N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3212

A claimed need for discovery does not prevent summary judgment without an evidentiary basis to believe discovery may produce relevant evidence.

Hariri v. Amper · filed 2008-03-25

It is settled that a claimed need for discovery, without some evidentiary basis indicating that discovery may lead to relevant evidence, is insufficient to avoid an award of summary judgment (see e.g. Cioe v Petrocelli Elec. Co., Inc., 33 AD3d 377 [2006]; Bank of Am. v Tatham, 305 AD2d 183 [2003]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when discovery is at an early stage and facts needed to oppose the motion may be within the movant’s exclusive knowledge.

Adler v. City of New York · filed 2008-06-10(f)

Nevertheless, inasmuch as discovery in the case is in its beginning stages, and information may be within the City’s exclusive knowledge as to whether it created the dangerous condition or enjoyed a special use of the sidewalk which gave rise to the dangerous condition (see Amabile v City of Buffalo, 93 NY2d 471 [1999]; Biondi v County of Nassau, 49 AD3d 580 [2008]; Posner v New York City Tr. Auth., 27 AD3d 542, 543-544 [2006]), summary judgment is inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Colon v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 35 AD3d 515, 517 [2006]; Baron v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 143 AD2d 792, 792-793 [1988]).

CPLR 3212 permits summary judgment before discovery when the uncontested facts support judgment and the opposing party identifies no issue requiring discovery.

Long Island Power Authority v. Anderson · filed 2008-07-22

Plaintiff Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 for an order granting summary judgment in its action against defendants seeking a declaratory judgment. The action was commenced on August 24, 2007, and the motion was made on February 25, 2008, without engaging in discovery. Predicated on the uncontested facts advanced by plaintiff, and the failure of defendants to identify an argument requiring discovery, the issue is deemed sufficiently ripe for decision.

CPLR 3212(f) does not allow a party to defeat summary judgment by requesting further discovery without an evidentiary basis to believe it will produce relevant evidence.

Doe v. City of New York · filed 2008-03-20(f)

Plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment on the ground that further discovery is needed. (CPLR 3212 [f].) No evidentiary basis has been offered to suggest that additional discovery would lead to relevant evidence necessary to oppose defendants’ meritorious grounds for summary judgment.

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Ruiz v. Griffin · filed 2008-04-22(f)

“CPLR 3212 (f) permits a party opposing summary judgment to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the position of the opposing party exist but cannot be stated” ... Here, the plaintiffs raised issues warranting further discovery. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, Old Navy’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when outstanding discovery may reveal facts needed to oppose the motion.

McGovern v. St. Cyril & Methodius Roman Catholic Church · filed 2008-06-24(f)

An award of summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the Diocese would be premature, since substantial discovery remains outstanding (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Rengifo v City of New York, 7 AD3d 773 [2004]; Lantigua v Mallick, 263 AD2d 467, 468 [1999]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment pending discovery when the nonmoving party shows that further discovery will yield material and relevant evidence.

Fleischman v. Peacock Water Co. · filed 2008-05-08(f)

However, while summary judgment may be denied when discovery has not been completed (see CPLR 3212 [f]), the nonmoving party must produce some evidence indicating that further discovery “will yield material and relevant evidence” (Zinter Handling, Inc. v Britton, 46 AD3d 998, 1001 [2007]). Here, we find no basis to disagree with Supreme Court’s conclusion that defendants had sufficient time to locate documents that would presumably be in their own possession and, therefore, the third-party complaint should be dismissed against Catskirondacks (see Meath v Mishrick, 68 NY2d 992, 994-995 [1986]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance pending discovery of facts needed to oppose it.

L & W Supply Corp. v. A.D.F. Drywall, Inc. · filed 2008-10-16(f)

Given that Federal asks for an opportunity to conduct discovery in order to oppose plaintiffs motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]), and also that facts necessary to oppose as to this issue are exclusively within the knowledge of ADF, a party who is adverse to Federal, Supreme Court should have held plaintiffs summary judgment motion as to the ninth cause of action in abeyance pending such disclosure (see Cassevah v Mack, 51 AD3d 1132, 1133 [2008]; Pank v Village of Canajoharie, 275 AD2d 508, 510 [2000]; Alston v Golub Corp., 129 AD2d 916, 918 [1987]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking to defer summary judgment for discovery to identify facts in the opponent’s exclusive possession that might preclude judgment.

Double Fortune Property Investors Corp. v. Gordon · filed 2008-10-21(f)

Defendant failed to identify any facts in plaintiffs exclusive possession that might have precluded summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to adjourn a summary judgment motion so the opposing party can review documents needed to determine whether a factual dispute exists.

Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. v. Hughes · filed 2008-11-05(f)

The Hugheses are entitled to copies of those documents to discover whether a question of fact exists regarding the second affirmative defense (see CPLR 3212 [f]). The documents have actually been provided by the plaintiff as part of its reply papers on this motion. The court adjourns that portion of the plaintiff’s motion until its December 5, 2008 return date and directs the Hugheses to serve opposition no later than November 28, 2008.

Under CPLR 3212(f), a summary judgment motion is not premature without evidence that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that facts needed to oppose the motion are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Prince v. Accardo · filed 2008-09-16(f)

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion, the appellant’s motion was not premature, as the plaintiffs offered no evidentiary basis ... suggesting that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the appellant’s knowledge and control (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d 736, 737 [2007]).

Section 3212 permits summary judgment when no material fact needs trial, and a request for more discovery does not delay it without facts suggesting that discovery will produce relevant evidence.

2386 Creston Avenue Realty, LLC v. M-P-M Management Corp. · filed 2008-11-18

Plaintiff’s argument that summary judgment was improper because discovery was incomplete is unavailing. CPLR 3212 provides that a party is entitled to summary judgment when there are no material issues of fact to be tried. ... A plaintiffs claimed need for discovery unsupported by facts suggesting it might lead to relevant evidence, which amounts to “mere hope,” is insufficient to forestall summary judgment (see Moran v Regency Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 20 AD3d 305, 306 [2005]).

CPLR 3212 (f) requires a party seeking more discovery to show that it might reveal facts within the movant’s control that would warrant denying summary judgment.

Nassau County v. Richard Dattner Architect, P.C. · filed 2008-12-02(f)

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the appellant dominated and controlled the activities of the subsidiary that owns Roy Kay’s successor entity and, moreover, made no showing that discovery might reveal the existence of facts within the appellant’s control which would warrant the denial of the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Serrano v New York Times Co., Inc., 19 AD3d at 578).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment without prejudice when discovery may uncover facts essential to opposing the motion.

Ruggio v. PCCB, Inc. · filed 2009-02-06(f)

Supreme Court properly denied the motion without prejudice. We agree with plaintiffs that discovery may uncover “facts essential to justify opposition” to the motion (CPLR 3212 [f]; see Wright v Shapiro, 16 AD3d 1042, 1043 [2005]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when essential facts may exist, but the proposed discovery must be capable of affecting the motion.

Clochessy v. Gagnon · filed 2009-01-15(f)

Hence, neither evidence of her intent to do so, nor defendant’s understanding thereof, would be sufficient to overcome plaintiffs’ demonstrated entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and Supreme Court properly , denied defendant’s request for further discovery before granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

CPLR 3212(f) requires an evidentiary basis to suggest that further discovery might yield relevant evidence before summary judgment is deferred for discovery.

Trombetta v. Cathone · filed 2009-02-10(f)

Defense counsel’s claim that further discovery was required (see CPLR 3212 [f]) is unavailing since the defendant failed to put forth some evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see Ruttura & Sons Constr. Co. v Petrocelli Constr., 257 AD2d 614, 615 [1999]).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts supporting the opposing party appear to exist but cannot yet be stated.

Aurora Loan Services v. Lamattina & Associates, Inc. · filed 2009-02-17(f)

“CPLR 3212 (f) permits a party opposing summary judgment to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the position of the opposing party exist but cannot be stated” ... Here, the plaintiff raised issues warranting further discovery. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, the motion of Washington Title for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Section 3212(f) does not require delaying summary judgment for discovery when the opposing party fails to explain its delay and offers only speculation about what discovery might reveal.

Dalaba v. City of Schenectady · filed 2009-04-09(f)

Finally, we discern no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court’s decision to grant plaintiff partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim without providing Edison with additional time within which to complete discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]). ... Given Edison’s inadequate showing, the grant of summary judgment to plaintiff was not premature.

Discovery concerning an issue irrelevant to the asserted defense does not make summary judgment premature.

Sassower v. Blumenfeld · filed 2009-05-01

However, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the plaintiffs’ alleged inability to demonstrate actual damages in this declaratory judgment action is wholly irrelevant to the defendant’s defense of impossibility. Based on the foregoing, the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment before discovery when the moving party appears to possess many relevant facts.

Slemish Corp. v. Morgenthau · filed 2009-06-02(f)

In any event, at this prediscovery juncture in a case where plaintiffs appear to have exclusive possession of many of the relevant facts, summary judgment is not appropriate (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny a summary judgment motion as premature when substantial discovery remains outstanding.

Seye v. Sibbio · filed 2009-04-21(f)

Additionally, the motion was premature since substantial discovery remained outstanding (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Patterson v Brennan, 292 AD2d 582 [2002]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny a summary judgment motion as premature, without prejudice to renewal after discovery, when discovery and depositions have not yet taken place.

Harvey v. Nealis · filed 2009-04-28(f)

The plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability was premature (see Hirsch v Greenridge Assoc., LLC, 26 AD3d 411, 412 [2006]). At the time of the plaintiffs motion, no discovery had taken place and neither party had been deposed (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Groves v Land’s End Hous. Co., 80 NY2d 978, 980 [1992]; Afzal v Board of Fire Commrs. of Bellmore Fire Dist., 23 AD3d 507, 508 [2005]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment or allow further disclosure when facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Desena v.City of New York · filed 2009-08-11(f)

Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), a trial court has the discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment or order a continuance to allow disclosure if “facts essential to justify opposition may exist, but cannot then be stated.” ... To the extent that Keyspan’s motion for summary judgment is based entirely upon evidence which refers to work which was planned or permitted to be performed at the work site, and not upon evidence showing what work was actually performed, the deposition of the Keyspan foreman, who was actually present, is necessary to resolve this factual dispute.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance for discovery when facts essential to opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

St Owner LP v. Doe · filed 2009-09-01(f)

Recognizing that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but could not be stated by the petitioner at the time without disclosure (CPLR 3212 [f]), the court granted the petitioner’s motion for discovery and held the respondent’s summary judgment request in abeyance.

Section 3212(f) permits additional discovery before summary judgment when the opposing party shows that it may yield material and relevant evidence.

Stoian v. Reed · filed 2009-10-29(f)

Under these circumstances, and given the fact that plaintiffs provide no reasonable excuse for delaying their request for additional discovery for over two years following depositions and, indeed, nearly six years after commencing this action, we find no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court’s decision to deny plaintiffs’ request (see Dalaba v City of Schenectady, 61 AD3d 1151, 1153 [2009]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not permit denial of summary judgment based on speculation that discovery may reveal useful information.

A & E Stores, Inc. v. U.S. Team, Inc. · filed 2009-06-09(f)

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the existence of an agreement to procure insurance or provide indemnification, and its speculation that useful information may be learned during discovery does not constitute ... grounds for denying the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Billy v Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 NY2d 152, 163-164 [1980]; Auerbach v Bennett, 47 NY2d 619, 636 [1979]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment while relevant discovery remains outstanding, with leave to renew when discovery is complete.

Kiernan v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp. · filed 2009-08-18(f)

The Supreme Court properly denied the motion of the plaintiff Robert Kiernan for summary judgment. ... However, the motion should have been denied with leave to renew upon the completion of discovery.

Under CPLR 3212(f), summary judgment is not premature when the opposing party fails to show that discovery would lead to relevant evidence.

J.J. Cassone Bakery, Inc. v. Neri's Land Improvement, LLC · filed 2009-09-29(f)

Moreover, contrary to Neri’s contention, Cassone’s cross motion for summary judgment was not premature, inasmuch as Neri failed to demonstrate that discovery would lead to relevant evidence (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Chambers v Old Stone Hill Rd. Assoc., 1 NY3d at 431; Evangelical Lutheran Church v Sahlem, 254 NY at 167; Forest Hills Gardens Corp. v 150 Greenway Terrace, LLC, 37 AD3d at 759-760; Forest Hills Gardens Corp. v Evan, 12 AD3d at 564; Silverstein v Shell Oil Co., 40 AD2d at 36; McKenna v Levy, 182 App Div 678 [1918]).

A party seeking further discovery to oppose summary judgment must offer an evidentiary basis suggesting that discovery may lead to relevant evidence.

Doe v. City of New York · filed 2009-11-17(f)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly rejected the plaintiffs contention that facts essential to justify opposition to that branch of the MTA/LIRR’s motion may exist upon further discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs cross motion to compel discovery. The plaintiff failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant evidence (see Panasuk v Viola Park Realty, LLC, 41 AD3d 804, 805 [2007]; Ruttura & Sons Constr. Co. v Petrocelli Constr., 257 AD2d 614, 615 [1999]).

Section 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment for further discovery unless the opposing party shows that discovery may reveal facts warranting denial.

Falcone v. Ibarra · filed 2009-11-17(f)

Furthermore, the defendant failed to establish that additional discovery would yield any facts indicating that the plaintiff was at fault and justify denying the plaintiffs’ motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Szczotka v Adler, 291 AD2d 444 [2002]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the opposing party needs discovery about facts material to the motion.

Westbrook v. Village of Endicott · filed 2009-11-25(f)

Street construction was occurring near where the accident occurred and, at a minimum, plaintiff is entitled to discovery on both defendant’s role in that construction and whether the construction created the pothole. ... As such, Supreme Court properly denied defendant’s motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Rupp v City of Port Jervis, 10 AD3d 391, 392 [2004]; Rengifo v City of New York, 7 AD3d 773 [2004]; cf. Federoff v Camperlengo, 215 AD2d at 808).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny or continue a summary judgment motion when essential facts cannot yet be stated, but the party seeking delay must offer an evidentiary basis that discovery may yield relevant evidence.

Shectman v. Wilson · filed 2009-12-08(f)

Pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), the trial court has discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment, or to order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had, if “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated.” For the court to delay action on the motion, the party seeking the delay must “put forth some evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery might lead to relevant evidence” (Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526, 527 [2009]; see Canarick v Cicarelli, 46 AD3d 587, 588 [2007]; Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d 736, 737 [2007]; Ruttura & Sons Constr. Co. v Petrocelli Constr., 257 AD2d 614, 615 [1999]).

Section 3212(f) does not justify postponing summary judgment based on speculation that discovery will uncover opposing evidence, particularly when the documents are not exclusively in the moving party’s possession.

Gersten-Hillman Agency, Inc. v. Heyman · filed 2009-12-10(f)

Here, not only is it evident that plaintiffs argument is based on pure conjecture and speculation, but it is also clear that any claimed documents are not in defendant’s exclusive possession, since plaintiff necessarily possesses any documentation or correspondence between the parties that would reveal an agreement to pay future commissions.

CPLR 3212(f) requires an evidentiary showing to defer summary judgment for discovery; speculation that discovery may uncover useful evidence is insufficient.

2 North Street Corp. v. Getty Saugerties Corp. · filed 2009-12-17(f)

Here, defendant’s proof fell short of the required showing, and its speculation that the discovery process may yield evidence sufficient to defeat the motion is not enough (see Clochessy v Gagnon, 58 AD3d 1008, 1010 [2009]; Lerwick v Krna, 29 AD3d 1206, 1209 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 712 [2006]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when further discovery may reveal material facts needed to oppose the motion.

Stubbs v. Ellis Hospital · filed 2009-12-31(f)

Accordingly, a triable issue of fact exists that warrants further discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Svoboda v Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp., Inc., 20 AD3d at 806; Pank v Village of Canajoharie, 275 AD2d at 509; Darling v Solomon, 227 AD2d at 851-852). As such, we discern no basis upon which to conclude that Supreme Court abused its discretion in denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Section 3212(f) permits delaying summary judgment for further discovery when necessary evidence is unavailable, but the opponent must offer an evidentiary basis to believe discovery will produce relevant evidence.

Williams v. D & J School Bus, Inc. · filed 2010-01-05(f)

While determination of a summary judgment motion may be delayed to allow for further discovery where evidence necessary to oppose the motion is unavailable to the opponent (see CPLR 3212 [f]), “[a] determination of summary judgment cannot be avoided by a claimed need for discovery unless some evidentiary basis is offered to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant evidence” (Ruttura & Sons Constr. Co. v Petrocelli Constr., 257 AD2d 614, 615 [1999]; see Wyllie v District Attorney of County of Kings, 2 AD3d 714, 717 [2003]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party seeking additional discovery before summary judgment must identify evidence that discovery might yield that could defeat the motion.

DeLorenzo v. St. Clare's Hospital · filed 2010-01-21(f)

In any event, plaintiff has failed to identify any evidence that might have been developed if additional discovery had been conducted that would have served to bar Supreme Court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Zinter Handling, Inc. v Britton, 46 AD3d 998, 1001 [2007]; Ahigian v Davis, 6 AD3d 956, 957 [2004]; Ramesar v State of New York, 224 AD2d 757, 759 [1996]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the opposing party needs discovery from the movant to obtain evidence relevant to the motion.

Execu/Search Group, Inc. v. Scardina · filed 2010-02-09(f)

Whether defendants misappropriated information while they were still working for plaintiff Execu/Search is a matter peculiarly within their own knowledge; however, at the time that the summary judgment motion was decided, defendants had not appeared for deposition or made their computers available for inspection. Thus, defendants cannot be heard to say that Execu/Search has failed to come forth with evidence sufficient to defeat the motion (CPLR 3212 [f]; see Raffaele v United States Life Ins. Co., 266 AD2d 100 [1999]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment for further discovery when the opposing party fails to show that the discovery sought is more than a fishing expedition.

Mancuso v. Allergy Associates · filed 2010-02-11(f)

Finally, plaintiff contends that defendants’ motion should have been denied insofar as it sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint because “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]). We reject that contention, based on plaintiffs “failure to demonstrate that the discovery being sought is anything more than a fishing expedition” (Greenberg v McLaughlin, 242 AD2d 603, 604 [1997]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party seeking discovery before summary judgment must show that discovery is needed to establish a triable issue of fact.

Bath Medical Supply, Inc. v. Allstate Indemnity Co. · filed 2010-02-19(f)

Further, in light of the availability of public records documenting plaintiffs licensing status, defendant “failed to demonstrate that discovery was needed in order to show the existence of a triable issue of fact (see CPLR 3212 [f])” (Delta Diagnostic Radiology, |P.C. v Interboro Ins. Co., 25 Misc 3d 134[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52222[U], *1-2 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; see also Corwin v Heart Share Human Servs. of N.Y., 66 AD3d 814, 815 [2009] [summary judgment should be deferred pending discovery only when the opponent “offer(s) an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery might lead to relevant evidence and that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff’]).

Section 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment when the opposing party fails to show that additional discovery would yield facts supporting its opposition.

Stanford v. Dushey · filed 2010-03-23(f)

Furthermore, the defendants failed to establish that additional discovery would yield any facts indicating that the plaintiff was at fault and justify the denial of the plaintiffs motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Falcone v Ibarra, 67 AD3d at 859; Carpio v Leahy Mech. Corp., 30 AD3d 554, 555 [2006]; Szczotka v Adler, 291 AD2d 444 [2002]).

A party seeking discovery to avoid summary judgment must offer an evidentiary basis that discovery may yield relevant evidence; speculative assertions are insufficient.

Steinberg v. Schnapp · filed 2010-04-13

Steinberg’s vague claims that he was made to bear the blame for purported problems in probating the estate, whatever they might be, do not meet the minimum showing necessary to forestall summary judgment.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny or continue a summary judgment motion when the opposing party shows that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated.

In re Thomas · filed 2010-04-16(f)

CPLR 3212 (f) and 3211 (d) provide that if it should appear from affidavits submitted in opposition to such motion that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated, the court may deny the motion or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained.” ... Respondent has not demonstrated that further discovery would reveal any additional facts to justify opposition to the motion. ... The request to dismiss or stay this motion to permit further discovery is denied.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when the opposing party needs further discovery of facts that may support its position.

Rodriguez v. DeStefano · filed 2010-04-20(f)

“CPLR 3212 (f) permits a party opposing summary judgment to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the position of the opposing party exist but cannot be stated” ... Here, the plaintiff raised issues warranting further discovery. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, that branch of the motion of ReMax and Coffen which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.

CPLR 3212(f) requires an evidentiary basis to suggest that further discovery may yield relevant evidence or reveal facts essential to oppose summary judgment that are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Brennan v. Gagliano · filed 2010-03-02(f)

Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the motion was not premature, as the plaintiffs failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to oppose the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the County (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d 736, 737 [2007]; Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759 [2006]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not require denial of summary judgment for outstanding materials unless the opposing party shows that those materials could produce evidence sufficient to defeat the motion.

Johnson v. Bauer Corp. · filed 2010-03-26(f)

Contrary to the further contention of plaintiffs, denial of the summary judgment motions was not required based on Bauer’s failure to provide them with certain materials inasmuch as they failed to demonstrate that the materials sought would produce evidence sufficient to defeat the motions (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Dunn v 726 Main & Pine, 255 AD2d 981 [1998]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment with leave to renew after discovery is complete.

Sidhari v. City of New York · filed 2010-03-23(f)

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of serious injury, with leave to renew upon completion of discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) allows a court to defer summary judgment so the parties can conduct discovery.

Gruenfeld v. City of New Rochelle · filed 2010-04-27(f)

The Supreme Court correctly determined that the plaintiffs and the YMCA should have been afforded an opportunity to conduct discovery prior to the award of summary judgment in favor of any of the parties (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Elliot v County of Nassau, 53 AD3d 561, 563 [2008]).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery when facts supporting a party opposing summary judgment appear to exist but cannot yet be stated.

Family-Friendly Media, Inc. v. Recorder Television Network · filed 2010-06-01(f)

CPLR 3212 (f) permits a party opposing summary judgment to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the position of the opposing party exist but cannot be stated (see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v LaMattina & Assoc., Inc., 59 AD3d 578 [2009]; Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 29 AD3d 636, 637 [2006]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment to show that facts essential to its opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Montalvo v. Chiaramonte · filed 2010-06-03(f)

Neither plaintiffs nor Chiaramonte submitted any affidavits ...or evidence to show that “facts essential to justify opposition [to the Tarts’ motion] may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) does not require depositions before summary judgment when the opponents have personal knowledge of the facts and fail to raise a triable issue.

Avant v. Cepin Livery Corp. · filed 2010-06-10(f)

Contrary to the finding of the motion court, depositions are not needed since the opponents of the motion had personal knowledge of the facts (cfi CPLR 3212 [f]), and failed to meet their obligation of laying bare their proof and presenting evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (Morgan v New York Tel., 220 AD2d 728 [1995]).

Section 3212 (f) permits a court to deny summary judgment and compel discovery when the opposing party has not had an adequate opportunity to obtain evidence essential to its opposition.

Barretta Realty Skyline v. American Abstract Associates, Inc. · filed 2010-06-11(f)

Consequently, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was properly denied since defendant had not yet had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery into issues which were within plaintiffs knowledge and which would be essential in opposing the motion (see Colombini v Westchester County Healthcare Corp., 24 AD3d 712, 715 [2005]). For this reason, the Civil Court properly granted defendant’s cross motion for an order compelling discovery pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party claiming summary judgment is premature to identify evidence that further discovery might produce and that could defeat the motion.

Len v. State · filed 2010-06-17(f)

Finally, we reject claimant’s alternative argument that the granting of the State’s summary judgment motion was premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]). Claimant “has failed to identify any evidence that might . . . [be] developed if additional discovery . . . [is] conducted that would . . . serve[ ] to bar [the Court of Claims] order granting [the State’s] motion” (DeLorenzo v St. Clare’s Hosp. of Schenectady, N.Y., 69 AD3d 1177, 1180 [2010]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking to defer summary judgment for discovery to show that further discovery may reveal facts essential to its opposition.

Nash v. Baumblit Construction Corp. · filed 2010-04-27(f)

Further, in its opposition, BCC failed to demonstrate that the plaintiffs’ motion was premature on the ground that discovery may lead to relevant evidence (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Wyllie v District Attorney of County of Kings, 2 AD3d 714, 717 [2003]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when conflicting accounts and outstanding depositions warrant further discovery.

Cardone v. Poidamani · filed 2010-05-11(f)

We agree with the Supreme Court that it would have been premature to award summary judgment at this stage of the case. Among other things, the plaintiff and Steven Barberesi submitted affidavits containing discrepancies pertaining to the circumstances of the accident, and Poidamani died during the pendency of the action. Furthermore, the plaintiff and Steven Barberesi have yet to be deposed.

Section 3212(f) permits a party opposing summary judgment to obtain further discovery when facts supporting its position may exist but cannot yet be stated.

In re the Estate of Fasciglione · filed 2010-05-04(f)

A party opposing summary judgment is entitled to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot then be stated (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 29 AD3d 636, 637 [2006]; Urcan v Cocarelli, 234 AD2d 537 [1996]). ... Under the circumstances of this case, the Surrogate’s Court properly denied the proponent’s motion as premature, without prejudice to renewal (see Groves v Land’s End Hous. Co., 80 NY2d 978 [1992]; Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 29 AD3d at 637-638; Matter of Jacinto, 172 AD2d 664 [1991]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when discovery may reveal facts supporting the opposing party’s position that it cannot yet state.

Evangelista v. Kambanis · filed 2010-06-29(f)

Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying, as premature, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Matter of Fasciglione, 73 AD3d at 769; Gruenfeld v City of New Rochelle, 72 AD3d 1025 [2010]; Rodriguez v DeStefano, 72 AD3d at 926; Harvey v Nealis, 61 AD3d 935, 936 [2009]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment for incomplete discovery when relevant discovery has been completed.

Loughlin v. City of New York · filed 2010-06-01(f)

The Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of Keyspan’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing Rainbow’s cross claim insofar as asserted against it. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s finding that discovery was incomplete (see CPLR 3212 [f]), relevant discovery had, in fact, been completed, and no party opposed Keyspan’s cross motion on that ground.

Under CPLR 3212(f), a summary judgment motion is not premature unless the opponent offers an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Espada v. City of New York · filed 2010-06-29(f)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the defendants’ motion was not premature, as the plaintiff failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the defendants’ knowledge and control (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Hill v Ackall, 71 AD3d 829 [2010]; Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d 736, 737 [2007]).

Section 3212(f) allows a court to deny or postpone summary judgment for further discovery when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Fabiano v. Philip Morris Inc. · filed 2010-07-13(f)

Finally, the court denies plaintiffs’ request for additional discovery. Where it appears that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated,” a court has the discretion either to deny the motion or to order a continuance to permit the opposing party an opportunity to obtain the required disclosure or affidavits (CPLR 3212 [f]). ... Here, plaintiffs have not identified facts essential to justify opposition to defendants’ motion.

Section 3212(f) permits delaying summary judgment for discovery when the opponent offers an evidentiary basis to believe discovery will yield relevant evidence.

Anne Koplick Designs, Inc. v. Lite · filed 2010-08-10(f)

Moreover, while determination of a summary judgment motion may be delayed to allow for further discovery where evidence necessary to oppose the motion is unavailable to the opponent (see CPLR 3212 [fj), “[a] determination of summary judgment cannot be avoided by a claimed need for discovery unless some evidentiary basis is offered to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant evidence” (Ruttura & Sons Constr. Co. v Petrocelli Constr., 257 AD2d 614, 615 [1999]; see Williams v D & J School Bus, Inc., 69 AD3d 617, 619 [2010]; Wyllie v District Attorney of County of Kings, 2 AD3d 714, 717 [2003]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not warrant denying summary judgment for further discovery when the opposing party fails to show that the discovery would produce evidence sufficient to defeat the motion.

Carson v. Town of Oswego · filed 2010-10-01(f)

Contrary to the further contention of plaintiffs, they failed to establish that the discovery they sought would produce evidence sufficient to defeat the motion, and thus denial of the motion was not warranted pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) (see Johnson v Bauer Corp., 71 AD3d 1586, 1587 [2010]).

Section 3212(f) permits a party opposing summary judgment to obtain further discovery when supporting facts appear to exist but cannot yet be stated.

Botros v. Flamm · filed 2010-10-05(f)

CPLR 3212 (f) permits a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the position of the opposing party exist but cannot be stated ... Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, with leave to renew upon the completion of disclosure, the defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when the opponent identifies facts essential to its opposition that are within the movant’s exclusive knowledge and control.

Miller v. Icon Group LLC · filed 2010-10-28(f)

The motion court properly denied defendant’s request for further discovery prior to determination of the motion (CPLR 3212 [f]), since defendant did not identify facts essential to justify opposition to the motion that would have been exclusively within plaintiffs knowledge and control (Global Mins. & Metals Corp. v Holme, 35 AD3d 93, 102-103 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 804 [2007]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery before summary judgment to show how it will uncover relevant evidence or material in the opposing party’s exclusive possession.

Kent v. 534 East 11th Street · filed 2010-10-28(f)

Here, the plaintiff has failed to establish how discovery will uncover further evidence or material in the exclusive possession of the defendants, as is required under CPLR 3212 (f).

Section 3212(f) does not require a court to decide a motion to compel disclosure before ruling on summary judgment when the requested disclosure is irrelevant to the dispositive motions.

Shields v. Carbone · filed 2010-11-24(f)

O&A cross-moved for summary judgment only on its breach of contract cross claim against Carbone, and the disclosure at issue dealt with its quantum meruit claim. Disclosure was stayed pending a determination of the dispositive motions (see CPLR 3214 [b]), and the demanded disclosure was irrelevant to those motions. Thus, Carbone was not entitled to have its motion to compel determined prior to the court issuing the order that is on appeal (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment pending discovery when the record provides some basis to believe evidence sufficient to oppose the motion may exist.

Westchester Medical Center v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 2010-12-17(f)

However, denial of the motion on the ground that necessary disclosure is lacking is appropriate if there is some basis in the record for finding that evidence sufficient to defeat the motion may exist, especially where the facts appear to lie within the knowledge of the opposing party and discovery is in its early stages.

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts supporting the opposing party appear to exist but cannot yet be stated.

Lettieri v. Cushing · filed 2011-01-11(f)

In addition, CPLR 3212 (f) permits a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the position of the opposing party exist but cannot be stated (see Botros v Flamm, 77 AD3d 602 [2010]; Family-Friendly Media, Inc. v Recorder Tel. Network, 74 AD3d 738 [2010]; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v LaMattina & Assoc., Inc., 59 AD3d 578 [2009]).

Section 3212(f) requires an evidentiary showing that further discovery will yield material and relevant evidence before summary judgment is delayed.

Saratoga Associates Landscape Architects v. Lauter Development Group · filed 2010-10-28(f)

Further, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs request for a stay of the motion pending further discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]). In the absence of “some evidentiary showing suggesting that completion of discovery will yield material and relevant evidence” (Zinter Handling, Inc. v Britton, 46 AD3d 998, 1001 [2007]; accord Overseas Private Inv. Corp. v Nam Koo Kim, 69 AD3d 1185, 1188 [2010], lv dismissed 14 NY3d 935 [2010]), plaintiff’s conjecture that, further discovery might support its claim of a joint venture or agency relationship between Zimmerman and Abode was nothing more than the “mere hope that evidence sufficient to defeat the motion may be uncovered” (Stoian v Reed, 66 AD3d 1278, 1280 [2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment with leave to renew when discovery remains outstanding.

Leung v. Suffolk Plate Glass Co. · filed 2010-11-03(f)

Since discovery is still outstanding in the action, the Supreme Court properly denied the appellants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them, with leave to renew after the completion of discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) does not require denial of a summary judgment motion merely because the opposing party argues that it is premature.

Nsiah-Ababio v. Hunter · filed 2010-11-03(f)

In this regard, the defendants’ contention that the motion should have been denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) as premature is unpersuasive.

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party requesting further discovery to oppose summary judgment must provide a proper evidentiary basis for the request.

Strauss v. Billig · filed 2010-11-04(f)

Defendant failed to provide a proper evidentiary basis supporting her request for further discovery on the issue of liability (see e.g. Global Mins. & Metals Corp. v Holme, 35 AD3d 93, 102-103 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 804 [2007]; CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking additional discovery to identify specific discovery calculated to yield facts warranting denial of summary judgment.

Town of Southold v. Estate of Edson · filed 2010-11-09(f)

In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]), and failed to request additional, specific discovery which was calculated to yield facts warranting the denial of the plaintiffs motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Town of Brookhaven v Mascia, 38 AD3d 758, 759 [2007]; Town of Hempstead v Incorporated Vil. of Atl. Beach, 278 AD2d 308, 310 [2000]).

Section 3212(f) does not warrant delaying summary judgment for discovery that the opposing party had a reasonable opportunity to pursue but did not.

LIN, KAI v. STRONG HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF DENTIS · filed 2011-03-25(f)

Plaintiff further contends that the court erred in granting defendants’ cross motions because defendants failed to disclose certain X rays and dental impressions. We reject that contention (see generally CPLR 3212 [f]; Walsh v Aspen Sq. Mgt., Inc., 46 AD3d 1411; Kenworthy v Town of Oyster Bay, 116 AD2d 628). The record establishes that, in response to plaintiff’s revised demand for discovery, defendants offered to arrange a meeting where plaintiff could inspect those items or, in the alternative, defendants offered to make copies of the requested items at plaintiff’s expense. Plaintiff did not accept either of defendants’ offers, however, and thus “plaintiff did not ‘demonstrate a reasonable attempt, prior to the [cross] motion[s], to pursue the discovery now claimed to be necessary’ ” (Walsh, 46 AD3d at 1412).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking more discovery before summary judgment to show by affidavit that essential facts exist but are unavailable.

Westport Insurance v. Altertec Energy Conservation, LLC · filed 2011-03-29(f)

While the plaintiff claimed that discovery was necessary, it failed to submit any affidavits establishing that facts existed which were essential to justify opposition to the motion but were not in its possession in light of the fact that discovery had yet to be completed (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Rodriguez v DeStefano, 72 AD3d 926 [2010]; Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 29 AD3d 636, 637 [2006]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking to defer summary judgment for discovery to submit an affidavit showing that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Panasia Estates, Inc. v. Hudson Insurance · filed 2011-04-07(f)

The court erred in denying plaintiffs properly filed summary judgment motion, absent the submission by defendant of an affidavit in opposition to the motion showing that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Miller v Icon Group LLC, 77 AD3d 586 [2010]; A & E Stores, Inc. v U.S. Team, Inc., 63 AD3d 486 [2009]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment without prejudice when the opposing party needs discovery that may reveal facts supporting its position.

Nicholson v. Bader · filed 2011-04-12(f)

“A party opposing summary judgment is entitled to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot then be stated” ... Here, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability approximately one month after joinder of issue and prior to the exchange of any discovery. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, without prejudice to renewal upon the completion of discovery.

Section 3212(f) does not require delaying summary judgment when the party seeking more discovery fails to show that it might produce evidence defeating the motion.

Freiman v. JM Motor Holdings NR 125-139, LLC · filed 2011-03-29(f)

There was no need to delay the determination of the motion by virtue of CPLR 3212 (f). The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that additional discovery might lead to relevant evidence which would have defeated any branch of the defendants’ motion (see Dempaire v City of New York, 61 AD3d 816 [2009]; Conte v Frelen Assoc., LLC, 51 AD3d 620, 621 [2008]; Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006]).

Section 3212(f) permits a party to avoid a summary judgment determination based on a need for discovery only if the party shows that discovery may lead to relevant evidence.

Chin-Sue v. City of New York · filed 2011-04-05(f)

A determination of a motion for summary judgment cannot be avoided by a claimed need for discovery unless the party opposing the motion demonstrates that discovery may lead to relevant evidence (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Nash v Baumblit Constr. Corp., 72 AD3d 1037, 1040 [2010]). Here, the plaintiff failed to make the requisite showing.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the opposing party has not had a reasonable opportunity for discovery and facts needed to oppose the motion are within the movant’s exclusive knowledge.

Dietrich v. Grandsire · filed 2011-04-26(f)

“Under CPLR 3212 (f), ‘where facts essential to justify opposition to a motion for summary judgment are exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant, summary judgment may be denied .... This is especially so where the opposing party has not had a reasonable opportunity for disclosure prior to the making of the motion’ ” ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, without prejudice to renewal.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice when the opposing party may need discovery to establish facts supporting its position.

James v. Aircraft Service International Group · filed 2011-05-17(f)

“A party opposing summary judgment is entitled to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot then be stated” ... Here, the appellant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it prior to the exchange of any discovery. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly denied the appellant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it without prejudice to renewal after the completion of discovery.

Section 3212(f) allows a court to withhold summary judgment when relevant discovery has not yet taken place.

Wasek v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 2011-06-07(f)

Given that discovery has not yet taken place regarding third-party plaintiffs’ claim to pierce the corporate veil of third-party defendant Construction Force Services, Inc., with which they allegedly had an agreement for provision of insurance coverage, summary judgment is not warranted at this time (see CPLR 3212 [f]; see also Berkeley Fed. Bank & Trust v 229 E. 53rd St. Assoc., 242 AD2d 489 [1997]).

Under section 3212(f), an affidavit must show that facts essential to oppose summary judgment may exist but cannot then be stated.

Citibank v. Silverman · filed 2011-06-09(f)

Assuming, arguendo, that CPLR 3212 (f) applies to an action commenced under CPLR 3213, defendant’s affidavit failed to show that “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]; see also Global Mins. & Metals Corp. v Holme, 35 AD3d 93, 103 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 804 [2007]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires more than speculation to establish that further discovery is necessary before summary judgment.

NIAGARA FALLS WATER BOARD v. CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS · filed 2011-06-17(f)

Further, plaintiff failed to establish, beyond mere speculation, that further discovery was necessary (see generally CPLR 3212 [f]; Heritage Hills Socy., Ltd. v Heritage Dev. Group, Inc., 56 AD3d 426, 427).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when the party seeking it demonstrates that discovery is warranted.

Ferolito v. Vultaggio · filed 2011-06-23(f)

Nor did defendants demonstrate that further discovery is warranted (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Voluto Ventures, LLC v Jenkens & Gilchrist Parker Chapin LLP, 44 AD3d 557 [2007]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to delay summary judgment for further discovery when the opposing party shows that the discovery may yield material evidence.

Suriel v. Dominican Republic Education & Mentoring Project, Inc. · filed 2011-06-23(f)

Initially, plaintiffs argue that the summary judgment motions should have been denied pending further discovery, but they fail to demonstrate how the discovery they seek would yield material evidence (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Beesmer v Besicorp Dev., Inc., 72 AD3d 1460, 1461 [2010]). To the extent that plaintiffs made that showing as to further discovery regarding DREAM’s finances, they have not shown how the discovery may reveal material facts within defendants’ exclusive knowledge (see Beesmer v Besicorp Dev., Inc., 72 AD 3d at 1461).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking additional discovery to oppose summary judgment to show why that discovery is necessary.

Nassau Regional Off Track Betting Corp. v. Gloria R. Keily Revocable Trust · filed 2011-07-19(f)

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]) or make a showing that additional discovery was necessary to oppose the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Westport Ins. Co. v Altertec Energy Conservation, LLC, 82 AD3d 1207, 1212 [2011]).

Section 3212(f) permits a party to oppose summary judgment as premature by showing that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge and control.

Haque v. Daddazio · filed 2011-05-10(f)

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to oppose the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the defendant (see CPLR 3212 [f|; Westport Ins. Co. v Altertec Energy Conservation, LLC, 82 AD3d 1207 [2011]; Gasis v City of New York, 35 AD3d 533, 534 [2006]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when the opposing party has not had an adequate opportunity for discovery.

Bond v. DeMasco · filed 2011-05-31(f)

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, their motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Lambert v Sklar, 61 AD3d 939, 940 [2009]; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v LaMattina & Assoc., Inc., 59 AD3d 578 [2009]). The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability prior to the parties’ depositions. The defendants did not have an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery (see Amico v Melville Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 39 AD3d 784, 785 [2007]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires evidence suggesting that further discovery will yield relevant evidence before a summary judgment motion can be denied as premature.

Ehrenhalt v. Kinder · filed 2011-06-16(f)

Defendant’s contention that plaintiffs motion is premature because more discovery is required is unsupported by any evidence suggesting that additional discovery will lead to further relevant evidence (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Zinter Handling, Inc. v Britton, 46 AD3d 998, 1001 [2007]; Duane Morris LLP v Astor Holdings Inc., 61 AD3d 418 [2009]).

CPLR 3212 (f) permits a court to defer summary judgment and order disclosure when facts essential to opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

East 75th Street Diagnostic Imaging v. Clarendon National Insurance · filed 2011-09-08(f)

As permitted by CPLR 3212 (f), the court has discretion to deny a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, or to order a continuance to permit plaintiff to pursue disclosure of underlying medical records, when a defendant moves for summary judgment upon a “naked” peer review report that appears to rely heavily upon the content of such records.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when discovery may reveal relevant evidence, but discovery does not delay judgment on defenses to which it could add nothing relevant.

Bank of America, N.A. v. Hillside Cycles, Inc. · filed 2011-11-01(f)

Here, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying, as premature, that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint, inasmuch as discovery may result in disclosure of evidence relevant to the causes of action asserted in the complaint (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Bond v DeMasco, 84 AD3d 1292, 1293 [2011]; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v LaMattina & Assoc., Inc., 59 AD3d 578 [2009] ; Betz v N.Y.C. Premier Props., Inc., 38 AD3d at 815).

Further discovery need not delay summary judgment when the opposing party identifies no essential facts within the movant’s exclusive knowledge.

Martinez v. 342 Property LLC · filed 2011-11-03(f)

We agree with the motion court’s finding that appellants have failed to-point to any facts within the exclusive knowledge of Site Safety which may exist and are essential to justify opposition to the summary judgment motion. We thus affirm the motion court’s conclusion that there was no need to await further discovery prior to decision of the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Auerbach v Bennett, 47 NY2d 619, 636 [1979]; Banque Nationale de Paris v 1567 Broadway Ownership Assoc., 214 AD2d 359, 361 [1995]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party opposing summary judgment must demonstrate that discovery is necessary to oppose the motion.

Gabriel v. Zwerin · filed 2011-11-09(f)

Further, the appellants failed to demonstrate that discovery was necessary to oppose the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f|; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Total Equipment, LLC v. Praetorian Insurance · filed 2011-11-09(f)

CPLR 3212 (f) permits the court to deny a motion for summary judgment if facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot be stated.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment and allow discovery into a material factual dispute.

Yant v. Mile Square Transportation, Inc. · filed 2011-11-10(f)

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion should have been denied and defendants should have been permitted to conduct discovery to determine whether or not plaintiff was indeed a passenger (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Bartee v D & S Fire Protection Corp., 79 AD3d 508 [2010]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion for further discovery when that discovery could yield facts essential to opposing the motion.

Robiou v. City of New York · filed 2011-11-22(f)

Moreover, we agree with the motion court’s conclusion that further discovery could not lead to “facts essential to justify opposition” (CPLR 3212 [f]), warranting a denial of defendant’s summary judgment motion (see Auerbach v Bennett, 47 NY2d 619, 636 [1979]; Banque Nationale de Paris v 1567 Broadway Ownership Assoc., 214 AD2d 359, 361 [1995]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), incomplete discovery does not make a summary judgment motion premature unless the opposing party shows that further discovery might lead to relevant evidence.

Campbell v. Malik · filed 2011-09-27(f)

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the motion was not properly denied as premature on the ground that discovery had not yet been completed. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that further discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Cortes v Whelan, 83 AD3d 763 [2011]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated because discovery remains outstanding.

Krystal G. v. Roman Catholic Diocese · filed 2011-10-14(f)

CPLR 3212 (f) authorizes denying a summary judgment motion if it appears from affidavits submitted in opposition that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated. Here, discovery has not yet taken place and Juan G.’s affidavit references discoverable materials, exclusively within defendants’ control, that may support plaintiffs’ contention that Agostino either knew or should have known of Cortez’s propensity to act in the manner that caused plaintiffs’ injuries (see n 12). Therefore, Agostino’s motion for summary judgment is denied as premature.

Section 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment as premature unless the opposing party shows reasonable efforts to discover facts that could create a triable issue or that further discovery might yield relevant evidence.

Swedbank, AB v. Hale Avenue Borrower, LLC · filed 2011-11-15(f)

Moreover, contrary to the respondents’ contention, that branch of the motion was not properly denied as premature on the ground that discovery had not yet been completed. The respondents failed to demonstrate that they made reasonable attempts to discover the facts which would give rise to a triable issue of fact or that further discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Cortes v Whelan, 83 AD3d 763, 764 [2011]; Sasson v Setina Mfg. Co., Inc., 26 AD3d 487, 488 [2006]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment for lack of discovery when the opposing party has neither sought the discovery nor shown that it would yield material or relevant evidence.

Leichter v. Cambridge Development, LLC · filed 2011-12-20(f)

There is no basis to deny the motion based on a lack of discovery from Avondale. Plaintiff has not shown that she made any attempt to obtain discovery from Avondale or that such discovery would lead to material or relevant evidence (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Voluto Ventures, LLC v Jenkens & Gilchrist Parker Chapin LLP, 44 AD3d 557 [2007]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion without prejudice when it is premature because discovery has not yet occurred.

Taylor v. Krebs · filed 2011-12-06(f)

Under the facts of this case, it was premature for the Supreme Court to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability prior to the exchange of any discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Babcock v Roche, 262 AD2d 512, 512-513 [1999]; McNally v Fitzgerald, 260 AD2d 355, 356 [1999]; Hentschel v Campbell Carpet Servs., 256 AD2d 500, 500-501 [1998]; Barletta v Lewis, 237 AD2d 238 [1997]). Accordingly, the motion should have been denied, without prejudice to renewal upon the completion of discovery.

Section 3212(f) does not require delaying summary judgment when there is no basis to believe further discovery will yield evidence sufficient to oppose the motion.

Rivera v. City of New York · filed 2011-12-13(f)

Nor is there a basis to suggest that further discovery may lead to relevant evidence sufficient to oppose the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Brennan v Gagliano, 71 AD3d 620 [2010]; Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d 736 [2007]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature, with leave to renew after disclosure is complete.

Gregorian v. New York Life Insurance Co. · filed 2011-12-20(f)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, those branches of the defendant’s motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the third and fourth causes of action alleging age discrimination, with leave to renew upon the completion of disclosure (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Groves v Land’s End Hous. Co., 80 NY2d 978, 980 [1992]; Botros v Flamm, 77 AD3d 602, 603 [2010]; Afzal v Board of Fire Commrs. of Bellmore Fire Dist., 23 AD3d 507 [2005]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking more discovery before summary judgment to show that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the moving parties’ knowledge and control.

Savage v. Quinn · filed 2012-01-17(f)

Moreover, contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the motions of the Stony Brook defendants and Nesti were not premature. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that additional discovery may have led to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to oppose the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of these defendants (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Westport Ins. Co. v Altertec Energy Conservation, LLC, 82 AD3d 1207 [2011]; Gasis v City of New York, 35 AD3d 533, 534 [2006]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when the opposing party needs discovery to obtain facts essential to its opposition.

Jones v. American Commerce Insurance · filed 2012-02-21(f)

Here, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability prior to the exchange of any discovery. Since the defendant had no personal knowledge of the relevant facts (cf. Deleg v Vinci, 82 AD3d 1146 [2011]), it should be afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery, including depositions of the plaintiff, the operator of the uninsured vehicle, and an eyewitness identified in the police accident report (see Gardner v Cason, Inc., 82 AD3d 930, 931 [2011]).

Section 3212(f) allows a party to oppose summary judgment as premature by showing that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Medina v. Rodriguez · filed 2012-02-21(f)

Contrary to the appellants’ contention, summary judgment was not premature. The appellants failed to demonstrate that discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Martinez v Kreychmar, 84 AD3d 1037, 1038 [2011]; Theresa Striano Revocable Trust v Hoffman, 71 AD3d 993, 994 [2010]; Hill v Ackall, 71 AD3d 829, 830 [2010]).

Section 3212(f) does not make summary judgment premature when the opposing party fails to show that further discovery would yield relevant evidence.

Seaway Capital Corp. v. 500 Sterling Realty Corp. · filed 2012-04-10(f)

Contrary to 500 Sterling’s contention, an award of summary judgment was not premature, as 500 ... Sterling failed to demonstrate that further discovery would lead to additional relevant evidence (see CPLR 3212 [f]; McFadyen Consulting Group, Inc. v Puritan’s Pride, Inc., 87 AD3d 620, 621 [2011]; Dombrowski v Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 77 AD3d 608 [2010]; Shectman v Wilson, 68 AD3d 848, 850 [2009]; JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Agnello, 62 AD3d at 663).

Section 3212(f) allows incomplete discovery to delay summary judgment when the opposing party shows that facts essential to its opposition may exist but cannot then be stated.

KIRBIS, RYAN D. v. LPCIMINELLI, INC. · filed 2011-12-23(f)

Contrary to defendant’s further contention, “the fact that discovery has not been completed does not provide a basis to defeat plaintiff[’s] motion inasmuch as [d]efendant[ ] failed to establish that facts essential to justify opposition [to the motion] may exist but cannot then be stated” (Ewing v ADF Constr. Corp., 16 AD3d 1085, 1087 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature, with leave to renew after discovery is complete.

Elbaz v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2011-12-27(f)

Upon granting reargument, under the circumstances presented here, the court properly denied, as premature, with leave to renew upon the completion of discovery, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see CPLR 3212 [f|; Lettieri v Cushing, 80 AD3d 574, 576 [2011]; Botros v Flamm, 77 AD3d 602, 603 [2010]; Smith v City of New York, 38 AD3d at 644).

A summary judgment motion is not premature when the opposing party fails to show that further discovery would yield relevant evidence.

Davis v. City of New York · filed 2011-12-27(f)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the motion was not premature, since she failed to demonstrate that further discovery would lead to additional relevant evidence (see CPLR 3212 [i]; Abraham Natural Foods Corp. v Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 84 AD3d 1281 [2011]; Wood v Capital One Fin. Corp., 82 AD3d 1214 [2011]).

Section 3212(f) does not make a summary judgment motion premature when further discovery is irrelevant and the opposing party identifies no inaccessible facts essential to its opposition.

Taylor Building Management, Inc. v. Priority Payment Systems, LLC · filed 2012-01-24(f)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in denying Taylor’s motion as premature, as further discovery of the relationship between Global and Woogo is irrelevant to the resolution of the motion at bar, and Priority has not identified any facts essential to justify opposition to which Priority did not have access (see Pacheco v Halstead Communications, Ltd., 90 AD3d 877 [2011]; Ordonez v Levy, 19 AD3d 385, 386 [2005]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not make a summary judgment motion premature when the opposing party fails to show that further discovery would yield relevant evidence.

Rohr v. City of New York · filed 2011-12-27(f)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the motion was not premature, since she failed to demonstrate that further discovery would lead to additional relevant evidence (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Abraham Natural Foods Corp. v Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 84 AD3d 1281 [2011]; Wood v Capital One Fin. Corp., 82 AD3d 1214 [2011]).

Section 3212(f) allows a court to defer summary judgment for discovery when the opposing party shows that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge and control.

Friedlander Organization, LLC v. Ayorinde · filed 2012-04-03(f)

Contrary to the appellants’ contention, the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was not premature. The appellants failed to demonstrate that discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to oppose the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Westport Ins. Co. v Altertec Energy Conservation, LLC, 82 AD3d 1207 [2011]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), outstanding discovery does not justify delaying summary judgment when it would not reveal facts essential to opposing the motion.

BYRD, JOSEPH v. RONEKER, JR., FREDERICK E. · filed 2011-12-30(f)

Because there is no indication on the record before us that either document would be relevant to the dispositive issues of whether defendant is liable under the Labor Law or for common-law negligence, we conclude that neither document would reveal “facts essential to justify opposition” to the motion (CPLR 3212 [f]). Thus, the court should have granted defendant’s motion even though defendant had not yet produced the requested documents.

Section 3212(f) does not allow a court to postpone a summary judgment decision based only on hope that further discovery will uncover supporting evidence.

TUPPER, JOSEPH v. CITY OF SYRACUSE · filed 2012-03-23(f)

Although plaintiffs contend that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment at this juncture of the litigation because plaintiffs need additional disclosure, the “[m]ere hope that somehow [plaintiffs] will uncover evidence that will prove a case provides no basis pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) for postponing a determination of a summary judgment motion” (Wright v Shapiro, 16 AD3d 1042, 1043 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rowland v Wilmorite, Inc., 68 AD3d 1770, 1771). Plaintiffs were afforded voluminous documentation pursuant to a request under the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law art 6), and they have failed to establish that additional discovery will enable them to prove their case.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice to renewal when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but cannot be stated until discovery is conducted.

VOIGT, TIMOTHY v. SAVARINO CONSTRUCTION CORP. · filed 2012-04-27(f)

We reject the further contention of plaintiff that the court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment without prejudice to renew upon the completion of discovery. “Where, as here, ‘the facts essential to opposing [plaintiff’s] motion may exist but cannot be stated without conducting discovery of employees of [plaintiff] and others, the court [properly denied] the motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f)’ ” (Brown v Krueger, 13 AD3d 1182, 1182-1183).

CPLR 3212(f) permits delaying a summary judgment motion for needed discovery, but mere hope that discovery will reveal a triable issue is insufficient.

Chester v. Alsol Enterprises, Ltd. · filed 2012-05-08(f)

Although determination of a summary judgment motion may be delayed to allow for further discovery where evidence necessary to oppose the motion is unavailable to the opponent (see CPLR 3212 [f]), the mere hope that further discovery will reveal the existence of a triable issue of fact is insufficient to delay determination of the motion (see Williams v D & J School Bus, Inc., 69 AD3d 617, 619 [2010]; Rodgers v City of Neto York, 34 AD3d 555, 556 [2006]; Wyllie v District Attorney of County of Kings, 2 AD3d 714, 717 [2003]; Greenberg v McLaughlin, 242 AD2d 603 [1997]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits discovery to explore material factual issues before summary judgment is resolved.

Cetindogan v. Schuyler · filed 2012-05-10(f)

Defendant is entitled to discovery to explore these material factual issues (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) allows a party to oppose summary judgment because essential facts may be unavailable, but the party must support that claim with evidence rather than speculation.

STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY v. RICCI, MATTHEW · filed 2012-06-15(f)

“Although a motion for summary judgment may be opposed on the ground ‘that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated’ . . ., ‘the opposing party must make an evidentiary showing supporting [that] conclusion, mere speculation or conjecture being insufficient’ ” (Preferred Capital v PBK, Inc., 309 AD2d 1168, 1169; see Newman v Regent Contr. Corp., 31 AD3d 1133, 1134-1135).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment for discovery when the opposing party shows that additional discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Princetel, LLC v. Buckley · filed 2012-05-01(f)

Moreover, contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the subject branch of the defendants’ motion was not premature. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that additional discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the defendants (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Martinez v Kreychmar, 84 AD3d 1037, 1038 [2011]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), outstanding discovery does not make a summary judgment motion premature unless the opponent shows that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within another party’s knowledge and control.

Norero v. 99-105 Third Avenue Realty, LLC · filed 2012-06-06(f)

Furthermore, contrary to their contention, the plaintiff’s motion was not premature, as they failed to demonstrate how discovery may reveal or lead to relevant evidence or that “facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within” another party’s “knowledge and control” (Espada v City of New York, 74 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2010]; see CPLR 3212 [f]; Naranjo v Star Corrugated Box Co., Inc., 22 AD3d 545, 545-546 [2005]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment as premature to show that discovery may reveal relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Boorstein v. 1261 48th Street Condominium · filed 2012-06-06(f)

Moreover, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was not premature. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the defendant (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Martinez v Kreychmar, 84 AD3d 1037, 1038 [2011]).

Section 3212(f) does not require denial of summary judgment for further discovery when much of the information sought is within the opposing party’s knowledge.

20 Plaza Housing Corp. v. 20 Plaza East Realty · filed 2012-08-30(f)

Defendant does not show that the motion should be denied under CPLR 3212 (f) ... Much of the information defendant would like to discover is within the ken of defendant.

CPLR 3212 (f) does not warrant denying summary judgment to obtain depositions concerning defenses that are precluded.

Arco Medical New York, P.C. v. Lancer Insurance · filed 2012-09-19(f)

Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to the denial of plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) or to have its cross motion to compel the depositions granted (see ARCO Med. N.Y., P.C. v Lancer Ins. Co., 34 Misc 3d 134[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 52382[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Misc 3d 71, 73 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006]).

Section 3212(f) does not require denial of summary judgment merely because discovery is incomplete; the opposing party must show that facts essential to its opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

PINK, RAYMOND v. RICCI, MATTHEW · filed 2012-11-09(f)

Turning to the merits of plaintiffs’ cross motion for partial summary judgment in appeal No. 1 and the cross motions of the Wilburs and the hockey associations for summary judgment, upon reargument, in appeal No. 2, we reject defendant’s contention that the court erred in failing to deny the cross motions as premature. “ ‘[T]he fact that discovery has not been completed does not provide a basis to defeat [the cross] motion[s] . . . inasmuch as [defendant] failed to establish that facts essential to justify opposition [to the cross motions] may exist but cannot then be stated’ ” (Newman v Regent Contr. Corp., 31 AD3d 1133, 1134-1135; see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when discovery needed to assess the claim remains incomplete.

GENESEE/WYOMING YMCA v. BOVIS LEND LEASE LMB, INC. · filed 2012-09-28(f)

Contrary to Bovis’s further contention, we conclude that the court properly determined that it is premature to grant Bovis’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the YMCA’s first cause of action, for breach of contract, because discovery has not been completed, including depositions concerning Bovis’s performance of its ... obligations under the Agreement (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Coniber v Center Point Transfer Sta., Inc., 82 AD3d 1629, 1629; Syracuse Univ. v Games 2002, LLC, 71 AD3d 1531, 1531-1532).

CPLR 3212(f) does not make a summary judgment motion premature merely because discovery has not occurred; the opponent must show that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Romero v. Greve · filed 2012-11-07(f)

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion, the Greve defendants’ motion was not premature. The plaintiff and the Jahrsdoerfer defendants “failed to demonstrate that discovery may lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of’ the Greve defendants (Boorstein v 1261 48th St. Condominium, 96 AD3d 703, 704 [2012]; see CPLR 3212 [f]; Norero v 99-105 Third Ave. Realty, LLC, 96 AD3d 727, 728 [2012]; Espada v City of New York, 74 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2010]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking discovery before summary judgment to show that the discovery is necessary or that relevant material is exclusively in the opposing parties’ possession.

Vazquez v. Diamondrock Hospitality Co. · filed 2012-11-15(f)

It has failed to show that discovery regarding Marriott and Courtyard’s relationship is necessary or that material defining that relationship is in their exclusive possession (see CPLR 3212 [f]; see also Cruceta v Funnel Equities, 286 AD2d 747 [2d Dept 2001]).

Subdivision (f) requires an opponent seeking to defer summary judgment to submit affidavits showing that facts essential to opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Debevoise & Flimpton LLP v. Candlewood Timber Group LLC · filed 2013-01-29(f)

Defendants did not submit affidavits showing “that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]).

A party opposing summary judgment must demonstrate that further discovery is necessary to oppose the motion.

Mehra v. Nayak · filed 2013-02-27(f)

Moreover, contrary to the plaintiffs contentions, he failed to demonstrate that further discovery was necessary in order for him to oppose the Woodhull defendants’ motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; cf. Cirincione v Atlantic Hylan Corp., 57 AD3d 707 [2008]).

A party arguing that summary judgment is premature because more discovery is needed must submit an affidavit conforming to CPLR 3212(f).

City of New York v. TransportAzumah LLC · filed 2012-12-11(f)

Defendant’s contention that the court erred by granting plaintiff summary judgment before defendant had the opportunity to take two more depositions is unavailing. As far as we can tell from the appendix submitted on appeal by defendant, defendant never submitted an affidavit in conformity with CPLR 3212 (f) (see Chemical Bank v PIC Motors Corp., 58 NY2d 1023 [1983]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when discovery relevant to a defense remains outstanding.

All Boro Psychological Services, P.C. v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2013-02-08(f)

Consequently, the Civil Court properly denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [f]) and granted defendant’s cross motion to compel plaintiff to provide full and complete responses to defendant’s discovery demands and to produce Vladimir Grin-berg for an EBT.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a party to obtain discovery needed to oppose a summary judgment motion.

Lemay v. Hush Bar & Lounge, Inc. · filed 2013-02-27(f)

Nonetheless, under the circumstances presented here, the plaintiff was entitled to discovery ... in order to oppose the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]; cf. Murray v ANB Corp., 74 AD3d 1548, 1549-1550 [2010]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment for additional discovery when the opposing party shows that discovery is likely to produce evidence warranting denial.

Cashman v. Berroa · filed 2012-12-20(f)

Plaintiff has not shown that additional discovery will likely lead to evidence warranting denial of Parkchester’s motion (see Smith v Andre, 43 AD3d 770, 771 [1st Dept 2007]; CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment as premature to show that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Raimondo v. Plunkitt · filed 2013-01-23(f)

Antone contended that the motion was premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]), but he failed to demonstrate that discovery might have lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the Plunkitts (see Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d 736, 737 [2007]).

Section 3212(f) permits the court to defer summary judgment until the parties have answered and had an opportunity for disclosure that could affect the result.

Puerto v. Doar · filed 2013-04-17(f)

Therefore summary disposition of this action in large part is unwarranted, except upon a motion for summary judgment after all parties have answered and the opportunity for any disclosure that potentially may defeat a summary disposition. (See CPLR 3212 [f].)

A party that did not identify undisclosed facts essential to its opposition and instead cross-moved for summary judgment could not invoke CPLR 3212(f) to avoid summary judgment.

Mot Parking Corp. v. 86-90 Warren Street, LLC · filed 2013-03-26(f)

Further, it never argued before the motion court that there may exist undisclosed facts essential to its opposition (see CPLR 3212 [f]); on the contrary, it cross-moved for summary judgment. Both plaintiffs motion and defendant’s cross motion were made months after the filing of the note of issue and certificate of readiness for trial. Accordingly, defendant cannot now invoke CPLR 3212 (f) to avoid summary judgment (cf. Rosenthal v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 30 AD2d 650 [1st Dept 1968]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when the opponent shows that discovery could yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Anzel v. Pistorino · filed 2013-04-10(f)

Further, contrary to the Pistorinos’ contention, the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should not have been denied as premature, because the Pistorinos failed to demonstrate how discovery could lead to relevant evidence or that “facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff” (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760 [2006] [citation omitted]; see CPLR 3212 [f]; Brennan v Gagliano, 71 AD3d 620, 621 [2010]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), an unsubstantiated hope of finding relevant evidence through further discovery does not prevent the court from deciding a summary judgment motion.

Carroll v. Radoniqi · filed 2013-04-11(f)

The court properly decided the motions for summary judgment, despite plaintiff’s claimed need for further discovery, since plaintiff offered only an unsubstantiated hope of discovering information relevant to his claims (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Leonard v Gateway II, LLC, 68 AD3d 408, 410 [1st Dept 2009]).

A party waives an argument under CPLR 3212(f) that it needs evidence to oppose summary judgment by filing a note of issue and certificate of readiness.

Rodriguez v. City of New York · filed 2013-04-23(f)

We are not persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument that summary judgment should be denied because the City has exclusive possession of evidence needed to oppose the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]). Plaintiffs waived this argument by filing a note of issue and certificate of readiness (see e.g. Melcher v City of New York, 38 AD3d 376 [1st Dept 2007]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery when facts supporting opposition to summary judgment may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Chmelovsky v. Country Club Homes, Inc. · filed 2013-05-01(f)

The Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, that branch of the third-party defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint. “A party opposing summary judgment is entitled to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot then be stated” (Matter of Fasciglione, 73 AD3d 769, 770 [2010]; see CPLR 3212 [f]; Evangelista v Kambanis, 74 AD3d 1278 [2010]; Rodriguez v DeStefano, 72 AD3d 926 [2010]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits delaying summary judgment for discovery when the opposing party shows that discovery may reveal relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within another party’s knowledge and control.

Seidman v. Industrial Recycling Properties, Inc. · filed 2013-05-22(f)

Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the motion was not premature, as the plaintiff failed to demonstrate how discovery may reveal or lead to relevant evidence, or that “facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within” another party’s “knowledge and control” (Espada v City of New York, 74 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2010] ; see CPLR 3212 [f]; Norero v 99-105 Third Ave. Realty, LLC, 96 AD3d 727, 728 [2012]; Haque v Daddazio, 84 AD3d 940 [2011] ).

Section 3212(f) permits postponing a summary judgment decision for discovery when the opposing party shows that essential facts are in the movant’s exclusive knowledge and possession and can be obtained through discovery.

M&T BANK v. HR STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC. · filed 2013-05-03(f)

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the motion was not premature. “Defendant failed to demonstrate that facts essential to oppose the motion were in plaintiff’s exclusive knowledge and possession and could be obtained by discovery” (Franklin v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 291 AD2d 854, 854; see CPLR 3212 [f]; Rowland v Wilmorite, Inc., 68 AD3d 1770, 1770-1771; Brummer v Barnes Firm, P.C., 56 AD3d 1177, 1179).

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party opposing summary judgment as premature must show that discovery might yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Cajas-Romero v. Ward · filed 2013-05-15(f)

The Supreme Court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs’ motion was premature. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant (see CPLR 3212 [f]; see also Boorstein v 1261 48th St. Condominium, 96 AD3d 703 [2012]; Dietrich v Grandsire, 83 AD3d 994 [2011]; Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not make a summary judgment motion premature unless the opposing party shows that further discovery may yield relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposition are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Peluso v. Red Rose Restaurant, Inc. · filed 2013-05-22(f)

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the defendants’ motion was not premature. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that further discovery might lead to relevant evidence ... (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Tillem v Cablevision Sys. Corp., 38 AD3d 878 [2007]; Lambert v Bracco, 18 AD3d 619 [2005]).

A party seeking discovery under CPLR 3212(f) must identify facts showing that discovery is needed on material issues.

Emery v. Parker · filed 2013-06-27(f)

Plaintiff does not cite any facts suggesting that she should have been afforded discovery pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f). On the contrary, the record is complete on all material issues. Plaintiffs request for discovery relating to a handwritten annotation on a form that was relevant to her claim for unemployment insurance before the Department of Labor is not relevant to her section 487 claim, the only claim at issue here.

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when facts essential to oppose the motion cannot yet be stated, including when the opposing party needs a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

Wesolowski v. St. Francis Hospital · filed 2013-07-03(f)

An award of summary judgment would be premature at this stage of the case. CPLR 3212 (f) permits a court to deny a motion for summary judgment where it appears that the facts essential to oppose the motion “exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]; see Jones v American Commerce Ins. Co., 92 AD3d 844, 845 [2012]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when evidence in the defendants’ possession or control may enable the opposing party to defeat the motion.

Hedges v. East River Plaza, LLC · filed 2013-07-23(f)

Consequently, the court denies defendant Costco Wholesale Corporation’s cross motion for summary judgment on the ground that evidence beyond plaintiffs’ possession and control, but within defendants’ possession or control, may defeat the motion. (CPLR 3212 [f].)

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but are not yet available.

Aetna Life Insurance v. Appalachian Asset Management Corp. · filed 2013-07-30(f)

The motion court properly denied Garg’s summary judgment motion as premature, since facts essential to the opposition may exist but could not have then been provided.