N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3212

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when opposing affidavits show that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated; a generic request for more discovery is insufficient.

Red Zone LLC v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP · filed 2013-08-27(f)

The court has discretion to deny summary judgment if it “appear[s] from affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated.” (CPLR 3212 [f].) ... The affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment do not suggest that there are essential facts that have yet to be discovered. Generic requests for more discovery do not disrupt an otherwise valid summary judgment motion.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment with leave to renew after discovery.

A&F Fire Protection Co. v. RLW4 Construction, Inc. · filed 2013-09-11(f)

Under the circumstances of this case, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying these motions with leave to renew upon the completion of discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Jones v American Commerce Ins. Co., 92 AD3d 844 [2012]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature while the parties complete depositions, with leave to renew afterward.

Park Edge Condominiums, LLC v. Midwood Lumber & Millwork, Inc. · filed 2013-09-18(f)

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the moving defendants’ cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging breach of contract insofar as asserted against them, with leave to renew upon completion of the depositions of both sides.

Section 3212(f) does not make summary judgment premature when unanswered interrogatories seek no information probative of the disputed issue.

Bonacasa Realty Co., LLC v. Salvatore · filed 2013-09-25(f)

To the extent that Salvatore failed to respond to certain interrogatories, such failure did not render summary judgment premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]), as those particular interrogatories did not seek information probative of the issue of whether Salvatore misused the corporate form to commit a fraud or wrong upon the plaintiff.

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment to show that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Amini v. Arena Construction Co. · filed 2013-10-01(f)

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that facts essential to his opposition to the summary judgment motions may exist but could not be stated (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) requires an evidentiary basis that discovery might reveal relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing summary judgment are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge and control.

Yellowbook, Inc. v. Bonfiglio & Asterita · filed 2013-10-30(f)

Moreover, the defendants could not avoid summary judgment based on their claimed need for discovery, as they did not offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the plaintiffs knowledge and control (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Seidman v Industrial Recycling Props., Inc., 106 AD3d 983, 985 [2013]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when unfinished discovery may reveal evidence in the moving party’s exclusive possession that could raise triable issues of fact.

Miller-Francis v. Smith-Jackson · filed 2013-11-21(f)

Moreover, denial of summary judgment is warranted because defendants’ motion curtailed the discovery process, and ... there may be evidence in their exclusive possession that would enable plaintiff to present other triable issues of fact (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits disclosure needed to challenge claimed damages before those damages are determined on summary judgment.

Old Republic Construction Insurance Agency v. Fairmont Insurance Brokers · filed 2013-11-26(f)

Thus, under CPLR 3212 (f), defendant was entitled to disclosure about the audits that plaintiffs used to calculate the premium increases before damages were determined.

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party claiming that summary judgment is premature must show a basis for believing further discovery will yield relevant evidence, or that essential facts are exclusively controlled by the other party, and must have made a reasonable effort to obtain the evidence.

Cueva v. 373 Wythe Realty, Inc. · filed 2013-11-27(f)

Further, the Supreme Court properly rejected Wythe’s contention that the plaintiffs’ motion should have been denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) on the ground that it was premature. A party who contends that a motion for summary judgment is premature must show that there is some evidentiary basis to believe that further discovery would produce relevant evidence or that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion are exclusively within the knowledge and control of the other party ... It must also show that it made a reasonable effort to discover that evidence ... Wythe failed to meet either of these requirements.

Section 3212(f) permits disclosure of information needed to challenge claimed damages before those damages are determined.

Old Republic Construction Insurance Agency of New York, Inc. v. Fairmont Insurance Brokers · filed 2013-12-10(f)

Thus, under CPLR 3212 (f), defendant was entitled to disclosure about the audits that plaintiffs used to calculate the premium increases before damages were determined.

An opponent seeking to defer summary judgment for discovery must show that the discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge and control; speculation is insufficient.

Suero-Sosa v. Cardona · filed 2013-12-11(f)

The plaintiffs argument, supported only by her attorney’s affirmation, that a deposition of a witness from Saxon Mortgage was necessary since it may lead to evidence about Saxon Mortgage’s right to enter or inspect the subject premises is without merit since, based on this record, such discovery is unlikely to lead to relevant evidence (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Neryaev v Solon, 6 AD3d 510 [2004]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking more discovery before summary judgment to show that it may yield material and relevant evidence; speculation is insufficient.

Jacobs v. Mazzei · filed 2013-12-12(f)

However, plaintiff did not make the requisite “evidentiary showing suggesting that completion of discovery will yield material and relevant evidence” (Zinter Handling, Inc. v Britton, 46 AD3d 998, 1001 [2007]; accord Saratoga Assoc. Landscape Architects, Architects, Engrs. & Planners, P.C. v Lauter Dev. Group, 77 AD3d 1219, 1222 [2010]). Supreme Court had all the relevant documents before it, and plaintiffs claim that a deposition of Mazzei might yield further evidence is mere speculation.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when facts supporting the opposing party’s position may emerge through further discovery.

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Arias · filed 2013-12-18(f)

The Supreme Court properly denied, in effect, as premature, the defendants’ motion. “A party opposing summary judgment is entitled to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot then be stated” (Matter of Fasciglione, 73 AD3d 769, 770 [2010]; see CPLR 3212 [f]; Chmelovsky v Country Club Homes, Inc., 106 AD3d 684 [2013]; Gregorian v New York Life Ins. Co., 90 AD3d 837, 839 [2011]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to hold a summary judgment motion in abeyance for further discovery when the possibility of obtaining material evidence is not speculative.

Cunningham v. Keehfus · filed 2013-12-26(f)

Supreme Court’s initial determination to hold the motion in abeyance pending depositions on the issue of whether defendants had constructive notice of the lead paint hazard was not an abuse of its discretion. Defendants moved for summary judgment prior to the court-imposed deadline for depositions, the authority to conduct depositions was limited and, based on the evidence submitted, the possibility that further discovery would produce material evidence was not speculative (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Mead v Pentair Pump Group, Inc., 30 AD3d 788, 790 [2006]; Svoboda v Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp., Inc., 20 AD3d 805, 806 [2005]; Patterson v Brennan, 292 AD2d 582, 583 [2002]).

A party claiming a summary judgment motion is premature must show that discovery might yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Williams v. Spencer-Hall · filed 2014-01-22(f)

ICL’s contention that the motion should have been denied as premature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) is unpersuasive. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Boorstein v 1261 48th St. Condominium, 96 AD3d 703 [2012]; Dietrich v Grandsire, 83 AD3d 994 [2011]; Trombetta v Cathone, 59 AD3d 526 [2009]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion exist but cannot yet be stated, with leave to renew after discovery.

Castagna v. Almaghrabi · filed 2014-01-29(f)

“CPLR 3212 (f) permits a court to deny a motion for summary judgment where it appears that the facts essential to oppose the motion ‘exist but cannot then be stated’ ” (Wesolowski v St. Francis Hosp., 108 AD3d 525, 526 [2013], quoting CPLR 3212 [f]), especially where, as here, the plaintiff has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery, and has no personal knowledge of the relevant facts (see Wesolowski v St. Francis Hosp., 108 AD3d at 526; Jones v American Commerce Ins. Co., 92 AD3d 844, 845 [2012]). Under the circumstances of this case, the motion for summary judgment should have been denied, with leave to renew after the completion of discovery.

Section 3212(f) requires a party claiming summary judgment is premature to show that essential facts are in the moving party’s exclusive possession and can be obtained through discovery.

BROWN & BROWN, INC. v. JOHNSON, THERESA A. · filed 2014-02-07(f)

In any event, plaintiffs “ ‘failed to demonstrate that facts essential to oppose the motion were in [defendants’] exclusive knowledge and possession and could be obtained by discovery’ ” (M&T Bank v HR Staffing Solutions, Inc. [appeal No. 2], 106 AD3d 1498, 1499; see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) does not warrant delaying summary judgment based on mere speculation that further discovery will reveal evidence sufficient to defeat the motion.

AUSTIN, VIVIAN M. v. CDGA NATIONAL BANK TRUST · filed 2014-02-14(f)

Finally, there is no merit to plaintiff’s contention that summary judgment is premature because she has not yet deposed defendants’ janitorial staff or reviewed defendants’ records to identify all employees who were working on the date of the accident. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence tending to show that she requested, and was denied, the opportunity to depose additional employees during the relevant time period, or that she requested, but was not provided, the records sought (cf. Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 29 AD3d 636, 637-638; see generally CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment to show a need for further discovery.

Chekowsky v. Windemere Owners, LLC · filed 2014-02-18(f)

Defendants failed to show that they needed further discovery, especially since they are not seeking any records from plaintiff, and they had 17 months to search their own records (see Bailey v New York City Tr. Auth., 270 AD2d 156 [1st Dept 2000]; CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when further discovery may lead to relevant evidence.

Degen v. Uniondale Union Free School District · filed 2014-02-19(f)

In any event, the defendants and the third-party defendant demonstrated that the plaintiffs’ motion was premature, as further discovery may lead to relevant evidence (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 29 AD3d 636, 637 [2006]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny a summary judgment motion as premature when a party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery.

Video Voice, Inc. v. Local T.V., Inc. · filed 2014-02-26(f)

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying, as premature, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Bank of Am., N.A. v Hillside Cycles, Inc., 89 AD3d 653, 654 [2011]; Silver v Silver, 63 AD3d 903 [2009]; Elliot v County of Nassau, 53 AD3d 561, 563 [2008]; Venables v Sagona, 46 AD3d 672, 673 [2007]).

Section 3212(f) does not require denial of summary judgment for lack of discovery when the opposing party knows the relevant facts and fails to explain what discovery it needs.

Santana v. Danco Inc. · filed 2014-03-20(f)

Their objection that plaintiff’s summary judgment motion was premature because there had not yet been any discovery, was an insufficient basis for denying the motion since the relevant facts would be within Racan’s knowledge and they failed to explain what discovery was needed to oppose the motion (see Soto-Maroquin v Mellet, 63 AD3d 449 [1st Dept 2009]; CPLR 3212 [f]).

A party opposing summary judgment as premature under subsection (f) must show that discovery would lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposition are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Rodriguez v. Farrell · filed 2014-03-26(f)

Additionally, the motions were not premature. Farrell failed to demonstrate that discovery would lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to justify opposition to the motions were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiffs (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Medina v Rodriguez, 92 AD3d at 851; Hill v Ackall, 71 AD3d 829 [2010]).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Schlichting v. Elliquence Realty, LLC · filed 2014-04-02(f)

“A party opposing summary judgment is entitled to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot then be stated” (Matter of Fasciglione, 73 AD3d 769, 770 [2010]; see CPLR 3212 [f]; Jones v American Commerce Ins. Co., 92 AD3d 844, 845 [2012]). ... Here, an award of summary judgment would be premature at this stage of the action.

CPLR 3212(f) does not require denial of a summary judgment motion filed before discovery when the opposing party has sufficient facts to respond and is not prejudiced.

Patino v. Drexler · filed 2014-04-15(f)

The court properly declined to deny defendants’ summary judgment motion under CPLR 3212 (f). Although the motion was filed before discovery, this was due to plaintiffs failure to timely submit discovery demands, and plaintiff was not prejudiced since he was able to adjourn the motion twice and was in possession of defendants’ responses for approximately two months before submitting his opposition papers. Based on the responses by defendants, as well as plaintiff’s personal knowledge as to whether defendants supervised his work, he possessed sufficient facts to address defendants’ motion.

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts supporting the opposing party may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Postilio v. Deblasi · filed 2014-04-16(f)

“CPLR 3212 (f) permits a party opposing summary judgment to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the position of the opposing party exist but cannot be stated” ... Here, the plaintiff raised issues warranting further discovery.

Under CPLR 3212(f), incomplete discovery does not make a summary judgment motion premature when the opposing party can present the facts essential to oppose it, but the motion may be premature when those facts remain within the movant’s knowledge.

Jeffrey v. DeJesus · filed 2014-04-17(f)

Although discovery was not complete, the motion court erred in concluding that plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability was premature. Both drivers submitted affidavits, and defendants were able to submit facts “essential to justify opposition [to the motion]” (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Flores v City of New York, 66 AD3d 599 [1st Dept 2009]). However, that branch of plaintiffs’ motion seeking summary judgment on the threshold issue of serious injury was properly denied as premature. We note that plaintiffs served their long overdue discovery responses shortly before moving for summary judgment. Accordingly, limited discovery has been conducted, and facts essential to justify opposition are within plaintiffs’ knowledge (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Grande v Peteroy, 39 AD3d 590 [2d Dept 2007]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature.

Diaz v. Jadan · filed 2014-04-22(f)

On the merits, the court correctly denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability as premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Belziti v Langford, 105 AD3d 649 [1st Dept 2013]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking to delay summary judgment to identify essential facts within the opposing party’s exclusive knowledge and control.

Merisel, Inc. v. Weinstock · filed 2014-05-06(f)

Finally, the court also properly declined to deny summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) since Merisel failed to identify facts essential to justify opposition to the motion which are exclusively within the Splash defendants’ knowledge and control (Global Mins. & Metals Corp. v Holme, 35 AD3d 93, 102-103 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 804 [2007]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when the opposing party raises issues that warrant it, particularly if that party has not had a reasonable opportunity for disclosure.

TD Bank, N.A. v. 126 Spruce Street, LLC · filed 2014-05-07(f)

Here, the defendant Club Central, LLC, raised issues warranting further discovery. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied, in effect, as premature, that branch of Lawrence’s motion which was for summary judgment on its cause of action for foreclosure.

An opposing party must show that discovery is necessary to defeat a summary judgment motion under CPLR 3212(f).

McGinley v. Mystic West Realty Corp. · filed 2014-05-13(f)

Nor have plaintiffs and the other opposing parties shown that discovery is necessary to oppose the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

A summary judgment motion may be decided after the opposing party obtains the requested deposition if the testimony raises no material factual issue.

DeRose v. Bloomingdale's Inc. · filed 2014-05-27(f)

We reach the merits of this case notwithstanding defendant’s argument that plaintiffs motion was premature. Although the parties proceeded with plaintiffs deposition after the filing of the motion, plaintiffs testimony was consistent with his affidavit. Therefore, defendant could not raise any issue of material fact that would preclude a grant of partial summary judgment concerning liability under Labor Law § 240 (1).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment while court-ordered discovery remains outstanding.

Daniels v. City of New York · filed 2014-05-28(f)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiffs cross motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint since, at the time of the cross motion, court-ordered discovery remained outstanding (see CPLR 3212 [f|; Chmelovsky v Country Club Homes, Inc., 106 AD3d 684 [2013]; Evangelista v Kambanis, 74 AD3d 1278, 1279 [2010]; Matter of Fasciglione, 73 AD3d 769, 770 [2010]; Gruenfeld v City of New Rochelle, 72 AD3d 1025, 1026 [2010]; Rodriguez v DeStefano, 72 AD3d 926 [2010]; Harvey v Nealis, 61 AD3d 935, 936 [2009]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when discovery may reveal facts needed to oppose the motion.

Malester v. Rampil · filed 2014-06-18(f)

Here, it is undisputed that no discovery had been conducted in this case prior to the filing of the appellants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them. Moreover, the plaintiffs raised issues requiring deposition testimony from the drivers of both vehicles in order to oppose the appellants’ motion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the appellants’ motion as premature.

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice when further discovery is needed to obtain facts essential to oppose the motion.

Dushnick v. Bellamy · filed 2014-07-16(f)

Here, in opposition to the defendant’s prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff raised issues warranting further discovery. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied, without prejudice to renewal upon the completion of discovery, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see TD Bank, N.A. v 126 Spruce St., LLC, 117 AD3d 716, 717 [2014]; Postilio v Deblasi, 116 AD3d 832 [2014]).

Section 3212(f) permits an opposing party to obtain discovery before summary judgment when facts supporting its position may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Johnson v. Richardson · filed 2014-08-27(f)

Since U-Haul had no personal knowledge of the relevant facts, it should be afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery, including depositions of the plaintiffs and the defendant Richardson.

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking discovery to oppose summary judgment to show that the requested material is essential to justify opposition.

JOHNSON, TREVOR v. MURPHY, ALEXA L. · filed 2014-10-03(f)

Furthermore, plaintiff failed to establish that the documents and photographs he sought were “essential to justify opposition” to the motion (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature when the opposing parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery that may yield relevant evidence.

Worley v. Safemove Rental · filed 2014-08-20(f)

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, their motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, with leave to renew after the completion of discovery. ... Under these circumstances, the opposing parties did not have a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; ...).

CPLR 3212(f) does not require denial of summary judgment as premature when the opponent fails to show that further discovery would reveal relevant evidence or essential facts.

1375 Equities Corp. v. Buildgreen Solutions, LLC · filed 2014-08-27(f)

In opposition to the motion, the defendant failed to articulate how discovery might lead to evidence relevant to the discrete ground upon which the plaintiff moved for summary judgment or, given the plaintiffs submissions on the motion, that the facts essential to oppose the motion were in the exclusive knowledge and control of the plaintiff.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a premature summary judgment motion when discovery may reveal relevant evidence or essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Buto v. Town of Smithtown · filed 2014-10-15(f)

Here, in opposition to the Town’s motion, the plaintiff demonstrated that the Town failed to disclose whether it widened the subject roadway at the location of the occurrence, a fact exclusively within the knowledge and control of the Town. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied, as premature, the Town’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, with leave to renew upon the completion of discovery.

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking to defer summary judgment to show that facts essential to its opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Knopf v. Sanford · filed 2014-12-11(f)

Defendants’ challenge to the enforceability of the loan agreements is unavailing, and they failed to show “that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery before summary judgment to explain how it would yield material evidence and reveal facts in the moving party’s exclusive knowledge.

Millington v. Kenny & Dittrich Amherst, LLC · filed 2015-01-22(f)

It suffices to say that those individuals are nonparties, and plaintiff does not elucidate how "further discovery would yield material evidence and also demonstrate how further discovery might reveal material facts in [defendant]'s exclusive knowledge" (Rochester Linoleum & Carpet Ctr., Inc. v Cassin, 61 AD3d 1201, 1202 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see CPLR 3212 [f]; 2 N. St. Corp. v Getty Saugerties Corp., 68 AD3d 1392, 1396 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 706 [2010]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial or continuance of summary judgment for incomplete discovery only when there is an evidentiary basis to believe discovery may produce relevant evidence; speculation is insufficient.

DaSilva v. Haks Engineers, Architects & Land Surveyors · filed 2015-02-17(f)

Plaintiffs argument, that he had no access to vital information about defendants’ actual roles and duties at the job site, or that he was deprived of an opportunity to elicit material facts, only expresses a mere hope or speculation that discovery might turn up some evidence giving rise to a triable issue of fact. Thus, there is no basis for denial or continuance of the motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) (Cooper v 6 W. 20th St. Tenants Corp., 258 AD2d 362, 362 [1st Dept 1999]).

An opponent seeking more discovery before summary judgment must show that facts essential to opposing the motion are in the movant’s exclusive knowledge and possession and could be obtained through discovery.

HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. PRIME, L.L.C. · filed 2015-02-06(f)

Defendants “failed to demonstrate that facts essential to oppose the motion were in plaintiff’s exclusive knowledge and possession and could be obtained by discovery” (Franklin v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 291 AD2d 854, 854; see CPLR 3212 [f]; Avraham v Allied Realty Corp., 8 AD3d 1079, 1079), and the “ ‘mere hope that somehow [defendants] will uncover evidence that will prove [their] case is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment’ ” (Rowland v Wilmorite, Inc., 68 AD3d 1770, 1771).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when facts essential to the opposing party’s case are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Mottley v. Walker · filed 2015-03-25(f)

Here, in opposition to the cross motions, the plaintiff demonstrated that facts essential to his opposition were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the cross movants (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Singh v Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 119 AD3d 768 [2014]). Accordingly, upon reargument, the Supreme Court should have denied the cross motions as premature, without prejudice to renewal upon the completion of discovery (see Johnson v Richardson, 120 AD3d 767 [2014]; Skoczek v Delgado, 115 AD3d 844 [2014]; Wesolowski v St. Francis Hosp., 108 AD3d 525 [2013]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment to show some evidentiary basis for needing further discovery.

Green v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority Bus Co. · filed 2015-04-07(f)

Even under such circumstance, the party invoking CPLR 3212(f) must show some evidentiary basis supporting its need for further discovery.

Section 3212(f) permits deferring a summary judgment determination while discovery develops facts needed to resolve a disputed fraudulent scheme affecting rent.

Meyers v. Four Thirty Realty · filed 2015-04-14(f)

Under all these circumstances, a determination of the proper base date rent would be premature and must await further discovery “for the limited purpose of determining whether a fraudulent scheme to destabilize the apartment tainted the reliability of the rent on the base date” (Matter of Grimm v State of N. Y. Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal Off. of Rent Admin., 15 NY3d 358, 367 [2010]; see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when outstanding discovery may reveal facts material to the motion.

Pastor v. DeGaetano · filed 2015-04-21(f)

Discovery may reveal that the plaintiff was given the requisite assurances, and that at least one of the plans offered at the closing was “substantially similar” to the contract plan, but that discovery remains outstanding. Accordingly, summary judgment should be denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when little discovery has taken place and party depositions have not occurred.

Takhalov v. Rottenberg · filed 2015-05-06(f)

Their motion for summary judgment was premature, as little discovery had taken place and depositions of the parties had not yet occurred (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Molester v Rampil, 118 AD3d 855 [2014]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment as premature, without prejudice to renewal after discovery, when further discovery may yield relevant evidence.

Martinez v. 305 West 52 Condominium · filed 2015-05-20(f)

Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court properly denied the motion and cross motions for summary judgment to the extent indicated above, as premature, since further discovery may lead to relevant evidence, although the denial should have been without prejudice to renew upon the completion of discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Johnson v Richardson, 120 AD3d 767, 768 [2014]; Malester v Rampil, 118 AD3d at 856; Video Voice, Inc. v Local T.V., Inc., 114 AD3d 935 [2014]; Degen v Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist., 114 AD3d 822, 823 [2014]; Colgan v Colgan, 94 AD3d 689, 690 [2012]; Juseinoski v New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens, 18 AD3d 713, 715 [2005]).

A party opposing summary judgment before discovery must explain what discovery it needs to oppose the motion.

Gyabaah v. Rivlab Transportation Corp. · filed 2015-06-04(f)

Although plaintiff’s motion was filed before discovery, defendants failed to explain what discovery was needed to oppose the motion (see Santana v Danco Inc., 115 AD3d 560 [1st Dept 2014]; see also CPLR 3212 [f]), and they did not serve discovery demands during the years the action was pending (see Patino v Drexler, 116 AD3d 534, 534 [1st Dept 2014]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Brea v. Salvatore · filed 2015-07-29(f)

A party opposing summary judgment is entitled to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot then be stated (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Nicholson v Bader, 83 AD3d 802 [2011]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires an opponent seeking to delay summary judgment for discovery to make an evidentiary showing that material facts needed to oppose the motion are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge or possession.

Bailey v. Dimick · filed 2015-06-04(f)

Initially, there was no basis to deny plaintiff’s summary judgment motion as premature. “Although a motion for summary judgment may be opposed with the claim that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but that such material facts are within the exclusive knowledge and possession of the moving party, the party opposing the motion must make an evidentiary showing to support that conclusion”

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment as premature to show that further discovery might produce relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Reynolds v. Avon Grove Properties · filed 2015-06-17(f)

A party contending that a motion for summary judgment is premature is required to demonstrate that additional discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to oppose the motion are exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Burlington Ins. Co. v Casur Corp., 123 AD3d 965, 965-966 [2014]; Singh v Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 119 AD3d 768 [2014]).

Section 3212(f) requires an opposing party seeking more discovery before summary judgment to make an evidentiary showing that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated; speculation is insufficient.

Hewitt v. Liverpool Central School District · filed 2015-12-31(f)

We agree with KHH that the court erred in denying the motions pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f). “Although a motion for summary judgment may be opposed on the ground ‘that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot be stated’ (CPLR 3212 [f]), ‘the opposing party must make an evidentiary showing supporting [that] conclusion’ ” (Preferred Capital v PBK, Inc., 309 AD2d 1168, 1169); ... “[m]ere speculation . . . is not sufficient to raise an issue of fact” (Newman v Regent Contr. Corp., 31 AD3d 1133, 1135 ... [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery before summary judgment to make an evidentiary showing that material facts are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge or possession.

Ivory Development, LLC v. Roe · filed 2016-01-21(f)

A party who opposes summary judgment on the ground that the moving party has exclusive knowledge and possession of pertinent facts that can be revealed through further discovery "must make an evidentiary showing to support that conclusion" (2 N. St. Corp. v Getty Saugerties Corp., 68 AD3d 1392, 1395-1396 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 706 [2010]; accord Bailey v Dimick, 129 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2015]; see CPLR 3212 [f]).

A party seeking more discovery to oppose summary judgment must show evidence that essential facts may be found; speculation is insufficient.

KLEPPER, HAHN & HYATT, ENGINEERS A, HEWITT, DONALD E. v · filed 2015-12-31(f)

We agree with KHH that the court erred in denying the motions pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f). “Although a motion for summary judgment may be opposed on the ground ‘that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot be stated’ (CPLR 3212 [f]), ‘the opposing party must make an evidentiary showing supporting [that] conclusion’ ” (Preferred Capital v PBK, Inc., 309 AD2d 1168, 1169); “[m]ere speculation . . . is not sufficient to raise an issue of fact” (Newman v Regent Contr. Corp., 31 AD3d 1133, 1135 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a party to argue that a summary judgment motion is premature, but the objection does not automatically prevent judgment.

Binkowitz v. Kolb · filed 2016-01-27(f)

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the plaintiff’s motion was not premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Le Grand v Silberstein, 123 AD3d at 775; Williams v Spencer-Hall, 113 AD3d at 760).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Alcor Life Extension Foundation v. Johnson · filed 2016-02-09(f)

As to its contention that it needs further discovery, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that facts essential to justify opposition to defendants’ motions might exist but could not then be stated (see CPLR 3212 [fl).

CPLR 3212(f) permits additional discovery to oppose summary judgment when it may yield relevant evidence or essential facts are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge and control.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hallock · filed 2016-04-06(f)

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, they failed to demonstrate that additional discovery may have led to relevant evidence or that facts essential to oppose the motion were ... exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Savage v Quinn, 91 AD3d 748, 750 [2012]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment as premature to show that further discovery might yield relevant evidence or that facts needed to oppose the motion are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge and control.

Rodriguez v. Gutierrez · filed 2016-04-20(f)

To defeat a motion for summary judgment based on outstanding discovery, it is incumbent upon the opposing party to provide an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were in the exclusive knowledge and control of the moving party (see Suero-Sosa v Cardona, 112 AD3d 706, 708 [2013]; Cajas-Romero v Ward, 106 AD3d 850 [2013]). ... Here, the respondents failed to demonstrate how further discovery beyond the existing deposition testimony may reveal or lead to additional relevant evidence.

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party seeking to delay summary judgment for discovery must identify information it hopes to obtain that could reveal a triable issue of fact.

Vladenn Med. Supply Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. · filed 2016-06-06(f)

Similarly, in the instant case, plaintiff "did not establish what information [it] hoped to discover that would demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact" ( id .; cf . American Tr. Ins. Co. v Jaga Med. Servs., P.C. , 128 AD3d 441 [2015]).

Section 3212(f) permits delaying summary judgment for discovery when the opposing party shows that discovery is necessary to oppose the motion.

Tavarez v. Herrasme · filed 2016-06-07(f)

Summary judgment was not granted prematurely, since defendants did not show that discovery was necessary to avoid summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits opposition to summary judgment based on facts that may exist but cannot yet be stated, but the opposing party must provide evidence supporting that claim; speculation is insufficient.

WEYDMAN ELECTRIC, INC. v. JOINT SCHOOLS CONSTRUCTION BOARD · filed 2016-06-10(f)

Although a motion for summary judgment may be opposed on the ground “that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated” (CPLR 3212 [f]), “the opposing party ... must make an evidentiary showing supporting this conclusion, mere speculation or conjecture being insufficient” (Pank v Village of Canajoharie, 275 AD2d 508, 509). Plaintiff failed to make the necessary evidentiary showing.

Under CPLR 3212(f), a plaintiff’s delay in starting discovery does not, by itself, warrant granting a defendant’s summary judgment motion.

Gomez v. Kozot Realty Corp. · filed 2016-09-15(f)

Although we do not condone plaintiffs failure to take any steps to commence discovery during the nearly 10 months between the service of Kozof s answer and the service of Kozof s summary judgment motion, this delay does not, standing alone, warrant granting that motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) does not require delaying summary judgment for discovery that is unnecessary to oppose the motion.

Stracar Med. Servs. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. · filed 2016-09-27(f)

Consequently, discovery relevant to the reasonableness of the EUO requests was not necessary for plaintiff to oppose defendant's motion ( see CPLR 3212 [f]; Interboro Ins. Co. v Clennon , 113 AD3d 596 [2014]; Palafox PT, P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 49 Misc 3d 144 [A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51653[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]; T & J Chiropractic, P.C. , 47 Misc 3d 130[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50406[U]; Metro Health Prods., Inc. , 47 Misc 3d 127[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50402[U]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking to delay summary judgment to show that facts essential to its opposition may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Madison Avenue Diamonds LLC v. KGK Jewelry LLC · filed 2016-10-11(f)

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that facts essential to justify opposition to summary judgment may exist but cannot be stated (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits postponement of summary judgment when essential facts may be in the moving party’s exclusive possession, but mere hope that discovery will uncover useful evidence is insufficient.

Citibank, NA v. Abrams · filed 2016-11-03(f)

As is relevant here, "[w]hile it is true that a motion for summary judgment may be opposed with the claim ... that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but that such material facts are within the exclusive knowledge and possession of the moving party, a party's mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat the motion may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to postpone determination on the motion" (Gersten-Hillman Agency, Inc. v Heyman, 68 AD3d 1284, 1288 [2009] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see CPLR 3212 [f]; Clochessy v Gagnon, 58 AD3d 1008, 1010 [2009]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment when affidavits show that facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Ingram v. Bay Ridge Automotive Management Corp. · filed 2016-12-07(f)

A party opposing summary judgment is entitled to obtain further ... discovery when it appears, from affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion, that facts supporting the opposing party’s position may exist but cannot then be stated (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Brea v Salvatore, 130 AD3d at 956; Nicholson v Bader, 83 AD3d 802 [2011]). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability insofar as asserted against the defendant Bay Ridge Lexus, with leave to renew upon the completion of his deposition.

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify denying summary judgment when a claimed need for discovery lacks an evidentiary basis suggesting it may yield relevant evidence.

RXR WWP Owner LLC v. WWP Sponsor, LLC · filed 2016-12-08(f)

Plaintiff’s claimed need for discovery, unsupported by any evidentiary basis to suggest that the same may lead to relevant evidence, is insufficient to deny summary judgment (CPLR 3212 [f]; Bailey v New York City Tr. Auth., 270 AD2d 156, 157 [1st Dept 2000]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when essential facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Brielmeier v. Leal · filed 2016-12-14(f)

“CPLR 3212 (f) permits a court to deny a motion for summary judgment where it appears that the facts essential to oppose the motion exist but cannot then be stated”

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when further discovery is needed to determine facts material to the motion.

Goldstein v. Orensanz Events LLC · filed 2017-01-10(f)

Accordingly, defendants have not complied with their discovery obligations, and further discovery is necessary to determine the cause of the structural failure (see CPLR 3212 ffl).

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when the opposing party needs facts that the movant has not disclosed.

Nachamie v. County of Nassau · filed 2017-02-01(f)

Additionally, as the plaintiffs correctly assert, further discovery is warranted with respect to, inter alia, the work actually performed by the Galvin-Madhue defendants and Galvin Bros, at the project site, as those defendants have not yet disclosed any records containing that information (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Herrera v Gargiso, 140 AD3d at 1123).

Section 3212(f) requires an evidentiary basis for believing that discovery may reveal facts essential to opposing summary judgment.

885 Park Ave. Brooklyn, LLC v. Goddard · filed 2017-02-10(f)

Tenant has failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery might lead to "facts essential to justify opposition" (CPLR 3212 [f]) or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within landlord's knowledge and control ( see Baron v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport , 143 AD2d 792 [1988]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny a summary judgment motion with leave to renew after the opposing party has had a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

Okula v. City of New York · filed 2017-02-15(f)

Under the circumstances of this case, at this stage of the proceedings, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against the defendant NYCTA, with leave to renew upon the completion of discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Brea v Salvatore, 130 AD3d 956 [2015]; Nicholson v Bader, 83 AD3d 802 [2011]; Amico v Melville Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 39 AD3d 784, 785 [2007]).

CPLR 3212(f) governs whether a summary judgment motion is premature.

Comas-Bourne v. City of New York · filed 2017-01-18(f)

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the motion was not premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]; ...).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment without prejudice to renewal when little discovery has occurred and party depositions remain outstanding.

Sodhi v. 112 Park Enterprises, LLC · filed 2017-02-15(f)

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court properly denied his motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability without prejudice to renew upon the completion of discovery, given that little discovery had taken place and the depositions of the parties had not yet occurred (see CPLR 3212 [fl; Herrera v Gargiso, 140 AD3d 1122, 1123 [2016]; Takhalov v Rottenberg, 128 AD3d 678, 678 [2015]; Sepulveda v Cammeby’s Mgt. Co., LLC, 119 AD3d 927 [2014]; Gardner v Cason, Inc., 82 AD3d 930, 931-932 [2011]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment with leave to renew when a party has not had a reasonable opportunity to complete discovery.

Martino v. Midtown Trackage Ventures, LLC · filed 2017-02-22(f)

Under the circumstances of this case, at this stage of the proceedings, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of Tishman’s motion with leave to renew after the completion of discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Brea v Salvatore, 130 AD3d 956 [2015]; Nicholson v Bader, 83 AD3d 802 [2011]; Amico v Melville Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 39 AD3d 784, 785 [2007]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery when the evidence on a summary judgment motion warrants it.

Oseguera v. Lincoln Properties LLC · filed 2017-02-28(f)

At the very least, this evidence ... establishes that further discovery is warranted (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery to show that it is necessary to oppose summary judgment.

600 Lexington Owner LLC v. Kaplowitz · filed 2017-04-20(f)

Nor has Wolf shown that further discovery was necessary to oppose plaintiff’s motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking discovery before summary judgment to show reasonable efforts to uncover facts that could raise a triable issue or that further discovery might yield relevant evidence.

Central Mortgage Co. v. Jahnsen · filed 2017-05-03(f)

The appellant failed to sufficiently demonstrate that she had made reasonable attempts to discover facts which would give rise to a triable issue or that further discovery might lead to relevant evidence (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Swedbank, AB, N.Y. Branch v Hale Ave. Borrower, LLC, 89 AD3d 922, 924 [2011]).

Section 3212(f) does not warrant denying summary judgment as premature when the opponent identifies no information in the movant’s exclusive control that could raise a material issue of fact.

McDaniel v. Codi Transport, Ltd. · filed 2017-04-20(f)

Denial of plaintiff’s summary judgment motion as premature is unwarranted, as defendants have not identified any information in the exclusive control of plaintiff that could raise a material issue of fact (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Erkan v McDonald’s Corp., 146 AD3d 466, 467 [1st Dept 2017]).

A summary judgment motion is not premature under CPLR 3212(f) when the requested discovery would provide extrinsic evidence that cannot be used to interpret an unambiguous will.

Matter of Chernik · filed 2017-05-03(f)

Since there was no ambiguity, resort to extrinsic evidence would have been inappropriate ... As such, the wife’s motion was not premature.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when relevant facts remain undeveloped because discovery has not yet occurred.

Peg Bandwidth, LLC v. Optical Communications · filed 2017-05-25(f)

Moreover, there are issues of fact as to which party breached the agreement, and there has been no discovery yet (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party seeking further discovery before summary judgment must show that discovery might yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control; mere hope of finding proof is insufficient.

Gannon v. Sadeghian · filed 2017-06-09(f)

We reject plaintiffs’ contention that summary judgment was premature because further discovery was needed. Plaintiffs failed “to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant” (Buto v Town of Smithtown, 121 AD3d 829, 830 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 3212 [f]), and the “ ‘[m]ere hope that somehow the plaintiff[s] will uncover evidence that will prove a case’ ” is insufficient for denial of the motion (Mackey v Sangani, 238 AD2d 919, 920 [1997]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking more discovery to oppose summary judgment to show that essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated; hope or conjecture is insufficient.

Safier v. Saggio Restaurant Inc. · filed 2017-06-15(f)

In opposition, plaintiff and codefendants neither submitted an affidavit demonstrating the existence of an issue of fact nor made any attempt to show that facts essential to justify their opposition to the motion existed that could not be stated absent a deposition of Tri-State (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Guaman v Ansley & Co., LLC, 135 AD3d 492, 492 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 3212(f) does not make summary judgment premature merely because discovery remains incomplete; the opponent must identify additional information the discovery may yield.

HSBC Bank USA Ex Rel. Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2006-AR5 v. Armijos · filed 2017-06-21(f)

Here, the appellant failed to establish what additional information he hoped to glean from the entire mortgage file in its original form that could not be gleaned from the original note and mortgage and the portions of the mortgage file that the plaintiff had provided (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Reale v Tsoukas, 146 AD3d 833, 835-836 [2017]; Joon Mgt. One Corp. v Town of Ramapo, 142 AD3d 587, 589 [2016]; Vikram Constr., Inc. v Everest Natl. Ins. Co., 139 AD3d 720, 721 [2016]).

Under section 3212(f), incomplete discovery does not make summary judgment premature without a showing that discovery might yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the opposing party’s knowledge and control.

Lynn v. McCormick · filed 2017-08-16(f)

Further, the Supreme Court properly rejected the plaintiffs’ contention, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f), that summary judgment was premature because discovery was not yet complete. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the defendants (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Singh v Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 119 AD3d 768, 770 [2014]; Boorstein v 1261 48th St. Condominium, 96 AD3d 703, 704 [2012]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when the parties have not had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.

Bernstein v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2017-08-30(f)

Here, Frias moved for summary judgment before the parties had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery (see Richardson v New York City Tr. Auth., 51 AD3d 899 [2008]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Williams v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2017-12-29(f)

A court may deny a motion for summary judgment if it appears from the record "that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated" (CPLR 3212 [f]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party claiming a summary judgment motion is premature to show that further discovery may yield relevant evidence; speculation alone is insufficient.

Haidhaqi v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority · filed 2017-09-20(f)

The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when further discovery may reveal facts essential to opposing the motion.

Antonyshyn v. Tishman Construction Corp. · filed 2017-09-20(f)

The appellants sufficiently established that facts may exist that would demonstrate that the plaintiff’s own actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Weininger v Hagedorn & Co., 91 NY2d 958 [1998]; Bustillo v Tuckahoe Dev., 300 AD2d 272 [2002]; Heffernan v Bais Corp., 294 AD2d 401 [2002]).

Section 3212(f) does not make a summary judgment motion premature merely because discovery remains open; the opposing party must show that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Niyazov v. Hunter EMS, Inc. · filed 2017-10-25(f)

Furthermore, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the plaintiff’s motion was not premature, as the defendants failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant evidence, or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Kimyagarov v Nixon Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d at 737).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking additional discovery to show that it could produce evidence sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Wiley v. ESI New York Inc. · filed 2017-12-05(f)

Defendants also failed to demonstrate that additional discovery could lead to evidence sufficient to defeat the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny a premature summary judgment motion, with leave to renew after discovery, when relevant facts may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Salameh v. Yarkovski · filed 2017-12-06(f)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, Cab’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, with leave to renew upon the completion of discovery (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Martino v Midtown Trackage Ventures, LLC, 147 AD3d at 1040; Ingram v Bay Ridge Auto. Mgt. Corp., 145 AD3d at 673; Brea v Salvatore, 130 AD3d at 957; Nicholson v Bader, 83 AD3d at 802; cf. Rungoo v Leary, 110 AD3d at 783; Cajas-Romero v Ward, 106 AD3d at 852).

Subdivision (f) permits an objection that a summary judgment motion is premature, but the court may reject that objection.

Pomerantsev v. Kodinsky · filed 2017-12-06(f)

Contrary to the contention of the plaintiff and Flores, the cross motion was not premature (see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when essential facts may be unavailable to the opposing party because discovery is incomplete.

Ud 1635, LLC v. Winkler · filed 2017-12-13(f)

On this record, and particularly in light of the fact that discovery in this case was not completed, those branches of Jasse’s motion which were, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the first and sixth causes of action insofar as asserted against it and declaring that the deed conveying the property to it is valid were properly denied, without prejudice to renew upon the completion of the depositions of Jasse’s shareholders. Essential facts regarding Jasse’s alleged status as a bona fide purchaser of the property may exist which are currently unavailable to the plaintiff (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Olmedo-Garcia v Dobson, 31 AD3d 727, 728 [2006]).

A party seeking discovery before summary judgment must show that further discovery is likely to yield material and relevant evidence.

New York State Workers' Compensation Bd. v. 21st Century Constr. Corp. · filed 2018-01-09(f)

A party opposing summary judgment on the ground that discovery is necessary "must produce some evidence indicating that further discovery will yield material and relevant evidence," and "[t]he mere hope that evidence sufficient to defeat the motion may be uncovered during the discovery process is not enough" ( Stoian v Reed , 66 AD3d 1278 , 1280-1281 [3d Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see CPLR 3212 [f]). The Court concludes that the Remaining Defendants have failed to demonstrate that discovery regarding the WCB's oversight of the Trust or the alleged misconduct of CRM is necessary to oppose the Board's motion, which is limited to the issue of the former members' joint and several liability for the deficit.

CPLR 3212(f) does not permit delaying summary judgment for discovery based only on hope or speculation that useful evidence may be found.

Deerin v. Ocean Rich Foods, LLC · filed 2018-02-07(f)

Although the plaintiff contends that, pursuant to CPLR 3212(f), she should have been permitted an opportunity to obtain discovery so that she could prove the existence of the agreement via other documents, she offered only "mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process[, which] is insufficient to deny the [defendants'] motion" ( Pierre v Demoura, 148 AD3d 736, 737; see Lynn v McCormick, 153 AD3d 688, 689; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Armijos, 151 AD3d 943, 944; Bentick v Gatchalian, 147 AD3d 890, 892).

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party seeking further discovery before summary judgment must show that it might lead to relevant evidence.

Cohen v. Lebgutt Realty, LLC · filed 2018-02-21(f)

Nor did the plaintiff show that summary judgment was premature, as she did not demonstrate that additional discovery might lead to relevant evidence ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Reynolds v Avon Grove Props., 129 AD3d 932, 933).

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when it may yield facts essential to opposing the motion.

Rodriguez v. P.S. 065 Mother Hale Academy · filed 2018-04-17(f)

Plaintiff submitted no evidence suggesting that further discovery would lead to facts essential to justify his opposition to defendants' motion ( see CPLR 3212[f]; RXR WWP Owner LLC v WWP Sponsor, LLC , 145 AD3d 494, 495 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of a summary judgment motion as premature when the opposing party shows that further discovery may reveal evidence in the movant's exclusive knowledge that would warrant denial.

Horvath v. High Peaks Sand, Gravel & Mins., LLC · filed 2018-08-01(f)

Under CPLR 3212 (f), summary judgment may be denied as premature where the opposing party has not yet had adequate opportunity to conduct discovery. ... The Court concludes that defendants have failed to demonstrate that information germane to their defenses of accord/satisfaction and payment lie in the exclusive possession of plaintiff.

CPLR 3212(f) allows a party opposing summary judgment to obtain discovery when supporting facts may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Hawana v. Carbuccia · filed 2018-08-08(f)

A party opposing summary judgment is entitled to obtain discovery when it appears that facts supporting the opposing party's position may exist but cannot then be stated ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Nicholson v Bader , 83 AD3d 802). ... Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability as premature ( see Sepulveda v Cammeby's Mgmt. Co., LLC, 119 AD3d 927; Betz v N.Y.C. Premier Properties, Inc. , 38 AD3d 815).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery before summary judgment to show that the discovery could produce evidence sufficient to defeat the motion and that facts essential to oppose it are in the movant's exclusive possession.

Feldmeier v. Feldmeier Equip., Inc. · filed 2018-08-22(f)

We agree with defendants that plaintiff failed to "show that the discovery sought would produce evidence sufficient to defeat the motion . . . , and that facts essential to oppose the motion were in [the movant's] exclusive knowledge and possession and could be obtained by discovery" ( Resetarits Constr. Corp. v Elizabeth Pierce Olmsted, M.D. Center for the Visually Impaired [appeal No. 2], 118 AD3d 1454, 1456 [4th Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see generally CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) does not entitle a party to discovery based on speculation that evidence sufficient to avoid summary judgment may be uncovered.

State of N.Y. ex rel. Perkins v. Cooke Ctr. for Learning & Dev., Inc. · filed 2018-08-23(f)

Nor was plaintiff entitled to discovery pursuant to CPLR 3212(f), as her speculations regarding such submissions were insufficient to show that discovery was necessary, as they represented a mere hope that evidence sufficient to avoid summary judgment may be uncovered ( see Tavarez v Herrasme , 140 AD3d 453, 454 [1st Dept 2016]; Weintraub v Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon , 172 AD2d 254 [1st Dept 1991]).

A party seeking more discovery before summary judgment must show that further discovery might lead to relevant evidence.

Johnson v. Lend Lease Constr. LMB, Inc. · filed 2018-09-12(f)

The plaintiff's contention that the defendants' motion should have been denied to afford him an opportunity to obtain discovery is without merit, as he did not show that further discovery might lead to relevant evidence ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Central Mtge. Co. v Jahnsen, 150 AD3d 661, 665; Reynolds v Avon Grove Props., 129 AD3d 932, 933).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to postpone a summary judgment decision for needed discovery, but the court may decline when the opposing party failed to pursue discovery in the time available.

Jackie's Enters., Inc. v. Belleville · filed 2018-10-25(f)

Considering all of the circumstances, including the ample time originally provided for paper discovery, the court providently exercised its discretion pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) in declining to postpone decision on defendants' motion ( see Meath v Mishrick , 68 NY2d at 994; Seton Health at Schuyler Ridge Residential Health Care v Dziuba , 127 AD3d at 1300; Ullmannglass v Oneida, Ltd. , 121 AD3d at 1373).

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when discovery has not occurred and facts needed to oppose the motion are within the moving party's knowledge.

50 W. 96th Realty LLC v. Lysle · filed 2018-10-26(f)

The prediscovery record now before us record "consists almost entirely of materials submitted by [respondent]" ( Cox v J.D. Realty Assoc. , 217 AD2d 179, 183 [1995]) and petitioner, who does not own the building and may not have ready access to information, correctly "recites the absence of discovery in this matter and asserts that the facts relating to [respondent's] residence and [her] use of the subject premises are peculiarly within [her] knowledge (CPLR 3212 [f])" ( id. ).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to defer summary judgment for outstanding discovery when the opposing party shows that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that facts needed to oppose the motion are exclusively in the moving party's control.

Portalatin v. City of New York · filed 2018-10-31(f)

Also contrary to the defendants' contention, summary judgment was not premature due to outstanding disclosure. The defendants did not establish that discovery might lead to relevant evidence, or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Williams v Spencer-Hall , 113 AD3d 759, 760; Boorstein v 1261 48th St. Condominium , 96 AD3d 703, 704).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment without prejudice when a party has not had a reasonable opportunity for discovery and further discovery may yield relevant evidence.

Haxhijaj v. Ferrer · filed 2018-11-07(f)

In a personal injury action, a party should generally be afforded a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery prior to the determination of a motion for summary judgment ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Brea v Salvatore , 130 AD3d 956; Malester v Rampil , 118 AD3d 855, 856). Here, little discovery has taken place, and depositions of the parties have not yet occurred. Moreover, the defendant submitted evidence suggesting that further discovery might lead to relevant evidence pertaining to the circumstances of the accident ( see Hawana v Carbuccia , 164 AD3d 563; Worley v Safemove Rental , 120 AD3d 667, 668). Accordingly, we will not disturb the Supreme Court's determination to deny the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability without prejudice to renew ( see Takhalov v Rottenberg , 128 AD3d 678; Amico v Melville Volunteer Fire Co., Inc. , 39 AD3d 784, 785).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery to show that facts may exist that would support its claim.

Barklee 94 LLC v. Oliver · filed 2018-12-04(f)

Plaintiff failed to meet its burden under CPLR 3212(f) to show that facts may exist that would establish its belated claim that elevator anchor bolts encroached upon its portion of the party wall.

Section 3212(f) allows a summary judgment motion to be denied without prejudice when the opposing party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery.

Amyotte v. Armic Serv. Corp. · filed 2018-12-05(f)

In a personal injury action, a party should generally be afforded a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery prior to the determination of a motion for summary judgment ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Brea v Salvatore , 130 AD3d 956). Here, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability less than three weeks after the defendants filed their answer, and under the unique circumstances of this case, the defendants did not have an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery ( see Chander v Eagle Sanitation, Inc. , 153 AD3d 658; Okula v City of New York , 147 AD3d 967, 968; Brea v Salvatore , 130 AD3d at 956-957). Accordingly, we will not disturb the Supreme Court's determination to deny the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability without prejudice to renew upon the completion of discovery.

Section 3212(f) does not require delaying summary judgment for discovery when the opposing party can rely on its own documents and identifies no essential facts in the movant's control.

A&W Egg Co., Inc. v. Tufo's Wholesale Dairy, Inc. · filed 2019-02-28(f)

Since defendant could have opposed the motion based on its own documents, and "point[ed] to no facts essential to [its] opposition that are in plaintiff's control," the motion was not prematurely decided before discovery ( Goldmuntz v Schneider , 99 AD3d 544, 545 [1st Dept 2012]; see CPLR 3212[f]).

Section 3212(f) permits discovery before summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion are in the other party's exclusive possession.

Whiteman Osterman & Hanna, LLP v. Preserve Assoc., LLC · filed 2019-02-28(f)

In this connection, the Court notes that detailed information concerning the fees claimed by plaintiffs has been in the possession of defendants for many years, and defendants neither contend nor offer admissible proof that information needed to oppose the motion lies in the exclusive possession of plaintiffs ( see CPLR 3212 [f]; Ingalsbe v Chicago Ins. Co. , 287 AD2d 939, 940 [3d Dept 2001]).

Section 3212(f) permits delaying summary judgment for discovery when the opposing party shows that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant's knowledge or control.

76 Port Richmond Ave. Corp. v. Port Richmond Realty Assoc. · filed 2019-03-06(f)

"A party contending that a motion for summary judgment is premature is required to [*2]demonstrate that additional discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to oppose the motion are exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant[s]" ( Burlington Ins. Co. v Casur Corp. , 123 AD3d 965, 965-966; see CPLR 3212[f]; Jannetti v Whelan , 131 AD3d 1209, 1210). ... The plaintiff failed to indicate what evidence might be uncovered through discovery.

Section 3212(f) requires an evidentiary basis to believe discovery may yield relevant evidence or that facts needed to oppose summary judgment are exclusively within the movant’s control.

Batashvili v. Veliz-Palacios · filed 2019-03-13(f)

Moreover, the defendant failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant evidence, or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiffs ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Abramov v Miral Corp. , 24 AD3d at 398; Niyazov v Bradford , 13 AD3d 501, 502).

Section 3212(f) does not make a summary judgment motion premature solely because discovery has not occurred.

Montalvo v. Cedeno · filed 2019-03-27(f)

Contrary to the defendants' contention, the plaintiff's motion was not premature ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Emil Norsic & Son, Inc. v L.P. Transp., Inc. , 30 AD3d 368, 369). Therefore, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to consider the motion on its merits.

Section 3212(f) does not make summary judgment premature merely because discovery remains incomplete; the opposing party must identify information that further discovery could yield.

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Wiener · filed 2019-04-24(f)

Here, the defendant failed to establish what additional information she hoped to glean from the entire mortgage file in its original form ( see CPLR 3212[f]; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Armijos , 151 AD3d 943, 944; Reale v Tsoukas , 146 AD3d 833, 835-836; Joon Mgt. One Corp. v Town of Ramapo , 142 AD3d 587, 589; Vikram Constr., Inc. v Everest Natl. Ins. Co. , 139 AD3d 720, 721), particularly given that relevant documents relating to the chain of title of the note and mortgage were attached as exhibits to the complaint.

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts supporting the opposing party may exist but have not yet been disclosed.

Vukel v. Joan DiGirolomo Irrevocable Trust · filed 2019-05-08(f)

CPLR 3212(f) permits a party opposing summary judgment to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts supporting the position of the opposing party exist but cannot be stated ( see TD Bank, N.A. v 126 Spruce Street, LLC , 117 AD3d 716, 717). ... Since the relevant facts as to what transpired between the plaintiffs and the Board are in the possession of the plaintiffs and the third-party defendants, the defendants should have been afforded the opportunity to obtain discovery from these parties prior to the granting of summary judgment against the defendants.

Section 3212(f) permits further discovery to oppose summary judgment when essential facts may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Matter of Vaccari v. Vaccari · filed 2019-05-23(f)

Moreover, their affidavit in support of discovery failed to show that "facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated" warranting further discovery (CPLR 3212[f]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery before summary judgment to show that discovery might yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant's control; mere hope is insufficient.

Bratge v. Simons · filed 2019-06-07(f)

We reject plaintiffs' contention that the court should have permitted further discovery before determining the motion. It is well settled that a party opposing summary judgment on the ground that additional discovery is needed must "demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant" ( Buto v Town of Smithtown , 121 AD3d 829, 830 [2d Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 3212 [f]; Gannon v Sadeghian , 151 AD3d 1586, 1588 [4th Dept 2017]). Here, we agree with defendants that plaintiffs' " mere hope' that further depositions would disclose evidence to prove their case is insufficient to support denial of the motion" ( Boyle v Caledonia-Mumford Cent. Sch. , 140 AD3d 1619, 1621 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 905 [2016]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), a party seeking to defer summary judgment for discovery must show that the discovery could produce evidence sufficient to defeat the motion and that essential facts are in the movant’s exclusive knowledge and possession.

One Flint St., LLC v. ExxonMobil Corp. · filed 2019-08-22(f)

The Atkin defendants contend that the summary judgment motions of plaintiffs and the Exxon defendants should be denied as premature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) because further discovery is necessary. We reject that contention. The Atkin defendants failed to establish "that the discovery sought would produce evidence sufficient to defeat the motion[s] . . . , and that facts essential to oppose the motion[s] were in [the movants'] exclusive knowledge and possession and could be obtained by discovery" ( Resetarits Constr. Corp. v Elizabeth Pierce Olmsted, M.D. Center for the Visually Impaired [appeal No. 2], 118 AD3d 1454, 1456 [4th Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Feldmeier v Feldmeier Equip., Inc. , 164 AD3d 1093, 1097 [4th Dept 2018]).

Section 3212(f) permits jurisdictional discovery before summary judgment when the opposing party makes a sufficient start showing that facts supporting personal jurisdiction may exist.

Best v. Guthrie Med. Group, P.C. · filed 2019-08-22(f)

Although defendants met their initial burden on the motion ( see generally Williams , 159 AD3d at 152), plaintiff made a "sufficient start" in establishing personal jurisdiction over the hospital pursuant to CPLR 301 and 302 (a) (1) to be entitled to disclosure pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) ( cf. Robins v Procure Treatment Ctrs., Inc. , 157 AD3d 606, 607 [1st Dept 2018]; Williams v Beemiller, Inc. , 100 AD3d 143, 152-153 [4th Dept 2012]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits further discovery before summary judgment when facts needed to oppose the motion may exist but cannot yet be stated.

Pinella v. Crescent St. Corp. · filed 2019-10-16(f)

Thus, the plaintiff was entitled to conduct discovery which may result in disclosure of relevant information ( see CPLR 3212[f]). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the branch of Crescent's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it was premature.

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when requested discovery needed to oppose the motion has not been received.

GC Chiropractic, P.C. v. Integon Natl. Ins. Co. · filed 2019-11-01(f)

In opposition to defendant's motion, and in support of its cross motion to compel [*2] discovery, plaintiff demonstrated that it had requested from defendant, but had not received in time to oppose defendant's motion ( see CPLR 3212 [f]), the medical records relied upon by defendant's peer reviewer. ... Accordingly, the order is reversed, defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied and plaintiff's cross motion to compel discovery is granted.

CPLR 3212(f) does not justify delaying summary judgment for further discovery when the opposing party failed to pursue available discovery and identifies no facts it might reveal.

Hamilton v. National Amusements, Inc. · filed 2019-11-12(f)

Plaintiff's arguments, that defendant's summary judgment motion should be denied pursuant to CPLR 3212(f), in order to permit her to depose defendant's witnesses and test the assertions made in their affidavits, are unavailing. Plaintiff had nearly two years to seek to depose defendant's representative, but did not. Instead, plaintiff filed a note of issue in February 2016, certifying that all discovery was complete. Thus, plaintiff "cannot cite [her] own inaction as justification to deny [defendant's] summary judgment motion" ( Espinoza v Fowler-Daley Owners, Inc. , 171 AD3d 480, 480 [1st Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Furthermore, plaintiff identifies no facts which she thinks might be clarified or brought to light with further discovery.

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking to delay or defeat summary judgment for discovery to show that needed proof is exclusively within the movant’s knowledge, that its opposition rests on more than conjecture, and that it has tried to discover contrary facts.

River Park Assoc. (1972) L.P. v. Richman Plaza Garage Corp. · filed 2019-12-03(f)

Information as to the existence and amount of the arrears was not within plaintiff's exclusive knowledge and defendant provided no evidence that it had requested discovery on this issue. In order to avail oneself of CPLR 3212(f) to defeat or delay summary judgment, "a party must demonstrate that the needed proof is within the exclusive knowledge of the moving party, that the claims in opposition are supported by something other than mere hope or conjecture, and that the party has made at least some attempt to discover facts at variance with the moving party's proof" ( Voluto Ventures, LLC v Jenkens & Gilchrist Parker Chapin LLP , 44 AD3d 557 [1st Dept 2007] [internal citations omitted]).

A party seeking discovery under § 3212(f) must make a sufficient start, supported by tangible evidence, toward showing that essential jurisdictional facts may exist.

Parisien v. American Ind. Ins. Co. · filed 2019-12-06(f)

Even if the argument were properly before us, neither the unverified complaint nor the conclusory affirmation of plaintiff's counsel in opposition to defendant's motion constituted the "tangible evidence" ( Mandel v Busch Entertainment Corp. , 215 AD2d 455, 455 [1995]) necessary to substantiate plaintiff's allegations that jurisdiction could exist, thereby demonstrating that plaintiff's assertion of the existence of a jurisdictional predicate was not "frivolous" ( Peterson v Spartan Indus. , 33 NY2d 463, 467 [1974]). Thus, plaintiff did not make a "sufficient start" ( id .) by showing that essential jurisdictional facts might exist to warrant discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction over defendant ( see Compas Med., P.C. ,47 Misc 3d 134[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50481[U]).

Section 3212 requires a party claiming summary judgment is premature for lack of discovery to provide an evidentiary basis that discovery might yield relevant evidence.

Unisol, Inc. v. Kidron · filed 2020-02-20(f)

We reject Kidron's argument that summary judgment was premature because he did not have the opportunity to take certain discovery. Kidron failed to provide an evidentiary basis for concluding that discovery might lead to relevant evidence ( see CPLR 3212[4]; Bailey v New [*2]York City Tr. Auth. , 270 AD2d 156, 157 [1st Dept 2000]).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment as premature to identify information that further discovery might uncover and make an evidentiary showing that the information is unavailable.

Greene v. Fast Eats Clifton Park, LLC · filed 2020-05-28(f)

Although defendant opposed plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the ground, among others, that it was premature and that further discovery is needed, defendant failed to identify any particular information that might be gained that was not then available and, thus, failed to make the requisite "evidentiary showing" to defeat the motion on this basis ( Ivory Dev., LLC v Roe , 135 AD3d 1216, 1224 [2016] [internal quotation marks, emphasis and citations omitted]; see CPLR 3212 [f]).

Section 3212(f) does not warrant delaying summary judgment for discovery when the information is held by the requesting party’s own agent and the party has not explained its failure to obtain it sooner.

Bethpage Fed. Credit Union v. Bouzaglou · filed 2020-05-28(f)

The motion court providently exercised its discretion in rejecting defendants' argument based on CPLR 3212(f). Although defendants purport to require discovery from a third party, that entity is defendants' own agent, and defendants neither explained why they were unable to obtain such information sooner nor outlined any efforts made to obtain it.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts essential to oppose the motion may exist but are unavailable pending discovery.

US Bank N.A. v. Juliano · filed 2020-06-03(f)

With respect to People's United's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, JPMorgan established that facts essential to establish that People's United was on notice of the WaMu mortgage at the time that Justine entered into the home equity line of credit may exist, but are currently unavailable. Accordingly, People's United's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it should have been denied, without prejudice to renew upon the completion of discovery ( see CPLR 3212[f]; UD 1635, LLC v Winkler , 156 AD3d 742, 743).

Section 3212(f) permits a court to deny summary judgment so a party can obtain discovery needed to oppose the motion.

Alfani v. Rivercross Tenants Corp. · filed 2020-07-16(f)

Accordingly, Rivercross's motion should have been denied to permit plaintiffs an opportunity to obtain discovery concerning the nature of the relationship between Rivercross and nonparty Roosevelt Island Operation Corporation (RIOC), the entity that in 2011, through an assignment, received UDC's rights under the ground lease, and their respective obligations for the premises and sidewalk ( see CPLR 3212[f]).

Under CPLR 3212(f), an opponent seeking discovery before summary judgment must show that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Glatzer v. City of New York · filed 2020-07-28(f)

In opposition, plaintiff and defendant, Iguana New York argue that the City's motion is premature as neither have had the opportunity to depose a witness from the City, however they failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovt?ry may lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the opponent's knowledge and control (see CPLR 3212[f]; Espada v. City of New York, 74 A.D.3d 1276, 1277 (2d. Dept. 2010).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party seeking to oppose summary judgment to show that facts essential to its opposition are exclusively within the other party's knowledge or control.

Osipova v. London · filed 2020-09-23(f)

Further, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge or control of the defendants ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Boorstein v 1261 48th St. Condominium , 96 AD3d 703, 704).

Section 3212(f) permits discovery before summary judgment when the opposing party shows that facts essential to justify opposition might exist.

Board of Mgrs. of the Apthorp Condominium v. Apthorp Garage LLC · filed 2020-10-27(f)

The motion court properly determined that discovery under CPLR 3212(f) was not warranted, as defendant failed to show that facts essential to justify opposition might exist.

CPLR 3212 (f) requires an evidentiary showing that facts essential to oppose summary judgment may exist but cannot yet be stated before additional discovery is warranted.

Targeted Lease Capital, LLC v. Wheel Equip. Leasing, LLC · filed 2020-10-09(f)

Defendant further contends that the court erred in granting the motion with respect to defendant inasmuch as defendant is entitled to additional discovery pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f). We conclude, however, that defendant did not make the requisite evidentiary showing that facts essential to justify opposition to the motion may exist but could not then be stated ( see Hewitt v Liverpool Cent. Sch. Dist. , 134 AD3d 1507, 1509 [4th Dept 2015]; see also M & T Bank v Benjamin [appeal No. 2], 145 AD3d 1519, 1520 [4th Dept 2016]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when incomplete discovery hinders a party’s ability to raise a material question of fact.

Gagnon v. Village of Cooperstown, N.Y. · filed 2020-12-03(f)

In other words, plaintiff's ability to raise a material question of fact on the issues of probable cause and actual malice was hindered by the lack of full and complete discovery. Accordingly, at this juncture, the Village is not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the malicious prosecution claim against it ( see CPLR 3212 [f]; Blake v City of New York , 148 AD3d 1101, 1107-1108 [2017]).

A summary judgment motion is not premature merely because discovery is incomplete; the opponent must show that further discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential opposing facts are exclusively within the movant's knowledge and control.

Gooden v. EAN Holdings, LLC · filed 2020-12-30(f)

Furthermore, the plaintiff's motion was not premature because the defendants failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that additional discovery may lead to relevant evidence, or [*2]that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiff ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Rodriguez-Garcia v Bobby's Bus Co., Inc. , 175 AD3d at 632).

Section 3212(f) does not delay summary judgment for further discovery when the opposing party fails to show that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the moving party’s knowledge or control.

Howell v. City of New York · filed 2021-02-10(f)

In opposition to the defendants' prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, demonstrate how additional discovery may lead to relevant evidence, or establish that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the defendants' knowledge or control ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Tsyganash v Auto Mall Fleet Mgt., Inc. , 163 AD3d 1033, 1034).

Section 3212(f) permits a summary judgment motion to be denied as premature when the opposing party shows that discovery might yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control; speculation is insufficient.

Sapienza v. Harrison · filed 2021-02-24(f)

Moreover, the defendant's contention that the motion was premature is without merit ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Lopez v Suggs , 186 AD3d 589, 590). "A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant" ( Singh v Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. , 119 AD3d 768, 770).

Section 3212(f) permits delaying summary judgment for further discovery when the opposing party provides an evidentiary basis to believe that discovery will yield relevant evidence.

Unity Elec., Co., Inc. v. William Aversa 2012 Trust · filed 2021-04-07(f)

Here, Unity failed to provide an evidentiary basis for its assertion that further discovery would lead to additional relevant evidence ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Seaway Capital Corp. v 500 Sterling Realty Corp. , 94 AD3d 856, 856-857; Williams v D & J School Bus, Inc. , 69 AD3d at 619).

Section 3212(f) requires a party seeking further discovery before summary judgment to show that discovery may yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are within the movant’s exclusive control; speculation is insufficient.

Lowes v. Anas · filed 2021-06-17(f)

"[A] party opposing summary judgment on the ground that additional discovery is needed must 'demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant' " ( Bratge v Simons , 173 AD3d 1623, 1624 [4th Dept 2019]; see CPLR 3212 [f]; Feldmeier v Feldmeier Equip., Inc ., 164 AD3d 1093, 1097 [4th Dept 2018]; see generally Resetarits Constr. Corp. v Elizabeth Pierce Olmstead, M.D. Center for the Visually Impaired [appeal No. 2], 118 AD3d 1454, 1456 [4th Dept 2014]). The motion will not be denied based on "mere speculation or conjecture" that discovery would assist in raising a triable issue of fact ( Weiss v Zellar Homes, Ltd. , 169 AD3d 1491, 1493 [4th Dept 2019]; see Resetarits Constr. Corp. , 118 AD3d at 1456).

A party seeking further discovery before a summary judgment motion is decided must show an evidentiary basis for expecting material evidence and explain how discovery might reveal facts exclusively known to the movant.

Porco v. Lifetime Entertainment Servs., LLC · filed 2021-06-24(f)

With regard to that part of plaintiffs' motions seeking to hold defendant's summary judgment motion in abeyance pending further discovery ( see CPLR 3212 [f]), the onus was on plaintiffs "to provide some evidentiary basis for [their] claim that further discovery would yield material evidence and also 'demonstrate how further discovery might reveal material facts in the movant's exclusive knowledge'" ( Rochester Linoleum & Carpet Ctr., Inc. v Cassin , 61 AD3d 1201, 1202 [2009], quoting Scofield v Trustees of Union Coll. in Town of Schenectady , 267 AD2d 651, 652 [1999]; accord Arthur Brundage Inc. v Morris , 189 AD3d 2032, 2032[*2][2020]).

CPLR 3212(f) does not make a summary judgment motion premature merely because discovery is incomplete.

Resnick v. Wainwright · filed 2021-03-24(f)

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the motion was not premature ( see CPLR 3212[f]).

Section 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment as premature to show that further discovery might yield relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant's knowledge and control.

Turnwood Assoc., LLC v. Sutton Hay Day, Inc. · filed 2021-03-31(f)

A party contending that a motion for summary judgment is premature is required to demonstrate that additional discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to oppose the motion are exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Reynolds v Avon Grove Props. , 129 AD3d 932, 933; Burlington Ins. Co. v Casur Corp. , 123 AD3d 965, 965-966; Singh v Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc ., 119 AD3d 768). Here, the defendants failed to make such a showing.

Section 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment as premature when the parties have not had an adequate opportunity for discovery.

Guo Ping Gu v. Malaxos · filed 2021-03-31(f)

The Supreme Court properly denied, as premature, that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment before the parties had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery, as little discovery had taken place and the depositions of the parties had not yet occurred ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Corvino v Schineller , 168 AD3d 812, 812-813; Bernstein v New York City Tr. Auth. , 153 AD3d 897, 897-898; Sodhi v 112 Park Enters., LLC , 147 AD3d 1000, 1001).

A summary judgment motion is not premature under CPLR 3212(f) unless the opponent offers an evidentiary basis that discovery may reveal relevant evidence or that essential facts are exclusively within the movant’s knowledge and control.

Chen v. City of New York · filed 2021-05-19(f)

Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the plaintiffs' motion was not premature as the defendants failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery may lead [*2]to relevant evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the plaintiffs ( see CPLR 3212[f]; Niyazov v Hunter EMS, Inc. , 154 AD3d 954, 955; Pierre v Demoura , 148 AD3d 736, 737).

CPLR 3212(f) requires a party opposing summary judgment as premature to explain how further discovery might yield relevant evidence or show that essential facts are exclusively within the movant's knowledge and control.

Ramlochan v. Hobbs · filed 2021-07-30(f)

Finally, plaintiff's contention that Keyspan's motion was premature ( see generally CPLR 3212 [f]) is without merit, as plaintiff failed to explain how further discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to plaintiff's opposition to the motion were exclusively within Keyspan's knowledge and control ( see Arena v City of New York , 192 AD3d 737 [2021]; Winzelberg v 1319 50th St. Realty Corp. , 114 AD3d 674 [2014]; Cajas-Romero v Ward , 106 AD3d 850, 852 [2013]).

CPLR 3212(f) permits denial of summary judgment when facts essential to opposing the motion may exist but cannot be stated without further discovery.

University Sq. San Antonio, Tx. LLC v. Mega Furniture Dezavala, LLC · filed 2021-10-01(f)

We agree with defendants that the court erred in denying their cross motion and granting plaintiff's motion inasmuch as defendants established that "facts essential to justify opposition [to plaintiff's motion] may exist but cannot . . . be stated" without further discovery (CPLR 3212 [f]).