said injury is compensable. N.C.G.S. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) defines a compensable injury as an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Jones v. Materials Handling Group · filed 2001-10-30(6)

On 17 July 1995 plaintiff sustained a compensable injury to his back arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

Section 97-2(6) does not treat a knee condition as a compensable injury when it neither arose from a work accident nor resulted from an accepted work injury.

Hall v. Middleby Group · filed 2002-06-14(6)

The plaintiff did not suffer a compensable injury to his right knee on or after May 25, 1999. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

A shoulder condition not causally related to employment is not a compensable injury under § 97-2(6).

Hailey v. Foods · filed 2002-07-09(6)

Plaintiff has failed to establish a compensable injury to her shoulders. N.C.G.S. §§ 97-2(6), 97-53(13).

Section 97-2(6) requires an injury by accident or specific traumatic incident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Whitley v. Sun River Service Corporation · filed 2002-08-22(6)

Plaintiff did not sustain an injury by accident or specific traumatic incident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the Defendant-employer on either November 2 or November 3, 2000.

Section 97-2(19) covers vocational rehabilitation services that help an injured worker become employable and find suitable work within medical restrictions.

Maynard v. Black Decker Corp. · filed 2003-03-24(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendant provide her with vocational rehabilitation services in order to assist her in her efforts at achieving functional capabilities, which will enable her to reach a level of stable employability, and then to assist her at locating suitable employment within her work restrictions given by Dr. Subin. N.C.G.S. §§ 97-2 (19) 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) permits educational training as vocational rehabilitation when the training would lessen a worker’s disability by improving the prospect of comparable wages.

Shogran v. R-Anell Custom Homes · filed 2004-04-19(19)

The North Carolina Court of Appeals has found that the Industrial Commission, in construing N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(19) and 97-25 , and determining whether a rehabilitative service will effect a cure, give relief, or lessen claimant's disability, has the discretion to approve educational training as a form of vocational rehabilitation. ... In the present case, the evidence of record indicates that plaintiff, given his physical limitations, would have difficulty finding employment that would pay him a comparable wage to his pre-injury earnings, and that further education would greatly enhance his chance of earning his pre-injury wage. ... Plaintiff would benefit from vocational rehabilitation compensation for necessary educational training to obtain a criminal justice position, as recommended by North Carolina Vocational Rehabilitation.

Section 97-2(19) covers vocational rehabilitation assistance as medical compensation for a compensable injury.

Mathis v. Wilkes Cty. Schools · filed 2004-06-22(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to vocational rehabilitation assistance. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(19); 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) includes vocational rehabilitation among covered medical expenses when reasonably required to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Nance v. Nash Finch Co. · filed 2005-05-06(19)

As a result of plaintiff's compensable injury by accident, plaintiff is entitled to have the defendants pay for all his related medical expenses incurred or to be incurred, including vocational rehabilitation, as may be reasonably required to effect a cure, give relief or lessen the period of disability. In order to lessen the period of disability, the plaintiff must cooperate with the remaining prong of defendants' vocational rehabilitation by complying with all of defendants' job placement efforts in obtaining suitable employment. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19) and 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) permits medical compensation for reschooling, retraining, and continuing vocational rehabilitation when needed to provide relief, effect a cure, or lessen the period of disability.

Punch v. Caldwell Freight Lines, Inc. · filed 2005-12-02(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have the defendant pay for medical expenses incurred or to be incurred, including plaintiff's reschooling and/or retraining, and/or continuing vocational rehabilitation as recommended by the North Carolina Vocational Rehabilitation Services, as a result of his compensable injury as may be required to provide relief, effect a cure or lessen the period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), § 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) includes a life care plan as a reasonable rehabilitative service when the plan is reasonably necessary to help an injured worker function, avoid complications, and live productively.

Scarboro v. Emery Worldwide Freight Corp. · filed 2007-08-07(19)

The greater weight of the evidence shows that the life care plan has been pertinent to plaintiff's case and was reasonably necessary for plaintiff to function optimally, avoid potential complications related to his injuries, and live a productive life. As such, the life care plan was a "reasonable rehabilitative service."

Section 97-2(19) treats vocational retraining through education as medical compensation for which the employer is responsible for educational expenses.

Garcia v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co · filed 2007-11-13(19)

Vocational retraining through education is a form of medical compensation under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19), and the employer is responsible for paying educational expenses for retraining.

Section 97-2(19) includes reasonably necessary vocational rehabilitation in medical compensation when it tends to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Parker v. Duke University · filed 2007-11-30(19)

Defendants are required to provide plaintiff with reasonably necessary medical treatment related to his compensable back injury by accident that tends to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability, including vocational rehabilitation. Plaintiff shall be obligated to make a good faith effort to participate in any reasonable vocational rehabilitation. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 , and 97-25.1 .

Section 97-2(19) includes vocational rehabilitation in medical compensation, and defendants may direct those rehabilitation efforts as they do other medical treatment.

Matherson v. Concrete · filed 2008-12-18(19)

Vocational rehabilitation comes under the definition of medical compensation. Defendants have the right to direct such efforts, just as with any other medical treatment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19) (2007).

Section 97-2(19) supports reasonable vocational assistance and retraining for an injured employee who needs help returning to work.

Nichols v. Bridger Drilling Enterprises · filed 2009-05-14(19)

Plaintiff's treating physician has recommended and plaintiff is entitled to receive reasonable vocational assistance and retraining to be provided by Defendants. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19); 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers reasonable vocational assistance and retraining for an injured worker.

Nichols v. Bridger Drilling Enterprises · filed 2009-06-02(19)

Plaintiff's treating physician has recommended and plaintiff is entitled to receive reasonable vocational assistance and retraining to be provided by Defendants. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19); 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) includes education as reasonable vocational rehabilitation when it is reasonably required to lessen an injured worker’s period of disability.

Heybyrne v. Valdese General Hospital · filed 2009-12-16(19)

Plaintiff's pursuit of her education is reasonable vocational rehabilitation and is reasonably required to lessen her period of disability. ... N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19) and 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) supports an award of reasonable vocational assistance to an injured employee.

Minor v. United Health Services · filed 2010-07-06(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to receive reasonable vocational assistance to be provided by Defendants.

Section 97-2(19) includes vocational rehabilitation services intended to lessen an injured worker’s period of disability in medical compensation.

Genna v. Duke University Medical Center · filed 2011-04-28(19)

Vocational rehabilitation is a component of medical compensation. ... Vocational rehabilitation services intended to lessen the period of disability are provided to an injured employee pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-25 and 97-2 (19).

Section 97-2(19) includes vocational rehabilitation in medical compensation only when it tends to lessen an established period of disability.

Johnson v. Southern Tire Sales & Service, Inc. · filed 2014-05-06(19)

As defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(19) (2013), “medical compensation” includes “vocational rehabilitation.” However, services only fall under the definition of “medical compensation” if they “effect a cure or give relief” or “will tend to lessen the period of disability.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(19). The Full Commission correctly reasoned that because vocational rehabilitation by its nature cannot effect a cure or give relief in a medical sense, it must lessen the period of disability in order to meet the statutory definition of medical compensation.

Under § 97-2(9), a compensable occupational disease does not establish entitlement to disability compensation unless the worker proves disability caused by that disease.

Kohnen v. Eaton Corp. · filed 2003-03-27(9)

Although plaintiff sustained a compensable occupational disease, the greater weight of the evidence fails to show that she sustained any disability as a result of the contraction of the occupational disease. ... Plaintiff failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that she is disabled and therefore she is not entitled to disability compensation under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (9); -54.

Section 97-2(9) requires a claimant seeking continuing disability benefits to show continuing disability or diminished wage-earning capacity.

Whitehead v. Pillowtex · filed 2003-09-11(9)

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of showing a continuing disability or diminished wage-earning capacity within the meaning of the Act.

Section 97-2(9) allows an employee to establish disability through competent evidence of inability to earn wages.

Austin v. Continental General Tire · filed 2006-05-30(9)

In the present case, plaintiff presented competent evidence of his inability to earn wages, satisfying his burden of proving disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (9).

Section 97-2(9) places the burden of proving ongoing disability on the employee.

Davis v. Harrah's Cherokee Casino · filed 2006-08-01(9)

The burden of proving disability under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 97-2(9) for the period subsequent to 27 December 2001 is on plaintiff.

An employee capable of some work may prove disability by showing that a reasonable effort to obtain employment was unsuccessful.

Ceballos v. INTREPID USA · filed 2007-02-06(9)

We therefore hold that plaintiff satisfied her burden under the second prong of the Russell analysis of producing evidence that she is capable of some work, but, after a reasonable effort, has been unsuccessful in obtaining employment.

Under § 97-2(9), medical evidence offered to prove disability must show that the compensable injury leaves the employee incapable of work in any employment.

Brooks v. Guarantee Services, Inc. · filed 2008-02-12(9)

Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient medical evidence demonstrating that she is, as a result of her August 21, 2003, compensable workplace injury, incapable of work in any employment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (9).

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as inability to earn preinjury wages in the same or other employment.

Silva v. Lowe's Home Improvement · filed 2009-05-19(9)

In order to prove disability under the Act, the employee must show that he is unable to earn the same wages he had earned before the injury, either in the same employment or in other employment.

Under § 97-2(9), competent evidence that a worker cannot earn wages establishes disability, after which the employer must show available work the worker could obtain given physical and vocational limits.

Burroughs v. Laser Recharge of Carolinas, Inc. · filed 2009-08-31(9)

In the present case, plaintiff presented competent evidence of his inability to earn wages, satisfying his burden of proving disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (9). Defendant did not meet their burden to show that employment is available for plaintiff and that he would be capable of obtaining employment, taking into account his physical and vocational limitations.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as injury-caused inability to earn preinjury wages in the same or other employment; the employee must prove that loss of earning capacity.

Nobles v. Coastal Power Inc. · filed 2010-01-05(9)

"Disability," as defined in the Worker's Compensation Act, is "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (9). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that he is unable to earn the same wages that he had earned before the injury, either in the same employment or in other employment, and that the diminished earning capacity is a result of the compensable injury.

Section 97-2(9) places the burden of proving continuing disability on the employee; an employee able to work who makes no reasonable effort to find work and shows no reason that seeking work would be futile does not meet that burden.

Casstevens v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Servs. · filed 2010-05-24(9)

Plaintiff's disability from his January 30, 2008 work injury ended April 24, 2008. Plaintiff has the burden of proving the extent of his continuing disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (9) (2009); Russell v. Lowes Product Distrib. , 108 N.C. App. 762 , 425 S.E.2d 454 (1993). Ms. McKinney and Dr. Guo released Plaintiff to return to work as of April 24, 2008 with a 25 pound lifting restriction, but Plaintiff refused to return to work. The evidence establishes that Plaintiff can work but did not make a reasonable effort to find work; that he has no factors such as age or lack of education that would make it futile to seek employment; and that Plaintiff did not return to work at a diminished wage. Thus, Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving continuing disability.

Section 97-2(9) places the burden on the claimant to prove the existence and extent of disability resulting from a work injury.

Ervin v. Mastercraft Fabrics · filed 2003-08-29(9)

Plaintiff has the burden of proving the existence of disability and its extent. In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to prove by the greater weight that he is disabled as a result of any June 5, 2001 injury by accident and consequently entitled to workers' compensation benefits.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability as injury-caused inability to earn preinjury wages in the same or other employment; the employee bears the burden of proving continuing disability.

Treat v. Mecklenburg County · filed 2008-12-16(9)

“Disability,” within the meaning ... of the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act [the Act], is defined as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” N.C.G.S. § 97-2(9) (1999). ... We hold that the burden remained on Plaintiff to prove continuing disability under the Act.

A doctor's failure to release an employee to work does not, by itself, establish disability under the medical-evidence method of proof.

Newnam v. New Hanover Regional Medical Center · filed 2011-06-07(9)

However, a finding that a doctor never released a plaintiff to return to work is insufficient to establish disability under the first prong of Russell.

Section 97-2(9) defines disability by lost wage-earning capacity; an employee who shows total incapacity for work need not also show that a job search would be futile.

Wilkes v. City of Greenville · filed 2017-06-09(9)

If plaintiff shows total incapacity for work, taking into account his work-related conditions combined with the other factors noted above, he is not required to also show that a job search would be futile.

A claimant’s employment after an injury does not foreclose proof of disability through an unsuccessful job search or the futility of seeking other work.

Harrison v. Gemma Power Sys., LLC · filed 2014-07-01(9)

Thus, Beard stands for the proposition that a claimant may obtain employment between the injury and the hearing before the Industrial Commission without foreclosing his or her ability to prove disability under the second or third prongs in Russell.

Section 97-2(12) includes a deceased employee’s biological posthumous child within the definition of child.

McLean v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol. · filed 2003-06-13(12)

Given the finding made in the State of Georgia and the lack of contrary evidence presented, Matthew Kali Askiri Garvey is decedent's biological posthumous child and is presumed to be dependent upon decedent. U.S. Const. Art. IV § 1 , cl 1 ; N.C.G.S. §§ 97-2(12); 97-39 .

Medical care is compensable under § 97-2(19) when reasonably necessary to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Santora v. Brinker Intl. · filed 2003-07-08(19)

The medical care sought and obtained by plaintiff through Dr. Alan Lippitt in Atlanta, Georgia, including but not limited to that of Ms. Sims, was not reasonably necessary to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen the period of disability. Based upon competent medical evidence, the treatment sought by plaintiff through Dr. Lippitt may have actually extended her period of disability and increased her level of permanent impairment. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(19); 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers medical treatment reasonably necessary to provide relief, effect a cure, or lessen the period of disability.

Thornburg v. Levitas · filed 2009-07-08(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants pay for medical expenses as a result of the compensable injury as are required to provide relief, effect a cure, or lessen the period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19); 97-25 . 2. However, based upon the totality of the credible medical evidence of record, the provocative discography and plasma disc decompression is not reasonably necessary to provide relief or effect a cure.

Medical compensation under § 97-2(19) does not cover treatment for a condition the worker has not proved was causally related to the compensable injury.

Campbell v. Conagra Foods, Inc. · filed 2011-01-20(19)

Plaintiff did not meet her burden to prove that her back condition is causally related to her compensable injury by accident and therefore plaintiff is not entitled to additional compensation for medical treatment related to her back condition as a result of the injury by accident of November 22, 2005.

Section 97-2(6) does not treat an employee’s injury in a mall parking lot as occurring in the course of employment merely because the employer shares maintenance costs with other tenants; the lot must be sufficiently under the employer’s control to count as its premises.

Deseth v. LensCrafters, Inc. · filed 2003-09-02(6)

For an injury to be compensable, it must be an “injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employments]” N.C. G.S. § 97-2(6) (2001). ... We are unpersuaded that by sharing in the costs of maintenance with other Hanes Mall tenants, LensCrafters “maintained” the parking lot such that the injury to the decedent occurred on LensCrafters’ premises.

Section 97-2(6) covers an employee's injury from an accident while leaving the employer's premises for lunch when the accident occurs on those premises.

Robertson v. Elon University · filed 2009-05-06(6)

On November 28, 2005, plaintiff was involved in an accident on her way to lunch while still on defendant-employer's premises. Therefore, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of her employment with defendant-employer.

Under § 97-2(6)’s premises rule, a shared loading zone counts as employment premises only if the employer has sufficient control over it.

Barham v. Food World, Inc. · filed 1980-06-03(6)

We therefore hold that, under the uncontroverted facts of this case, the parking lot and loading zone were not sufficiently under the control of defendant Food World so as to permit the conclusion that those areas constituted a part of the employment premises.

Section 97-2(2) requires a sole proprietor who elects workers’ compensation coverage to notify the insurer; the insurer has no duty to notify the proprietor of that option.

Carter v. Frank Shelton, Inc. · filed 1983-06-07(2)

Third, there was no duty on American to notify the plaintiff of the 1979 amendment to G.S. 97-2(2). That statute makes it the claimant’s responsibility to notify the insurer of his desire to be covered as a sole proprietor.

A sole proprietor's election for workers' compensation coverage gives the insurer constructive notice when communicated to its authorized agent, whose knowledge is imputed to the insurer.

Christie v. Christie T/A Christie Elec. · filed 2003-09-26(2)

Zurich Insurance Company, which insured plaintiff's business at all times in question, had constructive notice of plaintiff's election to be included in the workers' compensation policy for his company in that plaintiff notified Jay Kepley, an authorized agent of the insurance company, of his desire for personal coverage and Mr. Kepley's knowledge is imputed to the insurer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2); Doud v. K G Janitorial Service , 69 N.C. App. 205 , 316 S.E.2d 664 (1984).

A sole proprietor may elect workers' compensation coverage by notifying the insurer of that intention.

Zamora v. Therrell Custom Design, Ltd. · filed 2008-05-23(2)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2) indicates that sole proprietors can elect workers' compensation coverage by notifying the insurer of this intention. Plaintiff has failed to produce competent evidence supporting his allegation that he notified defendant of his election to be covered under defendant's policy.

A sole proprietor is excluded from workers’ compensation coverage unless the proprietor affirmatively elects to be included under the policy.

Jacobs v. Jacobs · filed 2008-08-15(2)

As a sole proprietor who did not take affirmative steps to be included under the policy in question, plaintiff was not covered under the workers' compensation policy of defendant-carrier at the time of his injury. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2).

A sole proprietor may be covered as an employee if he is actively engaged in the business and his insurer is notified of his election for coverage.

Southerland v. B. V. Hedrick Gravel & Sand Co. · filed 1996-07-02(2)

Further, in order for a sole proprietor to be included as an employee under his business’ workers’ compensation coverage, he must show that (1) he is actively engaged in the operation of the business, and that (2) his insurer is notified of his election to be covered.

Section 97-2(18) does not categorically bar compensation for a recurring hernia as one that cannot be of recent origin.

Pernell v. Piedmont Circuits · filed 1991-10-15(18)

The defendants urge us to pronounce as a matter of law that a recurring hernia is never of “recent origin.” This would prevent plaintiffs with prior hernias from ever meeting their burden as to the fourth statutory element. Because this would unduly extend the statute, we decline to do so.

Section 97-2(18) requires proof that a hernia resulted from an injury, appeared suddenly, immediately followed a work-related accident, and did not exist before the accident to be compensable.

Hanes v. Smith, Setzer, Sons, Inc. · filed 2002-04-23(18)

In order for a hernia to be compensable, it must be proven that: (a) there was an injury resulting in a hernia or rupture; (b) the hernia or rupture appeared suddenly; (c) the hernia or rupture immediately followed a work-related accident; and, (d) the hernia or rupture did not exist prior to the accident.

Section 97-2(14) requires consideration of the relationship’s history and circumstances to decide whether a spouse living apart had justifiable cause at the employee’s death.

Rogers v. University Motor Inn · filed 1991-07-16(14)

There is no specific formula for the definition of “justifiable cause” under the statute. One must consider the complexity and history of the particular relationship in order to determine whether the appellant was separated for justifiable cause in the months before Earl Rogers’ death.

Section 97-2(14) requires a surviving wife who was living apart from her husband at his death to show justifiable cause for the separation or desertion by him to qualify as his widow.

Jones v. Service Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. · filed 1983-09-06(14)

To qualify as the “widow” under our Workers’ Compensation law, being the surviving wife is not enough; if not living with her husband at the time of his death, it must be for “justifiable cause or by reason of his desertion at such time.” G.S. 97-2(14). ... Findings that Ruby K. Jones refused to join her husband in Greenville, though he repeatedly asked her to, because she preferred living in Virginia and did not want to leave her job there, is basis enough for the conclusion that her living apart from her husband was without justifiable cause.

Section 97-2(14) includes a wife who depended on the deceased employee for support at his death even if they lived apart; living apart for justifiable cause or desertion also qualifies regardless of dependency.

James ex rel. Edwards v. R.L. Dresser, Inc. · filed 2003-12-02(14)

We believe that by using the word “or” before method two, the General Assembly intended that the wife can qualify as widow if she is actually dependent on decedent whether or not living with him. In method three she qualifies if she is living apart for justifiable cause or desertion, whether or not dependent.

Under § 97-2(14), a wife living apart under a valid mutual separation agreement is not living apart for justifiable cause and cannot rely on misconduct predating the agreement to establish that cause.

Bass v. Mooresville Mills · filed 1971-07-14(14)

Thus two questions are raised: (1) Are a husband and wife living separate and apart for justifiable cause, within the meaning of G.S. 97-2(14), if they are living separate and apart as a result of a mutual agreement evidenced by a legally executed separation agreement? (2) Can the wife go behind a legally executed separation agreement in an attempt to show that the separation, though mutually agreed upon, was caused by the misconduct of the husband? We answer both questions in the negative.

Under § 97-2(14), spouses living apart by mutual agreement are not living apart for “justifiable cause” for purposes of the widow definition.

Sloop v. Williams Exxon Service · filed 1974-12-04(14)

Appellant Edna Sloop presents a single question for our consideration which can be stated as follows: “Did the' Full Commission err in concluding as a matter of law that a husband and wife are not living separate and apart for ‘justifiable cause’ within the meaning of G.S. 97-2(14) if they are living separate and apart as a result of a mutual agreement evidenced by a legally executed separation agreement?” ... In reaffirming Bass, we also affirm the opinion and award of the Full Commission.

Section 97-2(14) includes a widow who was living apart from the employee for justifiable cause when he died.

Bass v. Mooresville Mills · filed 1972-06-28(14)

He was survived by his widow, Mrs. Sue W. Bass, who was living apart from deceased employee for justifiable cause at the time of his death, a separation agreement between deceased and his widow having been rescinded by their resuming marital relations. Such widow is conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent upon deceased employee for support and is thus entitled to compensation at the rate of $50.00 per week for a period of 350 weeks, commencing 27 November 1969. G.S. 97-2(14); G.S. 97-38; G.S. 97-39.” ... We hold there is sufficient competent evidence in the record to support the Commission’s findings and conclusions which in turn support the opinion and award dated 10 November 1971 which is Affirmed.

Section 97-2(2) treats a corporate executive officer elected or appointed and empowered under the corporation’s charter and bylaws as an employee.

Jones v. Carolina Mountain Greens Inc. · filed 2004-02-05(2)

Every executive officer elected or appointed and empowered in accordance with the charter and bylaws of a corporation is an employee of such corporation under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-93 and 97-2 (2).

Section 97-2(2) treats executive officers of a for-profit corporation as employees under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Laughridge v. South Mountain Pulpwood Co. · filed 1966-03-30(2)

Keller and Lowery, by virtue of the quoted provision of G.S. 97-2, were *773employees of Pulpwood Company.

Medical compensation may include sick travel or adaptive equipment needed to make an injured worker’s vehicle accommodate medical needs arising from a compensable accident.

Fuller v. Wake Cty. · filed 2004-03-15(19)

Under the Act, medical compensation may include the provision of sick travel or special adaptive equipment necessary to modify an injured worker's vehicle to accommodate his or her special medical needs arising from the compensable accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(19) and 97-25 ; McDonald v. Brunswick Electric Membership Corp. , 77 N.C. App. 753 , 756 , 336 S.E.2d 407 , 409 (1985).

Section 97-2(19) covers vehicle modifications uniquely necessary to accommodate a work injury, but not the purchase of a van as an ordinary expense of life.

Stowers v. Colfax Welding · filed 2010-07-02(19)

Transportation, including the purchase of a van, is an ordinary expense of life. Compensable vehicle modifications are limited to those aspects which are not ordinary necessities, but are uniquely necessary in order to accommodate the Plaintiff's disability. Defendant-Employer is only required to pay for adaptive equipment necessary to modify a van in order to accommodate Plaintiff's disabilities related to his January 14, 2006 work injury.

Section 97-2(18)'s hernia requirements do not apply when a hernia is a direct and natural consequence of treatment for an earlier compensable injury.

Mills v. Lee's Plastering Svc. · filed 2004-05-19(18)

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (18), for an employee to receive compensation for a hernia, he must prove to the satisfaction of the Industrial Commission that there was an injury resulting in hernia, that the hernia or rupture appeared suddenly, and that it followed an accident and that it did not exist prior to the accident; however, such statutory requirements are not applicable in this case because the evidence of record shows that plaintiff's hernia is a likely result of the post-surgery physical therapy he received and, thus, occurred as a direct and natural consequence of the July 4, 2000, primary compensable injury.

Section 97-2(19) includes necessary unskilled attendant care services for a compensable injury as medical compensation, including care provided by an employee’s spouse.

Moore v. Statesville Roofing Heating · filed 2004-06-10(19)

As a result of the admittedly compensable injury, plaintiff is entitled to have defendants pay for unskilled attendant care services for six hours per day, seven days per week at the prevailing hourly rate from the date of this Opinion and Award. The hourly reimbursement rate may be increased periodically, as the prevailing wage increases in the market place. Plaintiff is entitled to have the defendants pay for services as may be provided by his wife, Charlotte Moore, for so long as she is fit and able to provide them, at a rate of $6.00 per hour. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(19), 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) includes reasonably necessary attendant care in medical compensation when it tends to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability.

Kish v. Frye Regional Medical Center · filed 2006-05-19(19)

Defendant is required to provide plaintiff with reasonably necessary medical treatment related to her compensable injury by accident which tends to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability, including retroactive and continuing attendant care when determined appropriate.

Medical compensation covers necessary attendant or supervisory care provided by an injured worker’s spouse, who may be compensated for that care.

Roberson v. Tar Heel Chevrolet Co. · filed 2007-01-17(19)

During those periods when attendant care was not being provided, plaintiff's wife provided attendant care for which she should be compensated. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to payment of attendant care for five hours per day Monday through Friday and for 16 hours per day on weekends from June 30, 2001 through April 2, 2004 and for seven hours per day Monday through Friday and for 14 hours per day on weekends from April 2, 2004 through the time of the Deputy Commissioner's hearing and continuing. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19); London v. Snak Time Catering, supra .

Section 97-2(19) covers reasonably necessary attendant care as medical compensation, including care provided by a worker’s spouse.

Speight v. Wilson Trucking · filed 2007-02-02(19)

Plaintiff's wife, Cynthia Stoops Speight, is entitled to payment for attendant care services provided to plaintiff seven days a week, 16 hours per day, at a rate of $ 10.00 per hour, since March 29, 2004, and continuing until further Order of the Commission. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19) and 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers medically necessary attendant care as medical compensation.

Gardin v. Gentiva Health Serv. · filed 2007-04-04(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to payment by defendant of attendant care for four hours per day beginning April 6, 2005 and continuing. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19).

Section 97-2(19) includes attendant care services among compensable medical expenses when they reasonably relieve the effects of a compensable injury.

Haber v. Finlay Fine Jewelry · filed 2007-05-30(19)

3. Plaintiff is entitled to payment by defendants of all medical expenses, including attendant care services, incurred or to be incurred, as a result of her compensable injury, for so long as such examinations, evaluations and treatments, may reasonably be required to effect a cure, give relief or tend to lessen plaintiff's period of disability. Specifically, plaintiff is entitled to attendant care for two hours per day beginning April 6, 2005 and continuing until receipt of a professional assessment of plaintiff's attendant care needs. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19); 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) covers necessary attendant or supervisory care as medical compensation, including reasonable payment for care supplied by a worker’s spouse.

Gutierrez v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc. · filed 2008-03-12(19)

Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to payment of attendant care for 16 hours per day, seven days per week, beginning November 23, 2004 and continuing until further order of the Commission. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19); London v. Snak Time Catering , 136 N.C. App. 473 , 525 S.E.2d 203 (2000). Since November 23, 2004, plaintiff's wife has provided unskilled attendant care for plaintiff for an average of 16 hours per day, seven days per week and she should be compensated at the reasonable rate of $10.00 per hour.

Section 97-2(19) covers compensable attendant care provided by an injured worker’s spouse.

Erwin v. Cks Packaging · filed 2008-08-04(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants pay for attendant care provided to him by his wife, Linda Erwin, in the amount of $10.00 per hour for six hours per day, seven days per week, and 12 hours per day on the weekend beginning March 4, 2004, the day such care was authorized by Dr. Gaul and continuing. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19); 97-25 .

Section 97-2(19) supports payment for a spouse’s attendant care at an approved hourly rate and for professional home health care at the going market rate.

Adcox v. Clarkson Brothers Construction Co. · filed 2008-11-25(19)

The undersigned approve a rate of $10.00 per hour for Mrs. Adcox's attendant care services. During the period of times when the attendant care is provided by someone other than Mrs. Adcox, defendants shall pay for the services at the going market rate for professional home health care. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19).

Section 97-2(19) covers non-skilled attendant care as a medical expense when the care is reasonably required to give relief or lessen a period of disability.

Miller v. Newton Transportation Company · filed 2009-02-23(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to payment of all medical expenses incurred or to be incurred as a result of his compensable injury, for so long as such examinations, evaluations and treatments may reasonably be required to effect a cure, give relief, or tend to lessen plaintiff's period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19); 97-25 . ... Plaintiff is entitled to payment by defendants for four hours of non-continuous, non-skilled attendant care per day, seven days per week.

Section 97-2(19) includes attendant care by a spouse, certified nursing assistant, or licensed practical nurse as medical treatment when reasonably required to cure, relieve, or lessen disability from a compensable injury.

Yuckel v. Richard Childress Racing Enterprises · filed 2010-03-12(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to all medical expenses incurred or to be incurred as a result of her compensable injury, for so long as such examinations, evaluations and treatments may reasonably be required to effect a cure, give relief or tend to lessen Plaintiff's period of disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19); 97-25 . Such medical treatment includes attendant care provided by Plaintiff's husband, a CNA, or LPN.

Section 97-2(19) includes attendant care needed to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen disability, and prior authorization is not required to recover its cost.

Guerrero v. Mabe's Tree Service · filed 2011-03-30(19)

Attendant care is recognized as necessary to effect a cure, provide relief, or lessen the period of disability as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19), and no prior authorization is required in order for the care to be recoverable.

Section 97-2(19) includes attendant care as "other treatment" within medical compensation.

Seguro-Suarez v. Southern Fiber · filed 2011-04-29(19)

Attendant care constitutes "other treatment" under the definition of medical compensation.

Section 97-2(19) includes attendant care provided by professional caregivers or family members within medical compensation.

Mazza v. Davidson Recycling, Inc. · filed 2011-07-08(19)

Attendant care services, whether provided by professional heath care providers or non-professional family members, is classified as medical compensation which is defined as "medical surgical, hospital, nursing, and rehabilitative services . . . and other treatment . . . required to effect a cure or give relief. . . ." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (19); Godwin v. Swift Co ., 270 N.C. 690 , 155 S.E.2d 157 (1967); Palmer v. Jackson , 161 N.C. App. 642 , 590 S.E.2d 275 (2003); Levens v. Guilford Cty. Schools , 152 N.C. App. 390 , 567 S.E.2d 767 (2002); Ruiz v. Belk Masonry Co. , 148 N.C. App. 675 , 559 S.E.2d 249 (2002); London v. Snak Time Catering, Inc ., 136 N .C. App. 473, 525 S.E.2d 203 (2000).

Section 97-2(19) covers attendant care services needed because of a compensable injury as medical compensation.

Boston v. Chesterfield Elem. school/burke County · filed 2011-08-25(19)

Plaintiff is entitled to attendant care services due to her compensable injury. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-25 ; Ruiz v. Belk Masonry Co. , 148 N.C. App. 675 , 559 S.E.2d 249 (2002); London v. Snak-Time Catering , 136 N.C. App. 473 , 525 S.E.2d 203 (2000).

Section 97-2(19) requires evidence that a life care plan itself is a reasonably necessary rehabilitative service; evidence that a doctor considered his recommendations for the plan reasonable does not establish that the plan qualifies as medical compensation.

Espinosa v. Tradesource, Inc. · filed 2013-12-03(19)

Here, however, the Commission has only determined as a matter of fact that Dr. Bockenek believed his own recommendations were reasonable. As Commissioner Nance pointed out in her dissent, those recommendations did not support the Commission’s conclusion that the life care plan was, in fact, a reasonably necessary rehabilitative service.

Attendant care services qualify as medical compensation when they are reasonable and necessary as a result of the employee’s injury, and the Commission must support an award with findings based on competent evidence.

Reed v. Carolina Holdings · filed 2017-02-07(19)

To award medical compensation, and specifically attendant care services, the Commission must make findings from competent evidence to support its conclusion that the attendant care services were reasonable and necessary as a result of the employee’s injury.

Attendant care must be prescribed by a health care provider authorized by the employer, but the prescription need not be written.

Thompson v. Int'l Paper Co. · filed 2017-01-17(19)

There was no need for the Commission to try to turn the FMLA letter into a written “prescription” when the statute merely requires that the attendant care be “prescribed by a health care provider authorized by the employer[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(19).

Section 97-2(19) makes family member attendant care compensable only when it is treatment and reasonable and necessary.

Leathers v. City Coach Lines · filed 2002-03-18(19)

Under Section 97-2(19) of the Act, attendant care provided by a family member is compensable provided the care is "treatment" and provided it is "reasonable and necessary."

Section 97-2(19) covers unskilled attendant care services that are reasonably required because of a compensable injury.

London v. Snak Time Catering · filed 2002-03-19(19)

As a result of the admittedly compensable injury, plaintiff is entitled to have defendants pay for unskilled attendant care services for eight hours per day, seven days per week at the prevailing hourly rate from the date of this Opinion and Award. ... N.C.G.S. §§ 97-2(19), 97-25.

Section 97-2(19) includes attendant care provided by family members when the care is reasonably required to give relief from a compensable injury.

Levens v. Guilford County Schools · filed 2002-08-20(19)

Additionally, there is ample evidence in the record indicating that the attendant care provided by Ms. Levens’ family members was reasonably required to provide relief from her disability; indeed, Ms. Groce testified that attendant care need not be provided by a certified nursing assistant, but may instead be adequately provided by a family member.

Section 97-2(19) permits compensation for attendant care provided by a spouse when the care is treatment that is reasonable and necessary.

Simmons v. Ezzel Trucking · filed 2003-04-29(19)

Under Section 97-2(19) of the Act, attendant care provided by a spouse is compensable provided the care is "treatment" and provided it is "reasonable and necessary."

Section 97-2(19)’s definition of medical compensation includes attendant care services as “other treatment.”

Thompson v. Cranfill, Sumner, & Hartzog · filed 2025-05-07(19)

The Act’s provision for “other treatment” was interpreted by our Supreme Court to include attendant care services.

Section 97-2(6) treats death as an injury by accident arising out of employment when the work exposes the employee to extreme heat and humidity beyond conditions encountered by the general public.

Reaves v. Industrial Pump Service · filed 2009-07-16(6)

In this case, the work which decedent was performing for defendant-employer subjected him to extreme conditions of heat and humidity which were greater than those conditions encountered by the general public. Dillingham v. Yeargin Construction Co., supra; Madison v. Int'l Paper Co. , 165 N.C. App. 144 , 598 S.E.2d 196 (2004). Therefore, decedent sustained an injury by accident arising out of his employment with defendant-employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) treats a heart injury caused by overexertion as an injury by accident even when the employee was performing a normal work activity.

Long v. City of Charlotte · filed 2010-04-20(6)

While it is true that an injury suffered while performing the employee's normal work routine is not typically compensable, our Courts have also recognized that "damage to heart tissue clearly precipitated or caused by `overexertion' constitutes an injury by accident." King v. Forsyth Cty., 45 N.C. App. 467, 468, 263 S.E.2d 283, 284 (1980) (citing Gabriel v. Newton, 227 N.C. 314, 42 S.E.2d 96 (1947)). ... The Commission's conclusion that Long suffered a compensable injury by accident is supported by its findings of fact and fully supports the award of death benefits to plaintiff.

Section 97-2(6) covers a heart attack as an injury by accident when employment exposes the worker to a special heat hazard that significantly contributes to the attack, even if the worker has preexisting heart disease.

Madison v. International Paper Co. · filed 2004-07-06(6)

Accordingly, the Commission’s findings of fact support the conclusion that Madison’s employment subjected him to a particular or special hazard from the elements, which caused, or significantly contributed to, his heart attack and resulting death, and further that this was a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

Section 97-2(6) places a traveling employee within the course of employment while staying in lodging required by the job, when an injury results from risks associated with that lodging.

Ramsey v. Southern Indus. Constructors · filed 2004-09-01(6)

Plaintiff's work in Petersburg, Virginia required him to find lodging for the night because his home was in Kinston, North Carolina. Therefore, plaintiff, as traveling employee, was in the course of his employment at the motel on the night of 17 July 2000 and his injuries were due to risks associated with his employment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6); See also Hobgood v. Anchor Motor Freight , 68 N.C. App. 783 (1984); Martin v. Georgia Pacific Corp ., 5 N.C. App. 37 (1969).

Employees required to travel away from the employer’s premises remain within the course of employment during that travel unless they distinctly depart on a personal errand.

Glenn v. Centerpoint Human Svcs. · filed 2004-11-17(6)

However, employees whose work requires travel away from the employer's premises are within the course of their employment continuously during such travel, except when there is a distinct departure for a personal errand.

Section 97-2(6) treats an employee as traveling for course-of-employment purposes when the job requires travel far enough from home to require lodging near the work site instead of commuting.

Ramsey v. Southern Industrial Constructors Inc. · filed 2006-06-20(6)

For the traveling employee rationale to apply in a case like this one, the travel must involve a distance sufficient to require plaintiff to find lodging at the site rather than commute from his home.

Section 97-2(6) keeps a traveling employee within the course of employment throughout work travel unless the employee distinctly departs on a personal errand.

Cook v. Watson Electrical Constr. Co. · filed 2007-02-13(6)

A traveling employee is within the course of his employment continuously throughout the travel unless there is a distinct departure on a personal errand.

A traveling employee going to an evening meal during an employer-paid training trip may be acting in the course of employment.

Martin Ex Rel. Martin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. · filed 1969-06-18(6)

We are of the opinion and so hold that while Martin was on his way to eat the evening meal, under the circumstances of this case, that he was at a place where he might reasonably be at such time and doing what he, as an employee, might reasonably be expected to do, and that in so doing he was acting in the course of and scope of his employment.

Section 97-2(6) treats an employee whose work requires travel away from the employer’s premises as within the course of employment throughout the trip unless the employee distinctly departs on a personal errand.

Smith v. CENTRAL TRANSPORT & LIBERTY MUT. INS. · filed 1981-04-07(6)

Since his work entailed travel away from the employer’s premises, and he was killed while driving for Central, the deceased is held “to be within the course of [his] employment continuously during the trip,” 5 N.C. App. at 41, 167 S.E. 2d at 793, since a distinct departure on a personal errand was not shown.

Section 97-2(6) requires a psychological condition to be a natural and proximate result of a compensable injury for the condition to be compensable.

Correa v. Kmart Corp. · filed 2005-01-21(6)

The plaintiff's psychological condition was not a natural and proximate result of plaintiff's underlying, compensable back injury. Plaintiff's psychological condition is not compensable. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) covers psychological conditions caused by an injury by accident at work when those conditions significantly contribute to disability, even if later nonwork accidents aggravate them.

Ferrell v. Central Carolina Bank · filed 2006-08-15(6)

As a result of her injuries by accident, plaintiff developed depression, anxiety and PTSD, which significantly contributed to her disability. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to compensation.

An injury by accident is compensable under § 97-2(6) when it proximately results in mental conditions such as depression and anxiety.

Estate of Garrison v. Gaines Motor Lines · filed 2007-02-02(6)

Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident on November 1, 1993, which proximately resulted in the development of mental conditions, including depression and anxiety. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) does not cover a psychological condition that is not a natural and proximate result of a compensable injury.

Correa v. Kmart Corp. · filed 2007-04-11(6)

Plaintiff's psychological condition was not a natural and proximate result of plaintiff's underlying, compensable back injury. Plaintiff's psychological condition is not compensable. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

A psychological condition that is the direct and natural result of a compensable injury by accident is compensable under § 97-2(6).

Randall v. Pee Dee Electric Membership Corp. · filed 2011-10-12(6)

Based upon the preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission concludes that plaintiff's psychological condition is the direct and natural result of and causally related to his 10 August 1990 injury by accident.

Section 97-2(6) covers post-traumatic stress disorder directly caused by a work-related injury by accident.

Mills v. Blue Ridge Metals · filed 1998-10-16(6)

As a direct and proximate result of plaintiff's work-related injury by accident on April 11, 1994, when plaintiff suffered a crush injury to his left ankle and foot and narrowly escaped being hit in the head and chest, plaintiff developed post-traumatic stress disorder. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6).

Section 97-2(2) permits an executive officer to be excluded from workers’ compensation coverage under the employer’s policy.

Marshall v. Td Landscaping · filed 2005-02-17(2)

On May 26, 2001, plaintiff was an executive officer of defendant-employer and as such was excluded from coverage under defendant-employer's workers' compensation insurance policy. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2).

Section 97-2(2) treats an executive officer specifically excluded from the corporation’s workers’ compensation insurance contract as outside employee status while that contract is in effect.

Scotchie v. Scotchie Enterprises · filed 2011-03-23(2)

Defendant-Employer, through the authority given to Plaintiff as the Vice President, applied for an obtained a workers' compensation insurance policy that excluded the officers of the Corporation. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2). Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (2), Plaintiff was not an employee of Defendant-Employer for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act at the time of his death.

Section 97-2(6) requires proof that an injury caused the claimed disability for the injury to be compensable.

Miller v. Carrols Corp. · filed 2005-04-12(6)

In order for an injury to be compensable it must be proven that the injury caused plaintiff's disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Disability under § 97-2(9) requires a causal connection between the work injury and the employee’s inability to earn wages.

Martin v. City of charlotte/mecklenburg Cty. · filed 2005-06-10(9)

Any disability or inability to earn wages plaintiff may now have is not the direct and natural result of, nor causally related to his August 3, 1988 injury by accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (9).

Disability under § 97-2(9) must result from the compensable injury; disability caused by an unrelated condition does not support disability compensation.

Gregory v. Primary Health Concepts · filed 2006-06-06(9)

Plaintiff's disability since January 7, 2000 has not been because of her compensable injury by accident to her back on July 13, 1998. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (9) (2001). Defendants are not responsible for payment of any disability compensation to plaintiff after January 7, 2000.

Section 97-2(9) requires disability to result from the compensable work injury; disability caused by an unrelated pre-existing condition is not compensable.

Benjamin v. Edwards Wood Prod. · filed 2007-02-02(9)

Any disability resulting from plaintiff's post-traumatic stress disorder is not as a result of the October 9, 2003 accident and consequently, is not compensable under the N.C. Workers' Compensation Act.

Disability under § 97-2(9) must result from the compensable work injury.

Crabtree v. Crabtree Transportation · filed 2007-10-10(9)

Any disability plaintiff may have had subsequent to June 15, 2001 is not the result of his October 12, 2000 injury by accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (9); 97-29 .

Section 97-2(9) requires a disability claimant to prove that the inability to earn comparable wages was caused by a work-related injury.

Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Construction, LLC · filed 2014-06-12(9)

In addition, a claimant must also satisfy the third element, as articulated in Hilliard, by proving that his inability to obtain equally well-paying work is because of his work-related injury.

Section 97-2(6) does not cover treatment for a later condition that was not proven causally related to the compensable injury by accident.

Ivey v. McMahan Bros. Pipeline · filed 2005-04-27(6)

The condition for which plaintiff was treated beginning in November 2002 was not proven to be causally related to the injury by accident on March 23, 2000. Consequently, plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation or to medical compensation beginning at that time, even if he had reopened his claim on a timely basis.

A claimed condition is not compensable under § 97-2(6) when competent medical evidence fails to connect it causally to a compensable injury.

Settlemyre v. P.D. Little Sons · filed 2005-06-03(6)

Plaintiff has failed to carry the burden of proof to establish by competent medical evidence that his pre-existing depression is causally related to the compensable injuries. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

A later condition is not attributable to a compensable injury under § 97-2(6) when that injury neither caused nor aggravated or accelerated the condition.

Sanderson v. Saia Motor Freight Lines, Inc. · filed 2009-07-13(6)

The greater weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that Plaintiff's right knee problems, his MRSA infection and his heart problems are not a result of and have not been aggravated or accelerated by his compensable right foot injury.

An injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment includes the body parts injured in the accident, even when some injuries were initially disputed.

Cantrell v. Diebold, Inc. · filed 2009-06-30(6)

On January 19, 2007, Plaintiff sustained an admittedly compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Defendant-Employer which resulted in injuries to her left foot, right foot, left hip and her cervical spine. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires credible evidence that a later condition is the direct and natural result of, or causally related to, the compensable injury.

Kroffe v. Duke University Health System · filed 2009-07-27(6)

There is insufficient credible lay and medical evidence of record upon which to conclude that Plaintiff's dizziness and related falls are the direct and natural result of, or causally related to, her August 20, 1992, injury by accident.

A claimed back condition is compensable as a separate injury only if the evidence establishes a causal relationship between it and the workplace accident.

Smith v. Williams · filed 2009-08-18(6)

The greater weight of the competent evidence of record fails to establish a causal relationship between plaintiff's injury by accident of January 16, 2006 and his herniated lumbar disc condition. Therefore, plaintiff's back condition is not compensable as a separate injury unrelated to his groin condition.

Section 97-2(6) requires a causal connection between a workplace accident and each condition claimed as a compensable injury.

Miller v. Commscope, Inc. · filed 2010-03-05(6)

The evidence was insufficient to establish that Plaintiff's compensable injury by accident caused his problems with his hips or his knees. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6).

Section 97-2(6) requires a causal link between a workplace injury and a later claimed condition, including a material aggravation of a preexisting condition.

Colvin v. N.C. Central University · filed 2010-04-15(6)

Given plaintiff's medical records and the medical testimony on the subject of the causation of plaintiff's shoulder, low back, and left leg conditions, the greater weight of the competent evidence shows that plaintiff's shoulder, low back, and/or left leg problems are not a direct and natural result of the 4 September 2007 injury to plaintiff's head and neck, or that the incident materially exacerbated or aggravated any preexisting shoulder, low back, and/or left leg problems.

Section 97-2(6) requires a causal connection between an injury by accident and a claimed condition, including proof that the accident caused or materially aggravated the condition.

Woodard v. Duke University · filed 2010-04-27(6)

In this matter, there is insufficient evidence of record upon which to conclude that plaintiff's cervical spine condition for which she has undergone two surgical procedures was caused or materially aggravated by the 21 November 2003 injury by accident.

Section 97-2(6) requires a clear causal connection between a compensable injury by accident and a later condition for which disability benefits are sought.

McFalls v. Western Carolina Center · filed 2010-06-08(6)

On January 25, 2002 decedent sustained an admittedly compensable injury by accident resulting in a right hip fracture. However, decedent's February 22, 2005 back surgery and death were not a result of that injury. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (6). Under North Carolina law, plaintiff carries the burden of establishing a clear causal connection between the accident and a condition allegedly causing disability.

Medical compensation under § 97-2(19) does not extend to treatment for a condition that is not causally related to the compensable injury.

Pollock v. Waspco Corp. · filed 2010-07-12(19)

However, because plaintiff's current back condition involves a different part of his spine and is not causally related to the compensable injury by accident, plaintiff is not entitled to further medical compensation as a result of the injury of June 20, 1994. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2 (19), 97-27 (b).

Section 97-2(6) requires proof that an additional condition is the direct and natural result of, or causally related to, the work injury.

Thompson v. Fedex ground/rps · filed 2011-01-27(6)

Plaintiff has failed to prove that her fibromyalgia, myofascial pain syndrome, or the vision problems she associates therewith are the direct and natural result of, or are causally related to, her December 16, 2000 injury by accident.