N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214

Section 214 gives conversion and replevin claims a three-year limitations period, generally running from the taking.

Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Simpson · filed 2025-06-18(3), (4)

Causes of action alleging conversion and replevin are each subject to a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[3], [4]; Merlino v Knudson , 214 AD3d 642, 645; Malanga v Chamberlain , 71 AD3d 644, 645), and they generally "accrue[ ] when the conversion or taking occurred, and not from discovery" ( Merlino v Knudson , 214 AD3d at 645 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see State of New York v Seventh Regiment Fund , 98 NY2d 249, 259; Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v Lubell , 77 NY2d 311, 317-318).

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Kumaran v. Northland Energy Trading, LLC · filed 2025-01-10(3)

Claims for conversion have a three-year statute of limitations. See NY CPLR 214(3) (“an action to recover a chattel or damages for the taking or detaining of a chattel” must be commenced “within three years”). Because Kumaran filed the action on September 6, 2019, within three years of Larkin’s last payment to Kumaran on October 14, 2016, Larkin’s claims for fraud and conversion are timely.

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period following the alleged theft.

Martinez v. Iqbal · filed 2024-11-20(3)

Relevant here, FLSA claims have a two or three year statute of limitations, depending on whether a defendant’s conduct was willful (see 29 U.S.C. § 255(a)), NYLL claims have a six-year statute of limitations (see N.Y. Lab. L. § 198), conversion claims have a three-year statute of limitations following the alleged theft (see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3)), and imposed constructive trust claims have a six-year statute of limitations following the occurrence of the wrongful act creating a duty to restitute (see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1)).

Section 214(3) gives a conversion claim a three-year limitations period.

Black v. Phoenix Cayman Ltd. · filed 2025-01-09(3)

Dismissal of the conversion claim is also proper insofar as it is based on any alleged acts of conversion occurring prior to June 12, 2017 — i.e., three years before the complaint was filed ( see CPLR 214[3]; Maya NY, LLC v Hagler , 106 AD3d 583, 585 [1st Dept 2013]).

Section 214(3) gives a conversion claim a three-year limitations period; a defendant seeking dismissal must show that the alleged conversion occurred more than three years before the action began.

Board of Mgrs. of the Brighton Tower II Condominium v. Brighton Bldr., LLC · filed 2024-04-10(3)

A cause of action alleging conversion is subject to a three-year limitations period ( see CPLR 214[3]; Obstfeld v Thermo Niton Analyzers, LLC , 168 AD3d 1080, 1083). ... Here, the defendants failed to demonstrate that the alleged conversion occurred more than three years prior to the commencement of this action, as they failed to identify when, if ever, funds allegedly were used for an unauthorized purpose, subject to a refused demand for return, or otherwise improperly disbursed.

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Clark v. Hemphill Artworks, LLC · filed 2024-03-16(3)

Under New York law, claims for conversion are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3).

Section 214(3) generally requires a conversion claim to be commenced within three years of the alleged conversion.

Lurie v. Lurie · filed 2024-04-24(3)

A cause of action alleging conversion typically must be commenced within three years of the alleged conversion ( see CPLR 214[3]) and "accrues and the limitations period begins to run on the date the conversion allegedly occurred" ( Matter of Asch , 164 AD3d 787, 788; see Sunyoung Jung v Reiner & Kaiser Assoc. , 220 AD3d 643, 644). Here, since the alleged conversion of LMC by Neil Lurie occurred, at the earliest, on December 23, 2015, the Trust defendants' counterclaim alleging conversion was timely, having been interposed less than three years later, on October 9, 2018.

Section 214(3) gives a claim for damages for conversion a three-year limitation period.

Jung v. Reiner & Kaiser Assoc. · filed 2023-10-04(3)

Pursuant to CPLR 214(3), "[a] cause of action to recover damages for conversion is subject to a three-year limitation period" ( Siegler v Lippe , 189 AD3d at 904). ... Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that so much of the cause of action alleging conversion as sought to recover funds allegedly converted prior to October 24, 2015, three years prior to the commencement of this action, is time-barred ( see Mohrman v Johns , 210 AD3d 1075, 1077).

Section 214(3) gives a plaintiff three years to bring conversion and replevin claims against an innocent possessor, beginning when the plaintiff demands return of the property and the possessor refuses.

Reif v. The Art Institute of Chicago · filed 2023-11-24(3)

In New York, the three-year statute of limitations begins to run after the plaintiff has demanded return of the chattel and such demand has been refused.

Section 214(3) gives a replevin claim a three-year limitations period; against a good faith purchaser, the claim accrues when the owner demands the property and is refused.

Middendorf v. American Numismatic Socy. · filed 2022-10-18(3)

The statute of limitations for replevin claims is three years, and a claim "against a good faith purchaser accrues once the true owner makes a demand and is refused" ( Swain v Brown , 135 AD3d 629, 631 [1st Dept 2016]; see CPLR 214 [3]).

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period that runs from the taking, not its discovery.

Merlino v. Knudson · filed 2023-03-01(3)

"A cause of action alleging conversion is subject to a three-year limitations period" ( Obstfeld v Thermo Niton Analyzers, LLC , 168 AD3d 1080, 1083; see CPLR 214[3]). A cause of action for conversion accrues when the conversion or taking occurred ( see Sporn v MCA Records , 58 NY2d 482, 488; Siegler v Lippe , 189 AD3d at 904), and "not from discovery" ( Obstfeld v Thermo Niton Analyzers, LLC , 168 AD3d at 1083; see Torrance Constr., Inc. v Jacques , 127 AD3d 1261, 1265).

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period that runs from when the conversion occurs.

Global Gaming Philippines, LLC v. Razon, Jr. · filed 2022-03-21(3)

Under New York law, a claim for conversion is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See CPLR § 214(3). ... Here, Plaintiff’s conversion claim against Razon accrued in January 2014 and is time barred.

Section 214(3) gives a conversion claim a three-year limitations period.

Pereira v. Brown · filed 2022-09-22(3)

In New York, the statute of limitations on a conversion claim is three years. ... The Trustee’s conversion claim accrued when Jennifer refused to do so after due demand from the Trustee. See MacDonnell, 193 N.Y. at 102. The Trustee timely filed the Complaint on March 5, 2020.

Section 214(3) generally gives a plaintiff three years to bring a conversion claim, but the fraud limitations period applies when actual fraud is essential to the claim.

Star Auto Sales of Queens, LLC v. Filardo · filed 2022-03-09(3)

A cause of action alleging conversion typically must be commenced within three years of the alleged conversion ( see CPLR 214[3]). However, when the allegations of fraud are essential to a cause of action alleging conversion based upon actual fraud, the cause of action is governed by the limitations period for fraud set forth in CPLR 213(8). ... Since the fifth cause of action, alleging conversion, is based upon fraud, it is governed by the statute of limitations period for fraud set forth in CPLR 213(8) ( see Loeuis v Grushin , 126 AD3d at 765; see also Monteleone v Monteleone , 162 AD3d at 762).

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Morrow v. Brighthouse Life Ins. Co. of NY · filed 2021-12-23(3)

A cause of action for conversion has a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214 [3]) and accrues on the date the conversion takes place ( see DiMatteo v Cosentino , 71 AD3d 1430, 1431 [4th Dept 2010]).

Section 214(3) gives a conversion claim a three-year limitations period.

Roelcke v. ZiP Aviation, LLC · filed 2021-11-23(3)

Therefore, because conversion has a three-year statute of limitations and the complaint was filed on August 10, 2015, the defendants’ counterclaim is not time barred unless it accrued before August 10, 2012.

Section 214(3) gives a conversion claim three years from the conversion itself, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers it or could have discovered it through due diligence.

Lyman v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. · filed 2021-12-14(3)

While the three-year statute of limitations for conversion (CPLR 214 [3]) accrued on the date the conversion occurred, not from the discovery of the conversion or the exercise of due diligence to discover ( see Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex. , 87 NY2d 36, 44-45 [1995]), the six-year statute of limitations for breach of the bailment contract (CPLR 213 [2]) began to run when plaintiff demanded return of the stocks and defendants did not deliver them ( see CPLR 206 [a][2]; Ganley v Troy City Natl. Bank, 98 NY 487, 494 [1885] [the defendant bank was bound to keep the treasury notes safe for the plaintiff, and to deliver them up to her upon her demand; "[s]he could not put the defendant in default upon its contract until a demand."]; see also Stephens v Crawford , 209 AD 142, 150 [2d Dept 1924], affd 239 NY 535 [1924]).

CPLR 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Vaughan v. Mouton · filed 2021-02-26(3)

Conversion is subject to a three-year limitations period ( see CPLR 214 [3]; see also Collymore v Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev. , 22 AD3d 703 [2005]).

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limit for conversion claims, but equitable estoppel can prevent a defendant from asserting that limit when concealment delayed the claim and the claimant acted diligently.

Su v. Sotheby's Inc. · filed 2020-09-29(3)

New York applies a three-year statute of limitations to conversion claims. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3). ... Because there are clear questions of fact whether Su is equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense, the motion for summary judgment must be denied.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Einhorn v. Einhorn · filed 1964-04-20(4)

In our opinion, the "Fifth” counterclaim as pleaded states a cause of action in conversion; as such it is barred by the three-year' Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd. 4; formerly Civ. Prac. Act, § 49, subd. 7).

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Nichimen & Co. v. Framen Steel Supply Co. · filed 1964-10-23(3)

A claim based upon a conversion is subject to a three-year period of limitations (CPLR 214, subd. 3).

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on a claim for conversion of securities.

Klein v. Bower · filed 1970-01-23(3)-(4)

Cause number two for conversion of his securities is subject to a three-year period. CPLR 214(3)-(4); Guild v. Hopkins, supra, Einhorn v. Einhorn, 20 A.D.2d 914, 249 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1964).

Section 214 gives a plaintiff three years from the transfer of stock certificates to bring a conversion claim based on that transfer.

Devine v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc. · filed 1968-06-24

Under the law of New York, plaintiff, suing for conversion by virtue of a wrongful transfer of stock certificates is barred by the three year statute of limitations provided by 7B N.Y. C.P. L.R. § 214 (McKinney 1963). There is no question but what § 214 governs an action in conversion and that it commenced to run from the date of transfer.

Section 214 gives a plaintiff three years to bring a conversion action, and lack of knowledge of the conversion does not delay that period.

Gerber v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. · filed 1970-09-21

It is further conceded that the applicable period of limitations for an action in conversion is three years. (CPLR 214; Henderson, supra.)

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on conversion actions.

Warhol v. Ward · filed 1972-01-25(3), (4)

Such cause of action is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to conversion actions (CPLR 214, subds. 3, 4).

Section 214(3) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a conversion action; when a demand is required, the period runs from when the right to demand is complete.

Federal Insurance v. Fries · filed 1974-05-20(3)

Since the Statute of Limitations for conversion is three years (CPLR 214, subd. 3) “ computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed,” (CPLR 203, .subd. [a]) plaintiff argues that its suit is timely. ... The Statute of Limitations therefore ran on December 12, 1970, three years from the time when the bank’s right to make a demand was complete. Because the action was commenced three months later, it is time-barred.

Section 214’s three-year limitation period applies to an action to recover papers as chattels, even if the papers are claimed to have no value.

Kean v. Harkness · filed 1972-02-15

The original first cause is barred by the Statute of Limitations as one to recover a chattel (CPLR 214); plaintiff’s ingenious claim that the papers sued for are not property, being without value, and ...that, therefore, a six-year limitation applies (“where not otherwise provided for ” [CPLR 213]), will not hold water.

Section 214’s three-year limit applies to an action to recover papers as chattels, even if the papers are claimed to have no value.

Kean v. Harkness · filed 1972-04-06

The original first cause is barred by the Statute of Limitations as one to recover a chattel (CPLR 214), plaintiff’s ingenious claim that the papers sued for are not property, being without value, and that, therefore, a six-year limitation applies (“where not otherwise provided for” [CPLR 213]), will not hold water.

Section 214(3) requires an action in replevin to be commenced within three years.

In re Reich · filed 1975-10-22(3)

We parenthetically note that, in any event, the respondent is entitled to summary judgment because of the bar of the Statute of Limitations, which bar was alleged as an affirmative defense. An action in replevin must be commenced within three years (CPLR 214, subd 3). Demand for recovery of the art items was made in 1969 and the present action is therefore time-barred.

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitation period on conversion actions.

American Home Assurance Co. v. Scarsdale National Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1978-10-16

The conversion action would have been barred.

Section 214 requires an action for conversion to be commenced within three years, subject to tolling.

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. E. W. Smith Co. · filed 1979-02-22

Since an action for conversion must be commenced within three years (CPLR 214) this suit would be barred unless the running of the statutory time period has been tolled.

CPLR 214(3) requires a conversion action to be brought within three years of the conversion.

Ryder v. Sheldon · filed 1979-04-05(3)

The claim against the estate is one for conversion, which action must be brought within three years from the date of conversion (CPLR 214, subd 3). The alleged conversion by withdrawal of the funds took place in May or June, 1971. This action was commenced in September, 1974, more than three years later. However, the additional benefit of the tolling of the Statute of Limitations for a period of 18 months, due to the death of John H. Ryder (CPLR 210, subd [b]), prevents interposition of the bar of the Statute of Limitations in this case.

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on conversion claims.

Smith v. Driscoll · filed 1979-04-16

However, the conversion action is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(3)’s three-year limit for recovering a chattel applies to a motion for its recovery under Domestic Relations Law § 234.

Anonymous v. Anonymous · filed 1979-12-04(3)

In holding that the three-year Statute of Limitations is inapplicable because CPLR 214 (subd 3) refers to an "action” to recover a chattel whereas only a motion is involved here, Special Term unduly focused on the term "action”. ... Thus, it seems clear that the various Statutes of Limitation are applicable to proceedings within an action, including a motion pursuant to section 234 of the Domestic Relations Law.

Section 214’s three-year limit applies when a claim is, in substance, for conversion, even if it is pleaded as fraud.

Stadtman v. Cambere · filed 1979-12-04(3)

Thus, Special Term correctly held that the first and second causes of action for replevin and conversion and the fifth cause of action for physical, mental and emotional injury and distress are barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations. (CPLR 214, subds 3, 4, 5.) ... However, we think that for purposes of Statute of Limitations this action must be considered as one for conversion and governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Williamsburg Candy & Tobacco, Inc. v. State · filed 1981-01-09

The State correctly points out that the Statute of Limitations applicable to the interposition of a claim for conversion would be three years, and has long since expired.

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion actions that ordinarily runs from the date of conversion.

Al-Roc Products Corp. v. Union Dime Savings Bank · filed 1980-03-10(3)

The three-year Statute of Limitations applicable in conversion actions (CPLR 214, subd 3) ordinarily runs from the date the conversion takes place.

Section 214(3) gives three years from the date of conversion to bring a conversion action.

Lerman v. Lerman · filed 1980-06-06(3)

CPLR 214 (subd 3) sets forth the applicable Statute of Limitations as three years from the date of the conversion.

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion actions of this type.

Merz v. Hemmerle · filed 1981-05-29(3)

There is also no question that the three-year limitations period for conversion actions of this type, New York CPLR § 214(3), see Ryder v. Sheldon, 69 A.D.2d 768, 415 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37 (App.Div. 1st Dep’t 1979); Zolli v. Zolli, 8 Misc.2d 582, 155 N.Y.S.2d 733, 736-37 (Sup.Ct. New York Co. 1956), would have expired in this case in the fall of 1979, unless the statute was tolled.

Section 214(3) gives a bailor three years to bring an action to recover a chattel, with the period beginning when the bailor demands its return and the bailee refuses.

Heede Hoist & Machine Co. v. Bayview Towers Apartments, Inc. · filed 1980-02-11(3)

Where this type of relationship exists, the Statute of Limitations begins to run when the bailor demands the property and the bailee refuses to deliver it (Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp. v Alto Corp., 25 AD2d 608, affd 19 NY2d 770). The appellant bailor demanded the return of the hoists approximately one month before this action was commenced. This is well within the three-year period in which an action to recover a chattel must be commenced (see CPLR 214, subd 3). Thus, the action and the simultaneous motion for an order of seizure were timely, and Special Term erred in denying the motion on this ground.

Section 214's three-year limitations period applies to a conversion claim when a shorter contractual period is unenforceable.

Continental Metals Corp. v. Municipal Warehouse Co. · filed 1982-02-26

Hence, the action, having been brought within the three-year statutory period, is timely.

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limit for commencing a conversion action.

Richard S. Ravenal, Inc. v. Gross · filed 1982-11-30(3)

CPLR 214 (subd 3) sets up a three-year limitation on the commencement of conversion actions.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for actions involving conversion of personal property.

Two Clinton Square Corp. v. Friedler · filed 1983-01-31

Insofar as it can be applied to allegations of a cause of action in conversion, the first affirmative defense should not have been dismissed. An action in conversion of personal property is governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214).

Section 214’s three-year period runs from the conversion of property; a continuing trespass gives rise to successive claims for interferences occurring within three years of suit.

Sporn v. MCA Records, Inc. · filed 1983-03-31

For the purposes of the Statute of Limitations, if the action is one for conversion, the time period will run from when that cause of action accrued — that is, when the conversion occurred. If the action is deemed one for trespass, then the cause of action will accrue at the time the trespass occurs. Trespasses of a continuing character may be considered a continuing trespass which would give rise to successive causes of action each time there is an interference with a person’s property so that relief would not be barred by the Statute of Limitations for interferences occurring within three years of the commencement of the action.

Section 214(3) allows three years to bring an action to recover a chattel or seek damages for its taking or detention.

White v. Secrest · filed 1983-07-27(3)

The limitation period for commencement of an action to recover a chattel or damages for the taking or detaining of a chattel is three years. (CPLR 214, subd 3.) ... For purposes of this motion, the court holds that the three-year period within which the plaintiffs might have commenced their action to recover possession of the mobile home began to run upon their receipt of the letter from defendants’ attorney on or about June 4,1982, and that the plaintiffs timely commenced their action in November of that year.

Section 214 gives a plaintiff three years to bring a conversion claim.

Lancaster v. Kindor · filed 1984-01-10

Even if the new summons and its accompanying complaint were deemed properly served in commencement of a brand new action, thus avoiding a defense of abandonment in failing to serve a complaint in the original action in a timely fashion, the conversion cause of action would be barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214). Plaintiff’s last genuine attempt to retrieve her personal property was on a trip to Florida in September, 1974. The commencement of an action in 1980, sounding in conversion, is thus time barred.

Section 214’s three-year limitations period for conversion does not support summary judgment when disputed facts leave its start date unclear.

Wichner v. Fortunoff · filed 1985-01-08

In view of the factual dispute between plaintiff and his stepbrother, it is not clear when the Statute of Limitations began to run and, consequently, summary judgment dismissing the third cause of action was unwarranted.

Section 214(3)'s three-year period for replevin does not bar a discovery proceeding seeking only information rather than the return of property.

In the Estate of re Laflin · filed 1985-05-28(3)

A discovery proceeding has been likened to replevin action. The Statute of Limitations for a replevin is three years (CPLR 214 [3]) in the absence of fraud, and this statute would apply in a discovery proceeding (Matter of Dunbar, 49 AD2d 858). However, in the instant case the fiduciary does not seek the return of specific property. He merely seeks information and the Statute of Limitations for replevin should not therefore apply. Accordingly, the cross motion to dismiss is denied.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for ordinary conversion actions.

New Windsor Associates v. Norstar Bank of the Hudson Valley, N. A. · filed 1985-11-25

This matter is a garden-variety conversion action governed by the three-year period of limitations in CPLR 214.

Section 214(3) gives conversion actions a three-year limitations period that generally runs from the date of conversion.

Bernstein v. La Rue · filed 1986-05-05(3)

The three-year Statute of Limitations is applicable to conversion actions (CPLR 214 [3]) and generally, runs from the date the conversion takes place (Al-Roc Prods. Corp. v Union Dime Sav. Bank, 74 AD2d 834).

Section 214 gives a conversion claim three years from the date of conversion.

Kalabakas v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1986-05-04

The three-year period in CPLR 214, running from the date of conversion, would have expired, at the latest, in February 1985 — three years after the release of the moneys and some 9 or 10 months before the inception of this action.

Section 214 (3)'s three-year period does not govern a tort claim against a municipal police officer acting within the scope of employment when General Municipal Law §§ 50-j and 50-i apply.

Pileckas v. Trzaskos · filed 1987-01-29(3)

Plaintiffs contend that this action seeking to recover damages for conversion and/or trespass to chattels is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations in CPLR 214 (3). Defendant contends that the applicable limitations period is one year and 90 days, pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-i. Supreme Court agreed with defendant and granted his motion to dismiss the complaint. We affirm.

Section 214(3)’s three-year period for conversion does not bar a claim that can also proceed on a timely mistake theory.

In re the Arbitration between Allen & First Wallstreet Settlement Corp. · filed 1987-05-07(3)

Petitioner characterizes his behavior as constituting conversion and thus asserts that the three-year limitation period of CPLR 214 (3) is applicable. ... Applying this liberal standard to the facts at hand, we find that respondent has articulated a colorable claim of mistake. Hence, the six-year period of CPLR 213 (6) is the governing time period.

Section 214(3) gives a conversion claim three years from when the plaintiff was required to pay more than originally obligated.

Thompson v. Whitestone Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1987-06-22(3)

The conversions did not occur, and thus the three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [3]; Sporn v MCA Records, 58 NY2d 482, 488-489) did not begin to run, until the plaintiffs were required to pay more than they were originally obligated to pay.

Section 214 requires a conversion claim to be brought within three years of the alleged conversion.

Rodgers v. Roulette Records, Inc. · filed 1988-01-11

Since a conversion had been alleged, the three-year statute of limitations would apply and would run from the time the conversion occurred.

Section 214(3)'s three-year limitations period applies to SCPA 2103 discovery proceedings seeking recovery of personal property in the absence of fraud.

In re Norstar Trust Co. · filed 1987-07-10(3)

A discovery proceeding commenced pursuant to SCPA 2103 has been likened to a replevin action, which has a Statute of Limitations of three years (CPLR 214 [3]). In the absence of fraud, that time-limiting provision applies in a discovery proceeding (Matter of Dunbar, 49 AD2d 858, 859; Matter of Laflin, 128 Misc 2d 348, 349).

CPLR 214(3) gives conversion and replevin claims a three-year limitations period that ordinarily begins when the conversion occurs.

Berman v. Goldsmith · filed 1988-06-06(3)

The three-year Statute of Limitations period, applicable in conversion and replevin actions (CPLR 214 [3]), ordinarily runs from the date the conversion takes place.

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limit for actions to recover chattels; when possession is rightful, the owner must demand their return without unreasonable delay.

Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, Conn. · filed 1989-10-16(3)

The pertinent statute of limitations provides that all actions for recovery of or injury to chattels must be commenced within three years. ... Therefore, in order for the statute of limitations to have run on the City’s claim against Mr. Hoelzer, the City’s demand must have been unreasonably delayed. ... Under the circumstances the City did not act so unreasonably as to deprive it of the mural.

Section 214(3)’s three-year period for recovering chattel from a good-faith purchaser begins when the owner demands its return and the possessor refuses.

Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art · filed 1990-07-16(3)

Thus the statutory limitations period will not begin to run until after the owner has made a demand and the possessor has refused to return the property.

Section 214(3)'s limitations period for recovering stolen property from an innocent purchaser begins no earlier than when the owner can demand its return.

Lawrence v. Meloni · filed 1990-07-13(3)

Because the owner could not make a demand until the stolen property was located on April 27, 1988, the Statute of Limitations governing the owner’s cause of action to recover the property (CPLR 214 [3]) did not begin to run, at the earliest, until that date.

The three-year period for replevin against a good-faith purchaser of stolen property begins when the owner demands its return and the purchaser refuses; the owner need not conduct a reasonably diligent search first.

Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell · filed 1991-02-14(3)

We agree with the Appellate Division that the timing of the museum’s demand for the gouache and the appellant’s refusal to return it are the only relevant factors in assessing the merits of the Statute of Limitations defense. We see no justification for undermining the clarity and predictability of this rule by carving out an exception where the chattel to be returned is a valuable piece of art.

Section 214 gives a plaintiff three years to bring negligence and products liability claims, measured from the injury-causing malfunction of the product.

Freedman v. Medtronic, Inc. · filed 1991-03-19

We affirm. The affidavit of plaintiffs medical expert, submitted upon renewal, raised a genuine issue of fact as to the date of the injury-producing malfunction and was sufficient to preclude summary judgment.

Section 214 gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period.

Banco De Desarrollo Agropecuario, S.A. v. Gibbs · filed 1989-04-06

Count Three, a claim for conversion, is governed by a three year statute of limitations as set forth in CPLR § 214.

Section 214 gives a conversion claim a three-year limitations period that begins when the conversion occurs.

Eisenberg v. Feiner (In Re Ahead by a Length, Inc.) · filed 1989-05-26

Under the applicable state law, an action for conversion must be commenced within three years of the time the action accrues, which is when the conversion occurred.

CPLR 214(3) gives a conversion claim a three-year limitations period.

Hallaway Properties, Inc. v. Bank of New York · filed 1989-11-15(3)

Accordingly, the third cause of action alleging conversion of funds is time barred (see, CPLR 214 [3]; Aiello v Saddock, 88 AD2d 984).

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on conversion claims.

Catlin v. Manilow · filed 1991-02-21

Accordingly, the court properly dismissed the fourth cause of action as time-barred under CPLR 214.

Section 214 bars a conversion claim commenced more than three years after the alleged commingling of corporate funds.

Corcoran v. Haddon S. Fraser Associates, Ltd. · filed 1991-03-19

The cause of action in conversion was also properly dismissed as commenced more than three years after the alleged commingling of corporate funds (CPLR 214; Two Clinton Sq. Corp. v Friedler, 91 AD2d 1193).

An owner’s failure to diligently search for a stolen chattel may support a laches defense, but it does not make an action against a good-faith purchaser untimely under the three-year statute of limitations.

Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell · filed 1990-01-25(3)

We hold that whether plaintiff was obligated to do more than it did in searching for the gouache depends on whether it was unreasonable not to do more, and whether it was unreasonable not to do more is an issue of fact relevant to the defense of laches and not the Statute of Limitations. The action, therefore, should not have been dismissed as barred by the Statute of Limitations.

When property is converted more than once, the three-year limitations period under § 214(3) is measured from the latest conversion.

Stanley v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. · filed 1991-05-28(3)

Special Term properly denied Dean Witter’s motion to dismiss those causes of action on the ground that Dean Witter, which had the burden of proof, failed to demonstrate that its reacquisition of the bonds, in 1987 and 1988, did not constitute a second act of conversion subsequent to its original purchase of the stolen bonds in 1983. In the event of multiple conversions, the date of the latest conversion is applicable in determining a claim that the complaint is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(3) provides a three-year limitations period for replevin claims.

In re the Estate of Hamilton · filed 1989-08-04(3)

More than enough years have certainly passed since Mrs. McClintic’s death (when Mr. Gordon argues the Statute of Limitations began to run) and even since the execution of the said receipts and releases to invoke the bar of the three-year Statute of Limitations for replevin which would apply here (CPLR 214 [3]; Matter of Mandelbaum, NYU, Oct. 3, 1985, at 7, col 3) if time were the only element as it is, for example, in the case of a promissory note payable on demand.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on a conversion claim, even when the claim is framed as breach of a bailment contract.

Katz v. Kar · filed 1993-04-26(4)

Further, this action, purportedly to recover damages for breach of a bailment contract, is, in fact, an action to recover damages for conversion. Consequently, the action is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations, which has expired (see, CPLR 214 [4]; Two Clinton Sq. Corp. v Friedler, 91 AD2d 1193).

Section 214(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on replevin claims; alleging fraud merely as the means of conversion does not make the six-year fraud period apply.

Garber v. Ravitch · filed 1992-10-01(3)

Plaintiffs argument that her cause of action is one for fraud, not replevin, and is therefore governed by the six-year limitation period set forth in CPLR 213 (8), not the three-year period set forth in CPLR 214 (3), is without merit. ... Here, the alleged fraud being merely the means of accomplishing the conversion of plaintiffs property, it adds nothing to a cause of action sounding in replevin.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for an action to recover damages for conversion.

Heller v. Hicks Nurseries, Inc. · filed 1993-11-15

The Supreme Court properly rejected the defendant’s Statute of Limitations defense, as the complaint states a cause of action to recover damages for conversion, and the action was commenced within the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (see, e.g., Sporn v MCA Records, 58 NY2d 482, 488; Two Clinton Sq. Corp. v Friedler, 91 AD2d 1193; CPLR 214).

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims for conversion or destruction of personal property.

Cast the Sleeping Elephant Trust v. Friends World College · filed 1994-12-15(4)

We agree with the IAS Justices that the cause of action herein is one strictly for conversion or destruction of personal property (see, Glass v Wiener, 104 AD2d 967, 968), and is accordingly governed by the three-year statute of limitations of CPLR 214 (4). Since the action was commenced some six years after the claimed damage to the property, it is time-barred.

Section 214(3) sets the limitations period for a claim alleging conversion or wrongful taking.

Goulian v. Gramercy 29 Apartments, Inc. · filed 1993-12-14(3)

As the alleged conversion or wrongful taking occurred in 1983, the claim is barred by the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [3]).

Section 214(3) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a conversion claim, generally measured from the date of conversion.

Hallman v. Horowitz · filed 1994-02-04(3)

The three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to conversion actions (CPLR 214 [3]) generally runs from the date the conversion takes place. ... Because the determination of this issue requires the resolution of material facts, the motion to dismiss the complaint on this ground must be denied.

Section 214 supplies the limitations period for conversion claims when no contractual obligation is alleged between the parties.

Cialeo v. Mehlman · filed 1994-12-08

Nor was there reason to apply the six year contractual limitation period (see, e.g., Baratta v Kozlowski, 94 AD2d 454) rather than the shorter period applicable to conversion claims (CPLR 214) in the absence of any allegation of a contractual obligation between plaintiff and the assignees.

CPLR 214(3) generally sets a three-year limitations period for Surrogate’s Court discovery proceedings involving replevin or conversion.

In re the Estate of Kraus · filed 1994-10-17(3)

Generally, the Statute of Limitations for a discovery proceeding is the three year Statute of Limitations provided under CPLR 214 (3) for replevin and conversion actions.

Section 214(3) gives a claimant three years to bring an action to recover a chattel.

New York City Transit Authority v. New York Historical Society · filed 1995-11-16(3)

The Fifth Avenue Coach Collection was transferred to the N-YHS in 1981. Thus, since plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued in 1981 by the alleged wrongful transfer of this collection, and since, pursuant to CPLR 214 (3), the Statute of Limitations for an action to recover a chattel is three years, plaintiffs’ claim to recover this collection is also time barred.

Section 214 (3) gives a plaintiff three years to bring an action to recover chattel, including collateral given for a usurious loan.

Tinter v. Sack · filed 1996-08-29(3)

As a result, plaintiffs’ action to recover the rings is not one governed by CPLR 215 (6), as the rings do not constitute an "overcharge”, but is an action to recover chattel, governed by the three-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 214 (3). Accordingly, that branch of the action is timely.

Section 214(3) gives a plaintiff three years from the conversion to bring a conversion claim or an action for damages for taking a chattel.

VIGILANT INS v. Hous. Auth. · filed 1995-11-01(3)

For Statute of Limitations purposes, an action for conversion as well as an action for damages for the taking of a chattel are subject to a three-year limitation period ( see , CPLR 214 [3]). Since accrual runs from the date the conversion takes place ( see , Sporn v MCA Records , 58 N.Y.2d 482, 488) and not from discovery or the exercise of diligence to discover ( see , Varga v Credit-Suisse , 5 AD2d 289, affd 5 N.Y.2d 865), we deem the conversion, as alleged, to have occurred in July 1983. That is the date when defendant Morgan placed "stops" on the bonds and allegedly first refused to honor the title and right of Drexel to negotiate the bonds or to redeem the interest coupons. Since the whole action was not commenced until 1990, the threeyear limitation bars this conversion claim and any tort-related relief or damages, as such.

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitation period for conversion actions and actions seeking damages for the taking of a chattel.

Vigilant Insurance of America v. Housing Authority of El Paso · filed 1995-11-01(3)

For Statute of Limitations purposes, an action for conversion as well as an action for damages for the taking of a chattel are subject to a three-year limitation period (see, CPLR 214 [3]). ... Since the whole action was not commenced until 1990, the three-year limitation bars this conversion claim and any tort-related relief or damages, as such.

Section 214 gives an owner three years to sue for recovery of chattel, beginning when the owner demands its return and the demand is refused.

Zucker v. Hirschl & Adler Galleries, Inc. · filed 1996-09-17

Moreover, it appears that the cause of action remaining in the plaintiff’s complaint does state a cause of action and the action was timely commenced as the three-year Statute of Limitations for recovery of chattel (CPLR 214) begins to run when the owner demands the return of the property and that demand is refused (Hoelzer v City of Stamford, 933 F2d 1131, 1135-1136 [2d Cir 1991]). Here, the action was commenced in 1995, less than three years following such demand and refusal.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for claims analogous to conversion or liability created by statute.

Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie · filed 1997-12-04(2), (4)

To the extent that respondents assert claims for civil theft, the New York analogue of which is conversion or imposition of a statutory liability, such claims are barred by New York’s three-year limitations period (CPLR 214 [2], [4]), applicable pursuant to the borrowing statute by reason of the fact that it is shorter than the corresponding Florida limitations period of five years (Fla Stat Annot § 812.035 [10]).

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Gold Sun Shipping Limited v. Ionian Transport Inc. · filed 1997-12-15

Therefore, the three-year Statute of Limitations for conversion is applicable.

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Rivera v. Viera · filed 1998-01-20(3)

The counterclaim is for conversion, and is barred by the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214 (3).

CPLR 214 sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Brewer v. State · filed 1998-03-12

A conversion claim is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214, and the motion as to that cause of action is timely.

Section 214(3) gives three years to bring an action to recover a chattel; when the defendant rightfully possesses it, the period begins upon demand and refusal.

Bendheim v. Butler · filed 1998-11-05(3)

Defendants’ next argument centers on the Statute of Limitations, which in this case is three years (CPLR 214 [3]) and, because defendants rightfully possessed the artwork, began to run from the time Salomon demanded its return and defendants refused (see, Hoelzer v City of Stamford, 933 F2d 1131, 1136-1137; Matter of Spewack, 203 AD2d 133; Berman.v Goldsmith, 141 AD2d 487).

Section 214(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims for conversion.

Erdheim v. Matkins · filed 1999-03-08(3)

The Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiffs third cause of action to recover damages for conversion as barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations as set forth in CPLR 214 (3) (see, Gold Sun Shipping v Ionian Transp., 245 AD2d 420).

Section 214(3)’s three-year period for a conversion claim begins when possession first denies the claimant’s rights to the property.

Elghanayan v. Elghanayan · filed 1999-10-28(3)

We affirm the dismissal of the cause of action for conversion on the ground that, based on these facts, defendants-respondents’ possession of any alleged partnership assets transferred to them in the 1970’s was, from the inception of such possession, a denial of any claim of plaintiffs to dominion, rights or possession in the transferred property, and thus immediately actionable as a conversion (Sporn v MCA Records, 58 NY2d 482, 487), a claim that became time-barred (CPLR 214 [3]) long before the commencement of this action in 1990.

Section 214(3) requires a conversion action to be brought within three years of the conversion.

Davidson v. Fasanella · filed 2000-02-07(3)

An action for conversion accrues on the date the conversion occurs (see, CPLR 214 [3]; Vigilant Ins. Co. v Housing Auth., supra, at 44; Sporn v MCA Records, supra, at 488). Here, the action accrued when the Koe-Cerr Gallery wrongfully delivered the painting to the defendant’s decedent. Since the defendant established that the painting was delivered to the decedent in 1977, the plaintiffs action to recover damages for conversion is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [3]; Erdheim v Matkins, 259 AD2d 515; Gold Sun Shipping v Ionian Transp., 245 AD2d 420).

Section 214(3) gives three years to bring a conversion claim; when a possessor openly treats property as its own, the claim accrues without a demand and refusal.

Songbyrd, Inc. v. Estate of Albert B. Grossman, Doing Business as Bearsville Records, Inc. · filed 2000-03-10(3)

New York has not required a demand and refusal for the accrual of a conversion claim against a possessor who openly deals with the property as its own.

Section 214's three-year limitations period applies to conversion claims, with the alleged conversion occurring on the date of eviction.

Gkanios v. D'Ambrosio · filed 2000-04-10

Similarly, the cause of action sounding in conversion was also properly dismissed as time-barred (see, CPLR 214; Vigilant Ins. Co. v Housing Auth., 87 NY2d 36, 44; Caitlin v Manilow, 170 AD2d 357), because the date of the eviction was also the date of the alleged conversion.

Section 214(3) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a conversion claim, beginning when the alleged theft occurs even if the plaintiff is unaware of it.

Herman v. Depinies · filed 2000-06-22(3)

The action is barred by the three-year limitations period applicable to causes of action for conversion (CPLR 214 [3]; see, Powers Mercantile Corp. v Feinberg, 109 AD2d 117, 121, affd for reasons stated 67 NY2d 981), which began to run at the time of the alleged theft even if plaintiff was then unaware of it (see, Guggenheim Found. v Lubell, 77 NY2d 311, 318).

Section 214(3) gives replevin and conversion claims a three-year limitations period; a demand for the property and a refusal can start that period.

Feld v. Feld · filed 2001-01-25(3)

Replevin and conversion claims are governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 214 (3). ... Since a demand and a refusal had been made by 1974, plaintiff’s causes of action in replevin and conversion were time barred long before he commenced this action.

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Heffernan v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. · filed 2001-05-29(3)

On remand, the motion court correctly granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the conversion cause of action as time-barred, except as to two plaintiffs whose checks were deposited by Helliwell within three years prior to the commencement of this action (CPLR 214 [3]).

Section 214(3) gives a plaintiff three years from the date of conversion to bring a conversion claim.

Ackerman v. Kovac (In Re All American Petroleum Corp.) · filed 2001-01-31(3)

Under New York Law, an action for conversion is subject to a three (3) year statute of limitation. CPLR 214(3). ... The accrual period runs from the date the conversion occurs. The Trustee’s Complaint was filed more than three years after the transfer of the Commercial List to RAD and, accordingly, the claim for conversion is time barred.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on conversion claims.

Cayuga Partners L. L. C. v. Essex Capital Partners, Ltd. · filed 2001-04-09(4)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the complaint, which states a cause of action to recover damages for conversion, is barred by the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations, since the alleged conversion occurred in August 1996 and the action was commenced in February 2000 (see, CPLR 214 [4]; Vigilant Ins. Co. v Housing Auth., 87 NY2d 36, 44).

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period; when possession begins lawfully, the claim accrues after a demand and refusal to return the property.

D'Amico v. First Union National Bank · filed 2001-07-19(3)

As to plaintiffs assertion of a cause of action for conversion, the motion court correctly held that the Statute of Limitations for conversion claims is three years (see, CPLR 214 [3]); that it begins to run when the plaintiff becomes aware that its agent’s possession is hostile; and that First Union’s possession was, until November 1997, “lawful and plaintiff was not aware that it would not turn * * * over the funds.” While “accrual [normally] runs from the date the conversion takes place (see, Sporn v MCA Records, 58 NY2d 482, 488) and not from discovery or the exercise of diligence to discover” (Vigilant Ins. Co. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, 87 NY2d 36, 44), it is well settled that, where the original possession is lawful, a conversion does not occur until after a demand and refusal to return the property (MacDonnell v Buffalo Loan, Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 193 NY 92, 101).

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on conversion claims.

Rattenni v. Cerreta · filed 2001-07-30(4)

Here, the facts set forth in the complaint alleged no more than a cause of action to recover damages for conversion (see, Meese v Miller, 79 AD2d 237) which is barred by the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(3)’s three-year limit for actions to recover a chattel does not apply to an action to recharacterize an agreement when the plaintiff already lawfully possesses the property.

PSINet, Inc. v. Cisco Systems Capital Corp. (In Re PSINet, Inc.) · filed 2001-12-18(3)

CPLR § 214(3) is not ambiguous, and by its terms plainly is inapplicable. This adversary proceeding is not an action to recover a chattel, or any number of chattels; PSINet already has the chattels — i.e., the equipment — in its lawful possession.

Section 214 gives a claimant three years to commence a bailment claim.

Wright v. State · filed 2003-03-26

Bailment claims must be commenced within three years (CPLR 214), and accrue “when the bailor demands the property and the bailee refuses to deliver it” (Heede Hoist & Mach. Co. v Bayview Towers Apts., 74 AD2d 598, 598 [1980]). Since the bailment claim here accrued on January 25, 2001, the instant motion is timely.

Section 214(3) provides a three-year limitations period for conversion claims that normally runs from the date of conversion.

In re the Estate of King · filed 2003-05-27(3)

The three-year statute of limitations period (see CPLR 214 [3]) normally runs from the date the conversion allegedly took place.

CPLR 214(3) applies a three-year limitations period to conversion claims.

Jones v. Community Bank of SulliVan County · filed 2003-06-12(3)

Turning to the merits, we agree with Supreme Court that the three-year statute of limitations for conversion is applicable here (see CPLR 214 [3]; Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex., 87 NY2d 36, 44 [1995]).

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Dastech International, Inc. v. F.T.L. International, Inc. · filed 2003-12-22(3)

The defendants correctly contend that the plaintiffs causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract for the sale of goods, breach of warranty, unjust enrichment, and conversion are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations (see Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725 [1], [2]; CPLR 214 [3]).

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the conversion occurs.

In Re Fischer · filed 2004-04-07(3)

A cause of action for conversion- is governed by a three-year statute of limitations which begins to run at the time of conversion.

Section 214(3) sets the limitations period for conversion claims.

Melnitzky v. Apple Bank for Savings · filed 2005-06-23(3)

Additionally, the claim for conversion is time-barred (see CPLR 214 [3]).

Section 214(3) gives conversion and unjust enrichment claims a three-year limitations period.

Lambert v. Sklar · filed 2006-06-20(3)

The Supreme Court properly dismissed the causes of action alleging conversion and unjust enrichment, as they are subject to a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [3]).

Section 214(3) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a claim to recover stolen property; against a good-faith purchaser, the claim accrues when the purchaser refuses a demand for its return.

Peters v. Sotheby's Inc. · filed 2006-09-14(3)

CPLR 214 (3) provides that an action to recover stolen property must be brought within three years after the action accrues. Where replevin is sought against the party who converted the property, the action accrues on the date of conversion (Sporn v MCA Records, 58 NY2d 482, 488 [1983]). Where, as here, the action is brought against a party who purchased the property in good faith, for value and without notice of the conversion, the action accrues only upon the refusal of a demand for its return (Menzel, 22 AD2d at 647).

Section 214(3) sets the limitations period for a conversion claim.

Melnitzky v. HSBC Bank USA · filed 2006-10-19(3)

We would add that the cause of action for conversion is time-barred (CPLR 214 [3]) and that the cause of action for prima facie tort fails to allege special damages (see Curiano v Suozzi, 63 NY2d 113, 117 [1984]).

CPLR 214 (3) generally gives a discovery proceeding a three-year limitations period, subject to applicable tolls.

In re the Estate of Jacobs · filed 2006-12-26(3)

The petitioner’s motion to add TIAA-CREF as a party therefore was timely brought within the three-year period prescribed in CPLR 214 (3), as tolled by CPLR 210 (c) and 204 (a).

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Rohmer Associates, Inc. v. Rohmer · filed 2007-01-04(3)

We conclude, nevertheless, that Supreme Court properly dismissed the cause of action because plaintiff did not state a cause of action for fraud, but for conversion, and the three-year limitations period applicable for the conversion action had expired (see CPLR 214 [3]; Jones v Community Bank of Sullivan County, 306 AD2d 679, 679-680 [2003]).

Section 214(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on an unjust enrichment claim seeking monetary relief.

Ingrami v. Rovner · filed 2007-11-27(3)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the three-year statute of limitations of CPLR 214 (3) governs here, since the plaintiff is seeking monetary, as opposed to equitable, relief (see Lambert v Sklar, 30 AD3d 564 [2006]; cf. Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar v 26 Adar N.B. Corp., 192 AD2d 501, 503 [1993]).

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period; when possession was initially lawful, the claim accrues upon demand for return and refusal.

In re Estate of Rausman · filed 2008-04-15(3)

CPLR 214 (3) provides a three-year statute of limitations for actions for conversion, which “normally runs from the date the conversion allegedly took place. Where possession is originally lawful, a conversion does not occur until the owner makes a demand for the return of the property and the person in possession of the property refuses to return it” ... Thus, the appellants failed to establish that the claim for conversion accrued before February 2005 and that the petitioner’s claim is time-barred.

Section 214(3) gives a conversion claim a three-year limitations period that begins when a lawful custodian unlawfully sells the property, even without a demand for its return.

Vogel v. Tunick · filed 2009-01-15(3)

The statute of limitations applicable to a cause of action for conversion is three years (CPLR 214 [3]). ... Applying the foregoing to the facts of this case, the sales of the individual pieces of artwork constituted “an overt and positive act of conversion” of those individual pieces of artwork by the decedent, Ms. Kassner and Sotheby’s sufficient to commence the running of the statute of limitations on the cause of action for conversion, at least with respect to each individual piece sold. ... Therefore, the court concludes that the plaintiffs’ cause of action for conversion as against Sotheby’s with respect to the individual pieces of the subject artwork sold on or before May 11, 2004 is time-barred (CPLR 214 [3]).

A conversion claim alleging a bad-faith taking is barred if filed more than three years after the taking.

Close-Barzin v. Christie's, Inc. · filed 2008-05-06(3)

Plaintiffs conversion claim is time-barred, since she alleges bad faith and the action was commenced more than three years after the alleged taking of the property occurred (see CPLR 214 [3]; Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v Lubell, 77 NY2d 311, 317-318 [1991]; Davidson v Fasanella, 269 AD2d 351 [2000]; Matter of Spewack, 203 AD2d 133 [1994]).

Section 214(3) gives a conversion claim a three-year limitations period; a rejected demand starts the period, and the alleged conduct here was not a continuing tort.

Sports Legends Inc. v. Carberry · filed 2009-04-07(3)

The motion court properly found that plaintiffs claim was ...barred pursuant to the three-year limitation of CPLR 214 (3). Plaintiff sent a “demand” letter to defendant on July 19, 1999 and the demand letter was deemed rejected by the letter’s own terms when not complied with in two weeks.

Section 214(3) gives conversion and replevin claims a three-year limitations period; a simple conversion claim accrues when the defendant interferes with the owner’s property.

McGough v. Leslie · filed 2009-09-08(3)

Although both claims are governed by the same statute of limitations of three years (CPLR 214 [3]), “[t]he rule in this State is that a cause of action for replevin against the good-faith purchaser of a stolen chattel accrues when the true owner makes demand for return of the chattel and the person in possession of the chattel refuses to return it” (77 NY2d at 317-318). ... Thus, plaintiffs’ claims in conversion are time-barred by more than a decade and must be dismissed.

Section 214(3) bars an estate’s claim to recover funds withdrawn from bank accounts when the petition is filed after the limitations period expires.

In re the Estate of Hayes · filed 2010-01-05(3)

by demonstrating that the executors’ petition asserting, inter alia, that certain funds withdrawn by the objectant from certain bank accounts are assets of the decedent’s estate, was interposed after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [3]; Matter of King, 305 AD2d 683 [2003]; Matter of Neshewat, 237 AD2d 524, 525 [1997]; see also Matter of O’Brien, 54 AD2d 880 [1976]).

Section 214(3) requires misappropriation or conversion claims to be brought within three years.

RUSO v. Morrison · filed 2010-02-04(3)

A claim for misappropriation of funds is subject to a three year statute of limitations in New York. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3); see also Ryder v. Sheldon, 69 A.D.2d 768, 769, 415 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y.App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1979) (applying section 214(3)’s three year statute of limitations for recovery of chattels to a claim for conversion of bank accounts).

Section 214 gives conversion and chattel taking claims a three-year limitations period that runs from the date of conversion rather than discovery.

Dore v. Wormley · filed 2010-02-08

Both actions for conversion and actions for damages for the taking of a chattel are governed by the three-year limitation period of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214, and “accrual runs from the date the conversion takes place and not from discovery or the exercise of diligence to discover.”

Section 214(6) bars legal malpractice claims after three years.

In re the Judicial Settlement of the Account of HSBC Bank U.S.A. · filed 2010-02-11(6)

We further conclude that the Surrogate properly determined that the breach of fiduciary claim against respondent law firm was, in essence, a claim for legal malpractice and thus was barred by the three-year statute of limitations {see CPLR 214 [6]; Harris v Kahn, Hoffman, Nonenmacher & Hochman, LLP, 59 AD3d 390 [2009]).

Subdivision 3 requires conversion actions to be commenced within three years.

DiMatteo v. Cosentino · filed 2010-03-19(3)

Supreme Court erred in granting those parts of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first five causes of action as barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to the conversion cause of action (see CPLR 214 [3]). We agree with defendant that, based upon the allegations of the complaint and the relief sought, the three-year limitations period applies to the causes of action for unjust enrichment (see Ingrami v Rovner, 45 AD3d 806, 808 [2007]), breach of fiduciary duty and the imposition of a constructive trust (see Gold Sun Shipping v Ionian Transp., 245 AD2d 420, 421 [1997]).

Section 214(6) requires legal-malpractice actions to be commenced within three years, subject to the continuing representation doctrine.

MIG, Inc. v. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, L.L.P. · filed 2010-03-29(6)

New York’s statute of limitations for legal malpractice is three years. ... New York does, however, recognize a limited exception to the three-year bar. ... In such cases, the three-year statute of limitations will not begin to run until the representation ends. ... The alleged drafting malpractice occurred in September 1997, the date when the COD was filed. ... Absent the continuing representation doctrine, then, the claim would have expired in September of 2000.

Section 214(3) requires conversion and replevin claims to be brought within three years of accrual.

Mirvish v. Mott · filed 2010-05-27(3)

Although declaratory judgment actions are typically governed by a six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213 (1), if the underlying dispute could have been resolved through an action or proceeding for which a specific, shorter limitations period governs, then such shorter period must be applied (Trager v Town of Clifton Park, 303 AD2d 875, 876 [2003]). Here, petitioner not only could have, but in fact did, avail himself of the remedy of claims sounding in conversion and replevin. Accordingly, this proceeding is subject to the three-year statute of limitations for such claims (see CPLR 214 [3]).

Section 214(4) gives claims sounding in tort a three-year limitations period.

Federal Insurance v. Distinguished Properties Umbrella Managers Inc. · filed 2010-07-12(4)

New York applies a three-year statute of limitations to claims sounding in tort, as is the case for Counts I (negligence) and II (negligent misrepresentation).

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on actions sounding in legal malpractice.

Fbangione v. Levine · filed 2010-09-14(6)

Since the instant action to recover damages for legal malpractice was not commenced until 4½ years after HHM was substituted for Levine as the plaintiffs’ counsel in the underlying action pursuant to a “Consent to Change Attorney,” the legal malpractice complaint insofar as asserted against Levine is time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations for actions sounding in legal malpractice (see CPLR 214 [6]; Loria v Cerniglia, 69 AD3d 583 [2010]; Sommers v Cohen, 14 AD3d 691, 693 [2005]).

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for replevin actions, subject to tolling recognized by the court.

In re the Estate of McLaughlin · filed 2010-11-04(3)

New York subjects such actions to a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [3]; Solomon R. Guggenheim Found, v Lubell, 77 NY2d 311, 317 [1991]). ... Further, because decedent died while the claim was outstanding, the statute of limitations was tolled for a period of 18 months (see CPLR 210 [b]; 214 [3]).

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year statute of limitations.

Chiste v. Hotels.com L.P. · filed 2010-11-15(3)

Claims for conversion have a three-year statute of limitations in New York. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3); ... Because he chose to sue in New York, Sidener is bound by New York’s shorter three-year limitations period, which means that Sidener’s conversion claim is untimely (it was not filed until December 9, 2008).

Section 214(3) imposes a three-year limitations period for conversion claims, running from the date of conversion rather than discovery.

Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby · filed 2010-11-22(3)

Conversion claims have a three-year statute of limitations in New York. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3). The statute begins to run “from the date the conversion takes place and not from discovery or the exercise of diligence to discover.”

Subdivision 3 gives conversion and replevin claims a three-year limitations period measured from the earlier of a refusal to return property after demand or disposal of the property.

Malanga v. Chamberlain · filed 2010-03-02(3)

The controlling three-year statute of limitations for conversion and replevin (see CPLR 214 [3]; Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v Lubell, 77 NY2d 311, 317 [1991]) runs from the earlier of the time when a defendant refuses to return the property after a demand, or the time when the defendant disposes of the property (see Matter of White v City of Mount Vernon, 221 AD2d 345, 346 [1995]; Bernstein v La Rue, 120 AD2d 476, 477 [1986]; Johnson v Gumer, 94 AD2d 955 [1983]).

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period, including claims for aiding and abetting conversion.

Marketxt Holdings Corp. v. Engel & Reiman, P.C. · filed 2010-03-15(3)

As explained above, C.P.L.R. § 214(3) prescribes a three year limitations period for conversion claims.

Section 214(3) requires conversion actions to be brought within three years.

Beesmer v. Besicorp Development, Inc. · filed 2010-04-29(3)

Inasmuch as the statute of limitations for a conversion action is three years (see CPLR 214 [3]; Tatko v Sheldon Slate Prods. Co., 2 AD3d 1030, 1031 [2003]), the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth causes of action relating to the sale of Besicorp, Ltd. in 1999 and 2000 were also properly dismissed as time-barred.

Section 214(3) provides a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Komolov v. Segal · filed 2012-06-12[3]

The three-year statute of limitations applicable to the conversion claims (see CPLR 214 [3]), was tolled when plaintiffs timely commenced this action within six months of the termination of the prior action (see CPLR 205 [a]).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for actions seeking damages for personal injury, including Section 1983 actions in New York.

Dellutri v. Village of Elmsford · filed 2012-09-28(5)

Accordingly, New York’s three-year statute of limitations for ‘an action to recover damages for a personal injury,’ N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(5), governs section 1983 actions in New York.

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion and replevin claims.

Dudek v. Nassau County Sheriff's Department · filed 2013-11-19(3)

Under New York law, the applicable statute of limitations for a conversion or replevin claim is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3).

Section 214(3) requires claims seeking damages for conversion to be brought within three years of accrual, which occurs when the conversion occurs.

City Store Gates Mfg. Corp. v. Empire Rolling Steel Gates Corp. · filed 2014-01-22(3)

Since a cause of action to recover damages for conversion accrues on the date the conversion occurs, and because Pintado’s employment with the plaintiff ended more than three years before the plaintiff commenced this action, these causes of action are also time-barred (see CPLR 214 [3]; Sporn v MCA Records, 58 NY2d 482, 488 [1983]; Davidson v Fasanella, 269 AD2d 351 [2000]).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitation period for conversion claims generally, subject to the more specific six-year rule in CPLR 213(7) for certain corporate actions.

Rye Police Ass'n v. Chittenden · filed 2014-01-27(4)

However, CPLR 213 (7) explicitly states that it is applicable in actions “to recover damages for waste or for an injury to property” (emphasis added), albeit only actions by corporations against a present or former director, officer, or stockholder. Thus, the court can easily conclude that CPLR 213 (7), rather than CPLR 214 (4), applies in this case.

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the conversion occurs, regardless of when it is discovered.

USHA Holdings, LLC v. Franchise India Holdings Ltd. · filed 2014-03-27(3)

“New York applies a three-year statute of limitations for conversion.” St. John’s Univ. v. Bolton, 757 F.Supp.2d 144, 179 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (citing N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(3)).

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the alleged conversion occurs.

Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. RBS Citizens, N.A. · filed 2014-03-30(3)

Under New York law, “Conversion claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, which begins running when the alleged conversion takes place.” Ferring B.V. v. Allergan, Inc., 932 F.Supp.2d 493, 510 (S.D.N.Y.2013); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3); Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, Tex., 87 N.Y.2d 36, 637 N.Y.S.2d 342, 660 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (1995).

Section 214(2) establishes a three-year statute of limitations for NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims.

Bowen-Hooks v. City of New York · filed 2014-03-31(2)

Under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, the statute of limitations is three years.

Section 214(4) bars a conversion claim filed more than three years after the alleged conversion.

American Entrance Services, Inc. v. Roeder · filed 2015-06-25(4)

Because the alleged conversion occurred in 2005, eight years before the filing of this action, the proposed claim is time-barred (see CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(3) gives a conversion claim three years from the alleged conversion to be filed.

Graham v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. · filed 2016-01-18(3)

Conversion claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, which begins to run when the alleged conversion takes place. ... According to the Verified Complaint, Graham’s last mortgage payment pursuant to the loan modification agreement was made in October 2011, and the Verified Complaint was filed in 2015, far outside the three-year statute of limitations. Thus, Count 5, alleging conversion, should be dismissed.

Section 214(3) gives conversion and replevin claims three years from accrual; against a bad faith possessor, the period begins with the wrongful taking without a demand and refusal.

Swain v. Brown · filed 2016-01-28(3)

Accordingly, since Delaine was holding the Artwork in bad faith, the demand and return rule does not apply and the three-year limitations period commenced as of the date of the wrongful taking, which occurred when Delaine retained the Artwork after the issuance of our March 18, 1993 order.

Section 214(3) permits a timely replevin claim to recover limited liability company membership interests.

Herman v. 36 Gramercy Park Realty Associates, LLC · filed 2015-08-11(3)

We find this claim timely (see CPLR 214 [3]; Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v Lubell, 77 NY2d 311, 317-318 [1991]).

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the conversion occurs.

Geotech Enterprises, Inc. v. 181 Edgewater, LLC · filed 2016-03-30(3)

Here, the defendant made a prima facie showing that the conversion cause of action was time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations applicable to conversion claims (see *1215 CPLR 214 [3]), inasmuch as the complaint demonstrates that more than three years had elapsed between the date of the alleged conversion of the plaintiffs’ property and the commencement of this action (see Muscat v Mid-Hudson Med. Group, P.C., 135 AD3d 915, 916 [2016]; Village of Lindenhurst v J.D. Posillico, Inc., 94 AD3d 1101, 1101 [2012], affd 22 NY3d 1024 [2013]; see also Texeria v BAB Nuclear Radiology, P.C., 43 AD3d 403, 405 [2007]).

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Martinez v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2016-04-04(3)

Claims of conversion are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3). ... All of Martinez’s state law claims are time-barred, as Martinez expressly concedes in her Opposition.

Section 214 gives three years to bring an action to recover a chattel; when one co-owner demands its return and is refused, the limitations period begins for all co-owners.

Samuels v. Greenberg · filed 2016-04-18

Once one co-owner makes a demand and that demand is refused, the bailment of property ceases and a claim alleging the conversion of the property accrues, commencing the statute of limitations against all co-owners of the property.

Section 214(3) requires a conversion action to be commenced within three years of the conversion.

Stewart v. GDC Tower at Greystone · filed 2016-04-06(3)

An action alleging conversion must be commenced within three years of the date of the conversion (see CPLR 214 [3]; Mariano v Fiorvante, 118 AD3d 961, 962 [2014]), and an action alleging wrongful eviction must be commenced within one year of the date of the eviction (see CPLR 215 [7]; Urra v Friedman, 231 AD2d 710, 710 [1996]; Klishwick v Popovicki, 186 AD2d 173, 174 [1992]).

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Matter of Courant · filed 2016-08-17(3)

CPLR 214 (3) provides a three-year statute of limitations for a conversion cause of action, whereas CPLR 213 (1) provides a six-year statute of limitations for a cause of action to impose a constructive trust.