N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

ThreeAm SPC, Ltd. v. Ribotsky · filed 2014-01-29(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Parekh v Cain, 96 AD3d 812, 815 [2012]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint states no legally cognizable claim or omits a material allegation needed to support one.

Basis Yield Alpha Fund v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. · filed 2014-01-30(a)(7)

A CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion may be used by a defendant to test the facial sufficiency of a pleading in two different ways. On the one hand, the motion may be used to dispose of an action in which the plaintiff has not stated a claim cognizable at law. On the other hand, the motion may be used to dispose of an action in which the plaintiff identified a cognizable cause of action but failed to assert a material allegation necessary to support the cause of action.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court assesses whether the complaint sufficiently pleads its causes of action and cannot resolve the authenticity of a disputed contract signature on the pleadings.

Grasshoff v. Etra · filed 2014-02-04(a)(7)

We note that on this pleading motion we are unable to determine the authenticity of defendant’s signature on the contract. The complaint sufficiently pleads the causes of action asserted (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, allegations survive if they fit any cognizable theory of recovery, even if the complaint is inartfully pleaded.

Cabrera v. Collazo · filed 2014-02-04(a)(7)

On a motion directed at the sufficiency of the pleadings, the issue is whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable theory of recovery, not whether the complaint is artfully pleaded (see Hirschhorn v Hirschhorn, 194 AD2d 768 [2d Dept 1993]), and the circumstances of this matter do not warrant dismissal of the action, at this juncture, as against the Tanzman defendants.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court presumes the alleged facts true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Hecht v. Andover Associates Management Corp. · filed 2014-02-05(a)(7)

The Supreme Court also properly denied that branch of Citrin Cooperman’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it. ... The facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Thomas v LaSalle Bank N.A., 79 AD3d 1015, 1017 [2010]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the complaint liberally.

Sacher v. Beacon Associates Management Corp. · filed 2014-02-05(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Salazar v. Sacco & Fillas, LLP · filed 2014-02-13(a)(7)

When assessing a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, “the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Minovici v Belkin BV, 109 AD3d 520, 521 [2013]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Treeline 990 Stewart Partners, LLC v RAIT Atria, LLC, 107 AD3d 788, 791 [2013]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a petition survives a motion to dismiss when, liberally construed and given every favorable inference, it adequately alleges a cause of action.

In re Mc. · filed 2014-02-13(a)(7)

The Family Court properly denied the father’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the petition for failure to state a cause of action. Liberally construing the petition, and giving it the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the petition adequately alleged that the father had abandoned the subject child (see Family Ct Act § 165 [a]; Social Services Law § 384-b [5] [a]; Matter of Clark v Ormiston, 101 AD3d 870 [2012]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the pleading every possible favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Shau Chung Hu ex rel. Lowbet Realty Corp. v. Lowbet Realty Corp. · filed 2014-02-18(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failing to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction (CPLR 3026), and the court should accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, accord the pleading the benefit of every possible inference, and only determine whether the facts, as alleged, fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Hurrell-Harring v State of New York, 15 NY3d 8, 20 [2010]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept its alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every possible inference, and decide whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Greenfield v. Long Beach Imaging Holdings, LLC · filed 2014-02-26(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Martino v. HV News, LLC · filed 2014-02-26(a)(7)

In deciding a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a legal malpractice complaint is insufficient if it does not allege that the plaintiff would have succeeded but for the attorney’s negligence, even when its allegations are accepted as true and liberally construed.

Hyman v. Schwartz · filed 2014-02-27(a)(7)

Here, although the complaint is replete with allegations of Schwartz’s alleged failures to use reasonable and ordinary skill in connection with both of plaintiffs underlying claims, it contains no allegation that, but for these alleged failures, plaintiff would have been successful on either claim.... Therefore, even if we accept the allegations as true and liberally construe the complaint to allege negligent representation by Schwartz (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Moulton v State of New York, 114 AD3d 115, 119 [2013]; Scheffield v Vestal Parkway Plaza, LLC, 102 AD3d 992, 993 [2013]), the allegations are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of legal malpractice (see Kreamer v Town of Oxford, 96 AD3d at 1128; MacDonald v Guttman, 72 AD3d at 1455).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Paino v. Kaieyes Realty, LLC · filed 2014-03-05(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 635 [1976]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), generic allegations of wrongdoing by unnamed defendants do not state a retaliation claim against a particular defendant.

Abe v. Cohen · filed 2014-03-11(a)(7)

The bulk of plaintiffs 127-paragraph complaint consists of generic allegations of wrongdoing by unnamed “defendants,” presumably including Cohen. These generic allegations fail to state a cause of action of retaliation by Cohen (see Askin v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 110 AD3d 621, 622 [1st Dept 2013]; Ortiz v City of New York, 105 AD3d 674, 674 [1st Dept 2013]).

On a motion under § 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference when deciding whether a claim is sufficiently pleaded.

Chapman, Spira & Carson, LLC v. Helix BioPharma Corp. · filed 2014-03-18(a)(7)

When we accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint, and afford plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, as we must on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]), the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state the formation of a contract, and its breach.

An ambiguous contract cannot be construed as a matter of law to dismiss a complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Agor v. Board of Education · filed 2014-03-06(a)(7)

“If the court concludes that a contract is ambiguous, it cannot be construed as a matter of law, and dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is not appropriate” (Telerep, LLC v U.S. Intl. Media, LLC, 74 AD3d 401, 402 [2010] [citation omitted]; see Vectron Intl., Inc. v Corning Oak Holding, Inc., 106 AD3d at 1165).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint survives a pre-answer motion to dismiss when its alleged facts, if proven, could establish a claim.

Ferraro v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2014-03-13(a)(7)

Upon defendants’ pre-answer, pre-discovery motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) and (7), it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the facts alleged by plaintiff, if proven, would not constitute discrimination, retaliation and a hostile work environment in violation of the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws.

A complaint alleging that the plaintiff complied with a real-property option agreement, exercised the option on time, and was refused conveyance sufficiently states a claim to withstand dismissal.

Tomhannock, LLC v. Roustabout Resources, LLC · filed 2014-03-13(a)(7)

Such allegations, in our view, are sufficient to withstand Roustabout’s motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts factual allegations as true, reads the complaint favorably to the plaintiff, and gives the plaintiff all reasonable inferences.

Alliance Network, LLC v. Sidley Austin LLP · filed 2014-03-20(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, all factual allegations must be accepted as truthful, the complaint must be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and the plaintiff must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a plaintiff need not provide evidentiary facts supporting allegations of malice.

Colantonio v. Mercy Medical Center · filed 2014-03-26(a)(7)

At this juncture, the allegations of malice that were set forth in the complaint and in the plaintiffs affidavit preclude dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). Notably, a plaintiff has “no obligation to show evidentiary facts to support [his or her] allegations of malice on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7)” (Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d at 1182 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Demas v Levitsky, 291 AD2d 653, 661-662 [2002]).

CPLR 3211(a)(3) and (7) do not warrant dismissal when the petitioner has standing and the petition’s allegations sufficiently state a cause of action.

Miller v. Marano · filed 2014-04-02(a)(3), (a)(7)

Contrary to the respondents’ contentions, the petitioner has standing to prosecute this proceeding, and the allegations in the ...petition are sufficient to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [3], [7]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Snyder v. Brown Chiari, LLP · filed 2014-04-03(a)(7)

In the procedural context of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, “the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference” (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires liberal interpretation of pleadings, but bare legal conclusions and factual claims contradicted by documentary evidence or inherently incredible do not survive a motion to dismiss.

Wiggins & Kopko, LLP v. Masson · filed 2014-04-03(a)(7)

While plaintiffs’ pleadings are liberally interpreted in the context of a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, such liberal standard “will not save allegations that consist of bare legal conclusions or factual claims that are flatly contradicted ... by documentary evidence or are inherently incredible” (DerOhannesian v City of Albany, 110 AD3d 1288, 1289 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 862 [2014]; Mesiti v Mongiello, 84 AD3d 1547, 1549 [2011]; Fernicola v New York State Ins. Fund, 293 AD2d 844, 844 [2002]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a legal malpractice complaint must plead specific facts showing that the attorney’s alleged negligence caused a less favorable outcome or damages.

Benishai v. Epstein · filed 2014-04-09(a)(7)

Here, viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 87-88), it failed to plead specific factual allegations demonstrating that, but for the defendant’s alleged negligence, there would have been a more favorable outcome in the underlying action or that the plaintiff would not have incurred any damages (id.; Tortura v Sullivan Papain Block McGrath & Cannavo, P.C., 21 AD3d at 1083).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

El Jamal v. Weil · filed 2014-04-09(a)(7)

In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, a court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the factual allegations fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 66 AD3d 122, 125 [2009], affd 16 NY3d 775 [2011]; Salvatore v Kumar, 45 AD3d 560, 562-563 [2007]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Simpson v. 1147 Dean, LLC · filed 2014-04-16(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the complaint to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]). Applying this standard, the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property (see Jannetti v Whelan, 97 AD3d 797 [2012]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a contract claim that fails to allege a breach of any particular contractual provision.

Feld v. Apple Bank for Savings · filed 2014-04-17(a)(7)

The contract cause of action was properly dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) because “plaintiff failed to allege the breach of any particular contractual provision” set forth in the brochure (see Kraus v Visa Intl. Serv. Assn., 304 AD2d 408, 408 [1st Dept 2003]; see also McNeary v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 286 AD2d 522, 524 [3d Dept 2001]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court treats the complaint’s allegations as true, construes them liberally, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Rafferty Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Kalvaitis · filed 2014-04-17(a)(7)

Deeming these allegations to be true, construing them liberally, and granting plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, as we must (see Delaware County v Leatherstocking Healthcare, LLC, 110 AD3d 1211, 1213 [2013]), we find that the amended complaint adequately states a cause of action for the imposition of a constructive trust (see Vopelak v Tedeschi, 281 AD2d 809, 810 [2001]; Henness v Hunt, 272 AD2d at 756-757; Maynor v Pellegrino, 226 AD2d 883, 884-885 [1996]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), allegations that amount to legal conclusions are insufficient to state a cause of action.

Goldberg v. Rosenberg · filed 2014-04-23(a)(7)

Applying these principles here, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of Rosenberg’s motion which were to dismiss those causes of action which sought to invalidate the decedent’s pour-over trust based upon undue influence, fraud, and lack of capacity, on the ground that the plaintiffs allegations constituted legal conclusions (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Paolino v Paolino, 51 AD3d 886, 888 [2008]; cf. Matter of Tognino, 87 AD3d 1153 [2011]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its factual allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, but does not presume bare legal conclusions to be true.

Goldberg v. Rosenberg · filed 2014-04-23(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Asgahar v Tringali Realty, Inc., 18 AD3d 408 [2005]). “However, bare legal conclusions are not presumed to be true, nor are they accorded every favorable inference” (Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 704 [2008]; see Morris v Morris, 306 AD2d 449, 451 [2003]; Doria v Masucci, 230 AD2d 764, 765 [1996]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Nerey v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. · filed 2014-04-30(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Minovici v Belkin BV, 109 AD3d 520, 521 [2013]; Rabos v R&R Bagels & Bakery, Inc., 100 AD3d 849, 851 [2012]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the nonmoving party every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Soodoo v. LC, LLC · filed 2014-04-30(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the nonmoving party the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint receives favorable inferences, and a breach of contract claim may proceed when those inferences leave factual issues about performance.

DB Mansfield LLC v. BNY Capital Funding LLC · filed 2014-04-29(a)(7)

However, the cause of action against BNY Capital Funding for breach of the purchase agreement should not have been dismissed. According the complaint the benefit of the inferences, there are issues of fact as to whether BNY acted in a commercially reasonable manner and in good faith with respect to its duties to help plaintiff maximize the value of its interest and to refrain from conduct that could have an adverse impact on such interest.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Borawski v. Abulafia · filed 2014-05-07(a)(7)

Since that issue was argued before the Supreme Court and has been briefed by the parties before us, we address it, and conclude that the cause of action to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress should have been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Greenberg v. Blake · filed 2014-05-07(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its factual allegations as true, and gives the pleading party every possible favorable inference.

Michaan v. Gazebo Horticultural, Inc. · filed 2014-05-07(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading must be liberally construed, the factual allegations must be deemed true, and the pleading party must be accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference ... Panish v Panish, 24 AD3d 642, 643 [2005]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Santana v. Leith · filed 2014-05-07(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Sacher v Beacon Assoc. Mgt. Corp., 114 AD3d 655 [2014]; Young v Brown, 113 AD3d 761 [2014]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Carrion v. 162 Pulaski, LLC · filed 2014-05-14(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”

A motion to dismiss must be denied when the complaint’s factual allegations, taken together, state any cognizable cause of action, even if the plaintiff identified a different theory.

SPRE Realty, Ltd. v. Dienst · filed 2014-05-20(a)(7)

Finally, inasmuch as the allegations in the complaint state a cause of action not for unjust enrichment but for quantum meruit (see Edward S. Gordon Co. v Peninsula N.Y. Partnership, 245 AD2d 189, 190 [1st Dept 1997]), we note that a motion to dismiss “must be denied if from the pleadings’ four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law” (511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 152 [2002] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) do not warrant dismissal when documentary evidence fails to utterly refute the allegations and the counterclaims state valid causes of action.

Island Tennis, LP v. Varilease Finance, Inc. · filed 2014-05-21(a)(1), (a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly denied the motion of Island Tennis and the guarantors (hereinafter collectively the appellants) pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) to dismiss the counterclaims. The documentary evidence submitted by the appellants did not utterly refute Varilease’s factual allegations, thereby conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law (see CPLR 3211 [a] [1]; Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arbitrage Partners, L.P. v Superior Well Servs., Inc., 20 NY3d 59, 63 [2012]). The counterclaims also stated valid causes of action, and the evidence submitted by the appellants failed to establish that a material fact as claimed by Varilease was not a fact at all and that no significant dispute exists regarding it (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181-1182 [2010]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Karimov v. Brown Harris Stevens Residential Management, LLC · filed 2014-05-21(a)(7)

Applying these principles here, the Supreme Court erred in granting the motion of the defendants Brown Harris Stevens Residential Management, LLC, and Fifth Seventy Seven, Inc. (hereinafter together the respondents), pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, draws every favorable inference for the plaintiff, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Karimov v. Brown Harris Stevens Residential Management, LLC · filed 2014-05-21(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Sposato v Paboojian, 110 AD3d 979 [2013]; Constructamax, Inc. v Dodge Chamberlin Luzine Weber, Assoc. Architects, LLP, 109 AD3d 574 [2013]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Lizjan, Inc. v. Sahn Ward Coschignano & Baker, PLLC · filed 2014-05-21(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Rabos v R&R Bagels & Bakery, Inc., 100 AD3d 849, 851 [2012]; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court views the complaint’s allegations in the plaintiff’s favor and may draw reasonable inferences from them.

Ozkurt v. Hyatt Realty, LLC · filed 2014-05-21(a)(7)

Viewing the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it can be inferred that the plaintiff was simply managing or supervising the work performed at the subject building, and did not at any time hold himself out as operating a home improvement business (see Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]; Dickson v Bonistall, 19 AD3d 640 [2005]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and grants dismissal only if the alleged facts fit no cognizable legal theory.

Nagan Construction, Inc. v. Monsignor McClancy Memorial High School · filed 2014-05-28(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the allegations in the complaint should be accepted as true, and the motion should be granted only if the facts as alleged do not fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Rietschel v Maimonides Med. Ctr., 83 AD3d 810 [2011]; Peterec-Tolino v Harap, 68 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2009]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires denial of a motion to dismiss when the complaint states cognizable causes of action.

Zellner v. Odyl, LLC · filed 2014-05-28(a)(7)

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) to dismiss the complaint. The factual allegations set forth in the complaint state cognizable causes of action to recover damages for breach of contact, as well as violations of, inter alia, Labor Law §§ 191 and 215.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, a complaint alleging bad faith must contain specific supporting facts rather than bald conclusions, even though pleadings receive a generous reading.

IDT Corp. v. Tyco Group, S.A.R.L. · filed 2014-06-05

But it is not too much to ask that a pleading filed after more than a decade of back and forth between the parties contain some specific facts supporting the claim of bad faith — not just the bald conclusions, contradicted by the only relevant document referred to, that Tyco insisted “on terms that conflicted with the Settlement Agreement” and “made a definite and final communication” of its intent to violate its obligations.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Gilewicz v. Buffalo General Psychiatric Unit · filed 2014-06-13(a)(7)

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, “plaintiffs complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, . . . the facts alleged therein are accepted as true, and . . . plaintiff is to be afforded every possible favorable inference in order to determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint ‘fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Palladino v CNY Centro, Inc., 70 AD3d 1450, 1451 [2010], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Suffolk County Water Authority v. Dow Chemical Co. · filed 2014-06-16(a)(7)

When faced with a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court is required to afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept each and every fact as asserted in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.

When a court considers evidence on a motion to dismiss without converting it to summary judgment, it asks whether the plaintiff has a cause of action; dismissal requires the absence of a significant factual dispute.

Agai v. Liberty Mutual Agency Corp. · filed 2014-06-18(a)(7)

Where evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), and the motion is not converted into one for summary judgment, the question becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, dismissal should not eventuate (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 274-275 [1977]; Fishberger v Voss, 51 AD3d 627, 628 [2008]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Canzona v. Atanasio · filed 2014-06-18(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court treats the pleading’s allegations as true and gives them every favorable inference.

Schlemme v. Planning Board · filed 2014-06-18(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and 7804 (f), all of the allegations in the pleading are deemed true and afforded the benefit of every favorable inference” (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Mastromarino, 98 AD3d 662, 662-663 [2012]; see Hogan v New York State Off. of Mental Health, 115 AD2d 638, 639 [1985]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court considers the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Uddin v. New York University · filed 2014-05-30

Considering the endorsed complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as is required on review of a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, we find that it asserts actions and omissions by defendant that support a viable breach of contract claim.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(5) motion to dismiss, the court should credit the allegations in the complaint.

Herman v. Herman · filed 2014-06-05(a)(5)

Plaintiffs are correct that the court should have credited the allegations in the complaint on this motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) (see e.g. Benn v Benn, 82 AD3d 548 [1st Dept 2011]; New York Tel. Co. v Mobil Oil Corp., 99 AD2d 185, 192 [1st Dept 1984]; see also Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 635 [1976]).

A complaint that sufficiently states its causes of action withstands a motion to dismiss under Section 3211(a)(7).

Molinoff v. Tanenbaum · filed 2014-06-11(a)(7)

The court also correctly concluded that the complaint sufficiently stated causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract, in quantum meruit, and on an account stated so as to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ... [1976]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of claims based on the same facts as a breach of contract claim when they fail to allege distinct, cognizable causes of action.

Edem v. Grandbelle International, Inc. · filed 2014-06-18(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the ...defendant’s motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the second through tenth causes of action, which alleged business fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, unjust enrichment, deceptive business practices, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, respectively. Those causes of action were all based on the same facts as the cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract, and failed to allege distinct, cognizable causes of action (see Betz v Blatt, 116 AD3d 813, 813 [2014]; Palmieri v Biggiani, 108 AD3d 604, 609 [2013]; Woss, LLC v 218 Eckford, LLC, 102 AD3d 860, 862 [2013]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint that adequately alleges the elements of a joint venture survives a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

Clarke v. Sky Express, Inc. · filed 2014-06-25(a)(7)

Accordingly, that branch of Ivy’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it was correctly denied.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Mariano v. Fiorvante · filed 2014-06-25(a)(7)

In assessing a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the facts as alleged in the complaint and the opposition papers must be accepted as true; the court must accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v East 149th Realty Corp., 20 NY3d 37, 43 n 4 [2012]; Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

A negligence complaint survives a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion when its allegations support a duty of reasonable care and a breach of that duty.

Chanice v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2014-06-26(a)(7)

The complaint is viable insofar as it alleges that the FedEx courier was negligent in pressing the button to close the door while facing away from the doorway without allowing himself to verify that no one was entering the elevator.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is construed liberally, its factual allegations are deemed true, and the nonmoving party receives the benefit of all favorable inferences.

Carillo v. Stony Brook University · filed 2014-07-02(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be ... construed liberally, the factual allegations deemed to be true, and the nonmoving party must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Hense v Baxter, 79 AD3d 814 [2010]; Castaldi v 39 Winfield Assoc., 30 AD3d 458 [2006]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court asks whether the complaint’s factual allegations, taken together, state any legally cognizable cause of action.

Davis v. South Nassau Communities Hospital · filed 2014-07-02(a)(7)

“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the sole criterion is whether from the complaint’s ‘four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law’ ” (Nasca v Sgro, 101 AD3d 963, 964 [2012], quoting Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the pleader every favorable inference when deciding whether it states a cognizable claim.

Matter of Marini · filed 2014-07-02(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Grant v. LaTrace · filed 2014-07-09(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CFLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts alleged in the complaint are accepted as true, the plaintiff ... is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and the court’s function is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Goldfarb v Schwartz, 26 AD3d 462 [2006]). Applying these principles here, we agree that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice against the Lamonsoff defendants.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, give the petitioner every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Matter of Saginario · filed 2014-07-09(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the petitioner the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Matter of White Plains Plaza Realty, LLC v Cappelli Enters., Inc. 108 AD3d 634, 636 [2013]; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the nonmovant every possible favorable inference.

Kramer v. Skyhorse Publishing, Inc. · filed 2014-07-14(a)(7)

Pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a party may move for an order dismissing a cause of action against it on the ground that the pleading fails to state a cause of action. In deciding the motion, the court must liberally construe the pleading, accept all of the alleged facts as true, and accord the non-movant every possible favorable inference, ascertaining only whether the allegations fall within any cognizable legal theory.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the complaint liberally, presumes its alleged facts true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Estate of Radvin v. City of New York · filed 2014-07-16(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026). The facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Thomas v LaSalle Bank N.A., 79 AD3d 1015, 1017 [2010]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to consider whether the complaint’s factual allegations, taken together, state a legally cognizable cause of action.

Aqua NY of Sea Cliff v. Buckeye Pipeline Co., L.P. · filed 2014-07-23(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the sole criterion is whether from the complaint’s “four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; see Country Pointe at Dix Hills Home Owners Assn., Inc. v Beechwood Org., 80 AD3d 643, 649 [2011]; Fishberger v Voss, 51 AD3d 627 [2008]).

Section 3211(a)(7) does not require dismissal of fiduciary duty and related claims as duplicative of a contract claim when the contract’s validity and enforceability are disputed.

Worldcare International, Inc. v. Kay · filed 2014-07-02(a)(7)

The Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the motion of the Superior defendants and the separate motion of the Kay defendants (hereinafter collectively the moving defendants) which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the fifth, sixth, seventh, and thirteenth causes of action insofar as asserted against them. Contrary to the contentions of the moving defendants, these causes of action, which alleged breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, diversion of corporate opportunity, and violation of the faithless servant doctrine, were improperly dismissed as duplicative of the cause of action alleging breach of contract. The cause of action alleging breach of contract was predicated on the failure of the former employees to comply with the provisions of an employee manual. Since there is a bona fide dispute as to the validity and enforceability of the employment manual as a contract, the plaintiffs are not required to elect their remedies (see Plumitallo v Hudson Atl. Land Co., LLC, 74 AD3d 1038, 1039 [2010]; Elbroji v 22 E. 54th St. Rest. Corp., 67 AD3d 957, 958 [2009]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a fraud complaint that identifies no particular material misrepresentation made to the plaintiffs.

Elie v. Marathon REO Management, LLC · filed 2014-07-30(a)(7)

Nonetheless, to the extent that the complaint seeks to recover damages for fraud, the complaint fails to state a cause of action, since it does not specify any particular misrepresentation of material fact made to the plaintiffs (see CPLR 3016 [b]; 3211 [a] [7]; Small v Lorillard Tobacco Co., 94 NY2d 43, 57 [1999]; Greenberg v Blake, 117 AD3d 683 [2014]).

Section 3211 (a) (7) requires courts deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action to construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the opposing party every favorable inference.

Siony v. Siunykalimi · filed 2014-07-30(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint or counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the opposing party the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Mazzei v Kyriacou, 98 AD3d 1088, 1089 [2012]; Cerciello v Admiral Ins. Brokerage Corp., 90 AD3d 967, 967 [2011]; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory rather than requiring evidence to support them.

D'AMICO, APRIL v. CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL CARE, INC. · filed 2014-08-08(a)(7)

We conclude that the court erred in dismissing the cause of action for abuse of process on the ground that there was Ano evidence@ to support the first element, i.e., that there was no evidence that the CMC defendants caused criminal process to issue against plaintiff. It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss a court must Aaccept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory@ (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court treats the pleading’s factual allegations as true and gives the petitioner every favorable inference.

Matter of Better World Real Estate Group v. New York City Dept. of Fin. · filed 2014-08-13(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the factual allegations in the pleading must be deemed true, and the petitioner must be afforded the benefit of every favorable inference ( see Matter of Oddone v Suffolk County Police Dept. , 96 AD3d 758, 760; Matter of Kar-McVeigh LLC v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Riverhead , 93 AD3d 799, 780). Applying that standard here, we must assume that the property was indeed improved with a two-family house still in the process of construction during the 2008/2009 tax year, as the petitioner alleges, and was mistakenly classified as a three-family house with a nonresidential unit.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Black v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2014-08-27(a)(7)

“In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should ‘accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ”

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe the complaint liberally, presume its allegations true, give the plaintiff favorable inferences, and ask whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Lebovits v. Bassman · filed 2014-09-10(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss, the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” ... Applying this standard here, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against the defendant Sovereign Bank (hereinafter Sovereign) to set aside a recorded mortgage on the ground of fraud and to recover damages for fraud and unjust enrichment.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the pleader every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Friedland Realty, Inc. v. 416 W, LLC · filed 2014-09-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Siracusa v Sager, 105 AD3d 937, 938 [2013]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court liberally construes the complaint and accepts its allegations as true when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

County of Nassau v. Expedia, Inc. · filed 2014-09-10(a)(7)

Affording the complaint a liberal construction (see AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co., 5 NY3d 582, 591 [2005]; Moore v Liberty Power Corp., LLC, 72 AD3d 660 [2010]), and accepting the allegations in the complaint as true (see Schwartz v Schwartz, 55 AD3d 897 [2008]), the plaintiff stated causes of action to recover damages for conversion and unjust enrichment (see City of Goodlettsville, Tenn. v Priceline.com, Inc., 605 F Supp 2d at 998-999; City of Findlay v Hotels.Com, L.P., 441 F Supp 2d 855, 864-865 [ND Ohio 2006]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), disputed factual issues about an attorney’s standard of care and whether a breach caused damages cannot be resolved.

Urias v. Daniel P. Buttafuoco & Associates, PLLC · filed 2014-09-17(a)(7)

Newman’s contention, in effect, that his failure to object to the attorney’s fee awarded to the Buttafuoco Firm was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs damages, and that he did not depart from the accepted standard of care, concern disputed factual issues that are not properly resolved on a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and dismisses only if the alleged facts fit no cognizable legal theory.

Peterson v. City of New York · filed 2014-09-17(a)(7)

“In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the allegations in the complaint should be accepted as true, and the motion should be granted only if the facts as alleged do not fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Nagan Constr., Inc. v Monsignor McClancy Mem. High Sch., 117 AD3d 1005, 1006 [2014]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Leiner v. Hauser · filed 2014-09-17(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action even when the pleading’s allegations are accepted as true.

NIAGARA PRESERVATION COALITION, INC v. NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY · filed 2014-10-03(a)(7)

Even accepting the allegations in the third cause of action as true (see generally Guggenheimer, 43 NY2d at 275), i.e., that the alterations to improve accessibility to the lower gorge and the construction of the winter storage facility for excursion boats constituted non-park purposes, we nevertheless conclude that petitioner failed to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; cf. Capruso, 23 NY3d at 638; Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, 95 NY2d at 630).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a court need not accept a bare legal conclusion as true.

Alva v. Gaines, Gruner, Ponzini & Novick, LLP · filed 2014-10-08(a)(7)

However, this assertion is a bare legal conclusion, which we do not deem to be true on the instant motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (see Aqua NY of Sea Cliff v Buckeye Pipeline Co., L.P., 119 AD3d 829 [2014]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and considers whether they state a legally sufficient claim.

Davis v. Boeheim · filed 2014-10-21(a)(7)

This appeal comes to us on a pre-answer motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a procedural posture which requires that "we accept as true each and every allegation made by plaintiff and limit our inquiry to the legal sufficiency of plaintiff's claim" (Silsdorf v Levine, 59 NY2d 8, 12 [1983]; see also Armstrong v Simon & Schuster, Inc., 85 NY2d 373, 379 [1995]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court deciding a motion to dismiss to accept the alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Indymac Venture, LLC v. Nagessar · filed 2014-10-22(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court must “accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (id. at 63 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleadings liberally and gives the plaintiff every reasonably favorable inference.

PlacevCiccotelli · filed 2014-10-23(a)(7)

Thus, when we construe the pleadings liberally and give plaintiff the benefit of every reasonably favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), we conclude that the allegations contained in the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution (see Kirchner v County of Niagara, 107 AD3d at 1622).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

HevRealtyUSA · filed 2014-10-23(a)(7)

To be sure, "on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Tomhannock, LLC v Roustabout Resources, LLC, 115 AD3d 1074, 1075-1076 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the claim and accepts as true the facts alleged and the plaintiff’s submissions in opposition.

New York State United Teachers v. State · filed 2014-09-23(a)(7)

On a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a plaintiffs claim is liberally construed and all facts asserted therein, as well as its submissions in opposition to defendant’s motion, are accepted as true.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, courts construe the complaint liberally, presume its allegations true, draw favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and ask whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Thompson Bros. Pile Corp. v. Rosenblum · filed 2014-10-01(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss [pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7)], the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”

On a motion to dismiss under Section 3211(a)(7), bare legal conclusions are not presumed true.

Barker v. Amorini · filed 2014-10-15(a)(7)

However, on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “bare legal conclusions are not presumed to be true” (Khan v MMCA Lease, Ltd., 100 AD3d 833, 833 [2012]; see Goel v Ramachandran, 111 AD3d 783, 791-792 [2013]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

J. Kokolakis Contracting Corp. v. Evolution Piping Corp. · filed 2014-10-21(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Rabos v R&R Bagels & Bakery, Inc., 100 AD3d 849, 851 [2d Dept 2012]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts accept the complaint’s allegations as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Tooma v. Grossbarth · filed 2014-10-29(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and the court’s function is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 87-88; Grant v LaTrace, 119 AD3d 646 [2014]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, but may dismiss a claim that does not plead reasonably inferable damages.

Mizuno v. Nunberg · filed 2014-11-05(a)(7)

Accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference ... he failed to “ ‘plead allegations from which damages attributable to the [defendants’ conduct] might be reasonably inferred’ ” ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly directed the dismissal of the complaint in the instant action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleadings receive a liberal construction and alleged facts are accepted as true.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Hall · filed 2014-11-05(a)(7)

Although there was no contract between Drummond and New York Land, affording the pleadings a liberal construction and accepting all facts alleged as true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]), the third-party complaint supports Drummond’s contention that the relationship between these two parties was so close as to approach privity (see Ossining Union Free School Dist. v Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 73 NY2d 417, 424 [1989]; Credit Alliance Corp. v Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 NY2d 536, 551 [1985]; Reliance Ins. Co. v Morris Assoc., 200 AD2d 728, 729 [1994]; Kidd v Havens, 171 AD2d 336, 339 [1991]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its factual allegations as true, and gives the nonmoving party all favorable inferences.

Hampshire Props. v. BTA Bldg. & Developing, Inc. · filed 2014-11-05(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be construed liberally, the factual allegations deemed to be true, and the nonmoving party must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences” (Carillo v Stony Brook Univ., 119 AD3d 508, 508-509 [2014]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, courts accept the complaint’s facts as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

DiMauro v. United, LLC · filed 2014-11-05(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Neckles Bldrs., Inc. v Turner, 117 AD3d 923, 924 [2014]; Schiller v Bender, Burrows & Rosenthal, LLP, 116 AD3d 756, 757 [2014]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the objectants favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts support a cognizable cause of action.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A., MTR. OF · filed 2014-11-14(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “we . . . must accept the facts as alleged in the [objections] as true, accord [objectants] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory . . . [T]he criterion is whether [objectants have] a cause of action, not whether [they have] stated one” (Genesee/Wyoming YMCA v Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc., 98 AD3d 1242, 1244 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; see also Matter of Budd, 267 App Div 966, 966).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), pleaded facts are presumed true and given every favorable inference, and the complaint survives if its allegations state any legally cognizable cause of action.

HECKL, RACHEL v. WALSH, DANIEL M. · filed 2014-11-14(a)(7)

It is well settled that, “ ‘[i]n considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded must be presumed to be true and accorded every favorable inference, and the sole criterion is whether from [the complaint’s] four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law’ ” (Stormes v United Water N.Y., Inc., 84 AD3d 1352, 1353).

On a motion under section 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the objectants favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts support a cause of action.

In re the Judicial Settlement of the Final Account of JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. · filed 2014-11-14(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “we . . . must accept the facts as alleged in the [objections] as true, accord [object-ants] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory . . . [T]he criterion is whether [objectants have] a cause of action, not whether [they have] stated one”

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must construe the petition liberally and determine whether its alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

In re Lorie Dehimer Irrevocable Trust · filed 2014-11-21(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the Surrogate must afford the petition a liberal construction and “determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the petition and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

DEHIMER, LORIE M., MTR. OF · filed 2014-11-21(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the Surrogate must afford the petition a liberal construction and “determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court treats the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and may consider the plaintiff’s affidavits to remedy pleading defects.

Lauder v. Goldhamer · filed 2014-11-26(a)(7)

In determining a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint, the facts alleged in the complaint must be deemed to be true, and the plaintiff must be accorded the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Further, a court may consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint (see Freeman v City of New York, 111 AD3d 780, 781 [2013]; Pasquaretto v Long Is. Univ., 106 AD3d 794, 795 [2013]).

A petition survives a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion when its factual allegations, accepted as true with favorable inferences, state a cognizable cause of action.

State v. Baker · filed 2014-12-01(a)(7)

The court concludes that, accepting as true the factual averments of the petition and granting petitioner every favorable inference which may be drawn from the pleading, the petitioner has pleaded a cause of action cognizable at law.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and may consider evidentiary material submitted by the parties.

Zapata v. Tufenkjian · filed 2014-12-10(a)(7)

Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, affording the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and considering the evidentiary material submitted by the parties (see ...), dismissal of the complaint was proper.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its allegations as true, gives the pleader every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ponce v. Liu · filed 2014-12-10(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, accord the pleader the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Lizjan, Inc. v Sahn Ward Coschignano & Baker, PLLC, 117 AD3d 914, 915 [2014]).

Section 3211(a)(7) does not permit dismissal for failure to state a cause of action when the complaint sufficiently alleges the elements of the claim.

Rose v. Different Twist Pretzel, Inc. · filed 2014-12-17(a)(7)

Here, the amended complaint sufficiently alleged the elements of tortious interference with contract against the Whitehall defendants. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should not have granted that branch of the Whitehall defendants’ cross motion which was to dismiss the cause of action alleging tortious interference with contract for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (see Chung v Wang, 79 AD3d 693, 694 [2010]; Micro Tech. Intl., Inc. v Artech Info. Sys., LLC, 62 AD3d 764, 764 [2009]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading.

Chiapperini v. Gander Mountain Co. · filed 2014-12-23(a)(7)

In determining a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, the subject pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Webb v. Greater New York Automobile Dealers Ass'n · filed 2014-12-31(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Paolicelli v Fieldbridge Assoc., LLC, 120 AD3d 643, 644 [2014]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint and asks whether its alleged facts state any cognizable cause of action.

Herman v. Kveton-Cattani · filed 2014-12-31(a)(7)

“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the sole criterion is whether from the complaint’s ‘four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law’ ”

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court gives the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether the complaint states a cause of action.

BEVILLE, DOLORES A. v. OLEAN GENERAL HOSPITAL · filed 2015-01-02(a)(7)

Supreme Court properly denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Affording plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88), we conclude that “the complaint state[s] causes of action for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress” (Brijlall v R.G. Ortiz Funeral Home, Inc., 13 AD3d 322, 323).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its allegations as true, draws favorable inferences, and may consider the petitioner's affidavits to remedy defects.

In re the Estates of Thomas · filed 2015-01-02(a)(7)

We agree with petitioners that the petition sufficiently states a cause of action for a constructive trust with respect to the NGR property, the Manitou Road property and NYSFC stock. “On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction . . . We accept the facts as alleged in the [petition] as true, accord [the petitioners] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ... In assessing a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), . . . a court may freely consider affidavits submitted by the [petitioner] to remedy any defects in the [petition] . . . and ‘the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one’ ” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Lawrence v Graubard Miller, 11 NY3d 588, 595 [2008]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint receives a liberal construction and every favorable inference when the court decides whether its allegations support a claim.

Beville v. Olean General Hospital · filed 2015-01-02(a)(7)

Supreme Court properly denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). ... Nevertheless, we agree with defendants that, even affording the complaint a liberal construction and accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, those allegations do not support a claim for punitive damages (see Fragrancenet.com, Inc. v Fragrancex.com, Inc., 68 AD3d 1051, 1052 [2009]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference to determine whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Sialeu v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2015-01-14(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must determine “only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), by liberally construing the pleading, deeming the facts as alleged to be true, and granting the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see id.; First Keystone Consultants, Inc. v DDR Constr. Servs., 74 AD3d 1135, 1136 [2010]; Katz v Katz, 55 AD3d 680, 682 [2008]; Fast Track Funding Corp. v Perrone, 19 AD3d 362, 362-363 [2005]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court construes the pleading liberally, accepts alleged facts as true, gives the pleader every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Hunter Group, Inc. · filed 2015-01-21(a)(7)

In assessing the adequacy of a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026), accept the facts alleged to be true, accord the pleader the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v Vigilant Ins. Co., 21 NY3d 324, 334 [2013]; Mandarin Trading Ltd. v Wildenstein, 16 NY3d 173, 178 [2011]; Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, a petition can sufficiently state a constructive trust claim when its allegations support that relief.

THOMAS, JOSEPH M., MTR. OF · filed 2015-01-02(a)(7)

We agree with petitioners that the petition sufficiently states a cause of action for a constructive trust with respect to the NGR property, the Manitou Road property and NYSFC stock.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), conclusory and unsubstantiated allegations in a family offense petition are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.

Ellen Z. v. Isaac D. · filed 2015-01-14(a)(7)

Such conclusory and unsubstantiated assertions in a family offense petition are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss the petition (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Matter of Davis v Venditto, 45 AD3d 837, 838 [2007]; Matter of Price v Jenkins, 92 AD3d 787 [2012]; Matter of Dowgiallo v Williams, 99 AD3d 708, 709 [2012]; Matter of Ozdemir v Riley, 101 AD3d 884, 885 [2012]; Matter of Marino v Marino, 110 AD3d 887, 888 [2013]; Matter of Bustamante v Largue, 112 AD3d 819, 820 [2013]).

A complaint may be dismissed under section 3211(a)(7) when, even read liberally with its alleged facts accepted as true, it fails to state a cause of action.

Maroutian v. Fuchs · filed 2015-01-26(a)(7)

The complaint fails to identify any work published by defendant Games and Economic Behavior which allegedly derived from plaintiffs work. Accordingly, even read liberally and accepting the facts alleged as true, the complaint fails to state a cause of action (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Hope Assoc. of Syosset, LLC v. STP Associates, LLC · filed 2015-01-28(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; DiMauro v United, LLC, 122 AD3d 568 [2014]).

On a motion to dismiss a family offense petition under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the petition, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the petitioner every favorable inference.

Matter of Xin Li v. Ramos · filed 2015-02-04(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss a family offense petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the petition must be liberally construed, the facts alleged in the petition must be accepted as true, and the petitioner must be granted the benefit of every favorable inference” (Matter of Arnold v Arnold, 119 AD3d 938, 939 [2014]; see Matter of Smith v Howard, 113 AD3d 781 [2014]; Matter of Clark v Ormiston, 101 AD3d 870, 871 [2012]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Morris v. Chase Bank · filed 2015-02-11(a)(7)

In considering a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Nerey v Greenpoint Mtge. Funding, Inc., 116AD3d 1015 [2014]; Goldberg v Rosenberg, 116 AD3d 919 [2014]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Hock v. Cohen · filed 2015-02-11(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026) and “ ‘accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Section 3211(a) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a viable cause of action against the moving defendant.

Kanterakis v. Kanterakis · filed 2015-02-18(a)

However, the Supreme Court properly granted Duffy’s motion based on the plaintiffs failure to state a viable cause of action against him.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the pleader every favorable inference, and asks whether the pleader has a cause of action.

Friedman v. Rice · filed 2015-02-24(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the facts as alleged must be accepted as true, the pleader must be accorded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court must determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable theory (ABN AMRO Bank, N.V. v MBIA Inc., 17 NY3d 208, 227 [2011]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). The criterion on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) is whether the pleader has a cause of action (Leon at 88; Baumann v Hanover Community Bank, 100 AD3d 814, 816 [2d Dept 2012]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must construe the complaint liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Farkas v. Mascolo · filed 2015-02-25(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

A claim survives a motion to dismiss under section 3211(a) when the alleged facts adequately support it.

Jones v. Voskresenskaya · filed 2015-02-24(a)

The facts alleged adequately support the claim and are set forth with sufficient particularity to survive a motion to dismiss (CPLR 3211 [a]; 3016 [b]; Stewart Tit. Ins. Co. v Liberty Tit. Agency, LLC, 83 AD3d 532, 533 [1st Dept 2011]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts liberally construe the complaint, accept its allegations as true, and give plaintiffs every favorable inference.

Turtle Island Trust v. County of Clinton · filed 2015-02-26(a)(7)

In addition to asserting the statutes of limitations as a defense, however, defendants assert that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action. On a motion based on this ground, courts must liberally construe the complaint, accept the allegations as true, provide the plaintiffs with the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether any cognizable legal theory will support the allegations (see He v Realty USA, 121 AD3d 1336, 1339 [2014]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), an affidavit does not warrant dismissal when it neither eliminates significant factual disputes nor completely refutes the complaint’s allegations.

Asmar v. 20th & Seventh Associates, LLC · filed 2015-02-26(a)(7)

GAL’s affidavit was also insufficient to warrant dismissal of the third-party complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), since the facts therein do not demonstrate the absence of any significant dispute nor do they completely refute the allegations against GAL (see Lawrence v Graubard Miller, 11 NY3d 588, 595 [2008]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint fails to state a cause of action.

El-Nahal v. FA Management, Inc. · filed 2015-03-04(a)(7)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when the complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Strunk v. New York State Board of Elections · filed 2015-03-11(a)(7)

Applying the above principles here, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, and properly granted the separate motions of several defendants pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them on that ground.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint states a cause of action if its factual allegations, taken together, support any legally cognizable claim.

Cohen v. Kings Point Tenant Corp. · filed 2015-03-18(a)(7)

“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the sole criterion is whether from the complaint’s ‘four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law’ ”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, and asks whether its facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Rodriguez v. Jacoby & Meyers, LLP · filed 2015-03-19(a)(7)

Turning to the merits, the standard to be applied on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is both familiar and well settled – "we must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts fit within any cognizable legal theory" (He v Realty USA, 121 AD3d 1336, 1339 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Snyder v Brown Chiari, LLP, 116 AD3d 1116, 1117 [2014]).

A complaint that states a cause of action for money had and received survives a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

SWEETMAN, ALICE ELAINE v. SUHR, SONJA G. · filed 2015-03-27(a)(7)

Although plaintiff failed to meet her initial burden of proof on the motion for summary judgment, we nevertheless conclude that the complaint states a cause of action for money had and received and that the court properly denied defendant’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint (see generally Gillon v Traina, 70 AD3d 1443, 1444, lv denied 14 NY3d 711).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the question is whether the pleaded facts state a cause of action, assuming those facts are true and giving the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Thomson v. New World Bible Translation Committee · filed 2015-04-01(a)(7)

When a party moves to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Sinagra v. City of New York · filed 2015-04-01(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court to accept the complaint’s allegations as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and decide whether those allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ackerman v. New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens · filed 2015-04-08(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Non-non v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Paolicelli v Fieldbridge Assoc., LLC, 120 AD3d 643, 644 [2014]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ehrenkranz v. 58 Mhr, LLC · filed 2015-04-15(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v McCabe & Mack, LLP, 105 AD3d 837, 839 [2013]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181 [2010]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

Acocella v. Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2015-04-15(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court is required to accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Porco v. Lifetime Entertainment Services, LLC · filed 2015-04-15(a)(7)

“[T]he standard to be applied on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is both familiar and well settled — ‘[the court] must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Rodriguez v Jacoby & Meyers, LLP, 126 AD3d 1183, 1185 [2015], quoting He v Realty USA, 121 AD3d 1336, 1339 [2014]; see People v Coventry First LLC, 13 NY3d 108, 115 [2009]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Nabatkhorian v. Nabatkhorian · filed 2015-04-22(a)(7)

Here, affording the pleadings a liberal construction, and accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, with the plaintiff accorded the benefit of every favorable inference (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the complaint fails to allege any material misrepresentation upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied to his detriment (see Matthews v Schusheim, 42 AD2d 217, 221 [1973], affd 35 NY2d 686 [1974]).

A CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion should be denied when the complaint adequately states a claim and the motion has not been converted to one for summary judgment.

Cooney v. City of New York Department of Sanitation · filed 2015-04-28(a)(7)

Indeed, DOS itself never requested that its motion be treated as one for summary judgment, and in Supreme Court plaintiff requested discovery in opposition to the motion. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) should have been denied.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint alleging breaches of a written separation agreement survives dismissal when its facts, accepted as true with favorable inferences, sufficiently state a cause of action.

Vogel v. Vogel · filed 2015-05-06(a)(7)

However, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the defendant’s cross motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action. Accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible ... favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 87-88), the complaint sufficiently stated causes of action to recover damages for various breaches of the parties’ written separation agreement (see JP Morgan Chase v J.H. Elec. of N.Y., Inc., 69 AD3d 802, 803 [2010]).

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

J&E Industries of Ossining, Inc. v. Peekskill Housing Authority · filed 2015-05-06(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal for failure to state a cause of action when the complaint alleges no facts supporting an inference of the defendants’ involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.

Koeppel v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. · filed 2015-05-07(a)(7)

The motion court properly dismissed the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action. The amended complaint alleges no facts from which it could be inferred that defendants had any involvement with the alleged scheme of plaintiffs business partners to illegally obtain his ownership interest in the Volkswagen dealership in which they each owned an interest.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, courts accept the alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and ask whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

HARRISON, DAWN v. SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER · filed 2015-05-08(a)(7)

“[W]hen reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, we must accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord plaintiff[] the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Williams v Beemiller, Inc., 100 AD3d 143, 148, amended on rearg 103 AD3d 1191 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Harrison v. Samaritan Medical Center · filed 2015-05-08(a)(7)

“[W]hen reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, we must accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord plaintiff! ] the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Williams v Beemiller, Inc., 100 AD3d 143, 148 [2012], amended on rearg 103 AD3d 1191 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts alleged facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, but may dismiss a complaint that fails to allege facts supporting an essential element of the claim.

Delollis v. Archer · filed 2015-05-13(a)(7)

Here, accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the complaint, on its face, failed to allege facts from which it could be reasonably inferred that the plaintiffs would not have suffered any damages but for the defendants’ negligence (see Sierra Holdings, LLC v Phillips, Weiner, Quinn, Artura & Cox, 112 AD3d 909, 910 [2013]; Citidress II Corp. v Tokayer, 105 AD3d 798, 798-799 [2013]; Wald v Berwitz, 62 AD3d 786 [2009]). ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe the complaint liberally, presume its alleged facts true, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Randazzo v. Nelson · filed 2015-05-20(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see CPLR 3026; Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Thompson Bros. Pile Corp. v Rosenblum, 121 AD3d 672, 673 [2014]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is construed liberally, its factual allegations are deemed true, and the nonmoving party receives all favorable inferences.

Ulysse v. AAR Aircraft Component Services · filed 2015-05-27(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint must be construed liberally, the factual allegations ... deemed to be true, and the nonmoving party must be given the benefit of all favorable Inferences (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Rathje v. Tomitz · filed 2015-05-27(a)(7)

“In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Simos v Vic-Armen Realty, LLC, 92 AD3d 760, 761 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Smith v Pottery King, Inc., 125 AD3d 753 [2015]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Waters Edge @ Jude Thaddeus Landing, Inc. v. B & G Group, Inc. · filed 2015-06-03(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the court should accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the defendant must establish that the plaintiff has no cause of action.

Pizzo-Juliano v. Southside Hospital · filed 2015-06-03(a)(7)

Pursuant to CPLR 3211, the defendant failed to establish that the plaintiff did not have a cause of action based on a lack of duty.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleaded facts are presumed true and receive every favorable inference.

Pirrelli v. OCWEN Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2015-06-03(a)(7)

For purposes of a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and are to be accorded every favorable inference (see Gershon v Goldberg, 30 AD3d 372 [2006]).