N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to noncompliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-291 when that statute provides an extensive remedy, because applying both statutes would create overlapping supervision, enforcement, and liability.

State Ex Rel. Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands Manufacturing, LLC · filed 2007-07-17

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-291 itself provides an extensive remedy for failure to comply with the escrow obligation. ... We conclude that it was not the legislature’s intent to extend the scope of Chapter 75 to include noncompliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-291.

In the area regulated by Article 2, a claim under the debt-collection provisions precludes a separate claim under the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act based on the same conduct.

Crabtree v. Smith · filed 2017-04-04

As such, even assuming that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged violations of both, a successful claim for violation of NCUTP was necessarily precluded by plaintiffs' claim for prohibited acts by debt collectors.

Section 75-1.1 does not exempt the cigarette industry merely because it is subject to regulation; its exception for pervasively regulated transactions was not extended here.

In re Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. Mktg. & Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig. · filed 2017-12-21

Although the cigarette industry has been subject to regulation, the Court declines to extend this limited exception to an industry that, to the Court’s knowledge, no North Carolina court has exempted from the statute.

Section 75-1.1 does not support a cause of action against a commodity broker for activity regulated under the Commodity Exchange Act.

Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Hunsucker · filed 1978-11-07

Therefore, ... we decline to hold that G.S. 75-1.1 will support a cause of action against a commodity broker for activity which is regulated under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to the alleged manipulation of DENR’s regulated rate-setting process because applying it would conflict with the framework governing that process.

STATE v. MCCLURE · filed 2004-12-04

This Court would likely cause conflict between the framework governing the DENR process and the more nebulous unfair trade practice statute by applying UDTPA to the rate-setting function of an administrative agency. ... The Court will not analyze the other arguments raised by defendants as to the UDPTA because it clearly does not apply to the conduct alleged by plaintiffs.

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to the alleged underground-storage-tank cleanup misconduct when other statutes provide remedies directly related to the claims.

STATE v. MCCLURE · filed 2005-10-28

The Court has found that it does not apply because of the other remedies provided by statute which are directly related to the claims asserted here.

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce; deception includes conduct with the capacity or tendency to deceive, and filing a false or misleading document with a government regulator can state a claim.

STATE Ex Rel. LONG v. CUSTARD · filed 2007-08-08(a)

Under section 75-1.1, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” are declared to be unlawful. ... “A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. [A] party is guilty of an unfair act or practice when it engages in conduct that amounts to an inequitable assertion of its power or position. Moreover, an act or practice is deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive.” ... Filing a false or misleading document with a government regulatory agency is clearly an act with the tendency to deceive, and states a cause of action for a violation of section 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1(a) requires a plaintiff to show an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately caused injury.

Gravelle v. Kaba Ilco Corporation · filed 2017-04-12(a)

North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). “‘In order to establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) [the] defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.’” Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 747 S.E.2d 220, 226 (N.C. 2013) (quoting Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (N.C. 2001)). For the reasons already stated, Gravelle has failed to establish an injury caused by Kaba’s false marking. We therefore affirm the entry of summary judgment for Kaba on Gravelle’s state-law claim.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover unfair or deceptive conduct occurring solely within a single business, including internal shareholder disputes that do not involve interactions with other market participants.

Brewster v. Powell Bail Bonding, Inc. · filed 2018-07-26

By statute, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” are “unlawful.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. As construed by our Supreme Court, this language is broad enough “to regulate a business’s regular interactions with other market participants” but not so broad as to capture conduct “solely related to the internal operations” of a business. White v. Thompson, 364 N.C. 47, 51–52, 691 S.E.2d 676, 679 (2010). Thus, “any unfair or deceptive conduct contained solely within a single business is not covered by” section 75-1.1. Id. at 53, 691 S.E.2d at 680. ... This case is a classic shareholder dispute, having nothing to do with the type of unfair market conduct section 75-1.1 was designed to address. ... Each and every alleged act, taken as true, is clearly internal to PBB, a single market participant. ... Brewster’s allegations fall squarely within the rule stated in White and its progeny. The Court therefore grants Defendants’ motion and dismisses the claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices with prejudice.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover unfair or deceptive conduct confined to a single business’s internal operations rather than dealings between market participants.

Bickley v. Fordin · filed 2018-02-20

Therefore, as our Supreme Court has observed, “the General Assembly did not intend for the Act’s protections to extend to a business’s internal operations.” White, 364 N.C. at 53, 691 S.E.2d at 680 (emphasis added). “[T]he Act is not focused on the internal conduct of individuals within a single market participant, that is, within a single business.” Id. ... Here, as in Thompson, the bad acts as alleged “did not occur in . . . dealings with [other market participants].” Id. Rather, the transaction which forms the basis of Plaintiff’s claim under the Act is more appropriately classified as internal conduct between two owners of a single business, M3 LLC. As such, being a transaction confined to M3 LLC, and not involving any other market participant, we hold that the transaction whereby Plaintiff agreed to sell back his 10% interest falls outside the scope of the UDTP Act.

Section 75-1.1 applies to unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce, but generally does not reach internal employment-compensation disputes that do not enter buyer-seller relations or otherwise affect the marketplace.

Schlieper v. Johnson · filed 2007-08-31(a), (b)

In applying the statute, the Court must first address the threshold inquiry of whether the acts complained of were “in or affecting commerce.” ... Whether an act is “in or affecting commerce” is a question of law for the Court to decide. ... In order to establish a prima facie claim under section 75-1.1, a plaintiff must show: “(1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” ... In this case, the actions alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are not “in or affecting commerce.” ... These facts allege a dispute over compensation due to employees under the terms of various documents that governed their relationship with their employer. ... The dispute here is over employment compensation in the context of a sale of a company’s assets. The acts alleged did not affect commerce or the marketplace as did the defendant’s actions in Sara Lee. ... The statute was not meant to apply to the internal affairs of business associations. ... For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ second claim for relief is granted.

Section 75-1.1 reaches unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce, but employment disputes outside a commercial setting and professional services rendered by learned professionals fall outside its scope.

Kingsdown, Inc. v. Hinshaw · filed 2015-03-25(a), (b)

North Carolina’s statute, however, targets “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) (2014). ... To establish the “commerce” requirement, the defendant’s conduct “must affect commerce in a commercial setting, . . . not in a private relationship type setting such as corporate governance issues, . . . securities transactions, . . . or disputes arising from employment[.]” ... The conduct about which Ms. Ray complains – which is the same sort of conduct she alleges in support of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress – arises out of her employment and plainly involves internal business disputes rather than interactions with businesses or consumers. As such, Kingsdown’s alleged conduct does not affect commerce in a commercial setting and cannot give rise to a cognizable claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. ... In defining the “in or affecting commerce” requirement, our legislature has provided that “‘commerce’ includes all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b) (2014). “In order for the learned profession exemption to apply, a two-part test must be satisfied. First, the person or entity performing the alleged act must be a member of a learned profession. Second, the conduct in question must be a rendering of professional services.” Reid v. Ayers, 138 N.C. App. 261, 266, 531 S.E.2d 231, 235 (2000) (citations omitted). ... As a result, the Court concludes that the learned profession exemption applies to bar Ms. Ray’s claim based on the Firm’s alleged conduct and, for this additional reason, Ms. Ray’s claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 should be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 75-1.1(a) does not cover unfair or deceptive conduct occurring solely within a single business entity, even though § 75-1.1(b) broadly defines commerce; the statute applies to interactions between market participants.

Alexander v. Alexander · filed 2016-12-06(a) (b)

The inflated payments that Defendant caused Otto Trucking to make to himself — as “land rent” in connection with the storage of the company’s vehicles — and the other payments he caused Otto Trucking to make for the benefit of himself and his family members are more properly classified as the misappropriation of corporate funds within a single entity rather than commercial transactions between separate market participants “in or affecting commerce.” Like the plaintiff in White, Plaintiff here “alleged and proved that [Defendant] breached his fiduciary duty as [co-owner of] this single market participant. . . . Because [Defendant] unfairly and deceptively interacted only with [Plaintiff, his co-owner], his conduct occurred completely within [the corporation] and entirely outside the purview of the [UDTPA].” Id. at 53-54, 691 S.E.2d at 680. ... For these reasons, the trial court erred in concluding that Defendant’s actions were “in or affecting commerce.” Therefore, no legal basis existed for finding Defendant liable under the UDTPA and awarding Plaintiff treble damages and attorney’s fees.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover unfair or deceptive conduct confined to the internal affairs of a single business because that conduct is not in or affecting commerce.

Bandy v. a Perfect Fit for You, Inc. · filed 2017-07-26(a), (b)

The UDTPA provides that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” G.S. § 75-1.1(a). ... For purposes of the UDTPA, the term “‘commerce’ includes all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” G.S. § 75-1.1(b). ... The Court agrees. ... “The [UDTPA] is not focused on the internal conduct of individuals within a single market participant, that is, within a single business . . . [a]s a result, any unfair or deceptive conduct contained solely within a single business is not covered by the Act.” ... The Court concludes that any alleged unfair or deceptive conduct in this action took place within Perfect Fit and was not in or affecting commerce. Therefore, the Motion for judgment on the pleadings concerning Bandy’s UDTPA violation claim should be GRANTED.

Section 75-1.1(b) requires conduct to be in or affecting commerce and does not apply to a business’s internal operations or internal corporate matters.

Pure Body Studios Charlotte, LLC v. Crnalic · filed 2017-10-18(b)

In order to state a UDTP claim, Crnalic must allege (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused injury to Crnalic. Belcher v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 162 N.C. App. 80, 85, 590 S.E.2d 15, 18 (2004). “‘[C]ommerce’ includes all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b). ... Section 75-1.1 applies to “(1) interactions between businesses, and (2) interactions between businesses and consumers.” White v. Thompson, 364 N.C. 47, 52, 691 S.E.2d 676, 679 (2010). Section 75-1.1 does not apply to a business’s internal operations. Id. at 53, 691 S.E.2d at 680; Urquhart v. Trenkelbach, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 12, at *11 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2017) (“Acts are not ‘in or affecting commerce’ if they are restricted to internal corporate matters.”). ... As such, Crnalic’s UDTP claim is based on conduct occurring solely within Pure Body and cannot serve as the basis for a claim under section 75-1.1. See Wilson v. Blue Ridge Elec. Membership Corp., 157 N.C. App. 355, 358, 578 S.E.2d 692, 694 (2003) (“Matters of internal corporate management, such as the manner of selection and qualifications for directors, do not affect commerce as defined by Chapter 75 and our Supreme Court.”); Talisman Software, Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Atkins, 2015 NCBC LEXIS 108, at *23 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2015) (granting plaintiff’s motion to dismiss defendant’s UDTP claim where the “conduct ar[ose] out of [defendant]’s employment as President and CEO of [plaintiff] and only implicate[d] internal business disputes). ... Therefore, the Court concludes that Crnalic’s Eighth Counterclaim fails to state a claim for UDTP and, accordingly, Pure Body’s Motion as to this claim is granted.

Section 75-1.1(b) reaches business interactions between market participants, but not unfair or deceptive conduct confined to the internal operations of a single business.

Wheeler v. Wheeler · filed 2018-04-25(b)

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to the internal conduct of individuals within a single market participant. Alexander, 792 S.E.2d at 904. Rather, “the General Assembly intended [section 75-1.1] to apply to interactions between market participants. As a result, any unfair or deceptive conduct contained solely within a single business is not covered by [section 75-1.1].” White, 364 N.C. at 53, 691 S.E.2d at 680. ... The Court, taking the factual allegations of the Amended Complaint as true, concludes that Gray has failed to allege that Joseph’s alleged unfair or deceptive conduct was in or affecting commerce. ... As the alleged conduct concerns the internal operations of a single business, the Amended Complaint fails to state a UDTP claim and, therefore, such claim is dismissed with prejudice.

Section 75-1.1 does not impose liability merely because an at-will work crew joins a competitor and the competitor takes over work previously performed by the former employer.

Austin Maintenance & Construction, Inc. v. Crowder Construction Co. · filed 2012-12-18(a)

As a result, we conclude that the record fails to support Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants “surreptitiously raided” Plaintiff’s workforce and that neither the decision by Mr. Lanier and his crew members to become Crowder employees nor the manner in which Crowder obtained the right to perform construction-related maintenance work previously performed by Plaintiff supported a finding of liability under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to a simple employment dispute between an employer and an employee when there is no conduct between them affecting commerce.

Combs v. City Electric Supply Co. · filed 2010-03-16

The Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act is not applicable to a simple employment dispute between an employer and employee.

Section 75-1.1(b) defines commerce to include all business activities, but the statute does not apply to general employment relationships.

Schlieper v. Johnson · filed 2009-02-03(b)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b) defines “commerce” to include “all business activities, however denominated . . . .” ... The statute does not apply to general employment relationships.

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in commerce, but ordinarily does not apply to run-of-the-mill employer-employee disputes, including employees’ claims for unpaid wages.

Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp. · filed 2007-11-19(a)

Under the UDTPA, it is unlawful to engage in "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). The UDTPA "was intended to benefit consumers, but its protections extend to businesses in appropriate situations." ... As Sara Lee emphasizes, the UDTPA "does not normally extend to run-of-the-mill employment disputes." ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of the Class Members’ unfair trade practices claim, as well as of their conversion claim.

Section 75-1.1(a) makes unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce unlawful, and a pre-employment fraudulent misrepresentation designed to induce an employment relationship can support a UDTPA claim even though the statute generally does not apply to ordinary employer-employee disputes.

GUHNE v. CERIDIAN HCM, INC. · filed 2021-03-26(a)

Under the UDTPA, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” are unlawful. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). “In order to establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” ... While it is true that the UDTPA generally does not apply to employer-employee disputes, where “the gravamen of [plaintiff’s] [c]omplaint involves alleged fraudulent statements made prior to employment and designed to induce [plaintiff] to enter into an employment relationship,” the claim survives. ... The court is therefore disinclined to dismiss the claim as Guhne has stated a plausible violation of the UDTPA in so far as it relates to the alleged promise of 75,000 shares of stock.

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to claims arising from the employer-employee relationship.

Wilson v. Wilson-Cook Medical, Inc. · filed 1989-08-18

That part of count three which alleges unfair trade practices because of Plaintiff’s resignation must be dismissed both because Plaintiff has stated no claim with respect to his employment termination, see Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. at 80, 221 S.E.2d 282, and because N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75.1-1, N.C.’s Unfair Trade and Deceptive Practices Act, does not apply to the employer-employee relationship.

Section 75-1.1 generally does not cover employer-employee disputes, but may apply when egregious or aggravating circumstances are present; at the pleading stage, allegations giving notice can suffice to avoid dismissal.

Eli Research, Inc. v. United Communications Group, LLC · filed 2004-04-06(b)

To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) that defendant committed unfair or deceptive acts, (2) that defendant’s action was in or affecting commerce, and (3) that the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. ... Typically, employer-employee disputes are deemed beyond the scope of the commerce that section 75-1.1 was intended to protect. ... For the act to apply in an employer-employee dispute, some egregious or aggravating circumstances must be shown. ... At this stage in the litigation, however, the court is not considering whether there is sufficient evidence to prove that Defendants engaged in egregious or aggravating circumstances. All that is required is that Plaintiffs’ allegations include enough detail that Defendants have notice of the nature of Plaintiffs’ claim and the facts underlying it. ... Defendants have not shown there is no set of facts that Plaintiffs could prove that would allow recovery.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover employer-employee relationships or employment practices.

Buie v. Daniel International Corp. · filed 1982-03-16

Unlike buyer-seller relationships, we find that employer-employee relationships do not fall within the intended scope of G.S. 75-1.1, in spite of plaintiffs strained characterization of the latter as “sale of employment skills.”

Section 75-1.1 does not cover employer-employee relationships.

Liggett Group, Inc. v. Sunas · filed 1993-12-21

With regard to Sunas’ counterclaim for unfair and deceptive practices, we have previously held employer-employee relationships do not fall within the scope of G.S. 75-1.1. ... Accordingly, the trial court properly entered summary judgment on this counterclaim.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover fraudulent conduct arising primarily from an employment relationship.

Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter · filed 1998-05-19

In this case, Defendant’s conduct primarily occurred during his employment with Sara Lee. Indeed, it was Defendant’s employment relationship with Sara Lee which placed him in a position of trust enabling him to engage in the fraudulent transactions at issue. It follows that Defendant’s conduct is not within the scope of Chapter 75. We therefore vacate those portions of the trial court’s judgment which trebled Sara Lee’s damages pursuant to Chapter 75.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover unfair trade practices claims arising from an employer-employee relationship.

Seigel v. Patel · filed 1999-04-06

The complaint indicates not that this is a worker’s compensation claim brought in a court of law at plaintiff’s election, but a claim for fraud and unfair trade practices against her employer under Chapter 75. It is the law of this state that plaintiff cannot bring such an action against her employer.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover conduct arising from an employer-employee relationship.

Dalton v. Camp · filed 1999-09-21

Camp’s conduct primarily occurred during his employment with plaintiff. In fact, it was Camp’s employment relationship with plaintiff that placed him in the position to negotiate with Walker. It follows that Camp’s conduct was not within the purview of Chapter 75.

Section 75-1.1 covers an employee’s fraudulent sales to an employer when the transactions are business activities in or affecting commerce; employee status alone does not exclude them.

Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter · filed 1999-10-08(a)

To the contrary, having already characterized defendant’s conduct as buyer-seller transactions that fall squarely within the Act’s intended reach, we conclude that defendant’s relationship to plaintiff as an employee, under these facts, does not preclude applicability of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 to this case.

Section 75-1.1 generally does not cover an ordinary employer-employee dispute when the employee’s conduct is not in or affecting commerce and lacks aggravating or egregious circumstances.

Dalton v. Camp · filed 2001-07-20(b)

As a consequence of concluding that employee Camp was without fiduciary duty, that his position was not one “in or affecting commerce,” and that his business actions were neither aggravating nor egregious, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment as to employer Dalton’s claim under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 generally does not cover employment disputes unless the parties are also involved in a business relationship; the challenged conduct must be in or affecting commerce.

Freeman v. Duke Power Company · filed 2004-09-27(b)

The statute generally does not apply to employment situations, see Dalton, 548 S.E.2d at 711, though the existence of an employment relationship will not necessarily defeat a claim if the parties are otherwise involved in a business relationship.

Section 75-1.1 can cover deceptive conduct that occurs before an employer-employee relationship begins.

Mayes v. Moore · filed 2006-02-16

Section 75-1.1 does not bar suits between employer and employee if the offending conduct occurred before or after the employment relationship’s existence.

Section 75-1.1’s “in commerce” requirement is not satisfied by alleged effects that remain within an employment relationship.

Kapur v. Imw Emr, LLC · filed 2020-12-18

The Court finds that these allegations are not adequate to take the claim beyond the context of the employment relationship and to demonstrate a claim arising “in commerce.”

Section 75-1.1 can cover conduct arising from an employment dispute when an alleged fraudulent transfer scheme among multiple companies affects commerce beyond the employment relationship.

Ehmann v. Medflow, Inc. · filed 2022-09-12

Here, while Plaintiff seeks remedies pursuant to an employment relationship with Medflow, the claims alleged include a scheme of fraudulent transfer between multiple companies, including Medflow, Medflow Holdings, and SNIC. The fact that such companies were each indirectly owned by Lindberg is no barrier. ... The facts alleged with respect to Plaintiff’s UVTA claim creates the foundation that satisfies the requirements under the UDTPA.

Section 75-1.1(a) requires aggravating or egregious circumstances to support an unfair or deceptive practices claim between an employer and employees; customer solicitation letters alone do not suffice.

Mountain Island Day Community Charter School v. Inspire Performing Arts Company, LLC · filed 2025-09-02(a)

“[W]ithout more” these letters do not present circumstances “aggravating or egregious enough to overcome the longstanding presumption against unfair and deceptive practices claims as between employers and employees.” Dalton, 548 S.E.2d at 712.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover employer-employee relationships.

American Marble Corp. v. Crawford · filed 1987-01-20

As defendant’s counterclaim involves such a relationship, we hold, following Buie, that it lies outside the scope of G.S. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 generally does not cover employer-employee disputes because they do not involve conduct in or affecting commerce.

Stec v. Fuzion Inv. Capital, LLC · filed 2012-04-30

This Court does not find any facts which would support the creation of another exception to the general rule that employer employee relationships fall outside the scope of the UDTPA. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendants’ actions are “in or affecting commerce.” Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to plead all the elements of a UDTPA claim and, therefore, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to this claim.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover a dispute over disability benefits provided as part of an employee’s compensation.

Welsh v. Wachovia Corp. · filed 2006-07-13

The STD benefit in this case is conferred on the employee as part of his compensation package, and thus involves a typical employment dispute. ... Thus, the district court erred in applying the Act to the facts of this case. The award of treble damages must be reversed.

Section 75-1.1 does not impose derivative or successor liability on a party that did not directly participate in the alleged unlawful conduct.

Tetterton v. Ocwen Federal Bank (In Re Tetterton) · filed 2007-12-13

Tetterton’s claims arising under the North Carolina Deceptive Trade Practices Act fail as a matter of law because North Carolina courts have held that liability under that statute does not extend to parties who did not directly participate in alleged unlawful activities during the execution of the mortgage. ... Thus, Tetterton’s claims under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 are not actionable.

A § 75-1.1 claim based on an alleged § 24-8 or usury-law violation fails when the plaintiff cannot state the underlying § 24-8 or usury claim.

Capparelli v. AmeriFirst Home Improvement Finance Co. · filed 2008-02-01

Having concluded that plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under either section 24-8 or North Carolina usury law, the court also concludes that plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for a violation of section 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury, and whether conduct violates the statute is a question of law for the trial court.

Eason v. CLEVELAND DRAFT HOUSE, LLC · filed 2009-03-17(a)

To state a claim for relief for unfair and deceptive practices, plaintiff must allege "(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice by defendant, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to plaintiff." ... Whether an alleged commercial act or practice is unfair or deceptive in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 is a question of law for the trial court. ... Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, plaintiff's allegations do not support a claim that defendants' actions were deceptive or unfair. ... Here, plaintiff merely alleges she was served drinks stronger than the recommended dosage. Plaintiff did not allege defendants misrepresented the amount of alcohol being served or that defendants made any representation at all as to the amount of alcohol in her drinks.

Section 75-1.1(a) makes unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce unlawful; a claim requires an unfair or deceptive act, a commerce nexus, and proximate actual injury.

Eli Global, LLC v. Heavner · filed 2016-12-06(a)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) provides that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” A claim for unfair and deceptive practices requires proof of: “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, which (3) proximately caused actual injury to the claimant.”

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury; an unfair practice offends public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious, while a deceptive practice has the capacity or tendency to deceive.

Ehmann v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC · filed 2020-02-27

A claim for unfair or deceptive acts or practices under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 requires “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury to plaintiffs.” ... These alleged acts are neither deceptive nor do they rise to the level of being immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to allege an unfair or deceptive act or practice, and the Court dismisses this claim with prejudice.

Section 75-1.1(a) makes unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce unlawful and requires an unfair or deceptive act, a commerce nexus, and proximate injury; a breach of warranty alone requires egregious or aggravating circumstances.

THE CITY OF HIGH POINT, NORTH CAROLINA v. SUEZ TREATMENT SOLUTIONS INC. · filed 2020-09-09(a)

Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a). “In order to establish a violation of N.C.G.S. § 75–1.1, a plaintiff must show: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury to plaintiffs.” ... “Under North Carolina law, a breach of warranty alone is insufficient to state a UDTPA claim. Rather, a party must allege some type of egregious or aggravating circumstances.”

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately causes actual injury, and a routine contract dispute without substantial aggravating circumstances does not state a UDTPA claim.

Honeywell International Inc. v. OPTO Electronics Co., Ltd. · filed 2022-04-14

To state a claim pursuant to the UDTPA, a plaintiff must allege (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) in or affecting commerce; (3) which proximately caused actual injury to claimant. Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C., Inc., 653 S.E.2d 393, 399 (N.C. 2007). A deceptive trade practice “is one that possesses the tendency or capacity to mislead, or creates the likelihood of deception.” Noble v. Hooters of Greenville (NC), LLC, 681 S.E.2d 448, 452 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). “A practice is unfair when it offends public policy and when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” Walker v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 515 S.E.2d 727, 729 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (internal citation omitted). Whether conduct is unfair or deceptive is a question of law for the court. Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 529 S.E.2d 676, 681 (N.C. 2000). To establish an UDTPA claim, Opticon must show “[s]ome type of egregious or aggravating circumstances.” Phelps Staffing, LLC v. C.T. Phelps, Inc., 740 S.E.2d 923, 928 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (emphasis in original). A “fundamental disagreement between the parties about a contract’s terms” is not a “substantial aggravating circumstance” that could elevate a routine contract dispute to an unfair and deceptive act. LRP Hotels of Carolina, LLC v. Westfield Ins. Co., No. 4:13-cv-94-D, 2014 WL 5581049, * 3 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 31, 2014); see also Ditch Witch of Charlotte, Inc. v. Bandit Indus., No. 15-cv-181, 2017 WL 390290, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2017) (“The exercise of contractual rights is not an unfair trade practice under the North Carolina statute.”). This is a contract dispute involving a disagreement as to the meaning of words in a settlement agreement. The Court rejects Opticon’s attempt to transform it into a UDTPA claim.

A plaintiff cannot sustain a statutory unfair-and-deceptive-trade-practices claim when the underlying fraudulent-concealment claim fails.

Dash BPO, LLC v. Lindberg · filed 2024-06-07

We also affirm the district court’s dismissal of Dash’s statutory unfair and deceptive trade practices claims—which are “premised upon defendants’ [alleged] fraudulent concealment” of Lindberg’s conduct—on the basis that a plaintiff cannot sustain such claims after failing to state a claim for fraudulent concealment. See id. at *10.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce that proximately causes injury, and it can reach post-cancellation billing and collection harassment.

Morgan v. AT & T CORP. · filed 2005-02-15

Our courts have established that an unfair and deceptive practices claim must show "(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affecting commerce, and (3) which proximately caused injury." ... Here, plaintiff contacted defendant regarding cancellation of the service, but continued to be billed for several months after the cancellation, even after attempting to contact defendant by telephone and in writing regarding the continued charges. Additionally, defendant placed plaintiff's account with a collection agency who continued to call and harass plaintiff, even after notification by plaintiff that the account had been cancelled. These actions, taken after plaintiff's cancellation of the contract and independent of the agreement governed by the filed tariff, present a claim sufficient, when taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to overcome a motion for summary judgment.

Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in commerce that proximately cause actual injury, and a contract dispute generally requires egregious or aggravating circumstances.

Rutledge v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Rutledge) · filed 2014-05-16

To state a claim under § 75-1.1, the Debtor must allege sufficient facts to show (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or to his business. ... A breach of contract claim, such as a disagreement with a loan servicer over terms and payments of a mortgage, must also allege egregious or aggravating circumstances to constitute an unfair or deceptive act under § 75-1.1. ... In the context of a misrepresentation claim brought under section 75-1.1, actual reliance requires that the plaintiff have affirmatively incorporated the alleged misrepresentation into his or her decision-making process: if it were not for the misrepresentation, the plaintiff would likely have avoided the injury altogether. ... These instances do not rise to the level of “unfair” acts as defined by North Carolina law or constitute egregious or aggravating circumstances with regard to the breach of contract claims. ... Accordingly, the Court cannot find that the actions of Wells Fargo personnel are sufficient to constitute a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted under § 75-1.1. The Motion to Dismiss is granted with respect to Count VI.

Section 75-1.1(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; a prima facie claim requires such an act, in or affecting commerce, that proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Sparks v. Oxy-Health, LLC · filed 2015-09-15(a)

To state a prima facie claim under the UDPA, plaintiffs must successfully show: 1) that defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, 2) in or affecting commerce, 3) which proximately caused Jarred’s injury.

A § 75-1.1 claim based on tortious interference fails when the underlying tortious interference claim fails.

Durham Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consolidated. · filed 2003-04-28

Because these defendants are entitled to summary judgment regarding Durham’s tortious interference claim, they are also entitled to summary judgment on Durham’s unfair trade practices claim, which is based on the tortious interference claim.

A § 75-1.1 claim based on alleged misuse of a trade secret fails when the underlying trade secret claim fails.

Area Landscaping, L.L.C. v. Glaxo-Wellcome, Inc. · filed 2003-10-07

Area also alleged that defendants’ misuse of its trade secret was an unfair or deceptive trade practice according to G.S. § 75-1.1. Since the trial court properly granted summary judgment as to the trade secret claim, this claim must also fail.

A § 75-1.1 claim based entirely on offering a defective product cannot succeed when the product is found not to be defective.

Muteff v. Invacare Corp. · filed 2012-02-07

We also disagree with Plaintiff’s argument that he was prejudiced for the same reason — having determined that the wheelchair was not defective, the jury could not have found any UDTP upon Plaintiff’s theory in that claim.

When a § 75-1.1 claim depends on an alleged trade secret violation, insufficient evidence of that violation can also defeat a request for a preliminary injunction on the § 75-1.1 claim.

Unimin Corp. v. Gallo · filed 2014-09-04

Plaintiff hinges its claim under the UDTPA on Defendants’ alleged violation of the NCTSPA. Because the Court is not satisfied that Plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on its claim under the NCTSPA, the Court therefore similarly concludes that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence of Defendants’ violation of the UDTPA to justify entry of a preliminary injunction.

A section 75-1.1 claim that depends on success of a contract claim fails when the contract claims fail.

Beverage Systems of the Carolinas, LLC v. Associated Beverage Repair, LLC · filed 2016-03-18

Plaintiff’s section 75-1.1 claim presupposes success of at least one of plaintiff’s contract claims. Because we hold that each of those claims fails, plaintiff’s unfair and deceptive practices claim also fails.

A § 75-1.1 claim that rests entirely on rejected constructive fraud and fiduciary duty claims fails with those underlying claims.

Azure Dolphin, LLC v. Barton · filed 2018-12-07

Having already rejected the only arguments that plaintiffs have advanced in support of their challenge to the trial court’s decision to dismiss their hybrid constructive fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claim, we are compelled to reject their challenge to the dismissal of their unfair and deceptive practices claim as well.

A section 75-1.1 claim based solely on underlying tort claims fails when those claims are dismissed; it may proceed when the underlying fiduciary duty claim remains.

Kixsports, LLC v. Munn · filed 2021-04-01

In addition, Vaughan is entitled to summary judgment on the section 75-1.1 claim in its entirety because all underlying tort claims against him have been dismissed. As to Munn, however, the underlying claim for breach of fiduciary duty remains. The Court therefore denies the cross-motions to the extent the section 75-1.1 claim against Munn is based on the allegations that he breached his fiduciary duties.

A section 75-1.1 claim predicated on trade-secret misappropriation and tortious interference with contract survives dismissal when those predicate claims survive.

Mech. Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Howard · filed 2021-08-11

MSS’s claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices under section 75-1.1 is predicated on its underlying allegations of trade-secret misappropriation and tortious interference with contract. Because these predicate claims survive, so too does the section 75-1.1 claim. The Court therefore denies the motions to dismiss this claim.

A section 75-1.1 claim based on fraud must be dismissed when the fraud allegations are inadequate.

Tac Invs., LLC v. Rodgers · filed 2021-09-10

This claim is based on the same allegations of fraud as the claims for rescission. Having concluded that the allegations of fraud are inadequate, the Court further concludes that the section 75-1.1 claim must also be dismissed.

A tortious interference or fraud claim that survives dismissal may support a claim under § 75-1.1.

Avadim Health, Inc. v. Daybreak Cap. Partners, LLC · filed 2021-11-30

Here, the Tortious Interference Counterclaims have survived the Motion, as discussed above, and the Tortious Interference Counterclaims that have survived the Motion may form the basis for the UDTP Act counterclaim. ... Here, the Fraud Counterclaim has survived the Motion as well, and may further form the basis for the UDTP Act counterclaim.

Section 75-1.1 claims based on tortious interference may proceed to the extent the underlying interference claims survive when defendants offer no independent ground for dismissal.

Fin. Carrier Servs. LLC v. Kingpin Cap. Inc. · filed 2025-06-19

McCray and Kingpin offer no independent reason to dismiss the section 75-1.1 claims apart from those related to the claims for tortious interference discussed above. Thus, the Court concludes that the section 75-1.1 claims shall proceed to the same extent as the tortious interference claims.

A § 75-1.1 claim based on tortious interference with contract can survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings when the underlying interference claim survives.

Accelerando, Inc. v. Relentless Sols., Inc. · filed 2025-06-19

Because the Court has concluded that Plaintiff’s claim against Yoder for tortious interference with contract survives the Motion, the UDTPA claim also survives at this stage.

Section 75-1.1 allows a claim based on conduct sufficiently pleaded as trade secret misappropriation and tortious interference with contract.

Accelerando, Inc. v. Relentless Sols., Inc. · filed 2025-06-19(a)

Because the Court has concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and tortious interference with contract, the allegations are likewise sufficient to state a UDTPA claim as to that same conduct.

A Section 75-1.1 claim fails when the same allegations are insufficient to support the underlying tort claims.

Law Off. of Ashley-Nicole Russell, P.A. v. McLawhorn Legal Servs. Pllc · filed 2026-01-21

As the Court concludes herein, infra paragraphs 42, 50, and 59, that Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to support a claim for tortious interference with contract, conversion, or computer trespass, the allegations are likewise insufficient to state a UDTPA claim as to that same conduct.

A section 75-1.1 claim cannot rest on underlying claims that have been dismissed.

Best Logistics Grp., Inc. v. Bravo · filed 2026-05-08

The claims for breach of Carson’s employment agreement, breach of the employee nonsolicitation clause in Bravo’s employment agreement, and tortious interference with existing and prospective contracts cannot support the section 75-1.1 claim because they have been dismissed, either voluntarily by Best Logistics or by the Court.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover a private homeowner’s sale of a personal residence because it is not a commercial land transaction affecting commerce.

Birmingham v. H&H Home Consultants & Designs, Inc. · filed 2008-04-01(b)

In conclusion, we hold Judge Kincaid did not err when he granted the Barnes defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s unfair and deceptive practices claim. Neither the complaint nor the affidavits allege any facts showing the Barnes defendants were engaged in a business or that this sale was a commercial land transaction that affected commerce.

Section 75-1.1(a) requires a plaintiff to show that the matter was in or affecting commerce, while the homeowner exception excludes private homeowners selling their personal residences from unfair and deceptive practice liability.

Glover v. Dailey · filed 2017-06-20(a)

Chapter 75 of our General Statutes prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) (2015). As the statutory language indicates, “to prevail on a cause of action for unfair and deceptive trade practices, a plaintiff must show that the matter was in or affecting commerce.” MacFadden v. Louf, 182 N.C. App. 745, 746, 643 S.E.2d 432, 433 (2007). ... As private homeowners selling their personal residence, therefore, defendants “are not subject to unfair and deceptive practice liability.” Davis, 115 N.C. App. at 7, 443 S.E.2d at 883. The trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ cause of action under the homeowner exception.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover private homeowners selling their residence, but a buyer may bring a claim against commercial defendants who allegedly concealed known termite damage; the buyer’s failure to inspect does not bar the claim as a matter of law.

Robertson v. Boyd · filed 1988-01-19

Defendants Boyd, being private parties engaged in the sale of a residence, were not involved in trade or commerce and cannot be held liable under the statute. ... However, defendants Booth Realty and Go-Forth were engaged in trade or commerce within the meaning of G.S. 75-1.1. ... Thus, plaintiffs’ claim under G.S. 75-1.1 is not barred as a matter of law by their failure to inspect for termite damage. ... Here plaintiffs allege that defendants knew about the termite damage and actively engaged in efforts to prevent plaintiffs from learning of the damage. On its face, therefore, the complaint alleges conduct which, if proved, may be either unfair or deceptive within the purview of G.S. 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to a homeowner's private sale of a residence because the homeowner is not engaged in commerce.

Johnson v. Beverly-Hanks & Associates, Inc. · filed 1990-02-20

To be accountable to any party for violating G.S. sec. 75-1.1, a defendant must be engaged in commerce. ... The undisputed facts establish that Mrs. Kefgen was merely a homeowner who listed her house for sale. Based upon this, Mrs. Kefgen cannot be liable for any acts which might generally be considered unfair or deceptive trade practices.

A homeowner who uses a real estate broker’s license to receive a referral fee from selling their own home falls within Section 75-1.1 despite the private homeowner exemption.

Davis v. Sellers · filed 1994-06-07

Although persons selling their own private residence are exempt from Chapter 75 liability, Rosenthal, supra, defendant wife’s receipt of the referral fee brings defendants’ transaction within the scope of G.S. 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover a private real estate transaction by an individual who is not in the business of selling real estate.

Stephenson v. Warren · filed 2000-03-07

Because plaintiff was not engaged in the business of selling real estate, her claim falls beyond the purview of section 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1’s possible homeowner exception is limited to an individual selling their own residence; a property’s residential character alone does not establish the exception.

FRAIM v. CHILLY DIL CONSULTING, INC. · filed 2022-07-25

However, as outlined above by the North Carolina Supreme Court, even if a homeowner’s exception exists, it does not apply simply because the property is a “residential dwelling” or the “claims relat[e] to the sale or purchase of residential property” as Defendants contend; rather, such an exception is limited to the sale by a private patty of his or her own residence.

Section 75-1.1 applies to a fraudulent scheme in the sale of corporate assets when the alleged misrepresentations are unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce that proximately injure the claimant.

Gress v. Rowboat Co., Inc. · filed 2008-06-03(a)

Instead, we find the facts before us demonstrate a fraudulent scheme concerning the sale of corporate assets, which is sufficient to establish a claim for relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. ... These facts establish more than just a breach of contract by plaintiff; they show a fraudulent scheme in which plaintiff’s misrepresentations were sufficiently deceptive to (1) constitute unfair or deceptive acts (2) in or affecting commerce, which (3) proximately caused injury to defendants. As such, defendants’ allegations, treated as true, are sufficient to establish a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 fraud-based claims accrue upon actual discovery of the fraud or when it should have been discovered through due diligence.

Cebula v. The Givens Estates, Inc. · filed 2014-07-15

The same general rule appears to be applicable to fraud-based claims brought pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. Shepard v. Ocwen Fed Bank, FSB, 361 N.C. 137, 141-42, 638 S.E.2d 197 200 (2006) (holding that an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim resting upon allegations of usury should be subject to the statute of limitations applicable to usury based claims). “‘Discovery’ is defined as actual discovery or the time when the fraud should have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence.”

A fraud-based claim under § 75-1.1 accrues when the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

S.B. Simmons Landscaping & Excavating, Inc. v. Boggs · filed 2008-08-19

This Court stated that “[u]nder North Carolina law, an action accrues at the time of the invasion of plaintiff’s right. For actions based on fraud, this occurs at the time the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence.”

Section 75-1.1 does not support a UDTPA claim by political subdivisions enforcing their taxing authority where the dispute involves no commercial activity implicating the Act.

Wake County v. hotels.com, Lp · filed 2007-11-19

In this case, Plaintiffs are political subdivisions of the State seeking to enforce their taxing authority. By even the most generous of interpretations, there is no commercial activity involved here that implicates the UDTPA, and therefore no basis for allowing these claims to proceed.

Section 75-1.1 does not give a third-party claimant a private right of action against an adverse party’s insurer unless the claimant has the required privity.

USA Trouser · filed 2018-02-20

Treating the allegations in USAT’s complaint as true, USAT has failed to establish the privity required by Murray for it to have standing to assert claims for unfair or deceptive trade practices and bad faith claims settlement. Without privity, the general rule that “a private right of action under N.C.G.S. § 58-63-15 and N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 may not be asserted by a third-party claimant against the insurer of an adverse party[,]” prevails. Lee, 136 N.C. App. at 810, 525 S.E.2d at 856 (citation and quotation marks omitted). USAT does not have standing to assert its unfair or deceptive trade practices claim and bad faith settlement claim. See id.

Section 75-1.1 permits an unfair-trade-practices claim by a person in contractual privity with an insurer, including an intended third-party beneficiary, but limits the claim to conduct concerning coverage that benefits that person.

Anderson v. Lancaster Aviation, Inc. · filed 2002-07-31

As such, because Anderson is in privity with Ranger based on the Renter Pilot Extension, Anderson may assert a § 75-1.1 claim against Ranger for Ranger's misconduct as to its handling of insurance claims and Anderson's inquiries relating to the coverage provided by the Renter Pilot Extension. However, the Court clarifies that Anderson's § 75-1.1 claim could only be based on Ranger's treatment of Anderson's claims for coverage that are specifically covered by the Renter Pilot Extension. In other words, the privity provided to Anderson by the Renter Pilot Extension does not allow him to assert that Ranger’s allegedly unfair treatment of Anderson’s claims for medical expenses qualifies as an unfair and deceptive trade practice, because his own medical expenses in this instance are not covered by the terms of the Renter Pilot Extension.

Section 75-1.1 permits an injured person, firm, or corporation to sue for unfair conduct affecting commerce or consumers, and requires substantial injury in North Carolina rather than substantial in-state effects.

Sheet Metal Workers Local 441 Health & Welfare Plan v. Glaxosmithkline, PLC · filed 2010-09-07

The NCUDTPA provides a remedy for a “person, firm, or corporation” injured as the result of an unfair business practice, and North Carolina courts have restricted the Act only to ensure that challenged activities affect consumers or commerce. ... This falls within the scope of the NCUDTPA, and GSK’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under North Carolina law should not be granted for this reason. ... GSK also claims that the NCUDTPA requires plaintiffs to show substantial effects within North Carolina. ... This argument, too, is without merit. ... Plaintiffs rightly argue that the NCUDTPA only requires plaintiffs to prove a substantial injury in North Carolina.

Section 75-1.1 allows a plaintiff in a direct business relationship with the defendant to bring a claim for unfair or deceptive acts affecting commerce; the plaintiff need not be a consumer.

Philson v. Cold Creek Farms, Inc. · filed 1996-07-31(a)

To prevail on a claim brought pursuant to § 75-1.1, a plaintiff must show: “(1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff or to his business.” ... All of plaintiffs’ allegations relate to the regular business activities of CCF, plaintiffs were in a direct business relationship with CCF, and CCF’s acts are alleged to have caused injury to the plaintiffs in their own business activities. Moreover, the court rejects CCF’s argument that only consumers may bring a § 75-1.1 cause of action and directs the parties to the court’s July 26, 1996, order for further discussion.

For threats used to secure a debtor’s consent to foreclosure, Section 75-1.1 gives the debtor and threatened officers, but not an unsecured creditor, the right to sue.

G.P. Publications, Inc. v. Quebecor Printing-St. Paul, Inc. · filed 1997-03-04

Similarly, in the instant case, we hold that only Signal and the officers who were threatened with civil suits by TFSI II have the right to bring an action under Section 75-1.1 for the activity of which Quebecor complains.

Section 75-1.1 creates a substantive UDTP claim; proving fraud establishes a prima facie violation, after which the defendant must prove exemption.

Jones v. Harrelson and Smith Contractors, LLC · filed 2008-12-16

The court’s ruling appears to reflect a misunderstanding of the nature of a claim brought under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (2007). A UDTP claim is a substantive claim, the remedy for which is treble damages. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (2007). Chapter 75 is not a remedial scheme for other substantive claims. ... “Once the plaintiff has proven fraud, thereby establishing prima facie a violation of Chapter 75, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that he is exempt from the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.”

Section 75-1.1 entitles plaintiffs to Chapter 75 damages if the jury finds fraud in the property sale.

Vickery v. OLIN HILL CONST. CO., INC. · filed 1980-06-03

The determination of the question of plaintiffs’ cause of action for unfair trade practices under G.S. 75-1.1 is dependent upon the jury’s response to the issue of fraud. If, on remand, the jury answers this issue in plaintiffs’ favor, plaintiffs will be entitled to Chapter 75 damages.

Section 75-1.1 covers fraudulent conduct in a property sale when the buyer knows of the seller’s mental condition.

Whitman Ex Rel. Wilson v. Forbes · filed 1982-02-16

We believe the acts here, if proven, would constitute a deceptive trade practice. That is, if fraud existed and if the defendant knew of the mental condition of plaintiff, his acts would fall within the purview of the statute.

Proof of fraud necessarily establishes a violation of Section 75-1.1.

North Carolina National Bank v. Carter · filed 1984-11-06

Unquestionably, proof of fraud necessarily constitutes a violation of G.S. 75-1.1, and under ordinary circumstances defendants would be entitled automatically to treble the damages fixed by the jury.

A § 75-1.1 claim based on alleged fraud fails when the evidence does not establish fraud.

Myers & Chapman v. Evans · filed 1988-12-08

Accordingly, because of the absence of fraud, plaintiff s claim of an unfair trade practice under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 is without basis.

Fraud can establish an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim under § 75-1.1.

Hair v. Melvin · filed 2006-02-07

Further, fraud can serve as the basis for an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim.

A borrower’s sufficiently pleaded fraud claim can support a claim under § 75-1.1.

Wnc Holdings, LLC v. Alliance Bank & Trust Co. · filed 2012-10-02

Given that Plaintiffs sufficiently pled claims for fraud, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs adequately pled their claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices.

Section 75-1.1 treats fraud affecting commerce that causes injury as an unfair or deceptive practice.

Laschkewitsch v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Distributors, Inc. · filed 2014-09-15

The Court has already found that Lincoln is entitled to summary judgment on its claim for fraud, and therefore it is established that plaintiffs actions constitute an “unfair or deceptive act or practice.” Bhatti 400 S.E.2d at 442. Further, plaintiff admits that his actions were “in or affecting commerce.” See [DE 12 at 16; DE 6 at 17] (admitting that plaintiff was engaged in the business of acting as an independent insurance agent, which is subject to Chapter 75 and is in or affecting commerce). Finally, as discussed supra Part III.A.Í, plaintiffs deceptive acts caused Lincoln’s damages. Therefore Lincoln is entitled to summary judgment on its Chapter 75 claim.

Section 75-1.1(a) does not reach a case in which the plaintiff alleges no substantial effect on in-state business operations.

Bondi v. Bank of America Corp. · filed 2005-08-05(a)

In the absence of a clear indication that the North Carolina legislature intended Section 75-1.1 to reach cases in which the plaintiff alleges no substantial effect on instate business operations, this Court concludes that the complaint states no claim under the statute.

Section 75-1.1 applies to primarily local concerns and, under this decision, requires a substantial effect on North Carolina operations or an in-state injury.

In Re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation · filed 2002-07-11

We believe `In' Porters reflects the better interpretation. ... Instead of emphasizing defendants' conduct, they have found that the statute focuses on *851 "the impact the practice has on the marketplace." Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981). The relevant marketplace is North Carolina. ... Because the named plaintiffs have not alleged that they experienced any harm within North Carolina, they cannot state a claim under the NCUTPA.

Section 75-1.1 reaches unfair or deceptive practices affecting commerce in the North Carolina marketplace and requires an in-state injury or substantial effect on in-state operations; an out-of-state plaintiff cannot rely merely on the defendant's North Carolina location or profits.

Kramer v. Aventis CropScience USA Holding, Inc. · filed 2002-07-11

We believe ‘In’ Porters reflects the better interpretation. ... The relevant marketplace is North Carolina. ... Following ‘In’ Porters’ use of the long-arm analogy, we examine whether plaintiffs’ contact with North Carolina would sustain personal jurisdiction there. The answer is decidedly no. Plaintiffs have not pled any contact with North Carolina. They have not alleged that they buy or sell any goods there, have any contact with a North Carolina company, or engage in any North Carolina commerce whatsoever. Because the named plaintiffs have not alleged that they experienced any harm within North Carolina, they cannot state a claim under the NCUTPA.

Section 75-1.1 requires proof of an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately caused injury, including an injury in North Carolina.

Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v. Hosiery · filed 1999-04-23

“To establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, the plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, N.C. Gen. State. § 75-1.1 (1994), and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” ... “Section “75-1.1[] requires an instate injury to plaintiff before plaintiff can state a valid unfair trade claim.” ... Accordingly, Sara Lee has failed to meet its burden of proving its claim under the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act.

Section 75-1.1 can apply to out-of-state conduct that causes injury in North Carolina when its application is constitutionally permissible.

American Rockwool, Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. · filed 1986-06-18

Section 75-1.-1, however, is not so limited. Indeed, before 1977, § 75-1.1 was specifically limited to dealings between persons “within this state.” In 1977, however, the Legislature amended the statute and deleted this geographic limitation. In re-writing § 75-1.1, the General Assembly expanded an effective cause of action for individuals and businesses in North Carolina who have been victimized by unscrupulous methods of competition or trade practices. The court perceives that the General Assembly intended to hold parties causing injury in North Carolina accountable in the courts of this state, insofar as possible.

Section 75-1.1 reaches foreign conduct only when it causes a substantial injurious effect on the plaintiff’s business operations in North Carolina.

The IN PORTERS, SA v. Hanes Printables, Inc. · filed 1987-06-11

While reference to section 1-75.4(4) limits the applicability of section 75-1.1 to cases having an in-state effect on plaintiff’s business operation, reference to the Sherman Act further limits the applicability of section 75-1.1 to cases having a substantial effect on plaintiffs in-state operations. ... The court believes that limiting the scope of the act to cases involving substantial effect on a plaintiff’s in-state business operation is consistent with, and perhaps required by, the commerce clause. ... For these reasons, limiting the sections reach to cases involving a substantial effect on plaintiff’s operations in North Carolina comports with the notion of fairness under the due process clause. ... Lacking substantial North Carolina effects, plaintiff’s claim falls outside the reach of 75-1.1 and is accordingly dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Section 75-1.1 broadly covers unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce, including some cases where the plaintiff’s injury occurred outside North Carolina.

MORRISON v. AQ TEXTILES LLC · filed 2022-01-27(a)–(b)

The statute’s plain language is broad in scope and applies to all acts or practices “in or affecting commerce,” including “all business activities, however denominated.” § 75-1.1(a)–(b). ... Consequently, the Court joins the cases cited above and interprets the NCUDTPA broadly to reach some cases where the injury occurred outside of North Carolina.

Section 75-1.1 protects consumers and does not reach claims lacking a substantial effect on in-state North Carolina operations.

Duke Energy International, L.L.C. v. Napoli · filed 2010-09-21

Although the NC UTPA’s language is broad, “it is not intended to apply to all wrongs in a business setting.” ... The Act’s “primary purpose is to protect the consuming public.” ... “the fundamental purpose of the [NC] UTPA is to protect the consumer, and courts invariably look to that purpose in deciding whether the Act applies.” ... The Court follows these precedents. A plaintiff who does not allege a substantial effect on in-state North Carolina operations fails to state a claim under the NC UTPA. ... Moreover, even if Duke could establish a substantial effect on its North Carolina operations, Duke has alleged no facts showing harm to North Carolina consumers. ... Duke’s NC UTPA claim is dismissed.

Section 75-1.1 reaches conduct that substantially injures a plaintiff in North Carolina and protects North Carolina consumers through a private remedy for unfair or deceptive acts.

Wall v. AutoMoney · filed 2022-07-19

Prior to 1977, section 75-1.1 was specifically limited to ‘dealings within this state.’ North Carolina’s General Assembly deleted the geographical limitation in 1977. Courts interpreted the legislature’s action as a desire to expand the scope of section 75-1.1 to the limits of North Carolina’s long-arm statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75.4(4). Thus, section 75-1.1 applies if the plaintiff alleges a substantial injurious effect on [a] plaintiff . . . in North Carolina. ... Therefore, despite Defendant’s effort to avoid the application of North Carolina law, for the purposes of Plaintiffs’ UDTPA claim, to enforce the choice-of-law provisions would violate the inherent public policy of North Carolina to broadly construe the UDTPA in order to provide a private cause of action for injured North Carolina consumers. See Broussard, 945 F. Supp. at 917. Thus, the trial court did not err by concluding Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains sufficient allegations to support a claim under the UDTPA despite the inclusion of a choice-of-law provision in Plaintiffs’ contracts stating South Carolina law should apply. Consequently, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6).

Section 75-1.1 likely requires allegations of intrastate conduct to state a claim, and in-state effects from a nationwide anticompetitive scheme can satisfy that nexus at the pleading stage.

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE v. MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP. · filed 2023-11-20

Merck is correct that the consumer protection laws of these states likely require some allegation of intrastate conduct to state a claim.

Section 75-1.1 does not reach an unfair-trade-practices claim absent a substantial effect on in-state business operations; any incidental injury in North Carolina is insufficient.

Merck & Co. Inc. v. Lyon · filed 1996-09-11

The Court agrees with Glaxo that plaintiffs have failed to allege a substantial effect on any in-state business operations, and therefore that their claim falls outside the reach of the North Carolina Trade Practices Act. Any injury plaintiffs may suffer in North Carolina will be incidental.

Section 75-1.1 broadly reaches commercial dealings, including transactions involving foreign plaintiffs when the alleged conduct has a substantial injurious effect on business operations in North Carolina.

Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc. · filed 1996-10-09

The wording of the statute and its purpose is broad and section (b), on its face, extends the statute to commercial dealings between persons at all levels of commerce. ... Thus, section 75-1.1 applies if the plaintiff alleges a “substantial injurious effect on plaintiffs business operations in North Carolina.” ... The Court finds the reasoning in Jacobs sound and in accordance with the North Carolina legislature’s desire to expand the scope of section 75-1.1 to the limits of North Carolina’s long-arm statute. ... Therefore, it follows that section 75-1.1 would govern the same transactions. ... because the Plaintiffs have presented evidence that the Defendants have caused a substantial injury to the Plaintiffs’ business operations in violation of the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act section 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants’ conduct had a substantial effect on in-state North Carolina business to state a claim under the NCUTPA.

In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litigation · filed 2014-09-25

To bring a claim under the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (“NCUTPA”), a plaintiff must allege that the defendants’ conduct had a substantial effect on in-state business. Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F.Supp. 1443, 1463 (M.D.N.C.1996). Accord Duke Energy Int’l, LLC v. Napoli 748 F.Supp.2d 656, 677 (S.D.Tex.2010) (holding that “[a] plaintiff who does *861not allege a substantial effect on in-state North Carolina operations fails to state a claim under the NCUTPA”). Defendants argue that no claim is stated because the IPPs’ complaints address nationwide effects that impact North Carolina no more than any other state. The Court disagrees. The cases upon which Defendants rely merely articulate the constitutional limitation of the NDCDTPA. IPPs allege that North Carolina IPPs were harmed by paying supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices” for Bearings. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶¶ 63-64; Doc. No. 70 at ¶ 252(d)). These allegations demonstrate that the application of North Carolina law is “neither arbitrary or unfair.” Duke Energy, 748 F.Supp.2d at 677. Therefore, the Court denies Defendants’ request for dismissal on this basis.

Section 75-1.1 prohibits trade dress infringement and false advertising and permits an injunction against those practices.

Irwin Industrial Tool Co. v. Worthington Cylinders Wisconsin, LLC · filed 2010-10-01

Worthington shall refrain from infringing BernzOmatic’s trade dress and engaging in false advertising, both as found by the jury in this case, in violation of the Lanham Act and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive trade practices; competition through imitation is permissible absent likely confusion and unfair or unreasonable practices.

Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. Sangiacomo N.A. Ltd. · filed 1998-07-22

The North Carolina unfair trade practices statute prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive trade practices. See N.C.Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1. ... North Carolina law fully supports competition through imitation absent a likelihood of confusion and the employment of unfair or unreasonable practices. ... Ashley’s claims of common law unfair competition, violation of the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and tortious interference with prospective business advantage therefore fail as a matter of law.

A competitor’s use of a similar address does not violate § 75-1.1 without evidence that its advertisements were false or misleading.

Population Planning Associates, Inc. v. Mews · filed 1983-11-15

We find no merit in plaintiffs contention that use of an address that is similar to a competitor’s address is equivalent to “passing off’ one’s goods as those of a competitor and constitutes an unfair trade practice. We find that plaintiff introduced no evidence that defendants published false or misleading advertisements so as to perpetrate an unfair or deceptive act or practice or an unfair method of competition within the meaning of G.S. 75-1.1 et seq.

Section 75-1.1(a) does not make this humorous advertising cartoon an unfair or deceptive act or practice.

Cathy's Boutique v. WINSTON-WINSTON-SALEM JOINT VENTURE · filed 1985-02-05(a)

We believe, even after viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, that the trial court correctly concluded as a matter of law that this cartoon did not constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice by the defendants.

Section 75-1.1 permits a trade dress claim to proceed when the allegations sufficiently state Lanham Act trade dress infringement.

Camco Mfg., Inc. v. Jones Stephens Corp. · filed 2019-05-20

Therefore, because Camco has sufficiently alleged a Lanham Act trade dress infringement claim, it has also sufficiently alleged a North Carolina UDTPA claim.

Section 75-1.1 does not treat an ambiguous “100%” or “Pure” product label as deceptive when the label as a whole makes clear that the product contains other ingredients.

Beardsall v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. · filed 2019-03-13

Thus, when the labeling is viewed as a whole, the terms “100%” and “Pure” do not make the FOTE label deceptive.

Under § 75-1.1(b), “commerce” means business activities, but securities transactions are extraordinary capital-raising events outside the statute’s “in or affecting commerce” requirement.

Degorter v. Capitol Bancorp Ltd. · filed 2011-07-29(b)

The UDTPA defines “commerce” as “business activities.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b). It is well established that under the UDTPA, “business activities” indicates “the manner in which businesses conduct their regular, day-to-day activities, or affairs, . . . or whatever other activities the business regularly engages in and for which it is organized.” HAJMM, at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 494.

Section 75-1.1(a) treats securities transactions as outside “commerce” under Chapter 75, so conduct centered on executing those transactions cannot support a UDTP claim.

Loftin v. Qa Invs. LLC · filed 2015-04-30(a)

Section 75-1.1(a) of the General Statutes regulates “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(a) (2014). ... Thus any allegations directed specifically to QA’s securities transactions fall within the Skinner rule, excluding them from the definition of “commerce” under Chapter 75 and preventing any claims made on the basis of those transactions. ... The Court believes that QA’s alleged involvement in “fraudulently marketing and selling illegal and abusive tax shelters” (Am. Compl. ¶ 213), when coupled with its role as the transaction agent responsible for executing FLIP, are sufficiently similar to the allegations against the Skinner defendant, and should be controlled by the Skinner court’s holding. Similar to Skinner, where the allegations involved false advice and fraudulent induction into securities transactions and the implementation of those transactions, any QA participation in the alleged scheme centered on QA’s involvement in the securities transactions. ... The motion to dismiss with respect to Loftin’s UDTP claim is GRANTED.

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to securities transactions or investments whose purpose is to raise capital.

Nnn Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC v. Grubb & Ellis Co.; Nnn Durham Office Portfolio 1, LLC v. Highwoods Realty Ltd. P's · filed 2016-12-29

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ investment is beyond the scope of chapter 75. See Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 275, 333 S.E.2d 236, 241 (1985) (“[S]ecurities transactions are beyond the scope of [section] 75-1.1.”); ... Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the Grubb & Ellis Defendants on Plaintiffs’ section 75-1.1 claim.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover securities transactions because they are subject to pervasive regulation under North Carolina’s Securities Act.

Kure Corp. v. Peterson · filed 2017-01-05

It is well settled law in North Carolina that “securities transactions are beyond the scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.” Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 275, 333 S.E.2d 236, 241 (1985). This rule is based on the rationale that securities transactions are “already subject to pervasive and intricate regulation under the North Carolina Securities Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78A-1 et seq.” Id.

Section 75-1.1(a) does not apply to securities transactions because the issuance, transfer, redemption, or retirement of securities is not a transaction in or affecting commerce.

Sloan v. Inolife Techs., Inc. · filed 2017-05-22(a)

As explained by Defendants to Plaintiffs in the March 10 Letter, it is well settled under North Carolina law that securities transactions cannot serve as the basis for a claim under section 75-1.1. E.g., Skinner v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 275, 333 S.E.2d 236, 241 (1985); Sterner v. Penn, 159 N.C. App. 626, 633, 583 S.E.2d 670, 675 (2003).

Section 75-1.1 does not cover securities-related transactions that are not regular, day-to-day business activities and therefore are not “in or affecting commerce.”

Tillery Envtl., LLC v. A&D Holdings, Inc. · filed 2017-08-04(a)

Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s section 75-1.1 claim must fail because the Court concludes that the alleged conduct does not fall within the definition of “business activities” and thus “commerce” as set forth in HAJMM. ... Thus, under HAJMM, Plaintiff has failed to allege conduct “in or affecting commerce” under section 75-1.1, requiring dismissal of Plaintiff’s UDTP claim.

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to securities transactions that fall outside its commerce requirement, so stock purchases cannot support recovery under it.

Bucci v. Burns · filed 2018-04-25

Section 75-1.1 does not “govern all wrongs.” Sterner v. Penn, 159 N.C. App. 626, 633, 583 S.E.2d 670, 675 (2003) (internal punctuation omitted). “[P]laintiffs must ‘first establish that defendants’ conduct was in or affecting commerce before the question of unfairness or deception arises.’” Id. (quoting HAJMM v. House of Raeford Farms, 328 N.C. 578, 592–93, 403 S.E.2d 483, 492 (1991)). “Although [the] statutory definition of commerce is expansive,” it does not include “securities transactions,” which are extraordinary events that fall outside the statute’s purview. HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 593, 403 S.E.2d at 492. Our legislature did not intend for section 75-1.1, “with its treble damages provision, to apply to securities transactions which were already subject to pervasive and intricate regulation” under state and federal statutes. Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 275, 333 S.E.2d 236, 241 (1985) (quoting Linder v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 1985)). ... Perdue is correct as to the alleged stock purchases. The NCSA defines “[s]ecurity” to include “stock,” and stock purchases are plainly securities transactions. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78A-2(11). Plaintiffs may not seek recovery under section 75-1.1 for these purchases as a matter of law. See HAJMM, 328 N.C. at 594, 403 S.E.2d at 493; Sterner, 159 N.C. App. at 634, 583 S.E.2d at 676. The section 75-1.1 claims of Marcy Bucci, Eugene N. Bucci, Christine Merritt, Tom Ferguson, Charles Ferguson, and Matthew Ferguson are therefore dismissed. ... It appears likely that the purchases of convertible notes are also securities transactions, but the issue is not sufficiently clear to permit a final decision at the pleading stage. ... The Court therefore denies the motion to dismiss the section 75-1.1 claims of Laurel Manderbach, Kevin Salva, Karl Schuler, Rick Bucci, Eugene M. Bucci, and David Lubin.

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to securities transactions, including the merger-related withholding of merger consideration at issue here.

Robichaud v. Engage2Excel, Inc. · filed 2019-05-10

North Carolina courts have held that the NCUDTPA does not apply to securities transactions. ... Applying controlling North Carolina law to the facts of this case, the Court finds that the securities exception applies and bars Plaintiff’s NCUDTPA claim.

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to securities transactions.

Weft, Inc. v. G.C. Investment Associates · filed 1986-03-20

The sixth claim for relief was brought under North Carolina General Statute § 75-1.1, which prohibits unfair trade practices and allows an injured party to recover treble damages and reasonable attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court of North Carolina just recently held in Skinner v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 314 N.C. 267, 333 S.E.2d 236 (1985), that securities transactions are beyond the scope of this statute. In so doing, the Skinner court found persuasive the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d 162 (4th Cir.1985), which similarly held North Carolina General Statute § 75-1.1 inapplicable to securities transactions. Since the complaint makes clear that this case involves securities transactions, the sixth claim must be dismissed.

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to securities transactions.

Skinner v. EF Hutton & Co., Inc. · filed 1985-08-13

We hold that securities transactions are beyond the scope of N.C.G.S. 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover misrepresentation claims arising from securities transactions.

McPhail v. Wilson · filed 1990-03-29

Under the teaching of Skinner, the court concludes that plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claim is not actionable under the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and should be dismissed.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover the issuance or redemption of cooperative revolving fund certificates because those capital transactions are not in or affecting commerce.

Hajmm Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc. · filed 1991-05-02(b)

We conclude, therefore, that, like more conventional securities, issuance or redemption of revolving fund certificates are not “in or affecting commerce” and are not subject to the Act.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover alleged misrepresentations in a securities transaction undertaken to form and organize a corporation.

Garlock v. Hilliard · filed 2000-08-22

The decision by Plaintiffs and Hilliard to form Southeastern constituted a securities transaction and an activity to raise capital and organize the business and was not part of Southeastern’s daily business activities. Accordingly, there is no purchase and sale transaction to which Chapter 75 would apply.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover securities transactions arising under the North Carolina Securities Act, including claims that investors were fraudulently induced to buy securities.

ATKINSON v. LACKEY 2015 NCBC 13A (Amended 02-27-2015) · filed 2015-02-27

Securities transactions arising under the NCSA are beyond the scope of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1. ... And second, because the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ constructive fraud claim, like their other claims, is that Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiffs to invest in securities, Plaintiffs’ UDTPA claim must be dismissed.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover investment transactions related to the creation, transfer, or retirement of capital, even when described as alternative investments.

Beam v. Sunset Fin. Servs., Inc. · filed 2019-09-03

The Beams’ investments—regardless of their “alternative” nature—are nonetheless transactions “related to the creation, transfer, or retirement of capital” which the HAJMM Court has recognized as falling within the securities exemption to the UDTPA.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover securities transactions, regardless of whether the defendants qualify as offerors or sellers under the NCSA.

Bucci v. Burns · filed 2020-06-30

The transactions at issue are securities transactions and therefore fall outside the purview of section 75-1.1 regardless of whether Burns and Perdue are offerors or sellers under the NCSA.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover securities transactions, including a passive investment in an LLC membership interest.

Slattery v. Appycity, LLC · filed 2021-03-24(a)

Therefore, the basis for Slattery’s UDTP claim is, in effect, the type of securities transaction that falls outside the scope of section 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover alleged misconduct in a transaction undertaken to raise investment capital.

Aym Techs., LLC v. Scopia Cap. Mgmt. Lp, 2021 Ncbc 20b · filed 2021-03-31(a)

Because our courts have repeatedly held that the only question for the Court under this exception is whether the basis for the transaction involved securities, see id.; White, 166 N.C. App. at 304; Latigo Invs. II, LLC, 2007 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *11, the Court concludes that the considerations motivating the recognition of a securities exception to section 75-1.1 are fully present here and that the exception should apply as a result.

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to securities transactions conducted through brokerage firms.

Sterner v. Penn · filed 2003-08-05

We are persuaded that the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Harrah is sound and, therefore, we hold that North Carolina’s UDTPA has no application here.

Section 75-1.1 damages aim to restore the victim to the original condition by compensating for what was lost.

Window World of Baton Rouge, LLC v. Window World, Inc.; Window World of St. Louis, Inc. v. Window World, Inc. · filed 2018-09-26

The general principle that damages should “restore the victim to his original condition, to give back to him that which was lost as far as it may be done by compensation in money” also governs recovery under Section 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 bars contributory negligence as a defense, but the parties’ conduct may still be relevant to proximate cause and the appropriate damages award.

In Re Fifth Third Bank, Nat. Ass'n · filed 2011-11-01

Secondly, Plaintiffs have not cited any decisions of the Supreme Court or this Court holding that, in a case brought under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, the trier of fact is precluded, in determining the appropriate amount of damages proximately caused by a defendant’s unfair and deceptive practices, from considering all the evidence, including the behavior of the parties, that might reasonably bear upon the issue of proximate cause. Without attempting to describe such situations in any detail, we are able to conceive of factual scenarios under which a party’s conduct might affect the extent to which a particular item of damage was or was not proximately caused by the relevant act or practice. As a result, despite the fact that “contributory negligence” is not a defense to a claim brought pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, the parties’ behavior may still be relevant, depending on the factual circumstances underlying a particular case, to the determination of an appropriate damage award.

A claim under § 75-1.1 requires proof that the challenged statements proximately caused damage; a late attempt to recast the claims as injury to competition is unavailing.

Blythe v. Bell · filed 2013-04-08

The court refuses that request, and amplifies that in addition to the reasons stated in its February 4, 2013 Order, to the extent that Plaintiffs seek to rely on statements made by Hickory Brand, Inc. (“HBI”) to the general public, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that these statements have proximately caused damage to them, and that Plaintiffs’ effort to recast their causes of action as claims for injury to competition is late and unavailing.

A Chapter 75 claim may be based on fraudulent inducement in contract-centered litigation, and contract defenses do not bar the claim.

Tradewinds Airlines, Inc. v. C-S Aviation Services · filed 2012-09-18

An unfair trade practices action “is neither wholly tortious nor wholly contractual in nature[.]” ... Second, our Courts have allowed a plaintiff to maintain a Chapter 75 action based upon fraudulent inducement of a contract. ... Third, as discussed in Section III E of this opinion, where there is fraud in the inducement, defenses based upon the contract are not applicable.

Misappropriation of trade secrets can violate § 75-1.1, and disputed facts about misappropriation can prevent summary judgment on that claim.

Koch Measurement Devices, Inc. v. Armke · filed 2015-05-01

The North Carolina Court of Appeals has recognized that a misappropriation of trade secrets can constitute a violation of G.S. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not bar an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim based on allegations including breach of fiduciary duty and trade-secret conduct.

Olympus Managed Health Care, Inc. v. American Housecall Physicians, Inc. · filed 2012-02-21

The Court is not aware of any precedent precluding an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim based on these allegations. Olympus, S. Jacobson, and Davis’s motion is DENIED on this point.

Section 75-1.1(b) covers an unfair method of competition that is in or affecting commerce and proximately causes actual injury, and a trade-secret misappropriation violates it only if it satisfies those three prongs.

Aym Techs., LLC v. Rodgers · filed 2018-02-09(b)

Turning then to the allegations here, the Court concludes, for purposes of the 12(b)(6) Motions, that CBC’s and Scopia’s alleged misappropriation of the Plan constitutes an unfair method of competition, was in or affecting commerce, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1(b), and, viewing its allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, proximately caused actual injury to Aym.

Section 75-1.1 does not provide a viable UDTPA claim when the alleged unfair or deceptive conduct is based solely on a nonactionable TILA violation.

TUTTLE · filed 2026-02-23

“[In] seeking payment of amounts exceeding $100,000 and conducting a foreclosure sale of Plaintiff’s home without having sent him monthly mortgage statements, [Defendants] violated TILA6 . . . [which], in turn, “violated North Carolina’s unfair and deceptive trade practices statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 et seq.” ... Because the UDTPA claim is based upon nonactionable violations of the TILA, it fails as a matter of law. See Register, 2005 WL 8159532, at *10. Therefore, Count 8 of the complaint fails to state a claim and will be dismissed.

Section 75-1.1 can encompass violations of HAMP directives when they amount to unfair or unscrupulous behavior.

Hinson v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Hinson) · filed 2012-04-17

Violations of the agency directives implementing HAMP can constitute the type of unfair or unscrupulous behavior which N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 seeks to prevent.

A breach of fiduciary duty is not a per se violation of § 75-1.1.

Brady v. Prince · filed 2015-01-07

Plaintiffs argument is misplaced, as Sara Lee did not hold that a breach of fiduciary duty was a per se violation of the statute.

A section 75-1.1 claim based entirely on alleged trade secret misappropriation fails when the evidence is insufficient to establish misappropriation.

Aym Techs., LLC v. Rodgers · filed 2019-10-16

Since the misappropriation and UDTPA claims are based entirely on the same conduct, the Court’s conclusion that Aym has failed to offer evidence of misappropriation under Chapter 66 compels the same conclusion concerning the sufficiency of Aym’s proof under section 75-1.1.

A violation of North Carolina’s Trade Secret Protection Act may support liability under § 75-1.1.

Nfh, Inc. v. Troutman · filed 2019-10-29

Under well-settled North Carolina law, a violation of North Carolina’s Trade Secret Protection Act may support liability under N.C.G.S § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 allows an unfair methods of competition claim based on breach of fiduciary duty or misappropriation of trade secrets.

Glover Construction Co. v. Sequoia Servs., LLC · filed 2020-06-18

North Carolina case law has held that breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of trade secrets may form the basis of an unfair methods of competition claim. ... Having already determined that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on these claims, GCC’s claim for unfair methods of competition should also be allowed to go forward.

A § 75-1.1 claim based on trade secret misappropriation can survive a motion to dismiss when the underlying misappropriation claim is adequately pleaded.

Strata Solar, LLC v. Naftel · filed 2020-10-29

Therefore, because the Court at this stage of the proceeding declines to dismiss the trade secret misappropriation claims brought against Naftel and Schooff, the Court DENIES the Motion to the extent it requests that the Court dismiss the UDTPA claim against Naftel and Schooff.

Section 75-1.1 claims may survive a motion to dismiss when claims for trade secret misappropriation and tortious interference with contract survive.

Power Home Solar, LLC v. Sigora Solar, LLC · filed 2021-06-18

The Court has concluded that Power Home’s claims for trade secret misappropriation and tortious interference with contract survive the Motion, at least in part. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Power Home’s claims pursuant to the UDTPA and for common law unfair competition should also survive the Motion and therefore the Motion to dismiss the UDTPA and unfair competition claims should be DENIED.

Section 75-1.1 allows a claim based on adequately pleaded tortious interference and trade secret misappropriation.

McGriff Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Hudson · filed 2023-01-17

Because the Court has found that McGriff has adequately pled claims for tortious interference and misappropriation of trade secrets, its claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices also survives.

A claim under § 75-1.1 based on alleged trade secret misappropriation may proceed when the misappropriation claim survives, but fails when no underlying conduct supports it.

Wolfspeed, Inc. v. Van Brunt · filed 2025-04-02

First, the Court agrees with Defendants’ contention as to Allen, as Count Seven has been dismissed as to Allen, and, as a result, there is no underlying conduct which supports the UDTPA claim against him. However, the Court has allowed Count Seven to survive as to Van Brunt and Onsemi, and, as a result, to the extent Count Eight is based on the same conduct alleged against Van Brunt and Onsemi in Count Seven, this claim survives.

Section 75-1.1 treats charging a consumer for a good or service never received as an unfair or deceptive practice distinct from excessive pricing, and an overcharging claim does not require actual reliance.

Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va. · filed 2013-08-28

Regardless of whether a party asserting excessive pricing, standing alone, can state a claim for an unfair and deceptive practice, charging for a good or service never received is an unfair and deceptive practice that is distinct from excessive pricing.

Section 75-1.1 covers systematically overcharging a customer over two years.

Sampson-Bladen Oil Co., Inc. v. Walters · filed 1987-06-16

Though plaintiff strenuously argues otherwise it seems plain to us, and we so hold, that systematically overcharging a customer for two years, as the jury found was done here in the amount of $2,795.30, is an unfair trade practice squarely within the purview of G.S. 75-1.1, as our Supreme Court has interpreted it in several cases, including Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E. 2d 397 (1981).

Standing under Section 75-1.1 is not necessarily coextensive with standing under Sections 75-1, 75-2, and 75-2.1, and the issue may require a more developed factual record.

Sykes v. Health Network Solutions, Inc. · filed 2013-12-05

The court is not yet persuaded that standing under Section 75-1.1 is necessarily coextensive with standing under Section 75-1, Section 75-2 or Section 75-2.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not require a plaintiff to be a competitor of, or in commercial dealings with, the defendant to assert a claim.

In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litigation · filed 2015-09-11

The Court does not agree that such a rule exists under North Carolina law, however.

Section 75-1.1 permits businesses to sue when alleged anticompetitive conduct affects commerce and causes consumers to pay inflated prices, even without direct commercial dealings with the defendants.

In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig. · filed 2018-08-21

Here, as discussed, EPPs claim that Defendants engaged in anticompetitive schemes, which ultimately resulted in consumers purchasing Lipitor at inflated prices. This suffices, under the Act, to confer EPPs with standing; as such, Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.

A member does not state an individual claim under § 75-1.1 when the alleged unfair practices arise from fiduciary duties tied to the member’s relationship through an LLC.

Crouse v. Mineo · filed 2008-03-18

All of the allegations alleging breach of fiduciary duty, and consequently a UDTP claim, relate to the parties’ relationship through Mineo & Crouse, PLLC. Therefore, we hold that Mr. Crouse did not state an individual claim for UDTP against Defendant.

Section 75-1.1 covers unlawful monopoly maintenance, attempted monopolization, and improper tying when the conduct meets the analogous Sherman Act liability standards.

United States v. Microsoft Corp. · filed 2000-04-03

The Court agrees. The facts proving that Microsoft unlawfully maintained its monopoly power in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act are sufficient to meet analogous elements of causes of action arising under the laws of each plaintiff state.