N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213

Section 213(5) applies a limitations bar running from discovery of spoliation or other misappropriation of property.

State v. Farragut Nursing Home · filed 1982-10-25(5)

The bar of the Statute of Limitations, be it the six-year limitation for money had and received or the shorter two-year time bar under CPLR 203 (subd [f]) “from actual or imputed discovery of facts” (not here applicable as no fraud is claimed) or under CPLR 213 (subd 5) from the discovery of spoilation or other misappropriation of such property does not apply to this action. There was no discovery of overpayment until the final audit particularly since some of the contested items were found in defendants’ favor.

Subdivision 1 requires a fraud-based rescission claim to be commenced within six years after the contract date.

Bowes & Co. v. American Druggists' Insurance · filed 1984-01-17(1)

Arbitration of a claim for rescission for fraud must be commenced within six years after the date of the contract (CPLR 213, subd 1; 35 Park Ave. Corp. v Campagna, 48 NY2d 813) or within two years after the fraud was or with reasonable diligence could have been discovered (CPLR 203, subd [f]).

Section 213(2) requires contract actions to be commenced within six years after accrual, except when Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides otherwise.

Sawyer v. Dudley · filed 1984-06-07(2)

CPLR 213 (subd 2) provides, in pertinent part, that an action upon a contractual obligation must be commenced within six years of its accrual except as provided in article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. An action for a breach of contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued (Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-725). The sole issue in this case is which of the two statutes is applicable.

Section 213(2) gives six years to sue on a contractual obligation.

Calamel v. Ridge View Realty Corp. · filed 1985-11-15(2)

"A cause of action against a contractor for defects in construction generally accrues upon completion of the actual physical work” and assertions of fraud and negligence cannot serve to extend the life of plaintiffs’ claim, which is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to contract claims (Cabrini Med. Center v Desina, 64 NY2d 1059, 1061; see also, State of New York v Lundin, 60 NY2d 987; CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(8) sets a six-year limitations period for fraud claims.

Glatzer v. Scappatura · filed 1986-01-27(8)

Accordingly, since the alleged fraudulent conduct complained of occurred in 1976, and the claim was not interposed until 1984, the claim is barred by CPLR 213 (8).

CPLR 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for an action based on an implied contract, running from the date of the implied contract.

Kalabakas v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1986-05-04(2)

The six-year period in CPLR 213 (2), running from the date of the implied contract, would thus not expire until February 1988.

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to contract claims and claims seeking contract-recoverable property or pecuniary damages.

Kracke v. Western World Insurance · filed 1986-06-30(2)

It is now clear that "an action for failure to exercise due care in the performance of a contract insofar as it seeks recovery for damages to property or pecuniary interests recoverable in a contract action is governed by the six-year contract Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 2)” (Video Corp. v Flatto Assoc., 58 NY2d 1026, 1028).

CPLR 213(8) gives fraud claims six years from the fraud itself to commence an action.

West 90th Owners Corp. v. Schlechter · filed 1988-02-23(8)

Applying either the six-year limitation from the date of the fraud itself (see, CPLR 213 [8]), or the alternate two-year time limit from date of discovery (see, CPLR 203 [f]), the claim is stale.

CPLR § 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract claims.

Fitzpatrick v. City of New York · filed 2000-06-13(2)

The six-year Statute of Limitations for Con Ed’s contract claim had not run (see, CPLR 213 [2]); the claim for indemnification had yet not even accrued.

Section 213(2) requires a contract action to be commenced within six years.

In Re Dayton Seaside Associates 2, L.P. · filed 2000-12-22(2)

In New York, contract claims are subject to a six year statute of limitations under CPLR 213(2).

Section 213(8) applies a six-year limitation period to fraud claims when the injury would not have occurred without the fraud; fraud cannot extend the limitations period for the same injury covered by a time-barred negligence claim.

Ruffing v. Union Carbide Corp. · filed 2003-09-22(8)

As to the claims asserted by Curtis in her individual capacity, we agree with IBM, and with our colleagues in the partial dissent, that Curtis may not assert fraud causes of action based on the allegations noted above where to do so would permit circumvention of the statute of limitations applicable to her negligence cause of action. ... If the allegations of the complaint are true, the damages incurred by the appellants were the product of the negligence of IBM in permitting the pregnant plaintiff, Curtis, to be exposed to noxious chemicals. The fraud inherent in the insistence by IBM that its workplace was safe for pregnant women did not result in the infliction of any additional damages over and above the damages to which the appellants would be entitled were they to prevail on their negligence causes of action. In accordance with the rule stated above, Curtis, whose negligence cause of action is time-barred, may not seek compensation for these damages by asserting a cause of action based on fraud.

Section 213 requires breach of contract claims to be brought within six years.

Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Wing Shing Products (BVI) Ltd. · filed 2004-07-01

Breach of contract claims are governed by a six-year statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213 (McKinney’s 2003). A cause of action for breach of contract accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the contract is breached.

Section 213(4) requires actions on a mortgage or mortgage secured debt to be commenced within six years.

NYCTL 1996-1 v. Harval Development Corp. · filed 2005-06-21(4)

Defendant Blake’s claim was untimely (CPLR 213 [4]; Green-point Sav. Bank v Kijik, 297 AD2d 359 [2002]; see also Island Holding v O’Brien, 6 AD3d 498 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 701 [2004]).

Section 213(2) gives implied-in-fact contract claims a six-year statute of limitations.

Beth Israel Medical Center v. Horizon Blue Cross And Blue Shield Of New Jersey, Inc. · filed 2006-05-19(2)

New York law provides a six-year statute of limitations period for implied-in-fact contract claims. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2). As previously noted, this action sought recovery for claims accrued between January 1, 1991, and December 31, 1996. The initial Complaint was not filed until July 7, 1998, so at least some of these claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, the Hospital for Special Surgery was not added as a plaintiff until a later date still. Accordingly, on remand, the District Court will have to determine, in the first instance, which claims are timely and which are not.

Section 213(2) gives a plaintiff six years from accrual to bring a breach of contract claim against an insurance broker.

Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of North America · filed 2007-09-28(2)

In order to be timely, the cause of action for breach of contract must have accrued less than six years before July 15, 2004, the date plaintiff filed this action.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract claims; a factual dispute over timeliness can prevent summary judgment on that defense.

The ESTATE OF MANTLE v. Rothgeb · filed 2008-02-26(2)

As the Court noted in its 12/21/07 Order, Defendants failed to show the absence of a factual dispute under either New York’s six-year statute of limitations, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2) (McKinney 2004), or Texas’ four-year statute of limitations, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.051 (Vernon 1997).

Section 213(2) gives a creditor six years to bring an action on a contractual obligation; after that period, the debt is unenforceable.

In Re Hess · filed 2009-05-06(2)

The Debtor objected to these claims on the grounds that they are time-barred by C.P.L.R. § 213. No response to the motions was filed. On the face of these proofs of claims, it is clear that each claim is indeed barred by New York’s six-year statute of limitations. Therefore, the Debtor’s objections to the claims are sustained and proofs of claims 3, 4 and 7 are expunged.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period did not bar a claim concerning work under one renovation contract when work under that contract ended less than six years before suit.

Haber v. Gutmann · filed 2009-07-30(2)

As only one contract existed and work under that contract terminated less than six years prior to the commencement of this action, the statute of limitations did not bar plaintiffs claim concerning any of defendant’s work (see CPLR 213 [2]; City School Dist. of City of Newburgh v Stubbins & Assoc., 85 NY2d 535, 538 [1995]).

Section 213(2) requires actions on express or implied contractual obligations or liabilities to be filed within six years.

Elliott v. the Marist Bros. of the Schools, Inc. · filed 2009-12-21(2)

New York’s statute of limitations requires contract actions to be filed within six years, ... and personal injury actions to be filed within three years. ... Plaintiffs claims are barred under New York law since the alleged acts stopped occurring in 1983.

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limit on actions to collect payment on promissory notes.

Honig v. Technicraft Industries, Inc. · filed 2010-12-14(2)

Plaintiffs’ action seeking payment on promissory notes which defendants had defaulted on by 1993 was time-barred (see CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract claims six years; a defective construction claim generally accrues when construction is substantially completed.

NEW YORK CENTRAL MUTUAL FIRE INS. v. GLIDER OIL COMPANY, INC. · filed 2011-12-30(2)

The statute of limitations for a breach of contract cause of action is six years (see CPLR 213 [2]). ... Brockett established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the breach of contract cause of action inasmuch as he established that the home was substantially completed in September 2001, more than six years before commencement of this action (see Lundin, 60 NY2d at 989; see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims; the court applied it only from the effective date of the New York choice-of-law provision.

Roling v. ETrade Securities LLC · filed 2012-03-27(2)

Presumably, Mr. Roling has asked for relief as of this date because New York has a six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract. ... The problem for Mr. Roling is that, based on the evidence of record, the first BCA that included a New York choice-of-law provision is the BCA effective from May to October 2005. ... The otherwise applicable California limitation period is four years. ... Therefore, Mr. Roling may seek relief only back to May 2005.

CPLR 213(2) bars a contract claim filed more than six years after it accrued.

Metwaly v. International Business Machines Corp. · filed 2012-07-31(2)

Plaintiffs contract claim would have nevertheless been time-barred even assuming a basis for the recovery of interest from 2002 existed (see CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims.

V.E.C. Corp. v. Hilliard · filed 2012-09-14(2)

Under New York law, causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing are governed by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2), which provides for a six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213(2) bars a construction-contract breach claim brought more than six years after substantial completion of the work.

Eastco Building Services, Inc. v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 2012-09-27(2)

Plaintiff commenced this action more than six years after completing its work, and therefore the claim for breach of contract is untimely and should have been dismissed (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) gives a plaintiff six years from each breach to seek damages for breach of contract.

Meadowbrook Farms Homeowners Ass'n v. JZG Resources, Inc. · filed 2013-04-10(2)

Since the plaintiff only seeks damages for alleged breaches that occurred within the six years prior to the commencement of this action, the causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract are not time-barred.

Section 213 gives a creditor six years to bring an action to recover on a promissory note.

In re Elverson · filed 2013-05-15

The application of the New York statute of limitations creates a bona fide dispute as to the enforceability of the Promissory Note. ... Under New York law, an action to recover on a promissory note must be commenced within six years.

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims.

Themis Capital, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo · filed 2014-07-09(2)

The DRC made its last payment under the Credit Agreement in 1990; plaintiffs initiated their lawsuit in 2009. Ordinarily, then, plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim would be time-barred.

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to defective-construction claims arising from a contractual relationship, even when pleaded as fraud or misrepresentation.

Starakis v. Baker · filed 2014-10-01(2)

Despite the fact that the plaintiffs also characterize the action as one sounding in fraud and misrepresentation, it is barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to a cause of action alleging breach of contract (see CPLR 213 [2]) since all liability for defective construction “has its genesis in the contractual relationship of the parties” (City School Dist. of City of Newburgh v Stubbins & Assoc., 85 NY2d at 538; see Town of Oyster Bay v Lizza Indus., Inc., 22 NY3d 1024, 1030 [2013]).

Section 213(2) gives a party six years from accrual to bring a breach of contract claim; a construction contract claim for payment accrues upon substantial completion of the work.

RAD & D'Aprile Inc. v. Arnell Construction Corp. · filed 2015-06-05(2)

Therefore, since plaintiff filed this action against defendant on March 21, 2014, 6V2 years after defendant’s substantial completion of the project and, even more egregiously, 8V2 years after its own substantial completion of the project, its first breach of contract cause of action is time-barred (see CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach of contractual representations and warranties, even when the claim is labeled indemnification.

Xerox State & Local Solutions, Inc. v. Xchanging Solutions (USA), Inc. · filed 2016-10-20(2)

The statute of limitation in New York for “an action upon a contractual obligation or liability” is six years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2). ... The fact that the amended complaint, and the APA, label the claim as one for “indemnification” does not alter the fact that it is one for breach of representations and warranties, which accrues at the time the representations and warranties are made.

Section 213(8) bars fraud claims brought more than six years after the last purchase of securities.

Varga v. McGraw Hill Financial, Inc. · filed 2017-02-10(8)

Plaintiff’s claims were brought more than six years after the last purchase of securities (CPLR 213 [8]) and thus are time-barred (see Prichard v 164 Ludlow Corp., 49 AD3d 408 [1st Dept 2008]; see also CIFG Assur. N. Am., Inc. v Credit Suisse *481 Sec. [USA] LLC, 128 AD3d 607, 608 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 906 [2016]).

Section 213(2) gives the Board six years to bring contractual claims for unpaid assessments, measured from when members fail or refuse to pay.

New York State Workers' Compensation Bd. v. 21st Century Constr. Corp. · filed 2018-01-09(2)

In a recent and virtually identical collection action, however, the Third Department ruled that the causes of action asserted by the Board are contractual in nature, regardless of their statutory underpinnings, and, therefore, are governed by the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR 213 (2) ( see Any-Time Home Care , 2017 NY Slip Op 08595 at *2-3; see also Belair Care Ctr., Inc. v Cool Insuring Agency, Inc. , 55 Misc 3d 1216 [A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50609[U], *9-10 [*7] [Sup Ct, Albany County 2017]). Further, it is by now well settled that the Board's claims accrued when the former Trust members failed or refused to pay the assessments ( see A & T Healthcare , 85 AD3d at 1437). Given that the Board first levied assessments on January 31, 2011 and members were given 45 days to respond ( see Papa Aff., Ex. B, pp. 2-3; Ex. G, ¶ 2256), the Board's claims accrued no earlier than March 18, 2011, and this action timely was commenced on January 31, 2014 ( see id. , Ex. D).

Section 213(2) gives six years to bring a contract claim; claims for breaches of mortgage loan representations and warranties accrue when the purchase agreements close.

LDIR, LLC v. DB Structured Prods., Inc. · filed 2019-04-25(2)

Finally, for the reasons stated in ACE Sec. Corp. v DB Structured Prods., Inc. (112 AD3d 522 [1st Dept 2013], affd 25 NY3d 581 [2015]), the breach of contract claims based on breaches of representations and warranties accrued on the closing date of the MLPAs, and are barred by the six-year statute of limitations on contract causes of action (CPLR 213[2]; see also Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp. Alternative Loan Trust v Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc. , 139 AD3d 519, 520 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 213(2) gives a party six years to bring a breach of contract or guarantee claim, measured from when payment could first be demanded.

Sotheby's, Inc. v. Mao · filed 2019-05-02(2)

Sotheby's causes of action against CFA for breach of the 2006 agreement and against Mao to enforce the guarantee are, of course, governed by a six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213[2]). ... Since the date two business days after December 28, 2007, was January 2, 2008 — and the parties never entered into a written agreement to waive or extend the statute of limitations in compliance with General Obligations Law § 17-103 — Sotheby's time in which to commence this action expired no later than January 2, 2014, about a year and a half before Sotheby's actually brought suit on June 25, 2015.

Section 213(2) requires an action on an express or implied contractual obligation to be commenced within six years after the claim accrues.

Ezra v. Weitz & Luxenberg · filed 2019-11-26(2)

New York C.P.L.R. § 213(2) requires “an action upon a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied,” to commence within six years of the claim accruing.

Section 213(4) bars a mortgage foreclosure action commenced more than six years after the full debt was accelerated.

Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Tortora · filed 2020-10-02(4)

Because Fannie Mae did not commence action No. 1 until 2018, more than six years after the debt was accelerated, Tortora established that the statute of limitations had expired, requiring dismissal of that action ( see CPLR 213 [4]; Larkin , 81 AD3d at 1355).

Section 213(4) gives six years to sue on a note secured by a mortgage; acceleration starts that period for the entire debt.

First Am. Tit. Ins. Co. v. Holohan · filed 2020-12-16(4)

The statute of limitations for an action to recover on a note which is secured by a mortgage on real property is six years ( see CPLR 213[4]). ... Consequently, the defendants demonstrated that the time within which to commence an action with respect to the entire debt has expired ( see Daldan, Inc. v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. , ___ AD3d ___, 2020 NY Slip Op 06749 [2d Dept]; Citimortgage, Inc. v Ford , 186 AD3d 1609).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.

KLAPPER v. SULLIVAN · filed 2021-03-29(2)

First, New Jersey and New York each have a six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. ... Because Defendants filed their Answer and Amended Counterclaims on July 20, 2020,11 Metus Capital’s breach of contract claim is timely under any potentially applicable statute of limitations.

Section 213’s six-year period for breach of contract claims applies when a contract’s five-year prescription clause requires only an assertion of the right to payment.

Ape Group SPA v. Republic of Argentina · filed 2022-02-15

For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that the prescription clause does not supersede New York’s six-year statute of limitations; rather, it prescribes the Republic’s obligation to pay where the security holder fails to assert a right to payment within the five-year period.

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims in New York.

Popovchak v. UnitedHealth Group Incorporated · filed 2023-09-19(2)

The statute of limitations period for breach-of-contract claims in New York is six years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2).

Section 213 requires breach of contract actions to be commenced within six years.

Mensah v. New York Inst. of Tech. · filed 2024-01-18

To the extent plaintiff asserts that defendant breached a contractual obligation to provide him with grades for courses that he admittedly never paid tuition for, his action is time-barred under the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims ( see CPLR 213; Matter of Edelen , 219 AD3d 931, 934 [2d Dept 2023], citing Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal , 81 NY2d 399, 402 [1993]; see also Marcal Fin. SA v Middlegate Sec. Ltd. , 203 AD3d 467, 468 [1st Dept 2022]). Plaintiff alleges that he attended the courses that he seeks grades for between 2003 and 2004, which is well outside the six-year statute of limitations. Moreover, the complaint fails to allege that he attempted to obtain his transcripts or certificate of graduation again after 2009, when defendant's last "breach" could have arguably occurred.

Section 213(2) gives contractual claims a six-year limitation period.

Kingstone Ins. Co. v. Marion Pharm. Inc. · filed 2024-02-15(2)

Although the negligence claim against Marion is time-barred, the cause of action for breach of contract against Marion, which plaintiff sought to add through its motion to further amend the complaint, was timely asserted within the six-year limitation period applicable to contractual claims ( see CPLR 213[2]), which will not expire until April 2024.

Section 213(2) gives contract claims a six-year statute of limitations.

Zittman v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. · filed 2024-02-29(2)

That is, six years for the statute of limitations on the underlying repurchase claims to expire, plus six years for the statute of limitations on the repurchase enforcement claims to expire ( see CPLR 213[2]).

Section 213(4) gives a lender six years to commence a mortgage foreclosure action after the debt is accelerated.

U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Schlesinger · filed 2024-05-01(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is governed by a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]; Lubonty v U.S. Bank N.A. , 34 NY3d 250, 261; MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v Singh , 216 AD3d 1087, 1088). ... Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that this action was time-barred by submitting evidence demonstrating that the mortgage debt was accelerated in November 2008 upon the commencement of the 2008 action, and that this action was commenced more than six years thereafter ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Simon , 216 AD3d 1041, 1042; U.S. Bank N.A. v Doura , 204 AD3d 721, 723; Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Iqbal , 195 AD3d 772, 773).

Section 213(1) gives six years to bring partnership accounting and breach of partnership agreement claims, measured here from dissolution of the partnership.

Monahemi v. Gohari · filed 2024-05-15(1)

Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that so much of the complaint as sought an accounting and to recover damages for breach of the partnership agreement as was based on the development and sale of the four subject properties was untimely through submission of his affidavit, which demonstrated that the parties entered into separate partnership agreements for each of the four subject properties, which dissolved more than six years prior to the commencement of this action ( see Partnership Law § 74; CPLR 213[1]; Gelman v Buehler , 20 NY3d 534, 537; Mashihi v 166-25 Hillside Partners , 51 AD3d 738, 739).

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract claims a six-year limitations period.

President and Fellows of Harvard College v. Marsh USA Inc. · filed 2024-08-15(2)

Because they are breach of contract actions, Counts I and II are subject to a six-year statute of limitations, and the causes of action began to accrue when Marsh first allegedly breached the Broker Agreement.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitation period for adequately pleaded breach of contract claims under subsection (2) and fraud claims under subsection (8).

Rabinowitz v. Clarke · filed 2024-09-26(2), (8)

Plaintiff adequately alleged fraud so as to invoke the six-year limitation period under CPLR 213(8). ... Plaintiff also adequately alleged breach of contract so as to invoke the six-year limitation period under CPLR 213(2).

Section 213(4) bars a mortgage foreclosure action brought more than six years after the lender accelerates the debt.

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Goldwasser · filed 2025-04-03(4)

As the instant action was brought more than six years after plaintiff accelerated the debt, it is barred by the statute of limitations applicable to foreclosure actions, and Supreme Court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint against them ( see CPLR 213 [4]; RPAPL 1301 [3]; HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. v Bresler , 212 AD3d 1, 3 [3d Dept 2022]).

Section 213(2) gives a party six years to bring an action on a contractual obligation, measured from the breach or failure to perform.

City of New York v. Crest Hous. Co. LLC · filed 2025-05-06(2)

Pursuant to CPLR §213(2), an action based on a contractual obligation or liability must be commenced within six years of accrual. In contract cases, the statute of limitations begins to run and the cause of action accrues when a contract is breached or one party fails to perform a contractual obligation.

Section 213(2) bars a claim for payment on an invoice when payment was due more than six years before the claim was brought.

Valentini v. 326 E. 30th St. Owners, Inc. · filed 2025-08-20(2)

Plaintiff argues that this claim is time-barred because defendant brought it more than six years after the date of the 326 East’s invoice, for that amount, to plaintiff. (NYSCEF No. 309 at 10, citing CPLR 213 [2].) ... Payment on the invoice was due more than six years ago. The branch of plaintiff’s motion for a judgment based on the exterior work it performed on plaintiff’s unit is denied.

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims.

Bugliotti v. the Republic of Argentina · filed 2026-03-09(2)

Under New York law, claims for breach of contract are subject to a six-year statute of limitations. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2).

Section 213(2) gives a party six years to bring a breach-of-contract claim.

Alterman & Boop LLP v. Emamian · filed 2025-06-13(2)

The longest statute of limitations which could possibly apply to Emamian’s counterclaims is the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract (see CPLR § 213[1][six year statute of limitations for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law], CPLR § 213[2] [six year statute of limitations for contractual obligation or liability], CPLR § 214[6] [three year statute of limitations for ... malpractice]).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for contract claims.

Silberblatt v. Stanley · filed 2007-11-19(2)

I conclude that the distinction is warranted. New York, whose law would likely govern this diversity action, has a six-year limitations period for claims asserted in contract. N.Y. CPLR § 213(2).

Section 213(2) requires breach of contract claims to be brought within six years after they accrue.

Hamza v. Yandik · filed 2023-08-18(2)

“The FLSA has a two-year statute of limitations that extends to three years for willful violations,” id. at 11 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 255), and Plaintiff’s state-law claims must be brought within six years after they accrue, see N.Y. Lab. Law § 663; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2).

Section 213(2)'s six-year contract limitations period applies to claims for breach of implied warranties arising from the rental of a scaffold.

Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co. · filed 1975-12-22(2)

We find no warrant for applying the restrictive four-year Statute of Limitations specified in section 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code to an action for breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for use in connection with the rental of the scaffold here in question. We hold, instead, that the six-year limitation period, relating to contracts in general, applies (CPLR 213, subd 2).

Section 213(2)’s six-year period applies to a property damage claim arising from a contractual agreement and submitted to arbitration, even when the claim could also support a tort action.

In re the Arbitration between Paver & Wildfoerster & Catholic High School Ass'n · filed 1976-02-19(2)

Thus, if a claim is substantially related to matters encompassed by the substantive agreement, it is immaterial, in applying the Statute of Limitations, whether it lies in "contract” or "tort”. Hence, the owner’s claim against the architects, although cognizable in law in either contract or tort malpractice, was timely asserted within the six-year period of limitations.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for a contract claim runs from each failure to make a required payment, rather than from discovery of the breach.

Schwarzler v. Garage Employees Union Local No. 272, I.B.T. · filed 1976-04-13(2)

Pursuant to the six-year contractual period of limitation (CPLR 213, subd 2), the claim now sought to be arbitrated is measured from each failure of the petitioner to pay any requisite contributions to the funds and not from the date the respondents purportedly discovered the breach of contract.

Section 213 gives six years to bring a contract claim, with the period beginning when the contract is breached.

Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Wing Shing Products (BVI) Ltd. (In Re AI Realty Marketing of New York, Inc.) · filed 2003-06-03

The parties dispute the events that triggered the running of a six-year statute of limitations, pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213 (McKinney 2003), on Wing Shing’s obligation to negotiate patent rights with Mr. Coffee. ... However, this Court finds that if Wing Shing did in fact have a responsibility to Mr. Coffee to negotiate the patent rights for the Design Patent, that obligation was breached by the filing of the application for the Design Patent.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for a claim to collect money owed on a contract.

Paonessa v. C & L Builder/Developer, Inc. · filed 2008-04-17(2)

Initially, we note that the six-year statute of limitations is applicable to a claim to collect money owed on a contract (see CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) gives six years to bring an implied contract claim; here, the period began when the spousal refusal created the contract.

Christopher v. Tomeck · filed 2011-03-03(2)

No dispute exists that, if the six-year statute of limitations for actions upon implied contracts pursuant to CPLR 213 (2) applies to plaintiffs claims premised on decedent’s refusal to pay for her spouse’s care, then such claims are time-barred because the implied contract arose when decedent executed the spousal refusal in 1997 (see Social Services Law § 366 [3] [a]; Matter of Tomeck, 8 NY3d at 740; Matter of Schneider, 70 AD3d 842, 844 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 709 [2010]; Commissioner of Dept. of Social Servs. of City of N.Y. v Fishman, 280 AD2d 396, 398 [2001]).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for contract-based claims.

Hakim v. Hakim · filed 2012-10-11(2)

The six-year limitations period for Isaac’s contract-based claims technically expired several years before Isaac commenced this action (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period for a contract claim runs from the breach; where payment was due upon a property sale, nonpayment did not breach the contract until the sale.

Glynos v. Dorizas · filed 2013-05-14

The court also properly determined that plaintiffs breach of contract claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. The alleged breach for nonpayment under the terms of the contract did not occur until the property was sold, less than six years before the action was commenced (see CPLR 213; ElyCruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402 [1993]).

Section 213(2)'s limitations period applies to a declaratory judgment action based in contract.

Kings Harbor Multicare Ctr. v. Townes · filed 2024-10-16(2)

The claims asserted in this action, which seeks a declaratory judgment based in contract, are not time-barred ( see CPLR 213[2]; Zwarycz v Marnia Constr., Inc. , 102 AD3d 774; Stein v Garfield Regency Condominium , 65 AD3d 1126, 1127).

Section 213(2) provides a limitations period for contract claims; a defendant seeking dismissal on that ground must establish that the action is untimely.

Housing Trust Fund Corp. v. Nugent-Nobles · filed 2025-02-19(2)

In any event, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the action was untimely ( see CPLR 213[2]; 214[2]; Soufer v Baroukhian , 182 AD3d 624, 626) or otherwise establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law ( see CPLR 3212).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of express or implied contract claims.

Lopez v. Thermo Tech Mechanical Inc. · filed 2023-05-31(2)

Plaintiff's NYLL claims, like his other state law claims, are subject to a six-year statute of limitations. See NYLL §§ 198(3), 663(3); Kermanshah v. Kermanshah, 580 F. Supp. 2d 247, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("New York's statute of limitations for breach of an express or implied contract is six years") (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2)).

CPLR 213(2)'s six-year period for actions upon contractual obligations does not apply to an action seeking a declaration that no valid contractual obligations ever existed.

Riverside Syndicate, Inc. v. Munroe · filed 2008-02-07(2)

Finally, the tenants argue that, since the agreement was made in 1996, this action, brought in 2004, is barred by the six year statute of limitations provided by CPLR 213 (2) for “an action upon a contractual obligation or liability.” ... This action is not one “upon a contractual obligation or liability,” but one to declare that no valid contractual obligations ever existed.

CPLR 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions on contractual obligations.

Troy Towers Redevelopment Co. v. City of Troy · filed 1976-02-19(2)

Likewise, the Statute of Limitations presents no bar to this action for we are dealing with a contractual obligation, arising from the resolution of September 4, 1969, which is subject to the six-year limitation of CPLR 213 (subd 2).

Section 213(2) requires an action on a contract to be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues.

John J. Kassner & Co. v. City of New York · filed 1979-03-27(2)

Therefore the cause of action for breach of contract accrued, within the meaning of the Statute of Limitations, no later than July 1, 1968.

Section 213 generally gives six years to commence contract actions, with the period running from the breach.

A. T. & M. Development Corp. v. Hawver & Ewasick, Inc. · filed 1982-04-29

It is undisputed that the contract in issue was for services to which a six-year Statute of Limitations applies (CPLR 213). The dispute concerns the accrual of the cause of action for purposes of measuring this time limitation. Generally, in contract cases, the cause of action accrues and the Statute of Limitations begins to run from the time of the breach (Kassner & Co. v City of New York, 46 NY2d 544, 550).

Section 213(2) requires an action upon a contractual obligation to be commenced within six years, generally running from the breach.

Medical Facilities, Inc. v. Pryke · filed 1983-06-16(2)

As to the defendant’s claim that the action was barred by the six-year limitation in CPLR 213 (subd 2), the principle is of course well established that an action for breach of contract commences running at the time the breach takes place (1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 213.10), and it seems patent that the insurance company did not violate any obligation on the day of the fire.

Contract actions generally must be commenced within six years.

Teitelbaum v. New York Property Insurance Underwriting Ass'n · filed 1984-11-09(2)

Defendant’s failure to deliver a policy or binder containing a two-year Statute of Limitations therefore constitutes a waiver of any limitations period other than the general statutory six-year period. (CPLR 213, subd 2; 1303 Webster Ave. Realty Corp. v Great Amer. Surplus Lines Ins. Co., supra; Medical Facilities v Pryke, supra; see, also, Aarons Fifth Ave. v Insurance Co. of North Amer., 52 AD2d 855; Conte v Yorkshire Ins. Co., 5 Misc 2d 670; cf. Gallagher v Gibbs, 84 AD2d 661.)

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to breach of contract actions.

Yakkey v. County of Nassau · filed 1986-06-30(2)

Alternatively, the defendant was entitled to partial summary judgment as to claims arising prior to August of 1977 which are precluded by the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to breach of contract actions (see, CPLR 213 [2]; Calfapietra v Donahue, 100 AD2d 504).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions.

O'Connor v. Maine-Endwell Central School District · filed 1986-12-11(2)

Consequently, because it would be unconstitutional to apply the one-year Statute of Limitations to this plaintiff’s claim, his action is still subject to the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to contract actions generally and, therefore, was commenced in a timely fashion.

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract actions a six-year statute of limitations.

Lyons v. Donnelly · filed 1994-05-31(2)

The plaintiff commenced this action on September 19, 1991, more than three years after the cause of action accrued (see, CPLR 214 [6]) but before the expiration of the six-year Statute of Limitations for breach of contract (see, CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims, accruing here after the insurer declined to participate in the appraisal process.

C & F Pollution Control, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. · filed 1995-12-07(2)

... Instead, we conclude that plaintiffs action against Fidelity did not commence until after November 1, 1983, when Fidelity initially declined to participate in the appraisal process to determine disputes described in the parties’ contract. The six-year Statute of Limitations period had not run at the time plaintiff discharged defendant.

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitation period for contract actions.

Ronald Chernow Associates, Inc. v. Public Service Commission · filed 1997-06-26(2)

Initially, we agree with Supreme Court’s conclusion that CPLR 213 (2), fixing a six-year Statute of Limitations in contract actions, had no bearing on petitioners’ claim for interest on the tax and surcharge component of overbillings that accrued prior to the PSC’s January 1994 determination in the NBC case.

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract actions a six-year limitations period that runs from the breach.

LaGreca v. City of Niagara Falls · filed 1997-11-19(2)

Supreme Court properly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) on the ground that it is time-barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations governing breach of contract actions (see, CPLR 213 [2]). The cause of action for breach of contract accrued at the time of the breach (see, Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402), i.e., when defendant terminated life insurance coverage for plaintiffs decedent in June 1988, allegedly in violation of a collective bargaining agreement.

Section 213(2) requires account stated actions based on legal services to be commenced within six years after services are completed; later billings do not restart the limitations period.

Stewart v. Stuart · filed 1999-06-07(2)

Since the plaintiff failed to commence an action based upon his account stated within six years after the date upon which he completed his services for the defendant and began mailings of the statements of account, the court correctly concluded that this cause of action is time-barred. There is no merit to the plaintiffs contention that the rendering of bills subsequent to the date upon which services were complete began the Statute of Limitations running anew each time these bills were generated.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract actions, running from the occurrence of the breach.

County of Rockland v. Kaeyer, Garment & Davidson Architects, P.C. · filed 2003-10-27(2)

A breach of contract cause of action accrues, and the six-year statute of limitations starts to run, upon the occurrence of the breach (see CPLR 213 [2]; Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402 [1993]; Mauro v Niemann Agency, 303 AD2d 468 [2003]; Levy v Luss & Co., 267 AD2d 213 [1999]; Bernstein v La Rue, 120 AD2d 476, 477 [1986]).

Section 213(2) applies the limitations period to breach of contract claims, running from the insured's death in this case.

Grunblatt v. First Unum Life Insurance · filed 2005-06-13(2)

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the statute of limitations on her causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract began to run upon the death of the insured husband (see Gallo v Savings Bank Life Ins. Fund, 257 AD2d 600, 601 [1999]).

Section 213(2) provides the limitations period for breach of contract claims, including claims arising from oral paving agreements.

Poli v. Lema · filed 2005-12-15(2)

Contrary to defendant’s contentions, the causes of action for both paving jobs sound in breach of contract, as opposed to negligence, and were therefore timely commenced (see CPLR 213 [2]; see e.g. Lino Del Zotto & Son Bldrs. v Colombe, 216 AD2d 778 [1995]).

Section 213(2) requires a breach of contract action to be commenced within six years.

Chayes v. Chayes · filed 2006-04-20(2)

This action, which alleges breach of the parties’ separation agreement, is barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [2]; see Hoffman v Cannone, 206 AD2d 740 [1994]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contractual obligations, subject to exceptions such as the four-year period governing contracts for the sale of goods under UCC article 2.

Village of Scarsdale v. New York City Water Board · filed 2006-10-31(2)

The respondent’s counterclaim to recover the amount allegedly owed by the appellant for the “excess water” supplied to it from the City of New York water supply was contractual in nature, as opposed to quasi-contractual in nature (cf. Bradkin v Leverton, 26 NY2d 192, 196-197 [1970]). Since the counterclaim was essentially predicated on a contract for the sale of goods (see Sternberg v New York Water Serv. Corp., 155 AD2d 658, 659 [1989]; see also UCC 2-102), the four-year statute of limitations contained in UCC article 2 applies (see UCC 2-725 [1]; CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 sets a six-year limitations period for a lienor's contract action when its mechanic's lien is invalid.

Cranesville Block Co. v. Spring Apartments, LLC · filed 2008-07-31

Pursuant to Lien Law § 54, even if a lien is invalid, a lienor may recover in an action on a contract against any party to the action. The statute of limitations for such an action is six years (see CPLR 213).

Section 213 supplies a six-year limitations period for a claim that a city breached its contractual obligations under a collective bargaining agreement.

Gooshaw v. City of Ogdensburg · filed 2009-11-25

... Supreme Court erred in converting the action to a CPLR article 78 proceeding and the six-year statute of limitations applies here (see CPLR 213).

Section 213(2) supplies the limitations period applied to a breach-of-insurance-contract claim; a complaint filed after that period expires is time-barred.

Last v. Guardian Life Insurance of America · filed 2010-04-27(2)

The defendant made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the causes of action in the complaint were asserted after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]; ...).

Section 213(2) gives breach-of-contract claims a six-year limitations period.

Chiste v. Hotels.com L.P. · filed 2010-11-15(2)

Breaches of contract claims in Wisconsin and New York have a six-year limitations period.

Section 213(2) applies the six-year limitation period to a contractual claim for a refund of money orders, measured from their issuance.

Stankevich v. Apple Bank for Savings · filed 2014-01-27(2)

Regardless of how plaintiff denominates his cause of action, he is seeking relief based upon an alleged underlying contractual claim regarding defendant’s obligation to refund to him the amounts paid for such money orders. As plaintiff did not commence this action until January 12, 2012, which was more than 21 years after the date of issuance of the money orders, the Justice Court did not err in finding that this action is time-barred (see CPLR 213 [2]) and in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract actions a six-year limitations period.

Anderson & Anderson LLP - Guangzhou v. Lowinger · filed 2020-03-18(2)

As Plaintiffs acknowledge, this action is subject to New York’s six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2), and would be timely only if it falls within the New York Savings Statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 205(a).

Section 213(2) allows six years to bring a breach of contract action; a suit filed soon after a refusal to provide a quitclaim deed is timely when the agreement set no deadline for providing it.

Tiozzo v. Dangin · filed 2021-08-19(2)

It is undisputed that Tiozzo did not demand a quitclaim deed until 2019, and that she brought this suit soon after Dangin's refusal to provide one, well within the six-year limitations period for breach of contract actions (CPLR 213[2]).

Section 213(2) requires breach of contract actions to be commenced within six years.

Rifkin v. Apple Computer · filed 2023-09-21(2)

Plaintiff's claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations governing breach of contract actions ( see CPLR 213[2]).

Section 213(2) gives a plaintiff six years from the breach to bring a breach of contract action.

McKenzie-Morris v. V.P. Records Retail Outlet, Inc. · filed 2024-09-27(2)

Under New York law, the statute of limitations for breach of contract actions is six years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2) (“The following actions must be commenced within six years . . . an action upon a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied . . . .”). The period begins to run when a breach occurs.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for contract claims does not apply to a fee liability that exists only because a statute imposed it.

City of New York v. Kingsview Homes, Inc. · filed 1979-06-28(2)

Hence, it reasoned that an expansion of the right which found origin in the agreement was contractual and therefore, subject to the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 2). We disagree. Here, in the absence of the statute, no liability for the fee of $1 per room per year would exist. ... In these circumstances, the action is one "to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute” (CPLR 214, subd 2) and is, therefore, governed by the three-year statute.

Section 213(2)'s six-year period for contract actions does not apply to an obligation arising from statute.

State v. City of Binghamton · filed 1979-11-21(2)

Appellant urges that the within action is one upon a contract and therefore is governed by the six-year provision of CPLR 213 (subd 2). However, we conclude that the obligation arises, not from contract, but rather, from statute.

Section 213(2)'s six-year period for contract actions does not apply to a § 1983 constitutional tort claim merely because a contract incorporates the underlying rights.

Pauk v. The Board of Trustees of the City University of New York · filed 1981-09-11(2)

But appellant is not suing for breach of contract; he is suing under § 1983 for the constitutional tort alleged to have occurred when his tenure application was rejected in violation of his First Amendment rights. ... For these reasons § 213(2) does not apply to appellant's suit.

Section 213 gives a taxpayer six years from payment to seek recovery of taxes paid under a mistaken assessment.

Battlefields, Inc. v. County Legislature of Rockland · filed 1976-03-22

The court, accordingly, finds that petitioner’s right to recover taxes which it had allegedly overpaid was subject to a six-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 213(6) gives an action based on mistake six years from the time the alleged mistake occurs.

Diematic Manufacturing Corp. v. Packaging Industries, Inc. · filed 1976-05-03(6)

New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) § 213(6) (McKinney 1972) states the applicable statute of limitations for an action based upon mistake, that is, six years from the time the alleged mistake occurs.

For an action based upon mistake, CPLR 213(6) imposes a six-year limitations period that begins when the mistake is committed, not when it is discovered.

Goodbody & Co. v. Stern · filed 1978-02-10(6)

The period of limitations for an action based upon mistake is six years (CPLR 213, subd 6). It begins to run when the mistake is committed, not when it is discovered.

Section 213 requires actions based on fraud or mistake to be commenced within six years after accrual.

Warwick Materials, Inc. v. J. K. Produce Farms, Inc. · filed 1985-06-10(6), (8)

Consequently, plaintiff’s first two causes of action based, upon fraud and mistake are barred by the Statute of Limitations as they were asserted more than six years after accrual (CPLR 213 [6], [8]) and more than two years after discovery (CPLR 203 [f]).

Section 213's six-year contract limitations period does not bar an implied housing merchant warranty claim for a defective roof when the expected life of the roof exceeds six years.

Vento v. Honeybee Homes Inc. · filed 1988-12-01

This court therefore finds that the Statute of Limitations for a defective roof is over six years as one could reasonably expect that a well-made roof should last over six years.

Section 213(6) governs the time limit for commencing claims based on mistake.

American Home Assurance Co. v. Scanlon · filed 1990-08-02(6)

National Union’s claims of mistake are, therefore, not time barred (CPLR 213 [6]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year statute of limitations for Navigation Law claims seeking reimbursement of cleanup costs.

Bologna v. Kerr-McGee Corp. · filed 2000-05-10(2)

However, a six-year statute of limitations applies to Navigation Law claims for reimbursement of cleanup costs such as those sought here. See CPLR 213(2); ... The six-year limitations period is measured from the time plaintiff suffered a loss by paying the debt for which it alleges defendant should be held responsible.

Section 213 supplies the New York limitations period for aiding-and-abetting claims when New York has the greatest interest in those claims.

Silverman v. H.I.L. Associates Ltd. (In Re Allou Distributors, Inc.) · filed 2008-03-31

For these reasons, and based upon the entire record, the Court finds that New York has the greatest interest in the Trustee’s aiding and abetting claims and that New York’s C.P.L.R. § 213 statute of limitations applies to the First and Second Claims for Relief.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year period for contract actions, but the twenty-year period in section 211(a) applies to qualifying bonds secured only by the issuer’s faith and credit.

Sovereign Bonds Exchange LLC v. Federal Republic of Germany · filed 2010-10-20(2)

Section 213(2) requires “an action upon a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied, except as provided in section two hundred thirteen — a of this article or article 2 of the uniform commercial code or article 36-B of the general business law!’ be commenced within six years. ... Because the German Banks have failed to show the Bonds were secured by something more than the “pledge of the faith and credit of the issuer,” the applicable limitations period under New York law is twenty years.

Section 213 gives breach of contract claims a six-year limitations period.

Cianciotto v. Hospice Care Network · filed 2011-07-26(2)

Turning to plaintiffs personal claims, the court rejects any suggestion that her personal claims are barred by limitations. Based upon the allegations of plaintiffs complaint, it appears that plaintiff has elected to pursue her action principally on a breach of contract theory. If such a claim is viable, the six-year statute of limitations governing contract claims (CPLR 213) applies to this lawsuit.

Section 213(1) gives restitution claims under New York law a six-year limitations period.

Danecker v. Board of Trustees of the Service Employees 32BJ North Pension Fund · filed 2012-08-02(1)

The relevant statute of limitations for restitution claims in New York is six years.

Section 213 supplies a six-year limitations period for an ERISA plan reimbursement claim analogous to a contract action when the plan has no shorter limitations period.

Kohl's Department Stores v. Castelli · filed 2013-08-08

Here, there is no indication that the Plan contained a shorter limitation period. For this reason, the applicable statute of limitations with respect to the Plaintiffs claim is six years.

Section 213(1)’s residual six-year limitations period governs a claim seeking an accounting for money or property allegedly held by a fiduciary.

McDonald v. Edelman & Edelman · filed 2013-11-12(1)

It has to do with whether defendants owe plaintiff a fiduciary duty to account for money or property allegedly belonging to him, and is therefore governed by the “residual” six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) (see Hartnett v New York City Tr. Auth., 86 NY2d 438, 443 [1995]; Bouley v Bouley, 19 AD3d 1049, 1051 [4th Dept 2005]).

Section 213(2) gives contract claims a six-year statute of limitations.

Hutter v. Countrywide Bank, N.A. · filed 2014-08-22(2)

As contract claims are subject to a six-year statute of limitations, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2), the time period to add this new claim expired on December 11, 2012.

Section 213(1)'s six-year limitations period does not apply to a claim under Real Property Law § 339-bb; CPLR 214(2)'s three-year period applies.

Pomerance v. McGrath · filed 2015-01-20(1)

The three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214 (2), as opposed to the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213 (1), applies to the underlying statutory violation at issue (see Hartnett v New York City Tr. Auth., 86 NY2d 438, 443-444 [1995]).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims, and section 213(8)'s two-year fraud discovery rule does not apply to those claims.

NWM Capital, LLC v. Scharfman · filed 2016-11-01(2), (8)

The mortgage proceeds claim is time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to breach of contract actions (see CPLR 213 [2]; Hahn Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v American Zurich Ins. Co., 18 NY3d 765, 770 [2012]). The two-year fraud discovery rule (see CPLR 213 [8]; Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527, 532 [2009]) is inapplicable since the claim is one for breach of contract, not fraud (see ACE Sec. Corp., Home Equity Loan Trust, Series 2006-SL2 v DB Structured Prods., Inc., 25 NY3d 581, 594 [2015]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for a misrepresentation claim sounding in fraud under Insurance Law § 3105.

CIFG Assurance North America, Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC · filed 2016-11-29(1)

The statute of limitations for misrepresentation is six years, rendering the claim timely (see CPLR 213 [1]; Santiago v 1370 Broadway Assoc., 96 NY2d 765, 766 [2001]; Bokara Rug Co., Inc. v Kapoor, 93 AD3d 583, 584 [1st Dept 2012]; Catanzano v Warren Rosen & Co., 19 AD3d 250, 250 [1st Dept 2005] [Insurance Law § 2123 misrepresentation claim governed by six-year statute of limitations]).

Section 213(2) bars contract claims whose limitations period expired before they were assigned.

Craft EM CLO 2006-1, Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank AG · filed 2017-08-14(2)

This Court finds that Craft's claims that Deutsche Bank failed to apply updated Moody's mapping tables and to meet specified criteria in the Reference Obligations are time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations, as HSBC had no viable claims to assign as of the execution of the 2016 Assignment Agreements (CPLR 213[2]).

Section 213(1) gives claims for an accounting a six-year limitations period that begins when a successor replaces the trustee.

Matter of Lee · filed 2017-08-23(1)

Claims for an accounting are subject to a six-year statute of limitations ... The claims against BNY accrued when Merrill Lynch succeeded it as trustee or cotrustee on December 13, 2001, and January 3, 2002.

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for contract claims.

Wilchfort v. Knight · filed 2018-03-30(2)

By contrast, New York enforces a six-year limitations period. CPLR § 213(2). Thus, Florida's shorter five-year period applies.

Section 213(2) does not bar a contract claim as a matter of law when the complaint alleges acknowledgment of the plaintiff’s role in February 2012 correspondence and was filed in January 2018.

Kim v. Francis · filed 2020-06-04(2)

Contrary to defendants' contentions, neither the statute of limitations under CPLR 213(2) nor laches bars the contract claim, as a matter of law since the complaint alleged that the individual defendants acknowledged plaintiff's role in the company through correspondence, in February 2012, which plaintiff submitted in opposition to the motion, and defendants failed to assert what prejudice they suffered as a result of the filing of the complaint in January 2018 for laches to apply ( Matter of Linker , 23 AD3d 186, 189 [1st Dept 2005]).

Section 213(2) gives quasi-contract claims at most six years to be brought.

Rawal v. Estate of Shashidhar Dave · filed 2021-05-24(2)

Plaintiff’s quasi-contract claims are subject to, at most, a six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for contractual claims, including express breach and implied covenant claims.

Endemann v. Liberty Insurance Corporation · filed 2022-05-05(2)

By contrast, the statute of limitations for a contractual claim—be it an express breach or an implicit violation—under New York law is six years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2).

Section 213(7) provides a six-year limitations period for derivative claims, including derivative breach of fiduciary duty claims.

Wong v. Board of Mgrs. of One Sunset Park Condominium · filed 2024-09-20(7)

CPLR 21 3 (7) sets forth a six~year. statute of Iimhati ons foe :derivative claims, .such as the breach of fiduciary duty .claim asserted here.

CPLR 213 gives six years to bring a rent abatement claim for breach of the warranty of habitability because the claim arises from an implied covenant in the lease.

Thor 560 W. 136th St., LLC v. Sanghvi · filed 2024-12-20

The statute of limitations for a rent abatement claim arising out of breach of the warranty of habitability is six years, because the claim is based on a breach of an implied covenant in the contract between the parties, and the statute of limitations for breach of contract under the CPLR is six years (CPLR 213; Whealon v Gramercy Park Residence Corp., 214 AD3d 427 [1st Dept 2023]).

CPLR 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for civil claims without another specified limitations period.

Kraemer v. Edelstein · filed 2026-04-09(1)

Although plaintiff asserts that the claim for subornation of perjury against Duval has no statute of limitations, in civil actions, if a statute of limitations is not set forth under CPLR 213(1), then the six-year statute of limitations applies, rendering all the claims arising from plaintiff's 2015 eviction time-barred.

Section 213’s six-year limitations period governs indemnification claims based on implied warranties of suitability and merchantability.

Durabla Manufacturing Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1998-02-03

While defendants further argue that the third and fourth causes of action are governed by the four-year statute for breach of warranty claims, they are, rather, governed by the six-year statute for indemnification claims.

Section 213’s six-year catchall does not apply to abuse-of-process claims because CPLR 214 provides a limitations period for them.

Levine v. Sherman · filed 1976-06-09(1)

Since abuse of process is a personal injury provided for by CPLR 214, the six-year catchall of CPLR 213 for unspecified situations is inapplicable.

Section 213(1)’s six-year period applies to a statutory claim that redresses a wrong already recognized at common law.

United States ex rel. Bilotta v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. · filed 2014-09-30(1)

A cause of action falls within C.P.L.R. § 213 when “analysis of the challenged causes of action reveals that they seek essentially to redress wrongs previously known to the law, ... before the enactment of the statutes discussed.”

Section 213(2)’s six-year contract limitations period is the analogous period for assessing laches in maritime maintenance and cure claims.

Fitzgerald v. Angela Compania Naviera, S. A. · filed 1976-06-22(2)

This court finds that to the extent that the general maritime law aspect of the first cause of action relates to defendants’ obligation to provide “maintenance and cure,” such cause of action comes within the contract statute of limitations and is not time-barred. As this District has previously ruled, “The claim for maintenance and cure is based on an implied ‘contractual obligation arising out of the nature of the employment.’ The analogous statute of limitation therefore is CPLR § 213 par. 2.”

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitation period for an action for which no other limitation is fixed by law.

In re the Arbitration between SCM Corp. & Fisher Park Lane Co. · filed 1976-12-02(1)

Were the landlord to seek such relief in a judicial proceeding, it would be barred by the six-year limitation provided by CPLR 213 (subd 1) for an action for which no other limitation is fixed by law.

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year limitations period for actions lacking another specific statutory limitation.

In re the Estate of D'Onofrio · filed 1978-11-22(1)

The only statutory limitation which might possibly be herein applicable is the omnibus language of CPLR 213 (subd 1) which provides that all actions for which no other specific limitations are provided are governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations. ... This statutory scheme suggests an intent on the part of the Legislature never to circumscribe a court in revoking a fiduciary’s authority where the circumstances justify such action. Clearly, if the court may always revoke letters based upon facts being presented to it even informally, it was not intended that as a matter of law, a time limit be placed when the same information could be presented in a formal proceeding.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law.

Williamsburg Candy & Tobacco, Inc. v. State · filed 1981-01-09(1)

Alternatively, CPLR 213 (subd 1) may be ... invoked for an action “for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law”. Therefore, the proposed claim for appropriation is not time barred.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitation for an action with no limitation specifically prescribed by law.

Korvettes Inc. v. Sanyo Electric Inc. (In Re Korvettes Inc.) · filed 1984-08-16

However, it is abundantly clear that this six-year limitations period should not control in this instance in that it bears no logical relationship to any aspect of the pursuit of a preference action.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for causes of action with no other Statute of Limitations.

Kolomensky v. Wiener · filed 1987-12-07(1)

Nor do we find merit in the appellants’ claim that a cause of action to recover damages for wrongful eviction under RPAPL 853 is governed either by CPLR 213 (1) or CPLR 214 (2). CPLR 213 (1) provides a six-year Statute of Limitations for causes of action with no other Statute of Limitations and CPLR 214 (2) provides a three-year Statute of Limitations for actions to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute. The appellants’ claim does not fall within the ambit of CPLR 214 (2) since a cause of action to recover damages for wrongful eviction has been recognized at common law and thus is not purely statutory (Maracina v Shirrmeister, 105 AD2d 672; Dzubey v Teachers’ Coll., 87 AD2d 783), and courts of this State have repeatedly held the provisions of CPLR 214 (2) do not apply to liabilities existing at common law which have been recognized or implemented by statute (Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169). Instead, we find that the causes of action under RPAPL 853 warrant applying a one-year Statute of Limitations due to the fact that they seek to recover for an intentional tort (see, Davis v St. Joseph’s Children’s Servs., 99 AD2d 960, affd 64 NY2d 794; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assocs., 43 NY2d 389; Trott v Merit Dept. Store, 106 AD2d 158; Schulman v Krumholz, 81 AD2d 883).

Section 213(1) requires an action with no specifically prescribed limitations period to be commenced within six years.

Bank of New York Financial Corp. v. Mitchell-B.J. Ltd. · filed 1995-12-05(1)

Therefore, CPLR 213 (1), which provides that "an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law” must be commenced within six years, applies to the instant claim and the IAS Court properly denied the motion to dismiss.

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud actions.

Schwartzman v. Weintraub · filed 1977-02-03(8)

This third cause is timely since it is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations for fraud (CPLR 213, subd 8).

Section 213(8) allows an actual fraud action within six years of the fraud or two years after discovery, or when discovery should reasonably have occurred, whichever is later.

Quadrozzi Concrete Corp. v. Mastroianni · filed 1977-03-21(8)

If predicated upon the ground of actual fraud, the Statute of Limitations would be six years from the commission of the fraud or two years from the time the plaintiff discovered, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, the fraud, whichever is later (CPLR 213, subd 8; 203, subd [f]).

For fraud claims, the limitations period is six years from the fraud or two years from discovery, whichever is longer.

Joyner v. Albert Merrill School · filed 1978-12-05(8)

An action based on fraud does not accrue until six years from the date of the fraud, or two years from the date the fraud is discovered or could, with reasonable diligence, be discovered. (CPLR 213, subd 8; 203, subd [f].)

Section 213(8) allows a fraud action to be commenced within two years after discovery of the fraud.

Scola v. Morgan · filed 1979-02-01(8)

The action, commenced on October 8, 1973, within two years after discovery of the fraud, was timely. Accordingly, the first affirmative defense of Statute of Limitations was properly dismissed as insufficient (CPLR 213, subd 8; 203, subd [f]).

For an action based on fraud, the limitations period runs from when the plaintiff discovered the fraud or, with reasonable diligence, could have discovered it.

Trepuk v. Frank · filed 1977-06-288

CPLR 213 (subd 8) is explicit that in an action based on fraud, the time within which the action must be commenced shall be computed from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have discovered it.

Section 213(8) makes whether fraud could have been discovered with reasonable diligence a mixed question of law and fact.

Trepuk v. Frank · filed 1978-04-04(8)

There is no indication in the challenged pleading or in the papers submitted that plaintiffs actually "discovered the fraud” prior to 1973 and, ordinarily, an inquiry as to the time a plaintiff or the person under whom he claims "could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” is a mixed question of law and fact (see CPLR 213, subd 8, formerly subd 9 [see L 1975, ch 43, § 2, eff Sept. 1, 1975]; Erbe v Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 3 NY2d 321, 326; Higgins v Crouse, 147 NY 411, 415).

Subdivision 8 provides a six-year limitations period for fraud actions, subject to the claim being governed by a shorter period when its substance is conversion.

Stadtman v. Cambere · filed 1979-12-048

Actions for fraud are governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations. (CPLR 213, subd 8.) However, we think that for purposes of Statute of Limitations this action must be considered as one for conversion and governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 213(1) bars an attack on the validity of Local Law No. 4, 1971, when the limitations period has expired.

Ingenito v. Conklin · filed 1982-04-05(1)

In addition, any attack on the validity of Local Law No. 4, 1971, of the County of Rockland is now barred by the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 1).

Section 213 bars an action to impose a constructive trust when the applicable Statute of Limitations has expired.

Pedersen v. Pedersen · filed 1982-12-17

While the evidence supports the findings of the trial court that defendant contributed to the purchase price of the marital residence and that all of the elements of a constructive trust were present (see Bankers Security Life Ins. Soc. v Shakerdge, 49 NY2d 939), the action to impose a constructive trust is barred by the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213; see Scheuer v Scheuer, 308 NY 447; cf. Augustine v Szwed, 77 AD2d 298).

Section 213 allows a fraud action to be brought within six years when the fraud was discovered within that period.

Two Clinton Square Corp. v. Friedler · filed 1983-01-31

Inasmuch as plaintiff alleges that it first discovered the fraud in June, 1980, the cause of action in fraud is within the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period, measured here from the alleged breach.

Bullard v. City of Fulton · filed 1983-07-11

The alleged breach could be said to have occurred as late as plaintiff’s last day of employment, December 31, 1977, a time well within the statutory period.

Section 213(1) gives constructive trust actions a six-year limitations period that begins when the wrongful act creating the restitution duty occurs, rather than when fraud is discovered.

Kitchner v. Kitchner · filed 1984-04-30(1)

It is well settled that the Statute of Limitations applicable in actions to impress constructive trusts can be found in CPLR 213 (subd 1), which prescribes a six-year period that commences to run upon occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution (Scheuer v Scheuer, 308 NY 447; Mann v Mann, 77 AD2d 866; Dolmetta v Uintah Nat. Corp., 712 F2d 15,18) and “not from the time when the facts constituting the fraud were discovered” (Motyl v Motyl, 35 AD2d 1051, 1052; see, also, Muller v Muller, 116 Mise 2d 660, 664).

For fraud, the limitations period is six years from the fraud or two years from discovery or when it reasonably could have been discovered, whichever is longer.

County of Westchester v. Welton Becket Associates · filed 1984-05-29(8)

The Statute of Limitations for fraud is either six years from the date of the fraud or two years from the time the fraud was discovered or with reasonable diligence could have been discovered, whichever is longer (CPLR 213, subd 8; 203, subd [f]).

Section 213(2) supplies a six-year limitations period for contract claims, but it does not govern a malpractice claim absent an agreement to achieve a specific result.

Albany Savings Bank v. Caffry, Pontiff, Stewart, Rhodes & Judge, P. C. · filed 1983-06-09(2)

In our view, the record fails to support this argument. Although plaintiff labels this a contract action, it is clear that the character of an action is determined by the essence of the conflict, not by a mere label (Brick v Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., 276 NY 259, 264). ... The pivotal issue is whether defendant expressly agreed to accomplish a specific result. Upon an examination of the pleadings, we fail to find any specific agreement, oral or written, to establish the marketability of title (cf. Boecher v Borth, supra).

Section 213 supplies the limitations period for an action that primarily depends on a right of indemnification.

United States v. New York · filed 1984-09-07

Because the action primarily depends upon a right of indemnification, CPLR § 213 applies, and the action is timely.

CPLR 213(2)'s six-year limitations period does not apply to administrative attempts to recoup Medicaid overpayments.

Cattaraugus County Nursing Home v. Axelrod · filed 1985-01-24(2)

This was error. As this court recently held in Matter of Cortlandt Nursing Home v Axelrod (99 AD2d 105, mot for lv to app granted 64 NY2d 602), that time limitation provision is inapplicable to administrative attempts to recoup Medicaid overages (id., at pp 106-107).

Section 213 gives separate actions for contribution or apportionment a six-year limitations period that starts when the judgment is paid.

L. B. Smith, Inc. v. Circle Air Freight Corp. · filed 1985-03-05

A separate action for contribution or apportionment, though, is governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213) which commences to run at the time of payment of the judgment (Bay Ridge Air Rights v State of New York, 44 NY2d 49 [1978]).

CPLR 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud measured from the last fraudulent act.

Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Baker · filed 1985-11-01(8)

Even if the relevant statute is assumed to be New York's, which provides either a period of two years from when the fraud could have been discovered, CPLR 203(f), or six years from the last fraudulent act, CPLR 213(8), the amendment should fail. According to affidavits and information submitted by both Hartford and Baker, the last fraudulent act occurred prior to the immunity agreement executed on January 19, 1979. Both the New York and the New Jersey statutes addressing fraud had run by the time of the filing of the New Jersey complaint in February 1985.