N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3212

Section 3212(b) permits a court to consider a summary judgment motion when omitted pleadings are submitted in reply and no prejudice is shown.

Budway v. McKee · filed 2010-01-29(b)

The plaintiff is correct that the pleadings should have been but were not attached to the moving papers. However, they were submitted in reply. (See CPLR 3212 [b].) There is no claim or showing of prejudice and in the interests of judicial economy, the court elects to entertain the motion.

CPLR 3212(b) requires a summary judgment motion to be supported by copies of the pleadings, including the complaint.

Williams v. Nelson · filed 2010-03-11(b)

CPLR 3212 (b) requires that a motion for summary judgment be supported by copies of the pleadings. ... Summary judgment was properly denied inasmuch as the complaint is not part of the record on the instant motion and cross motion.

A summary judgment motion must include a copy of the pleadings; omitting them warrants denial of the motion.

Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Board of Assessors · filed 2010-05-04(b)

CPLR 3212 (b) provides that “[a] motion for summary judgment shall be supported by affidavit, by a copy of the pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions.” Here, the petitioner failed to submit a copy of the petitions in support of its motion for summary judgment.

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment motion to include a complete set of pleadings; a motion missing pleadings may be denied without prejudice to renewal.

Lake v. Hertz Corp. · filed 2010-06-23(b)

Although plaintiff did not raise this deficiency in opposition to the motion or cross motion, the requirement of a complete set of pleadings is mandatory and exists for the benefit of the court. Accordingly, the motion and cross motion may be denied on that basis alone (Thompson v Foreign Cars Ctr., Inc., 40 AD3d 965 [2d Dept 2007]). The denial, however, is without prejudice to renew (Greene v Wood, 6 AD3d 976 [3d Dept 2004]).

CPLR 3212 (b) requires a summary judgment movant to attach the pleadings, but the omission may be excused when the opposing party supplies them.

Crossett v. Wing Farm, Inc. · filed 2010-12-09(b)

Initially, notwithstanding defendants’ failure to annex the pleadings to their motion as required by CPLR 3212 (b), which ordinarily necessitates denial of the motion without prejudice (see Bonded Concrete v Town of Saugerties, 3 AD3d 729, 730 [2004], lv dismissed 2 NY3d 793 [2004]), the failure to do so will be excused in this case given plaintiff’s submission of the pleadings in opposition.

A summary judgment motion must include a copy of the pleadings.

LaFiosca v. LaFiosca · filed 2011-03-03(b)

Plaintiff’s application seeking summary judgment to dismiss defendant’s counterclaim to set aside the postnuptial agreement dated April 14, 1994 because it is time-barred by the statute of limitations is denied. ... Finally, plaintiff fails to submit a copy of the pleadings regarding her application for summary judgment. CPLR 3212 (b) states in relevant part, “A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by affidavit, [and] by a copy of the pleadings . . ..”

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to submit the pleadings; a motion that omits them must be denied, without prejudice to renewal on proper papers.

Fiber Consultants, Inc. v. Fiber Optek Interconnect Corp. · filed 2011-05-24(b)

Denial of summary judgment was required since the plaintiff failed to include a copy of the pleadings in support of its motion, as required by CPLR 3212 (b) (see Matter of Fraternal Order of Eagles v Board of Assessors, 73 AD3d 770, 771 [2010]; Zellner v Tarnell, 54 AD3d 329, 329-330 [2008]; Sendor v Chervin, 51 AD3d 1003 [2008]; Thompson v Foreign Cars Ctr., Inc., 40 AD3d 965 [2007]; Matsyuk v Konkalipos, 35 AD3d 675 [2006]; Sted Tenants Owners Corp. v Chumpitaz, 5 AD3d 663 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(b) requires submission of the answer on a summary judgment motion, but the court may obtain an omitted answer and reach the merits when no party raises the defect.

North State Autobahn, Inc. v. Progressive Insurance Group · filed 2011-06-24(b)

None of the parties submitted the answer in violation of CPLR 3212 (b), and the court could have denied all the motions on that basis alone (Zellner v Tarnell, 54 AD3d 329 [2d Dept 2008]). As none of the parties has raised this procedural defect, rather than waste the court’s and the parties’ time, the court retrieved the answer from the Clerk’s Office and has reached the merits of the motions.

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to attach all pleadings to the motion.

Marks v. Robb · filed 2011-12-20(b)

The appellant failed to annex all of the pleadings to his motion as required by statute (see CPLR 3212 [b]; see also Roach v AVR Realty Co., LLC, 41 AD3d 821, 825 [2007]; Matsyuk v Konkalipos, 35 AD3d 675 [2006]; Hamilton v City of New York, 262 AD2d 283 [1999]).

Section 3212(b) requires pleadings to accompany a summary judgment motion, but the court may excuse their omission when the record is sufficiently complete to address the merits.

Hudson v. State · filed 2011-11-28(b)

The court denied defendant’s summary judgment motion on the ground that the cross motion was not supported by a copy of the pleadings as required by CPLR 3212 (b). As pointed out by defense counsel, the failure to include pleadings may be excused by the court if the record is sufficiently complete to address the merits (Crossett v Wing Farm, Inc., 79 AD3d 1334, 1335 [3d Dept 2010]; Sanacore v Sanacore, 74 AD3d 1468, 1469 [3d Dept 2010]; Greene v Wood, 6 AD3d 976, 977 [3d Dept 2004]). As all the pleadings were provided by claimant in his submission on his motion for summary judgment, the court grants defendant’s motion for reargument and will consider defendant’s summary judgment motion.

CPLR 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to attach all pleadings; failure to do so requires denial of the motion.

Weinstein v. Gindi · filed 2012-02-16(b)

Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law against plaintiff Pine Projects’ because he failed to include his answer with his motion for summary judgment as required by statute (see CPLR 3212 [b]).

CPLR 3212(b) does not make a summary judgment motion procedurally defective when a complete set of pleadings is annexed.

Hossain v. Kurzynowski · filed 2012-02-14(b)

The Supreme Court erred in denying the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on his Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action as procedurally defective pursuant to CPLR 3212 (b) since a complete set of pleadings were, in fact, annexed to the plaintiffs motion.

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment motion to include the pleadings; a missing pleading supplied in reply does not prevent consideration of the motion when no substantial right is prejudiced.

Avalon Gardens Rehabilitation & Health Care Center, LLC v. Morsello · filed 2012-07-11(b)

While CPLR 3212 (b) requires that motions for summary judgment be supported by, inter alia, a copy of the pleadings, CPLR 2001 permits a court, “[a]t any stage of an action,” to disregard a party’s mistake, omission, defect, or irregularity if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced.

CPLR 3212 (b) requires a summary judgment movant to append a complete set of the pleadings; failure to do so requires denial of the motion.

Mieles v. Tarar · filed 2012-11-14(b)

In addition, denial of that branch of the motion was required because Vlahakis failed to append a complete set of the pleadings to his motion for summary judgment as required by CPLR 3212 (b) (see Fiber Consultants, Inc. v Fiber Optek Interconnect Corp., 84 AD3d 1153 [2011]; Matter of Fraternal Order of Eagles v Board of Assessors, 73 AD3d 770, 771 [2010]; Zellner v Tarnell, 54 AD3d 329, 329-330 [2008]; Sendor v Chervin, 51 AD3d 1003, 1003 [2008]; Thompson v Foreign Cars Ctr., Inc., 40 AD3d 965, 965 [2007]; Matsyuk v Konkalipos, 35 AD3d 675, 675 [2006]; Wider v Heller, 24 AD3d 433, 434 [2005]; Sted Tenants Owners Corp. v Chumpitaz, 5 AD3d 663, 663 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to include all pleadings; omitting them can defeat the movant’s prima facie showing.

Washington Realty Owners, LLC v. 260 Washington Street, LLC · filed 2013-04-30(b)

The motion court erred when it determined that defendant met its prima facie burden since defendant failed to include all of the pleadings.

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment motion to include the pleadings and an affidavit from a person with knowledge of the facts.

Commissioner of Transportation v. Sunny Lumber Supply NY, Inc. · filed 2013-05-30(b)

As an initial matter, CPLR 3212 (b) requires that “[a] motion for summary judgment shall be supported by affidavit, by a copy of the pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions. The affidavit shall be by a person having knowledge of the facts; it shall recite all the material facts; and it shall show that there is no defense to the cause of action or that the cause of action or defense has no merit.” Here, respondent failed to annex the pleadings to its motion, as well as an affidavit from a person with personal knowledge. Therefore, the papers are defective, and the court declines to treat this motion as one for summary judgment (CPLR 3211 [c]).

An attorney affirmation disputing factual allegations has no evidentiary value, and a summary judgment motion must be denied if the movant fails to establish prima facie entitlement to judgment, regardless of the opposing papers.

Nouveau Elevator Industries, Inc. v. Glendale Condominium Town & Tower Corp. · filed 2013-06-26(b)

As the plaintiff correctly contends, the attorney affirmation submitted by the Board was without evidentiary value to the extent that it was submitted to dispute the factual allegations contained in the complaint (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 563 [1980]). Since the Board failed to establish, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, that branch of the Board’s motion which was for summary judgment was properly denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers (see generally Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).

CPLR 3212(b)’s pleadings submission requirement is satisfied when a party expressly incorporates pleadings already submitted with another summary judgment motion.

Carey v. Five Bros. · filed 2013-05-22(b)

Likewise, the Supreme Court should not have denied that branch of the Stop & Shop defendants’ cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that they failed to submit the pleadings in the action (cf. CPLR 3212 [b]). The plaintiffs had already submitted all of the pleadings in support of their own motion, and the Stop & Shop defendants expressly incorporated the exhibits already submitted by the plaintiffs into their cross motion (see Daramboukas v Samlidis, 84 AD3d 719, 721 [2011]; Carlson v Town of Mina, 31 AD3d 1176, 1177 [2006]; cf. Welch v Hauck, 18 AD3d 1096, 1098 [2005]; Gallagher v TDS Telecom, 280 AD2d 991, 991 [2001]).

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to submit the relevant pleadings; a complaint and answer satisfy that requirement.

Bagley v. Moffett · filed 2013-06-27(b)

Defendants’ motion papers included a copy of the complaint and the answer and, therefore, defendants complied with the requirements of CPLR 3212 (b) by tendering the relevant pleadings (see CPLR 3011; compare Bonded Concrete v Town of Saugerties, 3 AD3d 729, 730 [2004], lv dismissed 2 NY3d 793 [2004]).

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to attach a copy of the answer to the motion papers.

MSL Productions, Inc. v. IMR Group LLC · filed 2013-09-04(b)

However, the court, in its prior order, denied that branch of the motion which sought summary judgment inasmuch as the defendants failed to annex a copy of the answer to their motion papers as required by CPLR 3212 (b). The instant motion, therefore, to the extent that it seeks reargument of the branch of the prior motion for summary judgment, cannot establish that the court overlooked or misapprehended the law in this regard.

Section 3212(b) does not bar consideration of a summary judgment motion for failure to attach the answer when the record is sufficiently complete to decide it.

Mercado v. Ovalle · filed 2013-10-22(b)

In any event, this procedural defect does not bar consideration of the motion as defendants explained the absence of the answer and submitted a copy of Ovalle’s deposition transcript, wherein he denied the relevant allegations concerning ownership and control of the dogs and lot.

Section 3212(b) permits a movant to cure missing pleadings by submitting them with reply papers.

Singh v. Brown · filed 2014-03-13(b)

In this regard, plaintiffs’ argument that the deficiency may not be cured by annexing the missing pleadings to the reply papers is incorrect, and is rejected.

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment motion to be supported by an affidavit, the pleadings, and other available proof.

Rosenblatt v. St. George Health & Racquetball Associates, LLC · filed 2014-04-30(b)

To make a prima facie showing, the motion must be supported “by affidavit, by a copy of the pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions” (CPLR 3212 [b]).

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to provide the pleadings pertaining to the claims against that party, rather than complete copies of every party’s pleadings.

Reyes v. Sanchez-Pena · filed 2014-05-27(b)

The motion court erred in denying defendants’ motions on the ground that they failed to annex complete copies of the pleadings, including those of the non-movants, to their motion papers (see CPLR 3212 [b]). Since each moving party provided copies of the pleadings pertaining to the claims against that party, the record was complete for purposes of deciding the motions (see Chan v Garcia, 24 AD3d 197 [1st Dept 2005]).

CPLR 3212 (b) does not require a summary judgment movant to submit an amended answer that does not exist.

Vazquez v. Gun Hill Associates, LLC · filed 2014-11-12(b)

However, the defendant could not submit an amended answer because no such pleading existed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should not have denied the motion on the basis of a purported failure to comply with CPLR 3212 (b).

CPLR 3212(b) requires a summary judgment motion to include the pleadings; a court may excuse their omission when the record is complete and no substantial right is prejudiced.

Long Island Pine Barrens Society, Inc. v. County of Suffolk · filed 2014-11-12(b)

Notwithstanding that CPLR 3212 (b) requires that motions for summary judgment be supported by a copy of the pleadings, CPLR 2001 permits a court, at any stage of an action, to “disregard a party’s mistake, omission, defect, or irregularity if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced” (Avalon Gardens Rehabilitation & Health Care Ctr., LLC v Morsello, 97 AD3d 611, 612 [2012]; see CPLR 2001; U.S. Bank N.A. v Eaddy, 109 AD3d 908, 910 [2013]).

A summary judgment motion must include a copy of the pleadings; without one, the motion must be denied regardless of its merits.

TUDISCO, THOMAS J. v. MINCER, DAWNMARIE · filed 2015-03-27(b)

We agree with plaintiff that the court erred in granting defendant’s motion in part. “The failure of [defendant] to support [her] motion with a copy of the pleadings requires denial of the motion, regardless of the merits of the motion” (D.J. Enters. of WNY v Benderson, 294 AD2d 825, 825; see CPLR 3212 [b]; Notaro v Bison Constr. Corp., 32 AD3d 1218, 1219).

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to submit the pleadings, but an omitted complaint does not defeat the motion when the record is complete and no substantial right is prejudiced.

Lombardi v. Lombardi · filed 2015-04-22(b)

Additionally, although the defendants failed to submit a copy of the complaint in support of their cross motion for summary judgment, as required by CPLR 3212 (b), CPLR 2001 permits a court, at any stage of an action, to “disregard a party’s mistake, omission, defect, or irregularity if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced” (Long Is. Pine Barrens Socy., Inc. v County of Suffolk, 122 AD3d 688, 691 [2014]). Since the complaint was submitted by the wife in support of her motion, we find that the record is sufficiently complete, and there is no proof that a substantial right of the wife was impaired by the defendants’ failure to submit a full copy of the pleadings (see id. at 691; Daramboukas v Samlidis, 84 AD3d 719, 721 [2011]).

A summary judgment motion must include the pleadings, but a defendant who submits the complaint and its own answer need not submit other defendants’ answers.

BARNABA-HOHM, LORI v. ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL HEALTH CENTER · filed 2015-07-02(b)

Although CPLR 3212 (b) requires that a motion for summary judgment be supported by a copy of the pleadings, the Wilson defendants complied with that requirement by submitting the complaint and their answer, and they were not required to submit the answers of the other defendants (see Bacon v Arden, 244 AD2d 940, 941).

Section 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to submit the pleadings, but omission of other defendants’ answers did not justify denying the motion where the opponent did not object and no substantial right was prejudiced.

Mew Equity, LLC v. Sutton Land Services, LLC · filed 2016-11-16(b)

The Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the Sutton defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them due to their failure to provide all of the pleadings, as required by CPLR 3212 (b). In this regard, the Sutton defendants submitted the complaint and their answer, but did not submit the answers of the other defendants.

CPLR 3212(b) requires a summary judgment motion to include the pleadings, but a court may excuse an omission when no substantial right is prejudiced.

Wade v. Knight Transportation, Inc. · filed 2017-06-28(b)

We also disagree with the contention of Wade and the infant plaintiff that the Supreme Court should have denied the Knight defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the ground that they failed to submit copies of certain pleadings concerning the defendant Daniel Freudenberg with their motion papers. ... Notwithstanding that CPLR 3212 (b) requires that motions for summary judgment be supported by a copy of the pleadings, CPLR 2001 permits a court, at any stage of an action, to “ ‘disregard a party’s mistake, omission, defect, or irregularity if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced’ ” (Long Is. Pine Barrens Socy., Inc. v County of Suffolk, 122 AD3d 688, 691 [2014], quoting Avalon Gardens Rehabilitation & Health Care Ctr., LLC v Morsello, 97 AD3d 611, 612 [2012]; see CPLR 2001; U.S. Bank N.A. v Eaddy, 109 AD3d 908, 910 [2013]).

A motion for summary judgment must include copies of all relevant pleadings.

Davis v. State of New York · filed 2017-06-22(b)

Initially, the Court of Claims properly denied claimant’s motion for summary judgment inasmuch as his moving papers did not include a copy of all of the relevant pleadings (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Weinstein v Gindi, 92 AD3d 526, 527 [2012]).

A summary judgment motion must include the pleadings; omitting the claim and answer warrants denial.

Burnside v. State of New York · filed 2018-01-11(b)

Inasmuch as the record reflects that claimant's original moving papers did not include either a copy of his claim or defendant's answer, [FN1] his motion for summary judgment was properly denied for failing to include the pleadings as required by statute ( see CPLR 3212 [b]; Davis v State of New York , 151 AD3d 1411, 1412 [2017]; Weinstein v Gindi , 92 AD3d 526, 527 [2012]; Senor v State of New York , 23 AD3d 851, 852 [2005]; compare Bagley v Moffett , [*2]107 AD3d 1358, 1359-1360 [2013]).

CPLR 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to attach the pleadings, but the court may disregard an omission if it does not prejudice a party's substantial rights.

Sensible Choice Contr., LLC v. Rodgers · filed 2018-08-15(b)

CPLR 3212(b) requires, inter alia, that a moving party support its motion for summary judgment by attaching a copy of the pleadings. However, [*2]CPLR 2001 permits a court, at any stage of an action, to disregard a party's mistake, omission, defect, or irregularity if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced ( see Wade v Knight Transp., Inc ., 151 AD3d 1107, 1109). ... The defendants did not assert that they were prejudiced by the omission. Under such circumstances, the court properly disregarded the plaintiff's omission ( see Brightman v Prison Health Serv., Inc ., 108 AD3d 739, 742; Studio A Showroom, LLC v Yoon , 99 AD3d 632; Welch v Hauck , 18 AD3d 1096, 1098).

A summary judgment motion must include the pleadings, but a court may excuse an omitted answer when the record is complete and no substantial right is prejudiced.

Montalvo v. Episcopal Health Servs., Inc. · filed 2019-05-29(b)

While CPLR 3212(b) requires that motions for summary judgment be supported by a copy of the pleadings, CPLR 2001 "permits a court, at any stage of an action, to disregard a party's mistake, omission, defect, or irregularity if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced" ( Long Is. Pine Barrens Socy., Inc. v County of Suffolk , 122 AD3d 688, 691 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Avalon Gardens Rehabilitation & Health Care Ctr., LLC v Morsello , 97 AD3d 611, 612). Although the defendants failed to include a copy of their answer with their motion for summary judgment, they attached a copy of their answer to the reply affirmation of counsel. Thus, the record is sufficiently complete, and there is no evidence that a substantial right of the plaintiff was prejudiced by the defendants' failure to submit a copy of their answer with their motion papers ( see Lombardi v Lombardi , 127 AD3d 1038, 1040; Avalon Gardens Rehabilitation & Health Care Ctr., LLC v Morsello , 97 AD3d at 612; Pandian v New York Health & Hosps. Corp , 54 AD3d 590, 591).

CPLR 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to submit the relevant pleadings so the court can review the claims it seeks to dismiss.

Rivera v. City of New York · filed 2019-06-05(b)

The papers submitted in support of the motion failed to include copies of the relevant pleadings as required by CPLR 3212(b), thereby precluding review of the purported cross claims ( see Mieles v Tarar , 100 AD3d 719, 720; Matsyuk v Konkalipos , 35 AD3d 675, 676; Wider v Heller , 24 AD3d 433, 434).

CPLR 3212(b) requires a summary judgment movant to include the pleadings, but omitting an answer from the opening papers is a mere irregularity when it is supplied later and no party is prejudiced.

National Auditing Servs. & Consulting, LLC v. 511 Prop., LLC · filed 2020-09-29(b)

While, pursuant to CPLR 3212(b), plaintiff should have included a copy of defendant's answer with its moving papers, defendant submitted a copy of its answer with its opposition, and plaintiff submitted another copy with its reply. Plaintiff's failure to submit the answer with its opening papers was a mere irregularity, and no substantial right of any party was prejudiced ( see Mew Equity, LLC v Sutton Land Servs., LLC , 144 AD3d 874, 877 [2d Dept 2016]).

Section 3212(b) does not require denial of a summary judgment motion solely because the movant failed to submit the pleadings under the circumstances of this case.

Knox v. Rose · filed 2021-01-13(b)

Under the circumstances of this case, although the defendant's failure to submit a copy of the pleadings with his motion for summary judgment did not require denial of the motion ( see CPLR 3212[b]; Lombardi v Lombardi , 127 AD3d 1038, 1040), the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of his entitlement to summary judgment ( see UB Distribs., LLC v S.K.I. Wholesale Beer Corp. , 161 AD3d 1027, 1028; Parr Meadows Racing Assn. v White , 76 AD2d 858, 858).

Section 3212(b) generally requires a summary judgment movant to submit the pleadings, but the omission may be excused when the record contains them and is sufficiently complete to decide the motion.

DeRidder v. Omni Electro-Motive Co., Inc. · filed 2021-06-03(b)

Generally, a party's failure to submit the pleadings when moving for summary judgment requires denial of the motion ( see CPLR 3212 [b]; Davis v State of New York , 151 AD3d 1411, 1412 [2017]). This defect, however, may be excused where, as here, the record includes the pleadings and is sufficiently complete to address the merits of the motion ( see Sanacore v Sanacore , 74 AD3d 1468, 1469 [2010]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when the opposing party offers an evidentiary basis that discovery may reveal relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant's knowledge and control.

Board of Mgrs. of the 23-23 Condominium v. 210th Place Realty, LLC · filed 2020-07-22(f)

Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the motion was not premature, as the plaintiff failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that additional discovery may lead to relevant evidence, or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the corporate defendants ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Rodriguez-Garcia v Bobby's Bus Co., Inc. , 175 AD3d 631, 632; Lazarre v Gragston , 164 AD3d 574, 575).

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify delaying summary judgment for disclosure based on vague allegations of collusion.

Ull v. Royal Car Park LLC · filed 2020-01-09(f)

Her vague allegations that her children colluded in order to pay Jeffrey directly rather than pay the Trust, of which she is the trustee, do not support a request for disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3212(f) ( Citibank, N.A. v Furlong , 81 AD2d 803, 804 [1st Dept 1981]; see Fulton v Allstate Ins. Co. , 14 AD3d 380, 381 [1st Dept 2005]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not make a liability motion premature when the outstanding discovery would yield only evidence of the plaintiff's comparative fault.

Ashby v. Estate of Encarnacion · filed 2019-12-11(f)

Moreover, contrary to the defendants' contention, summary judgment was not premature due to outstanding discovery ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Kerolle v Nicholson , 172 AD3d at 1189). The outstanding discovery allegedly would lead only to evidence of the plaintiff's comparative fault ( see Francois v Tang , 171 AD3d 1139, 1140).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when the opposing party shows that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that facts essential to its opposition are exclusively within the movant's knowledge and control.

Coelho v. City of New York · filed 2019-10-30(f)

Moreover, the City's motion for summary judgment was not premature. "A party opposing summary judgment is entitled to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the opposing party's position may exist but cannot then be stated" ( Salameh v Yarkovski , 156 AD3d 659, 660; see CPLR 3212[f]; Ingram v Bay Ridge Auto. Mgt. Corp. , 145 AD3d 672, 672-673). "A party contending that a summary judgment motion is premature must demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant" ( Antonyshyn v Tishman Constr. Corp. , 153 AD3d 1308, 1310 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rungoo v Leary , 110 AD3d 781, 783). Here, the plaintiffs failed to make the requisite showing ( see Haidhaqi v Metropolitan Transp. Auth. , 153 AD3d 329).

Section 3212(f) does not warrant delaying summary judgment for further discovery based only on hope or speculation that useful evidence will emerge.

Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jamaica Wellness Med., P.C. · filed 2020-02-07(f)

In addition, defendant's " mere hope or speculation' that further discovery will lead to evidence sufficient to defeat [the Nationwide plaintiffs'] motion is insufficient to warrant denial thereof" ( Kaufmann's Carousel, Inc. v Carousel Ctr. Co. LP , 87 AD3d 1343, 1345 [4th Dept 2011], lv dismissed 18 NY3d 975 [2012], rearg denied 19 NY3d 938 [2012]; see Austin v CDGA Natl. Bank Trust & Canandaigua Natl. Corp. , 114 AD3d 1298, 1301 [4th Dept 2014]; see generally CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) does not make a summary judgment motion premature without an evidentiary basis that discovery may reveal relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant's knowledge and control.

Gaston v. Vertsberger · filed 2019-10-16(f)

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the plaintiff's motion was not premature, as the defendant failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant evidence, or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Lazarre v Gragston , 164 AD3d at 575; Niyazov v Hunter EMS, Inc. , 154 AD3d 954, 955; Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp. , 45 AD3d 736, 737).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature before discovery on the issue is complete.

Global Liberty Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. North Shore Family Chiropractic, PC · filed 2019-12-12(f)

Further, Supreme Court did not err by finding the motion for summary judgment on the issue of overbilling to be premature prior to discovery ( see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Jaga Med. Servs., P.C. , 128 AD3d 441, 441 [1st Dept 2015]; see also CPLR 3212[f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when further discovery may reveal relevant evidence or essential facts are exclusively within the movant's control; mere hope of finding helpful evidence is insufficient.

Dunn v. Covanta Niagara I, LLC · filed 2020-03-20(f)

The nonmovants failed "to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the [cross] motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant[s] . . . , and the [m]ere hope that somehow the [nonmovants] will uncover evidence that will [help their] case is insufficient for denial of the [summary judgment] motion" as premature ( Gannon v Sadeghian , 151 AD3d 1586, 1588 [4th Dept 2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]) .

Section 3212(f) permits a party to oppose summary judgment as premature by showing that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that facts needed to oppose the motion are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge and control.

R. L. v. New York City Dept. of Educ. · filed 2019-08-07(f)

Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the defendants' motion was not premature, as the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the defendants' knowledge and control ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Reynolds v Avon Grove Props. , 129 AD3d 932, 933).

Section 3212(f) allows a court to defer summary judgment when the opponent shows that further discovery may yield relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposition are exclusively within the movant's knowledge and control.

Rodriguez-Garcia v. Bobby's Bus Co., Inc. · filed 2019-08-21(f)

Furthermore, the plaintiff's motion was not premature, as the defendants failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that additional discovery may lead to relevant evidence, or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Lazarre v Gragston , 164 AD3d at 575; Niyazov v Hunter EMS, Inc. , 154 AD3d 954, 955).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking to delay summary judgment for discovery to show reasonable efforts to obtain the facts it needs.

New Way Med. Supply Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. · filed 2019-07-12(f)

Plaintiff's contention that defendant's motion should be denied as premature on the ground that discovery was not yet complete ( see CPLR 3212 [f]) lacks merit. ... As defendant's answer was served on March 21, 2014, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it made a reasonable attempt during the intervening 11 months to obtain the discovery it alleges that it needs.

Section 3212(f) does not make a summary judgment motion premature when the opposing party had years to conduct discovery and offers no excuse for failing to do so.

Dunn v. County of Niagara · filed 2019-06-07(f)

We reject plaintiffs' further contention that Cambria's motion was premature ( see CPLR 3212 [f]). About four years elapsed between the commencement of the action and the motion, and plaintiffs have not provided an excuse for why they could not have conducted any depositions or completed discovery during that time ( see Avraham v Allied Realty Corp. , 8 AD3d 1079, 1079 [4th Dept 2004]).

Section 3212(f) does not make a summary judgment motion premature unless the opposing party shows that further discovery may reveal relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant's control.

Zhou v. 828 Hamilton, Inc. · filed 2019-06-12(f)

The defendants failed to demonstrate how further discovery might reveal or lead to relevant evidence, or that facts essential to oppose the motion were exclusively within the plaintiff's control ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Robinson v Bond St. Levy, LLC , 115 AD3d 928, 929; Cajas-Romero v Ward , 106 AD3d 850, 852).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when outstanding discovery may bear on the issue to be decided.

Paramount Ins. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. · filed 2019-07-23(f)

However, the determination that defendant's policy is primary to the policy that Paramount issued to David Ellis was premature, as discovery concerning policies issued to other parties to the underlying litigation, including Union Square Café, was still outstanding (CPLR 3212[f]), and such policies were not submitted for Supreme Court's consideration.

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify delaying summary judgment for further discovery without some indication that the discovery will yield relevant evidence.

Rodriguez v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2019-05-14(f)

Plaintiff's contention that more discovery is required is unsupported by anything suggesting that additional discovery will lead to further relevant evidence ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Ehrenhalt v Kinder , 85 AD3d 553 [1st Dept 2011]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment when discovery may produce relevant evidence or facts essential to opposing the motion are within the other party’s knowledge and control.

Joon Management One Corp. v. Town of Ramapo · filed 2016-08-17(f)

The plaintiffs contention that the Town’s motion for summary judgment was premature is without merit, as it failed to demonstrate how discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the Town (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Rungoo v Leary, 110 AD3d 781, 783 [2013]; Cajas-Romero v Ward, 106 AD3d 850, 852 [2013]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), outstanding discovery does not warrant denying summary judgment when it is unnecessary to oppose the motion.

Health Imaging, P.C. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. · filed 2016-06-22(f)

Consequently, contrary to plaintiff's further argument on appeal, there was no outstanding discovery warranting the denial of defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f).

A renewed summary judgment motion is not necessarily premature under Section 3212(f).

Bazigos v. Krukar · filed 2016-06-08(f)

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant’s renewed motion was not premature (see Anzel v Pistorino, 105 AD3d 784, 786 [2013]; Matter of Dietrich, 271 AD2d 894, 895 [2000]; Mazzaferro v Barterama Corp., 218 AD2d 643, 643 [1995]; cf. CPLR 3212 [fl).

CPLR 3212 (f) does not require denial of summary judgment for further discovery when the discovery sought would not produce evidence sufficient to defeat the motion.

GDH CONSTRUCTION INC. v. GUGINO, MARK A. · filed 2016-06-10(f)

Plaintiff contends that defendants’ motion should have been denied as premature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) because further discovery was necessary. We reject that contention. Because the note and mortgage were a nullity “the discovery sought would [not] produce evidence sufficient to defeat the motion” (Resetarits Constr. Corp. v Elizabeth Pierce Olmstead, M.D. Center for the Visually Impaired [appeal No. 2], 118 AD3d 1454, 1456).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a premature summary judgment motion without prejudice to renewal after discovery.

Herrera v. Gargiso · filed 2016-06-29(f)

The parties’ factual accounts of the accident differed substantially, little discovery had taken place, and depositions of the parties had not yet occurred at the time the motion was made (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Takhalov v Rottenberg, 128 AD3d 678 [2015]; Malester v Rampil, 118 AD3d 855 [2014]). Accordingly, the denial of the plaintiff’s motion should have been without prejudice to renewal upon the completion of discovery.

Section 3212(f) requires a party claiming that a summary judgment motion is premature to provide an evidentiary basis that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s control.

Vikram Construction, Inc. v. Everest National Insurance · filed 2016-05-04(f)

A party who seeks a finding that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to put forth some evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Binyan Shel Chessed, Inc. v Goldberger Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 18 AD3d at 592).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when relevant facts are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge and further discovery could reveal them.

Greener v. Town of Hurley · filed 2016-06-02(f)

These facts are exclusively within the knowledge of the party moving for summary judgment and leave plaintiffs with only circumstantial evidence to oppose the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Pank v Village of Canajoharie, 275 AD2d 508, 509 [2000]). The Rodriguez affidavit, combined with the photographs of the damaged culvert pipe, demonstrate that the need for more discovery is based upon more than "pure conjecture and speculation" (Gersten-Hillman Agency, Inc. v Heyman, 68 AD3d 1284, 1288 [2009]). Consequently, summary judgment is inappropriate.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when facts needed to oppose the motion are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge and control.

Ruiz v. Torres · filed 2016-03-23(f)

In opposition to the plaintiffs’ prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the defendant Manuel Torres submitted his own affidavit, which demonstrated that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiffs and, therefore, could not then be stated (see CPLR 3212 [f]; James v Aircraft Serv. Intl. Group, 84 AD3d 1026, 1027 [2011]).

A summary judgment motion is not premature when the opponent fails to show that further discovery might yield relevant evidence or that facts essential to its opposition are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Orellana v. Maggies Paratransit Corp. · filed 2016-04-20(f)

Furthermore, contrary to the contention of Maggies Paratransit and Ramos, the motion was not premature, as they failed to show that additional discovery might lead to relevant evidence, or that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Arazashvilli v Executive Fleet Mgt., Corp., 90 AD3d at 683; Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d at 737; Rainford v Sung S. Han, 18 AD3d 638, 639-640 [2005]).

A mere hope that further discovery will uncover evidence to defeat summary judgment is insufficient to defeat the motion.

Somereve v. Plaza Construction Corp. · filed 2016-02-18(f)

However, a mere hope that further discovery will provide evidence to defeat summary judgment is insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion ( Flores v City of New York , 66 AD3d 599, 600 [1st Dept 2009]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), speculation that further discovery will produce relevant evidence does not prevent summary judgment.

Bennett v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 2016-03-02(f)

The appellants’ contention that further discovery would lead to such evidence is speculative (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a basis for postponing a summary judgment decision for discovery; a mere hope that discovery will uncover evidence is insufficient.

Zarzona v. City of New York · filed 1994-10-31(f)

The respondents, therefore, failed to provide a basis, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), for postponing a decision on the appellant’s summary judgment motion (see, Sarver v Martyn, 161 AD2d 623).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when the opponent shows that unfinished discovery may produce relevant evidence.

Macutek v. Lansing · filed 1994-03-17(f)

Because Cantanucci has made a threshold showing that the Bornts built the wooden framework for the house, it is more than mere hope or surmise that further discovery may produce relevant evidence regarding the fixation of the planking (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Corp., 81 NY2d 494; Groves v Land’s End Hous. Co., 175 AD2d 733, affd 80 NY2d 978). Therefore, granting the Bornts’ motion for summary judgment against Cantanucci was premature.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when discovery remains outstanding.

Watson v. Work Wear Corp. · filed 1994-03-08(f)

We also note that denial of summary judgment at this juncture was appropriate in view of the still outstanding discovery *232(CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212 (f) does not excuse a party’s failure to present evidentiary facts when it had ample opportunity to obtain them through disclosure.

Hanneford Circus, Inc. v. Cabar Circus Promotions, Ltd. · filed 1994-02-07(f)

We disagree with the defendant that the failure to present evidentiary facts should be excused pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) on the ground that the facts needed are exclusively within the knowledge of the plaintiff. Here, the action was pending for over a year before the motion for summary judgment was made, and the defendant failed to avail itself of any opportunities to obtain disclosure of such facts (see, Stevens v Hilmy, 185 AD2d 840; Yu v Forero, 184 AD2d 506; 4 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 3212.18).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice to renewal after discovery when the parties have not yet been deposed.

Kleinman v. Wider · filed 1993-10-01(f)

Inasmuch as the depositions of the parties have not yet been taken, Supreme ... Court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendants Namuliks’ cross motion for summary judgment without prejudice to renew at the close of discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to stay or deny a summary judgment motion with leave to renew when the opposing party needs more time to obtain evidence.

Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v. Fox Run Farms, Inc. · filed 1993-07-15(f)

Where, as here, the party opposing summary judgment needs further opportunity to obtain evidence in opposition to the motion, the appropriate course is to stay the motion or deny it outright with leave to renew (CPLR 3212 [f]; Siegel, NY Prac § 281, at 411 [2d ed]).

Under section 3212(f), a party seeking more discovery before summary judgment must explain its efforts to obtain depositions and why it lacked the opportunity to take them.

Sturtevant v. Home Town Bakery, Inc. · filed 1993-04-22(f)

Hobart’s claim that it was never given the opportunity to adequately examine the facts surrounding the occurrence is not supported by the record. The affidavit of Hobart’s attorney does not indicate what, if any, steps Hobart took to take pretrial depositions of plaintiff or any witnesses, nor does it detail the reason why it had no opportunity to take depositions (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) allows a court to consider a party’s need for additional discovery when deciding a summary judgment motion.

Hart v. Incorporated Village · filed 1993-05-24(f)

Further, the court properly considered the plaintiffs’ claim that additional discovery was needed in order for them to have a full opportunity to litigate the prior notice question (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not require postponing a summary judgment decision based on a conclusory assertion that additional documentary evidence exists.

CVC Capital Corp. v. Weil · filed 1993-04-01(f)

Plaintiff’s mere conclusory statement that there is additional documentary evidence in defendant’s possession which will establish defendants’ duty in a 1986 Puerto Rico bankruptcy matter to supervise the rendition of professional services by Puerto Rican law firms ... retained by plaintiff provides no basis, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), for postponing a decision on the summary judgment motion (see, European Am. Bank v Lofrese, 182 AD2d 67).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking more discovery before summary judgment to show that facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Frierson v. Concourse Plaza Associates · filed 1993-01-12(f)

Defendants were bound to show there was a likelihood of discovery leading to such evidence, i.e., that facts "may” exist but cannot be stated at that time (CPLR 3212 [f|). This they failed to do.

Section 3212(f) does not prevent summary judgment when the opposing party had an opportunity to obtain additional relevant facts.

Showell v. White Rock Products Corp. · filed 1992-11-16(f)

Moreover, the Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff was not denied the opportunity to adduce additional existing relevant facts (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Hecht v Vanderbilt Assocs., 141 AD2d 696, 700; Kennerly v Campbell Chain Co., 133 AD2d 669, 671).

Section 3212(f) does not permit further discovery to delay summary judgment when it would not produce relevant information.

Kracker v. Spartan Chemical Co. · filed 1992-05-18(f)

Since it is clear that further discovery would not have produced relevant information, it would have been error to allow it to delay summary judgment (see, Goldheart Intl. v Vulcan Constr. Corp., supra, at 508; CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not bar summary judgment based on a need for further discovery when the opposing party had ample time to seek disclosure but failed to do so.

Dabbs v. City of Peeksville · filed 1991-12-23(f)

Moreover, with respect to the plaintiff’s claim that additional discovery was necessary (see, CPLR 3212 [f]), we note that despite having ample time and opportunity to conduct disclosure, the plaintiff neither responded to the City’s discovery demands nor served discovery requests of her own. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff’s purported need for further discovery was not a bar to summary judgment (see, e.g., Hecht v Vanderbilt Assocs., supra; Eksouzian v Levenson, 139 AD2d 690; Monteleone v Incorporated Vil. of Floral Park, supra; Witte v Incorporated Vil. of Port Washington N., 114 AD2d 359).

Section 3212(f) permits a continuance for discovery when facts essential to oppose summary judgment cannot yet be stated, but the opposing party must show reasonable efforts to obtain them.

Newberg v. Village of Great Neck, Inc. · filed 1991-06-12(f)

CPLR 3212 (f) provides that upon a showing, by affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated, the court may deny the motion or order a continuance to permit disclosure to be conducted. ... Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they made reasonable efforts to ascertain the essential facts necessary to oppose the application by the defendant, Town, for summary judgment.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny or continue a summary judgment motion when an outstanding deposition may reveal a factual issue.

Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp. v. Kraus Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1991-03-14(f)

Completion of that deposition will enable the Motion Court to determine more fairly whether a factual issue exists as to whether plaintiff was still in negotiation with Crossland at the time of the termination of the contract. The Motion Court should have either denied the motion or granted a continuance to permit the deposition of Crossland. (CPLR 3212 [f].)

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to adjourn a summary judgment motion pending completion of discovery.

Coakley v. State · filed 1991-05-02(f)

Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) and Zuckerman v City of New York (49 NY2d 557), by an interim opinion and order dated June 15, 1990, we adjourned the motions pending the completion of discovery.

Inadequate discovery does not warrant denial of summary judgment unless the opposing party shows a basis for it.

Love v. Port Authority · filed 1990-12-04(f)

The plaintiff has not shown that denial of summary judgment would be warranted for lack of adequate discovery (Goldheart Intl. v Vulcan Constr. Corp., 124 AD2d 507).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking to delay summary judgment for incomplete discovery to identify essential facts that could justify denying the motion.

McSorley v. Philip Morris, Inc. · filed 1991-02-04(f)

Finally, the plaintiffs’ contention that summary judgment is premature because they have not fully completed discovery is without merit. The plaintiffs have failed to indicate the existence of any "essential” facts which would justify denial of the respondent’s motion (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 NY2d 152; Krinick v Sharac Rest., 144 AD2d 440).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when discovery may reveal defenses within the moving party’s knowledge.

Efdey Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Melita · filed 1990-11-26(f)

Moreover, “summary judgment is not justified where there are likely to be defenses that depend upon knowledge in the possession of the party moving for judgment, which might well be disclosed by cross-examination or examination before trial” (Terranova v Emil, 20 NY2d 493, 497; see also, Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 16 NY2d 344, 362; CPLR 3212 [f]). Thus, summary judgment was properly denied.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the moving party has exclusive knowledge of material facts.

Rivkin v. Brackman · filed 1990-11-20(f)

As for the fourth cause of action, this claim contains an allegation of undisclosed sales by FPG to a third party and should not have been summarily dismissed as defendants have exclusive knowledge of material facts (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits summary judgment despite incomplete discovery when the opposing party fails to show that the requested material could establish a triable issue of fact.

Jones v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1990-10-18(f)

Furthermore, the court did not err in granting summary judgment despite plaintiff’s failure to complete discovery, since plaintiff has failed to show that the requested material would have enabled him to demonstrate a triable issue of fact (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) requires more than speculation that further discovery may produce favorable evidence to defer summary judgment.

Corrigan v. DiGuardia · filed 1990-10-01(f)

Although the plaintiffs argue, inter alia, that summary judgment should be deferred pending further discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]), such an assertion must be supported by something more than surmise (see, Harris v Alcan Aluminum Corp., 91 AD2d 830, affd 58 NY2d 1036).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment or allow further disclosure when facts essential to oppose the motion may exist.

Wright v. Gardens · filed 1989-05-11(f)

These documents and the deposition of Hecht sought by plaintiff would "appear” to demonstrate "that facts essential to justify opposition may exist” (CPLR 3212 [f]) and, accordingly, the IAS court should have denied the motion for summary judgment or ordered a continuance for such disclosure.

Section 3212 permits summary judgment when the opposing party’s speculative assertions, unsupported by evidence, fail to raise a triable issue of fact.

Cofnas v. Tomases · filed 1989-05-23

Plaintiff’s speculative presentation of possible inadequacies in the warnings given does not without any evidentiary backup create an issue of fact ... Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment should be granted.

Under CPLR 3212(f), speculation that a pending deposition will reveal a factual issue is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Rogan v. Giannotto · filed 1989-06-19(f)

Conjecture alone does not suffice to defeat a summary judgment motion (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 563), and mere speculation that the pending deposition of the third-party defendant Orozco will uncover a question of fact is likewise insufficient (see, Kennerly v Campbell Chain Co., 133 AD2d 669; CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but cannot be stated until discovery is complete.

McGowan v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 1989-06-21(f)

Although plaintiffs’ burden in opposing a motion for summary judgment is " 'to assemble, lay bare and reveal [their] proofs’ ” (Cabrera v Ferranti, 89 AD2d 546, 547 [1st Dept 1982], appeal dismissed 67 NY2d 869 [1986]), it appears that the facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot be stated until disclosure has been had (CPLR 3212 [f]). Therefore as to the first, second and third causes of action, defendants’ motion is denied without prejudice to renew upon completion of discovery.

Section 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment based solely on a party's hope that discovery may uncover evidence.

Jones v. Gameray · filed 1989-08-07(f)

Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the mere hope by the plaintiff that he might be able to uncover some evidence during the discovery process was insufficient to deny summary judgment to the defendant Gameray (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Kennerly v Campbell Chain Co., 133 AD2d 669).

A party opposing summary judgment must offer admissible evidence sufficient to show a triable issue of fact.

Bowles v. City of New York · filed 1989-10-02(b)

The plaintiffs failed to offer evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact (see, CPLR 3212 [b]; Trails W. v Wolff 32 NY2d 207, 221; Hecht v Vanderbilt Assocs., 141 AD2d 696).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment is decided when the existing record is insufficient to resolve a material issue.

Szabados v. Quinn · filed 1989-12-12(f)

Order Supreme Court, New York County (David B. Saxe, J.), entered on or about May 12, 1989, denying the motion by defendant The Coca Cola Bottling Company of New York, Inc. (Coca Cola) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, with leave to renew upon completion of discovery, and granting plaintiffs’ cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) for further discovery, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

A party opposing summary judgment must submit evidence of probative value that raises a triable factual issue; a conclusory attorney affidavit is insufficient.

Ris v. Finkle · filed 1989-12-21

However, for purposes of a motion for summary judgment, it is insufficient and is of no probative value. Since plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of any factual issues by submitting evidence of probative value, that branch of the motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action is granted and it is dismissed.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment to allow disclosure when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Adelman v. Island Holding Corp. · filed 1990-01-08(f)

Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), a court may deny a motion for summary judgment if it appears "that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” ... Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in order to permit disclosure.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the opposing party shows ignorance of critical facts needed to defeat the motion.

Kelly v. St. Peter's Hospice · filed 1990-04-19(f)

However, plaintiff has neither demonstrated an ignorance of critical facts (see, Illumalights Mfg. v Neo-Ray Prods., 124 AD2d 644, 645) nor an unavoidable ignorance of facts necessary to defeat the summary judgment motions (see, Kenworthy v Town of Oyster Bay, 116 AD2d 628, 629) which would warrant a denial on CPLR 3212 (f) grounds.

CPLR 3212(f) does not permit postponing a summary judgment decision based on mere hope that further evidence will be found.

Sarver v. Martyn · filed 1990-05-14(f)

The plaintiffs conclusion that the horse was sick is unsupported by any probative evidence and amounts to sheer speculation. "Mere hope that somehow the [plaintiff] will uncover evidence that will prove [his] case, provides no basis, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), for postponing a decision on a summary judgment motion”

Section 3212 permits denial of summary judgment pending discovery when defendants raise material challenges to a note’s transfer, the authenticity of their signatures, and the plaintiff’s holder-in-due-course status.

Abco Refrigeration Supply Corp. v. T.G.S. Corner Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1990-05-15

Specifically, it is apparent that the summary judgment in plaintiffs favor is inappropriate at this juncture, where the defendants, in opposition to plaintiffs motion, have challenged not only plaintiffs alleged status as a holder in due course, but have also challenged the validity of the purported transfer of the note in question and the genuineness of their signatures thereon.

CPLR 3212(f) supports withholding summary judgment when discovery remains outstanding and material information is exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge.

Hammond v. State · filed 1990-06-07(f)

This is especially appropriate when discovery has not yet been obtained (see, CPLR 3212 [f]) and where, as claimant’s discovery motion urges, material information is within the exclusive knowledge of the defendant.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when evidence needed to oppose the motion is exclusively in the movant’s possession, but the opponent must offer more than suspicion or speculation.

Ramage v. Feore · filed 1990-07-02(f)

Although a motion for summary judgment may be denied upon a showing by the opposing party that evidence needed to oppose the motion is exclusively in possession of the movant (see, CPLR 3212 [f]), such a showing must be based upon something more than suspicion or speculation (see, Denkensohn v Davenport, 130 AD2d 860).

Section 3212(f) does not permit postponing a summary judgment decision based on speculation that discovery might uncover supporting evidence.

First City National Bank & Trust Co. v. Heaton · filed 1990-09-11(f)

"To speculate that something might be caught on a fishing expedition provides no basis pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) to postpone decision on the summary judgment motion” (supra, at 792).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice to renewal after discovery when material facts require further development.

Glazman v. Henry Lehr, Ltd. · filed 1990-10-11(f)

Under these circumstances the court properly denied TLH, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment without prejudice to renewal after discovery.

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify delaying summary judgment when no presently unavailable facts could support opposition to the motion.

Mastroianni v. Inc. Village of Hempstead · filed 1990-10-15(f)

Since, however, there is no indication that any facts exist which cannot now be stated but which would justify opposition to the motion and since it is otherwise clear that the village is not here liable for the acts on which this litigation is premised, we conclude that the request by the village for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been granted.

Section 3212(b) requires admissible evidence in opposing papers to resist a motion for summary judgment.

Sprecher v. Port Washington Union Free School District · filed 1990-10-29(b)

The opposing papers which consisted of the affirmation of the plaintiffs’ attorney to which several documents were attached did not supply the necessary admissible evidentiary showing to successfully resist the motion (see, CPLR 3212 [b]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits discovery before summary judgment when the opposing party has limited access to information held by the moving party, particularly early in the action.

Trustees of Welfare v. Iorio · filed 1990-11-21(f)

Moreover, considering plaintiffs’ limited access to information possessed by defendants prior to the action, and the extremely early stage of this action, plaintiffs demonstrated an entitlement to discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; see also, CPLR 3211 [d]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated because discovery remains outstanding.

Seidman v. Booth Memorial Medical Center · filed 1990-11-26(f)

The Supreme Court properly denied the appellant’s application for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it is asserted against it on the ground that facts essential to oppose the motion might exist but could not be stated by the plaintiff because of the appellant’s failure to comply with certain outstanding discovery requests (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; ...).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when further discovery is needed to develop facts relevant to the motion.

Petry Television, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co. · filed 1990-12-04(f)

The IAS court held that further discovery was warranted, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f). ... Absent further discovery, which defendants have resisted, the court below properly concluded that summary judgment was not warranted.

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify postponing summary judgment for further discovery based on speculation; the opposing party must allege admissible proof presenting a triable issue or give an acceptable excuse for lacking firsthand knowledge.

American Prescription Plan, Inc. v. American Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO Health Plan · filed 1991-02-11(f)

However, to avail itself of CPLR 3212 (f), the plaintiff must allege the existence of proof in admissible form which presents a triable issue of fact or an acceptable excuse for the absence of firsthand knowledge (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Chemical Bank v PIC Motors Corp., 58 NY2d 1023). In the present case, the plaintiff’s proof amounts to no more than surmise and suspicion that ACI was acting adversely to its interests.

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking more discovery before summary judgment to show that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated, that its lack of those facts is unavoidable, and that it reasonably tried to obtain them.

State v. Wisser Co. · filed 1991-02-28(f)

Nor did defendant sufficiently demonstrate "that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot [presently] be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]). While the affidavit of defendant’s counsel states that defendant lacks necessary information regarding ownership and control of the tanks, it falls short of establishing that its ignorance of the essential facts is unavoidable and that it has made reasonable attempts to obtain the necessary information (see, Alston v Golub Corp., 129 AD2d 916, 918; Kenworthy v Town of Oyster Bay, 116 AD2d 628, 629).

CPLR 3212 (f) permits pre-trial discovery before summary judgment when salient facts are within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Weintraub v. Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim, & Ballon · filed 1991-04-11(f)

Finally, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that under CPLR 3212 (f) there are salient facts within the knowledge and control of the movants which require pre-trial discovery (Fuchs v MiCAD Sys., 138 AD2d 312).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery when facts essential to opposing summary judgment may exist but cannot yet be stated; it does not permit a fishing expedition for a possible claim.

Aaron Pitter & Co. v. Segal · filed 1991-05-02(f)

Likewise, although CPLR 3212 (f) permits an opposing party to obtain further discovery if "facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated”, it should not be utilized to embark upon a "fishing expedition” simply exploring the possibility of asserting a cause of action.

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party seeking more discovery before summary judgment must show what evidence discovery might uncover and must have taken reasonable steps to obtain it earlier.

Scappaticci v. Willet · filed 1991-05-13(f)

Also, the defendant Ursula Willet is not entitled to denial of the present motion with leave to renew after further discovery (CPLR 3212 [f]), since she has failed to show the existence of evidence to which such disclosure might lead (see, e.g., American Prescription Plan v American Postal Workers Union, 170 AD2d 471) and since she failed to take reasonable steps to obtain disclosure earlier (see, e.g., Monteleone v Incorporated Vil. of Floral Park, 123 AD2d 312).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment when material facts are exclusively known to the moving party and the opposing party has diligently sought discovery.

Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. · filed 1991-05-31(f)

Considering that it is Mr. and Mrs. Dancour who have the exclusive knowledge as to whether at the time of the accident, Mrs. Dancour was operating the vehicle as an employee of Manny’s, we believe that a decision on any motion for summary judgment should be deferred until completion of those depositions.

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery to show how it might reveal facts that would warrant denying summary judgment.

Home Savings Bank v. Arthurkill Associates · filed 1991-05-31(f)

Arthurkill failed to demonstrate how further discovery might reveal the existence of facts, currently within the exclusive knowledge of the plaintiff, which would warrant the denial of summary judgment (CPLR 3212 [f]; see, e.g., Limpar Realty Corp. v Uswiss Realty Holding, 112 AD2d 834).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking discovery before summary judgment to show that essential facts needed to oppose the motion cannot yet be stated.

Joan & Dorothy Realty Corp. v. Brookville Properties, Inc. · filed 1991-05-31(f)

The defendants have likewise failed to establish the existence of facts essential to justify opposition to the summary judgment motion which they cannot state without discovery (see, CPLR 3212 [f]). Therefore, the Supreme Court did not err in granting summary judgment to the plaintiff.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment with leave to renew after relevant discovery is completed.

J. Grotto & Associates Inc. v. Lax · filed 1991-06-11(f)

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied with leave to renew upon completion of discovery (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny or defer summary judgment when evidence needed to oppose the motion is within the moving party’s exclusive knowledge.

Classic Moments Co. v. Akata · filed 1991-10-15(f)

It is well-settled that where a party is unable to effectively oppose a motion for summary judgment because the evidence needed is within the exclusive knowledge of the moving party, the court may deny the motion, without prejudice, or refrain from ruling on the motion pending further disclosure (CPLR 3212 [f]; Denkensohn v Davenport, 130 AD2d 860, 861).

CPLR 3212 (f) does not permit postponing a summary judgment ruling based solely on hope that further discovery will uncover supporting evidence.

Plotkin v. Franklin · filed 1992-01-21(f)

Mere hope that somehow the plaintiff will uncover evidence that will prove a case provides no basis pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) for postponing a determination of a summary judgment motion (see, Kennerly v Campbell Chain Co., 133 AD2d 669, 670).

Section 3212(f) allows a party opposing summary judgment an opportunity to complete discovery.

Aggen Road Citrus Grove v. Kousi · filed 1992-02-25(f)

Further, defendants should have the opportunity to complete discovery of plaintiff (CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212 (f) requires a party seeking discovery before summary judgment to show that facts essential to opposing the motion may exist.

Pow v. Black · filed 1992-04-14(f)

Plaintiffs would have us deny relief in order to afford them discovery, invoking CPLR 3212 (f). In our view, plaintiffs have not made the threshold showing that "facts essential to justify opposition may exist”, as required by that rule.

A party opposing summary judgment must present admissible evidence raising a material factual question or give an acceptable excuse for failing to do so.

United States Trust Co. v. Bamco 18 · filed 1992-05-19

This defense is supported only by hearsay affidavits which do not fulfill defendants’ burden in opposing a motion for summary judgment, upon which the opponent "must produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to require a trial of material questions of fact on which he rests his claim or must demonstrate acceptable excuse for his failure to meet the requirement of tender in admissible form; mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient” (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny or defer summary judgment when evidence needed to oppose the motion is exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge.

Yu v. Forero · filed 1992-06-01(f)

It is well settled that where a party is unable to effectively oppose a motion for summary judgment because the evidence needed is within the exclusive knowledge of the moving party, the court may deny the motion, without prejudice, or refrain from ruling on the motion pending further disclosure (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Classic Moments Co. v Akata, 176 AD2d 567, Denkensohn v Davenport, 130 AD2d 860, 861).

Section 3212(f) does not prevent summary judgment when the opposing party fails to satisfy its requirements and no material fact remains for trial.

Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co. · filed 1992-07-01(f)

Plaintiff having failed to satisfy CPLR 3212 (f) and there being no triable issues of material fact, defendant was properly awarded summary judgment by the trial court.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer deciding a summary judgment motion while a party examines evidence needed to oppose it.

Jones v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1992-07-09(f)

Because plaintiff has not yet conducted an examination of the vehicle, the more appropriate course of action would have been to grant renewal but to hold resolution of the summary judgment motion in abeyance while plaintiff conducts an examination and submits additional expert affidavits and evidence regarding the cause of this accident.

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking more discovery to defeat summary judgment to show that its lack of critical facts is unavoidable and that it made reasonable efforts to discover facts that could raise a triable issue.

Rothbort v. S.L.S. Management Corp. · filed 1992-08-03(f)

A party who claims ignorance of critical facts needed to defeat a motion for summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [f]) must first demonstrate that the ignorance is unavoidable, and that reasonable efforts were made to discover the facts which give rise to a triable issue (see, Kenworthy v Town of Oyster Bay, 116 AD2d 628, 629).

Section 3212(f) does not permit postponing a summary judgment decision based only on hope that discovery will uncover supporting evidence.

European American Bank v. Lofrese · filed 1992-08-17(f)

Mere hope that somehow there is additional documentary evidence in EAB’s possession which will prove improper loans provides no basis, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), for postponing a decision on the summary judgment motions (see, Kennerly v Campbell Chain Co., Campbell Chain Div. McGraw-Edison Co., 133 AD2d 669; Babcock v Allan, 115 AD2d 297).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment without prejudice when the opposing party needs discovery to obtain evidence needed to respond.

Hidary v. Maccabees Life Insurance · filed 1992-08-31(f)

It is plaintiff’s position, however, that she is unable to come forward at this time with evidence in admissible form showing that Jagust knew of the decedent’s medical history at the time the application was filled out, and requests that a determination of the instant motion be deferred until Jagust’s deposition ... has been taken. The court concurs (CPLR 3212 [f]; Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Desiderio, 104 AD2d 791).

Section 3212 permits a court to deny summary judgment while the opposing party seeks discovery of essential facts within the moving party’s exclusive knowledge and control.

Bisulco v. City of New York · filed 1992-09-29(f)

Moreover, at this point in the action, it is particularly inappropriate for this Court to sua sponte search the record and grant summary judgment on this cause of action since many of the underlying facts are within the exclusive knowledge and control of the defendant who erected and maintained the sign.

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when there is a basis to believe facts sufficient to justify it may exist.

Zelen v. City of Saratoga Springs · filed 1992-11-12(f)

We have reviewed plaintiffs discovery demand submitted with his opposition papers and NYRA’s response to the demand, including the reply affirmation of NYRA’s counsel, and find that aside from plaintiffs unsubstantiated allegations, there is no basis for concluding that facts sufficient to justify further discovery may exist (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) allows a court to defer a summary judgment motion when an opposing party shows that essential facts cannot yet be stated and further discovery is needed.

Joseph v. City of Buffalo · filed 1992-11-18(f)

Supreme Court should have decided the summary judgment motion. Neither plaintiff nor defendant Joseph opposed the City’s summary judgment motion upon the ground that facts essential to justify opposition existed but could not be stated, and neither party demonstrated that further discovery was essential to oppose the motion (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify further discovery when a party had ample time to pursue it and did not request it in opposition to summary judgment.

Liberman v. Gelstein · filed 1992-11-24(f)

Plaintiffs appellate argument that he needs further discovery (see, dissenting opn, at 442) is unavailing. Almost three years elapsed between defendant’s assertion of the common-interest privilege in his verified answer and the motion for summary judgment. Indeed, plaintiff never claimed a need for discovery in opposition to the motion (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) requires denial of summary judgment when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but are within the moving party’s exclusive knowledge or control.

Trustco Bank New York v. Higgins · filed 1993-03-04(f)

Where facts essential to justify opposition to a motion for summary judgment might exist, but cannot be stated because they are in the moving party’s exclusive knowledge or control, summary judgment must be denied (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment until discovery is complete when facts needed to oppose the motion are within the moving party’s knowledge and control.

Carter v. Maskell · filed 1993-04-22(f)

Given that facts necessary to oppose defendants’ summary judgment motion appear to be exclusively within defendants’ knowledge and control and plaintiffs disclosure has been prematurely curtailed, summary judgment is inappropriate (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Blue Bird Coach Lines v 107 Delaware Ave., 125 AD2d 971) until plaintiffs discovery has been completed.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when opposing affidavits show that facts essential to the opposition may exist but disclosure is needed.

Bank of New York v. Midland Avenue Development · filed 1993-05-10(f)

Moreover, it is apparent from the "affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist” but that disclosure is needed (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when a party has not had an opportunity to discover facts needed to oppose the motion.

Walter v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. · filed 1993-05-28(f)

The motion should also have been denied on the ground that plaintiff has not had an opportunity, through discovery, to inquire whether the river level had been altered by defendant at the time of the accident (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(b) requires a party opposing summary judgment to submit proof in evidentiary form showing facts sufficient to require a trial.

Carni v. Charles W. Jacobsen, Inc. · filed 1993-05-28(b)

In opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff failed to come forward, by the submission of proof in evidentiary form, to "show facts sufficient to require a trial” (CPLR 3212 [b]) on the issue of foreseeability. Therefore, defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Section 3212(f) permits summary judgment to be deferred when further discovery may reveal evidence needed to oppose the motion.

Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co. · filed 1993-06-10(f)

While these promises are not in themselves sufficient to justify holding International Paper liable for the alleged inadequacy of the scaffold with which plaintiff was supplied, they do furnish cause to believe that further discovery may lead to evidence that International Paper’s employees did exercise actual supervision or control over plaintiffs worksite (see, CPLR 3212 [f]). ... Thus, any conclusion that plaintiff cannot produce evidence to justify submitting the question of International Paper’s control and/or supervision to a trier of fact is, manifestly, premature, despite International Paper’s submission of an affidavit by its Safety Superintendent disclaiming supervision of any of its subcontractors (see, Groves v Land’s End Horn. Co., 80 NY2d 978).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but cannot be stated until discovery is completed.

Creteau v. Liberty Travel, Inc. · filed 1993-07-16(f)

LaCure’s summary judgment motion on the negligence and implied warranty causes of action was properly denied for the same reason. The full scope of LaCure’s relationship and involvement with Villa Carmel and the arrangements made by Liberty could not be ascertained by plaintiffs without further discovery.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment with leave to renew after discovery when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Caracci v. McChesney · filed 1993-08-09(f)

We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to deny the motion with leave to renew upon the completion of discovery. CPLR 3212 (f) provides, in relevant part, that "[s]hould it appear from affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated, the court may deny the motion”.

CPLR 3212 (f) permits a court to deny or defer summary judgment when essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated by the opposing party.

Soto v. City of Long Beach · filed 1993-10-18(f)

We find that the court did not err in denying the City’s motion for summary judgment. CPLR 3212 (f) provides that "[s]hould it appear from affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion [for summary judgment] that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated, the court may deny the motion or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had and may make such other order as may be just”.

CPLR 3212(f) permits discovery before summary judgment when essential facts are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge and may be disclosed through examination.

Baldasano v. Bank of New York · filed 1993-12-23(f)

Summary judgment is not justified where the existence of essential facts depends upon knowledge exclusively within the possession of the moving party and which might well be disclosed by cross-examination or examination before trial (CPLR 3212 [f]; Terranova v Emil, 20 NY2d 493, 497).

CPLR 3212(f) does not allow a party to defeat summary judgment by claiming a need for discovery when that party’s own inaction caused the lack of evidence.

Selznick v. Ordan Corp. · filed 1994-03-15(f)

Nor may plaintiff defeat summary judgment by asserting that salient facts exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movants exist which could not be stated without discovery (CPLR 3212 [f]), where, as here, the plaintiff’s own voluntary inaction is the cause of the lack of knowledge since plaintiff delayed six years in commencing the underlying action and never sought any discovery (Moxon v Barbour, 106 AD2d 558, 559).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment or allow more discovery when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

In re the Estate of O'Rourke · filed 1994-03-15(f)

While it is true that CPLR 3212 (f) authorizes the court to deny summary judgment or grant a continuance pending discovery when facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot be stated, here there is little or no indication as to what "essential” facts the petitioner believes exist that would justify the further discovery (see, Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 NY2d 152, rearg denied 52 NY2d 829).

Once a defendant shows entitlement to summary judgment, the plaintiff must offer evidence beyond conclusory assertions to substantiate the claim.

Richardson v. New York University · filed 1994-03-17

The defendants having made a showing of entitlement to summary judgment, therefore, plaintiff was required to produce evidentiary proof, beyond mere conclusory assertions, to substantiate his claim (National Bank v Alizio, 103 AD2d 690, 691, affd 65 NY2d 788).

CPLR 3212 (f) permits further discovery in response to a summary judgment motion, but not when the requested discovery is merely a fishing expedition.

Williams v. Village of Endicott · filed 1994-03-24(f)

Although CPLR 3212 (f) permits an opposing party to obtain further discovery, it should not be used when, as here, there has been a failure to demonstrate that the discovery being sought is anything more than a fishing expedition to explore the possibility of a cause of action.

Section 3212(f) requires denial of summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but are within the moving party’s exclusive knowledge or control.

Ciaffaglione v. Rabiner · filed 1994-03-31(f)

Where essential facts to justify opposition to a motion for summary judgment might exist, but cannot be stated because they are in the moving party’s exclusive knowledge or control, summary judgment must be denied.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment so the opposing party can conduct examinations before trial.

Williams v. Nolde · filed 1994-04-11(f)

We agree that the defendants should have such an opportunity (see, CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery to show how it might reveal material facts within the opposing party's exclusive knowledge and control.

Delaney v. Good Samaritan Hospital · filed 1994-05-31(f)

Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how further discovery might reveal the existence of material facts, currently within the exclusive knowledge and control of the defendants, which would warrant the denial of summary judgment (see, CPLR 3212 [f]; Kracker v Spartan Chem. Co., 183 AD2d 810, 813; Home Sav. Bank v Arthurkill Assocs., 173 AD2d 776, 777).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment pending discovery when affidavits show that facts essential to opposing the motion may exist.

Commerce & Industry Insurance v. North Shore Towers Management Inc. · filed 1994-09-16(f)

It must "appear from affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist.” (CPLR 3212 [f].) ... The court accordingly holds that the motion for summary judgment should be denied, with leave to renew after defendants have had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery.