N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1

Section 75-1.1 does not make former employees’ competition unfair when their noncompetition provisions no longer bind them.

Washburn v. Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. · filed 2008-05-06(a)

Finally, since Plaintiffs are not bound by the non-competition provisions, it simply cannot be said that they engaged in unfair methods of competition with Yadkin.

A violation of the North Carolina Debt Collection Act constitutes an unfair trade practice under § 75-1.1.

Clayton Bradley Williams, III v. Pennymac Loan Services, LLC · filed 2025-12-01(a)

“If a plaintiff proves that a debt collector violated a provision of the NCDCA, then that violation is an unfair trade practice under § 75-1.1.” ... “As found above, the Plaintiff stated a claim under Chapter 75, and the factual allegations supporting his NCDCA claim also support his NCUDTPA claim.”

Section 75-1.1 is violated when the defendant’s conduct violates § 1 of the Sherman Act.

ITCO Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp. · filed 1983-11-23

We thus hold that proof of conduct violative of the Sherman Act is proof sufficient to establish a violation of the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act.

A debt collector’s violation of the North Carolina Debt Collection Act is an unfair trade practice under § 75-1.1.

CUSTER v. DOVENMUEHLE MORTGAGE INC · filed 2024-10-18

If a plaintiff proves that a debt collector violated a provision of the NCDCA, then that violation is an unfair trade practice under § 75-1.1.

An objectively reasonable lawsuit does not constitute an unfair trade practice under § 75-1.1, even if brought for an improper purpose.

Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Goel · filed 2001-09-18

We therefore hold that plaintiff’s suit against Imperial was objectively reasonable, and thus that the suit did not constitute an unfair trade practice under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not treat the filing of an objectively reasonable lawsuit as an unfair trade practice, even if later evidence shows the claim is unenforceable.

Andrews v. Smith · filed 2005-12-06

As plaintiff's suit for specific performance of a land sales agreement was objectively reasonable at the time of filing, prior to depositions which established its unenforceability, its filing does not "constitute an unfair trade practice under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1". First Union, 166 N.C. App. at 534, 603 S.E.2d at 819.

Section 75-1.1 does not proscribe a good-faith assertion of legal rights based on an erroneous interpretation of law absent fraud, overreaching, or similarly egregious conduct.

Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Columbian Peanut Co. · filed 1986-11-26

To assert in good faith a claim predicated on an erroneous interpretation of the law is not an unfair act proscribed by N.C.Gen. Stat. § 76-1.1, as the remedy therfor lies in the law itself, i.e., such an erroneous view will not prevail. To hold otherwise would chill the just resolution of honest disputes meriting the same, such resolution being to the benefit of the parties themselves and the public. Nothing else appearing, there is nothing unfair in asserting one’s rights as perceived in good faith. In this case, nothing else appears. In the final analysis, Columbian’s conduct simply is not so eggregious as to arise to the level of conduct which is prohibited by the subject statute.

Section 75-1.1 does not impose liability for properly registering a judgment and recording payments against it.

Everett v. Continental Bank, N.A. · filed 1994-01-12

Since Continental acted properly, there could be no unfair or deceptive trade practices and thus plaintiffs’ claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 must be dismissed.

Section 75-1.1 does not create a cause of action against a state officer acting as a representative of the State.

Golden Rule Insurance v. Long · filed 1993-12-23

In Sperry Corp. v. Patterson, 73 N.C. App. 123, 325 S.E.2d 642 (1985), this Court held that G.S. § 75-1.1 does not create a cause of action against state officers when they act as representatives of the State. Long was a representative of the State in this matter, and plaintiff, therefore, has no cause of action.

A town cannot be sued under § 75-1.1 for unfair trade practices.

Stephenson v. Town of Garner · filed 2000-02-01

“in accord with Sperry,... a city may not be sued under Chapter 75.” ... Under Rea Construction, dismissal of the claim against the town was proper.

Section 75-1.1 does not apply to individuals who deal with a plaintiff solely in their official capacity as representatives of the State.

Halikierra Cmty. Servs. LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 2022 Ncbc 57a · filed 2022-09-27

Because Piggott and Cox interacted with Halikierra in their official capacity as employees of OCPI and no evidence in the record indicates otherwise, their action is the same as the State action, and they are therefore not subject to N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not allow a suit against the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill when sovereign immunity has not been waived.

Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina v. Helpingstine · filed 1989-01-09

Because the court finds that sovereign immunity protects the University from suit under Section 75-1.1, the University’s alternative argument will not be considered.

Section 75-1.1(b) defines commerce broadly to include all business activities, and the sale of real estate falls within commerce under the statute.

Gosai v. Abeers Realty Dev. Mktg., Inc. · filed 2004-10-19(b)

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1 (2003) declares unlawful "unfair and deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." This Court has stated that "[t]he purpose of G.S. 75-1.1 is to provide a civil means to maintain ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business and the consuming public within this State and applies to dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce." United Virginia Bank v. Air-Lift Associates, 79 N.C.App. 315, 320, 339 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1986). Except for certain limited exemptions set forth in the statute, commerce includes "all business activities, however denominated." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1(b) (2003). Specifically, a person engaged "in the sale of real estate is engaged in commerce within the meaning of G.S. 75-1.1." Rosenthal v. Perkins, 42 N.C.App. 449, 454, 257 S.E.2d 63, 67 (1979). Moreover, "a plaintiff who proves fraud thereby establishes that unfair and deceptive trade practices have occurred." Davis v. Sellers, 115 N.C.App. 1, 9, 443 S.E.2d 879, 884 (1994). The trial court's finding of unfair and deceptive trade practices is well supported by the evidence and was not error.

Section 75-1.1 treats an inequitable assertion of power or position as an unfair practice; a sophisticated buyer’s ability to verify a seller’s statement can defeat such a claim.

Libby Hill Seafood Restaurants, Inc. v. Owens · filed 1983-06-21

Finally, plaintiffs claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices pursuant to G.S. 75-1.1 is similarly appropriate for directed verdict. In essence, a party is guilty of an unfair act or practice when it engages in conduct that amounts to an inequitable assertion of its power or position.

Section 75-1.1 requires a real estate broker purchasing a client’s listed property to disclose a third-party offer and its terms to the client before the transfer.

Starling v. Sproles · filed 1984-02-21

We address the following question: Did the defendants Harold and Joanne Parker and Harold Parker Realty Company commit an unfair or deceptive act in violation of G.S. 75-1.1 by failing to disclose prior to the Parkers’ purchase of the property which the Sproles had ... listed with Harold Parker Realty Company that they had an offer to purchase the same property from a third party? We conclude there was an obligation on the part of the Parkers and Harold Parker Realty Company to have divulged completely the offer and its terms for consideration to the Sproles before transfer of the property to the Parkers.

A real estate broker’s conduct supporting constructive fraud can also support an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim under § 75-1.1 when the commerce element is present.

Spence v. Spaulding and Perkins, Ltd. · filed 1986-09-02

The evidence being sufficient to support plaintiffs’ constructive fraud claim afortioti it is also sufficient to support the unfair or deceptive trade acts or practices claim, since the evidence shows that the other element of the claim, that the practice or act offered commerce, is present.

A property sale made for profit can fall within § 75-1.1, and the seller bears the burden of showing that the transaction is outside the statute’s scope.

Willen v. Hewson · filed 2005-12-06

The trial court found that she “was motivated by the potential for profit, and she received actual gross profit in the amount of $253,165 from her conduct[.]” As such, she has not carried her burden of demonstrating that the transaction was beyond the scope of Chapter 75.

Section 75-1.1 does not require an enforceable contract between the parties; the claim turns on whether the alleged conduct was unfair or deceptive, occurred in or affected commerce, proximately caused actual injury, and involved conduct such as deceit or substantial aggravating circumstances rather than a mere breach.

Dealers Supply Co., Inc. v. Cheil Industries, Inc. · filed 2004-12-13

To state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices a plaintiff must show: “(1) that the defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of competition; (2) in or affecting commerce; (3) which proximately cause[d] actual injury to plaintiff.” ... Thus, the proper test under Section 75-1.1 is not whether the parties had an enforceable contract, but rather whether the allegedly unfair practice “offends established public policy” or is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” ... Therefore, because the alleged acts constituting unfair and deceptive acts more closely resemble Process Components and Custom Molders, Dealers has properly stated a claim for relief under Chapter 75.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover loans used to provide working capital because they are capital-raising devices rather than the entities' day-to-day business activities.

Bondi v. Bank of America Corp. · filed 2007-03-23(b)

Following the logic of these cases, the Bank’s loans to Parmalat entities fall outside of the scope of the statute. The loans were used to provide working capital for the functioning of their business activities and therefore did not constitute the “day-to-day” business of the entities. Bondi’s motion to dismiss this counterclaim is granted.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover a transaction whose purpose is to raise capital because it is not in or affecting commerce.

Latigo Invs. II, LLC v. Waddell & Reed Fin., Inc. · filed 2007-06-08

In sum, because the undisputed purpose of the transaction in this case, including the W&R Letter, was to raise capital for MB2, it is not a transaction “in or affecting commerce” as that element has been defined by the cases.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover a loan used to raise a business’s capital because that transaction is not in or affecting commerce.

Nobel v. Foxmoor Grp., LLC · filed 2022-02-11(a)

Because the loan at issue here was a capital raising device, it was not “in or affecting commerce” for purposes of the Act.

For a § 75-1.1 claim based on conduct in North Carolina, a substantial effect on the plaintiff’s North Carolina operations may be inferred from allegations that defendants conduct business and make false or misleading statements there.

Red Bull GmbH v. RLED, LLC · filed 2007-09-18

The Court has reviewed de novo the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and adopts that Recommendation. Thus, for the reasons set out in the Recommendation, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion to Transfer Venue [Doc. # 4] is DENIED. ... Finally, defendants contend that the fifth claim under N.C. GemStat. § 75-1.1 has an additional fatal defect in that applying it would violate due process because the Complaint fails to allege any substantial effect on plaintiffs’ operations in North Carolina.' (Def s br. in support of motion to dismiss, p. 19) It is true that the fifth claim as alleged complains only generally of the allegedly improper acts of defendants and the harm being caused to plaintiffs. However, the claim incorporates the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint. These paragraphs allege, among other things, that defendants are conducting business in North Carolina, that the claims arise from defendants’ acts in North Carolina, and that these acts have damaged Red Bull and its property in North Carolina. (Complaint ¶ 10) The preceding paragraphs also set put the type of activities that defendants are allegedly engaged in such as making false or misleading statements for the purpose of influencing persons to buy Roaring Lion. ... Thus, a substantial effect on plaintiffs’ operations in North Carolina may be inferred. This aspect of defendants’ motion to dismiss should be denied.

Section 75-1.1 requires an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that injures the plaintiff, and permits a foreign plaintiff to proceed against a resident defendant for foreign injuries when they have a substantial in-state effect on North Carolina trade or commerce.

In Re Flonase Antitrust Litigation · filed 2010-01-21

Section 75-1.1 states that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” ... To state a claim under the NCUDTPA, plaintiffs must allege that (I) Defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (ii) in -or affecting commerce and (iii) Plaintiffs were injured as a result. ... Relief is available to a foreign plaintiff under the NCUDTPA against a resident defendant even over alleged foreign injuries so long as the injuries have a “substantial in-state effect on North Carolina trade or commerce.” ... Plaintiffs sufficiently allege these elements. ... Plaintiffs have alleged substantial instate effect on North Carolina trade or commerce. They allege that Defendant maintains two large development and production facilities in North Carolina, and sold large amounts of Flonase within the state, including to Plaintiffs, at artificially inflated prices. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the NCUDTPA claim is denied.

Section 75-1.1 does not provide a remedy for an out-of-state plaintiff's out-of-state injuries unless the alleged violation has an in-state injury or a substantial effect on the plaintiff's in-state business operations.

In Re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation · filed 2009-10-09

Faced with conflicting authority, I conclude that the better reasoned cases require an in-state injury to a plaintiff's in-state business operations. The North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act is intended to protect the North Carolina consumer. ... Plaintiffs have not shown that their claims here have a sufficient effect on North Carolina business for them to benefit from this act intended to protect North Carolina commerce.

Section 75-1.1 requires a plaintiff seeking damages for an unfair and deceptive trade practice to prove actual injury proximately caused by the violation, and it permits only one recovery for the same conduct rather than duplicative recovery under contract and Chapter 75 theories.

Decker v. HOMES, INC./CONSTRUCTION MGMT. · filed 2007-12-18

The entry of default established the liability of defendants under a theory of unfair and deceptive trade practices. However, in order to recover damages arising from an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim, a plaintiff must prove actual injury as a proximate result of the violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1. ... Plaintiffs are entitled to one recovery for the same alleged wrongful conduct, but not multiple recoveries under theories of breach of contract and unfair and deceptive trade practices. ... The entry of default established the liability of defendants under each of these theories, but did not entitle plaintiffs to a double recovery.

Section 75-1.1 does not allow an already paid insurance policy limit to be included in the actual injury used to calculate damages for an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim.

Guessford v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance · filed 2013-10-18

Unlike the plaintiffs in Garlock, Vazquez, and Cullen who were still owed money under their respective contracts, the $900,000 payment to Plaintiff in this case is not part of Plaintiffs actual injury. Therefore, Defendant’s request for summary judgment is granted to the extent that Plaintiff may not include the $900,000 policy limit that Defendant already paid as part of Plaintiffs damages calculation under the UDTPA claim asserted here.

Section 75-1.1 claims may be pursued as class actions, including claims seeking treble damages.

Crow v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., Inc. · filed 1987-04-07

Further, it is contended that actions for usury, actions for violations of North Carolina’s Retail Installment Sales Act and actions for unfair and deceptive trade practices may not be maintained properly as class actions. ... The failure of the General Assembly to expressly prohibit class actions to enforce the statutes under which the plaintiffs claim relief convinces us that it intended to allow them for such purposes.

Section 75-1.1 does not impose liability on a city for operating a municipal cable system and declining private franchises when the legislature authorizes those actions.

Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Morganton · filed 1989-12-07

Monopolies are pertinent insofar as they constitute a “contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise ... in restraint of trade or commerce” which is illegal, N.C.G.S. § 75-1 (1981), or “[u]nfair methods of competition” or “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in or. affecting commerce, N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 (1977). ... Where the legislature has authorized a city to act, it is free to carry out that act without fear that it will later be held liable under state antitrust laws for doing the very act contemplated and authorized by the legislature. We hold that municipal ownership and operation of cable television systems does not violate the provisions of chapter 75 of the General Statutes.

Section 75-1.1 covers libel per se concerning a plaintiff’s business conduct when the libel proximately causes injury to the business.

Ellis v. Northern Star Co. · filed 1990-02-07

We further conclude that libel per se of a plaintiff as to the conduct of its business does violate N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 and, when the libel proximately causes injury to the business, gives rise to a cause of action under N.C.G.S. § 75-16.

Section 75-1.1 permits a claim based on false statements that defame a business when the statements plausibly constitute an unfair or deceptive act in or affecting commerce that proximately caused injury.

Bite Busters, LLC v. Burris · filed 2021-03-25

Accordingly, because the Court concludes that the Company has pleaded sufficient facts which, if proven, would support a finding that Burris engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice “in or affecting commerce” that proximately caused injury to the Company by defaming the Company in its trade or business, Burris’s motion to dismiss Bite Busters’s UDTPA claim based on these allegations should be denied.

A claim under § 75-1.1 based on business libel per se requires actual injury; presumed damages do not suffice.

Software Automation Holdings, LLC v. Insurance Toolkits, LLC · filed 2024-07-03

In other words, libel per se fulfills just the first two elements of a plaintiff’s prima facie UDTPA claim. A plaintiff still must allege damages, and presumed damages do not suffice.

Section 75-1.1 permits personal liability for unfair or deceptive trade practices committed by an agent or corporate officer.

Baker v. Rushing · filed 1991-10-15

Mosley argues that his status as an agent precludes his personal liability for the alleged torts of trespass, trespass to chattels, and conversion, and for the claims based on his alleged tortious conduct, specifically the claims for unfair or deceptive trade practices, N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 (1988), ... We disagree. It is well settled in North Carolina that a person is personally liable for all torts committed by him, notwithstanding that he may have acted as an agent for another or as an officer for a corporation.

Section 75-1.1 claims based on the processing of benefits under an ERISA plan are preempted by ERISA.

Ward v. Cigna Life Ins. Co. of New York · filed 2011-03-09

The Plaintiffs proposed claims pursuant to N.C.GemStat. §§ 58-63-15 & 75-1.1 are therefore entirely preempted by ERISA.

A § 75-1.1 claim based on unauthorized copying and distribution is preempted by the Copyright Act when an added allegation of deception does not change the nature of the claim.

Vogel v. Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. · filed 2008-12-30

While Plaintiffs additional allegation of deception alters, the scope of Plaintiffs claim under section 75-1.1, the nature of the state law claim remains identical to a claim under federal copyright law by virtue of the elements required by section 75-1.1.

A § 75-1.1 claim based on selling copyrighted material as one’s own, or without credit, is preempted by the Copyright Act.

SILER v. LEJARZA · filed 2019-11-21

This is classic reverse palming off, which is preempted by the Copyright Act. Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to this claim will therefore be granted.

Section 75-1.1(a) treats coercive wholesaling restrictions as unfair practices, but the Soft Drink Act preempts claims based on restrictions a bottler imposes to prevent transshipping.

Owens v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. · filed 1992-01-27(a)

Absent the protections of the Soft Drink Act, defendant’s wholesaling restrictions would be deemed coercive conduct and therefore violative of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(a). ... We hold, therefore, that our unfair practices laws are preempted by the Soft Drink Act to the extent that they would proscribe wholesaling restrictions imposed by bottlers to prevent transshipment.

Section 75-1.1 provides a private right of action, but ERISA preempts a claim under it concerning an ERISA plan.

Brown · filed 2025-12-10

The enabling statute that provides a private right of action for persons in general is the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, which is ERISA- preempted.

Section 75-1.1 covers unfair trade practices arising from general business conduct, and the PMPA does not preempt such claims when they do not concern franchise termination.

LC Williams Oil Co., Inc. v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1985-04-19(a)

... this Court concludes that the PMPA, 15 U.S.C. § 2806(a), does not preempt N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 75-1.1, 25-1-102(3) nor the common law duty of good faith dealing as they arise in this litigation.

Section 75-1.1 cannot support a claim based on inaccurate information furnished to consumer reporting agencies because the FCRA preempts that claim.

Ross v. Federal Deposit Insurance · filed 2010-10-29(a)

Because Ross’s NCUDTPA claim seeks to use § 75-1.1 as a "requirement or prohibition" under North Carolina law con- cerning "subject matter regulated under section 1681s-2," it is squarely preempted by the plain language of the FCRA.

Section 75-1.1 cannot support a claim for bad-faith handling of a National Flood Insurance Program policy because federal law preempts the state-law claim.

Woodson v. Allstate Insurance Company · filed 2017-05-03

Allstate contends that the Woodsons’ claim against it for bad faith handling of their claim, under the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 et seq., was preempted by federal law and therefore barred. We agree.

A Section 75-1.1 claim based solely on copying a copyrighted design is preempted by federal copyright law, even if the copying allegedly causes consumer confusion.

Patsy Aiken Designs, Inc. v. Baby Togs, Inc. · filed 1988-11-22

Plaintiff’s “Second Claim for Relief” seeks damages under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 under a fraud theory because of the alleged “confusion” to consumers caused by the copying of plaintiff’s designs. ... Plaintiff’s claims are based simply on that confusion which arises from the mere act of copying, and nothing else. As such, plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the Copyright Act.

Section 75-1.1 claims based on furnishing inaccurate information to credit reporting agencies are preempted by the FCRA.

Weber v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2022-08-31

Thus, the FCRA preempts Weber’s UDTPA claim based upon allegedly furnishing inaccurate information to the credit reporting agencies.

A Section 75-1.1 claim based on unauthorized copying is preempted by federal copyright law because the statute requires no additional element.

Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. America Online, Inc. · filed 2004-02-26

While there may be extra elements of fraud or deceit in any given unfair trade practices claim, there are no additional elements required in order to state an unfair trade practices claim than there are required to state a copyright claim. Accordingly, the state law claim is preempted by federal copyright law.

A default establishes liability under § 75-1.1 when the complaint sufficiently alleges unfair or deceptive trade practices.

MRD Motorsports, Inc. v. Trail Motorsports, LLC · filed 2010-06-15

From our review of these allegations, it is evident that defendants Shelton and Trail’s liability for unfair and deceptive trade practices was sufficiently alleged and deemed admitted.

A judgment resolving all substantive issues of a § 75-1.1 claim is final and appealable despite an unresolved request for attorney fees under § 75-16.1.

Bumpers v. COMMUNITY BANK OF N. VIRGINIA · filed 2010-06-17

A judgment ruling on all substantive issues of a claim under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 is final and appealable regardless of any unresolved request for attorney fees under N.C.G.S. § 75-16.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not allow an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim against a sanitary district acting as a quasi-municipal corporation.

Badin Shores Resort Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Handy Sanitary Dist. · filed 2018-02-06

We conclude that, regardless of whether a sanitary district is entitled to sovereign immunity, as a quasi-municipal corporation it cannot be sued for unfair and deceptive trade practices.

Section 75-1.1 does not allow tenants to sue their landlord’s property insurer for unfair practices when they are neither insureds nor intended beneficiaries of the insurance contract.

Prince v. Wright · filed 2000-12-29

Because plaintiff was not an intended third-party beneficiary in the actions taken by USF&G, there is no privity between USF&G and plaintiff, and plaintiff may not assert a claim against USF&G for unfair and deceptive trade practices.

A § 75-1.1 claim based on another party’s lawsuit requires a showing that the lawsuit was objectively baseless.

Lowder Constr., Inc. v. Phillips · filed 2020-01-08

As existing authority makes clear, the burden of establishing an exception to the protection to petition the courts provided by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is a heavy one that must be reserved for those lawsuits that are truly “utterly baseless”; the courts should not be hesitant to dismiss claims for unfair or deceptive trade practices grounded in another party’s decision to file a lawsuit.

Section 75-1.1 does not impose liability for filing an objectively reasonable lawsuit, even if the litigant had an anticompetitive intent.

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. · filed 2011-08-08

It need only conclude that asserting the claim is “objectively reasonable.” Because it is, liability under Section 75–1.1 based on the “sham litigation” exception is foreclosed.

Section 75-1.1 does not support an unfair or deceptive practices claim based solely on a trade secret misappropriation claim that fails.

Treece v. Advisors Excel, LLC · filed 2026-03-19

Inasmuch as Plaintiff’s Chapter 75 cause of action hinges on Defendant’s alleged misappropriation of trade secrets, dismissal is appropriate as set forth above.

Section 75-1.1 permits a claim to proceed despite dismissal of related contract or tort claims when the complaint alleges potentially unfair or deceptive conduct.

Charah, LLC v. Sequoia Servs., LLC · filed 2020-04-17

Therefore, so long as the complaint includes sufficient factual allegations of potentially unfair or deceptive conduct, the claimant may still maintain a UDTP claim, notwithstanding the dismissal of breach of contract or tort causes of action based on the same conduct.

Section 75-1.1 provides an independent unfair or deceptive trade practices claim that may survive summary judgment even when related contract or tort claims do not.

Campbell Sales Grp., Inc. v. Niroflex by Jiufeng Furniture, LLC · filed 2022-12-05

To the extent that Defendants are contending that the ability of LIU’s UDTP claim to survive summary judgment necessarily rises or falls based on whether LIU’s other substantive claims are allowed to go forward, that is not an accurate statement of North Carolina law.

Section 75-1.1 does not treat a fee for an optional pay-by-phone service as unfair or deceptive when customers have fee-free payment options.

Waddell v. U.S. Bank National Association · filed 2019-07-29(a)

Alternatively, U.S. Bank’s practice of charging customers a fee for paying by phone is not unfair or deceptive under the UDTPA.

Section 75-1.1 requires deceptive conduct in North Carolina or a substantial effect on commerce there.

First-Citizens Bank and Trust Company v. HSBC Holdings plc · filed 2024-07-09

Fifth, they contend that claim seven — implicating North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act — must be dismissed because no deceptive conduct occurred in North Carolina or had the requisite substantial effect on commerce there. ... The court otherwise grants the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for the reasons advanced by the defendants.

Section 75-1.1 does not make an insurer’s mistaken damage assessment and reasonable disagreement over coverage an unfair or deceptive practice.

Bailey v. Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's London · filed 2024-05-31

We agree with the district court that Appellants have failed to state a claim for any violation of the UDTPA. Appellants have alleged no unfair or deceptive business practice.

A violation of § 58-63-15 constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice under § 75-1.1 as a matter of law.

Jefferson-Pilot Life Insurance v. Spencer · filed 1993-05-18

A violation of § 58-63-15 as a matter of law constitutes an unfair and deceptive trade practice in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (1988).

Misleading advice about insurance coverage does not violate § 75-1.1 when it offers the agent little gain, affects only the insureds, and has negligible marketplace effect.

Erler v. Aon Risks Services, Inc. of Carolinas · filed 2000-12-29

Defendants stood to gain very little from their misleading conduct which was limited to these plaintiffs. We cannot characterize defendants’ actions as “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.”

Section 75-1.1 permits a claim against an employer for alleged fraud in settling former employees’ workers’ compensation claims when the conduct falls outside the employment relationship.

Johnson v. First Union Corp. · filed 1998-02-03

As discussed above, there is no other effective available remedy to penalize employers’ fraudulent conduct in regard to workers’ compensation claims under the Workers’ Compensation Act; we thus hold that this case is not controlled by Buie, 56 N.C. App. at 448, 289 S.E.2d at 120, and a cause of action against the employer exists under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not provide a cause of action for price discrimination between a supplier’s customers.

Van Dorn Retail Management, Inc. v. Klaussner Furniture Industries, Inc. · filed 1999-03-02

Although it is true that § 75-1.1 would not have applied to the events which gave rise to the Rose litigation, our Supreme Court was obviously aware that § 75-1.1 had been enacted at the time it rendered its decision in Rose. ... As there is no cause of action in North Carolina for price discrimination in the secondary line, we need not reach the other arguments and contentions of appellant.

Section 75-1.1(a) may cover slander per se between business competitors after their employment relationship ends.

Ausley v. Bishop · filed 1999-05-18(a)

We see no reason to distinguish libel per se from slander per se in this context, and hold that slander per se may constitute a violation of section 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 protects government officials acting as representatives of the state or a political subdivision, but does not protect fraudulent conduct outside their official duties.

Leftwich v. Gaines · filed 1999-08-17

Sperry and Golden Rule protect government officials from a lawsuit under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (1994) as long as they act as representatives of the State or a political subdivision of the State, e.g., a municipal corporation. ... The evidence of Gaines’ actions in this case is sufficient to establish that he was acting outside the scope of his duties in representing the town. Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud distinguish this case from the holdings of Sperry and Golden Rule.

Section 75-1.1 covers conduct amounting to a breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud when the conduct affects commerce and causes injury.

Compton v. Kirby · filed 2003-04-01(a)

North Carolina case law has held that conduct which constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud is sufficient to support a UDTP claim. ... Because we have already held that the issue of constructive fraud was properly submitted to the jury, defendant’s argument that the UDTP claim is improper must fail.

A violation of a manufactured-home licensing regulation may be evidence of an unfair or deceptive trade practice under § 75-1.1, but does not establish one as a matter of law.

Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of North Carolina, Inc. · filed 2007-12-07(a)

Nevertheless, a regulatory licensure violation may be evidence of a UDTP. Thus, even though defendant’s violations of subsections (1) and (4) of 11 NCAC 8.0907 are not unfair or deceptive trade practices per se, those violations are potentially relevant to any claim that defendant violated § 75-1.1.

A violation of the usury statute does not automatically violate § 75-1.1; a plaintiff must establish unfair or deceptive conduct.

Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC · filed 2008-09-02

The fact that the General Assembly has not included a similar provision in N.C.G.S. § 24-1.1 leads us to conclude that the General Assembly did not intend for violations of N.C.G.S. § 24-1.1 to be per se violations of N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 requires substantial aggravating circumstances for an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim based on a breach of contract.

Nuzzo v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company · filed 2025-08-04

The Complaint alleges no aggravating circumstances necessary to state a UDTPA claim. And State Farm’s inspection of Nuzzo’s property and assessment of her claim do not rise to the level of egregiousness needed to establish a UDTPA claim. So the court dismisses Count Three.

Section 75-1.1 does not allow treble damages for a breach of agreement merely to change the parties’ original bargain.

PCS Phosphate Co., Inc. v. Norfolk Southern Corp. · filed 2009-03-04

At the same time, to honor the parties’ original bar- gain, we reject plaintiff’s attempt to change the terms of the agreement by seeking treble damages for breach of the agree- ment under the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.

Section 75-1.1 does not cover the alleged unfair recruiting practices among NFL agents where industry regulation provides remedies and the challenged practices are accepted in the industry.

Champion Pro Consulting Group, Inc. v. Impact Sports Football, LLC · filed 2016-12-22

In sum, we find no basis to apply the UDTPA to the allegations made by Plaintiffs.

Section 75-1.1 claims must allege facts sufficient to support the claimed unfair or deceptive conduct.

Green v. Brock & Scott, PLLC · filed 2019-08-12(a)

Plaintiff bases his state law claim on the same facts as his claim for violation of § 1692c. Accordingly, for the same reasons the Court dismisses Plaintiff's § 1692c claim, the Court also dismisses Plaintiff's claim for a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75—1.1.

Section 75-1.1 requires a duty to disclose for a concealment or omission to be actionable.

COHEN v. SUBARU CORPORATION · filed 2022-03-10

“For a concealment or omission to be actionable under the [NC]UDTPA, the defendant must have had a duty to disclose that which was concealed or omitted.” ... But as decided above with respect to Plaintiffs’ common-law fraud claim under North Carolina law, the CAC does not allege that Plaintiffs “negotiated” with Denso. The Court will therefore grant Denso’s motion on this issue.

Section 75-1.1 does not support an unfair or deceptive trade practices claim based solely on statements protected by the privilege for judicial proceedings.

Brown v. Brown · filed 2023-09-29

By extension, Defendant’s privileged conduct cannot support a UDTPA claim.