N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint fails to state a meritorious cause of action, and the motion may be made at any time.

Kales v. City of New York · filed 2019-02-26(a)(7)

Although defendant framed its motion as seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint, because plaintiff failed to state a meritorious cause of action, Supreme Court did not err in treating it as a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) (s ee Ganzenmuller v [*2] Incorporated Vil. of Port Jefferson , 18 AD3d 703, 704 [2d Dept 2005]) which may be made at any time (CPLR 3211[e]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action.

Akinde v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. · filed 2019-02-28(a)(7)

Plaintiff's claim that defendant retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity, namely, filing complaints with the New York State Division of Human Rights, was correctly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211[a][7]).

For a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court liberally construes the allegations and accepts them as true when deciding whether the pleading states a claim.

Matter of Michael B. (Famulari) · filed 2019-03-06(a)(7)

Although the petitioner's allegations are to be liberally construed and accepted as true ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Zellner v Odyl, LLC , 117 AD3d 1040), pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 81.08(a), a petition for the appointment of a guardian must contain "specific factual allegations" as to the personal actions, financial transactions, or other actual occurrences which demonstrate that the AIP would likely suffer harm because he or she cannot adequately understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his or her inability to provide for personal needs or property management (Mental Hygiene Law § 81.08[a][4], [5]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a petition, but dismissal should be denied when evidentiary submissions raise genuine issues of fact requiring a hearing.

Bishop v. Bishop · filed 2019-03-06(a)(7)

Thus, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the Family Court petition ( see Matter of Green v Silver , 96 AD3d 843, 845; see also Matter of Bianca J. v Dwayne A. , 105 AD3d 574), and should have held a hearing on the Family Court petition.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint fails to state a cognizable claim, with facts accepted as true and favorable inferences drawn for the plaintiff.

Nowlin v. Schiano · filed 2019-03-22(a)(7)

Accepting as true the facts set forth in the complaint and according plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences arising therefrom, as we must in the context of the instant motion ( see generally Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we conclude that the complaint fails to plead a cognizable theory for legal malpractice because plaintiff's allegations do not support even an inference that any alleged negligence by defendants was a proximate cause of plaintiff's damages ( see Alden v Brindisi, Murad, Brindisi, Pearlman, Julian & Pertz ["The People's Lawyer"] , 91 AD3d 1311, 1311 [4th Dept 2012]; Pyne v Block & Assoc. , 305 AD2d 213, 213 [1st Dept 2003]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, considering evidence requires denial unless the movant shows that the plaintiff's claimed material fact is not a fact and that no significant dispute exists.

Shea v. Salvation Army · filed 2019-02-27(a)(7)

"Where, as here, evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) . . . the motion should not be granted unless the movant can show that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it"

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint's facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Tilford v. Greenburgh Hous. Auth. · filed 2019-03-27(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, with alleged facts accepted as true and favorable inferences given to the plaintiff.

Emanuel Mizrahi, DDS, P.C. v. Angela Andretta, DMD, P.C. · filed 2019-03-27(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( T. Mina Supply, Inc. v Clemente Bros. Contr. Corp. , 139 AD3d 1040, 1041; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Sasidharan v Piverger , 145 AD3d 814, 815; Out of Box Promotions, LLC v Koschitzki , 55 AD3d 575, 577).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action without deciding the merits.

Spatz v. Valle · filed 2019-04-02(a)(7)

Since there are no allegations that any subsequent increases in the base date rent were unlawful, the overcharge counterclaim, as framed, was properly dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), which "is not a dismissal on the merits" (Canzona v Atansio, 118 AD3d 837, 840-841 [2014]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires a court to construe the complaint liberally, assume alleged facts are true, draw every favorable inference for the plaintiff, and decide whether the facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Odierna v. RSK, LLC · filed 2019-04-03(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87; Stone v Bloomberg L.P. , 163 AD3d 1028, 1030).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to determine whether the pleading states a cause of action and permits consideration of defendant's evidence only within defined limits.

Neuman v. Echevarria · filed 2019-04-03(a)(7)

"When a party moves to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action" ( Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181; see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Enviroventures, Inc. v. Wingert · filed 2019-04-04(a)(7)

Because the statements are covered by absolute immunity, and all the causes of action against defendants are based on those statements, Supreme Court properly concluded that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against defendants [FN2] .

Section 3211(a)(7) requires dismissal when the complaint fails to state a cause of action under any cognizable legal theory.

Nyari v. Onefater · filed 2019-04-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1181).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to accept pleaded facts as true, give plaintiffs favorable inferences, and decide whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

McKee v. McKee · filed 2019-04-10(a)(7)

"On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Shah v Exxis, Inc. , 138 AD3d 970, 971; see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. , 98 NY2d 314, 326; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, draw every possible inference for the plaintiff, and decide whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Hausen v. North Fork Radiology, P.C. · filed 2019-04-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see CPLR 3026; Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. , 29 NY3d 137, 141; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the pleading does not state a cause of action.

Glaubach v. Slifkin · filed 2019-04-17(a)(7)

When evidentiary material is considered [on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)], the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one, and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the pleader to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, . . . dismissal should not eventuate" ( Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe pleadings liberally, accept their allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every possible favorable inference when deciding whether a cause of action is stated.

Metro Enters. Corp. v. New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin. · filed 2019-04-18(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), "we must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference" ( Matter of Dashnaw v Town of Peru , 111 AD3d 1222, 1225 [2013] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe pleadings liberally, accept alleged facts as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and decide whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

260 Mamaroneck Ave., LLC v. Guaraglia · filed 2019-05-01(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Canzona v Atanasio , 118 AD3d 841, 842; see Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC , 54 AD3d 703, 703-704).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires dismissal only when, even accepting pleaded facts as true and giving the plaintiff every favorable inference, the allegations do not fit any cognizable legal theory.

Aponte v. Estate of Rene Aponte · filed 2019-05-15(a)(7)

In assessing a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the facts pleaded are accepted as true and the plaintiff is accorded every possible favorable inference ( see Nonnon v City of New York , 9 NY3d 825, 827; McDonnell v Bradley , 109 AD3d 592, 593). The court must " determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Nonnon v City of New York , 9 NY3d at 827, quoting Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88). Such a motion should be granted only where, even viewing the allegations as true, the plaintiff still cannot establish a cause of action ( see High Tides, LLC v DeMichele , 88 AD3d 954, 956-957; Kuzmin v Nevsky , 74 AD3d 896, 898).

A dismissal for failure to state a cause of action generally is without prejudice and permits adequate repleading.

Matter of Blum v. Pathstone Corp. · filed 2019-05-16(a)(7)

Further, although respondent sought dismissal of several claims pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), "[a] dismissal for failure to state a cause of action based on the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading is not a dismissal on the merits, and does not bar the adequate repleading of the claim in a subsequent action," so such a dismissal should generally be without prejudice ( Canzona v Atanasio , 118 AD3d 837, 840-841 [2014]; see 175 E. 74th Corp. v Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. , 51 NY2d 585, 590 n 1 [1980]; Pereira v St. Joseph's Cemetery , 78 AD3d 1141, 1142 [2010]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the pleading fails to state a cognizable cause of action.

State Realty, LLC v. Ger · filed 2019-05-17(a)(7)

The standard of review on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is "whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail" ( Guggenheimer v Ginzberg , 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action while requiring the court to accept the complaint's facts as true and give plaintiffs every favorable inference.

Tsinias Enters. Ltd. v. Taza Grocery, Inc. · filed 2019-05-22(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, "the court will accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( see Nonnon v City of New York , 9 NY3d 825, 827, quoting [*2]Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a cause of action, but factual issues are not properly resolved on such a motion.

Mannino v. Passalacqua · filed 2019-05-22(a)(7)

To the extent that the Passalacquas contend that they used proceeds of the Wells Fargo mortgage to benefit the premises, that contention involves factual issues not properly resolved on a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) ( see Von Maack v Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr. , 140 AD3d 1055, 1058).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept opposition submissions as true, give the plaintiff every possible inference, and decide only whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Grinberg v. Davidzon Radio 620 Am · filed 2019-05-31(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a court must accept as true the submissions made in opposition to the motion, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory, without regard to whether the allegations ultimately can be established ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1984]; JGK Indus., LLC v Hayes NY Bus., LLC , 145 AD3d 979, 980 [2016]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, with pleaded facts accepted as true and favorable inferences given to the plaintiff.

Soller v. Dahan · filed 2019-06-05(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, " [w]e accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Wilson v Dantas , 29 NY3d 1051, 1056-1057, quoting Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint's facts as true, give the plaintiff favorable inferences, and decide whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Sloninski v. City of New York · filed 2019-06-05(a)(7)

"On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory"

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires a court assessing a complaint to accept its allegations as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and determine whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Apex Rehabilitation & Care Ctr. v. Butler · filed 2019-06-05(a)(7)

"When assessing the adequacy of a complaint in light of a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss, the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the allegations of the complaint as true and provide plaintiff . . . the benefit of every possible favorable inference'" ( AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co. , 5 NY3d 582, 591, quoting Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87). A court must "determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d at 87-88; see Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp. , 96 NY2d 409, 414; Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v Global Warranty Group, LLC , 165 AD3d 1308, 1309).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe complaints liberally, accept alleged facts as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and decide only whether the facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Shahid v. Legal Aid Socy. · filed 2019-06-19(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the complaint to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action, requiring the court to accept the alleged facts as true and determine whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Reilly v. First Niagara Bank, N.A. · filed 2019-06-19(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1181).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept alleged complaint facts as true, give the proponent every favorable inference, and decide whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Katz v. Blau · filed 2019-06-19(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the alleged facts in the complaint as true, accord the proponent the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Aviaev v Nissan Infiniti LT , 150 AD3d 807, 807-808; Baron v Galasso , 83 AD3d 626, 627-628).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires accepting the complaint's alleged facts as true, giving the plaintiff every favorable inference, and determining only whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Baugher v. Cullen & Dykman, LLP · filed 2019-06-19(a)(7)

"In reviewing a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the facts as alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded every possible favorable inference, and the court's function is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Mendelovitz v Cohen , 37 AD3d 670, 671; see Belling v City of Long Beach , 168 AD3d 900).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a pleading fails to state a legally cognizable cause of action, with the court liberally construing the pleading and accepting alleged facts as true.

Shahid v. Dechert, LLP · filed 2019-06-12(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" (Blum v Citibank, NA , 162 AD3d 631, 632, quoting Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC , 54 AD3d 703, 703-704; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87; Attallah v Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP , 168 AD3d 1026, 1027-1028; Kliger-Weiss Infosystems, Inc. v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C. , 159 AD3d 683, 684).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a cause of action that fails to state a claim.

Rusin v. Design-Apart USA, Ltd. · filed 2019-06-26(a)(7)

Accordingly, the defendant's cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss that cause of action should have been granted ( see generally Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and decide whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

LLC v. S&R Main Realty, LLC · filed 2019-06-26(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Nonnon v City of New York , 9 NY3d 825, 827).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits a court considering evidentiary material to determine whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, rather than merely whether one was stated.

Krakovski v. Stavros Assoc., LLC · filed 2019-06-26(a)(7)

Where, as here, evidentiary material is considered on a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, "the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one" ( Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the pleading fails to allege facts that, if true, would establish the asserted claim.

Matter of Maragos v. Town of Hempstead Indus. Dev. Agency · filed 2019-07-10(a)(7)

Since the County Comptroller failed to allege facts, which if true, would establish that the subpoenas issued to TOHIDA were "authorized" (CPLR 2308[b]), the Supreme Court should have granted TOHIDA's cross motion to dismiss the proceeding insofar as asserted against it ( see CPLR 3211[a][7]; 7804[f]; see generally Matter of MRI Enters., Inc. v Hausknecht , 142 AD3d 1078, 1080-1081).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts give the complaint a liberal construction, accept pleaded facts as true, draw every possible inference for the plaintiff, and ask whether the facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Graves v. Stanclift, Ludemann, McMorris & Silvestri, P.C. · filed 2019-07-11(a)(7)

When considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a cause of action, courts "must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading as true, confer on [the] plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference and determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( New York State Workers' Compensation Bd. v Any-Time Home Care Inc. , 156 AD3d 1043, 1046 [2017] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]; see NYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self-Ins. Trust v Recco Home Care Servs., Inc. , 141 AD3d 792, 794 [2016]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Keis v. Margiotta · filed 2019-07-17(a)(7)

Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to deny the plaintiff's motion and grant the defendant's cross application to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true, afford every favorable inference, and determine whether they fit any cognizable legal theory.

Matter of Goldberg v. Elia · filed 2019-07-18(a)(7)

In reviewing such an argument, we accept the facts alleged in the petition and accompanying affidavits as true, afford petitioner every favorable inference and determine whether [*2]the alleged facts fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; 7804 [f]; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Matter of 54 Marion Ave., LLC v City of Saratoga Springs , 162 AD3d 1341, 1342 [2018]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits a party to seek dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

County of Nassau v. Urban · filed 2019-07-24(a)(7)

Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the complaint, as amplified by the plaintiff's [*2]submissions establishing that the defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, stated a cause of action for civil forfeiture of the vehicle pursuant to Nassau County Administrative Code § 8-7.0(g)(4) ( see Rovello v Orofino Realty Co ., 40 NY2d 633, 635-636). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's denial of the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action and sets the standard for evaluating the complaint and supporting evidence.

S.P. v. Dongbu Ins. Co. · filed 2019-07-31(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Persaud v Everest Natl. Ins. Co. , 142 AD3d 544, 545; Lissauer v Guideone Specialty Mut. Ins. , 109 AD3d 878). However, a court is permitted to consider evidentiary material submitted by a defendant in support of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) ( see CPLR 3211[c]; Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1181). When evidentiary material is considered on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the motion has not been converted to one for summary judgment, the criterion is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether one has been stated, and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a fact at all, and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, dismissal should not eventuate ( see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires a court to accept pleaded facts as true, construe the claim liberally, and give the claimant every favorable inference when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

Roemer v. State of New York · filed 2019-07-31(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the claim must be afforded a liberal construction, the facts therein must be accepted as true, and the claimant must be accorded the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Law Offs. of Thomas F. Liotti, LLC v State of New York , 139 AD3d 812, 813).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires dismissal when the complaint fails to state a cognizable cause of action, treating pleaded facts as true except for bare legal conclusions or claims flatly contradicted by the record.

Mory v. Wells Fargo Mtge. Subpoena Dept. · filed 2019-08-09(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded in the complaint are presumed to be true in order to determine whether the allegations fit within any cognizable legal claim ( see Morone v Morone , 50 NY2d 481 [1980]; Perl v Smith Barney , 230 AD2d 664 [1996]). However, where the allegations consist of bare legal conclusions or factual claims that are flatly contradicted by the record, they are not entitled to such consideration ( see Mohan v Hollander , 303 AD2d 473 [2003]; Mayer v Sanders , 264 AD2d 827 [1999]).

Section 3211(a)(5) permits dismissal based on the statute of frauds, and section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action.

Martin Greenfield Clothiers, Ltd. v. Brooks Bros. Group, Inc. · filed 2019-08-21(a)(5), (a)(7)

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination directing dismissal of the plaintiff's breach of contract cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), since the alleged oral agreement is unenforceable as violative of the statute of frauds ( see Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201[1]; General Obligations Law § 5-701[a][1]). ... In addition, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination directing dismissal of the plaintiff's promissory estoppel cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, as the cause of action is impermissibly predicated on allegations that the defendant violated the same promise it made under the oral agreement ( see Celle v Barclays Bank P.L.C. , 48 AD3d 301, 303; Brown v Brown , 12 AD3d 176, 176-177; see generally Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v Long Is. R.R. Co. , 70 NY2d 382, 389-390).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) tests whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory, accepting the complaint's facts as true and giving the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Paramax Corp. v. VoIP Supply, LLC · filed 2019-08-22(a)(7)

Initially, we take judicial notice of an amended complaint filed by plaintiff after Supreme Court ruled on defendants' motion ( see Wimbledon Fin. Master Fund, Ltd. v Weston Capital Mgt. LLC , 160 AD3d 596, 596 [1st Dept 2018]; Federated Project & Trade Fin. Core Fund v Amerra Agri Fund, LP , 106 AD3d 467, 467 [1st Dept 2013]), and incorporate its factual allegations into our CPLR 3211 (a) (7) analysis, in which " [w]e accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory' " ( Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. , 29 NY3d 137, 141 [2017], quoting Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Southwestern Invs. Group, LLC v JH Portfolio Debt Equities, LLC , 169 AD3d 1510, 1510-1511 [4th Dept 2019]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Mitchell v. City of Geneva · filed 2019-08-22(a)(7)

In light of our determination that the court properly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we do not address whether the court properly converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3211 (c) or whether the court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Medical Care of W. N.Y. v. Allstate Ins. Co. · filed 2019-08-22(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, "[w]e accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Hall v McDonald's Corp. , 159 AD3d 1591, 1592 [4th Dept 2018]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action, applying the pleading facts as true and granting the plaintiff favorable inferences.

Felli v. Catholic Charities of Steuben County · filed 2019-08-22(a)(7)

Accepting as true the facts set forth in the amended complaint and according plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences arising therefrom, as we must in the context of the instant motion (see generally Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we conclude that the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action for unlawful eviction inasmuch as plaintiff was not a tenant under the RPAPL, but rather was a licensee ( see David v #1 Mktg. Serv., Inc ., 113 AD3d 810, 811 [2d Dept 2014]; Coppa v LaSpina , 41 AD3d 756, 759 [2d Dept 2007], lv denied 13 NY3d 706 [2009]; Andrews v Acacia Network , 59 Misc 3d 10, 11-12 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th, & 13th Jud Dists 2018]), and thus defendants were not required to use the eviction procedures set forth in RPAPL article 7 before removing plaintiff from the premises ( see Coppa , 41 AD3d at 759; Soto v Pitkin Junius Holdings, LLC , 58 Misc 3d 153[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 50156[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2018]; see generally Tantaro v [*2]Common Ground Community Hous. Dev. Fund, Inc ., 147 AD3d 684, 684 [1st Dept 2017], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 30 NY3d 1016 [2017]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and determine whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Garendean Realty Owner, LLC v. Lang · filed 2019-08-28(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court is required to accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action, with the alleged facts accepted as true and every favorable inference given to the plaintiff.

Saltini v. North Sea Dev. LLC · filed 2019-09-09(a)(7)

Affording the complaint a liberal construction, accepting the facts alleged therein as true, and granting the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( Saul v Cahan, supra), the complaint fails to allege "special circumstances" that could have transformed the business relationship between the plaintiff and the Lender into a fiduciary relationship, such as control by one party of the other for the good of the other or creation of an agency relationship ( L. Magarian & Co. v Timberland Co. , 245 AD2d 69, 70).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint's alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide only whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Q & O Estates Corp. v. US Bank Trust Nat'l Assoc. · filed 2019-09-11(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 88; Mehrhof v Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. , 168 AD3d 713, 714).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Breslin Realty Dev. Corp. v. Smith & DeGroat, Inc. · filed 2019-09-11(a)(7)

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting that branch of the S & D defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. While the plaintiff alleges that the S & D defendants fraudulently transferred certain funds to the two corporations solely owned by Martin I. Schackner, the Debtor and Creditor Law does not, "either explicitly or implicitly, create a creditor's remedy for money damages against parties who . . . were neither transferees of the assets nor beneficiaries of the conveyance" ( Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v Porco , 75 NY2d 840, 842; see Bashian & Farber, LLP v Syms , 167 AD3d 561, 564-565; Citicorp Trust Bank, FSB v Makkas , 127 AD3d 907, 908). Here, the plaintiff failed to allege that the S & D defendants benefitted from the alleged fraudulent transfers ( cf. Broadway Warehouse Co. v Buffalo Barn Bd., LLC , 143 AD3d 1238).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires a court to accept complaint allegations as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and decide whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Wood v. Villanueva · filed 2019-09-18(a)(7)

"In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court is required to accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Zuniga v BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. , 147 AD3d 882, 883).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe pleadings liberally, accept alleged facts as true, give plaintiffs favorable inferences, and decide whether the facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Makris v. Boylan · filed 2019-09-18(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Nelson v Citiwide Auto Leasing, Inc ., 154 AD3d 863, 864; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Board of Mgrs. of E. Riv. Tower Condominium v. Empire Holdings Group, LLC · filed 2019-09-18(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 88; Meyer v North Shore-Long Is. Jewish Health Sys., Inc. , 137 AD3d 880, 880-881; Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1181).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action.

Atalaya Asset Income Fund II, LP v. HVS Tappan Beach, Inc. · filed 2019-09-18(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1181).

A motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7) cannot resolve factual disputes; it tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.

Remora Capital S.A. v. Dukan · filed 2019-09-26(a)(7)

To the extent defendants dispute that Remora Capital rendered the requisite advisory services, that is an issue of fact not resolvable on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to determine whether the pleading states a cause of action, accepting alleged facts as true and giving plaintiffs every favorable inference.

Sassi v. Mobile Life Support Servs., Inc. · filed 2019-10-09(a)(7)

"When a party moves to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action. In considering such a motion, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]). Applying this standard, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe the complaint liberally, presume the alleged facts true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and determine whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. City of New York · filed 2019-10-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Santaiti v Town of Ramapo , 162 AD3d 921, 924-925).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action based on whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

TMCC, Inc. v. Jennifer Convertibles, Inc. · filed 2019-10-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the facts as alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and the court's function is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Grant v DiFeo , 165 AD3d 897, 898-899; Kupersmith v Winged Foot Golf Club, Inc. , 38 AD3d 847, 848).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits a post-answer motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action to be treated as a narrowly framed ground in a summary judgment motion, with liberal construction of the pleading.

State of New York v. Jeda Capital-Lenox, LLC · filed 2019-10-24(a)(7)

As Supreme Court found, this aspect of defendant's cross motion is properly treated "as a narrowly framed post-answer CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ground asserted in a summary judgment motion" ( Chenango Contr., Inc. v Hughes Assoc. , 128 AD3d 1150, 1151 [2015]; see David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 3212:20 at 29-30).

CPLR 3211(a)(1) permits dismissal when documentary evidence utterly refutes the plaintiff's factual allegations and conclusively establishes a defense, while CPLR 3211(a)(7) tests whether the pleading states a cause of action.

Porat v. Rybina · filed 2019-11-06(a)(1) and (a)(7)

When moving for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), the motion will only be granted if the party submits documentary evidence that utterly refutes the plaintiff's factual allegations and conclusively establishes a defense as a matter of law ( see Meyer v New York-Presbyterian Hosp. Queens , 167 AD3d 996, 997). ... When a party moves pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss an action, the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action ( see Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when speculative and inherently incredible allegations fail to state a cause of action.

Mira v. Harder · filed 2019-11-12(a)(7)

Even if plaintiff's claims were timely, based on alleged postemployment conduct, the complaint failed to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211[a][7]). The complaint contains merely speculative and "inherently incredible" allegations of widespread surveillance, conspiratorial meetings, and eavesdropping involving unidentified persons ( O'Donnell, Fox & Gartner v R-2000 Corp ., 198 AD2d 154, 154 [1st Dept 1993]), that are insufficient to state the necessary elements of a cause of action for employment discrimination, retaliation, harassment, or intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress ( see generally Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind , 3 NY3d 295, 311-313 [2004]; Askin v Dept. Of Educ. , 110 AD3d 621 [1st Dept 2013]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Williston v. Jack Resnick & Sons, Inc. · filed 2019-11-13(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC , 54 AD3d 703, 703-704).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assesses the complaint's allegations without deciding whether the plaintiff can prove them.

M.H.B. v. E.C.F.S. · filed 2019-11-14(a)(7)

However, in the context of this motion to dismiss, the Court does not assess the relative merits of the complaint's allegations against defendant's contrary assertions or to determine whether or not plaintiffs can produce evidence to support their claims ( see e.g. Residence on Madison Condominium v W.T. Gallagher & Assoc. , 271 AD2d 209, 210 [1st Dept 2000]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Santoro v. Poughkeepsie Crossings, LLC · filed 2019-12-11(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, " the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Blum v Citibank , NA , 162 AD3d 631, 632, quoting Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC , 54 AD3d 703, 703-704; see Attallah v Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP , 168 AD3d 1026; Kligler-Weiss Infosystems, Inc. v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C. , 159 AD3d 683, 684; SV Vernon 43, LLC v Malik , 138 AD3d 730, 731).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, give the nonmoving party every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Matter of Johnston v. Dickes · filed 2019-12-20(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must give the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged therein as true, accord the nonmoving party the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within a cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Matter of McBride v Springsteen-El , 106 AD3d 1402, 1402 [3d Dept 2013]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading receives a liberal construction, its allegations are assumed true, and the plaintiff receives every favorable inference.

Mulligan v. Long Is. Fury Volleyball Club · filed 2019-12-24(a)(7)

When determining a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, "the pleading is to be given a liberal construction, the allegations contained within it are assumed to be true and the plaintiff is to be afforded every favorable inference" ( Simkin v Blank , 19 NY3d 46, 52).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and draws favorable inferences to determine whether the pleadings support relief under any reasonable view of the facts.

Schmitt v. Artforum Intl. Mag., Inc. · filed 2019-12-26(a)(7)

It is well established that on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept as true the plaintiff's factual allegations and afford the plaintiff all favorable [*4]inferences in ascertaining whether the pleadings support relief on the basis of any reasonable view of the facts pled ( Aristy-Farer v State of New York , 29 NY3d 501, 509 [2017]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts assessing a complaint to assume its alleged facts are true and give the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Breest v. Haggis · filed 2019-12-26(a)(7)

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), we evaluate the sufficiency of the amended complaint by assuming that the facts alleged therein are true and according plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( Wilson v Dantas , 29 NY3d 1051, 1056-1057 [2017]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference.

SCE Assoc., Inc. v. Coglianese · filed 2020-01-08(a)(7)

Affording the second cause of action a liberal construction, [*2]accepting the facts alleged as true, and granting the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, the second cause of action failed to adequately plead the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants ( see Litvinoff v Wright , 150 AD3d at 715; Castellotti v Free , 138 AD3d 198, 209-210; Chasanoff v Perlberg , 19 AD3d 635, 635-636).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Wey v. NASDAQ, Inc. · filed 2020-02-11(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (a) (7), the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction and accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference ( Morone v Morone , 50 NY2d 481, 484 [1980]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Lopez-Lobo v. U.S. Nonwovens Corp. · filed 2020-02-13(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the facts as alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and the court's function is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Kupersmith v Winged Foot Golf Club, Inc. , 38 AD3d 847, 848).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Izmirligil v. Steven J. Baum, P.C. · filed 2020-02-13(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d at 87).

A court errs in dismissing a petition for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7) when the movant did not request that relief.

Matter of Anthony F. v. Christy G. · filed 2020-02-20(a)(7)

Initially, Family Court erred in dismissing the father's petition based upon failure to state a cause of action ( see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]) when the mother had not requested such relief.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a breach of contract complaint may be dismissed if it does not identify the contract provisions allegedly breached and evidence submitted in opposition does not cure that defect.

NFA Group v. Lotus Research, Inc. · filed 2020-02-26(a)(7)

Here, the complaint failed to specify the provisions of the parties' agreement that were allegedly breached. Further, the evidentiary material the plaintiff submitted in opposition to the defendant's motion failed to remedy the defect in the [*2]complaint ( see Barker v Time Warner Cable, Inc. , 83 AD3d at 751-752; Woodhill Elec. v Jeffrey Beamish, Inc. , 73 AD3d at 1422; Lester v Braue , 25 AD3d 769, 769-770). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint.

When a court considers evidence on a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion without converting it to summary judgment, dismissal requires a showing that a material fact alleged by the plaintiff is not a fact and that no significant dispute exists about it.

Patel v. Gardens at Forest Hills Owners Corp. · filed 2020-03-04(a)(7)

Where, as here, evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the motion is not converted into one for summary judgment, the question becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one, and the motion should not be granted unless the movant can show that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d at 88; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Ifantides v. Wisniewski · filed 2020-03-04(a)(7)

Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant the defendants' separate motions pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them for failure to state a cause of action.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state any cognizable cause of action.

Shahid v. Ridgewood Bushwick Senior Citizens Council, Inc. · filed 2020-03-11(a)(7)

We agree with the Supreme Court's granting of that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint. ... Here, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for fraud or any other cognizable cause of action in his complaint.

On a motion to dismiss a counterclaim under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its allegations as true, and asks whether they state a cognizable claim.

LG Funding, LLC v. United Senior Props. of Olathe, LLC · filed 2020-03-11(a)(7)

"When assessing a motion to dismiss a complaint or counterclaim . . . for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept as true all facts as alleged in the pleading, accord the pleader the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( V. Groppa Pools, Inc. v Massello , 106 AD3d 722 , 722; see CPLR 3211[a][7]; Dorce v Gluck , 140 AD3d 1111 , 1112).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Vanyo v. Buffalo Police Benevolent Assn., Inc. · filed 2020-03-20(a)(7)

Upon giving the amended complaint a liberal construction, accepting the allegations as true, and providing plaintiff with the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., Series 2006-FM2 v Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc. , 30 NY3d 572, 582 [2017]), we conclude that plaintiff has stated a cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation ( see generally Matter of Civil Serv. Bar Assn., Local 237, Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters v City of New York , 64 NY2d 188, 196 [1984]).

Under § 3211(a)(7), an apparent-authority claim survives dismissal when the pleadings raise a factual question about the dealers’ authority.

City of New York v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. · filed 2020-03-23(a)(7)

In sum, the Court rejects T-Mobile's dismissal request, as the Court cannot find as a matter of law at this pre-discovery stage of the case that the Dealers were at all times acting outside the scope of their authority without T-Mobile's consent so as to defeat a claim of apparent authority.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to assess whether the plaintiff has a cause of action when deciding a motion to dismiss.

State of N.Y. ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. Jpmorgan Chase & Co. · filed 2020-03-27(a)(7)

Dismissal under CPLR § 3211 (a)(7) requires the court to assess whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action and not whether he has stated one ( id. ).

On a motion under § 3211(a)(7), the court assesses whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.

Allergan Fin., LLC v. Pfizer Inc. · filed 2020-04-13(a)(7)

Finally, under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the court must only assess whether the plaintiff has a cause of action and not whether the plaintiff has stated one.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Kahlon v. DeSantis · filed 2020-04-29(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Medina v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. · filed 2020-05-06(a)(7)

"In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Lubonty v U.S. Bank N.A. , 159 AD3d 962, 963 [internal quotation marks omitted], affd 34 NY3d 250; see Nonnon v City of New York , 9 NY3d 825, 827; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court reads allegations liberally but may dismiss them when they still fail to state a cause of action.

St. George Outlet Dev., LLC v. Casino Mech. Corp. · filed 2020-05-06(a)(7)

Not even the application of the liberal pleading standard urged by Casino justifies allowing the larceny allegations to proceed.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court does not decide what the plaintiff can ultimately prove or whether the claimed damages are recoverable.

Duffy v. Baldwin · filed 2020-05-14(a)(7)

What plaintiffs can ultimately prove, or whether damages of this sort are recoverable, is not our concern when determining a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action ( see Landon v Kroll Lab. Specialists, Inc. , 22 NY3d 1, 6 [2013]; Tomhannock, LLC v Roustabout Resources, LLC , 115 AD3d 1074, 1076 [2014]; Stone Ridge Country Props. Corp. v Mohonk Oil Co., Inc. , 84 AD3d 1556, 1557 [2011]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, assumes its alleged facts are true, and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Matter of Zelouf · filed 2020-05-27(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading is "to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the [petitioner] is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v City of New York , 176 AD3d 1145, 1146).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint's allegations fail to state a cognizable cause of action.

Kim v. Francis · filed 2020-06-04(a)(7)

The complaint was properly dismissed as against defendant BDG Media Inc. (BDG) under CPLR 3211(a)(7), as the allegations against it failed to state any cognizable cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Kinnear v. Cefoli · filed 2020-06-10(a)(7)

"On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court will accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord [the plaintiff] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and [*2]determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Nonnon v City of New York , 9 NY3d 825, 827 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87). ... Construing the complaint liberally, we cannot conclude that the facts as alleged in the complaint do not fit within any cognizable legal theory. Accordingly, the defendant's cross motion should have been denied.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Golden v. The Diocese of Buffalo, NY · filed 2020-06-12(a)(7)

Accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint and according plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Southwestern Invs. Group, LLC v JH Portfolio Debt Equities, LLC , 169 AD3d 1510, 1510-1511 [4th Dept 2019]; see generally Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. , 29 NY3d 137, 141 [2017]), we conclude that the complaint fails to allege the requisite "substantial interference with the exercise of a common right of the public" ( 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods v Finlandia Ctr. , 96 NY2d 280, 292 [2001], rearg denied 96 NY2d 938 [2001]; see New York Trap Rock Corp. v Town of Clarkstown , 299 NY 77, 80 [1949]; see also Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. , 41 NY2d 564, 568 [1977], rearg denied 42 NY2d 1102 [1977]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a movant must establish that the complaint fails to state a viable cause of action.

Sucre v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. · filed 2020-06-17(a)(7)

In order to succeed on its motion to dismiss, Con Edison had to establish that the complaint fails to state a viable cause of action ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d at 88).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and dismisses it if those allegations do not state a cognizable cause of action.

Morales v. Triborough Podiatry, P.C. · filed 2020-06-17(a)(7)

"When a party moves to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action. In considering such a motion, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]). Applying this standard, we find that the complaint fails to state a cognizable cause of action to recover damages for employment discrimination or hostile work environment based on race or gender in violation of the NYCHRL ( see Torres v Louzoun Enters, Inc. , 105 AD3d 945, 945; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107).

On a motion to dismiss, a defendant's submissions can defeat an alleged material fact by showing that it is not a fact at all.

Trec v. Cazares · filed 2020-07-15(a)(7)

The defendants' submissions on their motion failed to show "that a material fact as claimed by the [plaintiff] to be one is not a fact at all" ( Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275), since they indicated that a holdover proceeding was not commenced by the estate until October 2017.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to overcome a qualified privilege.

Melis v. Van Wickler · filed 2020-07-22(a)(7)

GEICO also met its burden on its motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it. The statements made in GEICO's disclaimer letter were subject to a qualified privilege as both GEICO and Mulato and his wife, i.e., the policyholders, had an interest in that communication ( see Hame v Lawson , 70 AD3d 640, 641). Further, the plaintiff failed to allege any facts from which it could be inferred that GEICO's statements were made solely with malice, so as to overcome the privilege ( see id. at 641).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s alleged facts as true and gives the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference.

MacKay v. Paesano · filed 2020-07-22(a)(7)

Therefore, accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference ( see CPLR 3211[a][7]), we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to dismiss the causes of action alleging breach of a joint venture agreement and breach of fiduciary duty insofar as asserted against the defendant.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Darden v. OneUnited Bank · filed 2020-07-29(a)(7)

"In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court is required to accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff[ ] the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Zuniga v BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. , 147 AD3d 882, 883; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay · filed 2020-08-19(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1181).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Mann v. Sasson · filed 2020-08-26(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must " accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Nonnon v City of New York , 9 NY3d 825, 827, quoting Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Greenberg v. Wiesel · filed 2020-09-16(a)(7)

The Supreme Court also should have denied Wiesel's motion to dismiss those causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7). On a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, " the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( 260 Mamaroneck Ave, LLC v Guaraglia , 172 AD3d 661, 662, quoting Canzona v Atanasio , 118 AD3d 841, 842).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Green 333 Corp. v. RNL Life Science, Inc. · filed 2020-09-16(a)(7)

In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v Bonderman , 31 NY3d 30, 38; Korsinsky v Rose , 120 AD3d 1307, 1308).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Derosa v. Estate of Iannazzo · filed 2020-09-16(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court should accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Freundlich v Pacific Indem. Co. , 137 AD3d 967, 968). The role of the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Freundlich v Pacific Indem. Co. , 137 AD3d at 968).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts support a cognizable legal theory.

Katsoris v. Bodnar & Milone, LLP · filed 2020-09-23(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Dinger v Cefola , 133 AD3d 816, 817; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when vague and conclusory allegations fail to state a cause of action.

Influx Capital, LLC v. Pershin · filed 2020-09-30(a)(7)

Here, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the vague and conclusory allegations of the complaint failed to state a cause of action alleging tortious interference with existing contracts ( see R.I. Is. House, LLC v North Town Phase II Houses, Inc. , 51 AD3d 890, 896).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Hyatt v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB · filed 2020-09-30(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC , 54 AD3d 703, 704).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory; if it considers extrinsic evidence to remedy a pleading defect, it asks whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.

Richards v. Security Resources · filed 2020-10-06(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must "determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). However, where the court considers extrinsic evidence to remedy any defect in the pleading, "the criterion is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one" ( id. ; see Biondi v Beekman Hill House Apt. Corp. , 257 AD2d 76, 81 [1st Dept 1999], affd 94 NY2d 659 [2000]).

A motion to dismiss under § 3211(a)(7) is not supported by evidence that fails to show a pleaded factual allegation is untrue.

Palmer-Williams v. Rubin · filed 2020-10-07(a)(7)

The original chart did not demonstrate that a fact alleged by the plaintiff—that she received treatment at Rafat's private office prior to having surgery on the epidural lipomatosis—was not a fact at all ( see generally Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 274-275).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give its proponent every favorable inference.

Cajigas v. Clean Rite Ctrs., LLC · filed 2020-10-07(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the proponent the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Phillips v Taco Bell Corp. , 152 AD3d 806, 807; T. Mina Supply, Inc. v Clemente Bros. Contr. Corp. , 139 AD3d 1040, 1040-1041).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits a complaint to withstand dismissal when its allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action.

King v. Klocek · filed 2020-10-09(a)(7)

Here, contrary to defendant's contention, the allegations of the second amended complaint are sufficient to withstand defendant's CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss.

Section 3211(a)(7) does not warrant dismissal when the defendant’s evidence fails to defeat the plaintiff’s cause of action.

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Burns · filed 2020-10-14(a)(7)

Thus, the defendant failed to submit evidence sufficient to warrant relief pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court reads the complaint liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

AB Oil Servs., Ltd. v. TCE Ins. Servs., Inc. · filed 2020-11-04(a)(7)

"'On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss [a complaint] for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory'" ( Murphy v Department of Educ. of City of N.Y. , 155 AD3d 637, 638, quoting Phillips v Taco Bell Corp. , 152 AD3d 806, 807).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the plaintiff's factual contentions as true.

Columbia Mem. Hosp. v. Hinds · filed 2020-11-05(a)(7)

Even if we accept as true plaintiff's contention that it is entitled to payment of the MLMIC funds because it paid the premiums for the subject policy, which we must on a motion to dismiss ( see NYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self-Ins. Trust v Recco Home Care Servs., Inc. , 141 AD3d 792, 794 [2016]; SUS, Inc. v St. Paul Travelers Group , 75 AD3d 740, 741 [2010]), this Court recently concluded in Schoch v Lake Champlain OB-GYN, P.C. (184 AD3d 338, 342-344 [2020]) that entitlement to the MLMIC funds is not contingent on who paid the premiums for the subject policy.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

JDI Display Am., Inc. v. Jaco Electronics, Inc. · filed 2020-11-12(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 88; Meyer v North Shore—Long Is. Jewish Health Sys., Inc. , 137 AD3d 880, 880-881).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court liberally construes the complaint and dismisses it only if the allegations, taken as true, cannot establish a cause of action.

Cunningham v. Nolte · filed 2020-11-12(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint must be liberally construed, giving the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88). "Such a motion should be granted only where, even viewing the allegations as true, the plaintiff still cannot establish a cause of action" ( Hartman v Morganstern , 28 AD3d 423, 424).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Cunningham v. Mary Agnes Manor Mgt., L.L.C. · filed 2020-11-13(a)(7)

Accepting those facts as alleged in the first amended complaint as true, and affording every possible favorable inference to plaintiff, we conclude that plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts to overcome defendants' argument that the facility is an assisted living facility and not subject to those sections of the Public Health Law ( see generally Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint receives a liberal construction, and the court asks whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Sikorsky v. City of Newburgh, N.Y. · filed 2020-11-18(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must liberally construe the complaint and accept its allegations as true.

Johnson v. Woodruff · filed 2020-11-19(a)(7)

Liberally construing the complaint and accepting the allegations therein as true, as we must on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ( see Chanko v American Broadcasting Cos. Inc. , 27 NY3d 46, 52 [2016]; Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. , 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Scott v Smith , 104 AD3d 1029, 1030 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 860 [2013]), we are unpersuaded that Supreme Court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true and gives them every favorable inference.

Vaughn v. City of New York · filed 2020-11-30(a)(7)

Even accepting plaintiff's allegations as true, and according them the benefit of every favorable inference, as we must in the context of a motion to dismiss on the pleadings ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), defendants' CPLR 3211(a)(7) cross motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Suarez · filed 2020-12-02(a)(7)

Affording, as we must, the pleading a liberal construction, accepting all facts as alleged to be true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determining only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Arnell Constr. Corp. v New York City Sch. Constr. Auth. , 177 AD3d [*2]595, 596; U.S. Bank N.A. v Herman , 174 AD3d 831), we find that the complaint was facially adequate to state a cause of action to foreclose a mortgage.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court asks whether the alleged facts fit within any cognizable legal theory.

106 N. Broadway, LLC v. Lawrence · filed 2020-12-02(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss, the question is whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 88-89).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court assessing whether a complaint states a claim to construe it liberally, accept its allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Gagnon v. Village of Cooperstown, N.Y. · filed 2020-12-03(a)(7)

In determining whether a plaintiff has stated a cause of action, we afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the alleged facts fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87—88 [1994]; State of New York v Jeda Capital-Lenox, LLC , 176 AD3d 1443, 1445 [2019]). ... Thus, contrary to defendants' assertion, dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim on CPLR 3211 (a) (7) grounds is not warranted.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint and opposition submissions as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and permits sufficiently pleaded claims to proceed.

Pavich v. Pavich · filed 2020-12-15(a)(7)

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Nancy M. Bannon, J.), entered January 10, 2020, which granted the CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion of defendant World Cinema, Inc. (WCI), to dismiss the complaint as against it, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion denied, and the complaint reinstated as against WCI. ... These allegations are sufficient at this pleading stage.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the plaintiff's alleged facts as true, construes the complaint liberally, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Tsatskin v. Kordonsky · filed 2020-12-16(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true and liberally construe the complaint, according it the benefit of every possible favorable inference" ( Dee v Rakower , 112 AD3d 204, 208; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Canzona v Atanasio , 118 AD3d 841, 842).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Congregation Erech Shai Bais Yosef, Inc. v. Werzberger · filed 2020-12-16(a)(7)

Affording the amended complaint a liberal construction and giving the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Granada Condominium III Assn. v Palomino , 78 AD3d 996, 996-997), the amended complaint sufficiently states a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts construe the complaint liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Laguerre v. Maurice · filed 2020-12-23(a)(7)

In assessing the adequacy of a complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v Vigilant Ins. Co. , 21 NY3d 324, 334; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87; Murphy v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y. , 155 AD3d 637, 638).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Singh v. City of New York · filed 2020-12-30(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is afforded a liberal construction, the facts as alleged are accepted as true, and the plaintiffs are accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, allegations supporting a claim against a public entity in its proprietary capacity suffice unless the defendant shows that the complaint fails to state such a claim.

Perlov v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. · filed 2020-12-30(a)(7)

As the specific acts or omissions that the plaintiffs claim led to the decedent's death arose from the Port Authority's alleged failure to maintain the bridge in a reasonably safe condition, dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) could only eventuate if the Port Authority demonstrated that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action against it in its proprietary capacity ( see e.g. Heeran v Long Is. Power Auth. [LIPA] , 141 AD3d at 564-566). Here, the Port Authority did not do so.

On a CPLR 3211 motion, a court determines whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Farrell Limousine Serv. LLC v. Macro Consultants LLC · filed 2021-01-12(a)(7)

However, on a CPLR 3211 motion, courts "determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Here, the allegations in the complaint and the documents in the record may be construed as pleading that Farrell agreed to pay Macro for services beyond the contracted-for Phase One services and that those services included supervising the subcontractors who had responsibility for ensuring that the final ICAP application was timely filed. Thus, the unjust enrichment claim should not be dismissed, because the October 2010 contract does not cover plaintiffs' additional allegations concerning Macro's alleged extracontractual responsibility for the final ICAP application ( see Curtis Props. Corp. v Greif Cos., 236 AD2d 237, 239 [1st Dept 1997]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts state a legally cognizable claim.

Farro v. Schochet · filed 2021-01-13(a)(7)

In contrast, "[w]hen a party moves to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action. In considering such a motion, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( Morales v Triborough Podiatry, P.C. , 184 AD3d 754, 755 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Daniel v. Khadu · filed 2021-01-20(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion under section 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Barry's Auto Body of NY, LLC v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. · filed 2021-01-20(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87; Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1181).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, an allegation can be sufficient even if missing details raise questions about its credibility.

Bison Capital Corp. v. Hunton & Williams LLP · filed 2021-01-07(a)(7)

However, plaintiff's allegation, in its president's affidavit, that he expressly instructed defendant to place liens on the judgment debtor's assets, states a claim for breach of contract. While the failure to identify when or to whom the instruction was given may raise issues of credibility with regard to the allegation, on a motion addressed to the pleading, this was sufficient.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court assumes the pleaded facts are true and gives the petitioner every favorable inference when deciding whether those facts state a ground for relief.

Matter of Kristen B. v. Steven Z. · filed 2021-02-11(a)(7)

Assuming the truth of the allegations in the amended petition and according petitioner the benefit of every favorable inference, we conclude that the facts alleged in the amended petition do not fit into any of the specified grounds for vacatur of an acknowledgment of paternity more than 60 days after it was executed ( Matter of Joshua AA. v Jessica BB. , 132 AD3d 1107, 1108 [3d Dept 2015]; Matter of Ronnyeh R. v Gwendolyn M. , 99 AD3d 717, 717 [2d Dept 2012]; see also Demetrius H. , 35 AD3d at 1216).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading.

Bernhardt v. Schneider · filed 2021-01-27(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction ( see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is liberally construed in the plaintiff's favor.

Miller v. National Prop. Mgt. Assoc., Inc. · filed 2021-02-05(a)(7)

Supreme Court, however, properly denied defendants' motion insofar as it sought to dismiss the breach of contract claim against DaveBill on the ground that plaintiff failed to identify the portion of the lease agreement that was allegedly breached; liberally construed in plaintiff's favor, the complaint alleges that the implied warranty of habitability was breached, and defendants make no argument that such a theory fails to state a cause of action against DaveBill under these circumstances ( cf. Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC , 54 AD3d 703, 704 [2d Dept 2008], lv dismissed 12 NY3d 878 [2009]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Parish of the Holy Assumption Russian Orthodox Greek Church Catholic Church, Inc. v. Klestoff · filed 2021-02-24(a)(7)

"On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" ( T. Mina Supply, Inc. v Clemente Bros. Contr. Corp. , 139 AD3d 1040, 1040-1041; see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the petition’s allegations as true and give the petitioner the benefit of all favorable inferences.

Matter of Madden v. Village of Tuxedo Park · filed 2021-03-10(a)(7)

In deciding motions to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7) and 7804(f), the court must accept as true all allegations contained in the amended petition and afford the petitioner the benefit of all favorable inferences ( see Matter of Fanizzi v Planning Bd. of Patterson , 146 AD3d 98, 107).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and denies dismissal if the complaint states a cause of action.

Stewart v. Berger · filed 2021-03-17(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the third cause of action, which alleged breach of contract. ... As such, accepting the facts as alleged as true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the court properly determined that the complaint stated a cause of action alleging breach of contract.

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true and draws every possible inference in the plaintiff’s favor.

Coleman v. County of Suffolk · filed 2021-03-17(a)

Therefore, accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and resolving every possible inference in favor of the plaintiff, the complaint fails to state a viable cause of action against the defendants ( see Cockburn v City of New York , 129 AD3d at 897). The Supreme Court thus properly granted the defendants' renewed motion to dismiss the complaint.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

B&A Realty Mgt., LLC v. Gloria · filed 2021-03-17(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is construed in the plaintiff’s favor and its factual allegations are accepted as true.

Feldman v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. · filed 2021-03-23(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, "the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all factual allegations must be accepted as true" ( Alden Global Value Recovery Master Fund, L.P. v KeyBank N.A. , 159 AD3d 618, 621-622 [1st Dept 2018]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe pleadings liberally, accept allegations as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and ask whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

CSC Holdings, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. · filed 2021-03-23(a)(7)

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), pleadings are to be afforded a liberal construction, allegations are taken as true, the plaintiff is afforded every possible favorable inference, and a determination is made only as to whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion, the court accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint and in submissions opposing dismissal.

Engelman v. Rofe · filed 2021-03-04

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and any submissions in opposition to the dismissal motion ( see [*6]511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co. , 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]).

Bare legal conclusions are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

D'Artagnan, LLC v. Sprinklr Inc. · filed 2021-03-11(a)(7)

Instead, plaintiff's allegation that there was no meeting of the minds with respect to a material element of the parties' agreement is a bare legal conclusion that is insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss ( see Mark Hampton, Inc. v Bergreen , 173 AD2d 220 [1st Dept 1991], lv denied 80 NY2d 788 [1992]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and dismisses it if they fail to state a cause of action.

Bourianov v. Lovell · filed 2021-03-31(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint. Accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress ( see Ajie Chen v Deliso , 169 AD3d 761, 762; see e.g. Sahid v Chambers , 237 AD2d 175, 175).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a loss-of-consortium claim when the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, lacks allegations sufficient to state that cause of action.

Wasserman v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 2021-04-07(a)(7)

The Supreme Court also erred in denying that branch of Amica's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging loss of consortium. The complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88), failed to set forth allegations sufficient to state a cause of action to recover damages for loss of consortium ( see generally Klein v Metropolitan Child Servs., Inc. , 100 AD3d 708, 711).

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

WMC Realty Corp. v. City of Yonkers · filed 2021-04-21(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), we must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Izmirligil v Steven J. Baum, P.C. , 180 AD3d 767, 770).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and determines whether they state a cause of action.

Van Scoter v. Porter · filed 2021-04-30(a)(7)

Accepting plaintiff's allegations as true ( see Leon v Martinez , 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we conclude that the amended complaint states a cause of action for promissory estoppel.

On a motion under § 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Lake Valhalla Civic Assn., Inc. v. BMR Funding, LLC · filed 2021-05-12(a)(7)

"In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory"