N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3212

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when discovery has not yet been completed.

Ryo v. Minerva · filed 2002-01-14(f)

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly denied the appellants’ motion for summary judgment because discovery had not yet been completed (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Rosa v Colonial Tr., 276 AD2d 781; Campbell v City of New York, 220 AD2d 476, 477).

Incomplete discovery does not make a summary judgment motion premature unless the opposing party shows that essential facts are in the other party’s exclusive knowledge and possession and could be obtained through discovery.

Franklin v. Dormitory Authority of New York · filed 2002-02-01(f)

We reject the contention of defendant that the motion was premature because it had not completed discovery. Defendant failed to demonstrate that facts essential to oppose the motion were in plaintiffs exclusive knowledge and possession and could be obtained by discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Maron v Hillside Children’s Ctr., 247 AD2d 871; Lavin & Kleiman v Heinike Assoc., 221 AD2d 919).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking discovery before opposing summary judgment to show that essential facts exist and might be obtained through discovery.

Stevens v. Calspan-Corp. · filed 2002-03-15(f)

Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that facts essential to oppose the motion exist and might be obtained by discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Franklin v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 291 AD2d 854; Maron v Hillside Children’s Ctr., 247 AD2d 871).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking discovery to oppose summary judgment to show that facts essential to its opposition may exist.

Time Warner Cable of New York City v. Trinity Communications Corp. · filed 2002-03-29(f)

Defendant Trinity does not show, contrary to its argument, that there are facts essential to justify said defendant’s opposition to plaintiffs’ motion, in order to allow said defendant discovery, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) (Sucrest Corp. v Fisher Governor Co., 32 AD2d 517 [1st Dept 1969]). A fishing expedition by defendant Trinity cannot be permitted.

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Cooper v. City of New York · filed 2002-04-29(f)

Furthermore, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment pending discovery when the opposing party shows that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Falkowitz v. Peters · filed 2002-05-06(f)

Moreover, the defendants’ attorney failed to demonstrate that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]) and, thus, the defendants were not entitled to denial of the motion for summary judgment on the ground that discovery had not taken place (see Leggio v County of Nassau, 281 AD2d 518, 519; Lightfoot v City of New York, 279 AD2d 457, 458; Jones v Gameray, 153 AD2d 550, 551).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery to show that it may yield facts tending to prove the case and justify denying summary judgment.

Jackson v. United States Tennis Ass'n · filed 2002-05-20(f)

The Supreme Court also properly denied the plaintiffs cross motion for leave to recall a witness for a further deposition, as he failed to demonstrate that additional discovery would yield facts tending to prove his case and justify the denial of summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Town of Hempstead v Incorporated Vil. of Atl. Beach, 278 AD2d 308, 310).

A party opposing summary judgment must show that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated if the party cannot yet present them.

Barbour v. Knecht · filed 2002-06-18(f)

In opposing the cross motion, however, plaintiff failed to make a showing that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment for further discovery when the opposing party shows that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated.

Rodriguez v. City of New York · filed 2002-06-24(f)

Furthermore, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion are within the movant’s exclusive knowledge and discovery has not occurred.

Stevens v. Grody · filed 2002-08-26(f)

Moreover, that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been denied because the issue of whether the defendants’ friends used the boat dock as house guests or as permanent seasonal users was within the exclusive knowledge of the defendants, and no discovery had taken place (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Firesearch Corp. v Micro Computer Controls Corp., 240 AD2d 365, 366; Urcan v Cocarelli, 234 AD2d 537; Baron v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 143 AD2d 792, 793).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment pending further disclosure.

Couch v. County of Suffolk · filed 2002-08-12(f)

In any event, we agree with the plaintiff that the branch of Brunswick’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it should be denied pending further disclosure (see CPLR 3212 [f|; Plaza Invs. v Kim, 208 AD2d 704; Viti v Franklin Gen. Hosp., 190 AD2d 790).

Section 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment when the opposing parties fail to show that further discovery may reveal facts essential to their opposition.

Vidal v. Tsitsiashvili · filed 2002-09-09(f)

Furthermore, the parties opposing the motion failed to show that facts essential to justify opposition may exist upon further discovery.

A party seeking to postpone summary judgment for further discovery must show how that discovery might reveal material facts exclusively known to the movant; speculation is insufficient.

Green v. Covington · filed 2002-11-07(f)

Although a court may postpone a decision on a summary judgment motion when an affidavit submitted in opposition to it “demonstrates that opposing facts may exist, * * * an opposing party must demonstrate how further discovery might reveal material facts in the movant’s exclusive knowledge; * * * mere speculation will be insufficient” (Scofield v Trustees of Union Coll. in Town of Schenectady, 267 AD2d 651, 652 [citations omitted]; see CPLR 3212 [f]). Here, plaintiffs’ proof fell short of the required showing and, therefore, it was proper for Supreme Court to consider defendants’ motion.

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery before summary judgment to show that facts essential to oppose the motion exist and might be obtained through discovery.

Bateman v. Walbridge Aldinger Co. · filed 2002-11-15(f)

Supreme Court erred in denying defendants’ motions pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f). “Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that facts essential to oppose the motion exist and might be obtained by discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f|; Franklin v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 291 AD2d 854; Maron v Hillside Children’s Ctr., 247 AD2d 871)” (Stevens v Calspan-Corp., 292 AD2d 809, 810; see Waggoner v Lancet Arch, 291 AD2d 831).

CPLR 3212 (f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Giarguaro S.p A. v. Amko International Trading, Inc. · filed 2002-12-09(f)

Under CPLR 3212 (f), a court may deny a motion for summary judgment if it appears that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated.”

CPLR 3212(f) permits a party to seek further discovery before summary judgment when the party shows that facts essential to opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Durham v. Beaufort · filed 2002-12-16(f)

However, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that any “facts essential to justify opposition may exist” which at that time could not be stated (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212 permits a court to deny summary judgment with leave to renew after discovery when the record is insufficient to decide the motion.

Zeides v. Hebrew Home for Aged At Riverdale, Inc. · filed 2002-12-24

However, farther discovery is necessary to assess the nature of the alleged deficiencies in the care provided by the nursing home. Therefore, it would be appropriate to entertain the motion to amend and permit defendant to renew its application upon completion of discovery.

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery before summary judgment to show how it might reveal relevant facts within the moving party’s exclusive control.

Bogdanovic v. Norrell Health Care Services, Inc. · filed 2002-12-30(f)

Additionally, the plaintiffs failed to show how additional discovery might reveal the existence of relevant facts presently ... in the exclusive control of the moving party (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Carrington v City of New York, 201 AD2d 525).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice to renewal when further discovery is needed.

Apollo Steel Corp. v. Sicolo & Massaro, Inc. · filed 2002-12-30(f)

We agree with plaintiff that defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment should be denied without prejudice to renew following further discovery into the parties’ course of dealing and intent and, in particular, into the substance of the prior releases and the circumstances surrounding the execution of all the releases, including any pattern of partial payment and release (see CPLR 3212 [f]; cf. Best v Yutaka, 90 NY2d 833, 834; Paisley v RTS Transp. Sys., 285 AD2d 973; English v Ski Windham Operating Corp., 263 AD2d 443, 445; Bank of N.Y. v Midland Ave. Dev., 193 AD2d 641, 642).

Under CPLR 3212(f), incomplete discovery does not make summary judgment premature when the opposing party has begun no discovery and identifies no relevant facts exclusively within the movant’s knowledge.

Herba v. Chichester · filed 2003-01-16(f)

Next, we find no merit to plaintiff’s argument that Supreme Court erroneously dismissed its third-party beneficiary claim or, at the very least, that discovery was incomplete and, therefore, summary judgment on this issue was premature. ... Second, plaintiff had started no discovery proceedings, despite the lapse of two years between the commencement of the action and defendants’ motion. Third, plaintiff makes no claim that facts or materials in the exclusive knowledge and possession of defendants exist which would establish his status as an intended third-party beneficiary.

Under CPLR 3212(f), a mere hope that further discovery will uncover evidence does not make summary judgment premature.

Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Travelers Insurance · filed 2002-12-23(f)

Furthermore, we reject the plaintiffs argument pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) that summary judgment was premature as discovery was not yet completed. The plaintiffs mere hope that it might be able to uncover some evidence during the discovery process is insufficient to deny summary judgment (see Wood v Otherson, 210 AD2d 473; Pow v Black, 182 AD2d 484).

Section 3212(f) does not warrant denial of summary judgment without a basis to conclude that facts essential to oppose the motion may exist.

DeCintio v. Lawrence Hospital · filed 2002-11-07(f)

Contrary to plaintiffs argument, denial of Dr. Rubin’s summary judgment motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) would not have been appropriate since the court had no basis to conclude that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist.”

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment based on speculation that further discovery might reveal comparative negligence when the opposing party has failed to investigate the facts.

Karakostas v. Avis Rent A Car Systems · filed 2003-01-27(f)

“Summary judgment may not be defeated on the ground that more discovery is needed, where * * * the side advancing such argument has failed to ascertain the facts due to its own inaction”

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking more discovery before summary judgment to show that facts needed to oppose the motion are unavailable to it.

Williams v. Kublick · filed 2003-02-07(f)

We reject defendants’ further contention that more discovery was required with respect to the issue of defendants’ negligence. In opposing the cross motion, defendants’ counsel argued that plaintiff may have contributed to the dismissal of the prior actions. Defendants, however, made no showing that the facts necessary to support that contention are within plaintiffs exclusive knowledge and possession (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Lavin & Kleiman, 221 AD2d 919).

CPLR 3212(f) does not permit a party to defeat summary judgment merely by speculating that further discovery will reveal factual issues.

Ostrander v. Biel's Information Technology System Corp. · filed 2002-11-15(f)

We further reject the contention of plaintiff that defendants’ motion was premature and that the court should have afforded him the opportunity to conduct further discovery. Plaintiff’s speculation that “further discovery would yield factual issues precluding summary judgment is insufficient to defeat defendants’ motion” (Armatys v Edwards, 229 AD2d 906, 907; see CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment, but the party seeking it must show that the discovery is more than a fishing expedition.

Price v. County of Suffolk · filed 2003-03-17(f)

“While it is true that CPLR 3212 (f) permits an opposing party to obtain further discovery under certain circumstances, it should not be resorted to where, as here, there has been a failure to demonstrate that the discovery being sought is anything more than a fishing expedition”

CPLR 3212 (f) does not excuse a party’s failure to present evidence opposing summary judgment when the party had ample opportunity to obtain it through discovery.

Dennis v. City of New York · filed 2003-04-14(f)

Furthermore, since the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to commence discovery proceedings to obtain the outstanding discovery prior to the filing of the motion and cross motion for summary judgment, yet failed to do so, they ... cannot now argue that their failure to present evidentiary facts in opposition should be excused pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) on the ground that the facts needed are exclusively within the knowledge of the defendant and/or the third-party defendants (see Meath v Mishrick, 68 NY2d 992, 994-995 [1986]; Douglas Manor Assn. v Alimaras, 215 AD2d 522, 524 [1995]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a request for further discovery when the party had ample opportunity to obtain the evidence earlier.

Ptacek v. City Wide Asphalt Paving Co. · filed 2003-05-01(f)

The IAS court also properly rejected plaintiffs CPLR 3212 (f) request for leave to take the officers’ depositions. It appears that the officers could not give affidavits due to NYPD policy but could have been deposed prior to filing the note of issue and could also be subpoenaed to testify at trial. Denial of such leave was a proper exercise of discretion since plaintiff had ample opportunity to take the officers’ depositions before filing a note of issue.

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking discovery before summary judgment to show that the discovery is essential to opposing the motion.

Suero v. Fort I Group, L.P. · filed 2003-05-08(f)

Plaintiff has not shown that she was denied discovery “essential” to oppose defendants’ summary judgment motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212 permits a court to deny summary judgment with leave to renew when the opposing party needs discovery before the motion can be determined.

Terebessy v. Rapid Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2003-05-19(f)

After the plaintiffs made out their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on certain causes of action insofar as asserted against the defendants Huntington Properties, LLC, and Board of Managers of the 162 Huntington Street Condominium, it was demonstrated that the respondents were entitled to discovery from the plaintiffs and other third parties before the summary judgment motion could be determined. Accordingly, denial of the motion with leave to renew after completion of discovery was proper (see CPLR 3212 [b], [fl; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]).

Section 3212(f) does not justify delaying summary judgment based solely on a party’s hope that further discovery will uncover evidence.

Kershis v. City of New York · filed 2003-03-24(f)

Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the mere hope by the plaintiffs that they might be able to uncover some evidence during further discovery was insufficient to deny summary judgment to the respondents (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Abbenante v Tyree Co., 228 AD2d 529 [1996]; Jones v Gameray, 153 AD2d 550 [1989]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment without prejudice to renewal when discovery needed to resolve a critical issue remains incomplete.

Swezey v. Montague Rehab & Pain Management, P.C. · filed 2003-04-21(f)

The type and size of the needles that became lodged in and were surgically removed from the plaintiffs heart are critical issues in this case. Those needles had not yet been removed from a sealed pathology bag and examined by an expert at the time the appellants moved for summary judgment. Consequently, the Supreme Court properly denied their respective motions without prejudice to renewal (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Hoxha v City of New York, 265 AD2d 379 [1999]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment to establish that facts essential to its opposition are within the other party’s exclusive knowledge.

Montagna v. Unifund Financial Group, Inc. · filed 2003-06-02(f)

Further, the defendant did not establish that facts essential to oppose the motion were within the exclusive knowledge of the plaintiff (see CPLR 3212 [f|; Halpern Dev. Venture v Board of Trustees of Vil. of N. Tarrytown, 222 AD2d 652 [1995]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice to renewal after discovery.

Castillo v. County of Suffolk · filed 2003-07-21(f)

Under the circumstances herein, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion for summary judgment without prejudice to renewal upon completion of discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Destin v New York City Tr. Auth., 303 AD2d 713; Rajan v Insler, 300 AD2d 463 [2002]).

Section 3212(f) permits discovery before summary judgment when the opposing party shows that facts supporting its opposition exist but are not yet available.

Fox v. Tioga Construction Co. · filed 2003-07-30(f)

If the defendant can show that facts exist which would support opposition, but they are not presently available to it, discovery can be had pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f). ... As shown above, the defendant cannot and does not show such facts.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment without prejudice to renewal after disclosure when evidence of prior repairs warrants further inquiry.

Ruiz v. Peralta · filed 2003-06-19(f)

The evidence of multiple repairs on the subject traffic light performed by appellant in the eight months before the accident warrants denial of its motion for summary judgment without prejudice to renewal upon completion of disclosure (CPLR 3212 [f]; Ludwig v Welsbach Elec. Corp., 305 AD2d 124 [2003]).

Section 3212(f) allows a party to seek a continuance of a summary judgment motion to permit disclosure; the court may deny that request.

Norma Reynolds Realty, Inc. v. Bird · filed 2003-07-14(f)

Further, the Supreme Court also properly denied the appellant’s cross motion for a continuance of the defendants’ motion so as to permit disclosure (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 NY2d 152 [1980]; McSorley v Philip Morris, Inc., 170 AD2d 440 [1991]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when a party needs discovery to obtain facts that may support its opposition.

Escudero v. Long Beach Med. Ctr. · filed 2003-12-05(f)

So here under the first theory, vicarious liability, the weaker one espoused by the plaintiffs, they would have to show specific involvement in Mr. Hernandez's care and treatment by Mount Sinai, the clinical affiliate of Long Beach. It is perhaps unlikely that they will be able to succeed in doing that, but they should at least be given an opportunity to conduct discovery and try.

Under CPLR 3212(b), a party opposing summary judgment must submit admissible evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.

Crispino v. Greenpoint Mortgage Corp. · filed 2003-12-08(b)

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to submit evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact that she has suffered compensatory damages due to the fraud (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., supra at 324; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

A request for discovery under CPLR 3212(f) to oppose summary judgment may be rejected as unpreserved and unpersuasive.

Pine Equity New York, Inc. v. Manhattan Real Estate Equities Group · filed 2003-12-16(f)

Plaintiff’s argument that it needed discovery, under CPLR 3212 (f), to oppose defendants’ summary judgment motion, is unpreserved and unpersuasive.

Section 3212(f) permits delay of a summary judgment decision for further discovery when necessary evidence is unavailable, but the opponent must offer an evidentiary basis to expect relevant evidence from that discovery.

Wyllie v. District Attorney · filed 2003-12-22(f)

Although determination of a summary judgment motion may be delayed to allow for further discovery where evidence necessary to oppose the motion is unavailable to the opponent of the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]), “[a] determination of summary judgment cannot be avoided by a claimed need for discovery unless some evidentiary basis is offered to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant evidence” (Ruttura & Sons Constr. Co. v Petrocelli Constr., 257 AD2d 614, 615 [1999]; see also Weltmann v RWP Group, 232 AD2d 550, 551 [1996]; Mazzaferro v Barterama Corp., 218 AD2d 643, 644 [1995]). The evidence sought by the plaintiff either was available to her or unnecessary considering the evidence contained in the record.

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment on discovery grounds to show that it lacked an adequate opportunity for discovery and identify necessary facts uniquely held by the moving party.

Kraeling v. Leading Edge Electric · filed 2003-12-29(f)

In opposition to the Rosenbergs’ motion for summary judgment, Leading Edge also failed to show that it had an inadequate opportunity to conduct discovery, and failed to specify what facts, necessary to oppose the motion, were uniquely in the Rosenbergs’ possession (see CPLR 3212 [f]; ... Hecht v Vanderbilt Assoc., 141 AD2d 696, 700 [1988]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice and allow renewal after additional discovery.

Fellows v. County of Onondaga · filed 2003-12-31(f)

Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in denying without prejudice the motion of defendant-third-party plaintiff, Onondaga County Soil & Water Conservation District (OCSW), seeking summary judgment on contractual and common-law indemnification against third-party defendant Robert E. Dye, doing business as Bob Dye Construction, with leave to renew the motion upon Dye’s completion of additional discovery of present or former employees of OCSW (see generally CPLR 3212 [f]; Pank v Village of Canajoharie, 275 AD2d 508, 509-510 [2000]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment or order further discovery when facts essential to opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated; a request for discovery requires a good faith factual basis, not speculation.

Joachim v. Flanzig · filed 2004-02-25(f)

CPLR 3212 (f) provides that summary judgment may be denied where “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated.” In such a case, the court may either deny the motion or direct further discovery so that the evidence needed to oppose the summary judgment can be obtained. Mere speculation or hope that discovery will reveal material or relevant information necessary to defeat summary judgment is insufficient. The party asserting that evidence could be obtained through discovery which would defeat the summary judgment motion must demonstrate to the court a good faith factual basis for that belief.

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify delaying summary judgment for further disclosure based only on a hope of finding evidence.

David B. v. Millar · filed 2003-12-29(f)

The Supreme Court correctly granted the cross motion of the defendants St. Peter and Paul Roman Catholic Church and Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre (hereinafter the church defendants) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint without affording the plaintiff further disclosure. The plaintiffs attempted to prevent summary judgment dismissing their complaint by, in effect, relying on CPLR 3212 (f). ... The mere hope of discovering some evidence during further disclosure is insufficient to defeat summary judgment (see Kershis v City of New York, 303 AD2d 643 [2003]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not postpone summary judgment merely because a party speculates that further depositions might uncover helpful evidence.

In re the Estate of Leach · filed 2004-01-22(f)

Respondent’s speculation that deposing them might uncover some evidence to help prove his case is insufficient to invoke the provisions of CPLR 3212 (f) (see Allen v Vuley, 223 AD2d 868 [1996]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment while necessary discovery remains incomplete.

German v. Interfaith Medical Center · filed 2004-02-09(f)

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court ... properly denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment because discovery, including the court-ordered deposition of the plaintiff, had not yet been completed (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Ryo v Minerva, 290 AD2d 434 [2002]; Sazer v Marino, 280 AD2d 537 [2001]; Hoxha v City of New York, 265 AD2d 379 [1999]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking additional discovery to oppose summary judgment to show that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Wynn v. Rochester · filed 2004-02-11(f)

Contrary to the contention of plaintiff, the court properly refused to allow him to conduct additional discovery because he failed to make the requisite showing “that facts essential to justify opposition [to defendants’ motion] may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny or continue a summary judgment motion when essential facts are unavailable, but delay requires a likelihood that discovery will produce those facts.

Spatola v. Gelco Corp. · filed 2004-03-08(f)

Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), the court has discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment, or to order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had, if facts essential to justify opposition to the motion may exist but cannot then be stated. For the court to delay action on the motion, there must be a likelihood of discovery leading to such evidence.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the opposing party needs discovery and facts essential to its opposition may be exclusively within the movant’s knowledge.

Bartell v. Mazzafero · filed 2004-03-22(f)

In opposition to the appellant setting forth a sufficient basis for summary judgment, the respondents separately showed that they had not yet had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery and that facts essential to justify opposition to the ... motion may exist but are exclusively within the knowledge of the appellant (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Mazzola v Kelly, 291 AD2d 535 [2002]; Santiago v John J. Lease Realtors, 304 AD2d 743 [2003]). Accordingly, the appellant is not entitled to summary judgment at this time.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when witnesses have not yet been produced for depositions.

Sportiello v. City of New York · filed 2004-04-05(f)

Since the respondents have not yet produced any witnesses for depositions, it was premature to grant summary judgment at this stage of the proceedings (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Destin v New York City Tr. Auth., 303 AD2d 713 [2003]; Rajan v Insler, 300 AD2d 463 [2002]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment for discovery when the opponent shows a likelihood that discovery will reveal facts needed to oppose the motion.

Neryaev v. Solon · filed 2004-04-12(f)

The Supreme Court did not prematurely grant the motion without affording the defendant adequate discovery. Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), the court has discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment, or to order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had, if facts essential to justify opposition to the motion may exist but cannot then be stated. For the court to delay action on the motion, there must be a likelihood of discovery leading to such evidence.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when the opposing party has not had an opportunity for discovery and essential facts are exclusively within the movants’ knowledge.

181 South Franklin Associates, Inc. v. Y&R Associates, Inc. · filed 2004-04-19(f)

The motion was made before the plaintiff had an opportunity to conduct discovery, and there are essential issues of fact within the exclusive knowledge of Lieber, Ross, and Century (see Morris v Hochman, 296 AD2d 481, 482 [2002]). Thus, their motion for summary judgment was premature and should have been denied (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) does not require delaying summary judgment based only on speculation that further discovery might uncover supporting facts.

Ahigian v. Davis · filed 2004-04-22(f)

As plaintiffs failed to present anything more than speculation that the completion of discovery might uncover such circumstances (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Cox v Maloney, 262 AD2d 832, 833 [1999]), Supreme Court correctly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaints against them.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion when the opposing party needs a reasonable opportunity to obtain material discovery.

Catena v. Amsterdam Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 2004-04-29(f)

One of the issues raised by defendant before Supreme Court and on appeal is that plaintiffs motion was premature since considerable disclosure regarding significant issues had not yet been conducted (see CPLR 3212 [f]). ... Plaintiffs testimony is pertinent to important issues and defendant should have been afforded reasonable time following receipt of plaintiff’s responses to its disclosure demands to depose plaintiff (see Perotto Dev. Corp. v Sear-Brown Group, 269 AD2d 749, 749 [2000]; Shellberry v Albright, 262 AD2d 942 [1999]; Casey v Masullo Bros. Bldrs., 218 AD2d 907, 908 [1995]; Carter v Maskell, 192 AD2d 898, 900 [1993]).

Section 3212(f) permits a continuance when facts needed to oppose summary judgment may exist but the opposing party has not had an opportunity to obtain disclosure.

Sweeney Steel Service Corp. v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland · filed 2004-04-30(f)

Nevertheless, plaintiff demonstrated that facts necessary to oppose the motion may exist, and that it has not had the opportunity to obtain disclosure with respect to those events that may bring plaintiffs loss within the policy provisions (see CPLR 3212 [f]). We therefore reverse the order and grant plaintiffs cross motion seeking a continuance pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), and we remit the matter to Supreme Court to determine the motion after affording plaintiff the opportunity to pursue such disclosure for purposes of determining whether an insolvency event occurred during the policy period.

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts essential to opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated; speculation alone is insufficient.

Steinborn v. Himmel · filed 2004-07-01(f)

To be sure, when it appears “from affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion [for summary judgment] that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated, the court may deny the motion or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had and may make such other order as may be just” (CPLR 3212 [f]). ... In neither action have plaintiffs articulated any specific documentary or testimonial evidence they seek which might suggest that defendants had previous notice that Himmel posed a danger of violence or sexual assault to the boys in his charge.

Section 3212(f) does not entitle a party opposing summary judgment to discovery without facts essential to justify opposition.

Uptown Realty Group L.P. v. Buffaloe · filed 2004-08-05(f)

Because petitioner has not presented any facts essential to justify opposition to respondent’s summary judgment motion, petitioner has not demonstrated an entitlement to discovery pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment with leave to renew after depositions when unresolved facts bear on the motion.

Billis v. Leighton · filed 2004-05-25(f)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Milton A. Tingling, J.), entered January 15, 2004, which, in an action for legal malpractice, denied defendants-appellants predecessor attorneys’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them, with leave to renew after completion of depositions, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Issues of fact exist as to whether appellants continued to represent plaintiff after referring his case to codefendant successor counsel, or should be estopped from denying such continuing representation. Such issues are raised by evidentiary materials indicating that appellants told plaintiff, inter alia, that they had “replace[d]” the associate who was working on plaintiffs case with codefendants, and, responding to plaintiffs concerns about the referral, that codefendants “work[ed]” for” them, and that codefendants told plaintiff that they were “invited ... to join with” appellants in prosecuting plaintiff’s action and that “[b]oth of our legal firms are now jointly responsible for your representation” (CPLR 3212 [f]; cf. Malcolm v Mount Vernon Hosp., 309 AD2d 704, 705-706 [2003]).

Section 3212(f) permits a party to oppose summary judgment when facts essential to its opposition may be exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge and possession.

Rincon v. Finger Lakes Racing Ass'n · filed 2004-10-01(f)

It is well established that “[a] motion for summary judgment may be opposed with the claim that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but that such material facts are within the exclusive knowledge and possession of the moving party” (Pank v Village of Canajoharie, 275 AD2d 508, 509 [2000], citing CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(b) permits summary judgment when the opposing party offers no competent proof sufficient to raise a question of fact against the moving party’s evidence.

Greaves v. Burlingame · filed 2004-11-04(b)

Furthermore, in light of the absence of competent proof sufficient to raise a question of fact to oppose the evidence offered by plaintiff, we also find no error in the court’s subsequent grant of summary judgment in plaintiffs favor (see CPLR 3212 [b]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice or allow more time for discovery when facts essential to opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Hobbs v. Enprotech Corp. · filed 2004-11-19(f)

Plaintiff submitted affidavits in opposition to the motion establishing “that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but [could not] then be stated” without discovery (CPLR 3212 [f]). We therefore conclude that, under these circumstances, Supreme Court should have denied the motion without prejudice or ordered a continuance to permit plaintiff to obtain discovery (see id.; cf. Fellows v County of Onondaga, 2 AD3d 1462, 1463 [2003]).

Opposition to summary judgment based on speculation about usual business practices does not create a material factual issue when the proof lacks personal knowledge of what occurred.

Webb v. Tire & Brake Distributor, Inc. · filed 2004-12-16(b)

... we agree with Supreme Court’s conclusion that defendant’s proof in opposition is not based upon personal knowledge of what occurred and is insufficient to create a material question of fact in that regard (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Connor v Tee Bar Corp., supra at 730; see also Monge v Home Depot, 307 AD2d 501, 502 [2003]; La Hendro v Nadeau, supra at 719; Duprey v Drake, 182 AD2d 1015, 1016 [1992]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but cannot be stated without discovery.

Brown v. Krueger · filed 2004-12-30(f)

Supreme Court properly denied without prejudice the motion of Deargate Homes Limited and Frank Mauro (defendants) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claims against Mauro. Where, as here, “the facts essential to opposing defendants’] motion may exist but cannot ... be stated without conducting discovery of employees of defendants and others, the court should . . . den[y] the motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f)”

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment when facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated; an unsupported request for discovery is insufficient.

Fulton v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2005-01-13(f)

Although a motion for summary judgment may be denied if the facts essential to establish opposition “may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]), ... Plaintiff’s entirely unsupported assertion falls far short of the showing needed to withstand a motion for summary judgment on the ground of a need for discovery.

Section 3212(f) permits a continuance for further discovery, but a court may deny one when the party has had ample opportunity to obtain the evidence.

Rocco v. Prism Management Co. · filed 2004-09-30(f)

Nor did the motion court exercise its discretion improperly in denying a continuance for further discovery, since defendant-appellant had had ample opportunity to locate the declarant (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212 (f) does not justify delaying a summary judgment motion based only on a general belief that further discovery may uncover supporting facts.

Lewis v. Safety Disposal System of Pennsylvania, Inc. · filed 2004-11-30(f)

Plaintiff’s general belief, unsupported by any specific details, that further discovery may reveal additional facts to support his case, does not provide sufficient basis pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) for delaying determination of the summary judgment motion.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when a party needs to examine a witness to learn facts within the movant’s knowledge.

Peerless Insurance v. Allied Building Products Corp. · filed 2005-02-07(f)

Additionally, the “plaintiff cannot ascertain the extent of [Allied’s] knowledge without examining . . . [Allied’s] former employee, and this fact also warrants the denial of summary judgment at this time” (Tahini Inv. v Bobrowsky, 99 AD2d 489, 490 [1984]; see CPLR 3212 [f|; Terranova v Emil, 20 NY2d 493 [1967]; Mulvey v Service Sys. Corp., 146 AD2d 682, 683 [1989]).

Section 3212(f) does not excuse a lack of evidence when the information can be obtained from third parties and is not uniquely within the opposing party's control.

Education Resources Institute, Inc. v. Piazza · filed 2005-04-18(f)

Nor did the plaintiff submit an affidavit from either a representative of its agent, Zwicker & Associates, or an officer or employee of Hancock Bank. Since, moreover, the disputed payments were reportedly received from third parties, this information was not uniquely within the defendant’s custody and control (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the opposing party has lacked an adequate opportunity for discovery and facts needed to oppose the motion may be exclusively within the movant’s knowledge.

Ok Petroleum Distribution Corp. v. Nassau/Suffolk Fuel Oil Corp. · filed 2005-04-18(f)

In opposition to the prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment by the defendant Helen Shusterman-Fishman, the appellants demonstrated that they did not have an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery, and that facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but are exclusively within her knowledge (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Bartell v Mazzafero, 5 AD3d 618 [2004]; Mazzola v Kelly, 291 AD2d 535 [2002]; see also CPLR 3211 [d]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial or a continuance of summary judgment for discovery when essential opposing facts may exist but cannot yet be stated; the requesting party must identify those facts and its efforts to discover them.

In re the Estate of Druck · filed 2005-02-17(f)

CPLR 3212 (f) authorizes the court to deny summary judgment or grant a continuance pending discovery when facts essential to justify opposition to the motion may exist but cannot be stated. However, the party making the motion must show what “essential” facts exist and what steps he or she has taken to discover them.

CPLR 3212 (f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when facts essential to oppose it are exclusively held by the movant and can be obtained through discovery.

Wright v. Shapiro · filed 2005-03-18(f)

Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) a motion for summary judgment may be denied as premature where the opposing party shows that “facts essential to oppose the motion were in [the movant’s] exclusive knowledge and possession and could be obtained by discovery” (Franklin v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 291 AD2d 854, 854 [2002]; see 3212 [f]; Welch Foods v Wilson, 277 AD2d 882, 883 [2000]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment based on incomplete discovery to show that facts essential to its opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Ewing v. ADF Construction Corp. · filed 2005-03-18(f)

Likewise, the fact that discovepr has not been completed does not provide a basis to defeat plaintiffs’ motion inasmuch as “[d]efendant[ ] failed to establish that ‘facts essential to justify opposition [to the motion] may exist but cannot then be stated’ ” (Waggoner, 291 AD2d at 831, quoting CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a premature summary judgment motion, with leave to renew after disclosure, when outstanding discovery may reveal evidence relevant to the motion.

Miranda v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2005-05-09(f)

Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court erred in granting Mitchell’s premature motion for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Executive Aviation Servs. v Flightways of Long Is., Inc., 15 AD3d 611 [2005]; Finnegan v Ulrich, 288 AD2d 342 [2001]; Brown v County of Nassau, 226 AD2d 492 [1996]). Accordingly, the motion should have been denied with leave to renew upon the completion of disclosure.

Section 3212(f) does not permit a party to delay summary judgment based on a mere hope that further discovery will reveal a triable issue of fact.

Lambert v. Bracco · filed 2005-05-16(f)

A party’s mere hope that further discovery will reveal the existence of triable issues of fact is insufficient to delay determination on the issue of summary judgment (see Wyllie v District Attorney of County of Kings, supra; Weltmann v RWP Group, 232 AD2d 550 [1996]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment before discovery when facts needed to oppose the motion are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge.

Donato v. ELRAC, Inc. · filed 2005-05-23(f)

However, before any pretrial disclosure, such information would be exclusively within the knowledge of the defendants, and thus, summary judgment was inappropriate at this time (see CPLR 3212 [f]; ...).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment pending discovery when the opposing party shows that discovery may reveal facts warranting denial of the motion.

Serrano v. New York Times Co. · filed 2005-06-20(f)

Moreover, the plaintiff made no showing that discovery might reveal the existence of facts within the appellant’s control which would warrant the denial of the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., supra; Ruttura & Sons Constr. Co. v J. Petrocelli Constr., 257 AD2d 614 [1999]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment when a party merely hopes discovery will uncover evidence of liability.

Rinzler v. Jafco Associates · filed 2005-08-01(f)

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, supra); she merely invoked her right to discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]). Under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs mere hope that she might be able to uncover some evidence during discovery establishing liability on the part of Jafco was insufficient to deny summary judgment to Jafco (see Kershis v City of New York, 303 AD2d 643 [2003]).

CPLR 3212 (f) permits discovery to oppose summary judgment, but the opposing party must show that the discovery sought would produce relevant evidence supporting its allegations.

Riddy v. HSBC USA, Inc. · filed 2005-08-08(f)

Further, while CPLR 3212 (f) permits an opposing party to obtain discovery under certain circumstances (see Urcan v Cocarelli, 234 AD2d 537 [1996]), “it should not be resorted to where, as here, there has been a failure to demonstrate that the discovery sought would produce relevant evidence to support the plaintiffs allegations” (Frith v Affordable Homes of Am., supra at 537; see Greenberg v McLaughlin, 242 AD2d 603, 604 [1997]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not warrant postponing summary judgment for testimony that could not overcome the movant’s defenses.

Festinger v. Edrich · filed 2005-05-10(f)

Since defendants’ defense to this action is grounded upon the doctrines of judicial estoppel and unclean hands, such potential testimony cannot provide a basis for plaintiffs claim, and, therefore, cannot provide a reason, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), for postponing the granting of summary judgment to defendants (see generally Williams v General Elec. Co., 8 AD3d 866, 867 [2004]; Dunn v 726 Main & Pine, 255 AD2d 981, 982 [1998]; Wood v Otherson, 210 AD2d 473, 474 [1994]; Limpar Realty Corp. v Uswiss Realty Holding, 112 AD2d 834, 837 [1985]; La Scala v D’Angelo, 104 AD2d 930, 931 [1984]).

Subdivision (f) did not prevent summary judgment on the Indah Kiat 02 Notes despite the request for additional records.

Gryphon Domestic VI, LLC v. App International Finance Co. · filed 2005-05-17(f)

CPLR 3212 (f) did not bar the grant of summary judgment on the Indah Kiat 02 Notes (see e.g. Citibank, N.A. v Furlong, 81 AD2d 803, 804 [1981]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment based only on a party's hope that further discovery will uncover evidence.

Goldes v. City of New York · filed 2005-06-13(f)

Although a codefendant opposed the motion upon the ground that discovery had not been completed, its mere hope that evidence of affirmative negligence might be uncovered through the discovery process was insufficient to warrant denial of the motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) (see Neryaev v Solon, 6 AD3d 510 [2004]; Spatola v Gelco Corp., 5 AD3d 469 [2004]; Connecticut Indem. Co. v Travelers Ins. Co., 300 AD2d 530 [2002]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking discovery to oppose summary judgment to show that facts essential to its opposition exist but cannot yet be stated.

Naranjo v. Star Corrugated Box Co. · filed 2005-10-11(f)

In opposition, the appellant failed to demonstrate that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion existed but could not be stated without obtaining the deposition of an out-of-state witness (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Baron v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 143 AD2d 792 [1988]).

Section 3212(f) permits judgment to be delayed for discovery when a party shows that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Artigas v. Renewal Arts Realty Corp. · filed 2005-10-13(f)

It was not necessary to delay judgment in favor of respondents in order to permit discovery, petitioner having failed to show that facts essential to show his standing as a shareholder might exist but could not be stated (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212 (f) does not justify delaying summary judgment based only on a party’s hope that further discovery will uncover helpful evidence.

Bass v. Union Carbide Corp. · filed 2005-10-17(f)

The mere hope by a party opposing summary judgment that it will uncover evidence that will prove that the action is not time-barred is insufficient under CPLR 3212 (f) (see Town of Hempstead v Incorporated Vil. of Atl. Beach, supra).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to postpone summary judgment when essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated; mere hope that discovery will uncover evidence is insufficient.

Weintraub v. Levine · filed 2005-10-17(f)

Mere hope that somehow the opposing party will uncover evidence that will prove its case provides no basis pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) for postponing a decision on a motion for summary judgment (see Chemical Bank v PIC Motors Corp., 58 NY2d 1023, 1026 [1983]; Town of Hempstead v Incorporated Vil. of Atl. Beach, 278 AD2d 308 [2000]; Sellars v Redondo, 270 AD2d 407 [2000]; Carrington v City of New York, 201 AD2d 525 [1994]; American Prescription Plan v American Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO Health Plan, 170 AD2d 471 [1991]).

Section 3212(f) allows a party opposing summary judgment an opportunity for discovery about facts relevant to the motion.

Nesathurai v. University at Buffalo · filed 2005-11-10(f)

In any event, plaintiff is entitled to an opportunity for discovery on the issue of defendant’s participation in the alleged discriminatory conduct (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Brown v Krueger, 13 AD3d 1182 [2004]; Perotto Dev. Corp. v Sear-Brown Group, 269 AD2d 749 [2000]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when the opposing party has not had an opportunity to examine the plaintiff through its own physicians.

Brewster v. Skiba · filed 2005-10-27(f)

Even assuming that plaintiff satisfied his initial burden of proving a prima facie case of serious injury, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion on the ground that defendants did not have an opportunity to examine plaintiff by their own physicians (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery to oppose summary judgment to show that facts essential to its opposition may exist.

Cordova v. City of New York · filed 2005-10-31(f)

The plaintiff and the City were both required to make an evidentiary showing supporting their contention that facts essential to justify opposition may exist upon further discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Ruttura & Sons Constr. Co. v Petrocelli Constr., 257 AD2d 614, 615 [1999]), and they failed to do so.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny a summary judgment motion as premature, with leave to renew after discovery.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance v. Meis · filed 2005-11-07(f)

Even assuming that State Farm made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion as premature, with leave to renew following discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Smith v City of New York, 133 AD2d 818, 819-820 [1987] ).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when relevant facts remain unexplored in discovery and are exclusively within the opposing party’s knowledge.

Ticali v. Locascio · filed 2005-12-05(f)

Information about relevant matters exclusively within the defendant’s knowledge had not been explored in discovery. As such, the cross motion was premature (see ... CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) does not warrant additional discovery when the request is irrelevant to the claim and amounts to a fishing expedition.

Downey v. Schneider · filed 2005-11-21(f)

Moreover, since the plaintiffs request for additional discovery was not calculated to develop any additional information relevant to the plaintiffs claim and can be characterized as nothing more than a fishing expedition, relief pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) was properly denied (see Greenberg v McLaughlin, 242 AD2d 603, 604 [1997]; Price v County of Suffolk, 303 AD2d 571 [2003]; Karakostas v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 301 AD2d 632 [2003]; Zarzona v City of New York, 208 AD2d 920 [1994]; Amsterdam Sav. Bank v Terra Domus Corp., 97 AD2d 41, 45 [1983]).

A claim of incomplete discovery does not defeat a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment when the opposing party certified the case ready for trial and waited until opposing the motion to seek disclosure.

Matuszak v. B.R.K. Brands, Inc. · filed 2005-11-28(f)

Moreover, the plaintiffs certified this matter as trial ready, filed a note of issue, voiced no objection to the manner in which discovery was proceeding, and did not make any application to compel disclosure until they cross-moved in opposition to the defendant’s summary judgment motion. In such instances, the law is well settled that a claim of incomplete discovery will not defeat a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment (see Guarino v Mohawk Containers Co., 59 NY2d 753 [1983]; Kraeling v Leading Edge Elec., 2 AD3d 789 [2003]; Federoff v Camperlengo, 215 AD2d 806 [1995]; Kracker v Spartan Chem. Co., 183 AD2d 810 [1992]; Dabbs v City of Peekskill, 178 AD2d 577 [1991]; Hecht v Vanderbilt Assoc., 141 AD2d 696 [1988]).

Section 3212(b) permits a plaintiff to oppose summary judgment dismissing a third-party claim even when the plaintiff cannot sue the third-party defendant directly.

Mendez v. Union Theological Seminary · filed 2006-02-21(b)

Although plaintiff was a C&D Waterproofing employee at the time of the alleged accident and was consequently barred from suing C&D Waterproofing directly, he was, contrary to C&D Waterproofing’s contention, nonetheless entitled to oppose dismissal of the third-party action against C&D Waterproofing (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Way v Grantling, 289 AD2d 790 [2001]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the opposing party has not had an opportunity to discover facts needed to oppose the motion.

American Transit Insurance v. B.O. Astra Management Corp. · filed 2006-04-17(f)

Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied inasmuch as Leong has not had the opportunity to engage in discovery. (CPLR 3212 [f].) ... Indeed, as noted above, plaintiff did not even attach a copy of the policy to its moving papers in the instant case.

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking additional discovery before summary judgment to show that facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Nilsen v. City of New York · filed 2006-04-18(f)

Nor did the plaintiff demonstrate a likelihood that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion might exist, but could not be stated without additional discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Neryaev v Solon, 6 AD3d 510, 510-511 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not warrant additional discovery to oppose summary judgment when the relevant facts are solely within the opposing party’s possession.

Gaylord v. Fiorilla · filed 2006-04-25(f)

Contrary to his contentions, no amount of additional discovery would fortify him with facts necessary to oppose summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [f]), since information regarding the type of harm he suffered was in his sole possession.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when outstanding discovery concerns facts needed to oppose the motion.

A.B. Medical Services PLLC v. Utica Mutual Insurance · filed 2006-02-17(f)

In view of the foregoing, plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment should have been denied due to plaintiffs’ failure to respond to said discovery demands (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial or postponement of summary judgment for lack of disclosure when affidavits show that facts essential to opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Buja v. KCI Konecranes International plc · filed 2006-04-12(f)

In order for lack of disclosure to be a basis to deny or postpone a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff must submit affidavits “that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]). The plaintiff Buja has not presented sufficient affidavits to demonstrate that disclosure might lead to facts essential to justify opposition.

CPLR 3212(f) does not require deferring a summary judgment decision for further discovery when nothing indicates that discovery would produce evidence needed to defeat the motion.

Mahoney v. George · filed 2006-04-28(f)

We reject plaintiffs contention that the court should have deferred its decision on defendants’ motion with respect to the third and eighth causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) pending further discovery. In support of their motion with respect to those causes of action, defendants submitted evidence establishing that the person to whom the allegedly defamatory statements that are the subject of those causes of action were made unequivocally denied that the statements were made to him, and nothing in the record indicates that further discovery would lead to evidence of publication (see Snyder v Sony Music Entertainment, 252 AD2d 294, 299 [1999]).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery when facts needed to oppose summary judgment may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Juseinoski v. New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens · filed 2006-05-09(f)

CPLR 3212 (f) permits a party opposing summary judgment to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the position of the opposing party exist but cannot be stated (see Urcan v Cocarelli, 234 AD2d 537 [1996]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment when discovery may reveal facts needed to oppose the motion.

Gates v. Easy Living Homes, Inc. · filed 2006-05-16(f)

However, the Supreme Court properly declined to grant summary judgment at this juncture, as the respondents are entitled to obtain necessary discovery concerning the alleged fraud perpetrated by the plaintiff and the defendants Easy Living Homes, Inc., and Elliot A. Baker (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Aubrey Equities v SMZH 73rd Assoc., 212 AD2d 397, 398 [1995]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party seeking further discovery to oppose summary judgment must identify information that could aid its opposition; speculation is insufficient.

Lerwick v. Krna · filed 2006-05-18(f)

... plaintiff failed to identify any information that he sought which would have furthered his defense to this motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]) and his mere speculation is not enough (see Steinborn v Himmel, 9 AD3d 531, 535 [2004]).

Section 3212(f) does not entitle a party to additional discovery when it raises no sufficient doubt to justify it.

Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. v. Montana Board of Investments · filed 2006-06-06(f)

While disagreeing with the Appellate Division, the dissent cannot demonstrate that the Court's decision to deny additional discovery was an abuse of discretion ( see CPLR 3212 [f]). MBOI, in short, has not raised the "doubt" that would entitle it to the benefit of full (or fuller) discovery.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment with leave to renew after discovery on a material factual question.

Vassell v. Magno · filed 2006-06-06(f)

Although the appellants submitted additional proof in reply, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion with leave to renew after discovery had been taken on the question of the identity of the doctor who rendered treatment to the decedent (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Lexington Acupuncture, P.C. v. State Farm Insurance · filed 2006-06-07(f)

Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is premature pending the completion of discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) allows summary judgment to be denied when the opposing party has lacked an opportunity to obtain material evidence in the defendants’ control.

Murphy v. Carnesi · filed 2006-06-20(f)

Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, where Carnesi, Jr., the linchpin on the issue of implied consent, was sufficiently under the control of Carnesi, Sr., to provide favorable evidence in support of the summary judgment motion, but did not appear for a deposition, the plaintiff has been deprived of relevant evidence solely in the defendants’ control on this crucial issue (cf. CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when the opposing party shows that facts essential to its opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Cross Development, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 2006-07-07(f)

Travelers failed to make the requisite showing that facts essential to justify opposition to the cross motion may have existed but could not then be stated (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Wynn v AC Rochester [appeal No. 1], 4 AD3d 856 [2004]; Bateman v Walbridge Aldinger Co., 299 AD2d 834, 835 [2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 502 [2003]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated pending discovery.

Midborough Acupuncture P.C. v. State Farm Insurance · filed 2006-07-26(f)

Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is premature pending the completion of discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Subdivision (f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when the opposing party needs discovery to develop relevant facts.

Fazio v. Brandywine Realty Trust · filed 2006-05-30(f)

The prediscovery motion of the defendant Harvest Real Estate Services, Inc. (hereinafter Harvest), for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was premature, as the plaintiff was entitled to an opportunity to more fully develop Harvest’s alleged relation to, and control over, the subject premises at the time of the accident (see State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v Meis, 23 AD3d 372 [2005]; Smith v City of New York, 133 AD2d 818, 819-820 [1987]; see generally CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) does not permit postponing summary judgment based on a mere hope that further discovery will uncover evidence; the opposing party must show how discovery might yield material facts.

Casey v. Clemente · filed 2006-07-05(f)

Additionally, “it is well settled that the mere hope by the party opposing summary judgment that it will uncover evidence that will prove its case is insufficient under CPLR 3212 (f) to postpone a decision on a summary judgment motion” (Town of Hempstead v Incorporated Vil. of Atl. Beach, 278 AD2d 308, 310 [2000]). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in refusing to postpone its determination because the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate how further discovery might yield material facts which would warrant denial of’ summary judgment (Francis v Board of Educ. of City of Mount Vernon, 278 AD2d 449 [2000]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify delaying summary judgment for unfinished discovery unless the opposing party shows that facts essential to its opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Newman v. Regent Contracting Corp. · filed 2006-07-07(f)

However, “the fact that discovery has not been completed does not provide ... a basis to defeat [Regent’s cross] motion” (Ewing v ADF Constr. Corp., 16 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2005]), inasmuch as Bison failed to establish “that facts essential to justify opposition [to the cross motion] may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]; see Waggoner v Lancet Arch, 291 AD2d 831, 831 [2002]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking discovery to oppose summary judgment to provide an evidentiary basis and identify specific facts the discovery could reveal.

Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Holme · filed 2006-10-03(f)

The party invoking the section must provide a proper evidentiary basis supporting its request for further discovery. ... However, what Global has failed to do is to show any additional specific facts that would be discovered to show that its reliance was reasonable. Therefore, the plaintiffs request was properly denied.

Section 3212(f) permits discovery before summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion are within the opposing party’s exclusive knowledge.

Caprer v. Nussbaum · filed 2006-10-17(f)

Where a defendant would have “exclusive” knowledge of the details, so that it would be impossible for a plaintiff to obtain access to the information necessary to frame specific allegations (see Bernstein v Kelso & Co., 231 AD2d 314, 320-321 [1997]; Grumman Aerospace Corp. v Rice, 196 AD2d 572, 573 [1993]), and the only reason for the lack of detail in the pleadings is a result of the defendant’s peculiar knowledge, it is error to grant summary judgment without first allowing for discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f|; Salm v Feldstein, 20 AD3d 469, 470 [2005]; Berkowitz v Molod, 261 AD2d 128, 129 [1999]; Grossman v Pharmhouse Corp., 234 AD2d 918, 920 [1996]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment for further discovery only when discovery might yield material facts warranting denial; a fishing expedition is insufficient.

Min Whan Ock v. City of New York · filed 2006-11-14(f)

Finally, there is no basis in the record for the denial of summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f). The denial of summary judgment dismissing the complaint on that basis requires a showing that discovery might yield material facts that will warrant the denial of summary judgment (see De Lage Landen Fin. Servs. v Mannetti Assoc., 305 AD2d 365, 366 [2003]; Francis v Board of Educ. of City of Mount Vernon, 278 AD2d 449 [2000]; Venezia v Coldwell Banker Sammis Realty, 270 AD2d 480, 482 [2000]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when needed discovery concerns material in the moving party’s exclusive possession.

Kew Gardens Hills Apartment Owners, Inc. v. Horing Welikson & Rosen, P.C. · filed 2006-12-05(f)

Discovery as to material in the files of the defendant law firm and/or other discovery of material within the exclusive knowledge and possession of the HWR defendants is warranted. Thus, the Supreme Court correctly determined that summary judgment is inappropriate before adequate discovery has been conducted (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Plaza Invs. v Kim, 208 AD2d 704 [1994]; Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Desiderio, 104 AD2d 791 [1984]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party seeking relief because facts essential to opposing summary judgment are unavailable must establish that those facts are within the movant’s exclusive knowledge.

In re the Estate of DiCorcia · filed 2006-12-05(f)

Further, the objectants failed to establish that facts essential to oppose the cross motion were within the exclusive knowledge of the proponent (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Pearsall v Saracco, 305 AD2d 650 [2003]).

Section 3212(f) permits postponing a summary judgment decision for discovery only when the party shows more than hope of finding evidence, unavoidable ignorance of the facts, and reasonable efforts to discover them.

Companion Life Insurance v. All State Abstract Corp. · filed 2006-12-12(f)

In order to provide a basis pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) for postponing a decision, a party must show more than a mere hope that it might be able to uncover some evidence during the discovery process (see Kershis v City of New York, 303 AD2d 643 [2003]; Leggio v County of Nassau, 281 AD2d 518, 519 [2001]; Lightfoot v City of New York, 279 AD2d 457, 458 [2001]). In addition, the party must show that its ignorance was unavoidable and that reasonable attempts were made to discover the facts which would give rise to a triable issue of fact (see Gillinder v Hemmes, 298 AD2d 493 [2002]; Cruz v Otis El. Co., 238 AD2d 540, 541 [1997]). Companion failed to meet this burden.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment without prejudice when the opposing party has not had an adequate opportunity to discover facts within the movant’s knowledge.

Colon v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority · filed 2006-12-12(f)

Furthermore, the Transit Authority established that it did not have an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery into these issues, some of which are exclusively within the knowledge of the City (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Berchini v Silverite Constr. Co., 289 AD2d 434 [2001]; Urcan v Cocarelli, 234 AD2d 537 [1996]; Baron v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 143 AD2d 792 [1988]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment with leave to renew after discovery when factual questions warrant pretrial disclosure.

Hernandez v. City of New York · filed 2006-12-26(f)

Moreover, since the report raised genuine factual questions which could properly be investigated during pretrial disclosure, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the motion with leave to renew upon the completion of discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; see e.g. Peppas v City of New York, 6 AD3d 596 [2004]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Nelson v. Bestway Coach Express · filed 2007-01-16(f)

Finally, on the record before us, it appears that plaintiff has a reasonable excuse for her inability to carry her burden on summary judgment in that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot [now] be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]). Plaintiffs opposing papers demonstrate that Piedecasas’s conclusory, self-serving affidavit leaves numerous factual questions unanswered that — but for the conduct of the defense — would have been addressed at the deposition.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when the opposing party needs discovery to obtain facts that may justify opposition.

Andiero Partners, L.P. v. Duggan · filed 2007-01-19(f)

... the issue is simply whether Duggan has met the requirement s of CPLR 3212(f). ... Nonetheless , Duggan has shown a sufficient need for discovery concerning the insurance policy and the circumstanc es of its transfer in relation to the breach of fiduciary claim. ... Accord ingly, the partne rship's motion for summar y judgme nt agains t Duggan as execut rix is denied withou t prejud ice.

Section 3212(f) does not bar a summary judgment ruling before discovery when neither party claims discovery is needed.

Household Finance Realty Corp. v. Dunlap · filed 2007-03-05(f)

Although discovery had not been undertaken, this is not asserted by either side as a basis upon which to deny these motions (CPLR 3212 [fj), which are otherwise timely since the note of issue has not yet been filed. Therefore, the motions will be decided on the merits, and the court’s decision and order follows.

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Betz v. N.Y.C. Premier Properties, Inc. · filed 2007-03-27(f)

“CPLR 3212 (f) permits a party opposing summary judgment to obtain further discovery when it appears the facts supporting the position of the opposing party exist but cannot be stated” (Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, supra at 637). ... Here, the plaintiffs raised issues warranting further discovery. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Section 3212(f) does not permit postponing a summary judgment decision based on speculation that further discovery might uncover useful evidence.

Orange County-Poughkeepsie Ltd. v. Bonte · filed 2007-02-20(f)

As to Bonte’s professed entitlement to further discovery, “[t]o speculate that something might be caught on a fishing expedition provides no basis pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) to postpone decision on [a] summary judgment motion” (Gateway State Bank v Shangri-La Private Club for Women, 113 AD2d 791, 792 [1985], affd 67 NY2d 627 [1986]; see Rogan v Giannotto, 151 AD2d 655, 656 [1989]; Kennerly v Campbell Chain Co., Campbell Chain Div. McGraw-Edison Co., 133 AD2d 669, 670 [1987]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery to show that it is calculated to yield facts warranting denial of summary judgment.

Town of Brookhaven v. Mascia · filed 2007-03-20(f)

The denial of summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) requires a showing that the request for additional discovery is calculated to yield facts that would warrant the denial of summary judgment (see Min Whan Ock v City of New York, 34 AD3d 542 [2006]; Downey v Schneider, 23 AD3d 514, 517 [2005]). The defendants made no such showing here.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment without prejudice to renewal after discovery when facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Crossbay Acupuncture, P.C. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2007-03-28(f)

...the opposition papers set forth that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot be stated (see CPLR 3212 [f|), plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should have been denied without prejudice to renewal upon the completion of discovery.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment for discovery when the opposing party has lacked a reasonable opportunity for disclosure despite efforts to investigate.

Korson v. Preferred Mutual Insurance · filed 2007-04-03(f)

Even if the plaintiff made a showing sufficient to establish his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, however, the Supreme Court correctly concluded that the defendant was entitled to the opportunity to conduct discovery before summary judgment could be granted to the plaintiff, particularly since the defendant did not have a reasonable opportunity for disclosure prior to the making of the motion, despite its efforts to investigate (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 29 AD3d 636, 637 [2006]; Urcan v Cocarelli, 234 AD2d 537 [1996]; Baron v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 143 AD2d 792, 792-793 [1988]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when the opposing party has not had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.

Amico v. Melville Volunteer Fire Co. · filed 2007-04-24(f)

Here, the plaintiff has not had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery, and the motion by the defendant Melville Volunteer Fire Company, Inc., should have been denied as premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Fazio v Brandywine Realty Trust, 29 AD3d 939 [2006]; Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 29 AD3d 636 [2006]; Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v North Fork Bank, 16 AD3d 467 [2005]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits discovery before summary judgment when essential facts are within the moving party’s control and the opposing party has not had a reasonable opportunity to obtain them.

Banks v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2007-04-24(f)

Since the information that would clarify this issue is solely within the possession of the DOE and the New York City Transit Authority, the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery on this essential issue of fact (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

A party seeking further discovery before summary judgment must make an evidentiary showing that facts essential to opposing the motion may exist.

Fobbs v. Rahimzada · filed 2007-04-24(f)

The Supreme Court properly rejected the plaintiff s argument that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have ... been denied on the ground that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion may exist upon further discovery. The plaintiff failed to make the requisite evidentiary showing supporting her contention in this regard (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Cordova v City of New York, supra at 785; Lopes v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 273 AD2d 360, 361 [2000]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when the opposing party needs discovery to obtain evidence held by the movant.

Williams v. City of New York · filed 2007-05-15(f)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the City’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the malicious prosecution cause of action as premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 29 AD3d 636, 638 [2006]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking more discovery before summary judgment to give a nonspeculative basis for believing it may yield evidence warranting a different result.

Williams v. City of New York · filed 2007-06-05(f)

Nor have the plaintiffs demonstrated that additional discovery is necessary prior to summary disposition (see CPLR 3212 [f|). Although the plaintiffs urge that the motion for summary judgment was properly denied to permit them to conduct additional discovery and depositions, they have advanced no nonspeculative basis to believe that additional discovery might yield evidence warranting a different disposition (see Rosario v New York City Tr. Auth., 8 AD3d 147, 148 [2004]; Hernandez v Yonkers Contr. Co., 292 AD2d 422, 424 [2002]; Rodgers v Yale Univ., 283 AD2d 415, 416 [2001]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when discovery may produce evidence needed to oppose the motion.

Tucker v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2007-07-05(f)

The motion court erred in granting summary judgment prior to any discovery in the action (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) requires an evidentiary basis suggesting that further discovery may yield relevant evidence before a court may deny summary judgment on that ground.

Panasuk v. Viola Park Realty, LLC · filed 2007-06-26(f)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court incorrectly concluded that the motion should be denied on the ground that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion may exist upon further discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]). A determination of summary judgment cannot be avoided by a claimed need for discovery unless some evidentiary basis is offered to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant evidence (see Fobbs v Rahimzada, 39 AD3d 811 [2007]; Lambert v Bracco, 18 AD3d 619, 620 [2005]; Durham v Beaufort, 300 AD2d 435, 436 [2002]; Ruttura & Sons Constr. Co. v Petrocelli Constr., 257 AD2d 614, 615 [1999]), and the plaintiffs failed to make the requisite evidentiary showing.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment with leave to renew when discovery should first be completed.

Amaya v. Board of Education · filed 2007-09-11(f)

The defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly denied, with leave to renew. Under the facts of this case, discovery should first be completed (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits additional discovery before summary judgment when the opposing party shows that essential facts are within the movant’s exclusive knowledge.

In re the Estate of Zirinsky · filed 2007-09-11(f)

The objectants and Freidman failed to establish that facts essential to oppose the cross motion were within the exclusive knowledge of the proponent (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Matter of DiCorcia, 35 AD3d 463 [2006]).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery when essential facts supporting opposition to summary judgment likely exist but cannot yet be stated; mere hope of finding evidence is insufficient.

Smith v. Andre · filed 2007-09-25(f)

Further discovery may be permitted where it appears that essential facts supporting the position of an opposing party exist but cannot be stated (CPLR 3212 [f]; see Baldasano v Bank of N.Y., 199 AD2d 184 [1993]). However, the existence of issues of fact as to appellants’ obligation to respondents with regard to insurance has no bearing whatsoever on the liability of appellants to plaintiff.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the opposing party has not had an adequate opportunity to obtain discovery relevant to its opposition.

County of Nassau v. Velasquez · filed 2007-10-30(f)

In any event, the County demonstrated that it did not have an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery into the issue of whether the owner could establish innocent ownership under the statute by exploring, inter alia, whether the driver was known to frequent places where alcohol was served and had previously consumed alcohol while driving, the driver’s prior use of the subject vehicle and any restrictions thereon, whether the owner knew of the driver’s intended whereabouts on the night in question, and any other issues related to the question of innocent ownership (see CPLR 3212 [f]; see e.g. Berchini v Silverite Constr. Co., 289 AD2d 434 [2001]).

Section 3212(f) does not require denial of summary judgment merely because discovery is incomplete.

Sienna Capital Group, Inc. v. Rosen · filed 2007-10-09(f)

Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, we reject Sienna’s contention that denial of Rosen’s motion was warranted merely because discovery was not complete at the time the motion was made (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not make a summary judgment motion premature based on hoped-for discovery alone; the opponent must offer an evidentiary basis that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Kimyagarov v. Nixon Taxi Corp. · filed 2007-11-20(f)

Furthermore, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the motion was not premature, as they failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiffs (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]; Pina v Merolla, 34 AD3d 663, 664 [2006]; Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 29 AD3d 636, 637 [2006]; Ruttura & Sons Constr. Co. v Petrocelli Constr., 257 AD2d 614, 615 [1999]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when a party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery, with leave to renew after discovery.

Venables v. Sagona · filed 2007-12-11(f)

On the limited facts presented in this pre-discovery record, those branches of the defendants’ motion which were to dismiss the first, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action should have been denied as premature, with leave to renew upon completion of discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Amico v Melville Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 39 AD3d 784 [2007]; Olmedo-Garcia v Dobson, 31 AD3d 727 [2006]).

Section 3212(f) requires an evidentiary showing that facts essential to oppose summary judgment may exist but cannot yet be stated; a conclusory request for discovery is insufficient.

Walsh v. Aspen Square Management, Inc. · filed 2007-12-21(f)

Plaintiffs conclusory contention that additional discovery is necessary is insufficient to defeat Clover’s motion inasmuch as plaintiff failed to make the requisite evidentiary showing “that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]; see Preferred Capital v PBK, Inc., 309 AD2d 1168, 1169 [2003]; Noonan v New York Blood Ctr., 269 AD2d 323, 324 [2000]; Mazzaferro v Barterama Corp., 218 AD2d 643 [1995]; Atomergic Chemetals Corp. v Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 193 AD2d 551 [1993]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to grant further discovery in connection with a summary judgment motion.

Mazzei v. Licciardi · filed 2008-01-22(f)

Upon reargument, the court properly vacated the order dated ... and, inter alia, granted further discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Levy v Board of Educ. of City of Yonkers, 232 AD2d 377, 378 [1996]; Baron v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 143 AD2d 792, 792-793 [1988]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment or allow more discovery when the opposing party shows that facts essential to its opposition are within the movant’s knowledge.

Funding Group, Inc. v. Water Chef, Inc. · filed 2008-02-19(f)

Plaintiff has failed to establish the need for discovery to ascertain “facts essential to justify opposition” within defendant’s knowledge, which plaintiff would need to oppose the motion, so as to authorize the court to deny any relief or grant a continuance pending disclosure (CPLR 3212 [f|; see also Weltmann v RWP Group, 232 AD2d 550 [1996]; Aminov v East 50th St. Rest. Corp., 232 AD2d 592 [1996], Iv denied 89 NY2d 815 [1997]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a credible evidentiary basis for believing that disclosure might reveal facts creating an issue for trial.

J & A Concrete Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance · filed 2008-02-26(f)

Plaintiff fails to set forth any credible evidentiary basis pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) for believing that disclosure might reveal new information that would create an issue of fact as to when the contractor ceased work (see Global Mins. & Metals Corp. v Holme, 35 AD3d 93, 103 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 804 [2007]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to withhold a summary judgment decision pending discovery when evidence suggests that further discovery will yield material and relevant evidence.

Zinter Handling, Inc. v. Britton · filed 2007-12-06(f)

Next, although determination of a summary judgment motion may be withheld where discovery is incomplete (see CPLR 3212 [f]), there must be some evidentiary showing suggesting that completion of discovery will yield material and relevant evidence (see Lambert v Bracco, 18 AD3d 619, 620 [2005]). Here, not only does it appear that plaintiff’s argument is based on conjecture and speculation, the record reveqls that plaintiff had other sources from which to obtain the evidence that it now claims could be obtained through deposition of defendants. Accordingly, we are unconvinced that the need for additional discovery precludes a decision on defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when pertinent discovery remains outstanding.

Lynch v. Lynch · filed 2008-01-22(f)

Moreover, the Supreme Court improperly granted that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint where, as here, pertinent additional discovery remained outstanding (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), speculation that further discovery may reveal facts justifying denial is insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.

Tom L. LaMere & Associates, Inc. v. City of Syracuse Board of Education · filed 2008-02-01(f)

We reject at the outset plaintiffs contention that defendants’ motions are premature because further discovery may reveal facts justifying denial of the motions (see CPLR 3212 [f]). That contention is based on mere speculation and thus is insufficient to defeat the motions (see Preferred Capital v PBK, Inc., 309 AD2d 1168, 1169 [2003]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when needed discovery may yield material and relevant evidence.

Spellburg v. South Bay Realty, LLC · filed 2008-03-13(f)

The motion for summary judgment was premature as additional discovery, including the examination before trial of Barber and completion of Macchio’s deposition, was necessary and would “yield material and relevant evidence” (Zinter Handling, Inc. v Britton, 46 AD3d 998, 1001 [2007]; see CPLR 3212 [f]; Catena v Amsterdam Mem. Hosp., 6 AD3d 1037, 1038 [2004]).