N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) do not support dismissal when the documentary evidence does not establish a conclusive defense and the claim states a cause of action.

Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, N.Y. v. Christ the King Regional High School · filed 2017-04-19(a)(1), (a)(7)

Moreover, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) which was to dismiss the second cause of action.

CPLR 3211 (a) (7) permits dismissal of counterclaims that fail to state a cause of action under the facts alleged.

Medina v. Richard A. Kraslow, P.C. · filed 2017-04-19(a)(7)

Accordingly, that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the counterclaims for failure to state a cause of action should have been granted.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts accept the pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Connaughton v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. · filed 2017-05-02(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a)(7), "[w]e accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts construe the complaint liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Litvinoff v. Wright · filed 2017-05-03(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Epstein v. Fried · filed 2017-05-03(a)(7)

Moreover, accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the complaint failed to state a viable cause of action for an accounting against either L&K or the Fink firm.

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, the complaint’s allegations are deemed true when deciding whether they state a cause of action.

Victor v. County of Suffolk · filed 2017-05-03(a)(7)

However, the allegations of the complaint, which must be deemed true on this motion to dismiss (see Johnson v Kings County Dist. Attorney’s Off., 308 AD2d 278, 284 [2003]), are sufficient to state a cause of action to recover damages against the County pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 for violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court may consider the defendant’s evidence; if it does, the question is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, rather than merely stated one.

Skywest, Inc. v. Ground Handling, Inc. · filed 2017-05-03(a)(7)

“A court is, of course, permitted to consider evidentiary material submitted by a defendant in support of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). If the court considers evidentiary material, the criterion then becomes whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether [she or] he has stated one”

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint alleges no legal obligation to perform the conduct at issue.

LaRiviere v. Williams · filed 2017-05-04(a)(7)

In his complaint, plaintiff does not allege any legal obligation that defendants had to take any steps to authenticate plaintiffs alleged Jackson Pollock painting. Accordingly, plaintiff failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a motion under § 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its factual allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Antoine v. Kalandrishvili · filed 2017-05-17(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]).

Under section 3211(a)(7), bare legal conclusions are not presumed true or given every favorable inference on a motion to dismiss.

England v. New York City Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2017-05-17(a)(7)

However, bare legal conclusions are not entitled to the benefit of the presumption of truth and are not accorded every favorable inference (see e.g. Doria v Masucci, 230 AD2d 764, 765 [1996]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) is the proper ground for a motion to dismiss based on election of remedies or Workers’ Compensation Law exclusivity.

Rodriguez v. Dickard Widder Industries · filed 2017-05-24(a)(7)

As such, a motion to dismiss on these bases should be brought pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the movant’s evidence must establish that a material fact alleged in the petition is undisputedly not a fact at all.

Matter of Dinger · filed 2017-05-24(a)(7)

Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the petition sufficiently alleged that the decedent left no valid will (see SCPA 1002 [2]; 2-35 Warren’s Heaton, Surrogate’s Court Practice § 35.04 [4]), and the evidence submitted by the appellant in support of her motion failed to establish that this material fact was, undisputedly, not a fact at all (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; T. Mina Supply, Inc. v Clemente Bros. Contr. Corp., 139 AD3d 1040, 1041 [2016]; Matter of Saginario, 119 AD3d 697, 698 [2014]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ambrose v. Ambrose · filed 2017-05-24(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the petition’s allegations as true, gives them every favorable inference, and denies dismissal if they state a cause of action.

539 W 156, L.L.C. v. Hernandez · filed 2017-05-24(a)(7)

Civil Court properly denied respondents-appellants' preanswer motion to dismiss the holdover petition pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7). Accepting petitioner-landlord's allegations as true, and according them the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87—88 [1994]), the petition states a cause of action for possession based upon the rent stabilized tenant's assignment or sublet of the premises without permission ( see Real Property Law §§ 226-b[5]; Rent Stabilization Code [9 NYCRR] 2525.6(f)).

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the court determines whether a claim exists by allowing favorable inferences without considering its merits.

New York State Workers' Compensation Board v. Program Risk Management, Inc. · filed 2017-05-25(a)(7)

Further, on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we must ascertain whether a claim exists, allowing the requisite favorable inferences, without consideration of the merits of any such claim and, in our view, plaintiff’s first cause of action meets this standard (see EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; Mason v First Cent. Natl. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 86 AD3d at 855-856).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Gipe v. DBT Xpress, LLC · filed 2017-05-31(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and asks whether they fit any cognizable legal theory.

DeMarzo v. DeMarzo · filed 2017-05-31(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether the alleged facts support a claim.

DeMartino v. Golden · filed 2017-05-31(a)(7)

Affording the complaint a liberal construction, accepting the facts alleged therein as true, and according DeMartino the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the complaint fails to plead specific facts from which it can be inferred that DeMar-tino was in an attorney-client or fiduciary relationship, privity, or a relationship that otherwise closely resembles privity with the defendants, who were retained to represent DeMartino Building Co., Inc., and 150 Centerville, LLC, in the underlying action. Accordingly, the court properly directed dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) of the causes of action alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty insofar as asserted by DeMartino (see Fredriksen v Fredriksen, 30 AD3d at 371; Conti v Polizzotto, 243 AD2d 672, 673 [1997]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading and denies dismissal if its allegations, taken together, state any cognizable claim.

APF Management Co. v. Munn · filed 2017-06-07(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “[t]he sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a private nuisance claim when the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state the claim.

Wheeler v. Del Duca · filed 2017-06-21(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the defendants’ motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the first and second causes of action, which alleged a private nuisance, as the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for a private nuisance.

Failure to state a claim may be asserted at any time, even if it was not pleaded; listing it as an affirmative defense is surplusage that need not be dismissed.

San-Dar Associates v. Fried · filed 2017-06-15(e)

The motion court was free not to dismiss the “affirmative defense” of failure to state a claim, because failure to state may ... be asserted at any time even if not pleaded (CPLR 3211 [e]) and is therefore “mere surplusage” as an affirmative defense (Bernstein v Freudman, 136 AD2d 490, 492-493 [1st Dept 1988], citing Riland v Todman & Co., 56 AD2d 350 [1st Dept 1977]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires a court assessing whether a complaint states a cause of action to accept its factual allegations as true and consider whether the plaintiff can succeed on any reasonable view of those facts.

Aristy-Farer v. State of New York , New Yorkers for Students' Educational Rights v. State of New York · filed 2017-06-27(a)(7)

"In considering the sufficiency of a pleading subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7), our well-settled task is to determine whether, 'accepting as true the factual statements of the complaint, plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated" (CFE I, 86 NY2d at 318, quoting People v New York City Tr. Auth., 59 NY2d 343, 348 [1983]).

On a motion to dismiss under § 3211(a)(7), the court presumes pleaded facts true, gives the allegations every favorable inference, and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Tri-Star Lighting Corp. v. Goldstein · filed 2017-06-28(a)(7)

“In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded are presumed to be true, and the court must afford those allegations every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the proponent every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Brunache v. MV Transportation, Inc. · filed 2017-06-28(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, afford the proponent the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Baron v Galasso, 83 AD3d 626, 627 [2011]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action.

Sager v. City of Buffalo · filed 2017-06-30(a)(7)

We agree with Miranda, however, that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the complaint against him pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), and we therefore modify the order accordingly. The conclusory allegations in the complaint alleging liability on the same grounds as those alleged against the NHJB defendants based upon the alleged ownership or partnership interest in the operation of Molly's Pub are insufficient to state a cause of action against him.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Hall v. City of Buffalo · filed 2017-06-30(a)(7)

Accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true and affording him the benefit of every possible favorable inference on defendants’ motion to dismiss (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we conclude that the complaint sufficiently alleges that Habib was Eloffs employer and therefore potentially subject to vicarious liability for Eloffs actions (see Nerey v Greenpoint Mtge. Funding, Inc., 116 AD3d 1015, 1016 [2014]; Young v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 21 AD3d 1099, 1101 [2005]; see generally Riviello v Waldron, 47 NY2d 297, 302-304 [1979]; Bilias v Gaslight, Inc., 100 AD3d 533, 533-534 [2012]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Gutierrez v. McGrath Management Services, Inc. · filed 2017-07-05(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Alesawy v. Badawi · filed 2017-07-06(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, “the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Minovici v Belkin BV, 109 AD3d 520, 521 [2d Dept 2013]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Treeline 990 Stewart Partners, LLC v RAIT Atria, LLC, 107 AD3d 788, 791 [2d Dept 2013]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court reads the complaint liberally, accepts its factual allegations as true, gives the nonmoving party every possible inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Graven v. Children's Home R.T.F., Inc. · filed 2017-07-27(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a claim, we must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, confer on the nonmoving party the benefit of every possible inference and determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Doe v. Turnmill LLC · filed 2017-08-01(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.”

When a movant submits evidentiary material under CPLR 3211(a)(7), dismissal requires conclusive proof that the plaintiff has no cause of action.

Torres v. City of New York · filed 2017-08-09(a)(7)

Further, Queens Ballpark failed to establish conclusively that the plaintiff had no cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Hendrickson v Philbor Motors, Inc., 102 AD3d at 258).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint survives dismissal if its factual allegations, taken together, state any cognizable cause of action.

Ruggiero v. DePalo · filed 2017-08-23(a)(7)

“Upon a motion to dismiss [pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7)], the sole criterion is whether the subject pleading states a cause of action, and if, from the four corners of the complaint, factual allegations are discerned which, taken together, manifest any cause of action cognizable at law, then the motion will fail” (RBE N. Funding, Inc. v Stone Mtn. Holdings, LLC, 78 AD3d 807, 808 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires denial of a motion to dismiss when the complaint's factual allegations, taken together, state a legally cognizable cause of action.

Nestor v. Putney Twombly Hall & Hirson, LLP · filed 2017-08-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Ahmed Elkoulily, M.D., P.C. v. New York State Catholic Healthplan, Inc. · filed 2017-08-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a pleading is afforded a liberal construction, and the court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Caravello v One Mgt. Group, LLC, 131 AD3d 1191 [2015]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Saul v. Cahan · filed 2017-08-30(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “ ‘accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Non- non v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) does not warrant dismissal when the movant fails to show that a material fact alleged by the petitioner is false or that no significant factual dispute exists.

Matter of Curlin v. Clove Lane Homeowners Assn., Inc. · filed 2017-08-30(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly denied the appellants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and, in effect, CPLR 7804 (f) to dismiss the petition. ... In support of their motion, the appellants failed to demonstrate that a material fact claimed by the Curlins was not a fact at all or that no significant dispute exists regarding it (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d at 275).

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), courts accept the pleaded facts as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Maroulis v. Sari M. Friedman, P.C. · filed 2017-09-13(a)(7)

“In determining a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must ‘accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Sierra Holdings, LLC v Phillips, Weiner, Quinn, Artura & Cox, 112 AD3d 909, 910 [2013], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its factual allegations as true, and gives the nonmoving party all favorable inferences.

Christ the Rock World Restoration Church International, Inc. v. Evangelical Christian Credit Union · filed 2017-09-13(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be construed liberally, the factual allegations must be deemed to be true, and the nonmoving party must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) does not permit dismissal of conversion and fraud claims against a corporate officer when the complaint adequately alleges that the officer personally participated in the torts.

North Shore Architectural Stone, Inc. v. American Artisan Construction, Inc. · filed 2017-09-27(a)(7)

The complaint adequately alleged that Cina participated in the act allegedly constituting conversion by asserting that Cina arranged to have the replacement limestone delivered to Vitacco instead of the plaintiff, and that he participated in the alleged fraud by knowingly misrepresenting the facts regarding the delivery of the original limestone, with the intent of inducing the plaintiffs detrimental reliance. ... Accordingly, the defendants were not entitled to dismissal of the causes of action asserted against Cina pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion under § 3211(a)(7), the court asks whether the complaint’s factual allegations, taken together, state a legally cognizable cause of action.

Stewart Title Insurance Co. v. Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2017-10-04(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the sole criterion is whether, from the complaint’s “four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

Under § 3211(a)(7), a declaratory judgment complaint survives a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action if it presents a proper case for a declaration, regardless of whether the plaintiff will receive a favorable declaration.

County of Monroe v. Clough Harbour & Associates, LLP · filed 2017-10-06(a)(7)

We conclude that the court properly denied that part of defendant’s cross motion seeking to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (7). ... “the [general] rule in declaratory judgment actions [is] that on a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the only question is whether a proper case is presented for invoking the jurisdiction of the court to make a declaratory judgment, and not whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration favorable to him” (Law Research Serv. v Honeywell, Inc., 31 AD2d 900, 901 [1969]; see Plaza Dr. Group of CNY, LLC v Town of Bennett, 115 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2014]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Thomas v. Farrago · filed 2017-10-18(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a court may consider the defendant’s evidence but should grant dismissal based on that evidence only if it conclusively disproves a material allegation and no significant dispute remains.

Reznick v. Bluegreen Resorts Management, Inc. · filed 2017-10-18(a)(7)

While a court may consider evidentiary material submitted by a defendant in support of a motion to dismiss, the motion should not be granted unless this evidence shows “that a material fact claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a fact at all, and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it” (YDRA, LLC v Mitchell, 123 AD3d 1113, 1114 [2014]; see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Murphy v. Department of Educ. of the City of New York · filed 2017-11-01(a)(7)

“On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Phillips v Taco Bell Corp., 152 AD3d 806, 807 [2017]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a cause of action when the complaint’s allegations fail to state a claim.

Dineen v. Wilkens · filed 2017-11-01(a)(7)

Similarly, the court properly directed dismissal of the sixth cause of action, which alleges the aiding and abetting of a breach of fiduciary duty, for failure to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss under section 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint and gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, but dismisses it if the alleged facts do not support an enforceable right of recovery.

Reid v. Bainbridge Residence, LLC · filed 2017-11-03(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint is liberally construed, the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every favorable inference, factual submissions made in opposition to the motion to dismiss are considered, and the court only seeks to determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Minovici v Belkin BV , 109 AD3d 520 , 521-522 [2013]). Dismissal is nevertheless warranted where the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a legal malpractice complaint must allege supporting facts; a general recitation of the claim’s elements is insufficient.

Mid-Hudson Valley Federal Credit Union v. Quartararo & Lois, PLLC · filed 2017-11-09(a)(7)

Merely alleging the elements of a legal malpractice claim in a general fashion, without more, does not satisfy the liberal pleading standard of CPLR 3211.

A defamation counterclaim survives a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion when the answer sufficiently states an actionable claim.

Sallustio v. R. Kessler & Associates, Inc. · filed 2017-11-09(a)(7)

We conclude that Supreme Court properly denied that part of plaintiffs' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) seeking to dismiss the defamation counterclaim. ... The answer thus sufficiently states a counterclaim for defamation ( see Davis , 24 NY3d at 274).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe the complaint liberally, presume its allegations true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Kassapian v. City of New York · filed 2017-11-15(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Thompson Bros. Pile Corp. v Rosenblum, 121 AD3d 672, 673 [2014]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

GDG Realty, LLC v. 149 Glen Street Corp. · filed 2017-11-15(a)(7)

“In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court is required to accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (New York Tile Wholesale Corp. v Thomas Fatato Realty Corp., 153 AD3d 1351, 1353 [2d Dept 2017]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, but dismisses if the complaint still fails to state a cause of action.

Brummel v. Board of Trustees of the Vil. of E. Hills, N.Y. · filed 2017-11-15(a)(7)

Here, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and affording the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, the plaintiff did not state a cause of action to recover damages for defamation (see Pall v Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., 144 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2016]).

A key allegation pleaded on information and belief may be insufficient to state a claim under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Elmrock Opportunity Master Fund I, L.P. v. Citicorp North America, Inc. · filed 2017-11-02(a)(7)

The key allegation supporting the fraud in the inducement claim is that defendants knew that nonparty Entergy took the position that certain interests would revert to it after the Ground Leases expired. However, because it is pleaded on information and belief, this allegation is insufficient to state the claim (see Facebook, Inc. v DLA Piper LLP [US], 134 AD3d 610, 615 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 28 NY3d 903 [2016]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the nonmoving party every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

GMMM Westover LLC v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. · filed 2017-11-02(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a claim, we must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, confer on the nonmoving party the benefit of every possible inference and determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Graven v Children’s Home R.T.F., Inc., 152 AD3d 1152, 1153 [2017] [citations omitted]; see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v County of Chemung, 137 AD3d 1550, 1555 [2016], lv dismissed 28 NY3d 1044 [2016]).

Section 3211(a)(1) and (7) does not require dismissal when a complaint alleges facts sufficient to support the claim and documentary evidence does not conclusively establish a defense.

1507 Realty Services, LLC v. US Bank National Ass'n · filed 2017-11-22(a)(1), (a)(7)

The Supreme Court did not err in denying those branches of the defendant’s motion which were to dismiss the first and second causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) because the complaint alleged facts sufficient to maintain an equitable quiet title claim (see RPAPL 1515; see generally Carbone v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co., 145 AD3d 848 [2016]), and the documentary evidence did not conclusively establish a defense to those causes of action as a matter of law (see Cog-Net Bldg. Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co., 86 AD3d 585, 585-586 [2011]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action to construe the complaint liberally, accept its allegations as true, and give plaintiffs every favorable inference.

Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc. v. Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc. · filed 2017-12-12(a)(7)

When reviewing a defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, a court must "give the complaint a liberal construction, accept the allegations as true and provide plaintiffs with the benefit of every favorable inference" (Roni LLC v Arfa, 18 NY3d 846, 848 [2011]).

A CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion may be granted when a complaint offers only conclusory allegations and the plaintiff submits no materials curing those defects.

WDF Inc. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y. · filed 2017-12-14(a)(7)

While the complaint here recites a list of purported causes for delays allegedly attributed to defendants, it sets forth no factual allegations in support of such claims. Similarly, it makes no factual allegations supporting the conclusory claim that such alleged delays fell within the exceptions to the no-damages-for-delay rule (see Corinno, 67 NY2d at 309). Moreover, in opposition to defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7), plaintiff failed to submit any affidavits or other materials that remedied the defects in the complaint (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court to construe the complaint liberally, accept its allegations as true, and deny dismissal if those allegations state a cognizable cause of action.

Cheslowitz v. Board of Trustees of the Knox Sch. · filed 2017-12-20(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]). The complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all allegations must be accepted as true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, draws every favorable inference for the plaintiff, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Vassar College v. Marshall & Sterling, Inc. · filed 2017-12-27(a)(7)

In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Randazzo v Nelson, 128 AD3d 935, 936 [2015]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a court need not accept conclusory, inherently incredible, or speculative factual allegations as true.

Sonkin v. Sonkin · filed 2018-01-02(a)(7)

The court also correctly dismissed the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action. The court was not required to accept as true, factual allegations that were conclusory, inherently incredible, or speculative ( Erich Fuchs Enters. v American Civ. Liberties Union Found., Inc. , 95 AD3d 558 [1st Dept 2012]).

Section 3211 permits dismissal based on collateral estoppel or failure to state a cause of action.

Guidance Endodontics, LLC v. Olshan Grundman, Frome Rosensweig & Wolosky, LLP · filed 2018-01-11(a)(5), (a)(7)

Plaintiff's claims in this legal malpractice action are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel ( see Buechel v Bain , 97 NY2d 295, 303-304 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]; CPLR 3211[a][5]). ... We note also that the complaint fails to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211[a][7]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action.

D. Penguin Bros. Ltd. v. City Natl. Bank · filed 2018-02-01(a)(7)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Nancy M. Bannon, J.), entered January 29, 2016, which granted defendant City National Bank's (CNB) motion to dismiss the complaint as against it pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), unanimously modified, on the law, to make the dismissal without prejudice, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. ... These conclusory allegations fail to plead conspiracy against CNB, i.e., to connect CNB's actions with the otherwise actionable torts (fraud and conversion) allegedly committed by defendants James Robert Williams and David Spiegelman ( see Alexander & Alexander of N.Y. v Fritzen , 68 NY2d 968 [1986]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a cause of action when the pleading fails to allege facts supporting a required confidential or fiduciary relationship for an accounting.

PNC Bank, N.A. v. Lee · filed 2018-02-07(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of Gordon Brothers' motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss that cause of action, because the appellant failed to allege the existence of any confidential or fiduciary relationship on which a duty to account may be predicated ( see Kamisky v Kahn , 20 NY2d 573, 581-582; Maor v Blu Sand Intl. Inc ., 143 AD3d 579; Royal Warwick S.A. v Hotel Representative, Inc ., 106 AD3d 451, 452; Center for Rehabilitation & Nursing at Birchwood, LLC v S & L Birchwood, LLC , 92 AD3d 711, 713).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the pleading fails to state facts sufficient to establish a claim, with alleged facts accepted as true and favorable inferences given to the plaintiff.

McSpedon v. Levine · filed 2018-02-07(a)(7)

Accepting the facts as alleged in the amended complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88; Raach v SLSJET Mgt. Corp., 134 AD3d 792, 793), the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that he justifiably relied to his detriment upon a misrepresentation by any of the professional defendants ( see Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v Anza, 63 AD3d 884; Jacobs v Haber, 232 AD2d 372), or that he sustained any recoverable pecuniary damages as a result of the professional defendants' alleged fraudulent conduct ( see Jeffrey BB. v Cardinal McCloskey School & Home for Children, 257 AD2d 21; see also Howard S. v Lillian S., 62 AD3d 187, 193, affd 14 NY3d 431). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) the cause of action sounding in fraud insofar as asserted against the professional defendants.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true and determine whether they fit within any cognizable legal theory.

Detringo v. South Is. Family Med., LLC · filed 2018-02-07(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory"

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a viable cause of action.

Pandey v. Pierce · filed 2018-02-08(a)(7)

The aforementioned facts, and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, support [*2]defendants' first counterclaim, which alleges a viable cause of action for fraud connected with plaintiff husband's misrepresentations in the lease as the condominium owner, as well as his failure to return a security deposit that he was to hold in escrow and that he has not demonstrated a lawful right to retain ( see generally Eurycleia Partners, LP v Seward & Kissel, LLP , 12 NY3d 553, 559 [2009]; Kaufman v Cohen , 307 AD2d 113 [1st Dept 2003]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint's facts as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and determines whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Prime Alliance Group, Ltd. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co. · filed 2018-03-14(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181).

Subsection (a)(7) requires courts to accept pleaded facts as true and decide whether they fit any cognizable legal theory.

Gottlieb v. Wynne · filed 2018-03-14(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged [*2]in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Nelson v Citywide Auto Leasing, Inc., 154 AD3d 863, 864; see Myers v Schneiderman, 30 NY3d 1; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, with the pleading construed liberally and reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the opposing party.

Person v. Sulton · filed 2018-03-19(a)(7)

Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) was properly denied. Construing the answer liberally and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of defendant ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), defendant stated cognizable counterclaims to recover for alleged overbilling and padding of costs by plaintiff ( see O'Connor v Blodnick , Abramowitz & Blodnick, 295 AD2d 586, 587 [2002]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action, viewing alleged facts as true and giving the plaintiff every favorable inference.

White Knight of Flatbush, LLC v. Deacons of the Dutch Congregation of Flatbush · filed 2018-03-21(a)(7)

Here, even accepting the facts alleged in the second amended complaint as true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88), the plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that the lease would not have been breached but for the Sterling defendants' conduct ( see Nagan Constr., Inc. v Monsignor McClancy Mem. High Sch ., 117 AD3d at 1006; Ferrandino & Son, Inc. v Wheaton Bldrs., Inc., LLC , 82 AD3d at 1036).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true and gives the claimant every favorable inference when deciding whether the complaint states a cause of action.

Ehrenkranz v. 58 MHR, LLC · filed 2018-03-21(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of LePatner's motion which was to dismiss the 16th cause of action in the third-party complaint, although the dismissal should have been pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) and not CPLR 3211(a)(1) ( see Smalls v St. John's Episcopal Hosp ., 152 AD3d 629). Accepting the facts alleged in the third-party complaint as true, and according the third-party plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 88; Raach v SLSJET Mgt. Corp ., 134 AD3d 792, 793), the third-party complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to find that LePatner acted "with intent to deceive the court or any party" (Judiciary Law § 487; see Klein v Rieff , 135 AD3d 910; Savitt v Greenberg Traurig, LLP , 126 AD3d 506; Fleyshman v Suckle & Schlesinger, PLLC , 91 AD3d 591, 592-593).

Section 3211(a)(7) governs dismissal for failure to state a cause of action and requires the court to accept alleged facts as true and give the plaintiff favorable inferences.

Scollar v. City of New York · filed 2018-03-22(a)(7)

In deciding this appeal, we must liberally construe the complaint, as amplified by plaintiff's notice of claim, the transcript of the 50-h hearing and other papers submitted by the parties on the motions ( see Jeudy v City of New York , 142 AD3d 821, 821 [1st Dept 2016]; Kaminsky v FSP Inc. , 5 AD3d 251, 251-252 [1st Dept 2004]), presume the facts alleged in support of the complaint to be true, and afford plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Anderson v Edmiston & Co., Inc. , 131 AD3d 416, 417 [1st Dept 2015]).

Section 3211(a)(7) governs motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and requires courts to accept pleaded facts as true, draw favorable inferences, and determine whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Hall v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 2018-03-23(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, "[w]e accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) governs motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and requires the complaint to be construed liberally, with factual allegations treated as true and favorable inferences given to the nonmoving party.

Rad & D'Aprile, Inc. v. Arnell Constr. Corp. · filed 2018-03-28(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint must be construed liberally, the factual allegations deemed to be true, and the nonmoving party granted the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Nestor v Putney Twombly Hall & Hirson, LLP , 153 AD3d 840, 841).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to accept pleaded facts as true, give the pleader every favorable inference, and decide whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

PNC Bank, N.A. v. Steinhardt · filed 2018-03-28(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, accord the proponent of the pleading the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal [*2]theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; MVB Collision, Inc. v Allstate Ins. Co. , 129 AD3d 1041, 1042).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires accepting pleaded facts as true, giving the plaintiff favorable inferences, and determining whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Lubonty v. U.S. Bank N.A. · filed 2018-03-28(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of [*2]every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v E & G Dev. Corp., 138 AD3d 986, 986; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88). ... By showing that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff was not a fact at all, U.S. Bank established its entitlement to dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) ( see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d at 275).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action and requires the court to accept the complaint's factual averments as true when deciding whether the plaintiff can succeed on any reasonable view of the facts.

Davids v. State of New York · filed 2018-03-28(a)(7)

"In considering the sufficiency of a pleading subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7), our well-settled task is to determine whether, accepting as true the factual averments of the complaint, plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated" ( Aristy-Farer v State of New York, 29 NY3d 501, 509 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307, 318; People v New York City Tr. Auth., 59 NY2d 343, 348). ... Accordingly, the defendants were not entitled to dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to accept pleaded facts as true and determine whether they fit any cognizable legal theory when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

Chen v. Kupoint (USA) Corp. · filed 2018-04-11(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the complaint to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; Murphy v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 155 AD3d 637).

Subsection (a)(7) requires courts to construe the pleading liberally, accept alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide only whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Nurse v. Rios · filed 2018-04-18(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading is afforded a liberal construction and the court must give the plaintiff "the benefit of every possible favorable inference, accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Caravello v One Mgt. Group, LLC, 131 AD3d 1191, 1192 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; High Tides, LLC v DeMichele, 88 AD3d 954, 956).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the plaintiff cannot succeed under any reasonable view of the facts stated in the complaint.

Bidnick v. Grand Lodge of Free & Accepted Masons of the State of N.Y. · filed 2018-03-14(a)(7)

Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must determine whether the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated in the complaint ( see Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180; Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New Rochelle v County of Westchester, 282 AD2d 561).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when pleaded allegations fail to state a legally sufficient claim.

Pozner v. Fox Broadcasting Co. · filed 2018-04-02(a)(7)

As there are insufficient allegations in Fox's second counterclaim to support a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, the second counterclaim is dismissed for failure to state a claim.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint's allegations are insufficient to support a claim.

Esposito v. Weiner · filed 2018-04-25(a)(7)

However, the Supreme Court, upon reargument, should not have granted those branches of the Crabtree defendants' prior motion which were, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the demand for consequential damages, economic damages, lost profits, and punitive damages insofar as asserted against them. It would be premature, at this stage of the litigation, to conclude that the allegations were insufficient to support a claim for these damages ( cf. Gipe v DBT Xpress, LLC , 150 AD3d 1208).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, but relief is unwarranted when the complaint adequately states causes of action and contrary contentions raise issues of fact.

Tower Broadcasting, LLC v. Equinox Broadcasting Corp. · filed 2018-04-27(a)(7)

Here, the complaint, with its attached exhibits, adequately sets forth causes of action for a declaratory judgment, breach of contract, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, and defendant's contentions to the contrary raise issues of fact and do not warrant relief under CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a complaint to be liberally construed in the plaintiff's favor, with all allegations accepted as true, when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

NHD Nigani, LLC v. Angelina Zabel Props., Inc. · filed 2018-05-02(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all allegations must be accepted as true" ( 24 Franklin Ave. R.E. Corp. v Cannella , 139 AD3d 717, 717; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a legally sufficient claim, with its factual allegations accepted as true and favorable inferences afforded.

Matter of Lashlee v. Lashlee · filed 2018-05-09(a)(7)

"In determining a motion to dismiss a family offense petition pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the petition must be liberally construed, the facts alleged in the petition must be accepted as true, and the petitioner must be granted the benefit of every favorable inference'"

Section 3211(a)(7) permits a defendant to move to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, and the movant cannot shift its burden to the plaintiff.

Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v. 21st Century Pharmacy, Inc. · filed 2018-05-10(a)(7)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ellen M. Coin, J.), entered March 9, 2017, which, to the extent appealed from, denied defendants Innovative Health Chiropractic, P.C. and Kazu Acupuncture, P.C.'s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the first through fourth causes of action as against them, unanimously affirmed, with costs. Supreme Court correctly decided the motion brought by defendants, i.e., to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211[a][7]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). On appeal, defendants rely on the standard for deciding a motion for summary judgment (CPLR 3212) and improperly attempt to shift their burden as movants onto plaintiff.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action to be made at any time.

McMahon v. Cobblestone Lofts Condominium · filed 2018-05-15(a)(7)

Although so much of defendants' post-answer motion as sought to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under CPLR 3211(a)(1) was untimely, the court properly decided so much of the motion as sought dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, which may be made at any time ( see CPLR 3211(e); see e.g. Chuqui v Church of St. Margaret Mary , 39 AD3d 397 [1st Dept 2007]).

Section 3211(a)(7) tests whether a pleading states a cause of action, treating factual allegations as true and giving the pleader every favorable inference.

Juerss v. Millbrook Cent. Sch. Dist. · filed 2018-05-16(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), "the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail" ( Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action.

Bennett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. · filed 2018-05-16(a)(7)

"When a party moves to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action" ( Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181; see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action and requires denial when the allegations sufficiently state one.

Yablon v. Stern · filed 2018-05-22(a)(7)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (David B. Cohen, J.), entered March 30, 2017, which granted defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) insofar as it dismissed the first and second causes of action, and denied it as to the third, unanimously modified, on the law, to deny so much of defendant's motion as sought dismissal of the second cause of action, for conversion, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. ... These allegations sufficiently state a cause of action for conversion ( see Lemle v Lemle , 92 AD3d 494, 497 [1st Dept 2012]; Passaic Falls Throwing Co. v Villaneuve-Pohl Corp. , 169 AD 727 [1st Dept 1915]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court to accept pleaded facts as true, give the claimant every favorable inference, and decide only whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Union Temple of Brooklyn v. Seventeen Dev., LLC · filed 2018-06-06(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and afford the proponent the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 66 AD3d 122, 125, affd 16 NY3d 775).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to determine whether the alleged facts fit within any cognizable legal theory when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

Blum v. Citibank, NA · filed 2018-06-06(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory"

CPLR 3211(a)(5) permits dismissal based on res judicata, while CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action.

Corle v. Allstate Ins. Co. · filed 2018-06-08(a)(5), (a)(7)

Nevertheless, we conclude that defendant was not entitled to dismissal of the complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (5) based on res judicata. ... We reject defendant's further contention that the court erred in denying its motion insofar as it sought to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), for failure to state a cause of action.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court reviewing a failure-to-state-a-cause-of-action motion to accept pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide only whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Matter of Kassab v. Kasab · filed 2018-06-11(a)(7)

In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, a court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the factual allegations fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Matter of Kassab v Kasab , 137 AD3d 1135 , 1137 [2d Dept 2016]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires courts to accept pleaded facts as true and give plaintiffs every favorable inference when deciding whether a complaint states a cause of action.

Stinner v. Epstein · filed 2018-06-13(a)(7)

"In the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference. Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss" ( EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 5 NY3d 11, 19 [citation omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87, 88; Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, subject to liberal construction of the pleading and the exclusion of bare legal conclusions or claims contradicted by documentary evidence.

Ripka v. County of Madison · filed 2018-06-21(a)(7)

While we must liberally construe the pleadings and assume the truth of the allegations therein when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), this liberal standard "will not save allegations that consist of bare legal conclusions or factual claims that are flatly contradicted by documentary evidence or are inherently incredible" ( DerOhannesian v City of Albany , 110 AD3d 1288, 1289 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 862 [2014]); accord Graven v Children's Home R.T.F., Inc. , 152 AD3d 1152, 1153 [2017]; Hyman v Schwartz , 127 AD3d at 1283).

Section 3211(a)(7) governs motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, requiring the court to accept alleged facts as true, give the claimant every favorable inference, and decide whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Matter of 54 Marion Ave., LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs · filed 2018-06-21(a)(7)

Upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and 7804 (f), "[w]e accept the facts as alleged in the [petition/complaint] as true, accord [petitioners] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Matter of Ferran v City of Albany , 116 AD3d 1194, 1195 [2014]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court decides whether the pleading states a claim, rather than whether the claimant will ultimately prevail.

Edelman v. New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin. · filed 2018-06-26(a)(7)

The motion court correctly denied plaintiffs' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(c). In the context of defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court's focus was on whether plaintiffs had stated a claim for declaratory relief under the Commerce Clause, not on whether they could prevail on such a claim ( see Law Research Serv. v Honeywell, Inc., 31 AD2d 900 [1st Dept 1969]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a cause of action.

Matter of Hargraves v. City of Rye Zoning Bd. of Appeals · filed 2018-06-27(a)(7)

There must be a genuine, concrete dispute between adverse parties, not merely the possibility of hypothetical, contingent, or remote prejudice to the plaintiff ( see Premier Restorations of N.Y. Corp. v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs ., 127 AD3d at 1049; Chanos v MADAC, LLC , 74 AD3d 1007, 1008; Waterways Dev. Corp. v Lavalle , 28 AD3d 539, 540). Contrary to the petitioners' contention, they failed to allege the existence of a justiciable controversy in this case, relying instead upon hearsay as to what the applicants may do in the future. Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to, in effect, grant those branches of the applicants' separate motions which were, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the amended complaint ( see generally Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v Barwick , 67 NY2d 510; Self-Insurer's Assn. v State Indus. Commn ., 224 NY 13; Premier Restorations of N.Y. Corp. v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs ., 127 AD3d at 1049; Waterways Dev. Corp. v Lavalle , 28 AD3d at 539; Matter of United Water New Rochelle v City of New York , 275 AD2d 464).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to determine whether the pleading states a legally cognizable cause of action from its factual allegations.

McCarthy v. Shah · filed 2018-06-29(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), "the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law[,] a motion for dismissal will fail" ( Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires dismissal when a complaint fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action.

Shore View Acquisition I, LLC v. Vacaro · filed 2018-06-29(a)(7)

"[M]ere conclusory language, absent specific and detailed allegations establishing a material misrepresentation of fact, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, scienter, justifiable reliance, and damages proximately caused thereby, is insufficient to state a cause of action for fraud" ( Old Republic Natl. Tit. Ins. Co. v Cardinal Abstract Corp. , 14 AD3d 678 , 680 [2005]). Consequently, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the first cause of action should have been dismissed.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, applying liberal construction and favorable inferences to the pleaded facts.

313 43rd St. Realty, LLC v. TMS Enters., LP · filed 2018-07-05(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see CPLR 3026; Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. , 98 NY2d 314, 326; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87; Randazzo v Nelson , 128 AD3d 935, 936).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, and CPLR 3211(a)(4) permits dismissal when another action is pending.

Matter of Goodyear v. New York State Dept. of Health · filed 2018-07-06(a)(7), (a)(4)

Consequently, any such part of the petition must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action. ... It is well settled that where, as here, "there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same, a court has broad discretion in determining whether an action should be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) on the ground that there is another action pending" ( Scottsdale Ins. Co. v Indemnity Ins. Corp. RRG , 110 AD3d 783, 784 [2d Dept 2013]). We exercise our discretion to dismiss this petition in favor of the pending Family Court proceeding, which involves the same parties and in essence seeks the same relief.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks only whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Matneja v. Zito · filed 2018-07-18(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires factual allegations in a pleading to be treated as true and the pleader to receive every favorable inference when deciding a motion to dismiss.

Matter of Stukes v. City of White Plains · filed 2018-07-25(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the factual allegations in the pleading must be deemed true, and the petitioner must be afforded the benefit of every favorable inference ( Matter of Better World Real Estate Group v New York City Dept. of Fin ., 122 AD3d 27, 36).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action, while requiring the court to accept alleged facts as true and give the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference.

Rubman v. Osuchowski · filed 2018-07-25(a)(7)

We conclude that, "accept[ing] the facts as alleged in the [amended] complaint as true, [and] accord[ing] plaintiffs the benefit of every possible inference" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the amended complaint contains sufficient allegations to withstand that part of defendants' motion seeking dismissal of the class action allegations pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action.

Jean v. Chinitz · filed 2018-07-26(a)(7)

Accordingly, the portion of the first cause of action in the original verified complaint that alleges a section 487 violation fails to state a cause of action under the statute (see CPLR 3211[a][7]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint fails to state a cause of action, even after giving the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Yerushalmi v. Schoenfeld · filed 2018-08-01(a)(7)

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the first through fourth causes of action, which alleged violations of Judiciary Law § 487. Even as amplified by the plaintiff's affidavit and supporting evidence, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83), the complaint failed to allege that the defendants acted "with intent to deceive the court or any party" (Judiciary Law § 487[1]; see Fleyshman v Suckle & Schlesinger, PLLC, 91 AD3d 591, 592-593; Jaroslawicz v Cohen, 12 AD3d 160, 160-161).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint's alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Galardi v. Town of Hempstead · filed 2018-08-22(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must " accept the facts as alleged in the complaint [to be] true, accord plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every [*2]possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181, quoting Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court to accept the complaint's alleged facts as true, give plaintiffs the benefit of favorable inferences, and decide whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ferrera v. City of New York · filed 2018-08-22(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must " accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1180, quoting Nonnon v City of New York , 9 NY3d 825, 827 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action and requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true, draw favorable inferences, and determine whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Colella v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. · filed 2018-08-22(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( Nelson v Citiwide Auto Leasing, Inc., 154 AD3d 863, 864; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Gorbatov v Tsirelman, 155 AD3d 836, 837).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Clarke-St. John v. City of New York · filed 2018-08-22(a)(7)

Further, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 88; Raach v SLSJET Mgt. Corp ., 134 AD3d 792, 793), the complaint fails to state a cause of action sounding in fraud, as the plaintiffs do not allege that the DOE defendants made any false representation of fact to them upon which they relied to their detriment ( see Swartz v Swartz , 145 AD3d 818; MacBeth v New York Racing Assn ., 141 AD2d 805, 806; Ginsburg Dev. Cos., LLC v Carbone , 134 AD3d 890, 892; Mariano v Fiorvante , 118 AD3d 961).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide only whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Webster v. Forest Hills Care Ctr., LLC · filed 2018-09-26(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Nonnon v City of New York , 9 NY3d 825, 827; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

CPLR 3211(a)(5) permits dismissal when a claim is time-barred, and CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action.

Laner v. Laner · filed 2018-09-26(a)(5) and (7)

We also agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant the RUMC defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint insofar asserted against them for failure to state a cause of action. Accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88; Raach v SLSJET Mgt. Corp., 134 AD3d 792, 793), the complaint fails to state a cause of action against the RUMC defendants and NYPH.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Campanelli v. Long Is. Light. Co. · filed 2018-09-26(a)(7)

Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting the respondents' separate motions pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, requiring the court to accept the complaint's facts as true and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Melio v. John T. Mather Mem. Hosp. · filed 2018-10-03(a)(7)

" On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Garcia v Polsky, Shouldice & Rosen, P.C. , 161 AD3d 828, 829, quoting Shah v Exxis, Inc ., 138 AD3d 970, 971; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Sunlight Clinton Realty, LLC v. Gowanus Indus. Park, Inc. · filed 2018-10-10(a)(7)

The plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action sounding in private nuisance ... The plaintiffs further failed to state a cause of action sounding in public nuisance. ... Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant the defendant's cross motion to dismiss the complaint and deny the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.

Section 3211(a)(7) allows dismissal when a complaint fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action.

Robles v. Patel · filed 2018-10-10(a)(7)

However, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action based upon alleged misrepresentations the defendants made to Liberty Mutual, as the plaintiff failed to adequately allege that the misrepresentations were made for the purpose of being communicated to the plaintiff in order to induce his reliance thereon or that these misrepresentations were relayed to the plaintiff, who then relied upon them ( see Pasternack v Laboratory Corp. of Am. Holdings , 27 NY3d 817, 828; New York Tile Wholesale Corp. v Thomas Fatato Realty Corp ., 153 AD3d 1351, 1354; Bynum v Keber , 135 AD3d 1066, 1068). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the motion which was to dismiss so much of the fraud cause of action as was predicated upon alleged misrepresentations made by the defendants to Liberty Mutual.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action, accepting pleaded facts as true and giving the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Moso Realty Group, L.P. v. Convermat Paper Corp. · filed 2018-10-10(a)(7)

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against CC and the Shaherys. Accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 88; Raach v SLSJET Mgt. Corp. , 134 AD3d 792, 793), the complaint failed to alleged facts sufficient to establish that either the Shaherys or CC was CPC's alter ego, that the Shaherys abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form to perpetrate a wrong or injustice against the plaintiff ( see Damianos Realty Group, LLC v Fracchia , 35 AD3d 344), or that the Shaherys executed the lease on behalf of CPC after it was dissolved which would otherwise make the Shaherys responsible for CPC's obligations incurred under the lease ( cf. 80-02 Leasehold, LLC v CM Realty Holdings Corp. , 123 AD3d 872, 873-874).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action requires liberal construction of the pleading, presumes the alleged facts are true, and considers whether they fit any cognizable legal theory.

Minico Ins. Agency, LLC v. B&M Cleanup Servs. · filed 2018-10-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading must be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87; Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1182).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action while requiring the court to accept the pleading's allegations as true and draw every favorable inference.

Matter of Tyson v. Town of Ramapo · filed 2018-10-10(a)(7)

On a motion [to dismiss] pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) and 7804(f), only the petition is considered, all of its allegations are deemed true, and the petitioner is accorded the benefit of every possible inference" ( Matter of Brown v Foster , 73 AD3d 917, 918; see Matter of Johnson v County of Orange , 138 AD3d 850, 850-851).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits a court to dismiss a complaint when it fails to state a cause of action.

Silverberg v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon · filed 2018-10-24(a)(7)

However, contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, the complaint failed to state a cause of action to cancel of record the subject assignments of mortgage against the defendants Berkman, Henoch, Peterson, Peddy & Fenchel, P.C., Gilbert Henoch, sued herein as Gilbert Henock, Steven J. Peddy, Gary H. Friedenberg, Miriam Milgrom, Stephen J. Brookmeyer, Joseph E. Macy, Rudolf J. Karvay, Gregory P. Peterson, Bruce J. Bergman, Steven Brock, Robert A. Carruba, Vinson J. Friedman, Stanley Mishkin, Todd C. Steckler, Peter Sullivan, and Erick R. Vallely ( see CPLR 3211[a][7]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action and requires the court to apply the applicable pleading standard.

Matter of Sult v. Sult · filed 2018-10-24(a)(7)

"In determining a motion to dismiss a family offense petition pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the petition must be liberally construed, the facts alleged in the petition must be accepted as true, and the petitioner must be granted the benefit of every favorable inference'" ( Matter of Xin Li v Ramos , 125 AD3d 681, 682, quoting Matter of Arnold v Arnold , 119 AD3d 938, 939). Here, affording the petition a liberal construction, accepting the allegations contained therein as true, and granting the father the benefit of every favorable inference, the petition adequately alleged that the mother committed the family offenses of criminal mischief and harassment in the second degree ( see Family Ct Act § 821[1]; Penal Law §§ 145.00[1], 240.26).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Aristakesian v. Ballon Stoll Bader & Nadler, P.C. · filed 2018-10-24(a)(7)

Here, contrary to the defendant's contention, the complaint adequately alleged the required element of causation. ... Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's denial of that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the legal malpractice cause of action.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to decide whether the pleading states a cause of action, accepting alleged facts as true and giving plaintiffs every favorable inference.

Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Global Warranty Group, LLC · filed 2018-10-31(a)(7)

When a party moves to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), "the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action," and, in considering such a motion, "the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Jones v Rochdale Vil., Inc. , 96 AD3d 1014, 1017).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action, accepting its factual allegations as true and giving the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Caldara v. Monti · filed 2018-10-31(a)(7)

We agree with the Supreme Court that, accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the complaint failed to state a cause of action for either specific performance or rescission of the deed ( see Rojas v Paine, 101 AD3d 843, 846; see also Acocella v Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 127 AD3d 891, 892-893) .

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint's alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Borrerro v. Haks Group, Inc. · filed 2018-10-31(a)(7)

"On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Shah v Exxis, Inc. , 138 AD3d 970, 971; see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. , 98 NY2d 314, 326; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to construe the complaint liberally, accept its allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Abruscato v. Allstate Prop. · filed 2018-10-31(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true, and provide the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 5 NY3d 11, 19; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 88).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a legally cognizable cause of action, with alleged facts accepted as true and favorable inferences given to the plaintiff.

Minico Ins. Agency, LLC v. AJP Contr. Corp. · filed 2018-11-07(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading must be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory, without regard to whether the allegations ultimately can be established ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87; JGK Indus., LLC v Hayes NY Bus., LLC , 145 AD3d 979, 980; Quinones v Schaap , 91 AD3d 739, 740; Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1182).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action while accepting its allegations as true.

Jetro Holdings, LLC v. MasterCard Intl., Inc. · filed 2018-11-07(a)(7)

MasterCard moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it for failure to state a cause of action. ... In light of these contractual provisions, even accepting the allegations of the complaint as true ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87), in undertaking to indemnify PNC, Jetro satisfied its separate and distinct obligation to PNC, and it is not equitably subrogated to the rights of PNC as against MasterCard ( see Broadway Houston Mack Dev., LLC v Kohl , 71 AD3d 937, 937-938; Dezer Props. II, LLC v Kaye Ins. Assoc., Inc. , 38 AD3d 213; Federal Ins. Co. v Spectrum Ins. Brokerage Servs. , 304 AD2d 316, 317; Pathe Exch., Inc. v Bray Pictures Corp. , 231 App Div 465; see also Federal Ins. Co. v North Am. Specialty Ins. Co. , 47 AD3d 52, 62; cf . Hamlet at Willow Cr. Dev. Co., LLC v Northeast Land Dev. Corp. , 64 AD3d 85). Therefore, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting that branch of MasterCard's motion which was to dismiss the causes of action alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

Section 3211(a)(7) allows dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action, while the court accepts alleged facts as true and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Matter of Pesola Trust · filed 2018-11-21(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” ( Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC , 54 AD3d 703, 703-704; see Manik v Citimortgage, Inc. , 102 AD3d 929, 929-930).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, with pleaded facts accepted as true and favorable inferences given to the plaintiff.

Lopez v. Lozner & Mastropietro, P.C. · filed 2018-11-21(a)(7)

"On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Shah v Exxis, Inc. , 138 AD3d 970, 971; see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. , 98 NY2d 314, 326; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint's factual allegations as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and decide whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Bashian & Farber, LLP v. Syms · filed 2018-12-05(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court should accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; DiMauro v United, LLC , 122 AD3d 568).

Section 3211(a) permits a court, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, to reach the merits of a properly pleaded declaratory judgment claim when no questions of fact are presented and treat the motion as one for a declaration.

Breslin v. Frankel · filed 2018-12-12(a)

"Upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a court may reach the merits of a properly pleaded cause of action for a declaratory judgment where no questions of fact are presented [by the controversy]'" ( North Oyster Bay Baymen's Assn. v Town of Oyster Bay , 130 AD3d 885, 890, quoting Matter of Tilcon N.Y., Inc. v Town of Poughkeepsie , 87 AD3d 1148, 1150 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Under such circumstances, the motion to dismiss . . . for failure to state a cause of action should be taken as a motion for a declaration in the defendant's favor and treated accordingly'" ( North Oyster Bay Baymen's Assn. v Town of Oyster Bay , 130 AD3d at 890, quoting Siegel, NY Prac § 440 at 770 [5th ed 2011]; see Minovici v Belkin BV , 109 AD3d 520, 524; DiGiorgio v 1109-1113 Manhattan Ave. Partners, LLC , 102 AD3d 725, 728).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a legally cognizable cause of action.

Schwartz v. Main St. Li, LLC · filed 2018-12-13(a)(7)

We find that the third, fourth and fifth causes of action were properly dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

Section 3211(a) allows a defendant to seek dismissal of a cause of action, including for failure to state a cause of action.

Weslowski v. Zugibe · filed 2018-12-19(a)

Accordingly, we agree that those branches of the motion of the County and Fortunato which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action insofar as asserted against Fortunato and those branches of Zugibe's separate motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss those causes of action insofar as asserted against her should have been granted, and further, the court also should have granted those branches of the defendants' separate motions which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the third cause of action insofar as asserted against each of them.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true and give plaintiffs favorable inferences, while CPLR 3211(a)(1) requires documentary evidence to utterly refute the allegations and conclusively establish a defense.

Mahmood v. County of Suffolk · filed 2018-11-14(a)(1) and (a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1181). ... To prevail on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), a defendant must demonstrate that the proffered documentary evidence " utterly refutes plaintiff's factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law'" ( Old Republic Nat. Tit. Ins. Co. v Junction Abstract, Inc. , 150 AD3d 757, 758, quoting Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. , 98 NY2d 314, 326).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action and requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff favorable inferences, and determine whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

First Class Concrete Corp. v. Rosenblum · filed 2018-12-26(a)(7)

"On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Garcia v Polsky, Shouldice & Rosen, P.C. , 161 AD3d 828 , 829 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. , 98 NY2d 314, 326; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, with courts reading the complaint liberally, accepting alleged facts as true, giving favorable inferences, and deciding whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Michaels v. MVP Health Care, Inc. · filed 2018-12-27(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts read the complaint liberally, accept as true the facts alleged, accord the plaintiff "the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action.

R&R Capital LLC v. Merritt · filed 2019-01-08(a)(7)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered April 12, 2017, which denied plaintiffs' motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and/or for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion to dismiss the counterclaims granted. ... Moreover, Merritt's tortious interference counterclaim fails to meet the requisite elements to support such a claim ( see Guard-Life Corp. v S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp. , 50 NY2d 183 [1980]) because she does not allege valid agreements between herself and a third party. Her allegations regarding relationships with unnamed lenders are conclusory and vague, and she does not allege plaintiffs interacted with these third parties, or even knew about her relationships with them. ... The "lender liability" counterclaim fails because Merritt does not and cannot allege a lender-borrower relationship between her and plaintiffs. ... To the extent the slander counterclaim was not previously dropped, it should have been dismissed due to Merritt's failure to allege the actual words used and/or that the counterclaim is not based on non-actionable rhetorical hyperbole ( see CPLR 3016[a]; see also 600 W. 115th St. v Von Gutfeld , 80 NY2d 130 [1992], cert denied 508 US 910 [1993]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a petition for failure to state a cause of action.

Matter of Williams · filed 2019-01-09(a)(7)

Contrary to the appellant's contention, SCPA 2110(3) does not require that the petition contain an allegation that the fees paid were excessive. Accordingly, we agree with the court's denial of that branch of the appellant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the petition for failure to state a cause of action.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court assessing a complaint to construe it liberally, accept alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Gugliotta v. Wilson · filed 2019-01-16(a)(7)

"In assessing the adequacy of a complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must give the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged in the complaint to be true and afford the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference'" ( J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v Vigilant Ins. Co. , 21 NY3d 324, 334, quoting AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co. , 5 NY3d 582, 591).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a cause of action when the complaint, as pleaded, lacks allegations needed to state it.

AmBase Corp. v. Spruce Capital Partners LLC · filed 2019-01-17(a)(7)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered August 29, 2017, to the extent it granted defendants Spruce Capital Partners LLC and 111 W57 Mezz Investor LLC's (the Spruce defendants) motion to dismiss the second cause of action (for a declaratory judgment) pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), unanimously affirmed, without costs, and the appeal therefrom otherwise dismissed, without costs, as moot. ... However, the complaint, as currently pleaded, mentions neither damages nor a constructive trust. Similarly, the complaint does not allege that the Spruce defendants acted in bad faith because they colluded with other defendants who are not party to this appeal or that Investment was entitled to object to the strict foreclosure under UCC 9-621(a)(1). As plaintiffs recognize, they need to replead or amend.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint's factual statements as true and determine whether the plaintiff can succeed on any reasonable view of those facts.

Strujan v. Kaufman & Kahn, LLP · filed 2019-01-30(a)(7)

In considering the sufficiency of a pleading subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must determine whether, accepting as true the factual statements of the complaint, the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated ( see Aristy-Farer v State of New York , 29 NY3d 501, 509).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires a court to accept complaint allegations as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide only whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Southwestern Invs. Group, LLC v. JH Portfolio Debt Equities, LLC · filed 2019-02-08(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), [w]e accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory' " ( Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. , 29 NY3d 137, 141 [2017], quoting Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept complaint allegations as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Cukoviq v. Iftikhar · filed 2019-02-13(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, afford the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87; Aviaev v Nissan Infiniti LT , 150 AD3d 807, 808; Baron v Galasso , 83 AD3d 626, 628).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Chen v. Deliso · filed 2019-02-13(a)(7)

Accepting the plaintiffs' factual allegations as true, the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action alleging either intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress ( see Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181). ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) which were to dismiss the causes of action alleging intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe pleadings liberally, assume pleaded allegations are true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Attallah v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP · filed 2019-01-30(a)(7)

When determining a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, "the pleading is to be given a liberal construction, the allegations contained within it are assumed to be true and the plaintiff is to be afforded every favorable inference" ( Simkin v Blank , 19 NY3d 46, 52; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87; Hershco v Gordon & Gordon , 155 AD3d 1007, 1008; Kempf v Magida , 37 AD3d 763).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action to accept alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff favorable inferences, and decide only whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Victory State Bank v. EMBA Hylan, LLC · filed 2019-02-20(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading must be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory, without regard to whether the allegations ultimately can be established ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87; JGK Indus., LLC v Hayes NY Bus., LLC , 145 AD3d 979, 980; Quinones v Schaap , 91 AD3d 739, 740).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Udell v. NYP Holdings, Inc. · filed 2019-02-20(a)(7)

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination to, in effect, grant that branch of the Post defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action.

Ramirez v. Donado Law Firm, P.C. · filed 2019-02-20(a)(7)

A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action on the ground that the pleading fails to state a cause of action ( see CPLR 3211[a][7]).