N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a defendant’s affidavits warrant dismissal only if they conclusively show that an alleged fact is false and no significant dispute remains about it.

Lazaroff v. Paraco Gas Corp. · filed 2012-05-15(a)(7)

Contrary to the defendants’ contentions, the separate affidavits they each submitted did not warrant dismissal of those causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), since they did not establish conclusively that any fact alleged in the complaint is not a fact at all and that no significant dispute exists on the matter (see Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1182 [2010]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Palm v. Tuckahoe Union Free School District · filed 2012-05-15(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see First Keystone Consultants, Inc. v DDR Constr. Servs., 74 AD3d 1135, 1136 [2010]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint receives a liberal construction.

Way v. City of Beacon · filed 2012-06-13(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires a court to accept the complaint’s allegations as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and decide whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Lovino, Inc. v. Lavallee Law Offices · filed 2012-06-20(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181 [2010]).

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the court liberally construes the pleading, assumes the alleged facts are true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

In re Lee · filed 2012-06-20(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026). The facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Arnav Indus., Inc. Retirement Trust v Brown, Raysman, Millstein, Felder & Steiner, 96 NY2d 300, 303 [2001]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Thomas v LaSalle Bank N.A., 79 AD3d 1015 [2010]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Diaz-Montez v. Dore-Almonor · filed 2012-06-27(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true, “according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determining only whether the facts alleged ‘fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Rodriguez v City of New York, 35 AD3d 702, 703-704 [2006], quoting Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Wang v. Wang · filed 2012-06-27(a)(7)

Moreover, in evaluating the sufficiency of pleadings in deciding a motion made under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference” (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; see Matter of Haberman v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Long Beach, 94 AD3d 997 [2012]; East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 66 AD3d 122, 125 [2009], affd 16 NY3d 775 [2011]).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action must be denied unless the moving party shows that a claimed material fact is false and no significant dispute exists about it.

Quiroz v. Zottola · filed 2012-06-27(a)(7)

However, “a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) must be denied ‘unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the pleader to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it’ ” (Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d at 1182, quoting Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d at 275).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Perez v. Lopez · filed 2012-07-05(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026), “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Knutt v Metro Intl., S.A., 91 AD3d 915, 915 [2012]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court reads the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Ural v. Encompass Insurance Co. of America · filed 2012-07-05(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a court liberally construes the pleading.

Silvercorp Metals Inc. v. Anthion Management LLC · filed 2012-07-10(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction” (McRedmond v Sutton Place Rest. & Bar, Inc., 48 AD3d 258, 259 [1st Dept 2008]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Jones v. Bank of America National Ass'n · filed 2012-07-11(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, give plaintiffs favorable inferences, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Stennett v. Moveway Transfer & Storage, Inc. · filed 2012-07-11(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading must be afforded a liberal construction, and the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see First Keystone Consultants, Inc. v DDR Constr. Servs., 74 AD3d 1135, 1136 [2010]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Vescon Construction, Inc. v. Gerelli Insurance Agency, Inc. · filed 2012-07-11(a)(7)

“In determining a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must ‘accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Henderson v Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 91 AD3d 720, 721 [2012], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Elmhurst Dairy, Inc. v. Bartlett Dairy, Inc. · filed 2012-07-25(a)(7)

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court erred in determining that the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action as against Bartlett. On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action,” and, in considering such a motion, “the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, draws every possible inference for the plaintiff, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Jannetti v. Whelan · filed 2012-07-25(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the complaint to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts give the complaint a liberal construction but need not credit factual claims contradicted by documentary evidence.

Tenney v. Hodgson Russ, LLP · filed 2012-07-26(a)(7)

When assessing whether a complaint states a cause of action for purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the pleading is to be given a liberal construction, the allegations contained within it are assumed to be true and the plaintiff is to be afforded every favorable inference” (Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d 46, 52 [2012]). That favorable treatment is not limitless, however, and “allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence are not entitled to any such consideration” (Gertler v Goodgold, 107 AD2d 481, 485 [1985], affd for reasons stated below 66 NY2d 946 [1985]; see Brumaghim v Eckel, 94 AD3d 1391, 1393 n 1 [2012]). That is precisely the situation presented here, where essential factual elements of plaintiffs causes of action are contradicted by documentary evidence, and Supreme Court thus properly dismissed the complaint.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts alleged facts as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

HOPE Assoc. of Syosset LLC v. STP Associates LLC · filed 2012-07-26(a)(7)

However, upon a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court’s inquiry is limited. On such a motion, the court must accept as true the facts “alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, [and] accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference,” determining only “whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.”

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, a plaintiff’s affidavits can amplify a complaint, and dismissal is improper when the amplified allegations state a claim.

Gaskin v. Harris · filed 2012-09-12(a)(7)

However, the Supreme Court should not have granted that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging legal malpractice. ... Applying these principles here, the complaint, as amplified by the affidavits submitted by the plaintiff, adequately states a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice.

A CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion must be denied when the defendant’s evidence leaves a significant dispute about a material fact supporting the claim.

Rozell v. Milby · filed 2012-09-12(a)(7)

Here, while the County submitted some evidence that the subject roadway was owned, maintained, and controlled by the State of New York, and not the County, it failed to demonstrate that no significant dispute exists with regard to these facts, or with regard to whether the County was involved in the construction or design of the roadway. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the County’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss so much of the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it as were premised upon allegations that the County negligently designed, constructed, and maintained the subject roadway.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is construed liberally and the plaintiff receives every favorable inference; dismissal is proper only if the allegations, taken as true, cannot establish a cause of action.

Kamen v. Berkeley Cooperative Towers Section II Corp. · filed 2012-09-26(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint must be liberally construed, giving the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). Such a motion should be granted only where, even viewing the allegations as true, the plaintiff still cannot establish a cause of action (see Hartman v Morganstern, 28 AD3d 423, 424 [2006]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens v. Microtech Contracting Corp. · filed 2012-09-26(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703 [2008]).

Section 3211(a)(7) does not permit dismissal when the evidence fails to conclusively disprove a material fact alleged in the complaint.

Village of Woodbury v. Brach · filed 2012-10-03(a)(7)

Moreover, the record does not show that a material fact claimed by the plaintiff to be a fact is not a fact at all and that there is no significant dispute about that fact (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 274-275 [1977]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181 [2010]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ respective motions to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) insofar as asserted against each of them.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Minogue v. Good Samaritan Hospital · filed 2012-10-03(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every reasonable inference from the pleadings.

Dabriel, Inc. v. First Paradise Theaters Corp. · filed 2012-10-11(a)(7)

Here, even if we accept the allegations in the complaint as true, and afford plaintiffs every reasonable inference available from the pleadings, as required (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]), plaintiffs cannot meet this standard.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Bua v. Purcell & Ingrao, P.C. · filed 2012-10-17(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d at 326; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Wander v. St. John's University · filed 2012-10-17(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Norment v Interfaith Ctr. of N.Y, 98 AD3d 955 [2012]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court treats the complaint’s allegations as true.

Sinagra v. City of New York · filed 2012-10-18(a)(7)

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint are deemed to be true (Johnson v Kings County Dist. Attorney's Off., 308 AD2d 278, 284 [2d Dept 2003]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action.

Jacobs v. Holman · filed 2012-10-24(a)(7)

The Supreme Court properly granted the motion of the defendants Bay Shore Classroom Teachers Association, Inc., Darlene Dartch, Nancy Kavanaugh, New York State United Teachers, and Tammy Mays (hereinafter collectively the moving defendants) pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them since “[t]he complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action to recover damages for breach of a duty of fair representation” (Portlette v Toussaint, 31 AD3d 730, 730-731 [2006]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the question is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not merely whether the pleading states one.

Lin v. County of Sullivan · filed 2012-11-01(a)(7)

When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), it is well settled that “the criterion is ... whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ackerman v. Kesselman · filed 2012-11-07(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the complaint to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Reichenbaum v Cilmi, 64 AD3d 693, 694 [2009]). Here, the complaint states a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice insofar as asserted against the appellants.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Cascardo v. Snitow Kanfer Holtzer & Millus, LLP · filed 2012-11-14(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord [the plaintiff] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Cascardo v. Stacchini · filed 2012-11-14(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord [the plaintiff] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint receives all favorable inferences, but dismissal is proper if it still fails to state a cause of action.

Klein v. Metropolitan Child Services, Inc. · filed 2012-11-14(a)(7)

Here, although the complaint must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences at this stage in the proceedings (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Morales v Copy Right, Inc., 28 AD3d 440 [2006]), it nevertheless fails to state a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court reads the complaint liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Roslyn Union Free School District v. Barkan · filed 2012-11-14(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” ... Here, the complaint adequately alleges causes of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff all favorable inferences.

MURPHY, CAITLIN G. v. COMINSKY, NOAH · filed 2012-11-16(a)(7)

Accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true and according plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences, as we must in the context of this motion to dismiss, we conclude that plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable cause of action against defendant for a violation of the Dram Shop Act (see generally Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts liberally construe the pleading, accept its alleged facts as true, give the plaintiff every possible inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Khan v. MMCA Lease, Ltd. · filed 2012-11-21(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under § 3211(a)(7), the petition’s allegations are deemed true and the petitioner receives every favorable inference.

Grecco v. Cimino · filed 2012-11-21(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), all of the allegations in the petition are deemed true and the petitioner is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference (see Matter of Oddone v Suffolk County Police Dept., 96 AD3d 758, 760 [2012]; Matter of Kar-McVeigh, LLC v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Riverhead, 93 AD3d 799, 800 [2012]).

CPLR 3211 (a) permits dismissal when the complaint’s allegations fail to state a cognizable cause of action.

General Motor & Truck Repair, Inc. v. HOP Energy, LLC · filed 2012-11-28(a)

The Supreme Court properly granted the moving defendants’ separate cross motions pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them, as the allegations in the complaint were insufficient to make out a cognizable cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the question is whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.

Estate of Radvin v. City of New York · filed 2012-12-04(a)(7)

The criterion in considering a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) “is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one” (Allen v City of New York, 49 AD3d 1126, 1127 [3d Dept 2008], citing Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; see Griffin v Anslow, 17 AD3d 889, 891 [3d Dept 2005]).

An uncontested dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) is not the functional equivalent of a trial on the merits, so it does not prevent a codefendant from attributing fault to the dismissed party under CPLR article 16.

Hendrickson v. Philbor Motors, Inc. · filed 2012-12-12(a)(7)

Since Ford’s cross motion was one for dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), which is not the functional equivalent of a trial on the merits, Cooper Tire may seek to include any liability attributable to Ford as part of the total liability assigned to “all persons liable” for purposes of CPLR article 16.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court to construe a petition liberally and give it every possible favorable inference when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Clark v. Ormiston · filed 2012-12-12(a)(7)

The Family Court should have denied that branch of the respondent’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the petition for failure to state a cause of action. Liberally construing the petition, and giving it the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the petition adequately alleged that the respondent had committed the family offenses of harassment in the first and second degrees and disorderly conduct (see Family Ct Act §§ 165 [a]; 812 [1]; Penal Law §§ 240.25, 240.26, 240.20 [1]; Matter of Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 13 NY3d 475, 484 [2009]; Matter of Pamela N. v Neil N., 93 AD3d 1107, 1108-1110 [2012]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Standard Chartered Bank v. Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. · filed 2012-12-12(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court asks whether the complaint’s factual allegations, taken together, reveal any legally cognizable claim.

Nasca v. Sgro · filed 2012-12-19(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the sole criterion is whether from the complaint’s “four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; see Country Pointe at Dix Hills Home Owners Assn., Inc. v Beechwood Org., 80 AD3d 643, 649 [2011]; Fishberger v Voss, 51 AD3d 627, 628 [2008]).

On a pre-disclosure motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court asks whether the complaint states a cognizable claim, without deciding whether the plaintiff can ultimately prove it.

Nasca v. Sgro · filed 2012-12-19(a)(7)

Whether the complaint will withstand a subsequent motion for summary judgment, or whether the plaintiff will be able to prove his claim, is irrelevant to the determination of a pre-disclosure CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss (see Shaya B. Pac., LLC v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 38 AD3d 34 [2006]). Applying the above principles here, the Supreme Court properly granted the movants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

PDK Labs, Inc. v. G.M.G. Trans West Corp. · filed 2012-12-19(a)(7)

However, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) insofar as asserted against the individual defendants. ... Here, affording the pleadings a liberal construction, accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, and providing the plaintiff with the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the complaint adequately alleges that the individual defendants personally participated in the allegedly wrongful withholding of the pharmaceuticals.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts construe the petition liberally, accept its allegations as true, and give the petitioner every favorable inference.

Jeff M. v. Christine N. · filed 2012-12-20(a)(7)

When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we afford the petition a liberal construction, accept the allegations contained therein as true and grant the petitioner the benefit of every favorable inference (see Roni LLC v Arfa, 18 NY3d 846, 848 [2011] ; Matter of Pamela N. v Neil N, 93 AD3d 1107, 1108 [2012] ).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts support a cognizable legal theory.

Jimenez v. New York Law School · filed 2012-12-20(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and must determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Phillips v City of New York, 66 AD3d 170, 174 [1st Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also CPLR 3026).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Green v. Gross & Levin, LLP · filed 2012-12-26(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court presumes pleaded facts true, gives them every favorable inference, and asks whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Phillips v. Trommel Construction · filed 2012-12-26(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded are presumed to be true, and the court must afford those allegations every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Dickinson v Igoni, 76 AD3d 943, 945 [2010]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint and submitted materials as true when deciding whether they state a cause of action.

Komolov v. Segal · filed 2012-12-27(a)(7)

Accepting the complaint and the materials submitted on the various motions as true, as we must on a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, we find that they show that plaintiffs have a claim for conversion of the Picasso and Vlaminck paintings but not for the jewelry (see e.g. Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 NY3d 43, 49-50 [2006]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

IDT Corp. v. Tyco Group, S.A.R.L. · filed 2012-12-27(a)(7)

Hence, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, as we must on a motion to dismiss (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]), the plaintiffs here state a cause of action for breach of the agreement and breach of the duty to negotiate in good faith.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court determines whether the pleading states a cause of action.

ELRAC, LLC v. Manzo · filed 2012-12-07(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true.

Lino v. City of New York · filed 2012-12-20(a)(7)

Although the motion court did not resolve the factual issues regarding whether plaintiffs’ records are sealed in compliance with CPL 160.50 and 160.55, defendants’ motion to dismiss must be decided by accepting plaintiffs’ allegation as true that the NYPD is not complying with the statute (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994] [noting that on a motion to dismiss, the court is to “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true (and) accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference”]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a complaint should not be dismissed if the facts alleged could support relief.

POLK, KENNETH v. GUGINO, SR., JOSEPH · filed 2012-12-28(a)(7)

“Motions to dismiss should not be granted unless it is clear that there can be no relief under any of the facts alleged in the complaint” (H. M. Brown, Inc. v Price, 38 AD2d 680, 680).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court considers whether the plaintiff has a viable claim, giving the alleged facts every favorable inference.

Scheffield v. Vestal Parkway Plaza, LLC · filed 2013-01-03(a)(7)

When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; see Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d 46, 52 [2012]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Scheffield v. Vestal Parkway Plaza, LLC · filed 2013-01-03(a)(7)

In determining whether a complaint states a cause of action for purposes of such a motion, we must accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, confer on the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference and determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d at 52; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 88; Matter of Quiver Rock, LLC v New York State Adirondack Park Agency, 93 AD3d 1135, 1136 [2012]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court asks whether the pleading states a cause of action.

Austin v. Albany Law School of Union University · filed 2013-01-03(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court’s “sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action” (Polonetsky v Better Homes Depot, 97 NY2d 46, 54 [2001]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true and give the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Nadal v. Jaramillo · filed 2013-01-23(a)(7)

A court deciding a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff every possible favorable inference from them.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts state a cognizable claim.

Manik v. Citimortgage, Inc. · filed 2013-01-30(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]).

On a CPLR 3211 motion, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Claims of Torres v. City of New York · filed 2013-01-25

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, “the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Martin v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 92 AD3d 729, 730 [2d Dept 2012]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts pleaded facts as true and determines whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

Balkheimer v. Spanton · filed 2013-02-06(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the [pleading] as true, ... determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court examines the pleadings to determine whether they state a cause of action.

Miglino v. Bally Total Fitness of Greater New York, Inc. · filed 2013-02-07(a)(7)

In this case, though, Bally has moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), which limits us to an examination of the pleadings to determine whether they state a cause of action.

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those allegations fit a cognizable legal theory.

Pertoso v. Hanna · filed 2013-02-13(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “ ‘accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010], quoting Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) asks whether the complaint states a cause of action, with its alleged facts accepted as true and favorable inferences drawn for the plaintiff.

Siwiec v. Rawlins · filed 2013-02-13(a)(7)

In determining such a motion, the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Town of Carmel v. Melchner · filed 2013-02-27(a)(7)

In addressing that branch of the Melchners’ motion which was, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the second cause of action, we accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord the Town the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 87-88).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires denial of a motion to dismiss when the pleaded facts, liberally construed, support any cognizable cause of action.

Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v. East 149th Realty Corp. · filed 2013-03-05(a)(7)

It is settled that a motion for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) “must be denied if from the pleadings’ four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law” (511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 152 [2002] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Section 3211 requires a court to view a complaint liberally on a motion to dismiss, while permitting dismissal when the allegations and documentary evidence still fail to state a cause of action.

Front, Inc. v. Khalil · filed 2013-02-14

Even viewed in the liberal light required on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the third-party complaint and the documentary evidence fail, absent the libel claims, to allege the “malice” or use of “improper or illegal means” required to state a cause of action for tortious interference with business relations (see Amaranth LLC v J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 71 AD3d 40, 47 [1st Dept 2009], lv dismissed in part, denied in part 14 NY3d 736 [2010]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether the facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

ABBOTT, JENNIFER L. v. TONAWANDA COKE CORPORATION · filed 2013-03-15(a)(7)

Inasmuch as defendants’ motion is based on CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we must “accept the facts as alleged in the [first amended] complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory . . . [T]he criterion is whether [plaintiffs have] a cause of action, not whether [they have] stated ... one” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Genesee/Wyoming YMCA v Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc., 98 AD3d 1242, 1244).

Dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7) is improper when the movant fails to show that alleged material facts are not facts at all and that no significant dispute exists about them.

Nunez v. Mohamed · filed 2013-03-27(a)(7)

Since the appellant failed to show that these material facts alleged by the defendant third-party plaintiff were not facts at all and failed to demonstrate that no significant dispute exists regarding these allegations, the appellant was not entitled to dismissal of the third-party complaint insofar as asserted against him pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see Cog-Net Bldg. Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co., 86 AD3d at 586).

A motion challenging a defective pleading may be treated as a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion for failure to state a cause of action, even if brought under the subject-matter-jurisdiction ground in (a)(2).

Wenig Saltiel, LLP v. Secord · filed 2013-03-29(a)(7)

Accordingly, since the motion is more appropriately based upon what defendants claim to be a defective pleading, we consider the motion as having been made pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

On a section 3211(a)(7) motion, courts accept the complaint’s facts as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and ask whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Tung v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. · filed 2013-04-03(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co., 5 NY3d 582, 591 [2005]; Paramount Transp. Sys., Inc. v Lasertone Corp., 76 AD3d 519, 520 [2010]; JP Morgan Chase v J.H. Elec. of N.Y., Inc., 69 AD3d 802, 803 [2010]).

On a motion to dismiss under subsection (a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Lisi v. Kanca · filed 2013-04-03(a)(7)

Affording the complaint a liberal construction, accepting all facts as alleged in the complaint to be true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference as required on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint fails to state a cause of action alleging prima facie tort for statements made by the defendants during prior litigation involving the parties.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Keness v. Feldman, Kramer & Monaco, P.C. · filed 2013-04-10(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CFLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept the facts alleged in the pleading as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Vargas v. City of New York · filed 2013-04-10(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181 [2010]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the question is whether the complaint states a cause of action, with its alleged facts accepted as true.

Vermont Mutual Insurance v. McCabe & Mack, LLP · filed 2013-04-10(a)(7)

“When a party moves to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the standard is whether the pleading states a cause of action, not whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action” (Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1180-1181 [2010]; see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Torres v. Louzoun Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2013-04-17(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026), “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]).

The CPLR 3211(a)(7) standard applies when a court reviews objections in point of law raised in an Article 78 answer.

Lally v. Johnson City Central School District · filed 2013-04-04(a)(7)

We reject respondents’ contention that Supreme Court erred in applying the standards that govern a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to the claim for bad faith abolishment of the position. ... Such objections are appropriately afforded review similar in nature to that applied to defenses raised in a pre-answer motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Health Acquisition Corp. v. Program Risk Management Inc. · filed 2013-04-24(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court views the complaint favorably, accepts its factual allegations as true, and considers allegations amplified by the plaintiff’s affidavit when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Summit Development Corp. v. Interstate Masonry Corp. · filed 2013-04-24(a)(7)

Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accepting the factual allegations as true, the complaint, as amplified by the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff, sufficiently stated causes of action against Interstate and Janine Frantellizzi, Interstate’s president, to recover damages for fraud ... Accordingly, those branches of the defendants’ motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the first and second causes of action should have been denied.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Excess Line Ass'n v. Waldorf & Associates · filed 2013-05-03(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleadings are to be afforded a liberal construction and the court is obligated to accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and to accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (Mandarin Trading Ltd. v Wildenstein, 16 NY3d 173 [2011]; Salles v Chase Manhattan Bank, 300 AD2d 226 [2002]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Martin v. Restaurant Associates Events Corp. · filed 2013-05-08(a)(7)

Affording the complaint a liberal construction, accepting all facts as alleged in the complaint to be true, and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Reichenbaum v Cilmi, 64 AD3d 693, 694 [2009]), the complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action to recover damages for violations of Labor Law § 196-d allegedly occurring prior to March 1, 2011.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Murray Bresky Consultants, Ltd. v. New York Compensation Manager's Inc. · filed 2013-05-09(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss based upon failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is liberally construed, the facts as alleged are accepted as true and the plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every favorable inference (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; ABN AMRO Bank, N.V. v MBIA Inc., 17 NY3d 208, 227 [2011]; EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court assumes the alleged facts are true and determines whether they state a legally cognizable claim.

ACE Securities Corp. v. DB Structured Products, Inc. · filed 2013-05-13(a)(7)

The court is not permitted to assess the merits of the complaint or any of its factual allegations, but may only determine if, assuming the truth of the facts alleged, the complaint states the elements of a legally cognizable cause of action.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires courts assessing a motion to dismiss a counterclaim to construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and determine whether they fit a cognizable legal theory.

V. Groppa Pools, Inc. v. Massello · filed 2013-05-01(a)(7)

When assessing a motion to dismiss a complaint or counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept as true all facts as alleged in the pleading, accord the pleader the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory ... .

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts presume pleaded facts true and give them every favorable inference.

Krause v. Lancer & Loader Group, LLC · filed 2013-05-01(a)(7)

On a motion addressed to the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and are accorded every favorable inference (see Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825 [2007]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires denial of a motion to dismiss when the complaint’s allegations, read together, reveal any cognizable cause of action.

Anderson & Anderson, LLP-Guangzhou v. North American Foreign Trade Corp. · filed 2013-05-14(a)(7)

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action “must be denied if from the pleadings’ four corners ‘factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law’ ” (511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 152 [2002]).

On a motion to dismiss under § 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Mills v. Gardner · filed 2013-05-15(a)(7)

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the court will accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Matter of Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 13 NY3d 475, 484 [2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible inference.

Mongielo v. Cuomo · filed 2013-05-21(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss made pursuant to CPLB 3211 (a) (7), “the court must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference” (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the petitioner every favorable inference.

McBride v. Springsteen-El · filed 2013-05-30(a)(7)

On such a motion (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), “the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction. We accept the facts as alleged in the [petition] as true, accord [the petitioner] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Pamela N. v Neil N., 93 AD3d 1107, 1108 [2012]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the question is whether plaintiffs have a cause of action, rather than whether they have stated one.

Torok v. Moore's Flatwork & Foundations, LLC · filed 2013-05-30(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the question is whether the plaintiffs have a cause of action, not whether they have stated one (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; Scheffield v Vestal Parkway Plaza, LLC, 102 AD3d 992, 993 [2013]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and determines whether the allegations state a viable cause of action.

Deblinger v. Sani-Pine Products Co. · filed 2013-06-05(a)(7)

Accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]), these allegations fail to sufficiently state a viable cause of action alleging breach of fiduciary duty.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Felix v. Thomas R. Stachecki General Contracting, LLC · filed 2013-06-05(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit 'within any cognizable legal theory”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Rosin v. Weinberg · filed 2013-06-05(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026), “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and dismisses claims that fit no cognizable legal theory.

Klapper v. Graziano · filed 2013-06-13(a)(7)

Even accepting the allegations of the plaintiff as true, as this court must in a CPLR 3211 motion, and assuming every possible inference in favor of the plaintiff, the court cannot conclude that these allegations against the corporate defendants can fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994]; Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481 [1980]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal only when the complaint’s factual allegations fail to state a legally cognizable cause of action.

African Diaspora Maritime Corp. v. Golden Gate Yacht Club · filed 2013-06-25(a)(7)

The sole criterion for deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

A complaint survives a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7) if it sufficiently states a cause of action, regardless of whether the plaintiff can ultimately prove it.

African Diaspora Maritime Corp. v. Golden Gate Yacht Club · filed 2013-06-25(a)(7)

Whether plaintiff can ultimately establish its claim is irrelevant at this juncture since the sole consideration on a CPLR 3211 motion is whether the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Nouveau Elevator Industries, Inc. v. Glendale Condominium Town & Tower Corp. · filed 2013-06-26(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the complaint a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026), “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court reads the complaint liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

People v. Sprint Nextel Corp. · filed 2013-06-27(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss, pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction (see CPLR 3026; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]). The court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (Leon v Martinez).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court asks whether the complaint’s factual allegations taken together state any cognizable cause of action.

Gale v. Animal Medical Center · filed 2013-07-03(a)(7)

“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the sole criterion is whether from the complaint’s ‘four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law’ ” (Nasca v Sgro, 101 AD3d 963, 964 [2012], quoting Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires courts to construe the pleading liberally, treat factual allegations as true, and give the pleader every possible inference.

Global Marine Power, Inc. v. Kustom Engines & Performance Engineering, LLC · filed 2013-07-03(a)(7)

On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss for ... failure to state a cause of action, the pleading must be liberally construed, the factual allegations must be deemed true, and the pleading party must be accorded the benefit of every possible inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Kopelowitz & Co., Inc. v Mann, 83 AD3d 793, 797 [2011]; Panish v Panish, 24 AD3d 642, 643 [2005]).

On a motion to dismiss under section 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

VisionChina Media Inc. v. Shareholder Reppesentative Services., LLC · filed 2013-06-11(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the court accepts as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accords the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determines only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 *56[2001]).

Allegations need not definitively establish actual knowledge to survive a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion.

AIG Financial Products Corp. v. ICP Asset Management, LLC · filed 2013-07-09(a)(7)

While the allegations in the first amended complaint alone, if proven, would not definitively establish that Moore had actual knowledge of ICP’s efforts to defraud AIG sufficient to trigger aiding and abetting liability, that is not the standard on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the pleading, accepts the alleged facts as true, and gives the nonmoving party every favorable inference.

110 Central Park South Corp. v. 112 Central Park South, LLC · filed 2013-07-25(a)(7)

Pursuant to CPLR 3211, a party may move for an order dismissing a cause of action against it on the ground that the pleading fails to state a cause of action. In deciding the motion, the court must liberally construe the pleading, “accept the facts as alleged ... as true, accord [the non-moving party] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the alleged facts ... fit within any cognizable . . . theory.”

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Signature Bank v. Holtz Rubenstein Reminick, LLP · filed 2013-08-07(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

McDonnell v. Bradley · filed 2013-08-21(a)(7)

In assessing a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the facts pleaded are accepted as true and the plaintiff is accorded every possible favorable inference (see Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007]; Garner v China Natural Gas, Inc., 71 AD3d 825, 826 [2010]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court construes the pleading liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Sassower v. Gannett Co. · filed 2013-08-21(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “ ‘the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Green v Gross & Levin, LLP, 101 AD3d 1079 [2012], quoting Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court reads the complaint as a whole to determine whether its allegations state a claim.

Tap Holdings, LLC v. Orix Finance Corp. · filed 2013-07-16(a)(7)

The eighth cause of action, viewed in the context of all the other allegations in the second amended complaint, unquestionably paints a picture of complex machinations carried out by defendants with the singular goal of shirking the obligation to make payments on the notes which were assigned to Manager. Under the standard of review governing motions to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), that is sufficient to state a claim for successor and alter ego liability.

Section 3211(a)(1) and (7) permits dismissal when documentary evidence conclusively defeats the claim and the pleaded facts fail to support a cognizable cause of action.

Benson v. Deutsche Bank NaTional Trust, Inc. · filed 2013-08-14(a)(1), (a)(7)

Here, the documentary evidence conclusively established the continued validity of the first mortgage, dated March 26, 2004, and the allegations in the complaint failed to set forth the existence of a bona fide justiciable controversy as to whether title to the subject premises is wrongfully encumbered by the first mortgage (see CPLR 3211 [a] [1], [7]; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Weisblum, 85 AD3d at 109). Accordingly, upon reargument, the Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the appellants’ motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) to dismiss the seventh cause of action insofar as asserted against them.

Under § 3211(a)(7), a complaint survives dismissal when its allegations are sufficient to state a claim under a cognizable legal theory.

Tap Holdings, LLC v. Orix Finance Corp. · filed 2013-07-16(a)(7)

To the extent that defendants have moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we address only the pleading itself, keeping in ... mind that the motion should be denied if the facts alleged by Manager fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

JAS Family Trust v. Oceana Holding Corp. · filed 2013-08-28(a)(7)

In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a court deciding whether a complaint states a cause of action to construe the pleading liberally, accept its alleged facts as true, and give the plaintiff every possible inference.

Parkoff v. Stavsky · filed 2013-08-28(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d at 87; Felix v Thomas R. Stachecki Gen. Contr., LLC, 107 AD3d 664 [2013]).

On a motion under § 3211(a)(7), the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Barkany Asset Recovery & Management v. Southwest Securities Inc. · filed 2013-09-09(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss for failing to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction (CPLR 3026), and the court should accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, accord plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and only determine whether the facts, as alleged, fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Hurrell-Harring v State of New York, 15 NY3d 8, 20 [2010]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts support a cognizable legal theory.

Elmaliach v. Bank of China Ltd. · filed 2013-09-17(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court accepts as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and affidavits in opposition to the motion, accords the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determines only whether the facts as alleged manifest any cognizable legal theory (Sokoloff v Harriman Estates Dev. Corp., 96 NY2d 409, 414 [2001]; Richbell Info. Servs. v Jupiter Partners, 309 AD2d 288, 289 [1st Dept 2003]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and gives them every favorable inference to determine whether they support a cognizable legal theory.

Cablevision Systems Corp. v. Communications Workers of America District 1 · filed 2013-09-17(a)(7)

In deciding a motion to dismiss directed as to the sufficiency of the pleadings (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), a court must accept their allegations as true, according to them the benefit of every favorable inference to determine whether they come within the ambit of any cognizable legal theory (511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144 [2002]; Smith v Meridian Tech., Inc., 52 AD3d 685 [2d Dept 2008]; Parsippany Constr. Co., Inc. v Clark Patterson Assoc., P.C., 41 AD3d 805, 806 [2d Dept 2007]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the plaintiff every possible favorable inference.

Lissauer v. Guideone Specialty Mutual Insurance · filed 2013-09-18(a)(7)

Further, affording the complaint a liberal construction, accepting all facts as alleged in the complaint to be true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ... the ... complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420 (a) (2) to recover the amount of an unsatisfied judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant’s purported insured. ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint.

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court accepts the alleged facts as true, gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Pollack v. Cooperman · filed 2013-09-25(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must “ ‘accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord [the plaintiff] the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ”

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the pleaded facts as true, gives the plaintiff favorable inferences, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Kalmon Dolgin Affiliates, Inc. v. Tonacchio · filed 2013-10-16(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Minovici v Belkin BV, 109 AD3d 520, 521 [2013]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court liberally construes the complaint, accepts its allegations as true, gives the plaintiff every possible inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Sposato v. Paboojian · filed 2013-10-23(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory”

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint is construed liberally, its allegations are assumed true, and the plaintiff receives every favorable inference.

DerOhannesian v. City of Albany · filed 2013-10-24(a)(7)

When considering whether to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the pleading is to be given a liberal construction, the allegations contained within it are assumed to be true and the plaintiff[s] [are] to be afforded every favorable inference” (Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d 46, 52 [2012]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, section 3211(a)(7) requires liberal construction of the pleading, acceptance of its alleged facts as true, and every possible inference for the pleader.

Baker v. Comprehensive Mental Assessment & Medical Care · filed 2013-10-30(a)(7)

When assessing a motion to dismiss a complaint or counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept as true all facts as alleged in the pleading, accord the pleader the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Rabos v R&R Bagels & Bakery, Inc., 100 AD3d 849, 851 [2012]; Mazzei v Kyriacou, 98 AD3d 1088, 1089 [2012]; Yellow Book Sales & Distrib. Co., Inc. v Hillside Van Lines, Inc., 98 AD3d 663, 664 [2012]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pleaded facts receive favorable inferences, but bare legal conclusions and factual claims flatly contradicted by the record do not.

Silverman v. Nicholson · filed 2013-10-30(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), although the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and are to be accorded every favorable inference, “ ‘bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by the record are not entitled to any such consideration’ ” (Lutz v Caracappa, 35 AD3d 673, 674 [2006], quoting Doria v Masucci, 230 AD2d 764, 765 [1996]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), courts liberally construe the pleadings, accept the allegations as true, and give the plaintiff every possible inference.

Delaware County v. Leatherstocking Healthcare · filed 2013-10-17(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we will liberally construe the pleadings, deem the allegations to be true and grant the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference (see EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On appeal from a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, the court construes the complaint liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and gives plaintiffs every favorable inference.

Warberg Opportunistic Trading Fund,L.P. v. GeoResources, Inc. · filed 2013-10-22

Because this is an appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, we are required to “give the complaint a liberal construction, accept the allegations as true and provide plaintiffs with the benefit of every favorable inference” (Roni LLC v Arfa, 18 NY3d 846, 848 [2011]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, the court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations and reasonable inferences as true.

Saska v. Metropolitan Museum of Art · filed 2013-10-29

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint as well as all reasonable inferences that may be gleaned from those facts.

On a motion under § 3211(a)(7), the court accepts pleaded facts as true, draws favorable inferences for the plaintiff, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Gershner v. Eljamal · filed 2013-11-13(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must liberally construe the complaint, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Rabos v R&R Bagels & Bakery, Inc., 100 AD3d 849, 851 [2012]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference.

Markel Insurance v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance · filed 2013-11-13(a)(7)

Here, accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference ... the complaint failed to state a cause of action against Rebore to recover damages for legal malpractice. ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of Rebore’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging legal malpractice.

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Ferreira v. Cellco Partnership · filed 2013-11-20(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the court will ‘accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) asks whether the pleading’s factual allegations, taken together, state any legally cognizable cause of action.

Freeman v. City of New York · filed 2013-11-20(a)(7)

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), “the [initial] sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, courts construe the pleading liberally, accept its factual allegations as true, give the plaintiff every possible inference, and ask whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Goel v. Ramachandran · filed 2013-11-20(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) for failure to state a cause of action, the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Breytman v Olinville Realty, LLC, 54 AD3d 703, 703-704 [2008]; see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court construes the complaint liberally and accepts its allegations as true, but dismisses it if they state no cognizable legal claim.

Ram v. Torto · filed 2013-11-20(a)(7)

Even construing the allegations in the complaint liberally and accepting them as true (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), they state no cognizable legal claim against the defendants (see Newin Corp. v Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 37 NY2d 211 [1975]; Retina Assoc. of Long Is. v Rosberger, 299 AD2d 533 [2002]; Yalkowsky v Century Apts. Assoc., 215 AD2d 214 [1995]; Alexander v City of Peekskill, 80 AD2d 626 [1981]; see also Shapiro v McNeill, 92 NY2d 91 [1998]; Arkin Kaplan LLP v Jones, 42 AD3d 362 [2007]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires a complaint to receive liberal construction and the court to accept its alleged facts as true, give plaintiffs every favorable inference, and decide whether those facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Bass v. D. Ragno Realty Corp. · filed 2013-11-27(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the complaint must be afforded a liberal construction, and the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Margolin v IM Kapco, Inc., 89 AD3d 690, 691 [2011]).

Section 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint's allegations as true, give the plaintiff every favorable inference, and determine only whether the alleged facts fit any cognizable legal theory.

State Farm Insurance v. Shanley & Schwartz, Inc. · filed 2013-11-27(a)(7)

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court should accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and afford the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; Baron v Galasso, 83 AD3d 626, 627 [2011]; Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires the court to accept the complaint's allegations as true and give the plaintiff every favorable inference when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Dashnaw v. Town of Peru · filed 2013-11-27(a)(7)

In reviewing the merits of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, we “must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, take the allegations of the complaint as true and provide [the] plaintiff the benefit of every possible inference” (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; see Vectron Intl., Inc. v Corning Oak Holding, Inc., 106 AD3d 1164, 1165 [2013]).

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal of a fraud claim whose allegations fail to state a cause of action.

Nanomedicon, LLC v. Research Foundation of State University · filed 2013-12-04(a)(7)

However, the Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of Medicon’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) which was to dismiss Gouma’s fraud counterclaim/cause of action insofar as asserted against it.

Section 3211(a)(7) requires allegations to be treated as true and the claimant to receive every favorable inference when deciding whether a pleading states a cause of action.

MVM Construction, LLC v. Westchester County · filed 2013-12-04(a)(7)

“On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), all of the allegations in the petition are deemed true and the petitioner is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference” (Matter of Grecco v Cimino, 100 AD3d 892, 897 [2012]; see Matter of Oddone v Suffolk County Police Dept., 96 AD3d 758, 760 [2012]; Matter of Kar-McVeigh, LLC v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Riverhead, 93 AD3d 799, 800 [2012]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action and requires the court to accept factual allegations as true and draw favorable inferences for the plaintiff.

Wilson v. Phoenix House · filed 2013-12-10(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court’s role is ordinarily limited to determining whether the complaint states a cause of action.

Section 3211(a)(7) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Vital Realty, LLC v. Greenwich Insurance · filed 2013-12-17(a)(7)

Although plaintiff, as an existing entity, has the capacity and standing to sue on any viable claim it might have, its complaint should be dismissed on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action against defendants.

CPLR 3211(a)(7) requires courts reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action to construe the pleading liberally, accept its allegations as true, and give the claimant every favorable inference.

Cote v. Berger · filed 2013-12-18(a)(7)

When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), which is proper here, in that family offense proceedings under Family Court Act article 8 are civil in nature (see Family Ct Act § 812 [2] [b]), we afford the petition a liberal construction, accept the allegations contained therein as true, and grant the petitioner the benefit of every favorable inference (see Matter of Jeff M. v Christine N., 101 AD3d 1426, 1427 [2012]; Matter of Pamela N. v Neil N., 93 AD3d 1107, 1108 [2012]).

On a CPLR 3211(a) motion, the complaint’s allegations are construed liberally to determine whether they state a cause of action.

Clogher v. New York Medical College · filed 2013-12-04(a)

Here, the allegations set forth in the amended complaint, construed liberally, state a cause of action against the defendant New York Medical College (hereinafter NYMC) to recover damages for breach of contract.

On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, gives plaintiffs every favorable inference, and asks whether the alleged facts fit a cognizable legal theory.

Sierra Holdings, LLC v. Phillips · filed 2013-12-26(a)(7)

In determining a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

Section 3211(a)(7) does not permit dismissal of a malicious prosecution claim that sufficiently alleges a cause of action.

Moulton v. State · filed 2013-12-26(a)(7)

Accordingly, claimant’s malicious prosecution claim should not have been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court liberally construes the claim, accepts its alleged facts as true, and gives the claimant every favorable inference in deciding whether the claim fits a cognizable legal theory.

Moulton v. State · filed 2013-12-26(a)(7)

On defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, “the [claim] is liberally construed, the facts alleged [in the claim and any submission submitted in opposition to the dismissal motions] are accepted as true, [claimant is] accorded every favorable inference and the court determines only whether the facts alleged in the [claim] ‘fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Lazic v Currier, 69 AD3d 1213, 1213-1214 [2010], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court liberally construes the complaint and accepts its alleged facts as true when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

TRA-LIN CORPORATION v. LEVINE, STEVEN H. · filed 2014-01-03(a)(7)

Supreme Court erred in denying defendants’ motion seeking, inter alia, to dismiss the amended complaint against them pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), for failure to state a cause of action. Even affording the cause of action for fraud against defendants a liberal construction and accepting the facts alleged as true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88), we conclude that plaintiff alleges therein only that defendants, as corporate officers, knew of or participated in Empire’s decision to induce plaintiff to enter into a contract that Empire did not intend to honor, and “such allegations do not state a cause of action [for] fraud” (Makuch v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 1110, 1111).

Under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and resolves all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor when deciding whether it states a cause of action.

Cullin v. Lynch · filed 2014-01-08(a)(7)

Accordingly, even accepting the allegations in the amended complaint as true, and resolving all inferences in favor of the plaintiff (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for libel per se (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Rabiea v Stein, 69 AD3d 700 [2010]; Rufeh v Schwartz, 50 AD3d 1002 [2008]).

CPLR 3211(a)(7) does not permit a court to resolve disputed factual issues about causation or the standard of care on a motion to dismiss.

Endless Ocean, LLC v. Twomey, Latham, Shea, Kelley, Dubin & Quartararo · filed 2014-01-08(a)(7)

The defendants’ contentions that it was the conduct of the plaintiffs manager and unforeseeable events that were the proximate causes of the plaintiff’s damages, and that the defendants did not depart from the standard of care, concern disputed factual issues that are not properly raised and resolved on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s allegations as true and dismisses only if the alleged facts fit no cognizable legal theory.

Young v. Brown · filed 2014-01-22(a)(7)

In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the allegations in the complaint should be accepted as true, and the motion should be granted only if the facts as alleged do not fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Rietschel v Maimonides Med. Ctr., 83 AD3d 810 [2011]; Peterec-Tolino v Harap, 68 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2009]).

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court construes the petition liberally, accepts its allegations as true, and gives the petitioner every favorable inference.

Smith v. Howard · filed 2014-01-22(a)(7)

When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), we afford the petition a liberal construction, accept the allegations contained therein as true and grant the petitioner the benefit of every favorable inference (see Matter of Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 13 NY3d 475, 484 [2009]; Matter of Pamela N. v Neil N., 93 AD3d 1107, 1108-1109 [2012]).

A complaint survives a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion when its allegations sufficiently state a cause of action.

Gessin v. Throne-Holst · filed 2014-01-22(a)(7)

Thus, plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing to withstand defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; Sysco Corp. v Town of Hempstead, 133 AD2d 751 [2d Dept 1987]). Therefore, the motions to dismiss are denied.

On a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court accepts the complaint’s facts as true and gives the plaintiff every favorable inference, but may dismiss a claim that does not plead reasonably inferable damages.

Mizuno v. Barak · filed 2014-01-29

Accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint and according the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), he failed to “plead allegations from which damages attributable to the [defendants’ conduct] might be reasonably inferred” (Rock City Sound, Inc. v Bashian & Farber, LLP, 74 AD3d 1168, 1171 [2010]; see Market Ins. Co. v American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 111 AD3d 678 [2013]; Regina v Marotta, 67 AD3d 766 [2009]).