N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1

Section 75-1.1 protects consumers and permits one business to sue another only when they are competitors or potential competitors or have a commercial relationship.

Food Lion, Incorporated v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. · filed 1999-10-20(a) (b)

The Act's primary purpose is to protect the consuming public. See Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 333 S.E.2d 236, 241 (N.C. 1985). It gives a private cause of action to consumers aggrieved by unfair or deceptive business practices. See Marshall v. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (N.C. 1981). In addition, businesses are sometimes allowed to assert UTPA claims against other businesses because"unfair trade practices involving only businesses"can "affect the consumer as well." United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 370 S.E.2d 375, 389 (N.C. 1988). But one business is permitted to assert an UTPA claim against another business only when the businesses are competitors (or potential competitors) or are engaged in commercial dealings with each other. ... The UTPA, therefore, cannot be used here because there is no competitive or business relationship that can be policed for the benefit of the consuming public. The North Carolina statute has not been applied to a circumstance like this, and we believe the Supreme Court of North Carolina would hold that it should not be. We therefore reverse the district court's judgment that the ABC defendants, including Dale, were liable under the North Carolina UTPA.

Section 75-1.1 does not protect a poultry grower’s claims arising from service contracts to raise birds when the grower is not a consumer.

Bunting v. Perdue, Inc. · filed 1985-06-14

The remaining contracts entered into between plaintiff and defendants were service contracts, in which plaintiff contracted to raise either large or small birds to maturity. Plaintiff certainly cannot be characterized as a “consumer,” and thereby deserving of the statute’s protection. Such an application would be inconsistent with the purpose behind the enactment of § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 can support an unfair or deceptive practices claim even when the plaintiff has no viable tort or contract claim.

Wedderburn Corp. v. Jetcraft Corp. · filed 2015-11-06

Accordingly, the fact that a plaintiff may not have other viable tort or contract claims does not necessarily mean that it cannot allege a claim under G.S. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 generally does not cover ordinary contract, employment, or internal corporate management disputes without exceptional circumstances.

Carty v. Westport Homes of North Carolina, Inc. · filed 2012-04-30

Nothing alleged anywhere in Carty’s complaint makes this case sufficiently exceptional to jump the legal hurdles to a Chapter 75 claim.

Section 75-1.1 applies to commercial misconduct occurring outside and after the parties’ contract, including conversion, fraud, and interference with contractual relationships, rather than merely disputes over contract interpretation or performance.

Edmondson v. American Motorcycle Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1999-02-10

The Court finds the North Carolina unfair trade practices statute should apply. ... Such is not the case at hand; the dispute is not centered in an interpretation of the joint venture agreement or the parties’ performance thereunder. ... These acts do not derive from and are not centered in the parties’ defunct contractual relationship. Moreover, the dispute between the parties is not simply one of contractual interpretation but involves conduct by AMA outside of and after the termination of the contract. Nor is it merely a dispute concerning the performance of the contract. ... See, e.g., United Laboratories, Inc., 322 N.C. at 664-65, 370 S.E.2d at 389 (tortious interference with contracts and disputes between competitors violate the UTPA); ... The Defendants’ argument based on Broussard is rejected.

Section 75-1.1 does not provide a cause of action when the dispute is merely a breach-of-contract claim.

Pioneer/Eclipse Corp. v. Kohler Co., Inc. · filed 2000-03-22

Thus, the case devolves into a breach of contract claim pursuant to which no cause of action lies under North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. ... Having reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and recommendations, the undersigned concurs with his conclusions.

A mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not enough for a § 75-1.1 claim; the plaintiff must prove an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately caused actual injury.

GATX Logistics, Inc. v. LOWE'S COMPANIES · filed 2001-06-05

“It is well established that a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under G.S. section 75-1.1.” ... “A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” ... “To prevail under this statute, plaintiff must prove: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) that the action in question was in or affecting commerce, (3) that said act proximately caused actual injury to plaintiff.” ... “In the case at bar, the record shows that in its counterclaim for breach of contract, Lowe’s did not allege substantial aggravating circumstances attendant to the breach. “Defendants’ claim, at most, is a simple breach of contract, as they have failed to allege any substantially aggravating circumstances which would give rise to an unfair or deceptive practices claim.””

Section 75-1.1 does not cover a simple breach-of-contract dispute without egregious or aggravating circumstances, and a UDTPA claim requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury.

Ospina v. Piedra · filed 2021-02-11

Both federal district courts in the Western District of North Carolina and North Carolina state courts “routinely dismiss UDTPA claims asserted in simple breach of contracts cases.” ... “A simple breach of contract does not qualify as an unfair or deceptive act; instead, a plaintiff must allege ‘some type of egregious or aggravating circumstances before the [UDTPA] applies.’” ... However, where the examples given as aggravating factors “are conclusory and fail to state sufficient factual content to support a claim that is facially plausible,” the court should dismiss the UDTPA claim because it is thus layered on top of what is at bottom a breach of contract action. ... Here, it is evident to the Court that Plaintiff’s lawsuit is focused most centrally on Defendants’ alleged breach of contract. Thus, for that reason alone, case law from the Fourth Circuit counsels that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices claim should be granted. ... The Court thus recommends that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s UDTPA claim should be granted.

Section 75-1.1(b) excludes professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession from the statute’s definition of commerce.

Russe v. Harman · filed 2023-11-07(b)

However, the statute plainly provides that “‘commerce’ . . . does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.”

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to a breach of contract, even if intentional, and a failed fraud theory cannot independently support a claim under the Act.

Pappas v. NCNB National Bank of North Carolina · filed 1987-02-05

Plaintiffs claim that the Bank violated N.C.GemStat. § 75-1.1, the state’s Unfair Deceptive and Trade Practices Act. They allege that the Bank violated this Act when it lends below the prime rate or does not set out a specific rate for plaintiffs. First, the Bank did not commit common law fraud. Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot use the fraud allegation to satisfy the requirements of the Act. Second, plaintiffs’ claim fails to satisfy the requirements of the statute without the fraud claim. Third, the plaintiffs attempt to use the unfair trade act to reform or avoid what they consider a bad contract. In United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.) cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1054, 102 S.Ct. 599, 70 L.Ed.2d 590 (1981), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a breach of contract, even if intentional, does not fall within the purview of § 75-1.1. Thus, the plaintiffs’ cannot prevail under N.C.Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover a mere intentional failure to perform a commercial contract when the claim alleges neither deception nor injury to competition.

CF Industries, Inc. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. · filed 1978-02-27

Whatever may be the case generally, the court concludes that on the mere allegation of deliberate or intentional refusal to procure and deliver natural gas, without any suggestion of deception or any claim of injury to competition, plaintiffs have not stated a claim under § 75-1.1.

An ordinary breach of contract does not violate § 75-1.1 without substantial aggravating circumstances.

United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. · filed 1981-05-18

In a sense, unfairness inheres in every breach of contract when one of the contracting parties is denied the advantage for which he contracted, but this is why remedial damages are awarded on contract claims. If such an award is to be trebled, the North Carolina legislature must have intended that substantial aggravating circumstances be present.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances beyond an ordinary contract breach; an intentional breach and delayed disclosure alone do not suffice.

United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. · filed 1981-06-19

In a sense, unfairness inheres in every breach of contract when one of the contracting parties is denied the advantage for which he contracted, but this is why remedial damages are awarded on contract claims. If such an award is to be trebled, the North Carolina legislature must have intended that substantial aggravating circumstances be present. ... It then broke the contract, but we cannot conclude that unfairness inhered in the circumstances of the breach within the meaning of the statute simply because the breach was intentional and not promptly disclosed.

Under the pre-1977 version of § 75-1.1(a), an intentional breach of a distribution contract alone does not violate the statute.

Richard M. Stearns, Trustee in Bankruptcy for Carolina Acoustics Co., Inc. v. Genrad, Inc. · filed 1985-01-28(a)

Even if there had been an intentional breach of the distribution contract by Genrad, that would not have been a violation of the North Carolina statute.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances for a breach of contract to qualify as a deceptive trade practice.

Hageman v. Twin City Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. · filed 1988-03-15(a)

Substantial aggravating circumstances are necessary to label an act as a deceptive trade practice, and plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of such circumstances in this case.

Section 75-1.1 covers a breach of contract coupled with fraudulent misrepresentation.

Quate v. Caudle · filed 1989-08-15(a)

Defendant’s breach of contract coupled with the fraudulent misrepresentation constitute a violation under G.S. 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not make it unfair or deceptive, under these circumstances, to seek alternative service providers or exercise a contractual right to terminate on 60 days’ notice.

Tar Heel Industries, Inc. v. E. I. duPont De Nemours & Co. · filed 1988-08-02

Under the facts of this case, we find that it was not unfair or deceptive for DuPont to study and seek alternative methods of transportation; nor was it unfair or deceptive to exercise the contract’s termination clause.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances attending a breach of contract to support an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Thompson · filed 1992-07-21

We agree with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals which, in construing N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, stated that “a plaintiff must show substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach to recover under the Act, which allows for treble damages.”

A § 75-1.1 counterclaim based solely on an allegedly unconscionable contract fails when the contract is found not unconscionable.

Rite Color Chemical Co., Inc. v. VELVET TEXTILE CO. INC. · filed 1992-01-07

As the defendant conceded at the hearings prior to the trial court’s entry of directed verdict, the alleged unconscionability of the contract was the sole basis for the defendant’s counterclaim for unfair and deceptive trade practices. We assume without deciding that an unconscionable contract may provide the basis for an unfair and deceptive trade practice claim under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 (1988). ... Accordingly, because the implied amendment discussed above only amended the defendant’s answer with regard to the issue of unconscionability, and because the trial court found that the parties’ contract was not unconscionable, the plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict on its claim and on the defendant’s counterclaim.

A breach of contract does not support a § 75-1.1 claim without substantial aggravating circumstances.

Ace Chemical Corp. v. DSI Transports, Inc. · filed 1994-06-21

We conclude that these facts do not present aggravating circumstances surrounding defendant’s breach of contract and are insufficient as a matter of law to raise a claim of unfair and deceptive practices pursuant to G.S. 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial, aggravating circumstances for a breach of contract or ICC regulation to constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

Jacobs v. Central Transport, Inc. · filed 1995-04-13

The plaintiffs have failed to show substantial, aggravating circumstances. The breach of contract and ICC regulation does not rise to the level of an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim under § 75-1.1.

An ordinary breach of contract does not, by itself, violate § 75-1.1.

Jacobs v. Central Transport · filed 1996-05-03(a)

Mere breach of contract does not constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

Section 75-1.1 covers a contract breach accompanied by intentional deception and solicitation of the other party’s customers.

Southern Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Osborne · filed 1997-09-02

Indeed, the facts show intentional deception in dealing with plaintiff. ... The trial court found, and we agree, that such actions have the requisite causal connection to plaintiffs lost profits and that these actions are unfair and deceptive trade practices within the meaning of Chapter 75.

Section 75-1.1 requires egregious or aggravating circumstances before a simple breach of contract or failure to pay a debt qualifies as an unfair or deceptive act.

Norman Owen Trucking, Inc. v. Morkoski · filed 1998-10-20

Simple breach of contract or failure to pay a debt do not qualify as unfair or deceptive acts, but rather must be characterized by some type of egregious or aggravating circumstances before the statute applies.

A breach of contract alone does not support a claim under § 75-1.1; the plaintiff must allege substantial aggravating circumstances.

Norman v. Loomis Fargo & Co. · filed 2000-11-14(a)

The Complaint in this case, even in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, establishes, at most, that Loomis breached a unilateral contract by refusing to pay a promised reward. There is no allegation as to what action Loomis took — either in making the reward offer or refusing to pay the reward — that was either “unfair” or “deceptive” to potential “consumers” of the reward offer. In short, there has been no factual showing of “substantial aggravating circumstances attendant to” Loomis’ refusal to pay a reward to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, as to the unfair and deceptive trade practices claim, the Defendant’s motion will be granted.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances beyond a breach of contract, even an intentional one, to support an unfair or deceptive practices claim.

Sessler v. Marsh · filed 2001-07-17

It is well recognized, however, that actions for unfair or deceptive trade practices are distinct from actions for breach of contract . . . and that a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1. ... Even taking the evidence that was before the court on this motion in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we hold that the court did not err in granting summary judgment on this issue because plaintiff has failed to show substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach of contract.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances beyond a breach of contract to sustain an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

Southeastern Shelter Corp. v. BTU, INC. · filed 2002-12-03

We further note that while plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence of a contractual relationship between the parties, they have failed to show sufficient aggravating circumstances to maintain an action for unfair and deceptive trade practices.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances beyond a mere breach of contract to support an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

Watson Electrical Construction Co. v. Summit Companies, LLC · filed 2003-10-21

Furthermore, “it is well recognized ... that actions for unfair or deceptive trade practices are distinct from actions for breach of contract, and that a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1” ... Thus, “plaintiff must show substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach to recover under the Act.” ... Watson Electrical has not met this showing in this case; accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted on this issue.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances beyond an intentional breach of contract to support an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

M.D. Russell Construction, Inc. v. Consolidated Staffing, Inc. · filed 2022-03-23

Accordingly, Russell Construction must show that the breach of contract is “surrounded by substantial aggravating circumstances” to support a NCUDTPA claim. Griffith v. Glen Wood Co., Inc., 184.N.C. App. 206, 217 (2007). Russell Construction has failed to do so.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances for an unfair trade practices claim arising from a breach of contract; an uncertain ability to pay alone is insufficient.

Citadel Brands LLC v. Teespring, Inc. · filed 2024-06-28

While the alleged circumstances (ordering goods for which a buyer may not be able to pay) may arguably amount to an intentional breach of contract, simply claiming an uncertain ability to pay is insufficient, without more, to support a UDTP claim.

Section 75-1.1 requires egregious or aggravating circumstances beyond a mere breach of contract to support an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

Buckley LLP v. Series 1 of Oxford Ins. Co. N.C. · filed 2020-03-23

Our courts have held that there must exist “some type of egregious or aggravating circumstances” to invoke section 75-1.1. Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 657, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (2001) (quoting Allied Distribs., Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 847 F. Supp. 376, 379 (E.D.N.C. 1993)). Considering Buckley’s allegedly inflammatory allegations in light of the claims pleaded and the pleading requirements for those claims, the Court concludes that Buckley’s allegations should not be stricken.

Section 75-1.1 requires egregious or aggravating circumstances beyond a breach of contract to support an unfair or deceptive practices claim.

Harty v. Underhill · filed 2011-05-03

Additionally, even assuming arguendo that defendants failed to strictly follow the terms of their contract by proceeding to foreclosure and breached their contract, plaintiffs have not shown “egregious or aggravating circumstances” attending the alleged breach of contract to recover under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (2009).

Section 75-1.1 requires facts showing unfair or deceptive conduct; a contractual dispute without aggravating circumstances does not suffice.

Brier Creek Owners Ass'n v. Brier Creek Country Club Owners Ass'n · filed 2026-04-27

Defendant also alleges no aggravating circumstances or other facts that might support a Chapter 75 claim. ... Construing the few well-pleaded, non-conclusory allegations of the counterclaims in the light most favorable to Defendant, the Court concludes that Defendant has failed to state a claim under Chapter 75.

Section 75-1.1(b) excludes attorneys’ professional services from the Act’s coverage when the challenged conduct is legal representation.

Laws v. Priority Trustee Services of N.C., L.L.C. · filed 2009-03-16(b)

Defendants argue that this claim fails because N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75—1.1(b) provides an express exception for “professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession,” which applies to attorneys’ professional services. The court agrees. Any argument by the Plaintiffs that Defendants were not in fact engaging in legal work is simply without merit. Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated North Carolina Ethics Rules by simultaneously representing both the lender and serving as the substitute trustee. Such legal representation certainly constitutes “professional services” rendered by attorneys.

Section 75-1.1(b) exempts professional services rendered by members of learned professions from the statute's definition of commerce; an attorney's debt-collection work within the traditional attorney-client role qualifies.

Reid v. Ayers · filed 2000-06-06(b)

Our legislature has defined this requirement in the following manner: “ ‘[CJommerce’ includes all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b) (1999). We conclude that the “learned profession” exemption provided for in the second half of this definition operates to invalidate plaintiffs’ claim here. ... In order for the learned profession exemption to apply, a two-part test must be satisfied. First, the person or entity performing the alleged act must be a member of a learned profession. ... Second, the conduct in question must be a rendering of professional services. ... We feel the same type of analysis can be applied in the context of the practice of law. Debt collection, along with the collection of any attorney’s fees incurred as a penalty, is a necessary part of the practice of debtor-creditor law. Because defendants were engaged in that very practice here, they were rendering a professional legal service. Accordingly, their acts fall within the learned profession exemption. ... Although no bright line exists, we think that the exemption applies anytime an attorney or law firm is acting within the scope of the traditional attorney-client role. It would not apply when the attorney or law firm is engaged in the entrepreneurial aspects of legal practice that are geared more towards their own interests, as opposed to the interests of their clients. ... Because we conclude that defendants fall within the learned profession exemption, we hold that plaintiffs’ claim is legally insufficient.

Section 75-1.1 excludes professional services rendered by members of learned professions, including medical professionals, from its prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

Gaunt v. Pittaway · filed 2000-08-29(a), (b)

Our Court has made clear that unfair and deceptive acts committed by medical professionals are not included within the prohibition of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(a). ... Plaintiffs’ argument fails for the simple reason that medical professionals are expressly excluded from the scope of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(a) and thus it clearly does not follow that a statement by a medical professional, criminal or otherwise, is governed by this particular statute. Plaintiffs have no claim against defendants under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 for unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to a member of a learned profession, including an architect engaged in the practice of architecture.

RCDI Construction, Inc. v. Space/Architecture Planning & Interiors · filed 2002-01-15

The court then dismissed RCDI’s unfair competition claim on the grounds that Spaceplan was a member of a "learned profession" exempt from North Carolina’s unfair competition statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (1999). ... Having had the benefit of oral argument and having carefully considered the parties’ briefs, the record, and relevant legal authority, we conclude that the district court correctly decided the issues before it. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 75-1.1(b) excludes professional services rendered by a learned-profession member from the Act’s definition of commerce, using a two-part test requiring both learned-profession status and conduct that constitutes rendering professional services.

Battleground Veterinary Hosp., P.C. v. McGeoughâ · filed 2007-10-19(b)

The UDTPA defines “commerce” broadly, to include “all business activities, however denominated”, but not “professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b) (2005). ... Courts apply a two-part test when considering the UDTPA’s learned profession exemption. “First, the person or entity performing the alleged act must be a member of a learned profession. Second, the conduct in question must be a rendering of professional services.” Reid v. Ayers, 138 N.C. App. 261, 266, 531 S.E.2d 231, 235 (2000) (citations omitted). ... In considering facts related to the second prong of this test, “the crucial inquiry [is] whether the [particular function or conduct is] a necessary part of the [professional] services provided.” Id. at 267, 531 S.E.2d 231, 235 (citing Cameron v. New Hanover Mem. Hosp., 58 N.C. App. 414, 446–47, 293 S.E.2d 901, 920–21 (1982)). ... Defendants contend that dismissal of the UDTPA claim is appropriate because their conduct is protected by the statute’s learned professional exemption. ... Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendants, as veterinarians, are members of a learned profession. The question then is whether Defendants’ alleged tortious interference with VetCor’s contract rights involves the rendering of veterinary services. ... Reid does not address the legitimacy of a professional’s conduct on these facts. Because the law on this issue is not settled, and because there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to Defendants’ liability for tortious interference with contract, the Court defers ruling on this issue until trial.

Section 75-1.1 excludes professional services rendered by members of a learned profession from “commerce,” so the statute does not apply when the challenged conduct is the rendering of such services.

Wheeless v. Maria Parham Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2014-12-02(b)

To determine whether the “learned profession” exclusion applies, a two-part inquiry must be conducted: “[f]irst, the person or entity performing the alleged act must be a member of a learned profession. Second, the conduct in question must be a rendering of professional services.” ... It is well-settled by our Courts that “a matter affecting the professional services rendered by members of a learned profession . . . therefore falls within the exception in N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(b).” ... In this case, defendants’ alleged conduct in making a complaint to the Medical Board is integral to their role in ensuring the provision of adequate medical care. Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument is without merit.

For § 75-1.1, “commerce” excludes professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession, including a law firm and its attorneys acting within the traditional attorney-client role.

Moch v. A.M. Pappas & Associates, LLC · filed 2016-12-20(b)

We hold that plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege facts that, if true, would establish that the acts complained of were “in commerce” as the term is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b), and that the trial court did not err by dismissing this claim.

Section 75-1.1(b) excludes professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession from “commerce,” including attorney work within the traditional attorney-client role.

Moch v. A.M. Pappas & Assocs. · filed 2016-12-20(b)

As noted above, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b) provides that, for purposes of the statute, “commerce” “does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” ... We hold that plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege facts that, if true, would establish that the acts complained of were “in commerce” as the term is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b), and that the trial court did not err by dismissing this claim.

Section 75-1.1 excludes professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession, including chiropractic services and decision-making that affects their delivery.

Sykes v. Health Network Sols., Inc. · filed 2017-08-18(b)

The Court concludes that the section 75-1.1 claim is barred by the learned-profession exemption as that exemption has been interpreted by North Carolina’s appellate courts. ... Appellate precedent compels the conclusion that Plaintiffs’ section 75-1.1 claim is barred by the learned-profession exemption. ... Even where these elements are present, courts have also recognized an exemption known as the learned-profession exemption based on statutory language that places “professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession” outside the scope of section 75-1.1. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b). ... The practice of chiropractic, like the practice of medicine, should be considered a learned profession for purposes of section 75-1.1. ... As interpreted by our appellate courts, the learned-profession exemption is not limited to the actual delivery of professional services but extends to decision-making that affects the delivery of those services.

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, but the Act excludes professional services rendered by members of a learned profession from its definition of commerce.

Alamance Family Practice, P.A. v. Lindley · filed 2018-08-14(a)

The UDTPA declares unlawful “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). The Act defines commerce to include “all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” Id. § 75-1.1(b). For the learned profession exemption to apply, (1) the entity or person whose conduct is being challenged must be a member of a learned profession, and (2) the challenged conduct must constitute a rendering of professional services. Wheeless v. Maria Parham Med. Ctr., Inc., 237 N.C. App. 584, 589, 768 S.E.2d 119, 123 (2014); Reid v. Ayers, 138 N.C. App. 261, 266, 531 S.E.2d 231, 235 (2000). ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that Lindley’s alleged conduct, all of which related to the provision of allergy testing services and communications with patients, falls within the learned profession exemption.

The learned-profession exception does not exempt a UDTP claim arising from business-contract negotiations merely because the parties are medical professionals; the conduct must involve the rendition of professional services.

Hamlet H.M.A., LLC v. Hernandez · filed 2018-10-16(b)

This case involves a business deal, not rendition of professional medical services. Defendant alleged that the hospital made false representations to induce him to enter into a contract; the fact that he is a physician does not change the nature of the negotiation of a business contract. Plaintiff declined to enter into an employment contract with defendant; if defendant had been an employee of plaintiff, this situation may be somewhat more similar to Wheeless and Cameron, but plaintiff wanted defendant to be an independent contractor with an independent practice. If we were to interpret the learned profession exception as broadly as plaintiffs suggest we should, any business arrangement between medical professionals would be exempted from UDTP claims. The learned profession exception does not cover claims simply because the participants in the contract are medical professionals.

Section 75-1.1(b) excludes professional services rendered by members of learned professions, but does not protect representations made by doctors in business negotiations.

McClean v. Duke Univ. · filed 2019-03-25(b)

North Carolina courts agree "that unfair and deceptive acts committed by medical professionals are not included within the prohibition of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(a)." ... Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that Broderick made statements or engaged in conduct that was related in any way to her professional occupation. Because Broderick allegedly failed to provide counselling services to Plaintiff, it naturally follows that Broderick is not protected by the "learned profession" exclusion notwithstanding that she may in fact be a learned professional.

Section 75-1.1(b) excludes professional services rendered by members of a learned profession from the Act’s definition of commerce, so covered conduct is not actionable under the UDTPA.

In Re Se. Eye Ctr. (Old Battleground v. Ccsea) · filed 2019-05-07(b)

The sole question for the Court is whether Doug Harris’s conduct constituted the rendering of professional services for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b). Given the above, the Court concludes the answer to that question must be yes. ... Because Doug Harris’s complained of conduct falls outside of section 75-1.1’s definition of commerce, no genuine issue of material fact remains as to Plaintiffs’ claim against Doug Harris for unfair or deceptive trade practices. Consequently, the Court will grant Doug Harris’s motion and dismiss that claim.

Section 75-1.1(b) excludes professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession from the statute’s definition of commerce.

Aesthetic Facial & Ocular Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Zaldivar · filed 2019-03-19(b)

“[C]ommerce includes all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b) (2017) (quotation marks omitted). ... Here, the conduct as alleged by plaintiff’s complaint is “the solicitation of patients and the practice of medicine and surgery in North Carolina in violation of the agreement between Plaintiff and Zaldivar.” (Emphasis added.) The Agreement places a limitation on defendant’s ability to provide medical care and therefore arises from “a rendering of professional services.” Wheeless, 237 N.C. App. at 589, 768 S.E.2d at 123. The trial court did not err in determining this claim falls under the learned profession exemption, and this argument is overruled.

Section 75-1.1(b) exempts professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession from the Act, including conduct sufficiently tied to a medical provider’s patient care.

In re: NOVANT HEALTH, INC. · filed 2023-08-24(b)

By its terms, the statute does not apply to “professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” ... The learned profession exception applies to Novant’s conduct because its use of the pixel in promoting the MyChart patient portal was “a matter affecting the professional services,” specifically the practice of medicine, “rendered by members of a learned profession.”

Section 75-1.1(b)'s learned-profession exemption protects professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession, but it does not shield nonprofessional parties merely because they acted through a professional.

Huff v. Gallagher (In re Huff) · filed 2014-12-05(b)

The learned profession exemption to the NCDCA, § T5 — 1.1(b), specifically exempts from the definition of commerce “professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” ... For the learned profession exemption to apply, “the person or entity performing the alleged act must be a member of a learned profession” and “the conduct in question must be a rendering of professional services.” ... The learned profession exemption is a professional’s shield when acting on behalf of a client; it is not, as the Gallaghers assert in their motion, a party’s shield when a learned professional is acting on the party’s behalf. Here, the Gallagher’s counsel is not being sued; they are. Neither Bernard Gallagher nor Patti Ann Gallagher is a member of a learned profession, and as such, the learned profession exemption does not apply.

Section 75-1.1(b) exempts conduct by learned professionals when it constitutes professional services, including conduct sufficiently related to patient care; professional status alone does not exempt unrelated conduct.

Sykes v. Health Network Solutions, Inc. · filed 2019-06-14(b)

While we agree that the mere status of a defendant as a member of a "learned profession" does not shield that defendant from any claim under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 regardless of how far removed the claim is from that defendant's professional practice, we conclude that the conduct alleged here does fall within the exemption. All individual defendants, as well as all members of HNS, are licensed chiropractors, thus meeting the exemption's first prong. We also agree with defendants and the court below that the activity alleged in the second amended complaint constitutes rendering of professional services under the statute.

Section 75-1.1(b)’s learned profession exception covers a physician and entities that own or control an anesthesiology services provider when the challenged conduct concerns its services.

Se. Anesthesiology Consultants, Pllc v. Rose · filed 2019-10-10(b)

The Court concludes that the facts as alleged by Defendants cannot support a claim under UDTPA because MEDNAX, SAC, AAI, and Dr. Mason fall into the Learned Profession Exception. Plaintiffs’ Motion to dismiss the unfair and deceptive trade practices claim is GRANTED and Defendants’ claim under section 75-1.1 is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 75-1.1’s learned profession exception does not apply to a dispute over professional service agreements rather than the rendering of medical care.

Mason v. Health Management Associates, Inc. · filed 2019-10-24(b)

Because this claim arises out of the business relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants, the learned profession exception does not apply.

Section 75-1.1(b)’s learned profession exemption covers a hospital’s charges for emergency care and its failure to disclose those charges during treatment when the conduct is sufficiently tied to patient care.

McNew v. Fletcher Hosp., Inc. · filed 2022-09-20(b)

Particularly given our appellate courts’ expansive interpretation of the learned profession exemption in the healthcare field, the Court concludes, based on the above, that Plaintiff’s UDTPA claim is sufficiently tied to the provision of patient care to fall within the exemption’s reach.

Section 75-1.1(b)’s learned profession exemption covers a medical practice’s efforts to solicit patients when those efforts are directly related to patient care.

Carolina Med. Partners, Pllc v. Shah · filed 2023-01-24(b)

This alleged conduct—centered on patient solicitation—“is directly related to providing patient care” and fits comfortably within the statutory exemption. ... Accordingly, the learned profession exemption applies, and the Patels have not adequately alleged acts in or affecting commerce, as required by section 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1(b) excludes legal services rendered by attorneys in their traditional role as counsel from the statute’s definition of commerce.

Johnson v. PennyMac Loan Services LLC · filed 2024-09-12(b)

the acts alleged are not, by law, ‘in or affecting commerce.’ Section 75-1.1(b) of the North Carolina General Statute provides that ‘commerce’ ‘does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.’ ... Both of the acts alleged by Plaintiff were performed by Blanco on behalf of PennyMac in its role as counsel for PennyMac.

Section 75-1.1(b) excludes matters affecting professional services rendered by members of a learned profession from its definition of commerce.

Burgess v. Busby · filed 2001-03-20(b)

As in Abram, this is a matter affecting the professional services rendered by members of a learned profession and therefore falls within the exception in N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(b).

Section 75-1.1(b)’s learned profession exemption covers an architect’s offer to perform professional services.

RCDI Construction, Inc. v. Spaceplan/Architecture, Planning & Interiors, P.A. · filed 2001-04-20(b)

The plain language of this definition includes “offering to perform” professional services — which is precisely what Plaintiffs complain Defendants did here. This conduct, then, qualifies as “rendering of professional services” under the learned profession exemption and cannot serve as the basis for an unfair trade practices claim.

Section 75-1.1(b)'s learned profession exclusion does not prevent attorneys from bringing unfair or deceptive trade practices claims based on defamation of their business activities.

Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper · filed 2002-09-17(b)

We do not read section 75-1.1(b), however, to preclude an attorney from pursuing an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim. Thus, the mere fact that plaintiffs are learned professionals whose business activities defendants maligned does not remove plaintiffs’ claim for defamation outside of the scope of section 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 excludes a health care provider’s efforts to obtain review of another provider’s certificate of need application as professional services.

Abram v. Charter Medical Corp. of Raleigh, Inc. · filed 1990-12-04(b)

We find that the rationale of Cameron applies here; the General Assembly intended to exclude such professional services from the application of § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in commerce; a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not enough without substantial aggravating circumstances.

Miller v. Rose · filed 2000-07-05(a)

Nevertheless, “a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under [section 75-1.1 of the General Statutes].” ... “Substantial aggravating circumstances attendant to the breach must be shown.”

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in commerce, but an ordinary breach of contract is not a violation; whether conduct is unfair or deceptive is a legal question for the court, while proximate causation is for the jury.

US f/u/b S&D Land v. D'Elegance Mgmt Ltd · filed 2000-07-13(a)

An essential element of a Chapter 75 cause of action is that the defendant's Chapter 75 violation proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. See Ellis v. Smith-Broadhurst, Inc. , 268 S.E.2d 271, 273-74 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). Whether the Chapter 75 violation proximately caused the injuries is a factual question for the jury, see id. at 274, but whether the defendant's conduct is unfair or deceptive is a question of law for the court, see Hardy v. Toler, 218 S.E.2d 342, 345-46 (N.C. 1975).

Section 75-1.1 covers disputes between business competitors when an unfair or deceptive act or unfair method of competition occurs in or affects commerce and proximately causes actual injury; an intentional breach of contract alone is insufficient without substantial aggravating circumstances.

Edmondson v. American Motorcycle Ass'n · filed 2001-02-02(a)

Section 75-1.1 protects consumers as well as individual business persons. See McDonald v. Scarboro, 370 S.E.2d 680, 683 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). Thus, disputes between competitors such as Edmondson and the Defendants fall under the province of § 75-1.1. See McDonald, 370 S.E.2d at 683. ... In order to prevail on a § 75-1.1 claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) proximately causing actual injury to the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s business. See Spartan Leasing v. Pollard, 400 S.E.2d 476, 460-61 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). ... As the Defendants correctly point out, even an intentional breach of contract is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under § 75-1.1. See Broussard, 155 F.3d at 347. Rather, if a breach of contract situation is at issue, substantial aggravating circumstances attending to the breach must be present. See id.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover a mere breach of contract; egregious or aggravating circumstances, such as deceptive conduct, must be alleged.

Becker v. Graber Builders, Inc. · filed 2002-04-16

Under section 75-1.1, a mere breach of contract does not constitute an unfair or deceptive act. ... Egregious or aggravating circumstances must be alleged before the provisions of the Act may take effect.

A mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not an unfair or deceptive act under § 75-1.1; recovery requires substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach.

Bob Timberlake Collection, Inc. v. Edwards · filed 2006-02-21

“A mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not an unfair or deceptive act under Chapter 75. ... To recover for unfair and deceptive trade practices, a party must show substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach of contract.”

Section 75-1.1 requires proof of an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that injured the plaintiff; a mere breach of contract is insufficient without substantial aggravating circumstances.

Griffith v. Glen Wood Co., Inc. · filed 2007-06-19

To succeed on a claim for UDTP, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) in or affecting commerce; and (3) that plaintiff was injured thereby.” ... Mere breach of contract is not sufficient to sustain an action for UDTP, but if the breach is surrounded by substantial aggravating circumstances, it may sustain an action for UDTP. ... Plaintiff has presented no evidence of substantial aggravating circumstances surrounding the alleged breach of contract. ... In sum, plaintiff has failed to support an essential element of his UDTP claim and summary judgment was therefore properly granted on the claim.

A mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is insufficient to support a claim under § 75-1.1; substantial aggravating circumstances must accompany the breach, and qualifying insurance practices under § 58-63-15 are deemed Chapter 75 violations as a matter of law.

Burrell v. Sparkkles Reconstruction Co. · filed 2008-03-04

Although claims of unfair or deceptive trade practices are generally brought under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, if such practices occur in the insurance industry, they are instead governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-63-15 and, if proven, deemed to be violations of Chapter 75 as a matter of law. ... Moreover, “[t]o prevail on a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices, one must show: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or his business.” ... However, “a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.” ... Substantial aggravating circumstances must attend a breach of contract to permit recovery as an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce and requires a plaintiff to show an unfair or deceptive act, a commerce nexus, and proximate injury.

S.N.R. Management Corp. v. Danube Partners 141, LLC · filed 2008-04-15(a)

“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” ... “In order to establish a claim for unfair or deceptive acts or practices, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts tending to show: “(1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” ... “[A]n unfair act or practice is one in which a party engages in conduct which amounts to an inequitable assertion of its power or position.” ... “Furthermore, an act is unfair or deceptive under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 if it is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to customers.”

Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce; an insurance misrepresentation violating § 58-63-15(1) violates § 75-1.1 as a matter of law, and actual reliance is not required.

Cullen v. Valley Forge Life Insurance · filed 2003-12-16

A violation of this statute constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 as a matter of law. ... Accordingly, actual reliance is not a factor. We thus conclude that there were no genuine issues of material fact that Valley Forge engaged in an unfair and deceptive practice, and plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to this claim.

Section 75-1.1 makes unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce unlawful and requires an unfair or deceptive act, conduct in or affecting commerce, and proximate actual injury.

Henson v. GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC · filed 2009-05-19

“[U]nfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are . . . unlawful.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (2007). “To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or to his business.’ ” ... We find that the purported forgery is immaterial and does not support either claim in light of the fact that defendant provided clear title. ... Thus, even if Mrs. Henson did not sign the Agreement, plaintiffs did not suffer damage because the mobile home was not encumbered with a storage lien from Mr. Gordon.

Section 75-1.1 requires proof of an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately caused injury; an act is unfair if it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers, and deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive.

Hicks v. DUNN-BENSON FORD, INC. · filed 2009-06-16

In order to establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices [pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (2007)], a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.' Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (2001)). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 states that a trade practice is unfair if it "is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers." Furthermore, a trade practice is deceptive if it "has the capacity or tendency to deceive." To prevail on this claim, deliberate acts of deceit or bad faith do not have to be shown. Instead, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the act "`possessed the tendency or capacity to mislead, or created the likelihood of deception. '" Boyd v. Drum, 129 N.C. App. 586, 593, 501 S.E.2d 91, 97 (1998) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Section 75-1.1 makes unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce unlawful; conduct is unfair if it is unethical or unscrupulous and deceptive if it has a tendency to deceive.

Universal Furniture International, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc. · filed 2010-08-20

The UDTPA makes unlawful "unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. ... More specifically, a "practice is unfair if it is unethical or unscrupulous, and it is deceptive if it has a tendency to deceive." ... Because such conduct is unethical and has a strong tendency to deceive, we must affirm the court’s conclusion that Collezione contravened the UDTPA.

Section 75-1.1 reaches unfair competition and deceptive practices, with unfairness requiring unethical or unscrupulous conduct and deception requiring a tendency to deceive.

Daniel Group v. Service Performance Group, Inc. · filed 2010-11-10

This statute prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices. ... A practice is unfair if it is unethical or unscrupulous, and it is deceptive if it has a tendency to deceive. ... Here, plaintiff has not alleged facts to suggest that defendant has been deceptive, unscrupulous or unethical. ... Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the North Carolina unfair/deceptive trade practices claim is GRANTED.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances beyond a mere breach of contract, even an intentional one, to sustain an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

Hardin v. York Memorial Park · filed 2012-06-19

“It is well recognized... that actions for unfair or deceptive trade practices are distinct from actions for breach of contract. . . and that a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.”

Section 75-1.1(a) covers false representations, concealment of material facts, and fraudulent schemes in commerce that proximately cause injury; a mere breach of contract, fraud, or an award of actual damages is not independently required.

Estate of Hurst v. Moorehead I, LLC · filed 2013-08-06(a)

“Each of the four acts described by the trial court, all of which allege false representations or concealment of a material fact and/or establish a fraudulent scheme in procuring the conveyance of the Hurst/Henley tract in connection with the Epic Project, constitute unfair or deceptive acts in commerce in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.” ... “Fraud is a separate and distinct legal claim and is not a required element for an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim.” ... “In addition, an award of actual damages is not required to support a finding that plaintiffs were injured by the acts complained of. Rather, as the trial court instructed, the jury need only find that defendants’ unfair or deceptive act or practice proximately caused an injury to plaintiffs.”

Section 75-1.1 protects businesses in appropriate situations, but an intentional breach of contract alone is insufficient; substantial aggravating circumstances showing unfair or deceptive conduct are required.

Beverage Systems of the Carolinas, LLC v. Associated Beverage Repair, LLC · filed 2014-08-05

“Although [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1] was intended to benefit consumers, its protections do extend to businesses in appropriate situations.” ... “To prevail on a claim of unfair and deceptive practices, a plaintiff must show: “(1) defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) in or affecting commerce; and (3) that plaintiff was injured thereby.” ... With regard to plaintiffs contention that its unfair and deceptive practices claim could be based upon Ludine’s breach of the non-compete, “a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1. The plaintiff' must show substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach to recover under the Act.” ... Here, plaintiff has pled sufficient facts showing aggravating circumstances accompanying Ludine’s alleged breach of the non-compete to support its unfair and deceptive practices claim. ... Accordingly, plaintiff has forecasted evidence that Ludine’s breach of the non-compete was deceptive and was sufficient to maintain an unfair and deceptive practice claim.

Section 75-1.1(a) requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury, and a simple breach of contract is insufficient without egregious or aggravating circumstances.

Supplee v. Miller-Motte Business College · filed 2015-02-03(a)

“In order to prevail under [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a)] plaintiffs must prove: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) that the action in question was in or affecting commerce, (3) that said act proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff.” ... “Simple breach of contract . . . do[es] not qualify as unfair or deceptive acts, but rather must be characterized by some type of egregious or aggravating circumstances before the statute applies.” ... “Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Supplee’s UDTP claim.”

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury, and a mere intentional breach of contract is not enough without substantial aggravating circumstances.

flanders/precisionaire Corp. v. the Bank of Ny Mellon Trust Co. · filed 2015-04-07

“A claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes requires proof of three elements: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, which (3) proximately caused actual injury to the claimant.” ... “North Carolina law is clear that a mere breach of contract, albeit willful or intentional, cannot serve as the sole basis for a UDTP claim. ... Nevertheless, substantial “aggravating circumstances can elevate a breach of contract into an unfair and deceptive practice if the conduct of the breaching party is deceptive.” ... The Court disagrees, however, and instead concludes that the alleged acts BONY relies upon for its UDTP claim suggest, at most, an intentional breach of contract, and not an unfair and deceptive trade practice under Section 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 applies to residential rentals: a plaintiff must prove an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately caused injury, and a landlord’s continued rent demands despite knowing of uninhabitable conditions may support treble damages.

Stines v. Carter · filed 2015-04-07

To prevail on a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices, a party must show: “ ‘(1) [presence of] an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury to plaintiff[].’ ” ... Rental of residential housing is “commerce” for the purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. ... If the trial court determines that plaintiff had notice that the house was uninhabitable but continued to demand rent, the trial court may treble the amount of damages owed to defendant, if any, for the amount of rent defendant actually paid in excess of the fair market rental value of the property in its defective condition.

A Chapter 75 claim based on the same facts as a breach-of-contract claim requires aggravating circumstances and proof of additional, nonduplicative injury proximately caused by the conduct.

Glaxosmithkline LLC v. Dendreon Corp. · filed 2014-11-04

The Court concludes that GSK is not entitled to proceed on a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practice which is grounded on the same facts as its breach of contract claim without further demonstrating any aggravating circumstances and without reasonably anticipated proof of any damage proximately caused which is in addition to rather than duplicative of remedies afforded by the breach of contract claim.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury; an intentional breach of contract alone or an unreasonably low offer to settle legal claims is insufficient.

Davis v. State Farm Life Insurance · filed 2016-02-18(a)

To state a claim under the UDPA, the plaintiff must prove 1) that the defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, 2) in or affecting commerce, and 3) the defendant’s act proximately caused the plaintiff injury. ... “[A] mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under [the UDPA].” ... Such an offer hardly can be considered “unfair” within the meaning of § 75-1.1, in the sense that it is not “substantially injurious to consumers.” ... In any case, it is doubtful that an offer to settle a legal claim is “in commerce,” as is required by § 75-1.1, where the parties are neither in the relation of consumer-supplier or competitors, but, rather, are potential adversaries in a court proceeding.

Section 75-1.1 requires unfair or deceptive conduct, and a party’s decision to end lease negotiations and contract with another tenant, without more, is insufficient to state a Chapter 75 claim.

Remi Holdings, LLC v. Ix Wr 3023 HSBC Way L.P. · filed 2016-12-12

The Court additionally notes that Plaintiff’s allegations do not describe unfair or deceptive conduct sufficient to state a claim under Chapter 75. See Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (2001) (“In order to establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice . . . .”). The Court of Appeals has held that conduct similar to that alleged here does not violate Chapter 75. In Computer Decisions v. Rouse Office Management, the plaintiff negotiated to lease office space from the defendants. 124 N.C. App. 383, 385, 477 S.E.2d 262, 263 (1996). The parties engaged in detailed negotiations, apparently agreeing to all the terms of the proposed lease agreement. Id. at 385–86, 477 S.E.2d at 263–64. The parties failed to execute the lease, and the defendant instead leased the property to another tenant with whom it had been in negotiations. Id. The court dismissed plaintiff’s Chapter 75 claim, concluding that “by deciding not to pursue lease negotiations with plaintiff, defendants were simply exercising their right to contract freely with whomever they choose.” Id. at 390, 477 S.E.2d at 266. Under the similar facts in this case, the Starwood Defendants have likewise exercised their freedom to contract, and Plaintiff has failed to allege unfair or deceptive conduct sufficient to maintain a Chapter 75 claim. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices must be dismissed.

Section 75-1.1(a) bars unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.

Dicesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. · filed 2017-04-11(a)

Section 75-1.1(a) proscribes unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). ... The learned profession exemption excludes professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession from the definition of commerce. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b). For the learned profession exemption to apply, the entity whose conduct is being challenged must be a member of a learned profession, and the challenged conduct must be a rendering of professional services. ... The Court cannot conclude, based solely on the pleadings, that the learned profession exemption bars Plaintiffs’ Monopolization Claim as a matter of law. Thus, the Court denies the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on this ground, without prejudice to Defendant’s right to raise this issue in later motion practice based on a more developed factual record.

A mere breach of contract, even if intentional, does not support a § 75-1.1 claim without substantial aggravating circumstances such as fraud.

Strategic Mgmt. Decisions, LLC v. Sales Performance Int'l, LLC · filed 2017-08-07

Having already dismissed the conversion claim, the Court further agrees with Defendants that “a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.” ... Plaintiff has not alleged the type of “substantial aggravating circumstances,” such as fraud, necessary to transform a breach of contract into a section 75-1.1 claim. ... At most, Plaintiff’s allegation that Sales Performance “purposefully” copied and disseminated its intellectual property would constitute an intentional breach of the IP Agreement, which is insufficient to state a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices. (Compl. ¶ 29.)

Section 75-1.1 does not make a mere breach of contract an unfair or deceptive practice; substantial aggravating circumstances are required for a contract breach to support a claim.

Scigrip, Inc. v. Osae · filed 2018-01-30

The Court has concluded that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ trade secrets claim and, therefore, a violation of the TSPA cannot constitute the requisite unfair or deceptive act to support a UDTPA claim. Plaintiffs’ sole remaining claims are for breach of contract, and a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficient to sustain a UDTPA claim. Mitchell v. Linville, 148 N.C. App. 71, 74−75, 557 S.E.2d 620, 623 (2001). Although a breach of contract may constitute an unfair or deceptive act if a party shows substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach, Griffith v. Glen Wood Co., 184 N.C. App. 206, 217, 646 S.E.2d 550, 558 (2007), Plaintiffs neither alleged nor argued that any substantial aggravating circumstances surrounded Defendants’ breach. Therefore, even assuming that section 75-1.1 applies, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ UDTPA claim because Plaintiffs have failed to come forward with evidence of an unfair or deceptive act or practice.

Section 75-1.1 generally does not reach a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, without substantial aggravating circumstances; confusion from hurried intermediary negotiations and the breach did not support UDTP liability.

Alkemal Sing. Pte. Ltd. v. Dew Glob. Fin., LLC · filed 2018-04-19

“[A] mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 75-1.1” absent a showing of “substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach” of contract. ... Having found that the confusion surrounding this transaction and which agreement or agreements controlled was the result of hurried negotiations conducted almost entirely through an intermediary, the Court concludes that DEW’s conduct as alleged and proven, including its breach of contract, was not attended by egregious or aggravating circumstances sufficient to warrant a finding that such conduct was unfair or deceptive within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not make a mere breach of contract, even an intentional one, actionable as an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

McDonald v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co. · filed 2018-05-15

“[A]ctions for unfair or deceptive trade practices are distinct from actions for breach of contract, and a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.”

Section 75-1.1(a) requires substantial aggravating circumstances for a claim and does not cover disputes that are solely about entering into, interpreting, or enforcing a contract.

Purnima Sanghrajka, & Cary Foods, Inc. v. Family Fare, LLC · filed 2019-02-05(a)

North Carolina law requires a showing of "substantial aggravating circumstances" to support a claim under the UTPA. And the courts have consistently recognized that § 75-1.1 does not cover every dispute between two parties. The courts differentiate between contract and deceptive trade practice claims, and relegate claims regarding the existence of an agreement, the terms contained in an agreement, and the interpretation of an agreement to the arena of contract law. ... However, these facts did not give rise to "substantial aggravating circumstances" to support a UDTP claim. ... After viewing the facts and permissible inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, their UDTP claim is insufficient because it is solely premised on Plaintiffs' act of voluntarily entering into a contractual arrangement with Defendants.

Section 75-1.1 requires proof of an unfair or deceptive act affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury; an unfair practice may be immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious, and good faith is no defense.

Cronje v. Johnston · filed 2019-03-19(a)

We have held that in order to establish a violation of Chapter 75, a litigant must prove "the other party committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, that the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and that said act proximately caused actual injury to the litigant."

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury; an act is unfair if it offends established public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers, and deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive.

Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company · filed 2020-06-05

Plaintiff’s last claim is for unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. “[I]n order to establish a violation of [section 75-1.1], a plaintiff must show: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury to plaintiffs.” Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 653 S.E.2d 393, 399 (N.C. 2007). “The determination as to whether an act is unfair or deceptive is a question of law for the court.” Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (N.C. 2001). “A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” Hills Mach. Co., LLC v. Pea Creek Mine, LLC, 828 S.E.2d 709, 716 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Marshall v. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (N.C. 1981)). “[A] practice is deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive.” Walker, 653 S.E.2d at 399 (alteration in original) (quoting Marshall, 276 S.E.2d at 403). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that there is insufficient evidence that Defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act to create a genuine dispute of fact. Any failure by Defendant to comply with the industry standard of care in assessing and reporting Plaintiff’s medical history in this case is not deceptive, immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s claim for unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

A broken promise alone is insufficient to establish a UDTP claim under § 75-1.1; the plaintiff must show that the promisor intended to break the promise when it was made.

Hills Mach. Co., LLC v. Pea Creek Mine · filed 2019-05-21(a)

With respect to JOC’s UDTP claim, the evidence of Schoch’s statement that Case “stands behind its product,” and promised to fix the vibration in the Loader, when viewed most favorably to JOC, shows, at most, a broken promise. A broken promise, standing alone, is not enough to establish a UDTP claim, unless the evidence shows the promisor “intended to break its promise at the time that it made the promise.”

Section 75-1.1 requires a plaintiff to show an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately caused harm; an intentional breach alone is insufficient, but a breach with substantial aggravating circumstances may support a claim.

InSite Towers Development, LLC v. Terrell · filed 2020-07-21

To state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) committed an unfair or deceptive trade act or practice, (2) the act in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused plaintiff harm. ... Mere breach of contract, even if intentional, “is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under the UTPA .. ..” ... Only where a breach of contract claim is “surrounded by substantial aggravating circumstances” will it support an unfair and deceptive trade practice claim.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury, and a breach of contract alone is insufficient without substantial aggravating circumstances.

ABC Phones of North Carolina, Inc. v. Yahyavi · filed 2020-07-22

In order to establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. A practice is unfair if it is unethical or unscrupulous, and it is deceptive if it has a tendency to deceive. The determination as to whether an act is unfair or deceptive is a question of law for the court. ... A breach of contract claim on its own, absent substantial aggravating circumstances, does not state a claim under the UDTPA. ... The allegations against Yahyavi constitute nothing more than breach of contract. Victra failed to plead any aggravating circumstances surrounding its claim against Yahyavi for breach of contract. ... Therefore, Victra fails to state a UDPTA claim against Yahyavi, and this claim will be dismissed.

Section 75-1.1 requires proof of an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately caused injury, and a mere breach of contract generally is insufficient without egregious or aggravating circumstances.

Benchmark Electronics, Inc v. Cree Inc. · filed 2020-07-28

The UDTPA is meant to prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. In order to state a claim under the UDTPA, a plaintiff must show (1) [the] defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce; and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. Whether conduct is unfair or deceptive is a legal issue for the court to decide. ... “North Carolina courts have repeatedly held that a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under the UDTPA.” ... Thus, “a plaintiff must allege and prove egregious or aggravating circumstances to prevail on a UDTPA claim.”

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, and a misrepresentation-based claim requires an actionable deceptive act, commerce, proximate injury, and actual and reasonable reliance.

Mount Holly Kickboxing, LLC v. Franchoice, Inc. · filed 2021-03-24(a)

The North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“NCUDTPA”) prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts of practices in or affecting commerce.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). ... In order to establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. ... Even if the Court did allow Plaintiffs to seek summary judgment based on the new allegations, their claim would fail because none of the statements are actionable. ... In the Complaint, Plaintiffs base their NCUDTPA claim on the following three statements: 1) ILKB franchises were suitable for absentee ownership; 2) ILKB would successfully handle all marketing needs of the franchise; and 3) Tarver would earn $10,000 to $20,000 a month. As discussed with regard to the Minnesota common law claims, these statements are predictions of future events and there is no evidence that the statements were false representations of past or present facts at the time they were made; thus, they are inactionable. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count 2.

Section 75-1.1(a) requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury, and conduct violating N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-63-15(11) can support a private § 75-1.1 claim; the court held the pleaded conduct did not state such a claim.

BACON v. STATE AUTO PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2021-06-01(a)

To establish a claim under § 75-1.1(a), a complainant must show: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused injury to plaintiff. Gray, 529 S.E.2d at 681. ... Because Plaintiff “failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under § 58-63-15(11), [he] consequently also failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under § 75-1.1, as a matter of law.” Elliott, 883 F.3d at 399. Thus, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s USCP-based UPTPA claim.

Section 75-1.1 does not support an unfair or deceptive trade-practices claim based on a contract breach when the defendant successfully defeats the underlying breach claim; the plaintiff must also show substantial aggravating circumstances.

Whitmire v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company · filed 2022-10-26

Under North Carolina law, when a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices is premised on a breach of contract, a successful defense to the breach claim will defeat the claim of an unfair and deceptive trade practice.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act affecting commerce that proximately causes injury; a bare breach of contract is insufficient, so a plaintiff must plead an independent UDTPA claim or substantial aggravating circumstances accompanying the breach.

Guerrero v. Bank of America N.A. · filed 2023-03-30

The cardholders fail to plead a viable claim under the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“UDTPA”). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act that affected commerce and proximately caused an injury to the plaintiff. CS Tech., Inc. v. Horizon River Tech., LLC, 2020 WL 4546436, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 2020); see also Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 653 S.E.2d 393, 399 (N.C. 2007). However, a bare breach of contract “is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive.” Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 347 (4th Cir. 1998). Thus, when an alleged breach of contract is involved, the plaintiff must either plead a UDTPA claim “separate and apart from a breach of contract claim” or base the UDTPA claim on “a breach of contract accompanied by substantial aggravating circumstances.” Suntrust Bank v. Bryant/Stutphin Props., 732 S.E.2d 594, 599 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Here, the cardholders fail to make either showing.

Section 75-1.1(a) reaches materially misleading representations and omissions made in offering or providing student-loan debt-relief services.

Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection v. Consumer Advocacy Center Inc. · filed 2023-07-07(a)

From at least November 5, 2015, through October 23, 2019, in connection with offering or providing student loan debt-relief services, the Student Loan Debt-Relief Companies misrepresented, expressly or by implication, the following: ... These representations and omissions were material and likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. The Student Loan Debt-Relief Companies therefore violated the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(a), 5536(a)(1)(B). ... By reason of the facts described in Paragraph 21, the Student Loan Debt-Relief Companies violated the NCUDPA, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a).

Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce that proximately injure a plaintiff; a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is insufficient without substantial aggravating circumstances.

Rector v. Nirvana Extractions, LLC · filed 2023-07-31

The North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act “makes unlawful unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce that proximately injures a plaintiff.” ... For Plaintiff to prevail on its UDTPA claim it must show that “(1) the defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) the act or practice in question was in or affecting commerce; and (3) the act or practice proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” ... Additionally, “North Carolina courts have repeatedly held that ‘a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under [the UTPA,] N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1’” ... “North Carolina law requires a showing of ‘substantial aggravating circumstances’ to support a claim under the UTPA.’” ... A UDTP claim based merely on a breach of contract – without proof of aggravating circumstances which are not sufficiently alleged here – must fail. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged a claim under the NC UDTPA and that claim will be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 75-1.1 may cover violations of a regulatory statute, but the plaintiff must plausibly allege that the violation proximately caused its injury.

Mountaineer Motors of Lenoir, LLC v. Carvana, LLC · filed 2023-10-19

However, North Carolina law provides that violations of a regulatory statute, such as the Licensing Law, which governs businesses or their activities “may also be a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.” Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Services, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 324, 326 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992). But, merely alleging a regulatory violation is not enough; a Plaintiff must also plausibly allege that the violation was the proximate cause of its injuries. See id. (“If the violation of the Trade Secrets Protection Act satisfies this three prong test, it would be a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75–1.1.”).

Section 75-1.1 reaches unfair or deceptive acts or practices and unfair methods of competition, but the court found no plausible violation where the advertising was not shown false or unfair.

Whyble v. The Nature's Bounty Co. · filed 2023-10-31

... (citing Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of NC, Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 653 S.E.2d 393, 399 (2007)) (A claim under the NCCPS requires “an unfair or deceptive act or practice or an unfair method of competition.”) ... Here, as discussed above, Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege that Defendant’s claims that its Products reduce or treat joint pain are false or misleading. Defendant’s advertising and marketing of the Products thus is not offensive to public policy or “immoral, unethical oppressive, or unscrupulous.” Plaintiffs therefore do not meet their burden to show that the marketing and advertising of Defendant’s Products is unfair.

A mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not an unfair or deceptive act under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.

Dane v. Commonwealth Partners LLC · filed 2025-02-11

A “mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not an unfair or deceptive act under [the UDTPA].”

Section 75-1.1(a) makes unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce unlawful, and a claim requires an unfair or deceptive act, conduct in or affecting commerce, and proximate injury; excessive pricing allegations without sufficient facts showing the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious do not state a claim.

Carpenter v. William Douglas Management Inc · filed 2025-03-14(a)

Under the UDTPA, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” are unlawful. ... To state a UDTPA claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury to plaintiff[].” ... Carpenter paid less than the Fleming plaintiffs and cannot state a UDTPA claim for excessive fees.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury, and the court treated damages as a required element when dismissing the UDTPA counterclaim.

Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Lallier · filed 2018-08-10

In order to establish a prima facie case under the UDTPA, a plaintiff must show: "(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury to plaintiffs." ... As for subsection (a), defendants contend that Universal misrepresented pertinent insurance policy provisions by failing to identify the grant of coverage for wrongful employment practices and abuse of process and failing to identify the separation of insureds provision in the policy. ... Defendants' claim fails, however, because they did not plausibly allege that they suffered damages as a result of the omission. ... Thus, defendants have not plausibly alleged any damages resulting from any misstatement or omission.

Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices; conduct is unfair when unethical or unscrupulous and deceptive when it tends to deceive.

Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., and Bobby O'Neal and Keith O'neal, Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc. Bobby O'Neal and Keith O'Neal · filed 1987-04-09

The North Carolina unfair trade practices statute prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices. N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1 (1985). As used in the statute, the words “unfair methods of competition,” have not been precisely defined by the North Carolina courts, although it has been suggested that they encompass any conduct that a court of equity would consider unfair. Harrington Manufacturing Co. v. Powell Manufacturing Co., 38 N.C.App. 393, 248 S.E.2d 739, 744, 746 (1978), disc. rev. and cert. denied, 296 N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 469 (1979). A practice is unfair if it is unethical or unscrupulous, and it is deceptive if it has a tendency to deceive. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981); Overstreet v. Brookland, Inc., 52 N.C.App. 444, 279 S.E.2d 1, 7 (1981).

Section 75-1.1 is not violated by a contract breach, even an intentional one, absent aggravating circumstances.

United States Development Corporation v. Peoples Federal Savings & Loan Association · filed 1989-04-28

Turning to appellant’s next assignment of error, the district court was also correct in concluding that as a matter of law Peoples’ exercise of its contractual right to withdraw could not form the basis of a deceptive trade practice claim under Chapter 75, N.C.Gen.Stat. See United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 992 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054, 102 S.Ct. 599, 70 L.Ed.2d 590 (1981) (absent aggravating circumstances, even an intentional breach of a contract does not violate N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1).

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; intent and good faith are irrelevant, contributory negligence is no defense, and a violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 58-54.4 constitutes a Chapter 75 violation as a matter of law.

US Fire Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 1990-04-03(a)

Chapter 58 does not create a private right of action, but a violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 58-54.4 as a matter of law constitutes a violation of N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1. ... The court did not hold that a plaintiff must allege a violation of Chapter 58 in order to state a claim under Chapter 75. ... Plaintiffs may bring a third party claim. ... "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are ... unlawful." ... A practice will be considered unfair `when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.' `A party is guilty of an unfair act or practice when it engages in conduct which amounts to an inequitable assertion of its power or position.' A practice will be considered deceptive `if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive.' ... Intent and good faith are irrelevant to a determination of whether practices are unfair or deceptive. ... Contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is not a defense to a Chapter 75 violation. ... The court believes these practices, if found by the jury, could support a finding of unfair or deceptive acts or practices under Chapter 75. ... The allegations, if proven at trial, could support a finding of a violation of Chapter 75.

Section 75-1.1 covers conduct that is unfair or deceptive, but a simple breach of contract is not enough without substantial aggravating circumstances, and a broken promise requires no intent to perform when made.

1996-04-01 · filed 1996-04-01

To be actionable under the statute, conduct must be "immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious...." ... Either unfairness or deception can bring conduct within the purview of the statute; an act need not be both unfair and deceptive. ... A simple breach of contract is not unfair or deceptive, however, absent "substantial aggravating circumstances." ... And a broken promise is unfair or deceptive only if the promisor had no intent to perform when he made the promise.

A plaintiff must show conduct in or affecting commerce, unfairness or capacity or tendency to deceive, and proximate actual injury; an intentional breach of contract alone does not trigger the Act absent egregious or aggravating circumstances.

Armento v. Laser Image, Inc. · filed 1996-10-16

To prevail under the UTPA, a plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant engaged in conduct that was in or affecting commerce, (2) that the conduct was unfair or had the capacity or tendency to deceive, and (3) that the defendant’s deceptive conduct proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff. ... Taken alone, Sherry’s supposed breach of contract, even if intentional, certainly would not trigger the Act. ... The Plaintiff must show that egregious or aggravating circumstances place the Defendants’ actions within the statute. ... Considering the total circumstances surrounding the Defendants’ actions, this Court finds the omissions of Armento’s name was anything but the kind of “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious” act that would trigger coverage by the Act.

Section 75-1.1 does not support a claim based only on breach of contract without substantial aggravating circumstances, and the unfairness must occur when the contract is performed.

Williams v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 2005-02-17

Unfair and deceptive trade practices claims may not be maintained based on a breach of contract absent substantial aggravating circumstances. This is true even if the breach is intentional. ... A practice is unfair if “it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers” and is deceptive if “it has the capacity or tendency to deceive.” ... The unfairness must occur at the time the contract is performed. ... The disagreement which arises between the parties after the problem surfaces over who should bear the responsibility for detecting and preventing Sneed’s fraud does not normally fall into this category of behavior, no matter how insulting or frivolous plaintiff may feel PNC’s denials are. Plaintiffs sixth and ninth claims for relief should be dismissed.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce and resulting injury, and a garden-variety breach of contract requires substantial aggravating circumstances to support such a claim.

Triad Packaging, Inc. v. SupplyOne, Inc. · filed 2013-02-19

Under North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, a successful plaintiff must show: 1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; 2) in or affecting commerce; and 3) that plaintiff was injured thereby. ... In any event, a garden variety breach of contract claim is not sufficient to establish a claim under § 75-1.1 for unfair or deceptive trade practices. ... Plaintiffs fail to proffer evidence of “substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach” because the record tends to show that SupplyOne simply changed its mind about the best approach upon acquisition, which was less attractive than originally thought.

Section 75-1.1(a) does not reach a mere breach of contract unless the breach is accompanied by egregious or aggravating circumstances, and the plaintiff must show an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately caused actual injury.

Crosby v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. · filed 2015-06-16(a)

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1(a) (2013) provides that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." ... "Our case law establishes that [s]imple breach of contract ... do[es] not qualify as unfair or deceptive acts, but rather must be characterized by some type of egregious or aggravating circumstances before the statute applies." ... Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff's forecasted evidence merely stated that defendants did not apply plaintiff's payments according to the terms of the forbearance agreements, a basic breach of contract claim. Plaintiff did not allege before the trial court any circumstances independent of the forbearance agreement that would support a conclusion that defendants' actions amounted to egregious or aggravating circumstances. Therefore, we hold that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 75-1.1 requires courts deciding whether an act is unfair or deceptive to consider the facts surrounding the transaction and its impact on the marketplace.

Hall v. T. L. Kemp Jewelry, Inc. · filed 1984-11-06

To determine if an act is unfair or deceptive under G.S. 75-1.1, the court must look at the facts surrounding the transaction and the impact on the marketplace.

Section 75-1.1 does not require an insurer discussing one policy exclusion to list every other exclusion when an average consumer would not understand the statement to remove them.

Pearce v. American Defender Life Insurance · filed 1985-05-21

We do not believe the average consumer would understand the above-quoted statement, considered in context, to mean that the remaining exceptions to coverage set out in the Accidental Death Rider no longer applied. In addition to the “aircraft exception,” the Rider also excepts deaths resulting from the commission of a felony, intentionally self-inflicted injuries, and participation in a riot or insurrection. Defendant was not required to discuss all of these exceptions in its letter to Mr. Pearce in order to avoid being “deceptive” in discussing the “act of war” exception. We hold the court did not err in entering a directed verdict for defendant on these claims.

Section 75-1.1 permits the Attorney General to join assignees of sales contracts allegedly obtained through deceptive practices as defendants, and permits a plaintiff to plead inconsistent remedies without electing until before jury instructions or after the verdict.

State Ex Rel. Easley v. Rich Food Services, Inc. · filed 2000-08-29

However, for the sake of clarity in this important area, we will consider the power of the Attorney General to include financial institutions as parties in an action pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 on behalf of North Carolina consumers. ... The express provisions of Chapter 75 authorize the Attorney General to bring a civil action on behalf of North Carolina consumers to enforce the Chapter’s prohibition against deceptive sales practices. We now hold that in such an action the Attorney General may join as party defendants the assignees of sales contracts which were allegedly obtained in violation of Chapter 75. ... Further, in an action under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 based on deceptive sales practices, a plaintiff may allege inconsistent remedies, and need not make its election until either prior to jury instructions or after return of the jury verdict.

Section 75-1.1 permits a claim based on conduct prohibited by the Claims Act without a showing that the conduct occurred frequently.

BLOSS v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2025-04-09

A UDTPA claim arising from a violation of [the Claims Act] does not require the additional showing of frequency because “such conduct is inherently unfair, unscrupulous, immoral, and injurious to consumers.”

A violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-63-15(11)(f) constitutes a violation of § 75-1.1 without a separate showing that the conduct occurred frequently enough to indicate a general business practice.

Westchester Fire Insurance v. Johnson · filed 2001-02-28

Although Johnson did not cite any of the unfair settlement practices listed in § 58-63-15(11), conduct that violates § 58-63-15(11)(f) constitutes a violation of § 75-1.1 as a matter of law.* Gray, 529 S.E.2d at 683.

A claim under § 75-1.1 cannot proceed on alleged § 58-63 violations alone when the plaintiff has not alleged a sufficiently frequent practice to constitute a general business practice or any independent basis for liability.

Wake Stone Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1998-02-23

Like the plaintiff in Whiteville Oil, Wake Stone, in two complaints, has failed to allege that Aetna engaged in any prohibited practice with sufficient frequency to constitute a general business practice, as required by statute. ... Since Wake Stone alleged no grounds for a claim of unfair trade practices other than those cited above, all of which fall under § 58-63, there are no alleged independent grounds for a claim under § 75-1.1. Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be granted as to the second claim for relief.

Section 75-1.1 treats an insurer’s failure to attempt a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement when liability is reasonably clear as an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

Abt Building Products Corporation v. National Union Fire Insurance Company Of Pittsburgh · filed 2006-12-19

In its third contention of error, National Union maintains that the district court erred in failing to award judgment as a matter of law on ABT's claim that National Union had violated the UDTPA. ... Under the evidence here, however, the district court was justified in ruling that National Union's failure to settle was more than "honest disagreement or innocent mistake," and was instead a violation of section 58-63-15(11)(f) and "inherently unfair" under North Carolina law.

Section 75-1.1 imposes no unfair trade practice liability on an insurer or agent for an endorsement that makes no misrepresentation when neither owes a duty it has breached, assuming the section applies to insurance.

Greenway v. NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUR. MUT. INS. · filed 1978-02-21

Because the endorsement made no misrepresentation and because neither defendant-agent nor defendant-insurer violated any duty owed plaintiffs, neither defendant could possibly be guilty of any unfair trade practice pursuant to G.S. 75-1.1, if, arguendo, such statute contemplates regulating the insurance industry at all.

Section 75-1.1 provides a remedy for unfair trade practices in the insurance industry.

Ellis v. Smith-Broadhurst, Inc. · filed 1980-08-05(a)

We hold, therefore, that G.S. 75-1.1 provides a remedy for unfair trade practices in the insurance industry.

A violation of N.C.G.S. § 58-54.4 constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice under § 75-1.1.

Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co. · filed 1986-05-06(a)

We now hold that a violation of N.C.G.S. § 58-54.4 as a matter of law constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not prohibit an insurer from restricting agents’ use of its resources to sell competitors’ products when the restriction does not foreclose consumers or competitors from the market.

Dull v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. · filed 1987-04-21

The non-brokerage restrictions placed upon plaintiffs merely prevented them from using defendants’ resources to promote and sell the products of competitors. The facts of this case disclose no acts or practices on the part of defendants which may be held to be inequitable, oppressive, offensive to public policy, or substantially injurious to consumers.

Section 75-1.1 does not support an unfair or deceptive practice claim based solely on an insurer’s attorney negligently relying on hearsay and inadequately investigating a defense before pleading it.

Hoke v. Young · filed 1988-04-05(a)

The facts in plaintiffs complaint alleged only that INA’s attorney improperly relied on hearsay statements gathered by INA’s accident investigator, and, as a result of his negligent reliance, the INA attorney did not sufficiently investigate the defense before raising it in the answer. After review, we conclude these facts were insufficient, as a matter of law, to state a claim entitling plaintiff to proceed under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.

A violation of § 58-63-15 constitutes an unfair and deceptive trade practice under § 75-1.1 as a matter of law.

Miller v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1993-10-19

A violation of G.S. § 58-63-15 constitutes an unfair and deceptive trade practice in violation of G.S. § 75-1.1 as a matter of law.

An insurer violates § 75-1.1 by failing to attempt in good faith to settle a claim promptly, fairly, and equitably when liability is reasonably clear, without a separate showing that the conduct is a general business practice.

Gray v. North Carolina Insurance Underwriting · filed 2000-06-16(a)

Thus, such conduct that violates subsection (f) of N.C.G.S. § 58-63-15(11) constitutes a violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, as a matter of law, without the necessity of an additional showing of frequency indicating a “general business practice,” N.C.G.S. § 58-63-15(11).

An insurer’s allegedly inadequate claims investigation and continued denial of a claim can raise genuine issues of material fact requiring trial on a § 75-1.1 claim.

Martini v. Companion Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 2009-07-07

Plaintiff specifically alleges that defendant failed to conduct a reasonable and complete investigation before denying plaintiff’s claim — indeed, before speaking directly to plaintiff — and continuing to deny plaintiff’s claim after speaking with plaintiff and receiving an alternate explanation as to why the Montero was driven to the airport. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant failed to follow its claims handling guidelines. These allegations raise genuine issues of material fact, and thus it was improper for the trial court to resolve plaintiff’s Chapter 75 claim by summary judgment. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred by granting partial summary judgment in favor of defendant as to plaintiff’s claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices pursuant to § 75-1.1.

An insurer’s violation of an unfair claim settlement practice listed in § 58-63-15(11) is an unfair or deceptive act under § 75-1.1 as a matter of law.

Guessford v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance · filed 2013-01-16

Because a violation of Section 58-63-15(11) constitutes an unfair or deceptive act or practice under N.C. General Statute § 75-1.1 as a matter of law, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible UDTPA claim.

A § 75-1.1 claim based solely on an alleged violation of § 58-63-15(11) fails when the alleged conduct does not violate that provision.

Elliott v. American States Insurance Co. · filed 2018-02-20(a)

Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in granting ASIC’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because Elliott failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under § 58-63-15(11), and consequently also failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under § 75-1.1, as a matter of law.

Section 75-1.1 requires evidence of an unfair or deceptive act or practice to support a claim based on an insurer’s handling of a claim.

Browder v. State Farm Insurance · filed 2021-07-22

Plaintiffs do not have sufficient evidence to bring a successful UDTP claim because they cannot identify an unfair or deceptive act or practice that Defendant engaged in.

Section 75-1.1 treats an insurer’s conduct that violates the unfair claim settlement statute as an unfair or deceptive practice.

Villa Capriani Homeowners Ass'n v. Lexington Ins. Co. · filed 2021-10-14

Conduct that violates N.C.G.S. § 58-63-15(11) constitutes an unfair and deceptive act or practice under the UDTPA because “such conduct is inherently unfair, unscrupulous, immoral, and injurious to consumers.” Gray, 352 N.C. at 71; Country Club of Johnston Cty., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 150 N.C. App. 231, 246 (2002).

Section 75-1.1 requires egregious or aggravating circumstances beyond a simple denial of insurance coverage.

Hancox v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2022-11-22

Simple claim denial is not listed as an example of inherently unfair insurance trade practices under of § 58-63-15(11), nor does it “involve some type of egregious or aggravating circumstance[]. . . sufficient to violate” § 75–1.1.

An insurer’s erroneous denial of coverage during a dispute over policy interpretation does not establish an unfair or deceptive trade practice without aggravating circumstances.

Enck v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA · filed 2023-08-02

Rather, the parties have had an ardent dispute about insurance coverage that has ended up in court. Without more, Plaintiff has failed, as a matter of law, to establish evidence of “aggravating circumstances” sufficient to support a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice that proximately causes injury; an insurer’s claim handling does not violate the section when the evidence supports no reasonable finding of such an act.

Blakeney Preserve Homeowners Association, Inc. v. The Hanover American Insurance Company · filed 2024-06-07

The Court finds that the undisputed record fails to support a reasonable finding that Defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice — either through per se violations of N.C.G.S. § 58-63-15(11) or more general conduct — which caused injury to Plaintiff. Thus, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs claims for unfair and deceptive trade practices and acts pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.

An insurer’s phone communication of its coverage position can defeat a § 75-1.1 claim alleging failure to clearly affirm or deny coverage.

LaBudde · filed 2025-12-12

Nor did Phoenix violate the UDTPA by failing to clearly affirm or deny coverage. True, there is no letter in the record from Phoenix to plaintiff explaining the outcome of his 2019 claim, as there is regarding his 2017 claim. But after receiving the Vertex report, Crane spoke with plaintiff on the phone and communicated Phoenix’s position.

Section 75-1.1 permits a private unfair or deceptive practices claim based on insurance claims handling conduct listed in § 58-63-15(11), even when the insurer is exempt from chapter 58.

Watts Guerra LLC v. Series 1 of Oxford Ins. Co. Nc LLC · filed 2026-03-03(a)

Oxford’s argument that it is not subject to the Insurance Unfair Trade Practices Act is true, but unavailing. ... Given the holding in Gray, this Court concludes that Watts LLC has stated claims under chapter 75 for conduct that is also included in section 58-63-15(11).

Section 75-1.1 permits a claim based on an insurer’s prohibited settlement practices only if the claimant shows every element of an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

Murray v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1996-07-02

However, since § 58-63-15(11) is prescriptive, and does not constitute a cause of action in and of itself, the viability of plaintiff’s § 75-1.1 claim requires him to forecast evidence of each requisite element of an unfair and deceptive trade practice.

Section 75-1.1 provides a private remedy for conduct violating § 58-63-15(11), which is a per se unfair or deceptive trade practice.

Cash v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2000-04-04

“Violation of any form of conduct listed in § 58-63-15(11) operates as a per se instance of unfair and deceptive trade practice under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.”

Section 75-1.1(a) gives competitors a cause of action for unfair methods of competition affecting commerce; federal trademark or copyright infringement is not automatically a per se violation, and lack of intent or good faith does not by itself defeat a claim because marketplace effect is relevant.

Lyons v. Costumes · filed 2001-03-20(a)

The UDTPA provides a cause of action to competitors for "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). But to read the statute to create per se liability for violations of federal law would expand its scope beyond the apparent intent of the North Carolina legislature. ... And given that the legislature saw fit to state explicitly that state-law trademark infringement is a per se violation of the UDTPA, it surely would have enacted a similar provision relating to federal-law trademark and copyright infringement if it had believed that violations of those acts also constituted per se violations of the UDTPA.

A plaintiff claiming a violation of § 75-1.1 must prove an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately caused injury.

Dan King Plumbing Heating & Air Conditioning · filed 2022-01-18

In order to establish a violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, a plaintiff must show: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury to plaintiffs.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that injures the plaintiff; treble damages are automatic upon a violation.

La Michoacana Natural, LLC v. Maestre · filed 2019-06-06

“A claim under North Carolina’s UDTPA, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 , requires a showing that (1) defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce and (3) plaintiff was injured as a result. ... “Treble damages are assessed automatically upon a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.”

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury, and a used-car buyer’s “As Is—No Warranty” agreement does not by itself defeat a UDTPA claim at the pleading stage.

Sain v. Adams Auto Grp., Inc. · filed 2016-01-05

A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. A practice is deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive; proof of actual deception is not required. ... This Court held the fact that a purchaser signed an “As Is—No Warranty” agreement upon buying a used vehicle is not fatal to his or her claim for a violation of the UDTPA. ... Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, treating all factual allegations contained therein as true, sufficiently alleged a claim against defendant Adams for a violation of the UDTPA to survive Adams’ motion to dismiss. The portion of the trial court’s order dismissing Plaintiffs’ claim against Adams for unfair and deceptive trade practices is reversed and this cause remanded on that issue.

Section 75-1.1 permits individual liability for employees whose egregious acts outside their assigned duties otherwise qualify as unfair or deceptive practices in or affecting commerce, and is satisfied when trade-secret misappropriation meets the statute’s three elements.

Ge Betz, Inc. v. Conrad · filed 2013-12-03

Here, because individual defendants’ misappropriation of GE’s trade secrets met the three prongs necessary to find a defendant liable for violating section 75-1.1, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding individual defendants hable for violating section 75-1.1.

A claim under § 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury; unfairness and deception are judged by the stated standards, and the plaintiff need not show actual deception.

X-IT Products, L.L.C. v. Walter Kidde Portable Equipment, Inc. · filed 2001-07-09(a)

The essential elements of a cause of action under the NCUPTA include (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) in or affecting commerce; (3) that has proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or his business. ... An act is “unfair” under the statute if it “offends established public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” ... Similarly, an act is “deceptive” if it has the “capacity or tendency to deceive.” ... Whether a trade practice is unfair or deceptive depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and the impact the practice has on the marketplace. ... In addition, the plaintiff need not show that he was actually deceived.

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce and requires a plaintiff to show such an act, a commerce nexus, and proximate actual injury; factual issues are for the jury, while whether the facts violate the statute is a legal question.

Comer v. PERSON AUTO SALES, INC. · filed 2005-02-02(a)

In order to prevail in an UDTPA claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice ..., (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to plaintiff or to his business.” ... The court will then determine as a matter of law whether the proved facts amount to a violation of the statute. ... In North Carolina, it is a violation of the UDTPA for an employee of an auto dealership to make a statement to a customer leading the customer to believe that a vehicle has not been wrecked when the employee knows, to the contrary, that the vehicle has been wrecked. ... Further, a dealership has a duty to investigate the condition of a car if there are signs by which it reasonably should know of damage to the vehicle.

Section 75-1.1(a) makes unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce unlawful; a claim requires an unfair or deceptive act, conduct in or affecting commerce, proximate actual injury, and detrimental reliance on a deceptive statement or misrepresentation.

Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd. · filed 2003-06-17(a)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) provides that: “Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” ... “To prevail on a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices, a claimant must demonstrate the existence of three factors: ‘(1) 311 unfair or deceptive act or practice ... (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff....’” ... As to the element of proximate cause, this court has consistently held that liability under “Chapter 75 is limited to those situations when a plaintiff can show that plaintiff detrimentally relied upon a statement or misrepresentation and he or she ‘suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendant’s deceptive statement or misrepresentation.’ ”

Section 75-1.1(a) makes unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce unlawful; a private claimant must show an unfair or deceptive act or practice, that it was in or affected commerce, and proximate injury.

Page v. Lexington Insurance · filed 2006-04-18(a)

“In order to establish a violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, a plaintiff must show: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury to [the] plaintiff[].”

Section 75-1.1 requires a plaintiff to prove an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce and resulting injury.

Carter v. West American Insurance · filed 2008-05-20

To succeed on a claim for UDTP, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) in or affecting commerce; and (3) that plaintiff was injured thereby.” ... “A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” ... In sum, plaintiff has forecast no evidence that she was injured by any unfair or deceptive act on the part of defendants.

Section 75-1.1(a) makes unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce unlawful.

Shepard · filed 2026-05-20(a)

For a plaintiff to plead a Chapter 75 claim, he must show (1) that the defendant “engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice,” (2) that “the conduct was in or affecting commerce,” and (3) that the conduct “proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” ... As the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged multiple causes of action based in tort, they have stated a claim under Chapter 75.

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; a plaintiff must prove an unfair or deceptive act, a commerce nexus, and proximate actual injury, but need not prove fraud, bad faith, or intentional deception.

Vigus v. Milton A. Latta & Sons Dairy Farms, Inc. · filed 2009-05-19(a)

In North Carolina, "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) (2007). In order to prevail under this statute plaintiffs must prove: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) that the action in question was in or affecting commerce, (3) that said act proximately caused actual injury to plaintiff. Plaintiffs do not have to prove fraud, bad faith, or intentional deception, but proof of fraud necessarily constitutes a violation of the statute. In determining whether a representation is deceptive, its effect on the average consumer is considered. Conduct is unfair or deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive.