N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1

Section 75-1.1 does not make every instance of unfairness actionable; conduct must offend public policy or be unethical or unscrupulous, and the alleged removal from an email distribution list did not meet that standard.

Koukuntla v. Toll Brothers Real Estate, Inc. · filed 2025-02-24

The alleged removal of Plaintiff from the email distribution list does not offend public policy or rise to the level unethical or unscrupulous conduct.

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; a prima facie claim requires an unfair or deceptive act, conduct in or affecting commerce, and proximate injury.

B & M Realty, LLC v. Elam · filed 2025-04-24(a)

The UDTPA provides that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts of practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). “In order to establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” ... With respect to the first element, “[a] practice is unfair if it is unethical or unscrupulous, and it is deceptive if it has a tendency to deceive.” ... This undeniable fraud, which affected the commerce of renting the Properties, amounts to a violation of the UDTPA.

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, and a private claimant must prove an unfair or deceptive act, commerce, and proximate injury.

Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Ace American Insurance Company · filed 2025-07-15(a)

North Carolina declares as unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). ... “In order to establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” ... The determination of whether an act or practice is an unfair or deceptive practice that violates [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 75-1.1 is a question of law for the court. ... However, defendants’ decision to exercise their contractual right to effectuate settlement to avoid the risk presented by a jury verdict is not inherently inequitable. ... Accordingly, the court concludes there has been no violation of the UDTPA, and defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to this count.

A § 75-1.1 claim requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury; deception means a tendency to deceive, unfairness includes conduct contrary to public policy or that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers, and whether conduct violates the statute is a question of law for the court.

Oak Grove Techs., LLC v. Seventh Dimension, LLC · filed 2025-08-22

To state a UDTP claim, a plaintiff must allege that the “(1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656 (2001). “A practice is . . . deceptive if it has a tendency to deceive.” Id. “A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548 (1981). “The determination of whether an act or practice is an unfair or deceptive practice that violates N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 is a question of law for the court.” Krawiec, 370 N.C. at 612–13 (citation omitted).

A breach of contract supports a Chapter 75 claim only when substantial aggravating circumstances, such as fraudulent or deceptive conduct, are shown; mere nonperformance is insufficient.

AC Dev., LLC v. Edwards · filed 2025-07-16

“However, even considering these additional allegations, based on the facts alleged, there was insufficient evidence to support a claim under Chapter 75. ... “To recover for unfair and deceptive trade practices, a party must show substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach of contract.” ... “The record contains no evidence suggesting Defendants’ statements to this effect were deceitful when made. ... Plaintiff fails to produce any evidence from which a trier of fact could find and conclude Defendants’ representations were deceitful. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim and issue is affirmed.”

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in commerce and can apply when a landlord knowingly collects rent for uninhabitable residential premises.

Sawyer v. Billups · filed 2025-12-03(a)

It is unlawful to engage in “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) (2023). ... “Residential rental agreements fall within Chapter 75 because ‘the rental of residential housing is’ considered commerce pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.” ... Specifically, a UDTP claim may exist where a landlord continues to collect rent payments “after having knowledge of the uninhabitable nature” of the premises.

Section 75-1.1(a) can apply when a landlord collects rent for a residence the landlord knows is uninhabitable.

Horne v. Ginkgo Aurora LLC · filed 2025-12-03(a)

Collecting rent for a residence while knowing that the residence is uninhabitable can constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a).

A Chapter 75 claim requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce and injury; an intentional contract breach alone is insufficient, but computer trespass may support the claim.

Evergreen Builder Sols., LLC v. Taylor · filed 2025-12-29

To state a claim for relief under Chapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes for alleged unfair or deceptive conduct, “a plaintiff must show: (1) defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) in or affecting commerce; and (3) that plaintiff was injured thereby.” ... Though Evergreen’s breach of contract action premised upon the alleged disclosure of confidential information survives the motion to dismiss, that alone would not suffice to permit the UDTP cause of action to proceed. ... “[C]omputer trespass in violation of state law constitutes conduct ‘which a court of equity would consider unfair’” and may form the basis for a UDTP cause of action. ... Thus, the Court DENIES Price’s and Taylor’s motion to dismiss the UDTP cause of action.

Section 75-1.1 requires a UDTP plaintiff to show more than a mere breach of contract or a reasonable disagreement over insurance coverage.

Cardinal Financial Company, LP v. Investors Title Insurance Company, et al. · filed 2026-02-09

The Court will also allow Cardinal’s bad faith and UDTP claims to survive at this early stage of the lawsuit. While the Court agrees with Investors Title that Cardinal will ultimately be required to make a substantial showing beyond a breach of contract or a reasonable disagreement over insurance coverage to establish a bad faith or a UDTP claim, accepting Cardinal’s allegations as true, together with all permissible inferences, the Court declines to dismiss those claims now as a matter of law. Rather, the Court will consider the viability of the claims closely at Summary Judgment with the benefit of a full factual record following discovery (unless the Parties resolve this dispute sooner).

Section 75-1.1 makes unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce unlawful; a prima facie claim requires an unfair or deceptive act, conduct in or affecting commerce, and proximate injury, and a violation of § 58-63-15(11) is per se unfair or deceptive under § 75-1.1.

RestorePro Reconstruction, Inc. v. Simpson · filed 2026-04-15(a), (b)

The North Carolina UDTPA is codified under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 et seq. (2025). ... In order to establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.

Section 75-1.1(a) does not provide a remedy for claims concerning a contract’s existence, terms, or interpretation, and a fraud- or contract-invalidity-based claim also requires substantial aggravating circumstances.

Elrod v. WakeMed · filed 2021-09-22(a)

Here, where a valid contract governs the relationship between plaintiffs and defendant WakeMed, and where defendant Argos is alleged to have acted on behalf of WakeMed under the contract, the rights and remedies of the parties lie in contract law and not in unfair and deceptive trade practices. ... Second, where plaintiffs’ claims based in fraud and contract invalidity claims fail as a matter of law, plaintiffs unfair and deceptive trade practices asserted based upon the same underlying conduct also must be dismissed. See id. (stating “North Carolina law requires a showing of substantial aggravating circumstances to support a claim” for unfair and deceptive trade practices).

Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive trade practices in or affecting commerce, requiring unfairness or deceptive capacity and proximate actual injury.

Petersen v. State Employees Credit Union (In Re Kittrell) · filed 1990-05-31

Because the terms “unfair” and “deceptive” are not defined in the statute, the court must look to North Carolina case law for guidance. ... A practice is unfair when it offends public policy, as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. ... An act or practice is deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive. ... This court finds that the practices and actions of SECU herein described violate the public policy of protecting the retirement accounts of teachers and other state employees, have the tendency to deceive borrowers regarding their rights to their retirement accounts, and collectively constitute unfair and deceptive trade practices.

Section 75-1.1(a) reaches fraud or negligent misrepresentation and a broker’s failure to disclose material property information, while an undisclosed conflict of interest alone does not establish an unfair or deceptive practice absent evidence the broker negotiated the sales price.

John v. Robbins · filed 1991-04-24(a)

This court previously determined that the Johns have alleged fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices also survives Defendants’ motion for summary judgment because its foundation is Plaintiffs’ claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. ... Plaintiffs have nowhere alleged or shown evidence that Defendants negotiated the sales price of 132 Carolina Forest for them. As Plaintiffs fail to make any showing of this essential element of the claim, summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices based upon an alleged conflict of interests is proper. ... Consequently, Plaintiffs' allegation that the Merrill Lynch Defendants failed to disclose the square footage of the home states a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices sufficient to withstand Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Section 75-1.1 requires proof that the challenged conduct was unfair or deceptive, affected commerce, and caused actual injury, and it applies only when the alleged violator was engaged in commerce.

Silverman v. Miller (In Re Silverman) · filed 1993-03-12(a) (b)

To succeed under this statute, plaintiff must establish that the defendants’ actions were unfair or deceptive, affected commerce, and caused him actual injury. ... Section 75-1.1 does not apply to every transaction that might be viewed as unfair or deceptive. Rather, it applies only if the alleged violator is engaged in “commerce,” a term defined to include “all business activities, however denominated.” ... The parties’ submissions leave little doubt that the defendants were engaged in commerce when obtaining and structuring the Chloride deal. And, although the defendants sharply dispute plaintiff’s version of events, the court finds that he has submitted sufficient documentary evidence to create genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants’s actions were unfair or deceptive, and as to whether he was injured by these actions. Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to this claim.

Section 75-1.1 requires alleged and proven egregious or aggravating circumstances; an ordinary contract dispute or breach, without more, is not an unfair trade practice.

Allied Distributors, Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co. · filed 1993-10-08

Some type of egregious or aggravating circumstances must be alleged and proved before the statute’s provisions may be applied. ... Even a party who intentionally breaches a contract is not, without more, liable for such conduct under the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act. ... Latrobe’s conduct, as alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint, at most would be a violation of the Beer Franchise Law had plaintiffs stated a claim under that statute. Plaintiff have not pled any factual basis for a Chapter 75 claim upon which this court could find an unfair trade practice. ... For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have failed, as a matter of law, to state a claim for relief under N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury; an unfair practice offends public policy or is unethical or unscrupulous, and a deceptive practice has a tendency to deceive.

Marlen C. Robb & Son Boatyard & Marina, Inc. v. the Vessel Bristol · filed 1994-12-08

To prevail on a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices under Chapter 75, the claimant must show: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the claimant or his business. ... A practice is “unfair” when it offends established public policy and when the practice is unethical or unscrupulous, and is “deceptive” if it has a tendency to deceive. ... Evidence of negligence, good faith, or lack of intent are not defenses to an action under § 75-1.1. ... Defendant has failed to show the existence of an act or practice concerning plaintiff’s business policies that rises to the appellation “unfair” or “deceptive”. ... Although two former employees of the plaintiff testified as to a “policy^’ of disabling boats in order to keep them under repair, there was no evidence that such a policy was ever effected upon any unwary boat owners, including defendants. ... Second, the evidence presented does not indicate that any act by the plaintiffs employees, whether isolated or as part of the alleged practice, was unscrupulous or unethical, or had a tendency to deceive, to the point where it proximately caused injury to the defendants. ... Although within his rights to claim such a lien, to do so prior to notifying the defendants of their obligation to pay constitutes poor business judgment; that judgment, however, does not amount in this case to an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

Allegations that a bank represented it would guarantee a letter of credit, accepted a substantial commission, and later denied being a guarantor sufficiently state an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim under § 75-1.1.

A.C. Monk & Co. v. Ubaf Arab American Bank · filed 1995-01-31

The defendant also asserts that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices, under N.C.Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. ... The complaint alleges that the defendant’s acceptance of the significant commission, yet subsequent denial of its guarantor status constitutes a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices. ... That claim in the complaint is sufficiently stated to survive a motion to dismiss. ... Further, the complaint states a claim under N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1.

Proof of unfair claims practices automatically establishes an unfair or deceptive trade practice under § 75-1.1, but failure to prove unfair claims practices does not by itself defeat a related § 75-1.1 claim.

High Country Arts and Craft Guild v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company · filed 1997-10-17

While proof of unfair claims practices does constitute per se proof of an unfair or deceptive trade practice under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1, ... failure to prove unfair claims practices does not independently necessitate judgment as a matter of law against a related claim for unfair trade practices.

Section 75-1.1 does not support an unfair-and-deceptive-trade-practices claim when the defendant's conduct neither had a tendency to deceive nor actually deceived the plaintiff.

Forrest Drive Associates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1999-09-17

Plaintiffs seventh and final claim for relief is that the alleged actions of defendant as set out in the previous claims amounted to unfair and deceptive trade practices because they had the tendency to and did deceive and mislead plaintiff. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1. For the reasons set out previously, defendant’s actions neither had the tendency to deceive plaintiff, nor actually did so. Plaintiffs claim fails and summary judgment should be granted for defendant.

Section 75-1.1 requires proof of an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately caused actual injury, and deception requires only a capacity or tendency to deceive rather than actual deception.

Basnight v. Diamond Developers, Inc. · filed 2001-03-29

A party claiming a violation of section 75-1.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes must prove: “ ‘(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or his business.’ ” ... A practice is unfair or deceptive when “it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” ... “A practice is deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive the average consumer, but proof of actual deception is not required.”

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce; expensive, high-risk loan terms are not unfair when they are disclosed, accepted, and do not amount to predatory or unconscionable conduct.

Whitaker v. Mortgage Miracles, Inc. (In Re Summit Place, LLC) · filed 2002-11-04(a)

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1(a) provides in pertinent part: “Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” ... A practice is “unfair” when it offends established public policy and when the practice is unethical or unscrupulous, and is “deceptive” if it has a tendency to deceive. ... The terms of Mortgage Miracles’ loan are certainly expensive, but they are not predatory nor unconscionable nor unfair. ... The court finds that Mortgage Miracles’ fees and rates here are not such that they constitute an unfair trade practice. ... For these reasons the court finds that the Trustee has failed to demonstrate that Mortgage Miracles actions or its terms were unfair or deceptive trade practices pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1 et seq.

A party bringing a § 75-1.1 claim against an insurance company need not also allege a violation of § 58-63-15.

Cincinnati Insurance v. Centech Building Corp. · filed 2003-10-02

In so doing, the Court is mindful of the fact that in North Carolina "the remedy for a violation of section 58-63-15 is the filing of a section 75-1.1 claim. There is no requirement, however, that a party bringing a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices against an insurance company allege a violation of section 58-63-15 in order to bring a claim pursuant to section 75-1.1.” Country Club of Johnston County, Inc. v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 150 N.C.App. 231, 244, 563 S.E.2d 269, 278 (2002) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted). In this instance, however, except for attempting to impute the action of Massey to Plaintiffs, DDG has provided no evidence, save for unsupported assertions in its response brief, that Cincinnati’s actions, as opposed to those of Massey, were violative of section 75-1.1 in some way other than the alleged Chapter 58 violations. The Court’s grant of summary judgment is therefore effective against any and all alleged violations of North Carolina General Statutes section 75-1.1 that DDG has asserted against Cincinnati.

Section 75-1.1 broadly prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce, and conduct specifically prohibited by the Debt Collection Act may also violate it when occurring outside debt collection.

DirecTV, Inc. v. Cephas · filed 2003-12-02

Although DIRECTV cannot be directly liable under the NCDCA, provisions of that statute provide examples of behavior that will be considered unfair and deceptive within the broader scope of the UDTPA’s restrictions. ... Therefore, acts directly prohibited by sections 75-51 and 75-54 of the NCDCA in the specific context of debt collection may also be prohibited as general business practices under the UDTPA.

Section 75-1.1 treats a warranty breach as actionable only when particularly egregious or accompanied by deceptive conduct in commerce that proximately causes actual injury.

McDonald Bros., Inc. v. Tinder Wholesale, LLC · filed 2005-04-06

North Carolina statutes declare unlawful “unfair and deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1. To state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant committed “an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition”; (2) “in or affecting commerce”; (3) “which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff.” ... It is clear, however, that like a breach of contract, a mere breach of warranty does not constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice. ... Instead, a breach must be particularly egregious to permit recovery under § 75-1.1. ... In this case, Plaintiffs allegations closely resemble, but are more egregious than, those in Barbee. ... Thus, Plaintiff alleges a similar bad-faith denial of the warranty as found in Barbee, which, if true, would constitute an unfair trade practice. Plaintiff also alleges facts such as Defendant’s misrepresentations that it would honor the warranty, which could have a tendency to deceive. Count Five, therefore, sufficiently states a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices under § 75-1.1.

A practice violates § 75-1.1 when it has the capacity to deceive or is unfair because it violates established public policy, and actual deception is not required.

State ex rel. Cooper v. Nccs Loans, Inc. · filed 2005-11-01

"In order to establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff." ... "The determination of whether an act or practice is an unfair or deceptive practice that violates N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 is a question of law for the court." ... "[A] practice is deceptive if it has the tendency to deceive.... `[A] practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.'... Moreover, where a party engages in conduct manifesting an inequitable assertion of power or position, such conduct constitutes an unfair act or practice." ... "Proof of actual deception is not necessary; it is enough that the statements had the capacity to deceive." ... "We conclude that defendants' contracts \"had the capacity to deceive.\"" ... "violations of statutes designed to protect the consuming public and violations of established public policy may constitute unfair and deceptive practices." ... "Defendants' practice of offering usurious loans was a clear violation of this policy. We conclude that the trial court did not err by ruling as a matter of law that this constitutes unfair or deceptive trade practices, in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1 (2003)."

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury.

Anderson v. Brokers, Inc. (In Re Brokers, Inc.) · filed 2007-03-08

Under North Carolina law, the elements of a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices (“UDTP”) are: “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or to his business.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1 (2005); ... An essential inquiry of a UDTP claim is whether the behavior at issue affected commerce. ... To “affect commerce,” a defendant’s allegedly deceptive acts must have a tangible effect on the marketplace. ... Therefore, summary judgment must be denied on the UDTP claims as to both Anderson and Hodge.

Section 75-1.1 leaves the jury to decide whether defendants committed the alleged acts, while the court decides whether those proven facts amount to an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation · filed 2008-09-26

Under North Carolina law, whether the defendant committed the alleged acts is a question of fact for the jury, but whether the proven facts constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice is a question of law for the court. See United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 370 S.E.2d 375, 389 (1988) ("under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, it is a question for the jury as to whether the defendants committed the alleged acts, and then it is a question of law for the court as to whether these proven facts constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice.").

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury; a breach of warranty alone is insufficient without egregious or aggravating circumstances.

Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific LLC · filed 2009-09-30

To state a claim under the UDTPA, plaintiff must show (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice (2) in or affecting commerce (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or to his business. ... Under North Carolina law, a breach of warranty alone is insufficient to state a UDTPA claim. ... Rather, a party must allege some type of egregious or aggravating circumstances.

A violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-63-15 is, as a matter of law, also a violation of § 75-1.1.

Cleveland Construction, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance · filed 2011-04-29

Violations of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 58-63-15 are violations of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1 as a matter of law.

Section 75-1.1 requires proof of an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury, and defines commerce broadly to include all business activities except learned-profession services.

Old Republic National Title Insurance v. Welch (In re Oakes) · filed 2013-07-02(b)

To establish a violation of N.C. GemStat. § 75-1.1 and state a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices, a party must demonstrate: “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice by the defendant, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to plaintiff.” ... N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-l.l(b) defines “commerce” as follows: “ ‘Commerce’ includes all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” ... North Carolina courts “have construed the term ‘commerce’ broadly, encompassing more than mere business activity between sellers and buyers.” ... Additionally, the applicability of the UDTPA is not limited to cases only involving consumers.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or unfair method of competition, in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury to the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s business.

In re Residential Capital, LLC · filed 2014-04-14

The elements of a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of UDTPA are: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition; (2) in or affecting commerce; (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or to his business.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce and actual injury proximately caused by the defendant’s misrepresentation or unfair conduct.

Forshaw Industries, Inc. v. Insurco, Ltd. · filed 2014-03-04

To prevail on a claim of unfair or deceptive trade practices, a plaintiff must show that defendants: (1) committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) in or affecting commerce; and (3) that plaintiff suffered an actual injury as a proximate result of defendant’s misrepresentations or unfair conduct.

Section 75-1.1 requires evidence that a practice is unfair or has a tendency or capacity to mislead.

Overstreet v. Brookland, Inc. · filed 1981-06-16(a)

We find that our decision as to the issue of fraud in this case is substantially dispositive of plaintiffs’ alleged cause of action based upon unfair or deceptive trade practices in violation of G.S. 75-1.1. ... We do not find that plaintiffs have shown that defendant’s acts in this case meet any of these criteria, and therefore, we hold that the trial judge properly granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on this cause of action.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover a tenant’s intentional burning of leased property as an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

Threatt v. Hiers · filed 1985-09-03

The alleged acts of the deceased do not constitute unfair and deceptive trade practices within the intended purpose of the statute. Thus, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Chapter 75 of the General Statutes.

In a § 75-1.1 claim, the jury finds the facts and the court decides whether those facts establish an unfair or deceptive act.

Chastain v. Wall · filed 1985-12-17

In cases under G.S. 75-1.1 and 75-16 the jury finds facts and based on the jury’s findings, the court then determines as a matter of law whether the defendant’s conduct violated G.S. 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 provides a remedy for unfair or deceptive insurance practices, but an insurer’s investigation and denial of a claim do not support relief without evidence of unethical, oppressive, or deceptive conduct.

Marshburn v. AssociatEd Indemnity Corp. · filed 1987-02-17

Plaintiffs’ claim for relief under Chapter 75 must also fail. G.S. 75-1.1 provides, in pertinent part, that “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful” and has been held to provide a remedy for unfair and deceptive trade practices in the insurance industry. ... Our review of the record does not reveal the existence of any facts which would create any genuine issue that the manner in which defendant conducted its investigation, or its subsequent denial of plaintiffs’ claim, was unethical, oppressive or deceptive in any way.

Under § 75-1.1, the jury ordinarily determines the facts, and the court decides whether those facts establish an unfair or deceptive practice in trade or commerce.

La Notte, Inc. v. New Way Gourmet, Inc. · filed 1986-12-16

In cases under G.S. 75-1.1 and G.S. 75-16, it is ordinarily for the jury to determine the facts, and based on the jury’s findings, the court must then determine as a matter of law whether the defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.

Section 75-1.1 leaves factual findings to the jury, while the court decides whether those facts establish a violation.

Medina v. Town and Country Ford, Inc. · filed 1987-05-19

“In cases under G.S. 75-1.1 and 75-16, it is ordinarily the province of the jury to find the facts, and based on the jury’s findings the court must then determine as a matter of law whether the defendant’s conduct violated G.S. 75-1.1.” ... The court here, however, improperly submitted this question directly to the jury.

Under § 75-1.1, the jury decides whether the alleged acts occurred, and the court decides whether the proven facts constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall · filed 1988-07-28

Furthermore, under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, it is a question for the jury as to whether the defendants committed the alleged acts, and then it is a question of law for the court as to whether these proven facts constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

A § 75-1.1 claim supported by the evidence must be submitted to the jury with an instruction on unfair and deceptive trade practices.

Barber v. Woodmen of World Life Insurance Society · filed 1989-09-05

In the instant case the trial court failed to submit to the jury and subsequently failed to instruct the jury on the issue of unfair and deceptive trade practices as it related to the $10,000 policy. This was error.

Section 75-1.1 leaves the jury to find the facts and the court to decide whether those facts constitute an unfair or deceptive practice.

Tudor Associates, Ltd., II v. AJ & AJ Servicing, Inc. · filed 1993-09-07

Finally, under North Carolina law the jury only finds the facts which might support a cause of action under the Fair Trade Act, and whether the facts found constitute an unfair or deceptive practice under all the circumstances is a question of law for the court.

Section 75-1.1 does not make a bank’s failure to warn a contractor of funding trouble or its suspension of funding unfair or deceptive when the financing agreements disclaim any duty to the contractor.

Metric Constructors v. Bank of Tokyo · filed 2000-09-13

We agree with the magistrate judge that these allegations, when measured against the express terms of the Project financing agreements, do not give rise to unfair or deceptive practices under the North Carolina statute.

Section 75-1.1 unfair trade practice issues are questions of law for the court, based on the jury’s answers to interrogatories.

Pack Brothers Paint and Body Shop v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 2003-04-01

Unfair trade practice issues are a matter of law for the Court to decide based on interrogatories answered by the jury; the jury did not answer the unfair trade practices interrogatories favorably for plaintiffs.

An amendment adding a § 75-1.1 claim is futile when the record contains no evidence supporting unfair or deceptive trade practices.

Wilkerson v. Duke University · filed 2013-09-17

There is also no evidence in the record to support the claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices. See Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 352 N.C. 61, 68, 529 S.E.2d 676, 681 (2000) (“In order to establish a violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, a plaintiff must show: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury to plaintiffs.”). The trial court properly denied the motion to amend the complaint based upon the futility of these amendments as well.

Section 75-1.1 requires a deceptive act to cause actual adverse impact to be actionable; merely theoretical harm is insufficient.

Miller v. Ensley · filed 1988-02-16

Not every commercial transaction resulting in litigation forms a basis for an action under Chapter 75, and every false statement does not constitute a “deceptive” act under Chapter 75. To be actionable under Chapter 75, an act of deception must have some adverse impact on the individual or entity deceived. In the case below, Pharr’s “deception,” that he was the owner of the tracts did not affect Miller’s rights adversely. Miller was able to protect his rights by a lien claim under Chapter 44A. Thus, the harm caused by Pharr’s deception was, at most, theoretical, and not actual.

Section 75-1.1 claims require the plaintiff to incur actual damage as an essential element.

Piedmont Institute of Pain Management v. Staton Foundation · filed 2003-05-20

“Certain torts require as an essential element . . . that plaintiff incur actual damage.” ... Relevant to the present case, these torts include: ... and (5) unfair and deceptive trade practices, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (2002).

Section 75-1.1 requires a private UDTPA claimant to prove actual reliance on the defendant’s representation.

McManus v. Sturm Foods Inc. · filed 2013-08-26

Relief under the North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA) requires actual reliance. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1; Williams v. United Cmty. Bank, — N.C.App. —, 724 S.E.2d 543, 549 (2012). “Actual reliance is demonstrated by evidence [the] plaintiff acted or refrained from acting in a certain manner due to [the] defendant’s representations.” Id. (citing Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc., 120 N.C.App. 650, 662, 464 S.E.2d 47 (1995)) (inquiring into whether plaintiffs had actually seen alleged misrepresentations, and whether the misrepresentations played any role in their decision making). Because the UDTPA unambiguously requires actual reliance, and because the proposed class likely includes great swaths of purchasers who did not rely on Defendants’ alleged misrepresentation, the North Carolina class is also fatally overbroad.

A violation of another statute or regulation is not automatically a violation of § 75-1.1(a); it supports a UDTPA claim only when the other law designates the violation as a UDTPA violation or specifically defines and proscribes unfair or deceptive conduct.

Cross v. Formativ Health Management, Inc. · filed 2020-02-03(a)

Here, neither HITECH, nor the Privacy Rule and HHS guidance interpreting it as described by plaintiffs in their complaint, specifically designate that a violation thereof is also a violation of the UDTPA. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 45-55). Likewise, neither specifically defines and proscribes conduct which is unfair or deceptive within the meaning of the UDTPA. Rather, as described by plaintiffs in the complaint, the Privacy Rule and HHS guidance interpreting it, sets forth guidelines for calculating fees that covered entities may charge patients for medical records. (Id.). It does not specifically define and proscribe “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, where plaintiffs’ UDTPA claim is premised upon a violation of federal law, but such violations of federal law are not unfair or deceptive within the meaning of the UDTPA, plaintiffs’ UDTPA claim must be dismissed as a matter of law.

Section 75-1.1 applies to violations of the Trade Secrets Protection Act when the violation satisfies the statute’s requirements, even though Chapter 66 does not specifically list that Act as subject to section 75-1.1.

Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Services, Inc. · filed 1992-12-01

We, therefore, reject plaintiffs’ limited interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 and hold it to be applicable to violations of the Trade Secrets Protection Act.

A violation of HITECH or the Privacy Rule does not automatically constitute an unfair or deceptive act under § 75-1.1; the predicate law must specifically designate the violation as a UDTPA violation or define conduct that is unfair or deceptive within the UDTPA's meaning.

Cross v. Ciox Health, LLC · filed 2020-02-03(a)

In sum, plaintiffs’ UDTPA claim fails as a matter of law because a violation of HITECH or the Privacy Rule is not an unfair and deceptive act under the meaning of the UDTPA, and because plaintiffs have not otherwise alleged an unfair and deceptive act by defendants.

Section 75-1.1 permits a plaintiff to seek relief for violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-63-15(11).

Ballard v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company · filed 2024-02-02

Nonetheless, a plaintiff may obtain relief for violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-63-15(11) under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.

A private personnel service’s violation of N.C.G.S. § 95-47.6(2) or (9) constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice under § 75-1.1.

Winston Realty Co., Inc. v. GHG, INC. · filed 1985-07-03

We find this reasoning persuasive and hold that a violation of either or both N.C.G.S. §§ 95-47.6(2) and (9) as a matter of law constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.

Failing to explain a buyer’s cancellation rights orally while providing a defective cancellation notice violates § 75-1.1.

Eastern Roofing & Aluminum Co. v. Brock · filed 1984-09-18

Defendants contend that plaintiffs failure to comply with 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(e), by in fact failing to orally explain to defendants their rights to cancel at the time the agreement was signed, coupled with the defective notice of cancellation which was incomplete and unattached to the contract in violation of G.S. 25A-40(b) and 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(b), constitute an unfair and deceptive act in violation of G.S. 75-1.1. We agree.

Technical violations of federal regulations do not, without substantial aggravating circumstances, establish an unfair trade practice under § 75-1.1(a).

Jacobs v. Central Transport · filed 1996-05-03(a)

Not every technical violation of a federal regulation constitutes a violation of public policy. ... We see no substantially aggravating circumstances to justify trebling Central Transport's contract damages.

A bank’s strict liability under the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, without more, does not constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice under § 75-1.1 when the bank lacked actual knowledge or bad faith.

Moretz v. Miller · filed 1997-06-17

In short, we hold SNB’s violation of the concluding portion of G.S. § 32-9, without more (particularly in view of the jury’s factual determination of the absence of actual knowledge or bad faith by SNB), did not constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice under G.S. § 75-1.1.

An automatic-renewal statute violation does not by itself violate section 75-1.1; the conduct must amount to an unfair or deceptive practice.

Perkins v. The New York Times Company · filed 2023-05-23

Many sections of Chapter 75, not including the ARS, expressly provide that a violation of their terms also violates section 75-1.1. ... Other claims may fall within section 75-1.1 if they effect an unfair or deceptive practice on the consuming public. ... The text of section 75-41 does not reference section 75-1.1, and its only express remedy provides that a violation of the ARS “renders the automatic renewal clause void and unenforceable.”

Violations of North Carolina alcohol statutes and regulations are not per se violations of § 75-1.1.

Noble v. HOOTERS OF GREENVILLE (NC), LLC · filed 2009-08-18(a)

Accordingly, we decline to hold that a violation of the provisions of Chapter 18B or 4 N.C.A.C. § 2S is a per se violation of the UDTPA.

Section 75-1.1 covers residential rentals because renting residential housing is commerce, and a landlord’s failure to maintain habitable premises while collecting rent may constitute an unfair trade practice.

Creekside Apartments v. Poteat · filed 1994-08-16

Chapter 75 applies to residential rentals because the rental of residential housing is commerce pursuant to § 75-1.1.

Residential rental of property is activity “in or affecting commerce” under § 75-1.1, so a landlord may be liable for unfair or deceptive trade practices even when operating on a small scale.

Stolfo v. Kernodle · filed 1995-04-18(b)

Given the broad consumer protection intent of the statute, combined with case law and the General Assembly’s inclusive definition of the term “commerce,” we hold that the Kernodles’ rental of residential property is “in or affecting commerce.” Therefore, they can be hable under G.S. 75-1.1 if at trial they are shown to have committed unfair or deceptive trade practices. The trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the issue of liability under G.S. 75-1.1 is reversed; the case is remanded for trial.

Section 75-1.1 applies to residential rental housing because renting residential housing is commerce.

Friday v. United Dominion Realty Trust, Inc. · filed 2003-01-21(a)

This Court has previously held that, “Chapter 75 applies to residential rentals because the rental of residential housing is commerce pursuant to § 75-1.1.”

Under the pre-1977 version of § 75-1.1, residential rental housing is trade or commerce, and a landlord’s trespass and conversion of a tenant’s property can violate the section.

Love v. Pressley · filed 1977-12-07(a)

Thus we hold that the rental of residential housing is “trade or commerce” under G.S. 75-1.1. ... We hold that defendant’s conduct constituted unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce contrary to the provisions of G.S. 75-1.1 and affirm the award of treble damages to plaintiffs pursuant to G.S. 75-16.

Section 75-1.1 covers rental of mobile home park spaces; a private claimant cannot recover both breach of contract and statutory damages for the same conduct, and a good faith contractual failure does not support treble damages absent notice that the conduct violates the section.

Marshall v. Miller · filed 1980-07-15(a)

We now hold that rental of spaces in a mobile home park is also “trade or commerce” within the meaning of the statute. ... Where the same course of conduct gives rise to a traditionally recognized cause of action, as, for example, an action for breach of contract, and as well gives rise to a cause of action for violation of G.S. 75-1.1, damages may be recovered either for the breach of contract, or for violation of G.S. 75-1.1, but not for both. ... In the latter type of case, however, treble damages should not be assessed against a defendant who acts in good faith where he is not otherwise on notice that his conduct violates G.S. 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover landlord padlocking procedures that neither offend established public policy nor constitute an immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious practice.

Spinks v. Taylor · filed 1981-06-02

We agree with the Court of Appeals and hold that G.S. 75-1.1 is inapplicable to the facts of the case before us. We cannot say that defendant’s padlocking procedures offend “established public policy” or constitute a practice which is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.”

Section 75-1.1 permits a jury to find an unfair trade practice when a landlord seeks rent for an uninhabitable home despite repeated notices of its condition.

Allen v. Simmons · filed 1990-08-07

We hold on this record that a jury could find that plaintiff committed an unfair trade practice and the trial court erred in not submitting the factual issues to the jury.

Section 75-1.1 applies to residential leasing, and a tenant is a consumer under the statute.

Stanley v. Moore · filed 1994-02-01

It is also clear that a tenant is a consumer for purposes of the Act and that the leasing of residential property is within the purview of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574 (1977), disc. review denied, 294 N.C. 441, 241 S.E.2d 843 (1978), and that N.C.G.S. § 42-40(3) defines “landlord” as “any owner and any rental management company, rental agency, or any other person having the actual or apparent authority of an agent to perform the duties imposed by this Article.”

Section 75-1.1 may cover a landlord’s self-help eviction that violates the Ejectment of Residential Tenants Act.

Stanley v. Moore · filed 1995-03-03

Accordingly, it is clear that conduct which violates the Ejectment of Residential Tenants Act may also constitute a violation of the Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act, thus giving rise to an award of treble damages and attorney’s fees under that Act.

Section 75-1.1 covers residential rentals because renting residential housing is commerce.

Pierce v. Reichard · filed 2004-03-16

Chapter 75 applies to residential rentals because the rental of residential housing is commerce pursuant to § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not make a contractual dispute automatically an unfair or deceptive trade practice; substantial aggravating circumstances are required to support a claim.

Taylor v. United States · filed 2014-03-19

This conduct alleged, however, is not of the type actionable under the UDT-PA. ... “North Carolina law requires a showing of ' ‘substantial aggravating circumstances’ to support a claim” under the UDTPA. ... Thus, a defendant’s conduct in exercising perceived rights and remedies under a contractual agreement with another party, even if allegedly contrary to the to the terms of the agreement, does not form the basis for a UDTPA claim.

A mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not enough by itself to support an unfair-or-deceptive-trade-practices claim under § 75-1.1.

Wachovia Bank & Trust Co v. Carrington Development Associates · filed 1995-07-18

As this Court has said: “[A] mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under N.C.G.S. 75-1.1.”

A mere breach of contract, even an intentional one, does not violate § 75-1.1; a claim requires substantial aggravating circumstances, and disputes over an agreement's existence, terms, or interpretation belong in contract law.

Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. · filed 1998-08-19

Likewise, the district court should not have allowed the UTPA claim to piggyback on plaintiffs' breach of contract action. ... North Carolina courts have repeatedly held that "a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under [the UTPA,] N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1." ... North Carolina law requires a showing of "substantial aggravating circumstances" to support a claim under the UTPA. ... And "the courts have consistently recognized that § 75-1.1 does not cover every dispute between two parties. The courts differentiate between contract and deceptive trade practice claims, and relegate claims regarding the existence of an agreement, the terms contained in an agreement, and the interpretation of an agreement to the arena of contract law." ... Given the contractual center of this dispute, plaintiffs' UTPA claims are out of place.

A breach of contract accompanied by sufficiently aggravating circumstances may constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.

Garlock v. Henson · filed 1993-10-05

Defendant’s conduct in this matter was sufficiently aggravating to support the trial court’s conclusion that defendant violated G.S. § 75-1.1.

A mere breach of contract, even if intentional, does not support a § 75-1.1 claim without substantial aggravating circumstances.

Eastover Ridge, L.L.C v. Metric Constructors, Inc. · filed 2000-08-01

“The plaintiff must show “substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach to recover under the Act, which allows for treble damages.” ... Therefore, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to show sufficient aggravating circumstances to establish a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices.”

Section 75-1.1 does not require an enforceable agreement and is not barred by the absence of one, but conduct during negotiations must include sufficiently egregious or immoral circumstances to support a claim.

Big Red, LLC v. Davines S.P.A. · filed 2002-03-21

Lest there be any confusion, we do not hold that an enforceable agreement is a prerequisite to or an element of a claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, or an absolute defense to one; it is neither. We merely hold that Big Red has failed to allege that Davines committed acts or practices that are sufficiently egregious or immoral as to state a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices Act. In reaching this conclusion, we are counseled, as we should be, by North Carolina precedent which informs us that the fact that the alleged acts or practices occurred in the context of contract negotiations for a contract that the North Carolina Legislature has decreed must be in writing is a relevant consideration in the determination of whether unfair or deceptive practices have been perpetrated by one sophisticated business upon another.

A breach of contract or warranty, without substantial aggravating circumstances, does not constitute a violation of Chapter 75.

Mitchell v. Linville · filed 2001-12-28

In the instant case, the findings concerning the structural defects in plaintiffs’ home and subsequent award of damages based upon such defects, while certainly supportive of the conclusion that defendants breached the implied warranty of habitability, do not indicate “substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach” as to transform defendants’ actions into a Chapter 75 violation.

A mere breach of contract, without substantial aggravating circumstances, is not an unfair or deceptive trade practice under § 75-1.1.

Horack v. Southern Real Estate Co. of Charlotte, Inc. · filed 2002-05-21

However, this note and the other purported “aggravating circumstances” offered into evidence, none of which were substantial, lack the sufficiency needed to allow submission of an unfair or deceptive trade practice claim to a jury.

A breach of contract accompanied by aggravating factors can satisfy a claim under § 75-1.1.

Johnson v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance · filed 2005-09-20

Therefore, where the jury found that there was a breach of contract accompanied by aggravating factors, it was proper for the judge to conclude as a matter of law that a claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 had been satisfied.

A mere breach of contract is not an unfair or deceptive act under § 75-1.1, and recovery requires substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach.

Belviso v. Rosenke · filed 2009-09-01

A mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not an unfair or deceptive act under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (2007). Mosley & Mosley Builders v. Landin Ltd., 97 N.C. App. 511, 518, 389 S.E.2d 576, 580 (1990). "[A] plaintiff must show substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach to recover under the Act." Ace Chemical Corp. v. DSI Transports, Inc., 115 N.C. App. 237, 247, 446 S.E.2d 100, 106 (1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted). ... Plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to show that Arn's conduct rose to the level of "egregious or aggravating circumstances" to support an unfair or deceptive practices claim. Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 658, 548 S.E.2d 704, 712 (2001) (citations omitted). The trial court properly granted Arn and Home Spec summary judgment on this issue.

Section 75-1.1 does not support a UDTP claim for a mere breach of contract, even intentional, without substantial aggravating circumstances; a loan officer's mistake in failing to read an operating agreement is not enough.

Peak Coastal Ventures, L.L.C. v. Suntrust Bank · filed 2011-05-05

A mere breach of contract, even if intentional, cannot support a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices absent substantial aggravating circumstances. Id. at 62, 418 S.E.2d at 700. The Court agrees that Plaintiff has not pled any aggravating circumstances that would elevate a normal breach of contract dispute to a claim covered by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. A loan officer making a mistake in not reading PEAK Coastal’s Operating Agreement is not such a circumstance. (See Compl. ¶¶ 23, 34.)

Section 75-1.1 does not make a mere breach of contract an unfair or deceptive act; egregious or aggravating circumstances are required.

D.G. II, LLC v. Nix · filed 2011-07-05

“Under [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 75-1.1, an act or practice is unfair if it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. An act or practice is deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive.” ... “Under section 75-1.1, amere breach of contract does not constitute an unfair or deceptive act. Egregious or aggravating circumstances must be alleged before the provisions of the Act may take effect.” ... “Therefore, while the facts in the instant case clearly support plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract, they are not sufficiently “egregious or aggravating” to support a claim for UDP. Therefore, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants engaged in an unfair or deceptive act, and defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for UDP.”

A mere breach of contract, even intentional, does not violate § 75-1.1; the plaintiff must show substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach.

Birtha v. Stonemor, North Carolina, LLC · filed 2012-05-01

“a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.” ... “[P]laintiff[s] must show substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach to recover under the Act.”

Section 75-1.1(a) does not support a claim based only on alleged aggravating circumstances accompanying a breach of contract when the jury found no breach and no independent unfair or deceptive conduct.

Suntrust Bank v. Bryant/Sutphin Properties, LLC · filed 2012-09-18(a)

In summary, defendants have not shown any conduct upon which a Section 75-1.1(a) claim could stand except for a breach of contract claim. As the jury found that plaintiff had not breached the applicable contracts, defendants have no viable claim under Section 75-1.1(a). Accordingly, the trial court erred in entering an award on defendant BSP’s claim for Section 75-1.1(a).

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury; a mere breach of contract, even an intentional one, is insufficient without substantial aggravating circumstances.

Forest2market, Inc. v. Arcogent, Inc. · filed 2016-01-05

To state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 et seq. (“Chapter 75”), “a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” ... A party must therefore show “substantial aggravating circumstances” accompanying the breach of contract to sustain its Chapter 75 claim.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury; a mere breach of contract is insufficient without substantial aggravating circumstances.

Superior Performers, Inc. v. Phelps · filed 2016-01-05

Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are prohibited. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (“UDTPA”). To state a claiin for unfair' or deceptive trade practices, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) the defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintifff] or to the plaintiff[’s] business.” ... As the Fourth Circuit has explained, “North Carolina courts have repeatedly held that ‘a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under [the! UTPA,] N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.’ ” ... Instead, a plaintiff must show “substantial aggravating circumstances” to recover under the UDTPA.

Section 75-1.1 generally does not reach a breach of contract, even an intentional one, absent egregious or aggravating circumstances such as clear deception.

Post v. Avita Drugs, LLC · filed 2017-10-11

A section 75-1.1 claim may not be based on the “existence of an agreement, the terms contained in the agreement, and the interpretation of an agreement.” ... Thus, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has repeatedly stressed that a section 75-1.1 violation “is unlikely to occur during the course of contractual performance.” ... Only where the circumstances of the breach exhibit clear deception are they sufficiently egregious to impose section 75-1.1 liability. ... The Court therefore concludes that the facts alleged in the complaint, even if proven, do not constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice. ... These terms—and not section 75-1.1—define the parties’ rights and obligations, as well as the remedies for the alleged breaches.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury, and egregious conduct such as destroying or concealing documents and making false statements may make a contract breach actionable under the statute.

Window Gang Ventures, Corp. v. Salinas · filed 2019-04-02

To state a claim under the UDTPA, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) [that the] defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” ... Contrary to Defendants’ contention, this is the sort of egregious and aggravating conduct attendant to a contract breach that courts have found will sustain a claim under section 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury; a mere breach of contract, even an intentional one, is insufficient without egregious or aggravating circumstances.

Global Hookah Distributors, Inc. v. Avior, Inc. · filed 2019-07-25

To sustain a UDTPA claim, Plaintiff must show that: 1) Defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, that (2) was in or affecting commerce, which (3) proximately caused actual injury to it. ... However, “[a] mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under the UDTPA.” ... Instead, “in the context of a contractual relationship, a party must allege ‘[e]gregious or aggravating circumstances’ in addition to the underlying breach of contract.”

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury, and a mere breach of contract is insufficient without substantial aggravating circumstances.

CS Technology, Inc. v. Horizon River Technologies, LLC · filed 2020-08-06

A claim for unfair or deceptive acts or practices under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 requires “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury to plaintiffs.” ... “A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” ... “[A] practice is deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive.” ... “The determination as to whether an act is unfair or deceptive is a question of law for the court.” ... “The Court concludes that the parties have failed to show substantial aggravating circumstances surrounding the alleged breaches of contract to support their claims under section 75-1.1.” ... Therefore, the Court dismisses the parties’ claims for unfair or deceptive acts or practices under section 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce and requires an unfair or deceptive act, a commerce nexus, proximate actual injury, and substantial aggravating circumstances when the claim is based on breach of contract.

HOOKER v. THE CITADEL SALISBURY LLC · filed 2022-05-25

The UDTPA bars any “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. To sustain a UDTPA claim, Plaintiff must show that: (1) Defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, that (2) was in or affecting commerce, which (3) proximately caused actual injury to it. A breach of contract alone, even if intentional, does not support a UDTPA claim. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Carrington Development Associates, 459 S.E.2d 17, 21 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995). Instead, “substantial aggravating circumstances” must be present to maintain a UDTPA claim. Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 418 S.E.2d 694, 700 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Bartolomeo v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 889 F.2d 530, 535 (4th Cir. 1989)).

A breach of contract—even an intentional one—does not support a § 75-1.1 claim without substantial aggravating circumstances; conclusory allegations of invoice deception are insufficient.

Lowes Companies, Inc. v. Ferrandino and Son, Inc. · filed 2022-07-25

The Court cannot find sufficient aggravating circumstances based merely on the fact that Lowe’s audit uncovered discrepancies in Ferrandino’s invoices, even allegedly “intentional” breaches of contract.

A mere breach of contract does not violate § 75-1.1, but concealment, deception, deterrence of investigation, and systematic overcharging may constitute aggravating and egregious circumstances supporting a UDTPA claim when they proximately cause injury.

Foodbuy, LLC v. Gregory Packaging, Inc. · filed 2022-08-04

These findings of fact and the evidence supporting them establish that Foodbuy attempted to conceal its breach, deterred further investigation by GPI, employed deceptive practices for the purpose of continuing to receive the benefits of the Agreement, and engaged in systemically overcharging more than the Agreement allows. ... Collectively, these facts demonstrate more than a “mere breach of contract” and instead demonstrate aggravating and egregious circumstances attending the breach. ... In sum, Foodbuy’s continued overbilling despite representations to the contrary, coupled with the reliance on GPI to identify the overbilling and Foodbuy’s subsequent refusal to provide sufficient data for GPI to do so, extends beyond a “mere breach of contract” and constitutes an unfair and deceptive trade practice.

Section 75-1.1(a) requires substantial aggravating circumstances attending a breach of contract or warranty before the conduct can support a UDTP claim.

Izzy Air, LLC v. Triad Aviation · filed 2022-08-02(a)

The facts alleged, while arguably sufficient to state a claim for breach of the Warranty, do not indicate “substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach as to transform [D]efendants’ actions into a Chapter 75 violation.” ... Lacking any allegations of “substantial aggravating circumstances,” Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not turn a breach-of-contract dispute into an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim without substantial aggravating circumstances; incorrect or even intentional invoices alone are insufficient.

Industrial Timber, LLC v. Jackson Furniture Industries, Inc. · filed 2022-10-06

Accordingly, Jackson’s allegations do not constitute substantial aggravating circumstances and its second counterclaim fails to state a claim under North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act.

Section 75-1.1 does not make a mere breach of contract actionable; substantial aggravating circumstances are required, and a sufficient allegation of fraud can supply them.

The Boeing Company v. Ten Oaks Management, LLC · filed 2023-06-28

The NC UDTPA “makes unlawful unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce that proximately injures a plaintiff.” Duke Energy Carolina, LLC v. NTE Carolinas II, LLC, 2022 WL 2293908, at *18 (W.D.N.C. June 24, 2022). For Plaintiff to prevail on its UDTPA claim it must show that “(1) the defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) the act or practice in question was in or affecting commerce; and (3) the act or practice proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” Elsayed v. Family Fare LLC, 2020 WL 4586788 at *14 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 2020). Here, Defendants do not dispute that their actions were allegedly in or affecting commerce or caused injury to Boeing; however, they do contend that Plaintiff’s claim under the NC UDTPA fails because such a claim cannot be supported by a mere breach of contract, without necessary aggravating circumstances. “North Carolina courts have repeatedly held that ‘a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under [the UTPA,] N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1’” Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 347 (4th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). “North Carolina law requires a showing of ‘substantial aggravating circumstances’ to support a claim under the UTPA.’” Id. (citing Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 107 N.C. App. 53, 61 418 S.E.2d 694, 700 (1992)). However, a sufficient allegation of fraud constitutes a substantial aggravating circumstance in support of a UDTPA claim. Jones v. Harrelsson & Smith Contractors, LLC, 194 N.C. App. 203, 217, 670 S.E.2d 242, 252 (2008), aff’d, 363 N.C. 371, 677 S.E.2d 453 (2009) (citations omitted). Here, Boeing has sufficiently pled a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation; therefore the Court finds that Boeing has alleged a viable claim under the NC UDTPA.

A plaintiff must sufficiently plead substantial aggravating circumstances to proceed with a claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.

Carolina Drywall Supply, LLC v. Everdean Construction, LLC · filed 2024-08-23

While Plaintiff does not seek treble damages in its instant motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead “substantial aggravating circumstances” to proceed with its N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 claim.

A UDTPA claim based on breach of contract requires substantial aggravating circumstances beyond the breach; a mere breach is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive.

Friedlam Partners, LLC v. Lerner and Company Real Estate · filed 2024-09-30

Where a plaintiff raises a UDTPA claim based on a breach of contract, the plaintiff must allege substantial aggravating circumstances in addition to the breach of contract, because a mere breach of contract is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive.

A breach of contract, even if intentional, is not enough for a UDTPA claim; the plaintiff must allege substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach.

Godenzi · filed 2025-11-14(a)

To discourage this tendency, and to reign in the “extraordinary damages authorized by the UDTPA, North Carolina courts have repeatedly held that a ‘breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under [the UDTPA,] N.C.G.S. § 75–1.1.’ ... Instead, a plaintiff must show “substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach.”

Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, but a breach of contract alone—even an intentional breach—does not support a claim without substantial aggravating circumstances.

Santeiu · filed 2025-11-24(b)

Commerce is defined as “all business activities.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b). ... To discourage this tendency, and to reign in the “extraordinary damages authorized by the UDTPA, North Carolina courts have repeatedly held that a ‘breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under [the UDTPA,] N.C.G.S. § 75–1.1.’ ... Instead, a plaintiff must show “substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach.” ... Thus, notwithstanding the default, the question before the Court is whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled “substantial aggravating circumstances” to proceed with his UDTP claim. ... The answer is “no,” at least based on the current record. ... While the alleged circumstances may arguably amount to an intentional breach of contract, those allegations are insufficient, without more, to support a UDTP claim. Therefore, the Court will decline to award judgment based on Plaintiff's UDTP claim, which Plaintiff may continue to pursue if he chooses to do so.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury, and a mere breach of contract supports a claim only when substantial aggravating circumstances attend the breach.

Roach v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n · filed 2025-12-03

To demonstrate a violation of section 75-1.1, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or to his business.” ... “[A]ctions for unfair or deceptive trade practices are distinct from actions for breach of contract[;] a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under [section 75-1.1].” ... As a result, after establishing a breach, a plaintiff must make a showing of “substantial aggravating circumstances that attend the breach in order to recover under the Act.”

Section 75-1.1 requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately caused injury, and a mere breach of contract generally requires substantial aggravating circumstances to support a claim.

Simonvil · filed 2026-03-09

To state a claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant (1) engaged in an “unfair or deceptive act,” (2) that the act occurred “in or affect[ed] commerce,” and (3) that it proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. ... A practice is “unfair” if it offends “public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers,” and it is “deceptive” if it “has the capacity to mislead.” ... To prevent routine contract cases from becoming UDTP cases, courts have repeatedly held that “a breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive” to trigger § 75-1.1 absent “substantial aggravating circumstances.” ... Put simply, a plaintiff must allege “something more than a mere breach of contract.” ... an alleged misrepresentation about seat availability on a single flight does not, on these facts, constitute a substantial aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, the UDTP claim will be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 75-1.1(a) requires deceptive conduct to have the capacity or tendency to mislead and to cause actual injury proximately, while a contract breach supports a claim only when accompanied by substantial aggravating circumstances.

Tim Bartolomeo, D/B/A Quality Brands, Inc. v. S.B. Thomas, Inc. Cpc International, Inc. · filed 1989-11-17(a)

One need not show that he was actually deceived to prevail under the Act, as long as “the acts complained of possessed the tendency or capacity to mislead, or created the likelihood of deception.” ... The defendant’s intent or good faith is irrelevant. ... even if the statements did have a deceptive quality within the meaning of the Act, which we doubt, Bartolomeo has not shown that he “suffered actual injury as a proximate result” of these statements, ... Because he had all the notice for which he could conceivably have asked, and has not shown how the supposedly proprietary information that he gave to Thomas’ representatives was misappropriated to his actual injury, the district court properly concluded that this conduct did not violate the Act. ... A simple breach of contract, even if intentional, does not amount to a violation of the Act; a plaintiff must show substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach to recover under the Act, which allows for treble damages. ... The district court properly viewed these alleged occurrences as, at most, simple breaches of contract, not “substantial aggravating circumstances” that would justify the recovery of treble damages.

A breach of contract supports a claim under § 75-1.1 only when substantial aggravating circumstances make the conduct unfair or deceptive.

Johnnie A. Canady Nancy Canady v. Crestar Mortgage Corporation, Johnnie A. Canady Nancy Canady v. Crestar Mortgage Corporation · filed 1997-03-31(a)

The UTPA prohibits “[ujnfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” § 75-1.1(a). ... A mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under the UTPA. ... The plaintiff may only recover under the UTPA if he or she demonstrates substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach. ... Crestar’s decision to wait until the bankruptcy trustee decided whether the Crestar Deed of Trust was valid and Crestar’s legitimate, albeit incorrect, refusal to pay interest on the money do not rise to the level of immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious trade practices. Therefore, the district court correctly found that the Canadys were not entitled to treble damages or attorney’s fees because Crestar did not violate the UTPA.

Section 75-1.1 does not make a mere breach of contract, even an intentional one, actionable as an unfair or deceptive trade practice; substantial aggravating circumstances are required.

1998-08-19 · filed 1998-08-19

To correct this tendency, and to keep control of the extraordinary damages authorized by the UTPA, North Carolina courts have repeatedly held that "a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under [the UTPA,] N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1."

Section 75-1.1 generally does not recognize a claim arising from a contractual dispute unless the plaintiff shows substantial aggravating circumstances.

Domtar AI Inc. v. J.D. Irving, Ltd. · filed 2014-08-20

Under the UDTPA, “[ujnfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are ... unlawful.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1. Whether an act is unfair or deceptive is a question of law for the Court. Bernard v. Cent. Carolina Truck Sales, Inc., 68 N.C.App. 228, 314 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1984). When the crux of a dispute is contractual, an UDTPA claim is generally not recognized, and a showing of “substantial aggravating circumstances” is required. Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 347 (4th Cir.1998) (citation omitted). ... Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to state a proper claim under North Carolina’s UDTPA and defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to count three of the complaint.

Section 75-1.1(a) does not cover a failure to give prompt notice of contract termination when that failure does not surround or affect a sale.

United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. · filed 1980-01-23(a)

The short of the matter is that the breach of contract found by the jury— which is the basis of plaintiff’s section 75-1.1 claim — was the failure by the defendant to notify the plaintiff with reasonable promptness of its decision to discontinue performance of the agreement. In that circumstance, the court must conclude that such breach by the defendant was not directed to matters “involved in the bargain, sale, barter, exchange or traffic” of goods and services or to activities surrounding or affecting a sale.

Under the pre-1977 version of § 75-1.1, defects in a mobile home or a seller’s failure to perform promised services, without evidence of willful deception or bad faith, do not establish an unfair or deceptive practice.

Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Smith · filed 1980-02-05(a)

Nevertheless, under the evidence presented in this case, absent evidence of willful deception or bad faith, we cannot conclude that the existence of defects in the mobile home or Tunstall’s failure to perform the above stated services constitutes a violaton of G.S. 75-1.1 to warrant the award of treble damages under G.S. 75-16.

Section 75-1.1 does not prohibit a party from failing to negotiate an agreement on terms satisfactory to the other party.

Hammers v. Lowe's Companies, Inc. · filed 1980-08-05

We hold that defendant’s failure to negotiate an agreement on terms satisfactory to plaintiff simply did not constitute a violation of G.S. 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 covers a breach of contract accompanied by deceptive conduct, including a misleading statement that property remains available for sale.

Poor v. Hill · filed 2000-05-16

Mr. Hill’s 22 September 1994 letter to plaintiffs had the capacity to mislead and was therefore deceptive for Chapter 75 purposes.

Evidence that a business made promises it did not intend to keep can support submitting a § 75-1.1 claim to a jury.

Unifour Construction Services, Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. · filed 2004-04-20

Plaintiffs presented evidence that tended to show that, despite its representations to David, BellSouth had never intended to fulfill its agreement, except for building a small fence along the property line. ... We believe that this evidence, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, is sufficient to go to the jury on a claim under Chapter 75, as to both defendants.

A breach of contract alone does not violate § 75-1.1; egregious or aggravating circumstances must be alleged.

Keyzer v. AmerLink, Ltd. · filed 2005-08-16(a)

"Under section 75-1.1, a mere breach of contract does not constitute an unfair or deceptive act. Egregious or aggravating circumstances must be alleged before the provisions of the Act may take effect." ... We conclude generally that the alleged acts do not constitute unfair or deceptive trade practices.

Section 75-1.1 requires an aggravating act beyond a mere breach of contract; damages caused by the breach do not suffice.

Graywater Traders, Inc. v. B & B on Beach, Inc. · filed 2007-08-21

Here, Graywater does not contend beyond the mere breach of the contract that B & B committed an unfair and deceptive trade practice. Indeed, any damages caused by the loss of revenue and reliance on the contract for the expansion of the business arose from the breach of the contract itself, not from an aggravating act. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the unfair and deceptive trade practices claim.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances to support an unfair trade practices claim arising from a contract dispute; conclusory allegations that a party never intended to perform do not suffice.

TSC RESEARCH, LLC v. Bayer Chemicals Corp. · filed 2008-03-04

In fact, the more definite statement as to Plaintiffs UDTPA claim does nothing more than repeat verbatim the insufficient conclusory allegations of the fraud claim where Plaintiff contends that, because Defendants never eventually signed the licensing agreement, this shows they never intended to sign it. These assertions do not suffice to constitute misrepresentation or, in other words, the type of “substantial aggravating circumstances” required to demonstrate unfair trade practices in a contract setting.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances beyond a breach of contract; threatening and coercive conduct, even with potentially anticompetitive intent, was insufficient in this setting.

Thompson Installations, Inc. v. Stock Building Supply, LLC · filed 2012-02-21

Following Telephone Services, the court disagrees with Plaintiff's contention that Defendant's "threatening and coercive conduct,"20 regardless of Defendant's potentially anti-competitive intent, amounts to a substantial aggravating circumstance sufficient to support a claim under G.S. 75-1.1 in this breach of contract setting. Accordingly, the court CONCLUDES that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that Defendant committed unfair or deceptive trade practices under G.S. 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 requires aggravating circumstances beyond a mere breach of contract to support an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

Front St. Constr., LLC v. Colonial Bank, N.A. · filed 2012-05-11

The mere breach of a contract will not constitute a Chapter 75 violation under G.S. 75-1.1. ... A claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices based on a breach of contract requires the Front Street Plaintiffs to allege other aggravating circumstances attendant to the breach, which Front Street Plaintiffs have failed to do here.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances beyond a breach of warranty to support an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

Ellis v. Louisiana-Pacific Corporation · filed 2012-11-02

We are mindful that a mere breach of contract claim "is not unfair or deceptive, . . . absent substantial aggravating circumstances." ... We have reviewed the complaint and find no allegations of substantial aggravating circumstances sufficient to state a UDTPA claim.

Section 75-1.1 permits a claim based on deceit used to carry out and conceal a contract breach when the allegations show more than a mere breach of contract.

Sparrow Sys., Inc. v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, Pllc â · filed 2014-12-24

The Court concludes that these allegations evince more than a mere claim for breach of contract and suffice, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, to withstand Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

Section 75-1.1 requires aggravating circumstances beyond a breach of contract to support an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

NC & VA Warranty Co. v. Fidelity Bank (In re NC & VA Warranty Co.) · filed 2016-06-29(a)

It is well settled that even an intentional breach of contract is not an unfair or deceptive act under Chapter 75. ... The Trustee has failed to allege *130sufficient and specific facts that would establish “carefully circumscribed” aggravating factors that would give rise to a Chapter 75 claim. Therefore, this claim under the UDTPA would not survive a motion to dismiss and it would be futile for NCVA to include this claim in its amended complaint.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances attending a breach of contract; an intentional breach alone does not qualify.

Kerry Bodenhamer Farms, LLC v. Nature's Pearl Corp. · filed 2017-03-27

Accordingly, a plaintiff alleging breach of contract “must show ‘substantial aggravating circumstances attending the breach to recover’” under section 75.1-1.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances beyond a mere breach of contract to support an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

Chapel H.O.M. Associates, LLC v. RME Management, LLC · filed 2017-12-05

These facts do not allege substantial aggravating circumstances required to demonstrate a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices. Plaintiffs merely allege a claim for breach of contract. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices.

An intentional breach of contract, standing alone, does not support a claim under § 75-1.1.

SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae · filed 2020-02-28

As the Court of Appeals correctly held in Mitchell, such an intentional breach of contract, standing alone, simply does not suffice to support the assertion of an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances for a claim arising from a contract dispute; an intentional breach concerning performance of the contract is insufficient.

ATV Broadcast, LLC v. Bahakel Communications, LTD. · filed 2021-01-13

Even to the extent Defendants claim that ATV’s purported breaches of the Agreement were intentional, such alleged breaches clearly relate only to the parties’ performance of the contract, and thus, as a matter of law, cannot constitute “substantial aggravating circumstances” under the UDTPA.

Section 75-1.1 requires aggravating circumstances when a claim rests on a contract breach or unjust enrichment.

Haddock v. Volunteers of Am., Inc. · filed 2021-01-22

From the Court’s careful review of the Complaint, the only conduct currently actionable based on the Court’s ruling herein, is the alleged breach of contract by Defendants and unjust enrichment. This conduct is insufficient to form the basis of Plaintiffs’ UDTPA claim without allegations of an aggravating circumstance.

Section 75-1.1 requires an aggravating circumstance beyond a breach of contract to support an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

Martin Commc'ns, LLC v. Flowers · filed 2021-03-31

From the Court’s careful review of the Amended Complaint, the only conduct currently actionable based on the Court’s ruling herein is alleged breaches of contract by Defendants, unjust enrichment, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This conduct is insufficient to form the basis of Plaintiff’s UDTP claim without allegations of an aggravating circumstance.

Section 75-1.1 allows a claim involving a breach of contract to survive dismissal when the plaintiff plausibly alleges aggravating circumstances, particularly in a consumer adhesion contract.

Moose v. Allegacy Fed. Credit Union · filed 2021-05-05

Viewing these allegations in a light most favorable to Moose, the Court concludes that they suffice to plead aggravating circumstances, particularly given the context of a consumer adhesion contract.

Section 75-1.1 requires aggravating circumstances for an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim based on a breach of contract; a planned breach alone is insufficient.

Haddock v. Volunteers of Am., Inc. · filed 2021-08-25

In other words, any alleged unfair and deceptive conduct by Defendants is related to their planned breach of the Agreement, which is insufficient to support a UDTPA claim.

Section 75-1.1 permits a claim based on a breach of contract when substantial aggravating circumstances accompany the breach; filing a lien for more than the contract allegedly allows can qualify.

Gilmore's Farm, Inc. v. Herc Rentals, Inc. · filed 2021-09-27

As such, plaintiff has alleged an aggravating circumstance—the filing of a lien—beyond the mere breach of disregarding the rental agreement terms.

Section 75-1.1 does not make a mere breach of contract actionable, even if the breach was intentional.

Hatteras/Cabo Yachts, LLC v. M/Y Epic (official Number 747618, HIN: US-HATHR3021617), her engines, boilers, tackle, apparel, etc., in rem · filed 2021-09-29

However, “a mere breach of contract, even if intentional, is not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to sustain an action under [the UDTPA,] N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.” Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 418 S.E.2d 694, 700 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992). ... Spisso nor Acquaviva presented credible evidence of Hatteras’s deceptive or unfair conduct, and therefore, Hatteras is not liable under the UDTPA.

Section 75-1.1 requires aggravating circumstances to support an unfair or deceptive practices claim arising from failed contract negotiations.

MLU Services, Inc. v. Lawrence Mobile Home Service, Inc. · filed 2021-10-25

While the parties agreed to negotiate a written agreement, there was no valid, enforceable contract. Nor is there evidence of any aggravating circumstance to support a § 75–1.1 claim.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances beyond a knowing and intentional breach of contract to support a claim based on that breach.

Total Merch. Servs., LLC v. Tms Nc, Inc. · filed 2022-07-29

Viewing Defendants’ allegations in the light most favorable to Defendants, the Court concludes that Defendants have, at most, pleaded a knowing and intentional breach of contract. Our courts have made clear that such is not enough to plead substantial aggravating circumstances sufficient to sustain a claim under section 75-1.1 based on breach of contract.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances for a breach of contract to support an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim; failure to perform the contract alone is insufficient.

Value Health Sols., Inc. v. Pharm. Rsch. Assocs., Inc. · filed 2023-09-01

Setting aside the termination of Parthasarathy, this claim amounts to an allegation that PRA did not perform under the terms of the contract. This allegation does not support a finding of the required “substantial aggravating circumstances” attending the breach.

A failure to disclose a product defect does not support a § 75-1.1 claim based on breach of warranty without aggravating circumstances.

Challenge Printing Co. of the Carolinas, Inc. v. Tesla, Inc. · filed 2024-05-31

First, Challenge Printing’s claims based on Tesla’s alleged failure to disclose the defect at issue did not include any aggravating circumstances converting its breach of warranty claim into a UDTPA claim.

A party’s awareness of its own inability to meet contract specifications does not, by itself, turn an eventual breach into a section 75-1.1 violation.

water.io Ltd v. Sealed Air Corp. · filed 2025-02-19

Water.io’s mere awareness of its own shortcomings at the time of contracting, even if true, is not enough to transform its eventual breach into a violation of section 75-1.1.

A breach of contract supports a claim under Section 75-1.1 only when egregious circumstances accompany it.

Londry v. Stream Realty Partners, L.P. · filed 2025-07-07(a)

To rise to the level of a UDTPA claim, a breach of contract must be egregious.

Section 75-1.1 permits a claim based on breach of contract when the plaintiff adequately pleads substantial aggravating circumstances.

Comic Book Certification Serv. LLC v. Cbcs Operations, LLC · filed 2025-07-09

For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately pled substantial aggravating circumstances so as to support a claim for UDTP such that CBCS Operations’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to this claim.

Section 75-1.1 requires egregious or aggravating circumstances for a breach of contract to qualify as unfair or deceptive.

Compass Tax Servs. LLC v. Karki · filed 2025-07-23

The Court concludes that Lamichhane’s and Shrestha’s conduct as alleged and proven as to their breaches of the September Agreement, does not rise to the level of egregious or aggravating circumstances sufficient to warrant a finding that such conduct was unfair or deceptive within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 permits a claim based on substantial aggravating circumstances attending a breach of contract, considered together.

Blades v. Blusky Restoration Contractors, LLC · filed 2025-09-17

Although defendant argues these aggravating circumstances are summarized as “overbilling,” we determine there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support plaintiff’s prima facie UDTPA claim and support the jury’s findings. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied the JNOV motion after determining as a matter of law that the jury’s findings in the aggregate resulted in a UDTPA violation.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances beyond an alleged breach of contract to support an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

Butler v. Millennium Advisors, LLC · filed 2026-01-07

Plaintiff failed to meet the burden of showing any substantial aggravating circumstances to show that Defendant’s actions were more than an alleged breach of contract.

Section 75-1.1 requires egregious or substantial aggravating circumstances for an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim involving a contract.

Apex Health, Inc. v. Atrium Health, Inc. · filed 2026-02-11

Even if the contract included an express provision to co-brand the Plan in the manner Apex claims was contemplated, Apex’s allegations regarding Atrium’s “pattern of deception” fall short of the egregious or aggravating circumstances required to state a UDTPA claim.

A § 75-1.1 claim based on a breach of contract requires allegations of substantial aggravating circumstances.

Mezcalito Apex, Inc. v. Murillo · filed 2026-02-17

Further, to the extent that Count Three is premised on Defendant’s alleged breach of contract as asserted in Count One, the Court concludes that the Amended Complaint is devoid of allegations amounting to “substantial aggravating circumstances” necessary to sustain a UDTPA claim on the basis of an alleged breach of contract.

Section 75-1.1 requires an additional aggravating circumstance to support a claim based on breach of contract; inadequately alleged fraud does not suffice.

Exela Pharma Scis., LLC v. Rei Automation, Inc. · filed 2026-04-02

There must be some additional, aggravating circumstance. Fraud would usually suffice, but Exela has not adequately alleged fraud. Nor has it alleged any other conduct that could be considered an aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, the section 75-1.1 claim fails on its face.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances beyond a breach of contract; withholding information required by the contract alone does not suffice.

Pjc Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. Maaco Franchisor Spv LLC · filed 2026-04-22

Even if MAACO withheld information that it was contractually required to provide, that would be, at most, an intentional breach of the agreements, not an aggravating circumstance.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances for a breach of contract to support an unfair or deceptive practices claim.

Kadah v. Paladin Drones, Inc. · filed 2026-05-11

Further, even with Kadah having adequately stated a claim for breach of contract, there are no allegations of substantial aggravating circumstances that would bring the dispute within the scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75–1.1 et seq.

Section 75-1.1(a) permits a claim based on an alleged scheme of misrepresentations to obtain rent concessions when the conduct goes beyond a breach of lease.

Walter v. Freeway Foods, Inc. (In Re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc.) · filed 2012-03-21(a)

The breach of the lease is merely the result of the larger scheme of unfair and/or deceptive acts that Walter alleges. Furthermore, the Court has already concluded that Walter has sufficiently pled a cause of action for fraud under North Carolina law. Accordingly, it follows that such allegations are sufficient to support the lesser pleading standard of a claim under the UDTPA. Thus, the Motion is denied as to the Tenth and Fourteenth Causes of Action.

Section 75-1.1(b) excludes professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession; the court applied a two-part test, held that engineering is a learned profession, and left whether the defendants rendered professional services for resolution after factfinding.

Spirax Sarco, Inc. v. SSI Engineering, Inc. · filed 2015-08-10(b)

Under UDTPA, “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting com*424merce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” N.C. Gen.Stat: § 75-1.1(a). The act clarifies, however, that “‘commerce’ includes all business activities, however denominated,- but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-l.l(b). To come within this exemption, a two part test must be satisfied: (1) “the person or entity performing the alleged act must be a member of a learned profession;” and (2) “the conduct in question must be a rendering of professional services.” Reid v. Ayers, 138 N.C.App. 261, 266, 531 S.E.2d 231, 235 (2000). No North Carolina state court has stated that engineering is a learned profession. The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina has reached that conclusion with regard to architects, however, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision in a per curiam opinion. See RCDI Constr., Inc., 148 F.Supp.2d at 618-19, aff'd, 29 Fed.Appx. 120, 121 (4th Cir.2002). The court finds that under the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in RCDI Construction — which .the court must follow in the absence of contrary decisions by North Carolina state courts— that engineering constitutes a learned profession. As to the second part of the test, the court observes, again, that there is an apparent factual dispute regarding the nature of the contracts at issue in this case. Accordingly, the court finds that it is premature to rule on whether the actions of Benjamin Lewis and SSI Engineering constituted the rendering of professional services.

Section 75-1.1(b) excludes the rendition of professional services by a member of a learned profession from the definition of commerce, so unfair-and-deceptive-trade-practices claims based on those services are not available under the statute.

Sharp v. Gailor · filed 1999-02-02(b)

Finally, plaintiff alleges that her claims of unfair and deceptive trade practices are claims for which relief can be granted. These claims are not recognized by statute. While the General Assembly has declared unfair and deceptive practices “in or affecting commerce” to be unlawful, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) (1994), it has expressly excluded the rendition of professional services “by a member of a learned profession” from the definition of “commerce.” G.S. 75-1.1(b). Plaintiff argues that we should “giv[e] her the right to sue under the state’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act,” but as judges, we should not and will not rewrite a law enacted by our state legislature.

Section 75-1.1(b) excludes professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession from the statute’s definition of “commerce,” so the statute does not cover a medical professional’s provision of professional medical services.

Phillips v. a Triangle Women's Health Clinic, Inc. · filed 2002-12-31(b)

Thus, despite Section 75-1.1 being subject to a reasonably broad interpretation, the General Assembly expressly excludes the rendition of professional services by a member of a learned profession from the definition of “commerce.” ... Thus, previously established precedent compels us to conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices.

Section 75-1.1 excludes professional services rendered by members of learned professions from commerce, and the prohibition does not apply to unfair or deceptive acts by medical professionals, including hospitals.

Shelton v. Duke University Health System, Inc. · filed 2006-08-01(b)

In order to establish a claim [under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1], plaintiffs must show (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to them. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b) (1999) defines commerce as “all business activities however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” ... “Our Court has made clear that unfair and deceptive acts committed by medical professionals are not included within the prohibition of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(a).” ... This exception for medical professionals has been broadly interpreted by this Court, ... and includes hospitals under the definition of “medical professionals.” ... We hold that the facts of this case do not justify a departure from this precedent. This argument is without merit.

Section 75-1.1(b) excludes professional services rendered by members of learned professions from the statute’s definition of commerce, so medical professionals are not covered.

Cohn v. Wilkes General Hospital · filed 1991-03-12(b)

However, the Court notes that medical professionals are not contemplated by North Carolina’s prohibition of unfair trade practices. See, e.g., N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1(b) (“For purposes of this section, ‘commerce’ ... does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.”); Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., Inc., 58 N.C.App. 414, 293 S.E.2d 901, appeal dismissed & cert. denied, 307 N.C. 127, 297 S.E.2d 399 (1982); Opinion of Attorney General to Representative Robert L. Farmer, 47 N.C.A.G. 118 (1977).

Section 75-1.1 excludes professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession from commerce, and a claim requires proximate injury from the defendant's conduct.

Synergy Financial, L.L.C. v. Zarro · filed 2004-07-12

Assuming arguendo that H & R did have an attorney-client relationship with Synergy, no cause of action based on the statute would exist. ... North Carolina’s statute “define[s] ‘commerce’ as ‘all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.’ ... [T]he General Assembly expressly excludes the. rendition of professional service by a member of a learned profession from the definition of ‘commerce.’ ” ... H & R was not engaged in commercial dealings with Synergy by virtue of legal representation provided to Zarro and his entities.

Section 75-1.1(b) defines commerce broadly as business activities, but securities transactions and typical employer-employee disputes are outside the statute; a claim arising from one integrated business purchase cannot be dismissed piecemeal based only on its securities or employment components.

Kelley v. Cinar Corp. · filed 2002-02-25(b)

The statute defines “commerce” as encompassing “all business activities, however denominated ... [but not] including] professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1(b) (cited in HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 592-93, 403 S.E.2d 483, 492 (1991)). Despite the potential for broad application of this statute, North Carolina courts have cabined its protection even further than the “professional services” limitation. Stressing that NCUTPA was not “intended to apply to all wrongs in a business setting,” these courts have held that securities transactions and typical employer-employee disputes, inter alia, do not come within the scope of NCUTPA’s definition of “business activity,” and are thus not covered by the statute. ... Yet the claim cannot be dissected into its component parts and dismissed piecemeal. This case involves one large transaction relating to the purchase of a business. The Court is sympathetic to the argument that, in this case, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. As a result, plaintiffs’ claim, prior to 1991 at least, would have survived.

Section 75-1.1 applies to unfair or deceptive practices in business-to-business exchanges of services and does not require a buyer-seller relationship; breach of contract alone is insufficient, but fraud establishes a violation.

Gordon Barnes Glenn Phelps, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated With Themselves v. Cargill, Incorporated · filed 1989-11-22

Accepting the plaintiffs' allegations as true, as the court must do on a motion to dismiss, it is difficult to see how such practices as they have alleged could be seen as anything other than unfair and deceptive. ... but under North Carolina case law as it has developed since the amendment to § 75-1.1 this does not appear to be a requirement. ... Applying the above standard to the present case, it is apparent that an exchange of value was certainly occurring as a result of the plaintiffs' agreement to care for Cargill's swine; like the broker in Johnson they were selling their services. Accordingly, it was error to dismiss the plaintiffs' § 75-1.1 action because the activities complained of did not involve a sale. ... Proof of fraud is ipso facto proof that § 75-1.1 has been violated. ... However, plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss contained the specific statement that "Plaintiffs ... are pleading that breach of the alleged agreement is not the basis for Plaintiffs' cause of action under G.S. 75-1.1 but that [it is] the actions of Defendant which taken as a whole demonstrate a cause of action for unfair or deceptive acts or practices." This is indeed the gist of plaintiffs' allegations.