N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214

Section 214(3) gives a person three years to bring an action to recover a chattel, including a cooperative apartment stock certificate.

Loscalzo v. 507-509 President Street Tenants Ass'n Housing Development Fund Corp. · filed 2017-08-09(3)

An action to recover a stock certificate is governed by the three-year statute of limitations for recovery of a chattel (see CPLR 214 [3]; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v Smith Co., 46 NY2d 498 [1979]; Roth v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 178 AD2d 267 [1991]).

Section 214(3) requires a conversion action to be commenced within three years of the alleged conversion.

Matter of Imperato · filed 2017-04-26(3)

A cause of action alleging conversion must be commenced within three years of the alleged conversion (see CPLR 214 [3]; Mariano v Fiorvante, 118 AD3d 961, 962 [2014]). The appellants established, prima facie, that since the alleged conversion occurred in December 2003, and the petitioner did not commence this turnover proceeding until March 2007, the cause of action alleging conversion was time-barred.

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period that runs from the tort, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers it.

Bryant v. Broad. Music Inc. · filed 2018-05-09(3)

Under New York law, the statute of limitations for a claim of conversion is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3). The period begins to run from the time of the tort, rather than from the time of discovery.

CPLR 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Pentacon, LLC v. 422 Knickerbocker, LLC · filed 2018-10-10(3)

The defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the cause of action alleging conversion is time-barred ( see CPLR 214[3]; Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex. , 87 NY2d 36, 44; Matter of Imperato , 149 AD3d 1072, 1075; Matter of Chung Li , 95 AD3d 881, 882).

Section 214(3) requires a conversion action to be commenced within three years of the conversion.

Schulman v. Schulman · filed 2018-11-14(3)

"An action alleging conversion must be commenced within three years of the date of the conversion" ( Stewart v GDC Tower at Greystone , 138 AD3d 729, 730; see CPLR 214[3]; Mariano v Fiorvante , 118 AD3d 961, 962). Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff's cause of action alleging conversion accrued in 2003, and was therefore time-barred ( see Stewart v GDC Tower at Greystone , 138 AD3d at 730; Theaprin Pharms., Inc. v Conway , 137 AD3d 1254).

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period.

Obstfeld v. Thermo Niton Analyzers, LLC · filed 2019-01-30(3)

A cause of action alleging conversion is subject to a three-year limitations period ( see CPLR 214[3]).

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period that runs from the conversion, regardless of when it is discovered.

Rosenthal v. Hudson Val. Fed. Credit Union · filed 2019-05-09(3)

Conversion is subject to a three-year limitations period ( see CPLR 214 [3]; see also Collymore v Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev. , 22 AD3d 703 [2005]). "[A]ccrual runs from the date the conversion takes place and not from discovery or the exercise of diligence to discover" ( Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex. , 87 NY2d 36, 44-45 [1995] [internal citation omitted]; see Obstfeld v Thermo Niton Analyzers, LLC , 168 AD3d 1080 , 1083 [2019]). Since it is uncontested that defendant made the payment upon a forged endorsement more than three years prior to the commencement of this action, plaintiff's cause of action for conversion was properly dismissed as time-barred.

Section 214(3) gives a conversion claim a three-year limitations period that begins when the conversion occurs if the defendant never had rightful possession.

Su v. Sotheby's Inc. · filed 2019-10-04(3)

Because Yeh alleges that Su acted in bad faith and never had rightful possession of the Vessel, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of conversion, not on the date of a demand for return of the Vessel that was rebuffed.

Section 214(3) gives a plaintiff three years from the date of conversion to bring a conversion claim.

Gabayzadeh v. Global Equipment and Machinery Sales Inc. · filed 2019-11-21(3)

Conversion claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, which begins to run upon the date of conversion. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3); Johnson v. Law Office of Schwartz, 46 N.Y.S.3d 1, 5 (1st Dep’t 2016). ... Consequently, the conversion claim is not untimely on the face of the Amended Complaint.

Section 214(3)'s three-year limitations period for conversion runs from when the defendant exercises dominion over the property.

Mannino v. Passalacqua · filed 2019-05-22(3)

Moreover, the conversion cause of action was untimely, since the Passalacquas exercised dominion over the equity in the property when they gave Wells Fargo mortgages on the property in 2002 and 2003 ( see CPLR 214[3]; Theaprin Pharms., Inc. v Conway , 137 AD3d 1254, 1254; Matter of Channel Mar. Sales, Inc. v City of New York , 75 AD3d 600, 601).

Section 214(3) provides a three-year limitations period for claims to recover chattel, including conversion, replevin, and related declaratory judgment claims.

Republic of Turkey v. Christie's Inc. · filed 2019-12-02(3)

The three-year statute of limitations for the recovery of chattel set out in New York CPLR § 214(3) applies to Turkey’s conversion and replevin claims, as well as its declaratory judgment claim.

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year statute of limitations.

Ndemenoh v. City Univ. of N.Y. (CUNY)-City Coll. · filed 2020-02-20(3)

To the extent claimant's proposed causes of action include a claim based on "confiscation of [his electronic] devices" in connection with his arrests, such claim would sound in conversion ( see generally Colavito v New York Organ Donor Network, Inc. , 8 NY3d 43, 49-50 [2006]; Torrance Constr., Inc. v Jaques , 127 AD3d 1261, 1263 [3d Dept 2015]), and would be subject to a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[3]; Swain v Brown , 135 AD3d 629, 631 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 214(5) gives negligence claims a three-year limitations period.

Anderson v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead · filed 2020-03-02(5)

As an initial matter, the statute of limitations is three years for Plaintiff’s Section 1983 and negligence causes of action and one year for his intentional tort claims. ... Thus, because the events underlying Anderson’s claims herein occurred on December 22, 2013, see Compl. ¶ 19, the statute of limitations expired on December 22, 2016 at the latest.

CPLR 214(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on conversion claims.

Schum v. Spatorico · filed 2020-03-13(3)

We agree with defendants that Supreme Court erred in denying the motion to the extent that defendants sought dismissal of the third cause of action for conversion inasmuch as that cause of action is time-barred ( see CPLR 214 [3]; Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex ., 87 NY2d 36, 44 [1995]; Barrett v Huff , 6 AD3d 1164, 1166 [4th Dept 2004]).

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

Underwood v. Lastrada Entertainment Company, Ltd. · filed 2020-07-06(3)

The Defendants also point out, correctly, that there is a three-year statute of limitations on a claim of conversion. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3).

Section 214(3) gives claims involving conversion of property a three-year limitations period that begins when the property interest is allegedly converted.

Gelwan v. De Ratafia · filed 2025-12-18(3)

The court correctly applied the three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214(3) applicable to claims involving conversion of property rather than the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213(1) applied to equitable causes of action. Plaintiff's claim against Columbia County accrued at the time his property interest—the money from the settlement funds placed in escrow that were subject to the charging lien—was allegedly converted.

Section 214(3) gives a conversion claim a three-year limitations period.

A.S. v. S.J. · filed 2026-03-02(3)

Moreover, to the extent Defendant seeks recovery for alleged 2018 and 2019 transactions, CPLR § 214(3) imposes a three-year limitations period for conversion. The counterclaims were interposed in 2025-well beyond three years from the latest alleged act.

Section 214(3) gives a conversion claim three years; when possession was originally lawful, the claim accrues upon demand and refusal to return the property.

Qiao v. Tang · filed 2026-06-03(3)

"'A cause of action alleging conversion is subject to a three-year limitations period'" ( Merlino v Knudson , 214 AD3d 642, 645, quoting Obstfeld v Thermo Niton Analyzers, LLC , 168 AD3d 1080, 1083; see CPLR 214[3]). ... "'However, where possession is originally lawful,' such causes of action do not accrue 'until the owner makes a demand for the return of the property and the person in possession of the property refuses to return it'" ( Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v Simpson , 239 AD3d at 798, quoting Siegler v Lippe , 189 AD3d 903, 904). ... Accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference ( see Matter of Village of Kiryas Joel v Mezrich Estates Condominiums , 237 AD3d 724, 724), those causes of action accrued in August 2022, when Tang and Tang, P.C., refused to return the escrow funds upon the plaintiff's demand.

Section 214(3) applies a three-year limitations period to conversion claims brought in SCPA article 21 discovery proceedings.

In re Chung Li · filed 2012-05-01(3)

Here, Luk failed to meet her prima facie burden of demonstrating that the statute of limitations on the petitioner’s conversion claim had run. The evidence submitted by Luk in support of her motion did not establish that the purported conversion of the decedent’s ownership interest in the companies occurred more than three years prior to the commencement of this proceeding.

Section 214 gives three years to sue for conversion; a defendant seeking dismissal must show that the claim accrued more than three years before suit.

Lek v. LeK · filed 2024-05-01

Defendant contends that the statute of limitations period for larceny and conversion (three-years-see CPLR § 214) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (one-year-see Winslow v New York-Presbyt./Weill-Cornell Med. Ctr., 203 AD3d 533, 534 [1st Dept 2022]) have all expired. ... With respect to the larceny and conversion causes of action, defendant has failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the limitation period has expired. Since plaintiff commenced this action on April 4, 2023, defendant would have to establish that these causes accrued before that date in 2020.

Section 214(5) establishes a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, but that period does not extinguish an action already pending and timely under the prior law.

Figueroa v. Esso Standard Oil Co. · filed 1964-06-19(5)

The enactment of N.Y. CPLR § 214 (5), effective September 1, 1963, would appear now to establish a three year statute of limitations for personal injury actions whether predicated on negligence or unseaworthiness. ... Defendant cannot be advantaged by its having waited to make this motion until after September 1, 1963 when the three year statute became effective and under which the expiration date became a year before plaintiff started his suit.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limit for personal injury actions, including unseaworthiness claims, but is inapplicable to a pending action when applying the new law would work injustice.

Manuel Conty, Libellant-Appellant v. States Marine Lines, Inc. · filed 1966-01-05(5)

The present three-year statute, CPLR § 214(5), which applies to all personal injury actions whether predicated on negligence or unseaworthiness is in-apposite since “under N.Y. CPLR § 10003, the new law is inapplicable if applying it to pending actions would work injustice.” Figueroa v. Esso Standard Oil Co., supra, at 170.

The 1975 amendments to CPLR 214 apply prospectively, leaving a three-year limitations period for malpractice alleged to have occurred before 1975.

Ramos v. Ravan · filed 2001-12-13

Since the dates of the alleged malpractice predate the prospective 1975 amendments of both CPLR 214 and CPLR 208, the motion courts correctly applied a three-year limitations period from the dates of plaintiffs’ 18th birthdays (cf., Lozada v Gum Sook Baeck, 225 AD2d 405, lv denied 88 NY2d 816).

Section 214(5)'s limitations period for personal injury actions does not govern a quasi-contract claim for indemnity.

Hansen v. City of New York · filed 1964-09-09(5)

The action for indemnity is based upon principles of a quasi contract and is governed by the six-year period of limitations (see Rieger v. Frankstram Realties, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 243; CPLR 213, subd. 2) as distinguished from the “ action to recover damages for a personal injury”.

Section 214(6)’s malpractice limitations period does not bar a third-party indemnity claim, which accrues when the defendant pays the judgment.

Musco v. Conte · filed 1964-11-23(6)

The third-party defendants’ argument that the third-party complaint is barred by the Statute of Limitations applicable to actions based on malpractice (Civ. Prac. Act, § 50, subd. 1; CPLR 214, subd. 6) stands or falls on the validity of the proposition that a tort-feasor’s suit for indemnity is bound by the same time limits as a suit brought by the injured party. ... The general rule is established that the action accrues not at the time of the commission of the tort for which indemnity is sought, but at the time of the payment of the judgment (Satta v. City of New York, 272 App. Div. 782; Corbetta Constr. Co. v. Driscoll Co., 17 A D 2d 176, 180; Ann. 20 ALR 2d 925, 927); and this rule applies as well to third-party complaints (Ann. 11 ALR 2d 228, 242).

Section 214(6) gives malpractice claims involving property damage or personal injury a three-year limitations period that begins when the malpractice occurs, rather than when it is discovered.

Seger v. Cornwell · filed 1964-12-21(6)

It would appear, however, that the Legislature now intends that all malpractice actions, whether they involve property damage or personal injury, are to be covered by the three-year Statute of Limitations provided for in CPLR 214 (subd. 6). ... While the Legislature intended such a change, no change was intended to alter or abondon the rule that the Statute of Limitations in malpractice actions begins upon the commission, and not the discovery of the malpractice as urged by. the plaintiff.

Section 214(6) applies a three-year limitations period to a malpractice suit even when the complaint calls the physician’s alleged breach a contract claim.

Calhoun v. Gale · filed 1968-02-13(6)

Accordingly, the three-year period of limitation (CPLR 214, subd. 6 [superseding former Civ. Prae. Act, § 50, subd. 1]; see CPLR 218, subd. [b]; 2 Carmody-Wait 2d, New York Practice, §§ 13:25, 13:79) applies.

Section 214(5)’s negligence limitations period does not govern claims for indemnity or contribution based on negligence; those claims arise when the claimant is compelled to pay damages.

Winn v. Peter Bratti Associates, Inc. · filed 1975-02-10(5)

This court holds, therefore, that the Statute of Limitations which is applicable to the theories underlying a party’s causes of action for indemnity and contribution is not applicable to the latter causes of action and this rule applies to claims among joint tort-feasors inpari delicto (Wattecamps v. Artkraft Strauss Sign Corp., 75 Misc 2d 934; Sanchez v. Hertz Rental Corp., 70 Misc 2d 449). ... The court would add that even if the movant were correct in its assertion that the negligeuce and breach of warranty Statutes of Limitation (CPLR 214, subd. 5; 213, subd. 2) are applicable, the first cross claim based upon negligence would not be time barred since a cause of action for negligence does not accrue until the plaintiff is injured (see Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N Y 2d 340; Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, 44 A D 2d 316).

Section 214 does not govern a federal statutory indemnification claim that accrues when the government pays the injured party; CPLR § 213 applies.

United States v. New York · filed 1984-09-07

Niagara County also moves to dismiss, but argues only that the action is time-barred under CPLR § 214. ... Because the action primarily depends upon a right of indemnification, CPLR § 213 applies, and the action is timely.

CPLR 214 (6)'s three-year period does not apply to a separate contractual indemnification claim that does not allege negligent performance of professional services.

WSA Group, PE-PC v. DKI Eng'g & Consulting USA PC · filed 2019-12-26(6)

Like the claim for reimbursement of plaintiff's payment to DOT, this claim is not subject to CPLR 214 (6), as it does not allege negligence in performing professional obligations and thus is not "essentially a malpractice claim" ( Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.] , 3 NY3d at 542).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to file a negligence claim.

Friedman v. Bartell · filed 2025-06-16(5)

The statute of limitations on negligence claims is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5); see Cruz v. Guaba, 210 N.Y.S.3d 425, 426 (2d Dep’t 2024).

Section 214(2) gives NYSHRL claims a three-year limitations period.

McBeth v. City of New York · filed 2025-03-28(2)

Plaintiff’s claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) gives a breach of physician-patient confidentiality claim a three-year limitations period that runs from the breach.

Broden v. Rubinstein, M.D., M.P.H.. · filed 2024-10-11(5)

Under New York law, the statute of limitations for a breach of confidentiality claim is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5); Tighe v. Ginsberg, 540 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101 (4th Dept. 1989). Generally, “the statute of limitations runs from the time of the breach.” Henry v. Bank of Am., 48 N.Y.S.3d 67, 69 (1st Dep’t 2017).

Section 214(6) gives three years to bring a nonmedical professional malpractice claim, whether framed in contract or tort; later work on an unrelated job does not extend the completion date used to calculate that period.

Board of Mgrs. of 87-89 Leonard St. Condominium v. St. Owner · filed 2024-10-15(6)

"An action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort, must be commenced within three years" (CPLR § 214 [6]). ... Thus, Job #2 is at best incidental to Job #1 and does not extend the job completion date.

Section 214 gives a plaintiff three years from the incident to bring a negligence claim.

Donnelly v. MTP 57, LLC · filed 2024-06-10

The statute oflimitations for the negligence claim expired 3 years after the subject incident on June 26, 2023. See, CPLR §214.

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. Radium2 Capital, LLC · filed 2024-03-21(3)

Thus, although BMO’s injury accrued in Illinois, where BMO resides and sustained its alleged loss,6 the Court applies New York’s three-year statute of limitations and holds that BMO’s common law claims are time-barred.

CPLR 214(4) requires a negligence claim based on construction work to be brought within three years of the wrongful act.

Jefferson v. New Life Tabernacle, Inc. · filed 2024-03-13(4)

The defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the negligence cause of action was barred under the applicable three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[4]) by submitting evidence that the allegedly negligent construction work performed on its property occurred in or around June 2012, more than four years prior to the commencement of this action ( see Listwon v 500 Metro. Owner, LLC , 188 AD3d 1028, 1030; Lucchesi v Perfetto , 72 AD3d 909, 911).

CPLR § 214 sets a three-year limitations period for negligence claims.

Uzoigwe v. Charter Communications, LLC · filed 2024-04-24

Plaintiff does not refute that he filed his Complaint outside of the three-year statute of limitations period as prescribed by CPLR § 214, as his claim began to accrue on the date he was terminated by Defendant, January 18, 2020, and he filed the Complaint on August 23, 2023.

Section 214(2) gives NYSHRL claims a three-year limitations period.

Samuels v. City of New York · filed 2023-09-05(2)

The plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims in this case are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(3) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a conversion claim; for a bad-faith possessor, the period runs from acquisition of the property.

Swan v. Sotheby's Inc · filed 2023-11-01(3)

In New York, there is a three-year statute of limitations for conversion. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3). ... The three-year limitations period therefore runs from the time that Sotheby’s acquired the Drawing from Page. ... The conversion claim is therefore time-barred.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for claims under Section 296 of the New York State Human Rights Law.

Militinska-Lake v. Kirnon · filed 2023-11-15(2)

However, because claims under Section 296 of the NYSHRL have a three-year statute of limitations, our review of Militinska-Lake’s allegations goes beyond the four incidents noted above.

Section 214(2) gives a plaintiff three years to file a NYSHRL discrimination claim.

DeJesus v. Bon Secours Community Hospital · filed 2024-02-12(2)

In addition, claims for discrimination under the NYSHRL must be filed within three years of the alleged unlawful discrimination. Mouscardy v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 185 A.D.3d 579, 580–81 (2d Dep’t 2020) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2)). ... As such, plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim based on her pregnancy is time- barred.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for negligence claims.

Gordon v. Suffolk County · filed 2022-12-09

Because negligence claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, see Ross v. Louise Wise Servs., Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 478, 491 (N.Y. 2007) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214), Plaintiff’s negligence claims expired before he brought suit.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Title IX claims brought in New York, together with the state’s applicable tolling rules.

Doe v. State University of New York Purchase College · filed 2022-07-27(5)

Therefore, the tolling rules which apply to CPLR 214’s limitations period also apply to Title IX claims brought in New York.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Pryor v. Doe · filed 2022-05-11(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Plaintiff’s complaint, which is dated January 3, 2022, was filed more than eight months beyond the limitations period.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Davidson v. Lee · filed 2021-11-01(5)

New York provides a three- year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Thus, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim in this District is three years.

Section 214(4) requires a negligence action to be commenced within three years.

Avery v. WJM Dev. Corp. · filed 2021-09-15(4)

The cause of action alleging negligence is governed by a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[4]). Since the acts complained of allegedly took place, at the latest, in April 2012, and the instant action was not commenced until June 2015, the cause of action to recover damages for negligence insofar as asserted against Abillama is time-barred.

Section 214(4) gives negligence claims against insurance brokers a three-year limitations period.

Cosmopolitan Shipping CO., Inc. v. Continental Insurance Company · filed 2021-07-27(4)

Under New York law, negligence actions against insurance brokers are governed by a three-year limitations period pursuant to CPLR § 214(4).

Section 214's three-year limitations period bars a gross negligence claim based on a fire and lapse in insurance coverage when the claim is asserted too late.

John v. Varughese · filed 2021-05-12

Lastly, the cause of action alleging gross negligence, insofar as based on a 2011 fire [*2]and the lapse in insurance coverage at that time, was untimely asserted ( see CPLR 214; Pecoraro v M & T Bank Corp. , 11 AD3d 950, 952).

Section 214(4) gives negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims three years from the date the injury is sustained.

Broecker v. Conklin Prop., LLC · filed 2020-12-02(4)

Here, the causes of action alleging negligence and negligent misrepresentation are governed by a three-year statute of limitations period ( see CPLR 214[4]; Chase Scientific Research v NIA Group , 96 NY2d 20, 30-31). Conklin's injury was sustained on the date of the worker's injury, August 29, 2014 ( see Chase Scientific Research Inc. v NIA Group Inc. , 96 NY2d at 31). Prior to that, Conklin had no cognizable injury and, hence, the negligence and negligent misrepresentation causes of action were not enforceable. Since this action was commenced [*3]on August 9, 2017, it was within the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214 gives negligence claims a three-year limitations period.

Lewis v. Steward · filed 2020-11-19

In general, under New York law, negligence claims have a statute of limitations of three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214. ... Consequently, Lewis’s negligence claim, even if otherwise properly pled, would be subject to a three-year statute of limitations and hence time-barred.

Section 214(2) gives NYSHRL claims a three-year limitations period.

Bell v. SL Green Realty Corp. · filed 2021-02-11(2)

Claims alleging violations of NYSHRL and NYCHRL are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d). Because Plaintiff filed the action on August 21, 2019, the claims must relate to events that occurred after August 2016. The Complaint provides that Plaintiff was terminated in November 2015, and based on the face of the Complaint, all alleged acts occurred during her time of employment, i.e., before November 2015. Accordingly, the NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims are dismissed as untimely.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for this negligence action.

Ellis v. Newton Paper Co. · filed 1964-10-01

Accordingly, the action having been commenced within three years (CPLR 214) from the time the defendant nondomiciliary became amenable to personal jurisdiction in this State, the New York Statute of Limitations is no defense to the action.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, computed under section 20 of the General Construction Law.

Rush v. Bauerle · filed 1966-02-28(5)

Even if they are correct, service on October 11,1965 commenced the action within the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd. 5) because of the method of computing time mandated by section 20 of the General Construction Law.

Section 214's three-year limitations period bars a new negligence claim against a defendant added after the period expires.

Trybus v. Nipark Realty Corp. · filed 1966-06-13

Thereafter, following the expiration of the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214), plaintiff made the instant motion for leave to amend his complaint and to serve appellant as an additional defendant. In our opinion, plaintiff was in effect seeking to state a new cause of action against appellant, which was barred by the Statute of Limitations (cf. McCabe v. Queensboro Farm Prods., 15 A D 2d 553; Horan v. Pope & Talbot, 119 F. Supp. 711; Hankinson v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 160 F. Supp. 709).

CPLR 214 sets a three-year statute of limitations.

Brownstein v. Schlanger · filed 1968-02-02

CPLR 214 states the Statute of Limitations to be three years. ... Since this action was commenced on October 17, 1967, and since we must exclude the date of the accrual of the action on October 17,1964, and since the summons was served within the 60-day period as provided in CPLR 203, the summons and complaint were timely served.

Section 214(4) gives three years from accrual to bring an action for negligent injury to property; that period guides the laches inquiry in admiralty.

West African Steamship Co. v. McAllister Bros. · filed 1968-07-12(4)

The period limited by State law for commencement of an action for negligent injury to property is three years from the time the cause of action arose. N.Y. CPLR § 214(4). A Federal Court sitting in Admiralty applies the doctrine of laches to the question of a timely commencement of a suit and State limitary periods are customarily the guide to be followed.

Section 214(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for this federal civil rights action.

Beyer v. Werner · filed 1969-01-22(2)

But the present case, based on federal statute, is not within N.Y. CPLR § 215 literally or in substance; it is governed by N.Y. CPLR § 214 sd. 2, formerly N.Y.C.P.A. § 48, sd. 2, a three year limitation.

Section 214(6) requires an attorney malpractice action to be brought within three years; continuous representation does not extend the period when the attorney’s representation ended more than three years before suit.

Gilbert Properties, Inc. v. Millstein · filed 1972-11-28(6)

The statute, CPLR 214 (subd. 6), provides that an action for malpractice must be commenced within three years and it is further provided that the "time within which an action must be commenced * * * shall be computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed" (CPLR 203, subd. [a]). ... Here, however, the statutory defense may not be stricken on the basis that the accrual of plaintiff's cause of action was suspended during a continuance of the attorney-client relationship. The defendant's retainer by the plaintiff was terminated in 1966 and there is no claim by plaintiff that the defendant continued to represent it in the litigation or in any other manner within a period of three years prior to the commencement of the action.

Section 214 provides a three-year statute of limitations.

Neuman v. Dunham · filed 1975-09-23

CPLR 214 provides for a three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 214 provides a three-year statute of limitations.

Neuman v. Dunham · filed 1975-09-25

CPLR 214 provides for a three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 214 provides a three-year period running from injury for negligence claims involving personal injury or property damage, and the same period applies to strict products liability.

DeCrosta v. Reynolds Construction & Supply Corp. · filed 1975-12-04

As to negligence, the immediate purchaser again is protected against personal injury and property damage for a period of three years running from the time of injury and which statutory period is the same as that which applies to the theory of strict products liability.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on negligence claims.

New York Telephone Co. v. County Ashphalt, Inc. · filed 1976-04-13(4)

A claim based upon negligence is subject to a three-year period of limitations (CPLR 214, subd 4; 35 NY Jur., Limitations and Laches, § 30). Since the proposed counterclaim alleges that the representations were made between August 12 and September 20, 1971, it appears, on its face, to be time-barred.

CPLR 214(2) gives borrowers three years to bring an action to void a loan under Banking Law § 358.

Conrad v. Home & Auto Loan Co. · filed 1976-07-02(2)

Here, however, plaintiffs seek a declaration that the loan is void under section 358 of the Banking Law which is peculiarly a State statute and which pre-existed both the State and Federal Truth in Lending Acts. Such a suit is subject to a three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd 2).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for the automobile accident claim against the deputy sheriff.

Chmielewski v. Seymour · filed 1977-04-05(4)

This court, therefore, holds that CPLR 215 (subd 1) one-year limitations statute is inapplicable, and finds that plaintiff timely commenced the action within CPLR 214 (subd 4) three-year limitations period.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for negligence, malpractice, and conversion claims.

Kelly v. State · filed 1977-05-20

However, to the extent that the claim sounds in negligence, malpractice and conversion, a three-year ... Statute of Limitations controls (CPLR 214 [L 1962, ch 308]).

Section 214(6) bars a negligence claim filed more than three years after the defendant submitted the allegedly faulty appraisal.

Locafrance U. S. Corp. v. Daley-Hodkin Corp. · filed 1978-01-05(6)

The cause of action for negligence is barred by the three-year period of limitation (CPLR 214, subd 6) which began to run from January 19, 1973 the date defendant submitted its appraisal of the value of certain electronic equipment (CPLR 203, subd [a]).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for Section 1981 claims under New York law.

Keyse v. California Texas Oil Corp. · filed 1978-01-12(2)

Under New York law, section 1981 claims are governed by CPLR § 214(2), which imposes a three-year statute of limitations.

CPLR 214’s three-year period for statutory liabilities applies only to liabilities created by statute, and its three-year period for injury to property bars untimely property claims.

Sumner v. Century National Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1978-01-12(2), (4)

However, the cases make abundantly clear that in order for the three-year limitation to attach, the liability must be one which would not exist but for the statute. ... Inasmuch as the action is not one to recover for an injury to property and is not, within the meaning of CPLR 214, an action to recover on a liability imposed by statute, CPLR 214 has no application. ... As such, they fall within CPLR 214 (subd 4). Not having been brought within the time limited by law, they are barred.

Section 214's three-year limitations period barred a medical malpractice action brought after the period expired.

Greene v. Thompson · filed 1978-02-16

Lastly, in order to finalize the matter, we hold that the second action was subject to dismissal because of the passage of the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, 3211, subd [a], par 8).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for an action seeking recovery on a liability created or imposed by statute.

De Giacomo v. Kissinger · filed 1978-04-24(2)

We hold that section 207-c is properly the basis for a common-law action for declaratory relief, and is subject to the three-year limitation period contained in CPLR 214 (subd 2) applying to an action for recovery "upon a liability * * * created or imposed by statute” (cf. Poniatowski v City of New York, 14 NY2d 76; Board of Educ. v Rickard, 32 AD2d 135; Kramer v Board of Educ., 194 Misc 128, affd 275 App Div 915).

Section 214(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for the plaintiff’s civil-rights claims.

Williams v. Interstate Motor Freight Systems · filed 1978-09-27(2)

The applicable statute of limitations is three years pursuant to N.Y. CPLR § 214(2).

CPLR 214 requires actions for personal injury and property damage to be commenced within three years of the occurrence.

Levy v. Railroad Maintenance Corp. · filed 1979-04-06(4), (5)

Thus a total period of three years and almost four months of nontolled time elapsed prior to the commencement of this action on April 26, 1978. Accordingly, the provisions of CPLR 214 which mandates a three-year Statute of Limitations applies.

Section 214(2) and (4) provide a three-year limitations period for actions to recover upon a liability created by statute or for negligence.

Campito v. McManus, Longe, Brockwehl, Inc. · filed 1979-04-20(2), (4)

In my judgment, because of the apparent rule in this Circuit that scienter is not a requisite element of a private claim under § 17(a), the applicable statute of limitations is the one that New York provides for actions to recover upon a liability created by statute or for negligence, i. e., three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 214(2), 214(4) (McKinney Supp.1978).

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on an action to recover a liability created by statute.

City of New York v. Kingsview Homes, Inc. · filed 1979-06-28(2)

In these circumstances, the action is one "to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute” (CPLR 214, subd 2) and is, therefore, governed by the three-year statute.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for negligence claims.

Buzan v. Kenner Boat Co. · filed 1980-02-26

It is clear therefore that Martin Coleman has only a claim for negligence and it is time barred under the applicable three year statute of limitations (N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 214, 208 (McKinney’s 1972) and/or laches.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for a personal injury claim that does not allege an intentional act.

Rausch v. McVeigh · filed 1980-07-26(5)

In determining whether the one-year Statute of Limitations set forth for the tort of assault and battery, or the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth for a recovery of damages for all other personal injuries applies, the key element to be discerned is that of intent. ... No allegation of an intentional act by defendant, William McVeigh, Jr., is alleged. Accordingly, this court finds that the alleged cause of action is governed by CPLR (subd 5), and accordingly, a three-year Statute of Limitations is applicable.

CPLR 214 provides a three-year limitations period for negligence claims, measured from accrual.

Iazzetta v. State · filed 1980-10-10

Preliminarily, the causes of action for assault, battery and negligence were explicitly dealt with upon the prior motion and were timely asserted within one year (intentional tort) and three years (negligence) from accrual, having been interposed on October 24, 1979. (CPLR 214, 215; Vastola v Maer, 48 AD2d 561.)

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for the infant plaintiff’s injury claim.

Soanes v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad · filed 1981-02-24

The appropriate statute of limitations for the infant plaintiffs cause of action is three years, N.Y. CPLR § 214 (McKinney (Supp. 1980-81)).

Section 214(5) bars claims filed after its limitations period expires.

Vann v. State · filed 1979-09-13(5)

Furthermore, we note that all of the alleged causes of action were barred by the applicable Statutes of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd 5; 215, subd 3).

Section 214(4)’s three-year period covers negligence causing general monetary loss as an injury to property; section 214(2) does not cover notary misconduct liability that existed at common law before the statutory duty.

Independence Leasing Corp. v. Aquino · filed 1981-12-03(2), (4)

As to the first cause of action, the court finds that, although there is opinion otherwise ... the better-reasoned view is that the term “injury to property” in CPLR 214 (subd 4) refers to general monetary loss and not to specific property or items ... Therefore, the Statute of Limitations applies to this cause of action, which is for negligence alleging a general financial loss and the court, therefore, grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismisses the cause of action. ... If the liability of the notary public predates any statutory duty, the liability cannot be said to have been created or imposed by statute ... Therefore, the second cause of action, based on a violation of section 135 of the ... Executive Law is not barred by the Statute of Limitations and the court, therefore, denies the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing this cause of action.

Section 214(4) and (5) provide a three-year limitations period for actions involving injury to property or persons.

Edward M. Stafford and Peggie Ann Stafford v. International Harvester Company and Eastco Truck Sales, Inc. · filed 1981-12-31(4), (5)

The summary judgment in favor of Eastco is, therefore, reversed, as the complaint against it was timely since it was filed within New York’s three-year statute of limitations governing injury to persons or property. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4), (5).

CPLR 214’s three-year period applies to a claim for lost profits that requires proof of gross negligence or willful misconduct.

Zuckerbrod v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 1982-03-01(4), (5)

As plaintiffs must prove gross negligence or-willful misconduct in order to succeed, and are seeking tort damages (the recovery of lost profits due to the omissions from the listings), the three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to tort actions is applicable and bars this action (see CPLR 214, subds 4, 5; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Eneo Assoc., supra).

Section 214’s three-year limitations period barred a claim for one half of the proceeds of a joint savings account.

Marinelli v. Marinelli · filed 1982-05-17

We also hold that the second cause of action is time barred by the three-year limitations period in CPLR 214.

Section 214(2) bars claims that accrued more than three years before the action was filed.

Rand v. Brezenoff · filed 1982-11-09(2)

Given the three year statute of limitations mandated by CPLR § 214(2), all claims accruing prior to February 24,1978, are thus time-barred.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year period after accrual for the negligence claim when determining whether a motion to file a late claim is timely.

Jenkins v. State · filed 1983-04-23(5)

We observe initially that this motion, received by the State January 31,1983, was timely made within the applicable three-year period after accrual since the earliest possible accrual date was the aforesaid February 5, 1980 date. (See Court of Claims Act, § 10, subd 6; CPLR 214, subd 5; 307, 2211.)

CPLR 214 requires a negligence claim to be filed within three years of accrual.

Wardell v. State · filed 1983-07-11

Thus, a written notice of intention to file a claim was required to be filed within 90 days of such accrual and the claim ... itself within three years (Court of Claims Act, § 10, subd 6; CPLR 214). Claimant served his notice of intention to file a claim on March 12, 1979 and served his claim May 9, 1980, both clearly outside of the statutory limits.

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on claims for injury to property or personal injury.

Pico Products, Inc. v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc. · filed 1983-07-11(4), (5)

Since this is so whether the causes are viewed as seeking damages for injury to property (see CPLR 214, subd 4) or for personal injury (see CPLR 214, subd 5) ... it is unnecessary to characterize their nature. In either case, they are subject to a three-year Statute of Limitations and must be dismissed as time barred.

Section 214’s three-year limitation does not apply to administrative disciplinary hearings against physicians.

Sinha v. Ambach · filed 1982-12-02

Petitioner’s primary contention in this proceeding is that due process considerations require the application of a three-year Statute of Limitations as contained in CPLR 214 to these offenses. ... It was held that a Statute of Limitations is not applicable to administrative disciplinary hearings. We adhere to that holding.

Section 214 gives nuisance actions a three-year limitations period. An ongoing nuisance accrues anew each day, but money damages are limited to the three years before suit.

State v. Schenectady Chemicals, Inc. · filed 1983-02-18

The limitation applicable to a nuisance cause of action is the three-year period provided in CPLR 214. The rule with respect to an ongoing nuisance, as here alleged, is that the action continually accrues anew upon each day of the wrong although the recovery of money damages is limited to the three-year period immediately prior to suit (Kearney v Atlantic Cement Co., 33 AD2d 848).

Section 214(2) provides a limitations defense that must be affirmatively pleaded.

People v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1983-07-12(2)

The limitations provisions upon which the TA relies are subdivision 5 of section 297 of the Executive Law, CPLR 214 (subd 2) and CPLR 213 (subd 1). ... Nor do the other cited Statutes of Limitations affect the sufficiency of the first cause of action because they are but statutes of repose which must be affirmatively pleaded (CPLR 3018, subd [b]).

Section 214(2)'s three-year period does not cover Martin Act fraud claims based on common-law fraud; section 214(4)'s three-year period covers damages claims for breach of fiduciary duty based on injury to property.

Loengard v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. · filed 1983-10-06

The liability is one created by statute and thus covered by CPLR 214(2) only if it did not exist at common law or one which “would not exist but for the statute.” ... Fraud existed at common law and is not a liability created by statute; a six-year statute of limitations therefore should be applied to the Martin Act claims. ... Thus, the three-year statute of limitations provided for in CPLR § 214(4) is applicable to the plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for the plaintiff’s accident claim, running from the date of the accident.

Landi v. We're Associates, Inc. · filed 1983-12-16

This is an action by the plaintiff as a result of an accident which occurred on November 30, 1979. The main action was commenced against the named defendants, We’re Associates, Inc., Structure Tone, Inc., and Dimension Ceilings, Inc., on or about September of 1980. Therefore, pursuant to CPLR 214, the Statute of Limitations in this action ran on November 30,1982.

Section 214(2) gives plaintiffs three years to bring claims for statutory penalties, including claims under Insurance Law §§ 127 and 211.

Buccino v. Continental Assurance Co. · filed 1983-12-29(2)

Plaintiffs’ remaining claims are subject to the three year statute of limitations for “an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute except as provided in sections 213 and 215.” CPLR 214(2). Insurance Law §§ 127 and 211 expressly provide that the private right of action is to recover a “penalty”. The exceptions provided by CPLR 213 and 215 have no bearing on this case. Therefore, plaintiffs’ claim against Continental under § 211 and against the Krieglers under § 127 are barred except as to any cause of action that may have accrued after February 17, 1979.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for actions seeking damages for injury to property.

New York Telephone Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. · filed 1984-02-21(4)

Special Term properly dismissed the complaint as against Manreb, as well as Mobil’s cross claim, ruling that the action for property damage against Manreb was barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd 4) since the complaint alleges that Manreb owned the premises until 1974 and the action was begun in 1981.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limit on negligence claims for property damage.

Fargo Equipment Co. v. Carborundum Co. · filed 1984-07-13(4)

Carborundum’s proposed pleading alleged repairs by Buffalo Electric on January 6, 1978 and February 22,1978. Since Buffalo Electric was not made a third-party defendant until March 3, 1981, the negligence claim is time barred (see CPLR 214, subd 4).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for a declaratory judgment action whose underlying claim arises from a statute.

Stettine v. County of Suffolk · filed 1984-12-17(2)

Because the substance of the claim underlying the declaratory judgment action at bar (see Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229-230) arises out of sections 801 and 804 of the General Municipal Law, Special Term properly applied the three-year Statute of Limitations governing statutory causes of action (see CPLR 214, subd 2).

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for negligence and malpractice claims.

Di Maio v. State · filed 1985-03-15

It is this court’s determination that, as to the negligence and malpractice claims, we are without jurisdiction to entertain this motion since said actions accrued in 1968 and the underlying three-year Statute of Limitations has long since expired (see, Court of Claims Act § 10 [6]; CPLR 214).

Section 214’s three-year limitations period continues to run when attempted service is jurisdictionally defective and the defendant does not waive the defect.

Symonds v. Root · filed 1985-01-29

Special Term held that the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214) and we affirm. ... Since the defendant did not waive the lack of jurisdiction, the statute continued to run ... and the action was time barred when plaintiff secured his order authorizing service under CPLR 308.

Section 214(2) requires an action to recover on a liability created or imposed by statute to be commenced within three years.

Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Nelson · filed 1985-06-04(2)

An action to recover "upon a liability * * * created or imposed by statute” must be commenced within three years (CPLR 214 [2]).

CPLR 214 provides a three-year limitations period for a negligence action against a State employee, even when the State must indemnify the employee.

Paone v. Tryon · filed 1985-07-01

Since plaintiffs have the right to sue a State employee in the Supreme Court and the State is not the real party in interest based upon its duty to indemnify under the Public Officers Law, the applicable Statute of Limitations is three years as provided in CPLR 214. Therefore plaintiffs’ action was timely commenced as against defendant Dewey Tryon.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims treated as personal injury actions in New York.

Ladson v. New York City Police Department · filed 1985-07-11(5)

New York CPLR § 214(5) establishes three years as the applicable limitation.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for negligence and strict products liability claims.

Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co. · filed 1985-08-14

Proper service was not made on YMC until October 13, 1983, two months after the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214) had expired. Therefore, the motion by YMC to dismiss plaintiff’s causes of action for negligence and strict products liability must be granted.

Section 214 provides the three-year limitations period the court applied to the § 1983 and § 1985 claims.

Martin v. City of New York · filed 1985-08-21

In New York, that period is three years. CPLR § 214.

Section 214 provides a three-year period to bring a negligence claim, including a claim against defendants a plaintiff seeks to add.

Brady v. Woodworth · filed 1986-02-21

Moreover, plaintiffs’ motion to add these defendants was not made within three years of the date of the accident and, therefore, plaintiffs’ claims are time barred (CPLR 214).

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for products liability actions.

Makarow v. Volkswagen of America, Inc · filed 1987-02-02

New York law also provides for a three-year limitation period. McKinney's CPLR § 214. ... Under New York law, plaintiff's claim was time-barred three years after his accident.

Section 214(2)’s three-year limitations period does not bar an action commenced 15 months after the audited Medicaid reimbursement becomes final.

State v. Wachsman · filed 1986-12-08(2)

Therefore, since this action was commenced 15 months after the reviewed audit report became final, the bar of the Statute of Limitations does not apply here, whether it be a six-year period for money had and received or misappropriation of public property (see, CPLR 213 [2], [5]), or a three-year period for enforcing a determination of the Commissioner of Health under Public Health Law § 2803 (5) (see, CPLR 214 [2]).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injuries caused by negligent conduct.

Payne v. Geary · filed 1987-01-27(5)

In New York, CPLR § 214(5) provides a three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries caused by negligent conduct, and CPLR § 215(3) provides a one-year period for personal injuries caused by intentional torts. ... Thus, plaintiff’s complaint is time-barred whether the applicable period is considered to be one or three years, and whether the date of receipt or docketing is taken as the date of commencement of the suit.

Section 214’s limitations period bars a personal injury claim when it expires before the plaintiff obtains personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Adirondack Transit Lines, Inc. v. Lapaglia · filed 1987-05-21

On April 17, 1986, two days prior to the expiration of the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214), plaintiffs effected service of process upon Lapaglia’s attorneys pursuant to CPLR 303 and subsequently moved for an order pursuant to CPLR 303 and 308 either confirming and validating service on Lapaglia’s attorneys or ordering that service be made upon them nunc pro tunc. ... In conclusion, since personal jurisdiction over Lapaglia has never been obtained and the Statute of Limitations has since expired, plaintiffs’ action against Lapaglia is now time barred.

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years from the accident to bring negligence and strict products liability claims.

Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co. · filed 1987-05-22(5)

Plaintiff’s service of the summons and complaint by mail upon YMC under section 307 of the Business Corporation Law in March 1983 was within three years of plaintiff’s accident, and the causes of action for negligence and strict products liability should not have been dismissed (see, CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period, and the court treated claims as timely when the complaint placed the plaintiff’s knowledge of the alleged conduct within that period.

Doe v. Doe · filed 1987-08-14(4)

The court will first turn to defendant’s claim that the fourth and fifth causes of action are barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 214 (4). Taking the allegations of plaintiff as true, she sets forth in paragraph 7 (k) of her complaint that defendant told her of his homosexual activities in May 1986, well within the three-year time limit. The paragraph relied upon by defendant for setting plaintiffs knowledge of the homosexual activities back to 1983 merely alleges that the defendant had such activities then. It does not state that she knew of those activities at that point in time. Therefore, the claims as set forth in the fourth and fifth causes of action are not barred by the Statute of Limitations.

CPLR 214 (5) sets a three-year limitations period for negligence actions seeking damages for personal injuries.

Farkas v. Tarrytown Lumber, Inc. · filed 1987-08-31(5)

Consequently, the plaintiff may not avail himself of the six-month extension of the Statute of Limitations period contained in CPLR 205 (a) (see, Parker v Mack, supra, at 117-119; CPLR 304, 305 [b]), and the subsequently served summons and complaint, which were untimely (CPLR 214 [5]), were subject to dismissal (see, Parker v Mack, supra; Frerk v Mercy Hosp., 99 AD2d 504, affd 63 NY2d 635).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for a claim under Executive Law § 296(1)(a).

Koeppel v. Wachtler · filed 1988-06-13(2)

However, the plaintiff’s third cause of action, alleging a violation of Executive Law § 296 (1) (a), was governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2), and therefore, that cause of action was not time barred (see, Koerner v State of New York, Pilgrim Psychiatric Center, 62 NY2d 442; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 306-307).

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for claims it governs.

Jemison v. Crichlow · filed 1988-07-18

Thus, those claims which are governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214) have been timely interposed, while those governed by a one-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 215) are time barred.

Section 214 requires actions for negligent injury to person or property to be commenced within three years.

Jones v. Coughlin · filed 1988-09-20

Under CPLR § 214, an action to recover for such claims causing injury to person or property must be commenced within three years. Thus, all acts occurring outside the three year period, in this case all acts at Green Haven exclusive of the denial of temporary release are outside the limitations period and no cause of action may be maintained based thereon.

Section 214(2) requires a proceeding to compel compliance with a Commissioner of Health order to begin within three years of the order’s issuance.

State v. Mayflower Nursing Home · filed 1988-11-28(2)

However, we note that the plaintiff’s second cause of action to enforce a determination of the Commissioner of Health may not stand since proceedings to compel compliance with such an order must be commenced within three years of the issuance of the order (Public Health Law § 2803 [5]; CPLR 214 [2]).

Section 214(4)’s three-year period cannot be imposed on a claimed contractual duty without showing that the contract adds nothing to preexisting common-law or statutory duties.

Town of Hempstead v. Lizza Industries, Inc. · filed 1988-12-29(4)

The defendant contends that the plaintiff’s allegations arise from common-law or statutory duties and not from the contract and therefore should be subject to a three-year limitations period. However, the defendant has not submitted the contract and has not established, as a matter of law, that the alleged contractual obligations add nothing to the defendant’s preexisting common-law or statutory duty (cf., European Am. Bank v Cain, 79 AD2d 158).

Section 214(2) gives a bankruptcy trustee three years to bring claims against directors under BCL §§ 717, 719, and 720.

Purves v. ICM Artists, Ltd. · filed 1990-06-29(2)

As this is a liability imposed by statute and not contemplated by the provisions of CPLR § 213(7), we now hold that the three-year statute of limitations period mandated by CPLR § 214(2) governs the trustee’s claims brought pursuant to BCL §§ 717, 719, and 720.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for property damage claims under subdivision (4) and for § 1983 claims under subdivision (5).

Citrak v. Town of Chenango · filed 1990-10-04(4), (5)

Plaintiff all but concedes in his brief that his second cause of action for property damages against defendant is time barred and he does not dispute defendant’s proof that the latest date such damages could have occurred is March 1986, over three years before the suit was commenced (see, CPLR 214 [4]). As for the cause of action alleging a violation of 42 USC § 1983, that was also barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [5]; Owens v Okure, 488 US 235; 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, cert denied and appeal dismissed 481 US 1008) insofar as plaintiff’s claim apparently accrued in June 1985 and the action was not commenced until four years later.

Section 214 (5) applies a three-year limitations period to a tort claim against a social worker for breaching professional confidence.

Harley v. Druzba · filed 1991-01-24(5)

The cause of action was properly denominated as one in tort (see, MacDonald v Clinger, 84 AD2d 482, 486) subject to the three-year Statute of Limitations for negligence pursuant to CPLR 214 (5).

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for negligence and loss of consortium claims.

Darby v. Compagnie Nationale Air France · filed 1991-07-12

The statutes of limitations applicable to the instant case are the three-year statute of limitations governing negligence and loss of consortium claims pursuant to CPLR § 214, and the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death claims under Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 5-4.1. Therefore, the final day for commencing an action under § 214 was December 31, 1989, and under § 5-4.1, December 31, 1988.

Section 214’s three-year limitations period bars conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims when an earlier demand for the property was refused.

Roth v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. · filed 1991-12-17

To the extent that the complaint may be said to sound in conversion and breach of fiduciary duty, it is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214), since the December 28, 1983 letter from plaintiffs’ counsel, asserting that the shares are trust property, is merely a memorandum evidencing a prior demand by both trustees for return of the stock certificates and defendant’s refusal to do so.

Section 214(4) gives claims for tortious inducement of breach of contract and intentional infliction of economic harm a three-year limitation period that begins when the contract is breached.

Kronos, Inc. v. AVX Corp. · filed 1992-03-13(4)

The causes of action asserted against AVX are governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [4]) and accrued when the contract was breached (see, ...).

CPLR 214(5)’s three year limitations period does not apply to an article 78 proceeding merely because the petition makes a conclusory allegation of a federal Medicaid violation.

Medical Arts Sanitarium, Inc. v. New York State Department of Health · filed 1992-06-23(5)

Nor is the proceeding subject to the three year limitations period set forth in CPLR 214 (5) applicable to claims brought under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1396a (a) (13) (A) (the Boren Amendment), merely because the petition recites a conclusory allegation that the determination violates Federal Medicaid Law.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims against a water authority when its governing statute sets no separate period.

Gregory v. Monroe County Water Authority · filed 1992-07-31(5)

Since Title 5 does not set forth a statute of limitations for tort actions against MCWA, the three year statute of limitations applies as provided by CPLR § 214(5).

Section 214 supplies the three-year limitations period borrowed for a federal civil rights claim.

Cecere v. County of Westchester · filed 1993-03-04

The applicable period of limitations is three years, borrowed from NY CPLR § 214, as set forth in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1941-42, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1984).

Section 214(5) provides the three-year limitations period borrowed for § 1983 claims arising in New York.

Blankman v. County of Nassau · filed 1993-04-21(5)

Therefore, pursuant to CPLR § 214(5), the limitations period is three years.

Section 214’s three-year period for a claim alleging diversion of an opportunity does not begin before the alleged diversion is completed.

Lyall v. Grayco Builders, Inc. · filed 1992-05-05

The Yavner and Sherrill parties also argue the Gray parties’ set-aside claims are barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 214, on the basis that the claims accrued in 1978 and were not asserted until the 1982 amended answer. ... However, as the set-asides for the 106th Street project were not finally approved until 1980, it is difficult to see how the Gray parties’ claims accrued earlier than 1980, prior to any completed "diversion.”

Section 214(4)'s three-year period for property damage from negligent construction begins no later than the filing of the certificate of occupancy for the last unit.

Harbour Points Village Homeowners Ass'n v. Marrano/Marc Equity Joint Venture · filed 1992-07-14(4)

Because that cause of action accrued, at the latest, upon the filing of the certificate of occupancy for the last unit ... the commencement of that action in August of 1988, over three years beyond the date of completion of construction, was untimely (CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(4)'s three-year period for a tortious interference claim begins when the plaintiff suffers actual injury.

Kronos, Inc. v. AVX Corp. · filed 1993-04-01(4)

The parties agree that the three-year Statute of Limitations for injury to property applies (see, CPLR 214 [4]), and the sole question presented is whether the cause of action accrued when the contract was breached in 1984, as AVX contends, or in 1988 when plaintiff alleges it first suffered actual damages as a result of AVX’s tortious conduct. Plaintiff had no cause of action, and the Statute of Limitations could not start to run, until plaintiff suffered injury (see, Schmidt v Merchants Desp. Transp. Co., 270 NY 287, 300; see generally, Siegel, NY Prac § 40, at 47 [2d ed]).

Section 214(2) gives three years to bring an action to recover Medicaid reimbursement owed under a statutory payment scheme.

New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. McBarnette · filed 1993-07-15(2)

In that case, an action asserting that "the statutory and regulatory scheme entitling providers to payment for services properly reimbursable under Medicaid had been violated” (supra, at 839) was held to be governed by the three-year statutory limitations period of CPLR 214 (2) applicable to an action to recover upon a "liability * * * created or imposed by statute” (supra, at 838). The basis for recovery is indistinguishable from that asserted by plaintiff and the holding is entirely dispositive. Contrary to Supreme Court’s determination, plaintiffs commencement of this action in April 1992, seeking to recover payment of funds withheld or recouped by defendants commencing in July 1989, is within the three-year statutory period and, therefore, timely.

Section 214 gives a negligence claim a three-year limitations period.

Marine Midland Bank, N. A. v. State · filed 1993-07-22

In this case, inasmuch as negligence is being charged, the applicable Statute of Limitations is three years (see, CPLR 214). Because claimant’s application for leave to file its claim was made on January 15, 1992, the critical date for purposes of this appeal is January 15, 1989. Specifically, if claimant’s cause of action against the State accrued at any point prior to this date, then claimant’s late notice of claim motion must be denied.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for a statutory civil-service claim challenging legislative action.

Orange v. County of Suffolk · filed 1993-09-13(2)

Proceedings under Article 78, however, challenge administrative actions. Because this Court finds that Defendants’ actions in this case were legislative, the applicable statute of limitations is three years, as provided by CPLR § 214(2). Thus, Plaintiffs’ state law claim is not time-barred.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for an action to recover on a liability created or imposed by statute.

Mason Ex Rel. Mason v. Schenectady City School District · filed 1993-09-21(2)

In fact, the Masons ease is more analogous to an action “to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute” which, under CPLR § 214[2] carries a three year limitation period.

Section 214 does not bar a claim brought ten months after the cause of action accrues.

Espinal v. State · filed 1993-12-30

This motion was commenced 10 months after the accrual of the cause of action, and an action asserting a like claim against a citizen of the State would not be barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations (Court of Claims Act § 10 [6]; CPLR 214).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for covered claims, measured from accrual.

Corto v. Lefrak · filed 1994-04-12(4)

The record also reflects that the plaintiffs causes of action in the complaint, served on or about October 15, 1991, which accrued on September 21, 1985 when she was prohibited from removing the production property from the Kennedy Center pursuant to the writ of attachment, were also barred by the applicable statutes of limitations (i.e., CPLR 213 [2] [six years]; CPLR 214 [4] [three years]).

CPLR 214 (2) sets a three-year limitations period for damages actions alleging unlawful discriminatory practices under Executive Law § 296.

Alaimo v. New York City Department of Sanitation · filed 1994-04-25(2)

We further note that the commencement of the instant action to recover damages for unlawful discriminatory practices under Executive Law § 296 is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations prescribed in CPLR 214 (2) ... and the plaintiff here filed his complaint within the three-year ... limitations period.

Section 214(5)’s three-year limitations period for negligence does not apply when the complaint lacks the elements of negligence and alleges intentional conduct.

Tumminello v. City of New York · filed 1995-02-16(5)

Nor may the one-year time bar be evaded by the suggestion that Jenkins’ acts should be governed by the three-year statute of limitations for negligence (CPLR 214 [5]). Having failed to allege any of the essential elements of tortious negligence, the complaint leaves little room for construing the alleged conduct as anything but intentional.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for negligent tort claims.

Steo v. Cucuzza · filed 1995-03-27(5)

Thus, when the appropriate Statute of Limitations, either one year for intentional torts (see, CPLR 215 [3]) or three years for negligent torts (see, CPLR 214 [5]) is applied to each cause of action, it is clear that the plaintiff’s claims were time-barred as of 1984 unless the plaintiff could establish that the limitations period had been tolled or that the defendants should be estopped from asserting the Statute of Limitations as a defense.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year period for commencing negligence actions.

Kitson v. Atlantic Refining & Marketing Corp. · filed 1996-05-31(5)

Plaintiff’s action against Tyree and Todd was not commenced within the statutory three-year period for negligence actions (see, CPLR 214 [5]; Di Marco v Hudson Val. Blood Servs., 147 AD2d 156, 157).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for the property-damage claim, which was timely commenced before that period expired.

Northbrook National Insurance v. J & R Vending Corp. · filed 1996-06-11(4)

In the absence of any tolling of the statute of limitations, the three-year statute (CPLR § 214(4)) expires on April 2, 1996. ... (2) The filing of the summons and complaint on March 26, 1996 was a timely commencement of the direct action against Robertshaw.

Section 214 gives a negligence claim between private citizens a three-year limitations period.

Ferrer v. State · filed 1996-08-15

As the court has determined that the claim accrued on March 20, 1995, and a like claim between citizens would have to be filed within three years (CPLR 214), claimant faces no Statute of Limitations barrier with respect to his late claim request.

Section 214(5) gives a personal injury plaintiff three years to commence an action; buying an index number within that period does not make the action timely if the summons and complaint are filed after it expires.

Dawson v. Bastine · filed 1996-09-16(5)

In the instant matter, although the plaintiffs purchased an index number within the three-year period of limitations, they did not file a copy of their summons and complaint with the clerk within the limitations period and their ... motion for permission to make substituted service upon Liberty Mutual was made after the expiration of the limitations period (see, CPLR 214 [5]; Shivers v International Serv. Sys., 220 AD2d 357). Therefore, the action as to Bastine was never timely commenced and the court was without authority to permit substituted service following the expiration of the period of limitations.

Section 214(2)’s three-year period does not apply to claims to collect fees under Mental Hygiene Law article 43 or to set aside trust provisions that shield assets from those fees.

State v. Cetero · filed 1996-11-07(2)

defendants initially moved to dismiss the State’s second, third, fifth and sixth causes of action on the ground that such claims constituted "an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute” and, hence, were subject to the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2). ... We cannot agree. Whether viewed as an attempt to collect upon a liability imposed under Mental Hygiene Law article 43 (see, Mental Hygiene Law § 43.07 [c]) or, alternatively, as an attempt to merely set aside two provisions in the trust agreement that, in violation of the cited statutory provisions, would place the trust assets beyond the State’s reach (see, CPLR 213 [1]), it is clear that the six-year Statute of Limitations applies.

Section 214(3) can bar an untimely action seeking rights to photographs and negatives and their delivery.

New York City Transit Authority v. New-York Historical Society · filed 1997-03-17(3)

The Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ action as it was barred by the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [3]).