N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Sutch v. Sutch-Lenz · filed 2015-06-04(a)(7)

Here, even affording plaintiff’s complaint a liberal construction, accepting the allegations contained therein as true and granting plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Snyder v Brown Chiari, LLP, 116 AD3d 1116, 1117 [2014]), the pleading is devoid of the requisite allegations of fraud, collusion, malicious acts or other special circumstances necessary to maintain plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim against defendants.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court asks whether the complaint’s factual allegations, taken together, state any cognizable cause of action.

Law Offices of Thomas F. Liotti v. Felix · filed 2015-06-10(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the sole criterion is whether factual allegations are discerned from the four corners of the complaint which, taken together, manifest any cause of action cognizable at law (see Cohen v Kings Point Tenant Corp., 126 AD3d 843 [2015]; Strunk v New York State Bd. of Elections, 126 AD3d 777 [2015]; Herman v Kveton-Cattani, 123 AD3d 1093 [2014]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court reads the complaint liberally, accepts its factual allegations as true, and asks whether they fit a recognized legal theory.

Kaplan v. Khanna · filed 2015-05-15(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a complaint must be liberally construed, the factual allegations therein must be accepted as true, the plaintiff must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences therefrom, and the court must decide only whether the facts alleged fall under any recognized legal theory ... This motion also must be granted under CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Gumarova v. Law Offices of Paul A. Boronow, P.C. · filed 2015-06-17(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor and accepts its allegations as true.

Huang v. St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church · filed 2015-06-24(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to ... CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all allegations must be accepted as true” (Well v Yeshiva Rambam, 300 AD2d 580, 580 [2002]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts accept the pleaded facts as true, draw every favorable inference for the pleader, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

MVB Collision, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2015-06-24(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and afford the proponent the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Baron v Galasso, 83 AD3d 626, 628 [2011]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true.

JF Capital Advisors, LLC v. The Lightstone Group, LLC · filed 2015-07-01(a)(7)

Inasmuch as this appeal had its genesis in a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we are bound to, inter alia, “accept the facts as alleged in the [amended] complaint as true” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, treats its factual allegations as true, and gives the nonmoving party all favorable inferences.

Nasca v. Sgro · filed 2015-07-01(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be construed liberally, the factual allegations deemed to be true, and the nonmoving party must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Dolphin Holdings, Ltd. v Gander & White Shipping, Inc., 122 AD3d 901, 901-902 [2014]; Carillo v Stony Brook Univ., 119 AD3d 508, 508-509 [2014]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

GFRE, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A. · filed 2015-07-01(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Cremosa Food Co., LLC v. Amella · filed 2015-07-01(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court considers whether the factual allegations as a whole state any legally cognizable cause of action.

Russo v. Rozenholc · filed 2015-07-09(a)(7)

Of course, on a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court must determine whether the factual allegations taken as a whole manifest any cause of action cognizable at law (see Ackerman v 305 E. 40th Owners Corp., 189 AD2d 665, 666 [1st Dept 1993]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Rosenblum v. Island Custom Stairs, Inc. · filed 2015-07-15(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Board of Mgrs. of 136 St. Marks Place Condominium v St. Marks Place Condominiums, II, LLC, 128 AD3d 877 [2015]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts construe the complaint liberally, presume its allegations true, and give it every favorable inference.

Stein v. Chiera · filed 2015-07-22(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction. The facts alleged in it are presumed to be true and are to be accorded every favorable inference.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Tirpack v. 125 North 10, LLC · filed 2015-07-22(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the court should accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Simos v Vic-Armen Realty, LLC, 92 AD3d 760, 761 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Cervini v Zanoni, 95 AD3d 919, 921 [2012]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the alleged facts do not fit within any cognizable legal theory.

Lindine v. Iasenza · filed 2015-07-23(a)(7)

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action may be granted if "the facts alleged do not 'fit within any cognizable legal theory'" (Hyman v Burgess, 125 AD3d 1213, 1214 [2015], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court liberally construes the claim, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the cause of action every possible favorable inference.

Woodstock Construction Group, Ltd. v. State · filed 2015-07-29(a)(7)

Affording the claim a liberal construction, accepting all facts as alleged in the claim to be true, according the cause of action the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]), and considering that the claimant asserts causes of action in the alternative (see CPLR 3014), the claim states a cause of action alleging promissory estoppel.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), dismissal fails if the complaint’s factual allegations, taken together, state any cognizable cause of action.

Schwarz v. Consolidated Edison, Inc. · filed 2015-08-03(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court’s role is deciding “whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (African Diaspora Mar. Corp. v Golden Gate Yacht Club, 109 AD3d 204, 211 [1st Dept 2013]; Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v East 149th Realty Corp., 104 AD3d 401 [1st Dept 2013]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Schwartz v. Torrenzano · filed 2015-08-07(a)(7)

Pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), pleadings shall be liberally construed, the facts as alleged accepted as true, and every possible favorable inference given to plaintiff (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a claim may survive dismissal even when the plaintiff has not yet shown it can ultimately prove the claim.

Blue Island Development, LLC v. Town of Hempstead · filed 2015-08-12(a)(7)

Whether Blue Island can ultimately demonstrate that the denial of a modification to the restrictive covenant effects a taking, it has stated a claim (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; cf. Putnam County Natl. Bank v City of New York, 37 AD3d at 576-577), and the Town has not pointed to any documentary evidence defeating that claim (see CPLR 3211 [a] [1]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court examines whether the pleadings state a claim and cannot require evidence to support a complaint sufficient on its face.

Abdale v. North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System, Inc. · filed 2015-08-14(a)(7)

The court is limited to “an examination of the pleadings to determine whether they state a cause of action,” and the “plaintiff may not be penalized for failure to make an evidentiary showing in support of a complaint that states a claim on its face” (Miglino v Bally Total Fitness of Greater N.Y., Inc., 20 NY3d 342, 351 [2013]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference when assessing the allegations.

Anderson v. Edmiston & Co., Inc. · filed 2015-08-04(a)(7)

In particular, according her the benefit of every possible favorable inference ... plaintiff has adequately alleged that she was terminated, for purposes of stating the foregoing claims.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Wallkill Medical Development, LLC v. Catskill Orange Orthopaedics · filed 2015-08-19(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Non-non v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Paolicelli v Fieldbridge Assoc., LLC, 120 AD3d 643, 644 [2014]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court gives the pleader every favorable inference and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Matter of Clavin v. Mitchell · filed 2015-08-19(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the standard is whether, giving the pleader the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the four corners of the pleading contain factual allegations which can fit any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe pleadings liberally, accept alleged facts as true, and give plaintiffs every favorable inference when deciding whether the allegations state a cognizable claim.

Chan v. Chinese-American Planning Council Home Attendant Program, Inc. · filed 2015-09-09(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the pleadings must be liberally construed (see CPLR 3026; Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v East 149th Realty Corp., 104 AD3d 401 [1st Dept 2013]) and the court must “accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true,” accord plaintiffs “the benefit of every possible favorable inference,” and “determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v East 149th Realty Corp., 104 AD3d at 403 [internal quotation marks omitted]; Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825 [2007]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

A motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7) lies only if the pleading is defective on its face; required medical certifications need not be part of a guardianship petition.

In re the Appointment of a Guardian of the Person & Property for BM · filed 2015-09-11(a)(7)

The medical certifications required by SCPA 1750 and 1750-a are not a necessary component of the pleading itself (see SCPA 1752) and, a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion lies only if the pleading is defective on its face (see Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633 [1976]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is construed liberally, its factual allegations are deemed true, and the nonmoving party receives every favorable inference.

Barouh v. Law Offs. of Jason L. Abelove · filed 2015-09-16(a)(7)

In considering such a motion, “the complaint must be construed liberally, the factual allegations deemed to be true, and the nonmoving party granted the benefit of every possible favorable inference” (Hense v Baxter, 79 AD3d 814, 815 [2010]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleaded facts receive every favorable inference, but bare legal conclusions and factual claims flatly contradicted by the record do not.

Rhodes v. Honigman · filed 2015-09-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and are to be accorded every favorable inference, but “bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by the record are not entitled to any such consideration” (Silverman v Nicholson, 110 AD3d 1054, 1055 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lutz v Caracappa, 35 AD3d 673, 674 [2006]; Doria v Masucci, 230 AD2d 764, 765 [1996]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is construed liberally in the plaintiff’s favor and its allegations are accepted as true.

Hersh v. Cohen · filed 2015-09-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of aciton, the complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all allegations must be accepted as true (see Leon v Martinez, ... 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, but bare legal conclusions and claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence do not suffice.

School Transparency Organization v. Harpursville Central School District · filed 2015-09-28(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “ ‘the pleading is to be given a liberal construction, the allegations contained within it are assumed to be true and the plaintiff[s] [are] to be afforded every favorable inference’ .... This liberal standard, however, will not save allegations that consist of bare legal conclusions or factual claims that are flatly contradicted by documentary evidence or are inherently incredible” (DerOhannesian v City of Albany, 110 AD3d 1288, 1289 [3d Dept 2013], Iv denied 22 NY3d 862 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts liberally construe the pleading, accept its alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Caravello v. One Management Group, LLC · filed 2015-09-30(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is afforded a liberal construction and the court must give the plaintiff “the benefit of every possible favorable inference, accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (High Tides, LLC v DeMichele, 88 AD3d 954, 956 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; McDonnell v Bradley, 109 AD3d 592, 593 [2013]).

Under subsection (a)(7), a conclusory allegation of prejudice is insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

MILLER, ERICK J. v. ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY · filed 2015-10-02(a)(7)

Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, their conclusory allegation that they were “damaged and prejudiced” by the untimely disclaimer is insufficient to withstand this CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss (see Tierney v Capricorn Invs., 189 AD2d 629, 632, lv denied 81 NY2d 710).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and asks whether they state a legally sufficient cause of action.

Miller v. Allstate Indemnity Co. · filed 2015-10-02(a)(7)

We agree with Allstate in appeal No. 1 that the court erred in denying those parts of its motion to dismiss the fourth and sixth causes of action for failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). We recognize that this appeal comes to us on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), and “[t]hus, we accept as true each and every allegation made by plaintiff[s] and limit our inquiry to the legal sufficiency of plaintiff[s’] claim[s]” (Silsdorf v Levine, 59 NY2d 8, 12 [1983], cert denied 464 US 831 [1983]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, courts accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and afford the plaintiff every possible inference.

Murray v. Golley · filed 2015-10-09(a)(7)

Defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in denying his pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint against him pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) on the ground that he owed no duty of care to plaintiff. We agree. It is well settled that, on such a motion, all factual allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true and the benefit of every possible inference shall be afforded to the plaintiff (see Gibraltar Steel Corp. v Gibraltar Metal Processing, 19 AD3d 1141, 1142 [2005]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Rosner v. Amazon.com · filed 2015-10-21(a)(7)

In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, a court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the factual allegations fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; El Jamal v Weil, 116 AD3d 732, 733 [2014]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the pleadings and evidence show that an essential allegation is not a fact and no significant dispute about it exists, even after the plaintiff receives every favorable inference.

Leacock v. Leacock · filed 2015-10-21(a)(7)

According the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the pleadings and the evidence taken together demonstrate that his assertion that both parties intended to divide their jointly owned real property equally was “not a fact at all,” and “no significant dispute exists regarding it” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; cf. Asset Mgt. & Capital Co., Inc. v Nugent, 85 AD3d at 948-949; True v True, 63 AD3d at 1147-1148). Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint (see Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d at 54).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Clarson v. City of Long Beach · filed 2015-10-21(a)(7)

In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, afford the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must read the pleading liberally, accept its factual allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Harris v. Dutchess County Board of Cooperative Educational Services · filed 2015-11-04(a)(7)

The court must construe the pleadings liberally, accepting every factual allegation as true and affording plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference possible.

On a motion to dismiss, factual allegations in the complaint and opposition are assumed true, but conclusory allegations do not defeat the motion.

DRMAK Realty LLC v. Progressive Credit Union · filed 2015-11-05(a)(7)

It is assumed, of course, that plaintiffs' factual allegations are true, both in the complaint and in opposition to the motion ( see Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp. , 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]). However, conclusory allegations will not serve to defeat a motion to dismiss ( see Phillips v Trommel Constr. , 101 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2d Dept 2012]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Dinger v. Cefola · filed 2015-11-25(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Rabos v R&R Bagels & Bakery, Inc., 100 AD3d 849, 851 [2012]; Daub v Future Tech Enter., Inc., 65 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2009]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court may consider the plaintiff’s affidavits to remedy defects in the complaint and asks whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.

Citigroup Global Markets v. Infante · filed 2015-12-09(a)(7)

In assessing a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court may consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint and “the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 88 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiffs every favorable inference.

Campbell v. Self Initiated Living Options, Inc. · filed 2015-12-09(a)(7)

Even accepting as true the facts alleged in the amended complaint and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference ... plaintiffs, at-will employees of the defendant, failed to state a cause of action for breach of an implied contract (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Weiner v McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 NY2d 458 [1982]; Waddell v Boyce Thompson Inst. for Plant Research, Inc., 92 AD3d 1172 [2012]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the claimant every favorable inference, and asks whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Boggs v. State · filed 2015-12-09(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a claim pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) the court is required to “accept the facts as alleged in the [claim] as true, accord [claimant] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see also Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe a complaint liberally and accept its factual allegations as true, but need not credit bare legal conclusions or factual claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence.

Sullivan Farms IV, LLC v. Village of Wurtsboro · filed 2015-12-10(a)(7)

"In assessing the adequacy of a complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must give the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and afford the plaintiff 'the benefit of every possible favorable inference'" (J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v Vigilant Ins. Co., 21 NY3d 324, 334 [2013], quoting AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co., 5 NY3d 582, 591 [2005]). Nevertheless, "allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence are not entitled to any such consideration" (Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d 87, 91 [1999] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d 46, 52 [2012]; see Matter of Conners v Town of Colonie, 108 AD3d 837, 839 [2013]). Supreme Court correctly determined that such was the case presented here and, as such, we affirm.

Section 3211(a)(7) governs a motion challenging whether a complaint states a cause of action, even when the movant calls it a summary judgment motion.

Thompson v. City of New York · filed 2015-12-15(a)(7)

To the extent that defendants seek summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claims of negligence, negligence in the hiring, retention and supervision of Del Carpió, and claims pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, such motion is one for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and not summary judgment.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court determines whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Davis v. South Nassau Communities Hospital · filed 2015-12-16(a)(7)

In the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, we “determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is construed liberally, its factual allegations are accepted as true, and the plaintiff receives every possible favorable inference.

Stewart Title Insurance v. Wingate, Kearney & Cullen · filed 2015-12-16(a)(7)

Here, construing the complaint liberally, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, as we are required to do, the plaintiff stated a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts accept the complaint’s allegations as true, draw every favorable inference for the plaintiff, and ask whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

E & D Group, LLC v. Vialet · filed 2015-12-23(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court asks whether the complaint’s allegations, taken together, state a legally cognizable claim.

Kallista, S.A. v. White & Williams LLP · filed 2016-01-07(a)(7)

The legal standards to be applied in evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) are well-settled. In determining whether a complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action (Cooper v 620 Props. Assoc., 242 AD2d 359 [2d Dept 1997], citing Weiss v Cuddy & Feder, 200 AD2d 665 [2d Dept 1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) does not require dismissal of a foreclosure complaint for failing to allege or prove standing, because standing is not an element of the claim.

BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP v. Bertram · filed 2016-01-07(a)(7)

Moreover, the absence of pleaded allegations and/or proof of the plaintiff’s standing does not warrant a dismissal of the complaint on grounds of legal insufficiency as contemplated by CPLR 3211 (a) (7), since standing is not an element of the plaintiff’s claim for foreclosure and sale, in the first instance, and is not one in this action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court examines the complaint and denies the motion if it can discern any cause of action.

Incorporated Village of Manorhaven v. Toner · filed 2016-01-12(a)(7)

The court must look within the four corners of the complaint, and if any cause of action is discemable therefrom the motion should fail.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action.

Rios v. Tiny Giants Daycare, Inc. · filed 2016-01-20(a)(7)

Here, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant Jose Done’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against him on the ground that the conclusory allegations therein were insufficient to state a cause of action against him.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts liberally construe the pleading, accept its alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every possible inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Board of Managers of the 125 North 10th Condominium v. 125North10, LLC · filed 2016-01-26(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction (CPLR 3026), and the court should accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, accord plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and only determine whether the facts, as alleged, fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Hurrell-Harring v State of New York, 15 NY3d 8, 20 [2010]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Janker v. Silver, Forrester & Lesser, P.C. · filed 2016-01-27(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Dinger v Cefola, 133 AD3d 816, 817 [2015]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the alleged facts, accepted as true and read with every favorable inference, do not fit any cognizable legal theory.

Xiu Jian Sun v. Jing · filed 2016-02-03(a)(7)

Furthermore, to the extent that the factual allegations in the complaint can be construed to assert claims that are not predicated upon medical malpractice, the complaint failed to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). Affording the complaint a liberal construction, accepting the facts alleged as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, as the court is required to do, the facts as alleged do not fit within any cognizable legal theory, apart from the time-barred claim for medical malpractice (see Law Offs. of Thomas F. Liotti v Felix, 129 AD3d 783 [2015]; Thomson v New World Bible Translation Comm., 127 AD3d 731 [2015]; Salvatore v Board of Educ. of Mineola Union Free School Dist., 89 AD3d 1078 [2011]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires liberal construction of the pleading, acceptance of its alleged facts as true, and favorable inferences for the pleader.

RESZKA, ELIZABETH v. COLLINS, COUNCILMAN JOSEPH A. · filed 2016-02-05(a)(7)

We reject plaintiff’s further contention that the first counterclaim, alleging defamation, should be dismissed on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). “On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87). “We accept the facts as alleged [in the answer] as true, accord [defendant] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (id. at 87-88).

CPLR 3211(a) permits dismissal of counterclaims that allege no material facts supporting a cognizable cause of action.

Feinstein v. Rickman · filed 2016-02-17(a)

However, the Supreme Court erred in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the counterclaims of Giordano, who failed to allege any material facts giving rise to cognizable claims to recover damages for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or other causes of action (see generally Fischer v Maloney, 43 NY2d 553, 557 [1978]; Alexander v Scott, 286 AD2d 692, 693 [2001]; Realty By Frank Kay v Majestic Farms Supply, 160 AD2d 789, 790 [1990]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleaded facts are presumed true and receive every favorable inference.

Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Universal Development, LLC · filed 2016-02-17(a)(7)

For purposes of a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and are to be accorded every favorable inference (see Gershon v Goldberg, 30 AD3d 372 [2006]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its factual allegations as true, and gives the nonmoving party all favorable inferences.

Nilazra, Inc. v. Karakus, Inc. · filed 2016-02-24(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be construed liberally, the factual allegations must be deemed to be true, and the nonmoving party must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Carillo v Stony Brook Univ., 119 AD3d 508, 508-509 [2014]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Gutierrez v. Government Employees Insurance · filed 2016-02-24(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is afforded a liberal construction, and the court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Caravello v One Mgt. Group, LLC, 131 AD3d 1191 [2015]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court determines whether the pleading states a claim without requiring evidentiary support for it.

Time Equities, Inc. v. Naeringsbygg 1 Norge III AS · filed 2016-02-24(a)(7)

The court's role is limited to determining whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether there is evidentiary support to establish a meritorious cause of action ( see, Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180 [2d Dept 2010]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Bennett v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 2016-03-02(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Petkewicz v. Dutchess County Department of Community & Family Services · filed 2016-03-16(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should accept the alleged facts in the complaint as true and afford the proponent the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Baron v Galasso, 83 AD3d 626, 628 [2011]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, construes the pleading liberally, and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Wald v. Graev · filed 2016-03-17(a)(7)

Accepting these allegations as true, affording the pleading a liberal construction, and giving plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we conclude that Supreme Court properly held that the claim was barred by the applicable six year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [2]) to the extent it was based on the promise to immediately vest warrants on April 12, 2006, and to vest an additional 100,000 warrants on March 31, 2007.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint contains only vague and conclusory allegations and states no valid cause of action.

McFadden v. Schneiderman · filed 2016-03-18(a)(7)

It is well established that, “[i]n assessing a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), . . . ‘the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one’ ” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]). ... We conclude that the allegations contained in the complaint are vague and conclusory and do not allege a justiciable controversy, i.e., “a substantial legal controversy between the parties that may be resolved by a declaration of the parties’ legal rights” (Rice v Cayuga-Onondaga Healthcare Plan, 190 AD2d 330, 333 [1993]), or any other valid cause of action for which relief may be granted.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts accept the pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Matter of Kassab v. Kasab · filed 2016-03-23(a)(7)

In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, a court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the factual allegations fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Rosner v Amazon.com, 132 AD3d 835, 836 [2015]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, allegations are accepted as true, and dismissal is proper only if the alleged facts fit no cognizable legal theory.

Atlantic Hgts. Specialty Script Corp. v. Downstate at Lich Holding Co., Inc. · filed 2016-03-28(a)(7)

As movant acknowledges, "[i]n considering a motion to dismiss . . . for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the allegations . . . should be accepted as true, and the motion should be granted only if the facts as alleged do not fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Nagan Construction, Inc. v Monsignor McClancy Memorial High School , 117 AD3d 1005, 1006 [2d Dept 2014]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Janusonis v. Carauskas · filed 2016-03-30(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should accept the alleged facts in the complaint as true and afford the proponent the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; see also Baron v Galasso, 83 AD3d 626, 628 [2011]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and gives them every favorable inference when deciding whether they state a viable cause of action.

Board of Mgrs. of Foundry at Wash. Park Condominium v. Foundry Dev. Co., Inc. · filed 2016-03-30(a)(7)

Additionally, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, with respect to those branches of the motions of SBJ and BSRB which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them, accepting as true the facts alleged in the amended complaint and according them the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the amended complaint failed to state any viable cause of action against SBJ and BSRB.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), allegations in the pleadings and opposing affidavits may be sufficient to avoid dismissal even when the terms of an alleged agreement are disputed.

Sim v. Farley Equipment Company LLC · filed 2016-04-07(a)(7)

Although the nature, length and terms of the purported oral agreements between plaintiffs and defendants regarding the excavators are sharply contested, nevertheless, there are ample allegations in the pleadings and assertions in plaintiffs' affidavits to avoid CPLR 3211 (a) (7) dismissal of the causes of action for breach of contract and quantum meruit (see Hyman v Burgess, 125 AD3d 1213, 1214-1215 [2015]; Schultz Constr. v Franbilt, Inc., 285 AD2d 936, 937-938 [2001]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss an article 78 petition, the court considers only the petition, treats its allegations as true, and gives the petitioner every possible inference.

Matter of Johnson v. County of Orange · filed 2016-04-13(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted the respondents’ motion pursuant to CPLR 7804 (f) and, in effect, CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the petition in this proceeding. “On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and 7804 (f), only the petition is ... considered, all of its allegations are deemed true, and the petitioner is accorded the benefit of every possible inference” (Matter of Brown v Foster, 73 AD3d 917, 918 [2010]; see Matter of Schlemme v Planning Bd. of City of Poughkeepsie, 118 AD3d 893, 895 [2014]; Matter of Lobaina v Human Resources Admin., Office of Child Support Enforcement, 79 AD3d 884, 884 [2010]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, treats its factual allegations as true, and gives the nonmoving party all favorable inferences.

Stortini v. Pollis · filed 2016-04-20(a)(7)

‘On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be construed liberally, the factual allegations deemed to be true, and the nonmoving party must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences’

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court asks whether the complaint’s factual allegations, taken together, state any legally cognizable cause of action.

Matter of Soldatenko v. Village of Scarsdale Zoning Bd. of Appeals · filed 2016-04-20(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the sole criterion is whether, from the complaint’s four corners, factual allegations are discerned which, taken together, manifest any cause of action cognizable at law (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint receives a liberal construction, but dismissal is proper when its allegations do not indicate a cognizable theory of liability.

WHITE, ROSEMARY v. THE DIOCESE OF BUFFALO N.Y. · filed 2016-04-29(a)(7)

Although “[i]t is axiomatic that plaintiff’s complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, that the facts alleged therein are accepted as true, and that plaintiff is to be afforded every possible inference in order to determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint ‘fit within any cognizable theory’ ” (Palladino v CNY Centro, Inc., 70 AD3d 1450, 1451, quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88), we conclude that the complaint herein “ ‘gives not the slightest indication of a theory of liability of negligent supervision [or retention]’ ” (Darrisaw v Strong Mem. Hosp., 74 AD3d 1769, 1770, affd 16 NY3d 729).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint receives a liberal construction, its alleged facts are accepted as true, and the plaintiff receives every possible inference in determining whether the allegations state a cognizable claim.

SQUARE MAX, LLC v. TRICKEY, JR., JOHN T. · filed 2016-04-29(a)(7)

In assessing a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “[i]t is axiomatic that plaintiff’s complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, that the facts alleged therein are accepted as true, and that plaintiff is to be afforded every possible inference in order to determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint ‘fit within any cognizable theory’ ” (Palladino v CNY Centro, Inc., 70 AD3d 1450, 1451).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint is liberally construed, with its alleged facts accepted as true and every favorable inference given to the plaintiff, to determine whether it states a cognizable claim.

White v. Diocese of Buffalo · filed 2016-04-29(a)(7)

Supreme Court properly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). ... Although “[i]t is axiomatic that plaintiff’s complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, that the facts alleged therein are accepted as true, and that plaintiff is to be afforded every possible favorable inference in order to determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint ‘fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Palladino v CNY Centro, Inc., 70 AD3d 1450, 1451 [2010], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we conclude that the complaint herein “ ‘gives not the slightest indication of a theory of liability of negligent supervision [or retention]’ ” (Darrisaw v Strong Mem. Hosp., 74 AD3d 1769, 1770 [2010], affd 16 NY3d 729 [2011]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint withstands dismissal if its allegations state a cognizable cause of action.

Jetro Holdings, LLC v. Mastercard Intl., Inc. · filed 2016-05-03(a)(7)

In determining whether a complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action ( Cooper v 620 Prop. Assoc., 242 AD2d 359 [2d Dept 1997], citing Weiss v Cuddy & Feder , 200 AD2d 665 [2d Dept 1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Fough v. August Aichhorn Center for Adolescent Residential Care, Inc. · filed 2016-05-04(a)(7)

In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 66 AD3d 122, 125 [2009], affd 16 NY3d 775 [2011]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Acocella v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2016-05-04(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court is required to accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the pleader every favorable inference in deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Lieberman v. Green · filed 2016-05-11(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is afforded a liberal construction and the court must give the party “the benefit of every possible favorable inference, accept the facts alleged in the [pleading] as true, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (High Tides, LLC v DeMichele, 88 AD3d 954, 956 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see McDonnell v Bradley, 109 AD3d 592, 593 [2013]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint's alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Baer v. Law Offices of Moran & Gottlieb · filed 2016-05-12(a)(7)

Finally, on a motion to dismiss a third-party complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), this Court must "accept the facts as alleged in the [third-party] complaint as true, accord [the third-party plaintiffs] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Slezak v Stewart's Shops Corp., 133 AD3d 1179, 1179 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see State of N.Y. Workers' Compensation Bd. v 26-28 Maple Ave., Inc., 80 AD3d 1135, 1137 [2011]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts factual allegations as true and gives the pleading a liberal construction, but conclusory allegations and hoped-for discovery do not save a defective pleading.

128 Second Realty LLC v. Dobrowolski · filed 2016-05-17(a)(7)

We acknowledge that on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction, its allegations are accepted as true, landlords are accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference and the court determines "only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Nevertheless, we find that landlords' vague and conclusory allegations and expression of hope that discovery, if and when conducted, might provide some factual support for their causes of action under Rent Stabilization Code [9 NYCRR] §§ 2524.3(c) and 2524.3(d), provide an insufficient basis for failing to dismiss a patently defective holdover petition.

Section 3211(a)(7) tests whether a pleading states a cause of action, rather than whether its proponent has one.

Pinkesz Mutual Holdings, LLC v. Pinkesz · filed 2016-05-25(a)(7)

“When a party moves to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when unrefuted evidentiary material establishes that the defendant did not own or operate the vehicle involved.

Frost v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2016-06-01(a)(7)

However, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the NYCTA. The evidentiary material submitted by the appellants, which was not refuted by the plaintiff, established that the NYCTA did not own or operate the bus involved in the subject incident (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; see also Ruffino v New York City Tr. Auth., 55 AD3d 817, 819 [2008]; cf. Rampersaud v Metropolitan Transp. Auth. of the State of N.Y., 73 AD3d 888, 888 [2010]).

A verified complaint amplified by an affidavit and checks can state breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Chun v. Kim · filed 2016-06-15(a)(7)

Civil Court correctly denied defendant's CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss this action based upon an alleged loan. The verified complaint, particularly as amplified by plaintiff's prior (January 9, 2009) affidavit and the pertinent checks - which were payable to defendant and bore the notation "loan" - discloses that plaintiff has valid causes of action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts construe the complaint liberally, accept its factual allegations as true, and give the nonmoving party every possible favorable inference.

Godino v. Premier Salons, Ltd. · filed 2016-06-29(a)(7)

The complaint must be construed liberally, the factual allegations deemed to be true, and the nonmoving party granted the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the pleader every favorable inference.

Dorce v. Gluck · filed 2016-06-29(a)(7)

Affording the defendants’ counterclaims a liberal construction, accepting all facts as alleged in the counterclaims to be true, and according the defendants the benefit of every favorable inference as required on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the counterclaims fail to state a cause of action to recover damages for prima facie tort for statements made by the plaintiff in pursuit of a settlement prior to commencing the action.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Manning v. Pioneer Savings Bank · filed 2016-07-07(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must read the complaint liberally, assume its allegations are true, and deny the motion if the allegations fit any cognizable legal theory.

Heeran v. Long Is. Power Auth. (LIPA) · filed 2016-07-13(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action ( see CPLR 3211[a][7]), the court must read the complaint liberally and assume that the plaintiffs' allegations are true.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss a petition, the court treats its allegations as true and gives the petitioner every favorable inference.

Matter of Kunik v. New York City Dept. of Educ. · filed 2016-08-17(a)(7)

The Supreme Court erred in granting the respondents’ cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and 7804 (f) to dismiss the petition. “On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), all of the allegations in the petition are deemed true and the petitioner is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference”

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, presumes its allegations true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Diecidue v. Russo · filed 2016-08-31(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see CPLR 3026; Arnav Indus., Inc. Retirement Trust v Brown, Raysman, Millstein, Felder & Steiner, 96 NY2d 300, 303 [2001]; Thompson Bros. Pile Corp. v Rosenblum, 121 AD3d 672, 673 [2014]).

Section 3211(a)(7) tests the adequacy of a pleading rather than the ultimate merits of the claim.

Kaplan v. New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene · filed 2016-09-21(a)(7)

A motion to dismiss merely addresses the adequacy of the pleading, and does not reach the substantive merits of a party’s cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

ANDREWS, RICHARD T. v. COUNTY OF CAYUGA · filed 2016-09-30(a)(7)

Accepting as true the facts as alleged in the amended complaint and according plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Board of Trustees of IBEW Local 43 Elec. Contrs. Health & Welfare, Annuity & Pension Funds v D’Arcangelo & Co., LLP, 124 AD3d 1358, 1359), we conclude that plaintiff’s allegation that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment rights to adequate medical care by jail personnel is sufficient basis for the assertion of a cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see Powlowski, 102 AD2d at 583-584; cf. Matter of Wooley v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 15 NY3d 275, 281-283, rearg denied 15 NY3d 841).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Andrews v. County of Cayuga · filed 2016-09-30(a)(7)

Accepting as true the facts as alleged in the amended complaint and according plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Board of Trustees of IBEW Local 43 Elec. Contrs. Health & Welfare, Annuity & Pension Funds v D'Arcangelo & Co., LLP, 124 AD3d 1358, 1359 [2015]), we conclude that plaintiff’s allegation that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment rights to adequate medical care by jail personnel is sufficient basis for the assertion of a cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see Powlowski, 102 AD2d at 583-584; cf. Matter of Wooley v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 15 NY3d 275, 281-283 [2010], rearg denied 15 NY3d 841 [2010]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a cause of action.

Environmental Appraisers & Builders, LLC v. Imhof · filed 2016-10-12(a)(7)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against Kimberlie for failure to state a cause of action.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint's facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Xiu Jian Sun v. Lam · filed 2016-10-19(a)(7)

“In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint's facts as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Xiu Jian Sun v. Dick Bailey Serv., Inc. · filed 2016-10-19(a)(7)

"In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Fough v August Aichhorn Ctr. for Adolescent Residential Care, Inc., 139 AD3d 665, 666; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference, and may consider the plaintiff’s affidavit to remedy defects in the complaint.

Villar v. Timothy B. Howard, Erie County Sheriff · filed 2016-10-25(a)(7)

"[A]ccept[ing] the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord[ing] plaintiff[] the benefit of every possible favorable inference . . . [and] consider[ing] [the] affidavit[] submitted by . . . plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY3d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we conclude that the complaint adequately set forth a negligence claim to survive a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must construe the complaint liberally in the plaintiff’s favor and accept its allegations as true.

Friedman v. New York Life Insurance & Annuity Corp. · filed 2016-10-26(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all allegations must be accepted as true”

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, courts accept pleaded facts as true, draw favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Meehan v. County of Suffolk · filed 2016-11-02(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]).

Section 3211(a)(7) does not warrant dismissal for failure to state a cause of action when the plaintiffs have a negligence cause of action.

Arana v. Kish · filed 2016-11-02(a)(7)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the Patterson defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), as the plaintiffs have a cause of action against the defendants to recover damages for negligence.

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), courts liberally construe the pleading, accept its alleged facts as true, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

25 Bay Terrace Associates, L.P. v. Public Service Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 2016-11-02(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is afforded a liberal construction, and the court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court assumes the complaint’s factual allegations are true and denies dismissal if they state a cognizable claim.

Billiard Balls Management, LLC v. Mintzer Sarowitz Zeris Ledva & Meyers, LLP · filed 2016-11-02(a)(7)

To the degree the complaint alleges that the Firm was engaged to defend Billiard in the underlying action, and that the stipulation identifies the Firm (and its attorneys) as “Attorneys for Defendants” “Billiard Balls Management LLC d/b/a Slate,” and assuming such facts as true as this court must, the court finds that Billiard states a claim for legal malpractice.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court gives the complaint every favorable inference and treats its allegations as true.

Choi v. AmTrust North America · filed 2016-11-03(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) the complaint must be given every favorable inference and the allegations in the complaint are deemed to be true.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is construed liberally, its factual allegations are treated as true, and the nonmoving party receives all favorable inferences.

Olivieri Construction Corp. v. WN Weaver Street, LLC · filed 2016-11-09(a)(7)

“ ‘On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be construed liberally, the factual allegations deemed to be true, and the nonmoving party must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences’ ” (Hampshire Props. v BTA Bldg. & Developing, Inc., 122 AD3d 573, 573 [2014], quoting Carillo v Stony Brook Univ., 119 AD3d 508, 508-509 [2014]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

JT Queens Carwash, Inc. v. JDW & Associates, Inc. · filed 2016-11-09(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the court should accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Simos v Vic-Armen Realty, LLC, 92 AD3d 760, 761 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court credits the complaint’s allegations when deciding whether they adequately state a claim.

James v. City of New York · filed 2016-11-10(a)(7)

Crediting the allegations in the complaint for purposes of this motion to dismiss, we find that plaintiff, a correction officer and captain during the relevant time periods, has adequately alleged a claim for sexual orientation-based discrimination in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law (see Anderson v Edmiston & Co., Inc., 131 AD3d 416 [1st Dept 2015]; Askin v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 110 AD3d 621 [1st Dept 2013]).

Section 3211(a)(7) allows a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, but dismissal may be denied when the petition warrants relief.

Matter of Zvegintzov v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2016-11-16(a)(7)

Under the unique facts and circumstances of this particular case, that branch of the respondent’s motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and 7804 (f) to dismiss the petition for failure to state a cause of action should have been denied, the petition should have been granted, the determination dated June 25, 2014, should have been annulled, and the decision dated March 28, 2014, should have been vacated.

On a motion to dismiss under section 3211(a)(7), the court must construe the pleading liberally.

Weinstock v. Sanders · filed 2016-11-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading must be afforded a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss a counterclaim under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the pleader every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Wand, Powers & Goody, LLP v. Yuliano · filed 2016-11-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court must accept as true the facts as alleged in the pleading, accord the pleader the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arbitrage Partners, L.P. v Superior Well Servs., Inc., 20 NY3d 59, 63 [2012]; Mazzei v Kyriacou, 98 AD3d 1088, 1089 [2012]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and considers submitted evidentiary material in deciding whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.

Pall v. Roosevelt Union Free School District · filed 2016-11-23(a)(7)

Here, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, affording the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and considering the evidentiary material submitted by the parties (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Zapata v Tufenkjian, 123 AD3d 814, 816 [2014]), the plaintiff did not have a cause of action to recover damages for defamation.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must read the complaint liberally and assume the plaintiffs’ allegations are true.

Cash on Spot ATM Services, LLC v. Camia · filed 2016-11-23(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), the court must read the complaint liberally and assume that the plaintiffs’ allegations are true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703 [2008]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Weinstein v. CohnReznick, LLP · filed 2016-11-30(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court is required to accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ingvarsdottir v. Gaines, Gruner, Ponzini & Novick, LLP · filed 2016-11-30(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss a family offense petition under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the petition, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the petitioner every favorable inference.

Matter of Lashlee v. Lashlee · filed 2016-12-07(a)(7)

“In determining a motion to dismiss a family offense petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), ‘the petition must be liberally construed, the facts alleged in the petition must be accepted as true, and the petitioner must be granted the benefit of every favorable inference’ ” (Matter of Xin Li v Ramos, 125 AD3d 681, 682 [2015], quoting Matter of Arnold v Arnold, 119 AD3d 938, 939 [2014]).

On a motion under subsection (a)(7), a complaint survives if its factual allegations, construed liberally, state any cognizable cause of action.

Mahler v. North Shore Camp, LLC · filed 2016-12-07(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a defamation claim when the alleged statements are not dated with sufficient specificity, even after considering the plaintiff’s opposition affidavit.

Arvanitakis v. Lester · filed 2016-12-07(a)(7)

Here, to the extent that the complaint alleges that certain alleged defamatory statements were made “September 2012 through the present,” those allegations, even as supplemented by the affidavit Arvanitakis submitted in opposition to the motions, were not sufficiently specific with respect to time. Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly granted those branches of the defendants’ separate motions which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss so much of the defamation causes of action as were predicated upon alleged statements made during such general time periods (see Sirianni v Rafaloff, 284 AD2d 447, 448 [2001]; Dillon v City of New York, 261 AD2d at 40).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court may accept a plaintiff’s opposing affidavit as true when deciding whether equitable estoppel is sufficiently pleaded.

Deep Woods Holdings LLC v. Pryor Cashman LLP · filed 2016-12-06

However, accepting plaintiff’s affidavit in opposition to defendants’ motion as true, we find that plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that defendants should be equitably estopped from arguing that the assignment did not assign tort claims.

In an article 78 proceeding, a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) requires the court to accept the petition’s allegations as true and resolve ambiguous allegations in the petitioner’s favor.

Mental Hygiene Legal Service v. Daniels · filed 2016-12-13(a)(7)

In an article 78 proceeding, when confronted with a motion to dismiss the petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), all allegations in the petition are deemed to be true and where the allegations are ambiguous, they are resolved in petitioner’s favor (Matter of Castro v Schriro, 140 AD3d 644 [1st Dept 2016]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleading’s allegations as true, gives them every favorable inference, and denies dismissal if they sufficiently allege a cause of action.

Matter of Fanizzi v. Planning Bd. of Patterson · filed 2016-12-14(a)(7)

Deeming the allegations in the petition/complaint to be true and affording the petitioner the benefit of every favorable inference, the petition/complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action pursuant to FOIL. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the motions of the Town respondents and the developer which were pursuant to CPLR 7804 (f) and 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the petition/complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Cherofsky v. Cherofsky · filed 2016-12-21(a)(7)

“In considering a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), ‘the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court may consider a plaintiff’s affidavits to remedy defects in the complaint.

Ingutti v. Rochester General Hospital · filed 2016-12-23(a)(7)

In reviewing a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court may freely consider affidavits submitted by plaintiffs to remedy any defects in the complaint (see Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 635 [1976]), and “the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Leak v. Live Well Financial, Inc. · filed 2016-12-28(a)(7)

In determining a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion under subsection (a)(7), the court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true, construes them liberally, and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

JGK Industries, LLC v. Hayes NY Business, LLC · filed 2016-12-28(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe the allegations liberally, giving the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Dee v Rakower, 112 AD3d 204, 208 [2013]; East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 66 AD3d 122, 125 [2009], affd 16 NY3d 775 [2011]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, construes it liberally, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Jacobus v. Trump · filed 2017-01-09(a)(7)

It is well settled that “[i]n assessing the adequacy of a complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must give the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and afford the plaintiff The benefit of every possible favorable inference.’ ”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the claim receives a liberal construction, its facts are accepted as true, and the claimant receives every favorable inference.

Sawitsky v. State of New York · filed 2017-01-18(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the claim must be afforded a liberal construction, the facts therein must be accepted as true, and the claimant must be accorded the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]; Law Offs, of Thomas F. Liotti, LLC v State of New York, 139 AD3d 812, 813 [2016]).

On a pre-answer motion under § 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and considers whether the claim is legally sufficient.

Holliswood Owners Corp. v. Rivera · filed 2016-12-28(a)(7)

On a pre-answer motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court is required to “accept as true each and every allegation made by plaintiff and limit [its] inquiry to the legal sufficiency of plaintiff’s claim” (Silsdorf v Levine, 59 NY2d 8, 12 [1983]).

On a motion under subsection (a)(7), courts accept pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Garda v. Paramount Theatre, LLC · filed 2016-12-28(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]).

On a motion to dismiss a breach of contract claim, the plaintiff need not plead a precise measure of damages if the alleged facts support a reasonable inference that the breach caused damages.

Financial Guar. Ins. Co. v. Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. · filed 2017-01-19(a)(7)

At the pleading stage, in a breach of contract action, like a fraud action, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead the precise measure of damages, so long as facts are alleged from which damages attributable to the defendant's breach may reasonably be inferred.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Zuniga v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. · filed 2017-02-08(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court is required to accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Acocella v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 139 AD3d 647 [2016]; Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v White, 134 AD3d 755 [2015]; Pirrelli v OCWEN Loan Servicing, LLC, 129 AD3d 689 [2015]; Jahan v U.S. Bank N.A., 127 AD3d 926 [2015]; Benson v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust, Inc., 109 AD3d 495 [2013]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to plead required elements and submitted evidentiary material does not remedy the defect.

BROYLES, CHRISTINA J. v. TOWN OF EVANS · filed 2017-02-10(a)(7)

We conclude that the court properly granted the motion with respect to the first cause of action, asserting malicious prosecution on the part of defendants, for failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). In particular, we conclude that plaintiff failed adequately to plead the requisite elements of lack of probable cause and malice on the part of the officers, and likewise failed to submit affidavits or other evidentiary material remedying that defect of her complaint (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88).

Section 3211(a)(7) does not permit dismissal of a facially valid civil management petition before a probable cause hearing when its supporting expert evidence is sufficient at that stage.

Matter of State of New York v. Ezikiel R. · filed 2017-02-15(a)(7)

Although the court at a probable cause hearing or the factfinder at trial may or may not be convinced by the expert evidence, the evidence was not so deficient as to warrant dismissal of the petition at this early juncture (see Matter of State of New York v Richard L., 143 AD3d at 519).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Porco v. Lifetime Entertainment Services, LLC · filed 2017-02-23(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, this Court "must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (He v Realty USA, 121 AD3d 1336, 1339 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv dismissed and denied 25 NY3d 1018 [2015]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, the court must assume the complaint’s allegations are true.

FMC Co. v. Driscoll · filed 2017-01-31

For the purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 the court must assume the allegations in the complaint to be true.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), factual allegations of lost privacy, reduced use and enjoyment, and decreased property value can sufficiently plead injury to avoid dismissal.

CHOROMANSKIS, DIANE v. CHESTNUT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, IN · filed 2017-02-10(a)(7)

We conclude the factual allegations in the amended complaint as to the damages and/or injury suffered by plaintiffs are sufficient to avoid dismissal of the first five causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its allegations as true and gives the pleader every favorable inference to determine whether the facts support a cognizable claim.

Town of Tupper Lake v. Sootbusters, LLC · filed 2017-02-23(a)(7)

"[O]n a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we must afford the [pleading] a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, accord [the defendant] the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable theory" (He v Realty USA, 121 AD3d 1336, 1339 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv dismissed and denied 25 NY3d 1018 [2015]; see Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d 46, 52 [2012]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Barski v. Town of Aurelius · filed 2017-02-10

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction . . . We accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”

Section 3211(a)(7) asks whether the pleading states a cause of action, rather than whether the plaintiff can ultimately establish one.

Alves v. Santos · filed 2017-02-28(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts must liberally construe the pleading, accept its allegations as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Scialdone v. DeRosa · filed 2017-03-01(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Bibbo v Arvanitakis, 145 AD3d 657, 659 [2016]; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action when the pleading is defective on its face.

Natixis Real Estate Capital Trust 2007-HE2 Ex Rel. Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass'n v. Natixis Real Estate Holdings, LLC · filed 2017-03-09(a)(7)

Pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action lies if the pleading is defective on its face.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint alleging a false affirmation used to obtain a judgment and malice sufficiently states an abuse of process claim.

X-Act Contracting Corp. v. Flanders · filed 2017-03-16(a)(7)

The Kutner defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the abuse of process claim on the alternate grounds that the cause of action is not adequately pleaded (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). At the pleading stage, X-Act’s complaint sufficiently states a claim for abuse of process.

On a motion to dismiss an Article 78 petition for failure to state a claim, the court considers only the petition, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the petitioner every possible inference.

Matter of Munroe v. Ponte · filed 2017-03-22(a)(7)

“On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and 7804 (f), only the petition is considered, all of its allegations are deemed true, and the petitioner is accorded the benefit of every possible inference”

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court to read the complaint liberally, accept its allegations as true, and deny dismissal if those allegations state a cognizable cause of action.

Lee Dodge, Inc. v. Sovereign Bank, N.A. · filed 2017-03-22(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “[t]he sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true when they conflict with the movant’s version of events.

Carbures Europe, S.A. v. Emerging Markets Intrinsic Cayman Ltd. · filed 2017-03-02

Defendants’ contention that the subject transactions constituted permissible “hedging” under the MLA is supported by a version of events that conflicts with the allegations in the complaint, which we accept as true for purposes of deciding this CPLR 3211 motion.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a), the facts alleged in the petition are accepted as true.

Burdick v. Boehm · filed 2017-03-23(a)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a), the facts as alleged in the petition are accepted as true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss an article 78 petition, the petition’s allegations are taken as true and given every favorable inference.

Gilbert v. Planning Board of Town of Irondequoit · filed 2017-03-24(a)(7)

“In considering a motion to dismiss a CPLR article 78 proceeding pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and 7804 (f), all of the allegations in the petition are deemed to be true and are afforded the benefit of every favorable inference” (Matter of Eastern Oaks Dev., LLC v Town of Clinton, 76 AD3d 676, 678 [2010]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Matter of Haberman v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Long Beach, 94 AD3d 997, 1000-1001 [2012], lv dismissed 19 NY3d 951 [2012]). We conclude that petitioner stated a claim that respondent acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the appeal because the criteria set forth in Town Code § 235-53 (B) were not considered by respondent.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Blake v. City of New York · filed 2017-03-29(a)(7)

When dismissal is sought pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true and gives the petitioner every possible favorable inference when assessing whether the petition adequately pleads a claim.

Matter of Agai v. Diontech Consulting, Inc. · filed 2017-04-05(a)(7)

Accepting the facts as alleged in the amended petition as true, and according the petitioners the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the amended petition adequately pleads violations of Debtor and Creditor Law §§ 273, 273-a, 274, 275, and 276 against the law firm respondents (see DiMauro v United, LLC, 122 AD3d 568 [2014]; Joel v Weber, 197 AD2d 396 [1993]; Menaker v Alstaedter, 134 AD2d 412 [1987]; see also Matter of Setters v AI Props. & Devs. [USA] Corp., 139 AD3d 492 [2016]; American Media, Inc. v Bainbridge & Knight Labs., LLC, 135 AD3d 477 [2016]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Eisman v. Village of East Hills · filed 2017-04-12(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Sasidharan v Piverger, 145 AD3d 814 [2016]; Clarke v Laidlaw Tr., Inc., 125 AD3d 920, 921 [2015]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court reads the complaint liberally, accepts its factual allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

McFadden v. Amodio · filed 2017-04-13(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a claim, we must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, confer on the nonmoving party the benefit of every possible inference and determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Travelsavers Enterprises, Inc. v. Analog Analytics, Inc. · filed 2017-04-19(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Neckles Bldrs., Inc. v Turner, 117 AD3d 923, 924 [2014]; Robertson v Wells, 95 AD3d 862 [2012]; Sinensky v Rokowsky, 22 AD3d 563, 564 [2005]).