N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3212

Section 3212(f) permits a court to decide a summary judgment motion before the opposing party obtains requested discovery.

Bohm v. Nystrum Construction · filed 1994-10-17(f)

Moreover, the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the plaintiff to obtain discovery of certain information allegedly in the defendants’ possession prior to disposing of the defendants’ motions on the merits (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Rothbort v S.L.S. Mgt. Corp., 185 AD2d 806).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to rule on summary judgment without first allowing requested depositions when the decisive facts are undisputed.

Skrabalak v. Rock · filed 1994-10-20(f)

We further find that the Supreme Court properly denied defendant’s request to depose plaintiffs prior to ruling on this motion (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) does not permit postponing summary judgment for discovery based only on a hope that supporting evidence may emerge.

Wood v. Otherson · filed 1994-12-27(f)

The plaintiff, therefore, failed to provide a basis pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) for postponing a decision on the defendant’s summary judgment motion (see, Sarver v Martyn, supra).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking to defer summary judgment for discovery to provide affidavits and show that essential facts remain unavailable despite reasonable efforts.

Chas. H. Sells, Inc. v. Chance Hills Joint Venture · filed 1995-01-05(f)

In seeking a stay of a motion for summary judgment to permit discovery of essential facts unknown to the opposing party, the opposing party must provide affidavits (CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a request for discovery when the information sought would not affect the summary judgment issue.

Hayles v. Patmast Acquiring Corp. · filed 1995-01-10(f)

Plaintiff’s cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) was also properly denied, as the issues which plaintiff sought to discover regarding the inter-relationship between defendant Patmast Acquiring Corp. and the moving defendant employer had no bearing upon the issue of whether plaintiff had a right to maintain a separate cause of action for personal injuries against the employer (see, Heritage v Van Patten, 59 NY2d 1017).

A party opposing summary judgment under CPLR 3212(b) must submit facts sufficient to require a trial of a factual issue.

Kosson v. Algaze · filed 1995-01-17(b)

In order to defeat defendants’ motion for summary judgment, plaintiff had the burden of showing " ' "facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact” ’ ” (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562; CPLR 3212 [b]). As applied here, plaintiff had to submit evidentiary facts that he was employed by defendant St. Luke’s/Roosevelt Hospital Center for a fixed duration pursuant to a definite written contract of employment.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to withhold summary judgment when discovery may reveal defenses based on information held by the moving party.

Aubrey Equities, Inc. v. SMZH 73rd Associates · filed 1995-02-09(f)

Summary judgment should not be granted where there are likely to be defenses that depend upon knowledge in the possession of the party moving for summary judgment which may be disclosed by discovery (Terranova v Emil, 20 NY2d 493, 497).

A party opposing summary judgment must submit proof that raises an issue of fact; an unsupported challenge to a special litigation committee’s independence is insufficient.

Ungerleider v. One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp. · filed 1995-02-22

Plaintiff has not submitted any proof to raise an issue of fact as to the disinterested independence of the members of the committee.

Section 3212(f) permits a party to obtain evidence before summary judgment is awarded when facts supporting its position may exist but reasonable efforts have not yet secured them.

Saguid v. Kingston Hospital · filed 1995-03-02(f)

In response, plaintiffs argue that they have a reasonable excuse for not furnishing countervailing expert medical testimony (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; US 7 v Transamerica Ins. Co., 173 AD2d 311, 312). ... Having demonstrated that facts supporting their position may exist, but that despite having made reasonable attempts to obtain the information they were unable to acquire it (see, R.C.S. Farmers Mkts. Corp. v Great Am. Ins. Co., 56 NY2d 918, 921; State of New York v Wisser Co., 170 AD2d 918, 920), plaintiffs should be allowed an opportunity to procure the doctor’s testimony before summary judgment may be awarded on the third cause of action for Saguid’s physical injury.

On a summary judgment motion, the court may infer that no triable issue of fact exists when the opposing party fails to submit sufficient proof.

Index Stock Photography, Inc. v. United Parcel Service Corp. · filed 1995-03-08

It is well settled as a matter of law that where a party in opposition to a motion for summary judgment fails to submit sufficient proof to raise a triable issue of fact, the court may infer that none exists. ... Accordingly, the motion is granted to the extent that defendant’s liability herein is limited to $100.

Section 3212(f) does not warrant additional discovery to oppose summary judgment when the opponent fails to show that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and the request amounts to a fishing expedition.

de Paris v. 1567 Broadway Ownership Associates · filed 1995-04-11(f)

Nor did the IAS Court err in denying the Riese appellants’ cross motion for additional discovery pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f). Appellants have failed to establish that the facts concerning the genuineness of the Hirschfeld signatures on the mortgage documents allegedly essential to justify opposition to summary judgment, which may exist but cannot then be stated, are exclusively within the plaintiffs knowledge, and that the requested discovery was therefore anything more than a mere "fishing expedition” (Auerbach v Bennett, 47 NY2d 619, 636; Citibank v Furlong, 81 AD2d 803, 804).

Section 3212(f) does not justify delaying summary judgment for discovery when the opposing party had time to conduct it and has not shown that the needed facts are within the movant’s exclusive knowledge.

Forest Medical Professional Condominium v. Tiburzi · filed 1995-04-28(f)

We reject the contention that summary judgment should have been denied because plaintiff had no opportunity to conduct discovery concerning each defendant’s role in the construction and repair of the building. Plaintiff had a year in which to conduct that discovery (see, Meath v Mishrick, 68 NY2d 992, 994-995) and has failed to show that facts pertaining to that issue are within the exclusive knowledge of defendants (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; People v United Funding, 106 AD2d 846, 847, lv denied 64 NY2d 609).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment without prejudice when further discovery could reveal facts supporting opposition.

Foley v. Mobil Chemical Co. · filed 1995-04-28(f)

Because it appears that discovery by plaintiff could elicit facts to support opposition to Barnett’s motion, the court properly denied it (see, CPLR 3212 [f]). We modify the order on appeal, however, by denying Barnett’s motion without prejudice to renew following completion of the examination before trial of Barnett.

CPLR 3212(f) does not excuse a party’s failure to present evidence opposing summary judgment when it had ample time to seek discovery but did not do so.

Douglas Manor Ass'n v. Alimaras · filed 1995-05-15(f)

We also disagree with the appellants that their failure to present evidentiary facts in opposing the motion should be excused pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) on the ground that the facts needed are exclusively within the knowledge of the DMA.

Section 3212 does not allow a party to defeat summary judgment by speculating that discovery may uncover supporting evidence.

Network Management Services Group, Inc. v. Rosenkrantz Lyon & Ross, Inc. · filed 1995-01-31

Plaintiff’s speculation that some evidence of Manchester’s alleged authority may come to light during discovery is insufficient to bar summary judgment (see, American Prescription Plan v American Postal Workers Union, 170 AD2d 471, 473, citing Chemical Bank v PIC Motors Corp., 58 NY2d 1023).

CPLR 3212(f) does not prevent summary judgment when a request for further discovery rests on speculation about what it might reveal.

Wisnowski v. City of Syracuse · filed 1995-03-17(f)

Plaintiffs speculation that the City must have a procedure for promptly notifying the Commissioner of Public Works when a notice of claim is received by the Corporation Counsel and that further discovery is necessary to uncover that procedure (see, CPLR 3212 [f]) is insufficient to defeat summary judgment (see, Dabbs v City of Peekskill, supra).

CPLR 3212 (f) does not justify delaying summary judgment for further discovery when the claims supporting the request are speculative.

Dufrane v. Robideau · filed 1995-04-27(f)

We reject any notion that plaintiffs’ motion made pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) could have corrected such failure since the claims made therein are speculative, particularly in light of the shortcomings noted in the affidavit of plaintiffs’ expert (see, Kennerly v Campbell Chain Co., 133 AD2d 669).

Under CPLR 3212(f), a request for more discovery does not defeat summary judgment when the party had ample opportunity to conduct discovery but served no demands.

Federoff v. Camperlengo · filed 1995-05-04(f)

Defendants’ further claim that additional discovery was necessary (see, CPLR 3212 [f]) is unavailing. Despite ample time and opportunity to conduct discovery, the record reflects that defendants served no discovery demands of their own.

Under CPLR 3212 (f), mere suspicion that further discovery will uncover documentary evidence provides no basis for denying summary judgment.

Jee v. B.P. Cleaners, Inc. · filed 1995-05-22(f)

Moreover, under the facts of this case, and pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), the plaintiffs’ mere suspicion that further discovery will uncover written documentary evidence of said agreement provides no basis for denying the defendants’ summary judgment motion as to the first, second, third, fifth, and sixth causes of action (see, American Prescription Plan v American Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO Health Plan, 170 AD2d 471, 473).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment so discovery can take place.

Freier v. Amax, Inc. · filed 1995-07-14(f)

Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion of defendant Bryan M. Pfohl for summary judgment dismissing the complaint so that discovery could take place (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to delay summary judgment for discovery when essential opposing facts may exist but cannot yet be stated; hope and speculation about what discovery might reveal are insufficient.

Mazzaferro v. Barterama Corp. · filed 1995-08-07(f)

Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), the trial court has discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment, or to order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had, if "facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated”. ... Since there was only hope and speculation as to what additional discovery would uncover in the present situation, the court properly granted the motion for summary judgment.

Section 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment for further discovery when the party seeking it failed to ascertain the facts through its own inaction.

Milea v. Ames Department Store, Inc. · filed 1995-09-29(f)

We also reject plaintiffs’ contention that the motion was properly denied as premature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f). ... They did not seek additional discovery until defendant moved for summary judgment.

CPLR 3212 (f) permits a court to deny summary judgment or allow more time for discovery when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

A. F. Green & Co. v. William Penn Life Insurance · filed 1995-10-24(f)

CPLR 3212 (f) authorizes the court to deny summary judgment or grant a continuance pending discovery when facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot be stated.

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking to delay summary judgment for discovery to identify essential facts it believes are exclusively within the opposing party’s knowledge and possession.

Lavin & Kleiman v. J.M. Heinike Associates, Inc. · filed 1995-11-15(f)

There is no merit to the contention of defendant that summary judgment should have been denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) because plaintiff had not complied with certain discovery demands of defendant. Defendant failed to indicate the essential facts that it believes are in the exclusive knowledge and possession of plaintiff (see, Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 NY2d 152, 164).

Further discovery warrants denial of summary judgment under CPLR 3212(f) only when the opposing party shows how it might reveal material facts within the movant’s exclusive knowledge and control.

Paskiewicz v. National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People · filed 1995-06-26(f)

Here, the plaintiff failed to present sufficient proof to sustain his burden of establishing that Killoran acted with malice, and has not demonstrated how further discovery might reveal the existence of material facts, currently within the exclusive knowledge and control of the defendants, which would warrant the denial of summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [f|; Delaney v Good Samaritan Hosp., 204 AD2d 678; Kracker v Spartan Chem. Co., 183 AD2d 810).

Subdivision (f) does not justify delaying summary judgment for discovery when the opposing party has equal or superior knowledge of the facts and access to relevant evidence.

Hanson v. Capital District Sports Inc. · filed 1995-08-17(f)

Because there is no question that defendant’s knowledge of the underlying facts and means of access to relevant evidence were equal, if not superior, to plaintiff’s, we are not persuaded by defendant’s effort to fit this within the holding of Koen v Carl Co. (70 AD2d 695) or the provision of CPLR 3212 (f).

Section 3212 permits summary judgment without further discovery when the opposing party identifies no needed discovery and the issues can be decided on the papers.

Farrakhan v. N.Y.P. Holdings, Inc. · filed 1995-12-19

Finally, while plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to discovery before this matter may be disposed of on the merits, they have failed to indicate what discovery is required. Moreover, the issues raised in this motion are all matters of law which can be determined by the court on the papers, without need for any discovery.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice or defer ruling when evidence needed to oppose the motion is within the moving party’s exclusive knowledge.

Morris v. Goldstein · filed 1996-01-16(f)

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly denied the branch of the appellant’s motion which was for summary judgment since the information concerning the appellant’s relationship with the defendant Melvin Goldstein is within the exclusive knowledge of the defendants.

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking discovery before summary judgment to offer an evidentiary basis that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated; mere hope of finding useful evidence is insufficient.

Ramesar v. State · filed 1996-02-01(f)

We also reject claimant’s contention that the Court of Claims erred in granting summary judgment prior to discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]). Claimant failed to offer any evidentiary basis to support a claim that “facts essential to jxistify opposition [to the motion] may exist but [could not] then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]; see, Harris v Alcan Aluminum Corp., 91 AD2d 830, affd 58 NY2d 1036). A mere hope that further discovery will disclose evidence that will prove claimant’s case is insufficient (see, Babcock v Allan, 115 AD2d 297, 298).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance while discovery may reveal evidence relevant to the claim.

Lindstedt v. 813 Associates · filed 1996-02-07(f)

The cross motions of defendants and third-party defendant for dismissal of plaintiffs’ remaining claim based on common-law negligence are held in abeyance pending completion of discovery.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when further discovery may reveal facts that raise a triable issue.

Ponce v. St. John's Cemetery · filed 1995-12-28(f)

However, as almost no pretrial discovery has been conducted herein, the court properly denied summary judgment against the owner defendants pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f).

Section 3212 does not require denial of summary judgment solely because the moving party has not been deposed when the opponent offers no admissible evidence to rebut a prima facie showing.

Doyle v. B3 Deli, Inc. · filed 1996-02-13

In opposition, the plaintiff came forward with no admissible evidence to rebut the appellant’s prima facie showing, and we reject the plaintiff’s argument that summary judgment should be denied because the deposition of the appellant has not occurred (see, CPLR 3212 ED.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when a party has not had an opportunity to depose potential witnesses about a material fact.

Hand v. Stanper Food Corp. · filed 1996-02-20(f)

Nonetheless, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied as premature. The plaintiffs have not yet been afforded the opportunity to depose certain employees of the defendant, whose identities were previously withheld and who are potential witnesses, as to how the sign at issue was broken off (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts needed to establish a defense are solely within the moving party’s knowledge and the opposing party only recently learned of the issue.

Seaman Corp. v. Binghamton Savings Bank · filed 1996-06-13(f)

Although plaintiff contends that defendants had ample opportunity to conduct discovery and that their failure to fully avail themselves of that opportunity precludes reliance upon CPLR 3212 (f) as grounds for avoiding summary judgment, the record demonstrates that it was not until the present motions were brought that defendants became aware of Prodec’s practice of paying plaintiff on account, rather than on an invoice or job basis. ... Because the information necessary to establish this defense is solely within plaintiff’s knowledge (Prodec is no longer in existence), Supreme Court did not err in finding that defendants should have an opportunity to conduct discovery with respect thereto (see, Sanders Constr. Co. v Bankers Trust Co., 123 AD2d 251, 252).

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party seeking further discovery to avoid summary judgment must show how it may reveal material facts exclusively controlled by the other party.

Castrol, Inc. v. Farm Trading Co. of N.Y.C., Inc. · filed 1996-06-24(f)

Furthermore, the defendant has failed to demonstrate how further discovery might reveal the existence of material facts, currently within the exclusive control of the plaintiff, which would warrant the denial of summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Kracker v Spartan Chem. Co., 183 AD2d 810).

CPLR 3212(f) gives the court discretion to deny a request for a continuance in summary judgment proceedings.

Leggett v. Castillo · filed 1996-05-06(f)

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion when it denied the plaintiffs request for a continuance pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) (see, Pannullo v Staro, 139 AD2d 636; see generally, Freier v AMAX, Inc., 217 AD2d 981).

Under CPLR 3212(f), summary judgment may be denied with leave to renew when material facts remain to be discovered and are peculiarly within the moving party’s possession.

Espindola v. Jorawar · filed 1996-06-11(f)

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied with leave to renew since issues of fact exist with respect to defendant Gold’s relationship to the subject premises during the time the infant plaintiff was allegedly exposed to lead paint and since plaintiffs have yet to complete discovery as to material factual issues, knowledge of which is peculiarly within defendant-appellant’s possession ... (CPLR 3212 [f]; Di Miceli v Olcott, 119 AD2d 539).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when relevant information remains with the moving party and discovery is outstanding.

Kelly v. Fleet Bank · filed 1996-07-03(f)

... its failure to comply with discovery demands for its "collateral file” of documents concerning its relationship with Goff Leasing and for documents concerning its involvement in the Goff Chevrolet bankruptcy, Supreme Court did not err in its determination to deny the motion as premature (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Campbell v City of New York, 220 AD2d 476, 477; Casey v Masullo Bros. Bldrs., 218 AD2d 907, 908).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking discovery to oppose summary judgment to show a likelihood that the discovery will yield relevant evidence; mere hope is insufficient.

Steinberg v. Abdul · filed 1996-08-08(f)

We add that the mere hope, expressed by plaintiffs, that evidence sufficient to establish defendants’ assumption of a duty to plaintiffs’ decedent may be obtained during discovery does not fulfill their obligation to demonstrate the likelihood of such disclosure (CPLR 3212 [f]) and, thus, is insufficient to defeat defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Frierson v Concourse Plaza Assocs., 189 AD2d 609, 610).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when affidavits show that facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

International Rescue Committee v. Reliance Insurance · filed 1996-08-15(f)

Therefore, at this early stage of the litigation, the IAS Court properly denied the motion for summary judgment since "it appear[ed] from affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but [could not] then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [fj).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment to allow disclosure when facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Island Transportation Corp. · filed 1996-11-14(f)

Therefore, even if this Court were to accept, for the sake of argument, plaintiff’s contention that defendants’ opposition to its motion is insufficient, it is apparent that, at this juncture, "facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated”, warranting denial of the motion in order to permit defendants to conduct disclosure (CPLR 3212 [f]; see, Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 506).

CPLR 3212(f) does not delay summary judgment for discovery when the opposing party fails to show that the sought document is exclusively within the movant’s knowledge or control and gives no excuse for not obtaining it.

Eagen v. Harlequin Books Inc. · filed 1996-07-12(f)

We reject the contention that defendant’s motion is premature because plaintiff has not had the opportunity to conduct discovery with respect to the agreement between defendant and his employment agency, Carrie Allen. Plaintiff failed to show that the agreement was within the exclusive knowledge or control of defendant (see, CPLR 3212 [f]) and failed to offer an excuse for failing to obtain the document in the seven months following joinder of issue (see, Milea v Ames Dept. Store, 219 AD2d 798).

CPLR 3212 (f) does not postpone a summary judgment decision merely because a party hopes further discovery will uncover evidence to prove its case.

Muhlrad v. Town of Goshen · filed 1996-09-23(f)

The mere hope that through further discovery the plaintiffs will uncover evidence that will prove their case provides no basis, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), for postponing a decision on a motion for summary judgment (see, Zarzona v City of New York, 208 AD2d 920; Kennerly v Campbell Chain Co., 133 AD2d 669, 670).

CPLR 3212(f) does not allow a party to avoid summary judgment based on mere hope that discovery will uncover evidence when the relevant facts are available.

Weltman v. RWP Group, Inc. · filed 1996-10-21(f)

Where, as in this case, the facts are not exclusively within the movant’s knowledge, the opponent cannot avoid summary judgment by relying upon "[t]he 'mere hope’ that evidence sufficient to defeat the motion may be uncovered during the discovery process” (Mazzaferro v Barterama Corp., 218 AD2d 643, 644, quoting Jones v Gameray, 153 AD2d 550, 551; see, Kennerly v Campbell Chain Co., 133 AD2d 669).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of partial summary judgment when discovery is incomplete.

Elkman v. Southgate Owners Corp. · filed 1996-11-07(f)

The IAS Court properly denied partial summary judgment on the first cause of action alleging breach of the implied warranty of habitability (Real Property Law § 235-b) in connection with an alleged noxious odor condition emanating from a retail fish store in an adjacent building neither owned nor controlled by defendant cooperative apartment corporation. Not only was discovery incomplete (CPLR 3212 [f]), but material issues of fact exist, including whether any portion of the apartment was affected and whether the condition was detrimental to life, health or safety within the meaning of the statute.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment to allow affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be completed.

Grossman v. Pharmhouse Corp. · filed 1996-12-30(f)

Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), the court had discretion to deny the motion "to permit affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had”.

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery when witnesses have exclusive knowledge of facts needed to oppose summary judgment.

Fishkill Health Related Center, Inc. v. Van Dewater & Van Dewater · filed 1997-01-13(f)

Because Gifford and Hubbard have exclusive knowledge about whether they discussed the possibility of securing a Yellowstone injunction, fairness entitles the plaintiffs to further discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Terranova v Emil, 20 NY2d 493, 497; Kindzierski v Foster, 217 AD2d 998; Baldasano v Bank of N. Y, 199 AD2d 184; Ellis v Allstate Ins. Co., 151 AD2d 543).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking discovery before a summary judgment ruling to show that facts essential to opposing the motion may exist.

Moukarzel v. Montefiore Medical Center · filed 1997-01-14(f)

Nor did plaintiffs make the threshold showing that facts essential to justify opposition may exist (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery before summary judgment to explain how it might reveal essential facts within the opposing party’s exclusive knowledge.

In re the Estate of Venner · filed 1997-01-16(f)

Service of the notice of motion stayed disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3214 (b) and petitioners failed to specifically set forth how further discovery might reveal the existence of essential and/or material facts, currently within the exclusive knowledge of respondent, which would warrant the denial of summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 NY2d 152, 163-164; Auerbach v Bennett, 47 NY2d 619, 636; Delaney v Good Samaritan Hosp., 204 AD2d 678, 678-679; Kracker v Spartan Chem. Co., 183 AD2d 810, 813).

Section 3212(f) permits a party opposing summary judgment to seek discrete discovery on issues raised by a supporting document if that discovery has not yet occurred.

State v. Metz · filed 1997-02-05(f)

When a document is offered in support of a motion for summary judgment, the opponent of the motion, if need be, may seek discrete discovery on the issues raised by that document if it has not yet taken place (CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when discovery is needed because proof necessary to show a triable issue is within the moving party’s exclusive knowledge.

Speirs v. Not Fade Away Tie Dye Co. · filed 1997-02-18(f)

Even if the defendants had met their initial burden of proof, at this early stage of the proceedings the denial of summary judgment was appropriate pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) since much of the proof necessary to enable the plaintiff to demonstrate triable issues of fact was within the exclusive knowledge of the defendants (see, Jered Contr. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., 22 NY2d 187, 194; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 168 AD2d 121, 137; cf., Meath v Mishrick, 68 NY2d 992).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment pending discovery when facts essential to opposing the motion may be within the movant’s exclusive knowledge.

Barletta v. Lewis · filed 1997-03-03(f)

In addition, there is sufficient reason to believe that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion are within the exclusive knowledge of the plaintiff and may be revealed through pretrial discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Schleich v Gruber, supra; Blue Bird Coach Lines v 107 Delaware Ave., 125 AD2d 971).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and may be revealed through discovery.

MBL Life Assurance Corp. v. Shorenstein Co. · filed 1997-03-18(f)

Where pertinent facts essential to justify opposition to a motion for summary judgment are exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant, and may be revealed through discovery, summary judgment should be denied (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Classic Moments Co. v Akata, 176 AD2d 567). ... Since MBL was clearly possessed of information regarding Flynn’s involvement, or lack thereof, in the project, and since it failed to set forth any of that information in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, we find that the motion should have been granted.

Section 3212(f) does not permit postponing summary judgment for discovery when the opposing party merely speculates that discovery might reveal evidence of negligence.

Agoglia v. Sterling Foster & Co. · filed 1997-03-31(f)

CPLR 3212 (f) does not countenance the postponement of summary disposition where, in opposing the defendants’ motion, the plaintiff merely speculates that "discovery might uncover * * * that [the injuries sued upon] resulted from the defendant’s negligence” (Wood v Otherson, 210 AD2d 473, 474; Zarzona v City of New York, 208 AD2d 920; Kracker v Spartan Chem. Co., 183 AD2d 810, 811; European Am. Bank v Lofrese, 182 AD2d 67, 74; Weinstein v Cohen, 179 AD2d 806, 807; Plotkin v Franklin, 179 AD2d 746).

CPLR 3212 requires a party opposing summary judgment to meet an evidentiary burden; speculation about proximate cause is insufficient.

Tolliver v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1997-04-10

Even taken together with the assailant’s lack of familiarity with the building, plaintiff’s conclusion that his attacker gained entrance to the premises because of the broken front door lock and not as a tenant or invitee of a tenant is speculative. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to meet his evidentiary burden in order to defeat defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Borrero v New York City Hous. Auth., 236 AD2d 262).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the opposing party has not had an adequate opportunity to obtain discovery on relevant matters within the movant’s knowledge.

Firesearch Corp. v. Micro Computer Controls Corp. · filed 1997-06-02(f)

In any event, the plaintiff has established that it has not yet received an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery into several relevant issues, some of which are exclusively within the knowledge of the defendants (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Urcan v Cocarelli, 234 AD2d 537; Halpern Dev. Venture v Board of Trustees, 222 AD2d 652; Baron v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 143 AD2d 792). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the motion for summary judgment.

Section 3212 may require discovery concerning a release before summary judgment is granted when the circumstances warrant it.

Best v. Yutaka · filed 1997-06-10

In these unique factual circumstances, discovery should have been allowed concerning the release (CPLR 3212 ED.

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery to show that relevant evidence likely lies in the opposing party’s exclusive control and how discovery might reveal it.

Paragon Cable Manhattan v. P & S 95th Street Associates · filed 1997-06-12(f)

Contrary to the motion court’s conclusion, defendants did not affirmatively show a "likelihood” that there is relevant evidence in the exclusive knowledge and control of the cable company, or how such might be revealed through further discovery (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and the opponent has lacked a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

C & L Bros. v. 3467 Merrick Road Laundry, Inc. · filed 1997-06-30(f)

The plaintiff has succeeded in establishing that facts essential to opposing the motion of the defendant No-Jo Laundries, Inc. (hereinafter No-Jo), for summary judgment are exclusively within the knowledge of No-Jo. Moreover, notwithstanding No-Jo’s execution of a stipulation expressly providing for discovery in this action, the record unequivocally demonstrates that the plaintiff has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to conduct such discovery. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court should have denied No-Jo’s motion for summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Urcan v Cocarelli, 234 AD2d 537; Halpern Dev. Venture v Board of Trustees, 222 AD2d 652; Baron v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 143 AD2d 792).

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify postponing summary judgment merely because a party hopes an uncompleted deposition will uncover supporting evidence.

Mackey v. Sangani · filed 1997-04-25(f)

We reject the contention of plaintiff that the motion for summary judgment is premature because defendant has not yet been deposed.

Subdivision (f) requires a party seeking to defer summary judgment for lack of discovery to show that its ignorance of critical facts is unavoidable and that it made reasonable efforts to discover them.

Cruz v. Otis Elevator Co. · filed 1997-04-28(f)

A party who claims ignorance of critical facts to defeat a motion for summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [f]) must first demonstrate that the ignorance is unavoidable and that reasonable attempts were made to discover the facts which would give rise to a triable issue (see, Rothbort v S.L.S. Mgt. Corp., 185 AD2d 806; State of New York v Wisser Co., 170 AD2d 918; Kenworthy v Town of Oyster Bay, 116 AD2d 628).

Summary judgment should not be granted before discovery based solely on an affidavit about matters exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge.

Reohr v. Golub Corp. · filed 1997-09-17(f)

Inasmuch as this affidavit—which comprised the sole evidentiary foundation for defendant’s motion—recites matters that are exclusively within defendant’s knowledge, it should not, without more, form the basis for an award of summary judgment before the opposing party has had an opportunity to conduct discovery (see, Grumman Aerospace Corp. v Rice, 199 AD2d 365, 366; Denkensohn v Davenport, 130 AD2d 860, 862).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery in opposition to summary judgment when the party shows that the requested discovery is more than a fishing expedition.

Greenberg v. McLaughlin · filed 1997-09-22(f)

While it is true that CPLR 3212 (f) permits an opposing party to obtain further discovery under certain circumstances, it should not be resorted to where, as here, there has been a failure to demonstrate that the discovery being sought is anything more than a fishing expedition (see, Zarzona v City of New York, 208 AD2d 920; Kenworthy v Town of Oyster Bay, 116 AD2d 628; see also, Auerbach v Bennett, 47 NY2d 619, 636).

CPLR 3212 (f) permits a summary judgment motion to be stayed when relevant facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and discovery remains outstanding.

Berkeley Federal Bank & Trust FSB v. 229 E. 53rd Street Associates · filed 1997-09-25(f)

Appellants’ motion for summary judgment was properly stayed pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) upon an ample showing that facts relevant to the subject pleading are exclusively within appellants’ knowledge and that appellants have repeatedly failed to comply with respondents’ discovery requests (see, Simpson v Term Indus., 126 AD2d 484, 486).

CPLR 3212(f) permits additional discovery before summary judgment when relevant matters are solely within the moving parties’ control.

Cozza v. Aetna Insurance · filed 1997-10-06(f)

Further, additional discovery with respect to matters solely within the control of the appellants is warranted (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Classic Moments Co. v Akata, 176 AD2d 567).

CPLR 3212 (f) applies when facts needed to oppose summary judgment may exist but cannot be stated because they are within the moving party’s exclusive knowledge or control.

Nadeau v. Connell · filed 1997-10-30(f)

Generally, CPLR 3212 (f) finds application where facts essential to justify opposition to a motion for summary judgment might exist but cannot be stated because they are in the exclusive knowledge or control of the moving party (see, Trustco Bank v Higgins, 191 AD2d 788, 789). Plaintiff cannot claim that defendant and White have exclusive knowledge of the events underlying this lawsuit since he was a participant in those events.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment for further discovery when the opposing party shows that discovery might reveal material facts within the movant’s exclusive knowledge and control.

Kalra v. New York Life Insurance · filed 1997-11-10(f)

Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how further discovery might reveal the existence of material facts, currently within the exclusive knowledge and control of the defendants, which would warrant the denial of summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [fl; Delaney v Good Samaritan Hosp., 204 AD2d 678).

CPLR 3212 (f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated without discovery.

Sovik v. Healing Network · filed 1997-11-19(f)

Supreme Court properly denied that motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f). Plaintiffs established that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot be stated without conducting discovery concerning the involvement of defendant Hughes in the drafting and publication of the letter and his status as an officer or director of THN at the relevant times.

Section 3212(f) requires evidentiary proof that facts essential to oppose summary judgment may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Luckey Platt Centre Associates · filed 1997-12-04(f)

As we find that defendant’s allegations of conspiracy consist of nothing more than conjecture and surmise ... and because defendant has failed to offer any evidentiary proof to support its claim that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion for summary judgment may exist, but could not then be stated (see, CPLR 3212 [f|; Ramesar v State of New York, 224 AD2d 757, 759, lv denied 88 NY2d 811), we affirm.

A party seeking to resist summary judgment because discovery is missing must show that the missing material contains facts essential to justify opposition.

Cecos International, Inc. v. Advanced Polymer Sciences, Inc. · filed 1997-12-31(f)

Plaintiff failed to show that the failure to produce those reports deprived it of “facts essential to justify opposition” to the motion (CPLR 3212 [f]; see, Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 NY2d 152, 164, rearg denied 52 NY2d 829).

Section 3212(f) permits discovery before summary judgment when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but are within the moving parties’ exclusive knowledge.

Jemmott v. Aldrich · filed 1998-03-09(f)

The cross motions for summary judgment were incorrectly granted. It is apparent from the record that “facts essential to justify opposition” to the motions may exist but cannot be stated at this time as they are within the exclusive knowledge of AEW, Inc., and the Mission (see, CPLR 3212 [f]). Under such circumstances, the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery concerning the ownership and control of the subject premises (cf, Smith v City of New York, 133 AD2d 818).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts essential to opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated because a pertinent discovery request remains unanswered.

Colicchio v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey · filed 1998-01-27(f)

Since it appeared that such facts might exist but could not be stated because defendant failed to respond to a reasonable and pertinent discovery request, summary judgment should have been denied with leave to renew after either the requested documents were turned over or defendant stated under oath that no such documents existed.

Section 3212(f) allows a party to oppose summary judgment as premature when essential facts are in the other party’s exclusive possession and may be obtained through discovery.

Maron v. Center · filed 1998-02-04(f)

The contention that the motion was premature because plaintiff had not completed discovery is without merit. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that facts essential to oppose the motion for summary judgment were in the exclusive knowledge and possession of defendant and could be obtained by pending discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 NY2d 152, 163-164, rearg denied 52 NY2d 829; Lavin & Kleiman v Heinike Assocs., 221 AD2d 919).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when discovery remains incomplete and factual issues preclude judgment.

In re Scuderi · filed 1998-02-02(f)

The motion for summary judgment dismissing the objections to the accounting was properly denied in part, since the objections raise factual issues precluding the relief sought. Additionally, as a result of the frivolous and dilatory motion practice, discovery has not yet been completed (see, Campbell v City of New York, 220 AD2d 476; CPLR 3212 [f]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), speculation that further discovery will reveal factual issues is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Palmatier v. Eastman Kodak Co. · filed 1998-02-04(f)

The speculation of plaintiffs and Castle that further discovery would yield factual issues precluding summary judgment is insufficient to defeat the motion (see, ... CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212 permits denial of summary judgment without prejudice to renewal when material discovery remains outstanding.

Gold v. Zito & Zito Maintenance Co. · filed 1998-02-23

Furthermore, because there was additional discovery to be completed, the court did not err in denying the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment without prejudice to renewal upon the completion of the additional deposition (see, CPLR 3212).

CPLR 3212 permits summary judgment before discovery is complete when the opposing party offers only hope and speculation about what further discovery might reveal.

Smith v. Hanauer · filed 1998-04-06

Furthermore, since there was only hope and speculation as to what additional discovery would uncover, the Supreme Court properly granted the motion even though discovery was incomplete (see, Mazzaferro v Barterama Corp., 218 AD2d 643).

Section 3212(f) does not require denial of summary judgment when the circumstances do not warrant additional discovery.

Gonzalez v. New 40 Rector Street Co. · filed 1998-05-05(f)

In the present circumstances, plaintiffs purported need for additional discovery did not warrant denial of the motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f).

Section 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment as premature when the opposing party offers only hope of uncovering evidence to support its case.

Rubin v. Universal Ford, Inc. · filed 1998-05-18(f)

The Supreme Court denied the motion as premature (see, CPLR 3212 [f]). We reverse. ... Universal’s contention is without merit, as it is based upon a “[m]ere hope that somehow [it] will uncover evidence that will prove [its] case” (Kennerly v Campbell Chain Co., 133 AD2d 669, 670; see, Aminov v East 50th St. Rest. Corp., 232 AD2d 592, 593; Abbenante v Tyree Co., 228 AD2d 529, 530).

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when supporting facts cannot yet be stated, but the opposing party must show that the discovery would produce relevant evidence.

Frith v. Affordable Homes of America, Inc. · filed 1998-08-31(f)

Although CPLR 3212 (f) permits a party opposing summary judgment to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the position of the opposing party exist but cannot be stated (see, Urcan v Cocarelli, 234 AD2d 537), it should not be resorted to where, as here, there has been a failure to demonstrate that the discovery sought would produce relevant evidence to support the plaintiffs’ allegations (see, Greenberg v McLaughlin, 242 AD2d 603; Zarzona v City of New York, 208 AD2d 920; Plotkin v Franklin, 179 AD2d 746; Kenworthy v Town of Oyster Bay, 116 AD2d 628; see also, Auerbach v Bennett, 47 NY2d 619, 636).

Section 3212(f) does not justify delaying summary judgment for a deposition when the opposing party has already interviewed the witness and has the witness’s affidavit.

Wittkopp v. ADF Construction Corp. · filed 1998-10-02(f)

We also reject the contention of defendant that plaintiffs’ motion was properly denied because defendant did not have the opportunity to depose plaintiff’s supervisor. Defendant interviewed the supervisor immediately after the incident, and the supervisor’s affidavit was submitted by third-party defendant in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion. Thus, defendant has failed to show that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but [could not] then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]) and that defendant requires the discovery of facts that are within the exclusive knowledge of another party (cf., Capitaland United Soccer Club v Capital Dist. Sports & Entertainment, 238 AD2d 777, 780).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when the opposing party has not yet had an opportunity to complete discovery.

O'Rourke v. Baisi · filed 1998-05-28(f)

The motion was properly denied as premature since plaintiff has not yet been afforded the opportunity to complete discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [fl).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny a summary judgment motion as premature when the circumstances warrant it.

Cao v. City of New York · filed 1998-09-28(f)

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly denied the motion for summary judgment as premature (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Hughes Training, Inc. v. Pegasus Real-Time, Inc. · filed 1998-11-12(f)

Defendants’ submissions do not (as they contend) establish that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot [now] be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]; cf., Kennerly v Campbell Chain Co., 133 AD2d 669, 670); nor have they proffered a convincing excuse for not having undertaken the desired discovery sooner (see, Forshay v Star Dairy, 187 AD2d 838, 839, lv dismissed 81 NY2d 818).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice when facts needed to oppose the motion are within the moving party’s exclusive knowledge and discovery is incomplete.

Hentschel v. Robert Campbell Carpet Services · filed 1998-12-21(f)

Because these facts are within the exclusive knowledge of the defendants, we conclude that their motion for summary judgment should have been denied, without prejudice to renewal upon completion of discovery, including the completion of the plaintiffs deposition of Gruber (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking additional discovery before a summary judgment motion is decided to establish that the discovery is needed.

Renaissance 21 Inc. v. New York Property Insurance Underwriting Ass'n · filed 1999-01-19(f)

Inasmuch as the defendant failed to raise a genuine triable issue of fact in opposition to the motion (see generally, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557), and similarly failed to establish that additional discovery was required before the motion could be decided (see, CPLR 3212 [f]), the Supreme Court properly awarded partial summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of the plaintiff.

Incomplete discovery does not require denial of summary judgment when the evidence sought could not defeat the motion.

Dunn v. 726 Main & Pine, Inc. · filed 1998-11-13(f)

Contrary to plaintiffs contention, the fact that discovery was not complete does not warrant denial of the motions pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) (see, Landes v Sullivan, 235 AD2d 657, 658; Mazzaferro v Barterama Corp., 218 AD2d 643, 644). The additional discovery sought by plaintiff, aimed at revealing defendants’ actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the sidewalk, would not produce evidence sufficient to defeat the motions.

Section 3212(b) requires a party opposing a supported summary judgment motion to present evidence showing a genuine issue of fact; hearsay and conclusory allegations alone are insufficient.

Snyder v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc. · filed 1999-01-28(b)

When challenged on a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff may not rely solely on hearsay or conclusory allegations that the slanderous statement was made ... Here, Snyder’s opposition consists solely of such allegations.

Under CPLR 3212(b), once the moving party shows entitlement to judgment, the opposing party must offer admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Great Neck Plaza, L.P. v. Le Peep International, Inc. · filed 1999-04-12(b)

The appellants’ conclusory allegations in opposition to the motion, unsubstantiated by any evidentiary facts, were insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, supra).

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment merely because discovery is incomplete; the opposing party must show that further discovery may yield supporting evidence or that relevant evidence is exclusively within the movant’s knowledge or control.

Younger v. Spartan Chemical Co. · filed 1999-02-25(f)

As a final matter, we are unpersuaded that the incomplete status of discovery justified denial of the motion (see, CPLR 3212 [f]). Notably, the summary judgment motion was heard more than 18 months following the commencement of the action (see, Douglas Manor Assn. v Alimaras, 215 AD2d 522) and in opposing the motion plaintiffs offered nothing to show that further discovery would lead to competent evidence in support of their causes of action (see, Mazzaferro v Barterama Corp., 218 AD2d 643) or that any such evidence was in defendant’s exclusive knowledge or control (see, Eagen v Harlequin Books, 229 AD2d 935).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the opposing party has not had an opportunity to complete discovery.

Baron v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 1999-03-09(f)

Upon the present circumstances, the motion court erred in granting summary judgment where plaintiff has not yet been afforded the opportunity to complete discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not permit postponing summary judgment based only on speculation that discovery might reveal evidence of negligence.

Marino v. City of New York · filed 1999-03-01(f)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, CPLR 3212 (f) does not ... countenance the postponement of summary disposition where, as here, in opposing the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff merely speculates that discovery might uncover that the injuries sued upon resulted from the defendants’ negligence (see, Agoglia v Sterling Foster & Co., 237 AD2d 549).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment without prejudice to renewal after discovery when the record lacks evidence needed to decide the motion.

McNally v. Fitzgerald · filed 1999-04-05(f)

Thus, the appellants’ motion should be denied without prejudice to renewal upon the completion of discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Hentschel v Campbell Carpet Servs., supra).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when essential facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

First Bank of the Americas v. Motor Car Funding, Inc. · filed 1999-05-11(f)

We affirm the denial of summary judgment to Pirrera because discovery is not complete. ... Under CPLR 3212 ... (f), the court may deny a motion for summary judgment if it appears that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated.”

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment to allow a party to complete discovery.

Nager v. Teachers' Retirement System of City of New York · filed 1999-05-25(f)

In this action seeking legal and equitable relief for defendants’ allegedly improper investment policies with respect to the Variable B Annuity Program (L 1982, ch 735), the motion court properly denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment to permit plaintiffs to complete discovery (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts essential to oppose the motion are controlled by the movant and may be revealed through discovery.

Shellberry v. Albright · filed 1999-06-18(f)

Supreme Court properly denied the motion of defendant Edwin J. Shoemaker for summary judgment with leave to renew upon completion of all discovery. Where pertinent facts essential to justify opposition to a motion for summary judgment are exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant and may be revealed through pretrial discovery, summary judgment should be denied (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Blue Bird Coach Lines v 107 Del. Ave., 125 AD2d 971; Mack v Gregory Mem. Hosp., 90 AD2d 969).

CPLR 3212(f) does not permit postponing summary judgment based solely on a party’s hope of uncovering supporting evidence.

Duche v. Star Recycling · filed 1999-05-17(f)

The plaintiffs failed to submit any evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact that the defendants were not immune from suit under the Workers’ Compensation Law, and the plaintiffs’ mere hope that somehow they will uncover evidence that will prove their case provides no basis pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) for postponing summary disposition (see, Agoglia v Sterling Foster & Co., 237 AD2d 549; Plotkin v Franklin, 179 AD2d 746).

Mere speculation that discovery might uncover evidence supporting a claim does not require denial of summary judgment as premature under CPLR 3212(f).

Cox v. Maloney · filed 1999-06-17(f)

Finally, we note that plaintiffs’ mere speculation that discovery might possibly uncover some evidence to support their claim of liability did not require Supreme Court’s denial of the motion as premature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) (see, Eagen v Harlequin Books, 229 AD2d 935; Ramesar v State of New York, 224 AD2d 757, 759, lv denied 88 NY2d 811; Mazzaferro v Barterama Corp., 218 AD2d 643).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment with leave to renew after discovery when facts essential to opposing the motion are within the movant’s knowledge and the opponent has not had a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

English v. Ski Windham Operating Corp. · filed 1999-07-06(f)

The plaintiff successfully established that facts essential to opposing the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the validity of certain release agreements and the plaintiffs negligent direction, supervision, and instruction cause of action, are exclusively within the knowledge of the defendant. Moreover, the record unequivocally demonstrates that the plaintiff has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with leave to renew upon the completion of discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; C & L Bros. v 3467 Merrick Rd. Laundry, 240 AD2d 690).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the opposing party needs more discovery, but a party that delayed discovery must give a convincing excuse for the delay.

Sloane v. Repsher · filed 1999-07-29(f)

However, where, as here, there has been a delay in discovery, the opposing party seeking discovery must proffer “a convincing excuse for not having undertaken the desired discovery sooner” (Hughes Training v Pegasus Real-Time, 255 AD2d 729, 730).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment to allow further discovery when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Josephson v. Crane Club, Inc. · filed 1999-08-26(f)

In addition the record suggests that, upon the motion, “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated”, warranting its denial in order to permit further discovery to be conducted (CPLR 3212 [fl; see, Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 506).

CPLR 3212(f) makes summary judgment premature when relevant information remains in the moving party’s exclusive possession and discovery is outstanding.

Esposito v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 1999-08-26(f)

As this information is in defendants’ exclusive possession and control (CPLR 3212 [f]; see, Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 506), summary judgment is not appropriate at this juncture.

Section 3212(f) permits delaying summary judgment for discovery when essential opposing facts may exist but cannot yet be stated; speculation alone is insufficient.

Missouri v. Boyce · filed 1999-09-09(f)

While, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), a motion for summary judgment may be denied to permit disclosure to be had where “it appear [s] from affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated,” here, the opposing papers by Ernestine Boyce and plaintiffs do not give any reason to believe that discovery would produce any evidence supporting liability on the part of the NYCHA.

CPLR 3212(b) requires an opponent of summary judgment to present admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact after the movant makes a prima facie showing.

In re the Estate of Zimmerman · filed 1999-09-27(b)

In opposition to the proponent’s prima facie showing, the appellant failed to present any admissible evidence which would raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether such circumstances existed (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when discovery is needed to determine facts material to the motion.

Kozdranski v. O'Brien-Kreitzberg & Associates, Inc. · filed 1999-10-01(f)

In opposition, plaintiff established that the motion is premature (see, CPLR 3212 [fl). Plaintiff’s attorney asserted that no discovery had been conducted, and he submitted portions of the City’s contracts with OKA and the general contractor, thereby establishing that discovery is required to determine whether OKA had the authority to supervise or control plaintiff’s work, the construction methods or safety measures at the worksite (see, Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 506; Olney v Ciminelli-Cowper Co., 248 AD2d 1019).

A party opposing summary judgment because discovery is unfinished must show that essential facts are exclusively known to another party or explain why discovery could not have been completed.

Santangelo v. Fluor Constructors International, Inc. · filed 1999-11-12(f)

We reject plaintiffs’ contention that APi’s cross motion was premature because plaintiffs had not completed discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [fl). Plaintiffs failed to establish that facts essential to justify opposition to the cross motion were within the exclusive knowledge of APi or another party (see, Wittkopp v ADF Constr. Corp., 254 AD2d 775) or that they could not have completed discovery during the two years since commencement of the action (see, Adams v Glass Fab, 212 AD2d 972, 974).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when substantial discovery remains outstanding.

Lantigua v. Mallick · filed 1999-07-12(f)

Moreover, an award of summary judgment in favor of the appellants on the ground that liability cannot be imposed upon them because the building is owned by a corporation would be premature, since substantial discovery remains outstanding (see, CPLR 3212 [f|; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494; Brown v County of Nassau, 226 AD2d 492; Yu v Forero, 184 AD2d 506).

CPLR 3212 (f) does not delay summary judgment for incomplete discovery when the existing record amply establishes the dispositive fact.

Inner City Drywall Corp. v. Reliance Insurance · filed 1999-07-29(f)

The completion of discovery is immaterial as the record contains ample documentation that the subject projects were completed over a year before suit was commenced.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment with leave to renew after discovery.

Bi-County Concrete Corp. v. Newman Development Group, L. L. C. · filed 1999-09-20(f)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the motion with leave to renew upon the completion of discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; see also, Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851; Coppola Gen. Contr. Corp. v Noble House Constr., 224 AD2d 856; Matter of Upstate Bldrs. Supply Corp. [Maple Knoll Apts.], 37 AD2d 901).

Section 3212(f) allows a court to give a party opposing summary judgment an opportunity to identify a source of evidence the party has not yet been able to examine.

Goeddertz v. Petit · filed 1999-10-01(f)

In any event, plaintiff established in opposition to the motion that defendants sold the truck before she had an opportunity to examine it, and the court properly gave plaintiff an opportunity to identify the truck’s present owner (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment until disclosure is complete when relevant facts are within another party’s knowledge.

Raffaele v. United States Life Insurance · filed 1999-11-18(f)

Whether the decedent was a drug user at the time he submitted the application is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of plaintiff, who was the decedent’s wife, and the decedent’s other family members, and a summary disposition in plaintiff’s favor would be premature at least until disclosure from her, and any other family members claiming knowledge of the decedent’s abstinence from drugs, is complete (CPLR 3212 [fl).

CPLR 3212(f) does not require delaying summary judgment for outstanding discovery when the party seeking delay moved for summary judgment before discovery was complete and had ample time to pursue it.

Dellwood Country Club, Inc. v. Budget Rent A Car Corp. · filed 1999-12-06(f)

The Supreme Court properly rejected the plaintiff’s claim that Budget’s cross motion should be denied pending completion of discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]). By moving for summary judgment before completion of discovery, the plaintiff charted its own procedural course in this case and may not now be heard to complain (see, John Eric Jacoby, M.D., P. C. v Loper Assocs., 249 AD2d 277, 278).

Section 3212(f) does not permit postponing a summary judgment decision based solely on hope that discovery will uncover supporting evidence.

Jones v. Surrey Cooperative Apartments, Inc. · filed 1999-12-09(f)

“Mere hope that somehow the plaintiffs will uncover evidence that will prove their case, provides no basis, pursuant to CPLR 3212(f), for postponing a decision on a summary judgment motion.”

Section 3212(f) permits a court to postpone a summary judgment decision when the opposing affidavit shows that facts needed to oppose the motion may exist.

Scofield v. Trustees of Union College · filed 1999-12-09(f)

CPLR 3212 (f) provides that if the affidavit submitted in opposition to a motion demonstrates that opposing facts may exist, the court may postpone its decision. ... Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in not postponing the decision.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when relevant depositions remain outstanding.

Palmer v. Trachtenberg · filed 2000-01-18(f)

The motion for summary judgment was also properly denied given outstanding depositions of defendants (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when essential facts are unavailable to the opposing party and pertinent discovery remains outstanding.

Finkelstein v. Cornell University Medical College · filed 2000-02-01(f)

At this juncture, the record reflects that essential facts exist but are unavailable to plaintiff, warranting denial of the summary judgment motion (CPLR 3212 [f]; see, Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 506), especially where demands for pertinent documents (see, Simpson v Term Indus., 126 AD2d 484, 486) and examination before trial are outstanding (Terranova v Emil, 20 NY2d 493, 497).

CPLR 3212(f) does not permit postponing a summary judgment motion based only on a belief that further discovery might help.

Petitpain v. Curti · filed 2000-02-07(f)

The plaintiffs belief that additional discovery might reveal something helpful to his case does not provide a basis pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) for postponing a determination of a motion for summary judgment (see, Cooper v Milton Paper Co., 258 AD2d 614; Agoglia v Sterling Foster & Co., 237 AD2d 549; Plotkin v Franklin, 179 AD2d 746).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated without discovery.

Perotto Development Corp. v. Sear-Brown Group · filed 2000-02-16(f)

However, because the facts essential to opposing defendant’s motion may exist but cannot be stated without conducting discovery of employees of defendants and others, the court should have denied the motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) (see, Sovik v Healing Network, 244 AD2d 985, 986).

A party seeking discovery before summary judgment must show that facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated; a mere hope of finding evidence is insufficient.

In re the Estate of Dietrich · filed 2000-04-27(f)

Respondents offer no excuse for their failure to conduct discovery during the time period for doing so established by Surrogate’s Court and they have failed to demonstrate that, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), facts essential to oppose petitioner’s motion may exist but cannot now be stated (see, Hughes Training v Pegasus Real-Time, 255 AD2d 729, 730). Respondents’ mere hope that further discovery might disclose evidence that would prove their claims is insufficient (see, Ramesar v State of New York, 224 AD2d 757, 759, lv denied 88 NY2d 811).

To oppose summary judgment on whether an injury is serious under Insurance Law § 5102 (d), the plaintiff’s expert must provide quantitative objective findings and an opinion on the injury’s significance.

Grossman v. Wright · filed 2000-05-08

Therefore, in order to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether an injury is serious within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), the plaintiff’s expert must submit quantitative objective findings in addition to an opinion as to the significance of the injury.

Section 3212(f) makes summary judgment inappropriate when the opposing party establishes that discovery is incomplete.

Hammond v. Alekna Construction, Inc. · filed 2000-02-16(f)

Additionally, plaintiffs established that summary judgment is inappropriate because discovery is incomplete with respect to those defendants (see, CPLR 3212 [f|; Hammond v Alekna Constr., supra).

Under CPLR 3212 (f), pending depositions do not require denial of summary judgment when further discovery would be futile.

Noonan v. New York Blood Center, Inc. · filed 2000-02-29(f)

Plaintiff suggests that summary judgment was appropriately denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) inasmuch as the motion was made after plaintiff noticed defendants’ depositions, but prior to any such depositions being held. While it is often appropriate to deny summary judgment with leave to renew, where the movant has failed to comply with discovery demands ... here it is apparent that such a procedure would constitute an exercise in futility.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment for further discovery when the opposing party shows that discovery might reveal material facts.

Herskowitz v. Greystone Jewish Center · filed 2000-03-20(f)

Finally, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate how further discovery might reveal the existence of material facts which would warrant the denial of summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [fl; Delaney v Good Samaritan Hosp., 204 AD2d 678).

CPLR 3212(f) does not permit postponing a summary judgment decision based only on hope that further evidence will be uncovered.

Sellars v. Redondo · filed 2000-03-20(f)

However, mere hope that evidence will be uncovered that will prove the plaintiffs’ case provides no basis pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) for postponing a decision on a cross motion for summary judgment ... and is insufficient to defeat the cross motion.

Section 3212(f) permits additional discovery before summary judgment when affidavits show that facts essential to oppose the motion may exist.

Murray v. SYSCO Corp. · filed 2000-06-29(f)

Finally, plaintiffs claim that he should be allowed additional discovery pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) is without merit. Other than the conclusory statements of plaintiffs counsel, there is nothing set forth in the affidavits submitted in opposition to defendant’s motion that persuade this Court that facts essential to justify opposition to defendant’s motion may exist.

Section 3212(f) permits additional discovery and postponement of summary judgment when the opposing party shows that facts essential to its opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Pank v. Village of Canajoharie · filed 2000-08-03(f)

The evidence submitted by plaintiffs in the form of expert affidavits establishes “that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot [now] be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]). ... Accordingly, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiffs’ request for additional discovery and holding defendants’ motions for summary judgment in abeyance pending the completion of that discovery.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice to renewal when the opposing party needs time to obtain evidence for opposition.

Hill v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2000-05-22(f)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment without prejudice to renewal at a time when the plaintiff is able to provide a medical affidavit in opposition to such a motion. The plaintiffs incarceration at the time of the instant motion prevented him from being examined in order to provide a medical affidavit in opposition, and it appeared that the plaintiff was due to be released in a few months. As a result, the Supreme Court properly concluded the plaintiff could be examined upon his release, and, upon renewal of the motion, could submit the relevant material in opposition (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Urcan v Cocarelli, 234 AD2d 537).

Section 3212(f) does not warrant deferring summary judgment for discovery based on unsubstantiated or conclusory assertions.

Middle Village Associates v. Pergament Home Centers, Inc. · filed 2000-05-24(f)

Accordingly, Pergament suggests that summary judgment be deferred until discovery pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) can be had. Summary judgment should not be deferred where unsubstantiated or conclusory assertions, such as Pergament’s conjecture here, are made as a basis to defeat summary judgment.

Under CPLR 3212(f), summary judgment may be premature when the opposing party has not had an opportunity to conduct discovery.

Heath v. County of Orange · filed 2000-06-12(f)

Moreover, since the plaintiff moved for summary judgment before the defendant had an opportunity to conduct any discovery, under the circumstances of this case, summary judgment would be premature at this point (see, CPLR 3212 [f|; Hoxha v City of New York, 265 AD2d 379).

Section 3212 permits summary judgment before discovery when the defenses and counterclaims lack evidentiary support.

American Home Assurance Co. v. Gemma Construction Co. · filed 2000-09-14

We find no merit to any of the defendants’ affirmative defenses or counterclaims, and the fact that defendants have not yet been afforded discovery does not preclude their summary dismissal (see, Chemical Bank v PIC Motors Corp., 58 NY2d 1023, 1026).

Section 3212(f) does not require postponing summary judgment for discovery when the facts needed to oppose the motion are within the opposing party’s knowledge.

Aldridge v. Rumsey · filed 2000-09-29(f)

We reject the contention of defendant that the motion was premature because he had not conducted discovery of plaintiff and eight nonparty witnesses. Plaintiffs motion sought summary relief only with respect to defendant’s conduct, and the facts essential to oppose that motion were completely within defendant’s knowledge (see, CPLR 3212 [f¡).

CPLR 3212(b) requires evidentiary support to defeat summary judgment; speculation alone does not establish a triable issue of fact.

Abitol v. Schiff · filed 2000-10-16(b)

Mere speculation that the defendant may have failed to take some unspecified measure to avoid the accident, or in some other way contributed to the occurrence of the accident, without evidentiary support in the record, is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Mehring v Cahill, 271 AD2d 415; Salazar v Ospina, 253 AD2d 550, 551).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny or continue a summary judgment motion to allow disclosure when essential facts needed to oppose it may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Frouws v. Campbell Foundry Co. · filed 2000-09-25(f)

Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), the trial court has the discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment or order a continuance to allow disclosure if “facts essential to justify opposition may exist, but cannot then be stated”.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when an outstanding examination may yield evidence pertinent to the claim.

Rosa v. Colonial Transit, Inc. · filed 2000-10-30(f)

Furthermore, an award of summary judgment would be inappropriate in this case since Wilkerson has not appeared for court-ordered examinations before trial, thereby depriving the plaintiffs and codefendants of an opportunity to obtain evidence pertinent to the cause of the accident (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Hoxha v City of New York, 265 AD2d 379; Lantigua v Mallick, 263 AD2d 467; Campbell v City of New York, 220 AD2d 476; Soto v City of Long Beach, 197 AD2d 615).

Incomplete discovery does not make summary judgment premature without a showing that material facts remain within the opposing party’s exclusive control.

Drug Guild Distributors v. 3-9 Drugs Inc. · filed 2000-11-06(f)

There is no merit to the defendant’s contention that summary judgment was premature because discovery was not complete. The moving papers did not indicate that there were any facts within the exclusive control of the plaintiff that remained to be discovered (see, CPLR 3212 [f|).

CPLR 3212(f) does not permit postponing a summary judgment decision based solely on the opposing party’s hope of uncovering evidence to prove its case.

Town of Hempstead v. Inc. Village of Atlantic Beach · filed 2000-12-11(f)

The Villages do not specify what particular evidence they seek, and it is well settled that the mere hope by the party opposing summary judgment that it will uncover evidence that will prove its case is insufficient under CPLR 3212 (f) to postpone a decision on a summary judgment motion (see, Chemical Bank v PIC Motors Corp., 58 NY2d 1023, 1026; Carrington v City of New York, 201 AD2d 525, 526; American Prescription Plan v American Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO Health Plan, 170 AD2d 471).

Section 3212(f) does not warrant delaying summary judgment for discovery when the opposing party had ample time to obtain it and offers no evidence that it would reveal facts essential to its opposition.

Chase Automotive Finance Corp. v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2001-02-01(f)

Finally, defendant’s argument that it was entitled to further discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]) must be rejected. Defendant had more than a year from the time this action was commenced to the time plaintiff moved for summary judgment to take the depositions of Inman and the Pulcinis but did not do so (see, McCarthy v Pall Corp., 214 AD2d 705; O'Melia v Antoncic, 176 AD2d 792). Additionally, defendant has offered no evidence to persuade us that further discovery would disclose facts essential to its opposition of plaintiffs motion (see, Murray v SYSCO Corp., 273 AD2d 760).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to consider an opponent’s need for discovery when deciding summary judgment.

Faustini v. Palladino · filed 2001-02-06(f)

It also is apparent from the affidavits that discovery is needed (CPLR 3212 [fl).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when the opposing party has not had an opportunity to take relevant discovery.

Sazer v. Marino · filed 2001-02-13(f)

Moreover, since the appellant moved for summary judgment before the respondents had an opportunity to depose her, summary judgment dismissing the complaint would be premature at this point (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Hoxha v City of New York, 265 AD2d 379; Sazer v Marino, 266 AD2d 448).

Section 3212(f) does not allow a court to postpone summary judgment based solely on the hope that further disclosure might uncover helpful evidence.

Maysek & Moran, Inc. v. S.G. Warburg & Co. · filed 2001-06-19(f)

The mere hope that further disclosure might uncover evidence likely to help its case did not provide the IAS court a basis to postpone decision of defendants’ summary judgment motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) (see, Jones v Surrey Coop. Apts., 263 AD2d 33, 37).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking more time to oppose summary judgment to show by affidavit that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated; speculation is insufficient.

Firth v. State · filed 2001-10-11(f)

Although a door once closed may now have been reopened, it was still incumbent upon claimant to set forth evidence in admissible form sufficient to oppose the motion, or to establish by affidavit “that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]). ... We find this response to be palpably inadequate to oppose summary judgment.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment, with leave to renew after discovery, when facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Webb v. Larmond · filed 2001-10-22(f)

In opposition to the respondents making out a prima facie case for their entitlement to summary judgment, the plaintiff demonstrated that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion may exist but could not then be stated (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Caracci v McChesney, 196 AD2d 522). Thus, that branch of the motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the respondents should be denied, with leave to renew upon the completion of discovery.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a party to oppose summary judgment as premature when discovery is needed to obtain facts in the movant’s sole possession.

Ingalsbe v. Chicago Insurance · filed 2001-10-25(f)

Second, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that discovery is necessary to obtain facts in the sole possession of B-R (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

IMC Mortgage Co. v. Griggs · filed 2001-12-10(f)

CPLR 3212 (f) permits a court to deny a motion for summary judgment where "facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated.”

Speculative allegations unsupported by competent evidence are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

Lorber v. Prospect Park Nursing Home, Inc. · filed 2001-12-10(b)

In opposition to the motion, the plaintiff’s assertions concerning the defendant’s negligence were, purely speculative, and unsupported by any competent evidence.

CPLR 3212(b) permits summary judgment when the opposing party offers no admissible proof supporting its allegations or raising a question of fact.

Krouner v. Travis · filed 2002-01-31(b)

Assuming arguendo, plaintiffs breach of contract and negligence causes of action are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations (see, CPLR 213, 214), the fact remains that plaintiff presented no admissible proof that would support or raise a question of fact as to the conclusory and speculative allegations of defective installation contained in the complaint (see, CPLR 3212 [b]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny or continue a summary judgment motion for discovery when the opposing party shows that discovery might reveal material facts affecting the outcome.

North American Specialty Insurance v. Schuler · filed 2002-02-01(f)

Finally, the court properly refused to deny or continue the motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) to permit discovery. Defendant failed to “demonstrate how * * * discovery might reveal the existence of material facts” that would affect the outcome of the motion (Welsh v County of Albany, 235 AD2d 820, 822).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the opposing parties have not had an adequate opportunity to discover relevant facts, particularly facts within the movant’s exclusive knowledge.

Berchini v. Silverite Construction Co. · filed 2001-12-24(f)

Furthermore, the other parties established that they have not had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery into several relevant issues, some of which are exclusively within the knowledge of the appellant (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Firesearch Corp. v Micro Computer Controls Corp., 240 AD2d 365; Urcan v Cocarelli, 234 AD2d 537; Halpern Dev. Venture v Board of Trustees, 222 AD2d 652).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery before summary judgment to show that discovery could yield facts supporting its opposition.

Szczotka v. Adler · filed 2002-02-11(f)

Furthermore, the defendant failed to establish that additional discovery would yield any facts indicating the plaintiff was at fault and justify denying her motion (see, CPLR 3212 [fl).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when an outstanding report is essential to opposing the motion.

Navedo v. 250 Willis Avenue Supermarket · filed 2002-01-08(f)

The IAS court should have denied ... defendant’s motion as premature since plaintiff had established that production of such report was essential to justify opposition to the motion (CPLR 3212 [f]; see, Petrell v Victory Mkts., 283 AD2d 955; Esposito v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 264 AD2d 370).