N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214

CPLR 214(3) gives conversion claims in discovery proceedings a three-year limitations period.

In re Neshewat · filed 1997-03-24(3)

Generally, the Statute of Limitations applicable to a discovery proceeding is the three-year Statute of Limitations under CPLR 214 (3) for replevin and conversion actions (see, Matter of Kraus, 208 AD2d 728; Matter of Bellingham, 132 AD2d 973). Contrary to the conclusion reached by the Surrogate’s Court, the claim here was not based upon a theory of quasi-contract, but upon conversion. As the instant proceeding was not commenced within the required three years, the claim for conversion of money must be dismissed as time-barred.

Section 214(2) gives a General Business Law § 349(h) claim a three-year limitations period.

Avdon Capitol Corp. v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance · filed 1997-06-02(2)

However, in this case, the plaintiffs’ proposed claim is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations under CPLR 214 (2).

Section 214(2) gives claims under New York’s Human Rights Law § 296 a three-year limitations period.

Riedinger v. D'AMICANTINO · filed 1997-08-19(2)

... claims under § 296 "are governed by the three-year statute of limitations prescribed by CPLR 214(2).” ... Under that rule, all of plaintiff's allegations of sexual harassment and retaliation that occurred after March 13, 1992 are admissible.

Section 214 gives a plaintiff three years from an injury to bring a personal injury claim; a distinct later injury can have its own three-year period.

Geressy v. Digital Equipment Corp. · filed 1997-09-16

If any plaintiff had suffered a new injury subsequent to her initial injury, any claims based on the later injury could be filed within three years of that later injury.

Section 214(5) imposes a three-year limitations period on a negligence claim for disclosing confidential patient information.

Pugach v. Borja · filed 1998-02-06(5)

Since the claim sounds in negligence, premised upon the breach of the independent duty not to disclose confidential patient information (see, CPLR 4504; 8 NYCRR 29.1 [a] [8]), the three-year Statute of Limitations provided in CPLR 214 (5) is applicable. The fourth cause of action accrued on September 17, 1991, when, it is alleged, Borja made the unauthorized disclosure. Inasmuch as the action was commenced in 1997, the claim must be dismissed as barred by the operative three-year limitations period.

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and New York Executive Law § 296.

Hudson v. Delphi Energy & Engine Management Systems, Inc. · filed 1998-05-21

Claims under 42 U.S.C. '§ 1981 and New York Executive Law § 296 are subject to New York’s three year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and New York Executive Law § 296.

Johnson v. Delphi Energy & Engine Management Systems, Inc. · filed 1998-05-21

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and New York Executive Law § 296 are subject to New York’s three year limitations period for personal injury actions. Tadros v. Coleman, 898 F.2d 10 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 869, 111 S.Ct. 186, 112 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990); N.Y. CPLR 214.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Seeman v. International Business Machines Corp. · filed 1998-07-27(5)

Since the plaintiff commenced her action on or about September 20, 1993, the action was not time-barred pursuant to the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (5) as to either movant.

Section 214’s three-year limitations period can bar a direct claim against a third-party defendant even with relation back under CPLR 203(f).

Zamani v. Rite Way Building Industries, Inc. · filed 1998-10-05

Even with the benefit of the relation back provision of CPLR 203 (f), the plaintiffs claim against the appellant, which is subject to a three-year limitation period (see, CPLR 214), was untimely when the third-party action against the appellant for contribution was commenced (see, CPLR 214; Liverpool v Arverne Houses, 67 NY2d 878; Dormitory Auth. v Baker, Jr., of N. Y., 218 AD2d 515, 516; cf., Duffy v Horton Mem. Hosp., 66 NY2d 473).

Section 214(2) gives New York Human Rights Law claims a three-year limitations period measured from the filing of the action in court.

Stephanie J. QUINN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREEN TREE CREDIT CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1998-11-05(2)

In contrast to her Title VII claim, Quinn’s cause of action under New York’s Human Rights Law is governed by a three-year statute of limitations, measured from the filing of the action in court.

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period that begins when the injury occurs, even if the plaintiff is unaware of it.

King v. Albany County Public Defender's Office · filed 1998-11-19(6)

Plaintiffs action is, in addition, barred by the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [6]) which begins to run “when an injury occurs, even if the aggrieved party is then ignorant of the wrong or injury” (Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, 84 NY2d 535, 541). Accordingly, the instant claims accrued on March 3, 1987, the date of plaintiffs conviction.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for New York Human Rights Law claims.

Beattie v. Farnsworth Middle School · filed 1998-12-09(2)

A three-year statute of limitations attaches to Plaintiff's corresponding New York Human Rights Law § 296(1) claims.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a claim for equitable indemnity based on negligence.

Fromer v. Yogel · filed 1999-03-23(4)

New York’s N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 214(4)(McKinney 1996) [hereinafter CPLR § —] applies to this claim, which provides that the action must be commenced within three years. Therefore, to the extent the claim seeks recovery for negligence by the Defendants prior to this period, their motion to dismiss is granted.

CPLR 214 (2) imposes a three-year limitations period on a claim under Executive Law § 296 (2) (a).

Karczewski v. Sharpe · filed 1999-04-26(2)

The plaintiffs motion for leave to amend her complaint to assert a cause of action alleging a violation of Executive Law § 296 (2) (a) was properly denied as it was made after the expiration of the three-year Statute of Limitations under CPLR 214 (2).

Section 214(4) and (6) impose three-year limits on tortious interference with contract and legal malpractice claims, respectively.

Burton v. Rogovin · filed 1999-06-10(4), (6)

... and, in any event, both the malpractice and tortious interference claims are time-barred (CPLR 214 [4], [6]).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for claims alleging constitutional deprivations and violations of 42 USC § 1983.

Weimer v. Lake · filed 2000-01-13(5)

In light of the above, measured from March 3, 1994, plaintiff’s claims for the intentional torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment are barred by the one-year Statute of Limitations (see, Bardi v Warren County Sheriff’s Dept., 260 AD2d 763, 764; see also, CPLR 215) and those for alleged constitutional deprivations and violation of 42 USC § 1983 are barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (see, Brown v State of New York, 250 AD2d 314, 318; see also, CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on breach of fiduciary duty and related conspiracy claims seeking only monetary damages.

Antonios A. Alevizopoulos & Associates, Inc. v. Comcast International Holdings, Inc. · filed 2000-03-13(4)

When a plaintiff seeks only monetary damages, breach of fiduciary duty claims and, concomitantly, conspiracy to breach fiduciary duty claims, are governed by a three-year limitations period.

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence claim.

Fitzpatrick v. City of New York · filed 2000-06-13(5)

Con Ed commenced the third-party action against Roadway in October 1998, after the expiration of the three-year Statute of Limitations period applicable to the plaintiffs’ negligence claim. (See, CPLR 214 [5].)

Section 214 (2) gives claims under Insurance Law § 4226 a three-year limitations period.

Russo v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance · filed 2000-07-27(2)

We likewise conclude that the three-year Statute of Limitations provided for in CPLR 214 (2) applies to plaintiffs Insurance Law § 4226 cause of action and, thus, such cause of action is time barred.

Section 214(5)’s three-year personal injury limitations period applies to § 1983 and § 504 Rehabilitation Act claims.

Hallett v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 2000-08-14(5)

Plaintiffs claims under § 1983 and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are subject to New York’s three-year limitations period for personal injury claims.

Section 214(4) and (6) provide a three-year limitations period for these claims, running from injury; the claims were time-barred because the action began more than three years after the bids opened.

IT Corp. v. Ecology & Environmental Engineering, P. C. · filed 2000-09-29(4), (6)

It is not disputed that those causes of action are subject to a three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [4], [6]) and that they accrued when plaintiff was injured (see, Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, 84 NY2d 535, 541). ... Because plaintiff waited more than three years after the bids were opened to commence its action, those causes of action are time-barred (see, IFD Constr. Corp. v Corddry Carpenter Dietz & Zack, supra, at 92).

Section 214(2) gives Human Rights Law discrimination claims a three-year limitations period.

Martinez-Tolentino v. Buffalo State College · filed 2000-11-13(2)

The ADA has a 300-day Statute of Limitations (see, 42 USC § 20Q0e-5 [e] [1]), and the Human Rights Law has a three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [2]).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for an action to recover on a liability created by statute, including a claim under General Business Law § 349(h).

Busbee v. Ken-Rob Co. · filed 2001-02-22(2)

This cause of action has a three-year limitations period as an action to recover upon a liability created by statute (CPLR 214 [2]; Avdon Capitol Corp. v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 240 AD2d 353; see, Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co., 94 NY2d 330, 343). Whether measured from the inception of the lease in 1979 or the execution of a lease in plaintiffs own name, the deceptive practices of defendant were completed more than three years prior to the commencement of this action, so any cause of action based thereupon is barred.

CPLR 214 sets a three-year limitations period for negligence and Labor Law injury claims.

Honrado v. H.R. Electric Co. · filed 2001-06-22

Since the 1999 dismissal related to an August 1995 incident, plaintiff was foreclosed from initiating a timely new action since the three-year period of limitations had already run (see, Shepard v St. Agnes Hosp., 86 AD2d 628 [2d Dept 1982]) and the CPLR 205 six-month extension was not, by its terms, available to plaintiff.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for New York Human Rights Law claims, measured from the filing of the lawsuit.

McCoy v. City of New York · filed 2001-02-14(2)

McCoy’s cause of action under New York’s Human Rights Law is governed by a three-year statute of limitations period, measured from the filing of the action in court.

Section 214(2)'s three-year limitations period applies to § 1983 and New York Human Rights Law claims.

Purdy v. Town of Greenburgh · filed 2001-09-26(2)

Thus, we find that plaintiffs § 1983 and NYHRL claims are subject to New York’s three-year statute of limitations. This action was commenced on June 13, 2000. Accordingly, plaintiffs claims based on discriminatory acts occurring prior to June 13, 1997 are time barred.

CPLR 214 (4) and (5) impose a three-year limitations period on claims for misappropriation, negligence, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.

Demas v. Levitsky · filed 2002-02-14(4), (5)

The first, seventh and ninth (to the extent that New York recognizes a cause of action for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage [see, Kronos Inc. v AVX Corp., 81 NY2d 90]) causes of action are governed by the three-year statute of limitations of CPLR 214 (4) and (5).

Section 214(5) gives a person three years from accrual to file a personal injury claim.

Folkes v. New York College of Osteopathic Medicine of New York Institute of Technology · filed 2002-03-27(5)

In New York, personal injury claims must be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). The court assumes, for purposes of this motion, that plaintiff commenced her action by service and filing of the Summons With Notice on July 12, 1999. Thus, on their face, all claims that occurred prior to July 12, 1996, which includes all of plaintiffs’ claims except for those alleged to have occurred on August 14,1996 and May 14,1997, are time barred unless they are deemed to be part of a continuing violation, discussed infra.

Section 214 supplies a three-year period from accrual for determining whether a late-claim motion is timely.

Dippolito v. State · filed 2002-06-03

As a threshold issue, the court notes that it has jurisdiction to review and determine this motion since it was filed within three years from the date of accrual. (CPLR 214; Court of Claims Act § 10 [6].)

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for personal injury claims used in section 1983 actions.

Pearl v. The City Of Long Beach · filed 2002-07-15(5)

In section 1983 actions, the applicable limitations period is found in the "general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions," Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989), and the parties agree that in this case that period is three years, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (McKinney 1990).

Section 214(2) gives NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims a three-year limitations period, barring claims based on earlier acts.

Kato v. Ishihara · filed 2002-12-27(2)

The NYSHRL and NYCHRL are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. ... Because Plaintiff filed the Complaint on July 21, 2001, acts or events occurring before July 21, 1998 are time-barred.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims arising in New York.

Branch v. Guilderland Central School District · filed 2003-01-10(5)

In New York, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and thus claims under § 1983, is three years.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which governs § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Warren v. Altieri · filed 2003-03-13

As noted by the district court, Warren’s § 1983 action is governed by New York’s three-year statute of limitations as set out in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214, the provision applicable to actions for personal injury.

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on statutory liability claims, including state SIP claims.

New York v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. · filed 2003-04-28(2)

Accordingly, Niagara Mohawk’s Motion to Dismiss the state law SIP claims falling outside the 3-year statute of limitations period imposed by N.Y. CPLR § 214(2) is granted.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in New York, including claims against a sheriff in his official capacity.

Murcia v. County of Orange · filed 2002-01-24(5)

The statute of limitations for actions brought in the State of New York pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or brought pursuant to any other statute, is three years.

Section 214(2) gives a plaintiff three years to seek recovery for discriminatory paychecks, but earlier pay records may be used as evidence.

Kent v. Papert Companies, Inc. · filed 2003-09-18(2)

As Supreme Court correctly ruled, plaintiff’s discriminatory wage claims under the Executive Law and the Administrative Code are each governed by a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [2]; Executive Law § 297 [9]; Administrative Code § 8-502 [d]). ... Thus, plaintiff may introduce evidence that Picaño and Huck were paid a greater wage in 1994 than she for similar work, and, if she proves her case, she is entitled to compensation for each diminished paycheck issued within the statutory three-year period.

Section 214 bars a complaint filed more than three years after the applicable limitations period has run.

Lu v. Conlon · filed 2004-03-04

The complaint, having been interposed more than three years subsequent to the running of the applicable three-year statutory period (CPLR 214), was also properly dismissed as time-barred.

Section 214(2) gives plaintiffs three years to file NYSHRL discrimination claims.

Hill v. Citibank Corp. · filed 2004-03-26(2)

Discrimination claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are subject to three-year statutes of limitations for filing a complaint. ... The Complaint was filed on March 8, 2002, and thus, to be timely, the plaintiffs claims must have arisen for statute of limitations purposes after March 8, 1999.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for this accident damages action.

Micro-Spy, Inc. v. Small · filed 2004-06-07

We further note that the instant action was timely commenced by filing of the summons with notice (see CPLR 304) within the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214; see also CPLR 210 [b]).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, and § 214(2) provides the same period for actions to recover upon liability, penalty or forfeiture.

Farbstein v. Hicksville Public Library · filed 2004-06-30(2), (5)

Accordingly, the ... limitations period for Section 1981 derives from New York’s personal injury statute, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (McKinney 2003), and the limitations period for Section 1985 derives from the New York statute governing actions to recover upon liability, penalty or forfeiture, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (McKinney 2003). ... The resulting limitations period for both of these claims is three years.

Section 214 provides three-year limitations periods for deceptive trade practices, conversion, and damages claims for breach of fiduciary duty; a conversion claim runs from the date of conversion.

Meadowbrook-Richman, Inc. v. Associated Financial Corp. · filed 2004-07-14

The statute of limitations for deceptive trade practices under New York General Business Law § 349 is three years. ... Conversion claims are governed by a threé-year statute of limitations, running from the date of the actual conversion. ... Because the AFC Parties seek damages for the alleged breach of fiduciary duty, a three year statute of limitations applies.

Section 214(4) applies a three-year limitations period to a claim for losses from defective construction when the claimed damages are not recoverable for breach of contract.

Agway Insurance. v. P & R Truss Co. · filed 2004-10-01(4)

The proposed cause of action is thus subject to the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214 (4), and the motion to intervene was made five months after that period expired.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which the court applied to a Title IX claim.

Curto v. Edmundson · filed 2004-12-17(5)

In New York, personal injury claims must be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Curto commenced this action in November 2001. Thus, all claims that accrued prior to November 1998, which includes claims related to the November 1997 exam, are time-barred.

Section 214(2) gives a creditor’s liability for breach of the peace during repossession a three-year limitations period when that liability was created by statute.

General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Vucich · filed 2005-01-20(2)

CPLR 214 (2) prescribes a three-year statute of limitations period for an action to recover upon a liability created or imposed by statute. ... we conclude that the statute created a new liability for a wrong that no other statute of limitations prescribes (see State of New York v Cortelle Corp., supra at 86; compare Bryden v Wilson Mem. Hosp., 136 AD2d 843, 844 [1988]).

Section 214(4) bars a negligence claim that accrued more than three years before the action commenced.

Synor v. Padavano · filed 2005-02-04(4)

Memorandum: Supreme Court properly granted that part of the motion of defendants Darren M. Padavano and D.M. Padavano Construction Co. seeking dismissal of the cause of ac...tion for negligence against them on the ground that it accrued more than three years prior to commencement of the action (see CPLR 214 [4]; ...).

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims under New York General Business Law § 349.

Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hospital · filed 2005-03-29(2)

Furthermore, Kolari’s claim is barred by the three-year limitations period applicable to § 349 claims.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which New York courts apply to § 1983 claims.

Plumey v. New York State · filed 2005-06-15(5)

In New York, the statute of limitations period is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). This action was commenced on November 27, 2000, and accordingly any claims that accrued prior to November 27, 1997 are time-barred unless there is a basis to toll the statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Sidney v. Wilson · filed 2005-06-24(5)

In New York, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on New York State Human Rights Law claims.

Giannone v. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. · filed 2005-09-21(2)

Giannone’s HRL and NYCHRL claims are time-barred to the extent they concern events prior to December 5, 2000, or more than three years before Plaintiff filed the Complaint.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for conversion and legal malpractice claims.

Collymore v. Secretary of Housing & Urban Development · filed 2005-10-24

The Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Mid-Island Equities Corp., Lucien Zarnowski and Joseph Gusmorino on the ground that the action was time-barred. The statute of limitations applicable to actions alleging conversion and legal malpractice is three years ... This clearly falls outside the applicable statutes of limitations.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for New York State Human Rights Law claims.

Fleming v. Verizon New York, Inc. · filed 2005-11-16(2)

Plaintiffs HRL and NYCHRL claims are each governed by a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for conversion and tortious interference claims.

Weizmann Institute of Science v. Neschis · filed 2005-12-14(3)-(4)

Under New York law, a three-year statute of limitations applies to both claims.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury and property damage claims.

Crum & Foster Insurance v. State · filed 2006-01-24

Since the three-year statute of limitations for causes of action to recover property damages and damages for personal injuries expired before July 7, 2004, the Court of Claims improperly granted the claimant relief.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for the professional malpractice and breach-of-contract claims addressed here.

Rubin v. Valicenti Advisory Services, Inc. · filed 2006-06-16(6)

Here, the statutes of limitations applicable to Rubin’s claims for professional malpractice and breach of contract are three years, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6) (McKinney 2003), and the statute of limitations applicable to a claim of fraud is six years, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (McKinney 2003).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for discrimination claims, but related conduct outside that period may support a continuing hostile work environment claim.

Farrugia v. North Shore University Hospital · filed 2006-06-21(2)

Given the three-year statute of limitations, only conduct occurring on February 6, 2000 or later can be used to support his claim of discrimination, unless the continuing doctrine applies.

CPLR 214 sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims alleging negligent conduct.

Goldstein v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance · filed 2006-09-12

Further, the causes of action alleging intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of duty, and bad faith are barred by the one-year statute of limitations for intentional torts to the extent that they allege intentional conduct (see CPLR 215), or the three-year statute of limitations governing personal injury claims insofar as they allege negligent conduct (see CPLR 214).

Section 214’s limitations period runs from the alleged wrong, which occurred when the claimant was suspended.

Napolitano v. New York State Grievance Committee · filed 2006-10-31

The Court of Claims properly found that the claim was time-barred, as any alleged wrong occurred at the date of the claimant’s suspension in May 2001 (see Court of Claims Act *980§ 10 [3]; CPLR 214), and further that the claimant failed to adequately describe the nature of his claim (see Court of Claims Act § 11 [b]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which the court applied to a § 1983 false arrest claim.

Johnson v. Department of Housing Preservation & Development · filed 2007-01-10(5)

In New York State, the applicable statute of limitations for personal injuries is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (McKinney 2003). ... Because his complaint was filed more than three years after his arrest, the claim relating to that arrest is time-barred.

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in New York.

Cotz v. Mastroeni · filed 2007-02-23

Defendants also argue, and have pled in their Answer, that several of plaintiffs claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are barred by the applicable three-year statute of hmitations which begins to run when plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the harm. ... Clearly, this incident occurred more than three years prior to plaintiffs commencement of this litigation so that this claim is also barred by the statute of limitations.

CPLR 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for consequential tort damages arising from telephone service omissions when the governing tariff limits liability to gross negligence or willful misconduct.

Community Network Service, Inc. v. Verizon New York, Inc. · filed 2007-04-12(4)

Since there is no dispute that the governing Public Service Commission tariffs limit defendant’s liability for service omissions to gross negligence or willful misconduct, and since plaintiff is seeking consequential tort damages in the form of lost profits, the applicable statute of limitations is three years (CPLR 214 [4]; see Columbe v New York Tel. Co., 102 AD2d 909 [1984]). ... Thus, the claim as to the lack of ARS service is timely.

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on negligence claims.

Ross v. Louise Wise Services, Inc. · filed 2007-05-03

The second and third causes of action — for negligence and infliction of emotional distress — are barred by the statutes of limitations under CPLR 214 (three years) and CPLR 215 (one year) respectively.

Section 214(2) provides the three-year limitations period for an insurer’s arbitration claim to recover no-fault benefits under Insurance Law § 5105.

City of Long Beach v. State Farm Insurance · filed 2007-05-08(2)

Here, pursuant to Insurance Law § 5105, State Farm initiated arbitration approximately two years after the subject accident and, thus, well before the expiration of the applicable limitations period (see CPLR 214 [2]). Therefore, the Supreme Court improperly granted Long Beach’s petition based on the application of the one-year and 90-day statute of limitations of General Municipal Law § 50-i.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for this action, measured from the defendants’ election under Executive Law § 297(9).

New York State Division of Human Rights v. Giffuni · filed 2007-05-15(2)

A year later, after expiration of the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [2] [measured from defendants’ section 297 (9) election]), plaintiff moved for a default judgment, annexing the affidavit of service asserting service on defendants’ attorneys, and defendants cross-moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

CPLR 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims based on conduct made illegal by statute that do not allege all the elements of common-law fraud.

State v. Daicel Chemical Industries, Ltd. · filed 2007-07-05(2)

Plaintiff s second and third causes of action, under Executive Law § 63 (12) and General Business Law § 349, were properly found to be time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [2]). These claims rely on allegations of conduct made illegal by statute, and do not even allege all the elements of common-law fraud, and as such they are covered by CPLR 214 (2) (see Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 NY2d 201 [2001]).

Section 214(2) gives a plaintiff three years from an alleged discriminatory act to file a claim under the New York State Human Rights Law.

Kassner v. 2nd Avenue Delicatessen Inc. · filed 2007-07-24(2)

Because this allegation also is pleaded as having occurred in 1999, it too is time-barred under the ADEA, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. We conclude, therefore, that the district court correctly ruled that Kassner had made no timely allegations of employment-related age discrimination based on changes in work stations and work shifts.

Section 214(2) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a NYSHRL claim based on a discrete discriminatory act.

Kassner v. 2nd · filed 2007-07-24(2)

Because this allegation also is pleaded as having occurred in 1999, it too is time-barred under the ADEA, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL.

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for negligence causes of action.

Cialino v. O'Neill · filed 2007-10-16(4)

Because this action was commenced more than four years later on April 6, 2005, it was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence causes of action (see CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for New York statutory consumer fraud claims and breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking money damages.

Gavin v. AT&T CORP. · filed 2008-02-12

The limitations period for the New York and Illinois statutory consumer fraud claims is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214; 815 ILCS 505/10a(e). The limitations period for the New York breach of ... fiduciary claims is three years, since Plaintiff is seeking money damages in connection with this claim.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for ordinary negligence actions.

Haggerty v. Quast · filed 2008-02-19

There is also a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the shorter statute of limitations set forth in General Municipal Law § 50-i, as opposed to the three-year statute of limitations for ordinary negligence (CPLR 214).

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for an action alleging discrimination by a place of public accommodation under the Human Rights Law.

Goldin v. Engineers Country Club · filed 2008-09-02

Rather, the complaint alleged discrimination based on sex under the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296), which allows parties to commence an action against discriminatory places of public accommodation, and the applicable statute of limitations is three years (see Koerner v State of N.Y., Pilgrim Psychiatric Ctr., 62 NY2d 442, 446 [1984]; Bistrisky v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 23 AD3d 866, 867 [2005]; see also CPLR 214).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for monetary claims alleging malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, or negligence.

In Re Smith · filed 2009-01-26(6)

The New York statute of limitations for an action for malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence is three years if the movant is seeking monetary relief. ... As the Movants here are seeking monetary relief against both the Trustee and the Bondholders the three year statute of limitations is applicable.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for New York Human Rights Law claims.

Wright v. Eastman Kodak Co. · filed 2008-04-23(2)

Furthermore, even in the absence of the ADR Releases, plaintiffs’ claims are untimely under the applicable statutes of limitation: 300 days under Title VII, three-years under the NYSHRL, and four years under Section 1981. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); N.Y. CPLR § 214(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1658.

Section 214(2) gives New York State Human Rights Law claims a three-year limitations period.

Whaley v. City University of New York · filed 2008-04-24(2)

Because plaintiff filed this action on September 7, 2004, no discrete actions that occurred before September 7, 2001 are actionable under § 1983, New York Executive Law § 290, and NYC Administrative Code § 8-107. See Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247-48 (2d Cir.1999) (three-year statutes of limitations for § 1983); CPLR 214(2) (same for New York State Human Rights Law); New York City Admin. Code § 84502(d) (same for New York City Human Rights Law).

Section 214 does not bar ordinary negligence claims commenced within three years of the initial finding.

Gosse v. Saint Peter's Hospital · filed 2009-02-11

As both action No. 1 and action No. 2 were commenced within three years of Mr. Gosse’s initial “worrisome” liver finding, if such action sounds in ordinary negligence the statute of limitations will not bar plaintiffs’ ordinary negligence claims.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for a negligent misrepresentation claim seeking emotional injury damages, measured from when the injury occurred.

Colon v. Banco Popular North America · filed 2009-02-24

Plaintiffs acknowledge that the point of injury occurred when he was arrested and incarcerated on December 1, 2003, and accordingly, the action, commenced in April 2007, is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period applied to § 1983 claims arising in New York.

Alaimo v. TRI-VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DIST. · filed 2009-07-06(5)

Thus, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214 requires personal injury actions to be commenced within three years, subject to the exceptions it lists.

MacCharulo v. Gould · filed 2009-08-14

All claims against Defendants Burge, Phillips, Colella, Hermann, Miller, Dr. Langbart, Henderson, Dr. Kami, Dr. Klein, Vito, Churns, Croce, Roberts, Correctional Officer Miller, Belanger, and Muetzel are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as untimely. ... Section 214 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules provides, in relevant part: ... “The following actions must be commenced within three years: ... an action to recover damages for a personal injury except as otherwise provided in sections 214-b, 214-c and 215.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 (McKinney’s 2003).

CPLR 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period applicable to the injury claim.

Bevilacqua v. Bloomberg, L.P. · filed 2010-02-02(5)

Although Scales attempted to serve the second third-party complaint upon Quincy pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 307, the motion court did not abuse its discretion in determining that service was properly effectuated pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 306, and thus that service was complete when the Secretary of State was served on April 4, 2008, within the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214 (2)'s time bar is a personal defense; even a successful assertion does not deprive the forum of jurisdiction over the claim.

Gaul v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation · filed 2009-08-10(2)

The successful assertion of a time-bar defense results in the loss of an opportunity to prosecute claims considered stale under the terms of a statutory defense in bar. It does not result in an adjudication that the forum in which said claims were advanced was without authority and/or jurisdiction to hear or to otherwise act with respect to such claims (see Matter of Morgenthau v Erlbaum, 59 NY2d 143, 149 [1983] [“A court cannot be said to be acting without power merely because it issues an arguably erroneous ruling in a case that is otherwise properly before it”]).

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims seeking monetary damages for injury to property.

Steinfeld Ex Rel. Estate of General Vision Services v. Richard A. Eisner & Co. (In Re General Vision Services, Inc.) · filed 2010-02-03(4)

“Where the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature,” the action is generally deemed to be one “alleging ‘injury to property’ within the meaning of CPLR 214(4), which has a three-year limitations period.”

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on claims for breach of fiduciary duty seeking money damages and negligence.

Roslyn Union Free School District v. Barkan · filed 2010-03-02(4)

The District’s breach of fiduciary duty cause of action, which seeks money damages, and its negligence cause of action, are time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (4) (see Livichusca v M & T Mtge. Co., 49 AD3d 822, 823-824 [2008]; Weiss v TD Waterhouse, 45 AD3d 763, 764 [2007]; Nathanson v Nathanson, 20 AD3d 403, 404 [2005]; Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 118 [2003]; Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v Hunter Turbo Corp., 241 AD2d 505 [1997]).

Section 214(3) requires actions to recover a chattel or damages for taking or detaining a chattel to be commenced within three years.

Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art · filed 2010-03-03(3)

Accordingly, the three year statute of limitations for conversion and replevin (CPLR § 214(3)) applies to all of the plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 214(2) applies a three-year limitations period to NYCHRL and NYSHRL claims.

Williams v. City of New York · filed 2010-03-04(2)

The statute of limitations governing § 1983 claims is three years from the filing of the complaint, Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989), as is the statute of limitations governing NYCHRL and NYSHRL law claims. Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 765 (2d Cir.1998) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (McKinney 2003)); Hill v. Citibank Corp., 312 F.Supp.2d 464, 474 (S.D.N.Y.2004).

Section 214(2) gives claims under General Business Law § 349 a three-year limitations period.

Thrane v. Franklin First Financial, Ltd. · filed 2010-03-12(2)

A claim under Section 349 is subject to the three-year statute of limitations found in N.Y. CPLR § 214(2).

CPLR 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for the action.

Gruber v. Erie County Water Authority · filed 2010-03-26(2)

We thus conclude that the three-year limitations period pursuant to CPLR 214 (2) applies and that this action, commenced within two years and five months from the date it accrued, was timely.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on tortious interference claims.

AMS Group LLC v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank · filed 2010-03-29(4)

Upon a thorough review of the record, we identify no error in the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) and tortious interference claims, which are subject to two- and three-year statutes of limitations, respectively, see 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4), are time-barred. Plaintiffs became aware of Chase’s refusal to extend credit to the AMS Group no later than May 7, 2004. Their August 3, 2007 complaint is therefore untimely under either limitations period.

CPLR 214(3) provides a three-year statute of limitations for replevin actions to recover tangible personal property.

In re Thomas · filed 2010-04-16(3)

In New York, a replevin action is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214 (3). ... All of these filings were within three years of the original demand for possession of the chattels (CPLR 214 [3]), and thus timely within the statute of limitations.

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on General Business Law § 349 and Insurance Law claims.

Pike v. New York Life Insurance · filed 2010-04-27(2)

The plaintiffs’ breach of General Business Law § 349 and breach of the Insurance Law causes of action are both governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [2]; Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 NY2d 201, 208 [2001]; Dolce v Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 272 AD2d 432 [2000]), and their fourth cause of action, alleging that the subject policies were unsuitable for their needs, was properly treated by the court as an attempt to state a claim under 28 USC § 1658 (b), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which is governed by a statute of limitations of two years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation, or five years after the violation.

Section 214 bars a legal malpractice action after three years.

Kurman v. Schnapp · filed 2010-05-04

Any cause of action for legal malpractice by plaintiff against defendant was time-barred after 2002, since the allegation that defendant may have left TLC with the impression that he was still representing plaintiff in 2005 and 2006 does not establish a continuing attorney-client relationship between plaintiff and defendant after 1999 (see CPLR 214).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for actions to recover damages for personal injury.

Davis v. Brookdale University Hospital & Medical Center · filed 2010-06-04(5)

In the instant case, there is no evidence of “intentional, offensive contact” on the part of Brookdale. The allegations against Brookdale are wholly in negligence and, therefore, are governed by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(4) limits monetary recovery to property damage that occurred within three years before the action began.

King v. 870 Riverside Drive Housing Development Fund Corp. · filed 2010-06-08(4)

Plaintiff’s claim for damages arising from the coop’s alleged failure, in violation of the proprietary lease, to repair the continuing leaks is not time-barred, but recovery of monetary damages is limited by CPLR 214 (4) to any alleged damage that occurred within three years of the commencement of the instant action (see Kaymakcian v Board of Mgrs. of Charles House Condominium, 49 AD3d 407 [2008]).

Section 214(4) requires an action to recover damages for an injury to property to be commenced within three years.

Winstar Holdings, LLC v. Blackstone Group, LP (In Re Winstar Communications, Inc.) · filed 2010-08-11(4)

The New York statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ negligence claim (Count 4) is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4). Therefore, Count 4 must be dismissed whether the Delaware or New York limitations period applies.

Section 214 provides a three-year statute of limitations for claims brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983.

Greenfield v. Town of Babylon Department of Assessment · filed 2010-09-28

In any event, Greenfield also asserted a claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, which has a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214; Wilson v Garcia, 471 US 261 [1985]; Corvetti v Town of Lake Pleasant, 227 AD2d 821, 823 [1996]; see also Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v Commission of Webster Cty., 488 US 336, 345 [1989]; Matter of Resnick v Town of Canaan, 38 AD3d 949, 952-953 [2007]; Matter of Krugman v Board of Assessors of Vil. of Atl. Beach, 141 AD2d 175. [1988]).

Section 214(5) gives constitutional tort claims a three-year statute of limitations.

Roye v. State of New York · filed 2010-09-30(5)

The causes of action alleging constitutional torts(4) - violation of movant's due process rights during his disciplinary hearing and his right to exercise his religion - are subject to a three year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR § 214 (5) (see Brown v State of New York, 250 AD2d 314, 318 [1998]). Thus, since the instant motion was filed on May 25, 2010, and these particular causes of action accrued, at the earliest, in July 2009, the motion is timely, and the Court has jurisdiction to determine its merits.

Section 214(6) applies a three-year limitations period to a breach of contract claim that is essentially a professional malpractice claim.

Napoli v. Moisan Architects · filed 2010-10-26(6)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, his cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract “is essentially a malpractice” cause of action (Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.], 3 NY3d 538, 542 [2004]), which is governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Richey v. Hamm · filed 2010-11-12

The accident occurred on July 12, 2005 and, although the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 would appear to have expired on July 12, 2008, we take judicial notice of the fact that July 12, 2008 was a Saturday (see Matter of Persing v Coughlin, 214 AD2d 145, 149 [1995]). Thus, pursuant to General Construction Law § 25-a (1), the statute of limitations did not expire until Monday, July 14, 2008.

Subsection 214(4) requires tortious interference with contract actions to be commenced within three years.

Chung v. Wang · filed 2010-12-07(4)

Rather, the cause of action alleging tortious interference with contract is governed by the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214 (4) (see Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp., 81 NY2d 90, 92 [1993]), while a cause of action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years from the time of the fraud or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered, or with reasonable diligence, could have been discovered, whichever is longer (see CPLR 213 [8]; Pericon v Ruck, 56 AD3d 635, 636 [2008]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitation period for personal injury actions.

Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. Village of Wesley Hills · filed 2010-03-31(5)

In any event, Plaintiffs could not pursue claims based on alleged false representations made in 1997 and 2004 under §§ 1982, 1983, and 1985 as such claims would be time barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. ... N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (setting a three-year statute of limitations in personal injury actions).

Section 214(6) requires nonmedical malpractice actions to be commenced within three years of completion of the work.

Reyes-Dawson v. Goddu · filed 2010-06-01(6)

Pursuant to CPLR 214 (6), an action instituted for malpractice “other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” (see Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.], 3 NY3d 538, 539-540 [2004]) must be instituted within three years of the completion of the work involved (see City School Dist. of City of Newburgh v Stubbins & Assoc., 85 NY2d 535, 538 [1995]).

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period on legal malpractice actions regardless of whether the underlying theory is contract or tort.

Tsafatinos v. Lee David Auerbach, P.C. · filed 2011-01-25(6)

The statute of limitations applicable to actions sounding in legal malpractice is three years “regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” (CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for claims brought under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL.

Butler v. New York Health & Racquet Club · filed 2011-01-26(2)

The statute of limitations is three years for claims brought under both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-502(d).

Section 214 imposes three-year limitations periods for monetary breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and conversion or recovery of chattels, with conversion claims generally accruing upon demand and refusal.

Marchig v. CHRISTIE'S INC. · filed 2011-02-01(3), (4)

Under New York law, a plaintiff seeking to recover monetary damages for a breach of fiduciary duty must file suit within three years from the time the cause of action accrues. ... The applicable statute of limitations provides that a claim for negligence must be filed within three years of the time the injury is suffered. ... The New York statute of limitations for conversion and recovery of chattels is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3). Generally, New York applies a “demand and refusal” rule to accrual of such claims, meaning that the claim does not accrue at the time of the alleged conversion, but rather at the time “the true owner makes demand for return of the chattel and the person in possession of the chattel refuses to return it.”

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on claims seeking only money damages.

Weksler v. Weksler · filed 2011-02-01

The ninth and tenth causes of action are subject to CPLR 214’s three-year limitations period because plaintiff seeks money damages only under these claims (see Yatter v Morris Agency, 256 AD2d 260, 261 [1998]). These claims are not time-barred inasmuch as Kane Kessler’s aforementioned invoice recites actionable conduct committed within three years prior to the commencement of this action.

Section 214(5) requires personal injury actions to be commenced within three years.

Kameraj v. Joseph · filed 2011-02-22(5)

It is undisputed that plaintiff served the summons and complaint on defendant after the applicable three-year statute of limitations had expired (see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for claims arising from statutory obligations.

M.N. Dental Diagnostics, P.C. v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2011-03-01(2)

Therefore, the three-year statute of limitations as set forth in CPLR 214 (2) is applicable here.

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for negligence claims, measured from accrual.

Bond v. Progressive Insurance · filed 2011-03-03(4)

In our view, plaintiffs cause of action charging HEG with negligence, breach of duty and “errors and omissions” sounds in tort (see Santiago v 1370 Broadway Assoc., 96 NY2d 765, 766 [2001]), is governed by the three-year negligence statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [4]; Chase Scientific Research v NIA Group, 96 NY2d 20, 30 [2001]), and, for the reasons stated below, did not accrue until the April 2008 judgment awarded damages against the O’Rourkes.

Section 214(6) bars an action commenced more than three years after the attorney-client relationship ends.

Riley v. Segan, Nemerov & Singer, P.C. · filed 2011-03-22(6)

Because the action was commenced more than three years after plaintiffs’ receipt of the August 25, 2004 letter, it is time-barred (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(4) gives negligence claims a three-year limitations period.

Il Cambio, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 2011-03-29(4)

Claims in negligence are governed by the three-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 214 (4) (see Tischler Roofing & Sheet Metal Works Co. v Sicolo Garage, 64 Misc 2d 825 [1970]).

Section 214(2) applies a three-year statute of limitations to actions to recover a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.

Eldridge v. Carmel Central School District Board of Education · filed 2011-03-29(2)

As this is “an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute” (CPLR 214 [2]), a three-year statute of limitations is applicable (see CPLR 214 [2]; Espie v Murphy, 35 AD3d 348 [2006]; Charleson v City of Long Beach, 297 AD2d 775 [2002]; Shechtman v Sverdrup & Parcel Consultants, 226 AD2d 268 [1996]).

Section 214(6) requires legal malpractice actions to be commenced within three years.

Krichmar v. Scher · filed 2011-03-29(6)

To dismiss an action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) as barred by the applicable statute of limitations, a defendant must satisfy the threshold burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that the time within which to sue has expired, and once that showing has been made, the burden shifts to the opponent to establish that the statute of limitations has been tolled or that he or she actually commenced the action within the applicable limitations period (see Hebrew Inst. for Deaf & Exceptional Children v Kahana, 57 AD3d 734 [2008]; Savarese v Shatz, 273 AD2d 219, 220 [2000]). Here, the defendants sustained their initial burden on the motion by demonstrating that the applicable limitations period had expired with respect to all of the alleged acts of legal malpractice (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(4) gives negligence and aiding-and-abetting fiduciary-duty claims a three-year limitations period.

Baron v. Galasso · filed 2011-04-05(4)

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contentions, the Supreme Court properly applied the three-year statute of limitations to the ninth cause of action, alleging negligence and the eleventh cause of action, alleging aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty (see CPLR 214 [4]; IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 139-140 [2009]; Matter of Kaszirer v Kaszirer, 286 AD2d 598, 599 [2001]; Heffernan v Marine Midland Bank, 283 AD2d 337, 338 [2001]).

Section 214(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for permissibly unexhausted IDEA claims brought directly in federal court.

Piazza v. Florida Union Free School District · filed 2011-04-07(2)

Courts in the Second Circuit considering IDEA claims that are permissibly unexhausted have followed this rule by applying a three-year statute of limitations borrowed from N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2). ... The Court will therefore apply a three-year limitations period, the most generous option advanced by the Plaintiffs.

Section 214(4) generally imposes a three-year limitations period for monetary claims involving injury to property, subject to CPLR 213(7)'s six-year period for covered corporate actions.

Roslyn Union Free School District v. Barkan · filed 2011-05-03(4)

Causes of action that seek monetary damages for injury to property are generally subject to a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [4]; IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 139 [2009]). But CPLR 213 (7) extends the limitations period to six years for “an action by or on behalf of a corporation against a present or former . . . officer ... to recover damages for waste or for an injury to property or for an accounting in conjunction therewith.” ... If the specific language of CPLR 213 (7) encompasses a particular claim, it supplants the general three-year rule of CPLR 214 (4).

Section 214(6) applies a three-year limitations period to claims that are essentially for professional malpractice, including contract theories based on professional services.

City of Binghamton v. Hawk Engineering P.C. · filed 2011-06-16(6)

Initially, Supreme Court properly determined that plaintiffs claim is essentially one for professional malpractice and, thus, the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214 (6) applies, rather than the six-year period for breach of contract actions.

Section 214(6) gives claims against an architect for professional malpractice a three-year statute of limitations.

Vlahakis v. Belcom Development, LLC · filed 2011-07-12(6)

A cause of action to recover damages against an architect for professional malpractice is governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]; Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.], 3 NY3d 538, 542 [2004]; Napoli v Moisan Architects, 77 AD3d 895 [2010]).

Section 214(6) requires legal-malpractice actions to be commenced within three years, subject to applicable tolling.

Rupolo v. Fish · filed 2011-08-23(6)

The defendants demonstrated that the alleged legal malpractice occurred more than three years before the instant action was commenced on October 31, 2008 (see CPLR 214 [6]; Kennedy v H. Bruce Fischer, Esq., P.C., 78 AD3d 1016, 1017 [2010]).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for injury to property.

Pursnani v. Stylish Move Sportswear, Inc. · filed 2012-02-07(4)

Thus, those causes of action are governed by the three-year limitations period applicable to injury to property (see CPLR 214 [4]; IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 139-140 [2009]; Carbon Capital Mgt., LLC v American Express Co., 88 AD3d 933 [2011]; Monaghan v Ford Motor Co., 71 AD3d 848, 849-850 [2010]; Yatter v Morris Agency, 256 AD2d 260, 261 [1998]; Powers Mercantile Corp. v Feinberg, 109 AD2d 117, 120-121 [1985], affd 67 NY2d 981 [1986]).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims.

Hoy v. INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF BAYVILLE · filed 2011-02-25(5)

The Section 1983 claim is subject to the three-year statute of limitations under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

CPLR 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for an action to recover upon a liability created or imposed by statute.

Doe v. Belmare · filed 2011-03-31(2)

This court agrees with plaintiff. Public Health Law article 27-F was enacted upon the recognition that “maximum confidentiality protection” for HIV related information was “an essential public health measure” and that “strong confidentiality protections can limit the risk of discrimination and the harm to an individual’s interest in privacy.” (L 1988, ch 584, § 1.) It provides that any person who discloses confidential HIV related information in violation of section 2782 shall be subject to a civil penalty, and that any person who willfully does so shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. These are characteristics of a claim based on statute, akin to a claim pursuant to the Executive Law for discrimination, and not a standard claim for personal injury. It is apparent to this court that Public Health Law article 27-F was enacted to protect a vulnerable class of individuals and in this regard, is dissimilar to a standard personal injury action to which Unconsolidated Laws § 7401 applies. Thus, the requirement of the Unconsolidated Laws for service of a notice of claim within a shortened statute of limitations does not apply to this action.

Section 214(6) gives architectural malpractice claims a three year limitations period that accrues when contractual performance and the professional relationship end.

Mary Imogene Bassett Hospital v. Cannon Design, Inc. · filed 2011-05-12(6)

The applicable statute of limitations for a claim of architectural malpractice is three years, “regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” (CPLR 214 [6]; see Town of Wawarsing v Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc., 49 AD3d 1100, 1101 [2008]).

Section 214(6) requires malpractice claims to be brought within three years, beginning when an actionable injury occurs and tolling during continuous representation.

Protostorm, LLC v. Antonelli, Terry, Stout & Kraus, LLP · filed 2011-11-29(6)

The statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs’ malpractice claim is three years, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6), and it begins to run on “the day an actionable injury occurs,” regardless of when plaintiffs discover such injury, McCoy v. Feinman, 99 N.Y.2d 295, 301, 755 N.Y.S.2d 693, 785 N.E.2d 714 (2002). However, under the “continuous representation doctrine,” the statute of limitations is tolled for as long as “there is a mutual understanding” between attorney and client “of the need for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim.”

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, subject to tolling.

Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. · filed 2012-01-24(5)

The applicable three-year statute of limitations for a personal injury action (CPLR 214 [5]) was tolled until petitioner turned 18, and expired on April 27, 2009, when he turned 21 (see CPLR 105 Q]; 208).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for NYSHRL claims.

Bermudez v. City of New York · filed 2011-03-25(2)

Bermudez’s claims under Section 1983, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (NYSHRL claims); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d) (NYCHRL claims).

Section 214(6) requires an action to recover damages for legal malpractice to be commenced within three years after accrual.

Rakusin v. Miano · filed 2011-05-17(6)

An action to recover damages arising from legal malpractice must be commenced within three years after accrual (see CPLR 214 [6]; 203 [a]).

Section 214(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for actions to recover a liability, penalty, or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.

Keitt v. New York City · filed 2011-09-29(2)

Contrary to the authority cited by the City Defendants, however, “[cjourts in the Second Circuit considering IDEA claims that are permissibly unexhausted have [applied] a three-year statute of limitations borrowed from N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2),” which governs “an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.... ” Piazza, 777 F.Supp.2d at 689 (collecting cases). A three-year limitations period would also apply to the extent Keitt is bringing his IDEA claim under Section 1983. See Quackenbush v. Johnson City Sch. Dist., 716 F.2d 141, 147 (2d Cir.1983) (finding right of action for IDEA violations to be available under Section 1983, where plaintiff has been denied procedural safeguards and there is no final administrative decision).

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period, and earlier harassment allegations are not preserved absent a continuing violation.

Green v. Continuum Health Partners, Inc. · filed 2011-10-11(2)

Plaintiff failed to show a continuing violation between the sexual harassment that he alleges occurred before December 30, 2005, three years before he commenced this action (see CPLR 214 [2]; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 307 [1983]), and the harassment that he alleges occurred on July 31, 2008 (see Sirota v New York City Bd. of Educ., 283 AD2d 369 [2001]).

Section 214(4) subjects tortious interference claims to a three-year limitations period.

Kosowsky v. Willard Mountain, Inc. · filed 2011-12-01(4)

The claim against Wilson for tortious interference with contract is subject to a three-year limitations period (see CPLR 214 [4]; Andrew Greenberg, Inc. v Svane, Inc., 36 AD3d 1094, 1099 [2007]) and is thus time-barred as to claims arising before February 23, 2007.

Section 214(2) requires actions based on a statutory liability to be commenced within three years.

Vig v. New York Hairspray Co. · filed 2012-03-22(2)

Plaintiff did not commence this action, however, until October 24, 2007, more than three years later. Accordingly, the action was properly dismissed as time-barred (see CPLR 214 [2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-502 [d]).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for the claims covered by it.

Peterec-Tolino v. Harap · filed 2012-03-27(2)

Although plaintiff commenced this action more than three years later, after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [2]), it is timely pursuant to CPLR 205 (a), since it was commenced within six months after termination of a timely commenced federal action.

Section 214 requires negligence and personal injury claims to be commenced within three years.

Jones v. Riese Organization · filed 2012-03-29(4), (5)

Plaintiffs claims against the condominium boards for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence are time-barred since the allegations in the complaint establish that they accrued no later than 1990 (see CPLR 214 [4], [5]; Yatter v Morris Agency, 256 AD2d 260, 261 [1998]).

Section 214(2) bars State Human Rights Law claims filed more than three years after the alleged discrimination.

Mejia v. Roosevelt Island Medical Associates · filed 2012-05-10(2)

As employment discrimination claims under the State HRL are governed by a three-year statute of limitations, plaintiff’s allegations relating to delays of vacations in 1999 and 2000 are not actionable (see CPLR 214 [2]; Mascola v City Univ. of N.Y., 14 AD3d 409, 409 [2005]).

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice action to be commenced within three years after the claim accrues.

Pace v. Raisman & Associates Esqs., LLP · filed 2012-05-23(6)

The law firm defendants satisfied this threshold burden by showing that the trust amendment was executed in January 2001, that the last conveyance to the trust was made no later than the date of the decedent’s death in October 2005, which was more than three years prior to the commencement of the action, and that the applicable statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim pursuant to CPLR 214 (6) is three years from the date that the cause of action accrued (see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]).

Section 214 provides a three-year statute of limitations for section 1983 causes of action in New York.

Way v. City of Beacon · filed 2012-06-13

Causes of action asserted pursuant to section 1983 have a three-year statute of limitations in New York (see CPLR 214; Matter of Greenfield v Town of Babylon Dept. of Assessment, 76 AD3d 1071, 1073-1075 [2010]), and accrue “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of [the] action” (Pearl v City of Long Beach, 296 F3d 76, 80 [2002] [internal quotation marks omitted], cert denied 538 US 922 [2003]; see Rimany v Town of Dover, 72 AD3d 918, 921 [2010]; Palmer v State of New York, 57 AD3d 364 [2008]).

Section 214(4) requires an action to recover for injury to property to be commenced within three years.

Backus v. Lyme Adirondack Timberlands II, LLC · filed 2012-06-21(4)

The statute of limitations for an action to recover for injury to property, such as an RPAPL 861 action, is three years (see CPLR 214 [4]; Chargo v Simons, 71 AD3d 1481, 1482 [2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 713 [2010]; Mandel v Estate of Frank L. Tiffany, 263 AD2d 827, 829 [1999]).

Section 214(5) subjects negligence claims to a three-year limitations period.

Zimmerman v. Poly Prep Country Day School · filed 2012-08-28[5]

Negligence claims are subject to the general three-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions. See Sharon B. v. Reverend S., 244 A.D.2d 878, 665 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (4th Dep’t 1997) (applying N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214[5] to claims against dioceses arising out of sexual abuse by priest).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for the New York State Human Rights Law claims discussed by the court.

Odom v. Doar · filed 2012-09-20(2)

Similarly, because Odom did not file his federal complaint until January 2011, his claims brought under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law, both of which have a three-year statute of limitations, are also time-barred. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d); see also Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen, Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2007).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for violations of the New York Human Rights Law.

Cost v. Super Media · filed 2012-10-01(2)

The statute of limitations for a violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law is three years. ... (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d)).

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for New York consumer protection claims; claims alleging purchases within that period survive a motion to dismiss.

In re Conagra Foods Inc. · filed 2012-11-15

Ohio’s limitations period, for example, is two years, while the statute of limitations in New York is three years. Ohio Rev.Code 1345.10(C); McKinney’s CPLR § 214.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for actions seeking recovery for injury to property, with continuing wrong claims reaching only the three years before suit.

Gates v. AT&T Corp. · filed 2012-11-21(4)

We reject defendant’s contention that the action is time-barred by the three-year limitations period applicable to actions for injury to property (see CPLR 214 [4]). ... “These alleged acts of continuous nuisance and trespass give rise to successive causes of action under the continuous wrong doctrine,” with recovery of damages limited to the three-year period preceding the commencement of the action (Lucchesi v Perfetto, 72 AD3d 909, 912 [2010] [citations omitted]; see Petti v Town of Lexington, 92 AD3d 1111, 1114-1115 [2012]).

Section 214(4) requires applicable claims to be brought within three years.

Zinter Handling, Inc. v. General Electric Co. · filed 2012-12-13(4)

Turning to the claims asserted against JCM, to the extent that plaintiff’s unfair competition claim is premised upon a specific letter that Spota sent to GE in August 1999, such claim is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [4]; Ullmannglass v Oneida, Ltd., 86 AD3d 827, 828 [2011]).

CPLR 214(4) requires certain claims to be brought within three years.

Alizio v. Perpignano · filed 2013-01-23(4)

The Supreme Court also erred in denying that branch of the Perpignano defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss, as barred by the statute of limitations, Joseph’s third amended cross claim asserted against Perpignano and Irving Eisenberg’s estate insofar as they related to the diversion of partnership funds, as those amended cross claims did not relate back to the original cross claims and, therefore, were barred by the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 214 (4) (see IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 139 [2009]; Hughes v Bi Feng Nie, 12 AD3d at 407).

CPLR 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for injury to property claims.

Robertson v. Wells · filed 2012-05-01(4)

The negligence claim is governed by the three-year limitations period applicable to injury to property (see CPLR 214 [4]). Since the acts complained of allegedly took place, at the latest, in May 2007, and the instant action was not commenced until December 2010, so much of the complaint as, in effect, alleged negligence was time-barred.

CPLR 214 provides a three-year limitations period for ordinary negligence claims.

MANCUSO, DANIEL v. KALEIDA HEALTH · filed 2012-11-09

Because the seventh cause of action sounds in ordinary negligence, it is governed by the three-year statute of limitations found in CPLR 214 and is thus timely.

Section 214(2) generally requires actions to recover liability, penalties, or forfeitures created by statute to be commenced within three years.

Kassman v. KPMG LLP · filed 2013-02-07(2)

Under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, claims must be brought within three years. ... In this case, as Kassman filed her EEOC charge on August 19, 2010, and the complaint in this case on June 2, 2011, the parties agree that she cannot bring Title VII claims for events that occurred prior to October 29, 2009, or claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL for events that occurred prior to June 2, 2008. ... Thus, to the extent that Kassman alleges that she received discriminatory performance evaluations prior to those dates, they are — as Kassman implicitly concedes by not arguing to the contrary— time barred under the relevant statutes. However, to the extent that she alleges such discrimination after those dates (see, e.g., TAC ¶¶ 92-94, 118-23), her claims are timely and may proceed.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims.

Nguyen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA · filed 2013-02-22

Nguyen’s other claims, conversion and breach of fiduciary duty, are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 (McKinney 2012).

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on monetary damages claims that cannot be recast as equitable disgorgement.

Access Point Medical, LLC v. Mandell · filed 2013-04-02

In contrast, plaintiffs’ demand for the return of attorneys’ fees they paid to defendants is, essentially, a claim for monetary damages. The calculated use of the term “disgorgement” instead of other equally applicable terms such as repayment, recoupment, refund, or reimbursement, should not be permitted to distort the nature of the claim so as to expand the applicable limitations period from three years to six. We cannot allow a purely semantic distinction to control the application of the statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) imposes a three-year limitations period on most personal injury claims.

Sanchez v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 2013-04-25(5)

Most personal injury claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for this Bivens action arising in New York.

Rudaj v. Treanor · filed 2013-06-17

“The statute of limitations for Bivens actions arising in New York is three years.” Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251 (1989)); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214. ... Applying the three-year statute of limitations, the limitations period expired on October 26, 2007; Rudaj’s Fourth Amendment claim, filed in October 2011, is time-barred.

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on statutory liability, penalty, or forfeiture claims.

People v. Sprint Nextel Corp. · filed 2013-06-27(2)

CPLR 214 (2) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on any “action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.” ... Thus, the third and fourth causes of action must be dismissed as time-barred to the extent that they apply to periods before March 31, 2008.