N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213

CPLR 213(2)'s contract limitations period does not apply when the record shows no contractual relationship between the parties.

Langham v. State · filed 1986-10-30(2)

Plaintiffs also assert that the contractual limitations period of CPLR 213 (2) should govern. However, the record contains no evidence of a contractual relationship between the affected employees and the State defendants.

Section 213(5) applies to State actions concerning the spoliation or misappropriation of personal property, not real property.

New York State Water Resources Commission v. Liberman · filed 1971-12-01(5)

The provisions of that article are now found in section 63-c of the Executive Law and subdivision 5 of CPLR 213. It has been held that the authority granted the State by these statutes relates only to personal property, and not to real property. ... The first affirmative defense should be dismissed.

Section 213(7) gives a corporation six years to sue a current or former director, officer, or stockholder for waste; adverse domination can toll that period.

Levin v. Modi · filed 2021-10-15(7)

The parties do not appear to dispute that a six-year statute of limitations applies to the Trustee’s corporate waste claims. ... N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(7) (McKinney) (“The following actions must be commenced within six years: an action by or on behalf of a corporation against a present or former director, officer or stockholder . . . to recover damages for waste . . . .”). ... However, because the Trustee was not appointed until June 2018 and the original complaint was filed in March 2019, the Trustee’s State Law Claims are not time barred under either the three-year or six-year limitations periods given these allegations of adverse domination.

Section 213(8)'s six-year limitations period applies to stockholder derivative claims for waste and diversion of corporate assets when actual fraud is not pleaded.

Cohen v. Manson · filed 1973-06-28(8)

As limited by ■the briefs, at issue in this stockholders’ derivative action is whether new claims asserted in an amended complaint are subject to the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd. 8) or that applicable to fraud actions (CPLR 213, subd. 9; 203, subd. [f]). The claims are essentially for waste and diversion of corporate assets and no attempt is made to plead actual fraud.

CPLR 213(7)’s six-year limitations period does not apply to claims that are not for corporate waste.

Kazakhstan Investment Fund Ltd. v. Manolovici · filed 2003-06-05(7)

The IAS court properly held the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (7) inapplicable since plaintiffs claims are not for corporate waste.

Section 213(2) gives implied warranty claims a six-year limitations period running from the date of sale.

Braniff Airways, Inc., Phillip Addabbo, and Morton D. Stein, as of the Estate of Maurice Berg, Deceased v. Curtiss-Wrigh · filed 1970-04-16(2)

New York's six year limitation period runs from the date of sale. See CPLR § 213(2) (McKinney 1963).

Section 213(2)’s six-year limitations period for a breach of warranty claim does not begin when the machine becomes operable.

Lewis v. John Royle & Sons · filed 1971-06-24(2)

'There is no merit to appellant’s argument that the cause of action does not arise until the machine becomes operable CPLR 213 (subd. 2) and Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (supra) expressly state otherwise.

Section 213(2) gives six years from the original sale to bring a breach-of-warranty claim based on that sale.

Victorson v. Kaplan · filed 1973-08-21(2)

Leave to reargue is granted and upon reargument the court adheres to its original decision dismissing as time barred the claims of breach of warranties and apportionment of relative responsibility based upon breach of warranties. These claims were not asserted until 1970, that is, considerably longer than six years (CPLR 213, subd. 2) after the original sale of the subject extractor by defendant Bock in 1948.

Section 213’s six-year contract limitations period applies to breach-of-warranty claims.

Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc. · filed 1974-04-15(2)

The third and fourth causes of action, for (breach of warranty, were not asserted for the first time until 'March, 1973, and they should have been dismissed, since they would have been time-barred even had they been asserted in the original complaint (former Civ. Prac. Act, § 48; CPLR 213; Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-725; Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., (25 N Y 2d 340, supra, which is still the law as to warranty causes of action).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitation period for a breach-of-warranty action that accrues in New York.

Myers v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. · filed 1972-03-27(2)

The cause of action based on breach of warranty thus having accrued in New York, the “ borrowing statute ” is inapplicable and the six-year limitation of CPLR 213 (subd. 2) applies.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for contract actions excludes sales contracts governed by article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

Reiss v. Pacific Steel Pool Corp. · filed 1973-03-02(2)

CPLR 213 provides: “The following actions must be commenced within six years: * * * 2. an action upon a contractual obligation or liability express or implied, except as provided in article 2 of the uniform commercial code; ’ ’ ... From the foregoing it is apparent that the four-year Statute of Limitations is applicable in the instant case and, therefore, the action is time-barred.

Section 213(2)'s six-year limitation does not apply to a guarantor whose liability follows a sales contract subject to a four-year limitation.

American Trading Co. v. Fish · filed 1974-02-19(2)

Since under the sales contract the obligation of Kinematix was subject to the four-year Statute of Limitations (Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-725, subd. [1]) defendant’s liability was similarly limited, rather than by the six-year limitation afforded by subdivision 2 of CPLR 213.

Section 213(2)'s six-year limitations period applies to a warranty claim arising from a transaction entered into before New York's Uniform Commercial Code took effect.

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Rust Engineering Co. · filed 1973-08-01(2)

Since here the transaction was entered into before the date when the Uniform Commercial Code became effective in this State (Uniform Commercial Code, § 10-105), the preoode six-year period of limitation applies (CPLR 213, subd. 2), and inasmuch as the transaction was not completed until July 2, 1965, the last date when delivery was made, this action is riot time-barred.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period does not apply to unjust enrichment or account stated claims based on nonpayment for goods; those claims are subject to the four-year period for sales of goods.

Herba v. Chichester · filed 2003-01-16(2)

A reading of plaintiff’s complaint establishes that the breach of contract, unjust enrichment and account stated causes of action are based on the same allegations, i.e., nonpayment by Cobleskill for the delivery of goods by plaintiff. As a result, all three causes of action are governed by the four-year statute of limitations and are time-barred (see Sitkiewicz v County of Sullivan, 256 AD2d 884, 885, lv denied 93 NY2d 908; see also Bray Terms. v Transport Oil Co., 180 AD2d 938, 939-940; Sawyer v Camp Dudley, 102 AD2d 914).

Section 213(2)’s six-year period does not apply to an obligation to pay for goods sold when UCC 2-725 governs the sale.

Troy Boiler Works, Inc. v. Sterile Technologies, Inc. · filed 2003-06-20(2)

The court agrees with defendant that this language makes it clear that actions based on a contractual obligation to pay the purchase price for the sale of goods are subject to the narrower statute of limitations set forth in UCC 2-725, and not the broader contract statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2).

Section 213’s six-year period for contract claims does not apply to contracts for the sale of goods, which are governed by the UCC’s four-year period.

Jackson v. Eddy's LI RV Center, Inc. · filed 2012-02-24

While claims for breach of contract under New York law are generally covered by a six year statute of limitations, that limitations period does not apply where, as here, the contract at issue is for the sale of goods and is therefore governed by the UCC.

Section 213’s six-year period does not govern a breach of implied warranty claim involving the sale of goods; the four-year Uniform Commercial Code period applies.

Bristol Village, Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. · filed 2013-01-03

The statute of limitations for such a cause of action against a manufacturer or distributor is four years and “accrues on the date the party charged tenders delivery of the product” ... Plaintiff did not commence this action until 2012, therefore the breach of implied warranty claim is untimely.

Section 213(2) does not supply the limitations period for contract and account stated claims arising from sales of goods; those claims are subject to a four-year period.

CPB International, Inc. v. Federal Laboratories Corp. · filed 2013-02-01(2)

With respect to the remaining causes of action, we agree with defendant that each are subject to a four-year limitations period under the law of both New York (see UCC 2-725 [1]; CPLR 213 [2]; Herba v Chichester, 301 AD2d 822, 822-823 [2003]) and Pennsylvania (see 13 Pa Cons Stat § 2725 [a]; 42 Pa Cons Stat § 5525 [a] [2]), and that more than four years elapsed between the accrual of plaintiff’s most recent cause of action and its commencement of the instant action.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for contractual obligations yields to the UCC’s four-year period for contracts involving the sale of goods, including anticipatory repudiation claims.

QK Healthcare, Inc. v. InSource, Inc. · filed 2013-05-08(2)

Since UCC 2-725 is the more specific statute, UCC 2-725, and not CPLR 213 (2), is controlling (see Matter of Dandomar Co., LLC v Town of Pleasant Val. Town Bd., 86 AD3d 83, 92-94 [2011]) and, thus, the plaintiffs claim is governed by a four-year statute of limitations.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period does not apply to contracts predominantly for the sale of goods.

Laing Logging, Inc. v. International Paper Co. · filed 1996-06-13(2)

We also reject plaintiff’s contention that Supreme Court erred in dismissing the first and second breach of contract causes of action contained in the amended complaint as barred by the four-year Statute of Limitations applicable to the sale of goods (see, UCC 2-725). According to plaintiff, there is at least a question of fact as to whether the contracts were for the provision of services and, therefore, subject to the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]). It is clear that the predominant purpose of the parties’ contracts was the transfer of title to personal property, i.e., wood chips, which is a sale of goods (see, UCC 2-105 [1]; 2-107); plaintiffs’ labor in chipping the wood and delivering it to defendant’s site was merely incidental or collateral to the sale of wood chips (see, Sawyer v Camp Dudley, 102 AD2d 914).

CPLR 213(1) provides a six-year limitation period for actions in equity.

Pitt v. City of New York · filed 1981-11-12(1)

However, this is manifestly inappropriate as CPLR 213 (subd 1) contemplates actions in equity.

Section 213’s six-year period for contractual obligations does not govern a specific performance claim that requires equitable relief and has no comparable remedy at law.

Beresovski v. Warszawski · filed 1971-05-26

We find inapplicable the 6-year statute pleaded in bar and conclude that the 10-year Statute of Limitations provided by section 53 of the Civil Practice Act, and recognized as governing actions in equity, applies and will be effective in this case, if the cause of action, which had accrued prior to the effective date of the CPLR, was not barred at that time (CPLR 218, subd. [b]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for an action for specific performance.

Puro v. Puro · filed 1972-04-12

This being an action for specific performance, the applicable period of limitations is six years (CPLR 213). The supplemental complaint having been served well within that period, the court finds that the action is not time-barred.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an action seeking equitable rescission of a contract.

Van Dussen-Storto Motor Inn, Inc. v. Rochester Telephone Corp. · filed 1972-11-17(1)

The court agrees with plaintiff’s contention that it is really seeking equitable relief in asking for a rescission of the original contract, traditionally an equitable remedy. The applicable Statute of Limitations is six years and therefore this action was timely commenced (CPLR 213, subd. 1).

Section 213's six-year period governs equitable rescission claims.

Van Dussen-Storto Motor Inn, Inc. v. Rochester Telephone Corp. · filed 1978-07-13(1)

Rescission is an equitable cause of action (Overland v Le Roy Foods, 113 NYS2d 124, affd 279 App Div 1085), therefore the six-year Statute of Limitations governs (CPLR 213, subd 1; Buscarello v Guglielmelli, 44 Misc 2d 1041, 1042-1043; 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 213.01) and not the three-year statute which controls causes of action created by statute (CPLR 214, subd 2).

Section 213(1) generally governs only actions for equitable relief.

Cullen v. Margiotta · filed 1987-02-02(1)

Plaintiffs have argued for the application of CPLR § 213(1) or § 213(6), each providing a six-year period. We find neither appropriate. Section 213(1) “has generally been understood to govern only actions for equitable relief.” ... Civil RICO makes no provision for equitable relief.

Section 213(1) applies a six-year limitations period to claims for which no specific limitation is prescribed, including restitution based claims.

Abercrombie v. Andrew College · filed 2006-06-15(1)

Causes of action, including equitable remedies, “for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law” are governed by the six-year statute of limitations under New York law. ... Claims based in restitution, such as the claim for unjust enrichment, are also subject to this six-year statute of limitation.

CPLR 213(1) gives a rescission claim six years from accrual; absent continuing fraud or duress, a claim to rescind a deed accrues when the deed is executed.

English v. Brady · filed 2025-12-23(1)

"Rescission is an equitable cause of action . . . , [and] therefore the six-year [s]tatute of [l]imitations" set forth in CPLR 213 (1) applies ( Van Dussen-Storto Motor Inn , Inc. v Rochester Tel. Corp. , 63 AD2d 244, 250 [4th Dept 1978]; see Mandour v Rafalsky , 238 AD3d 637, 638 [1st Dept 2025]; Hoffman v Cannone , 206 AD2d 740, 740 [3d Dept 1994]). Further, inasmuch as plaintiff did not allege continuing fraud or duress ( see Rubin v Rubin , 275 AD2d 404, 405 [2d Dept 2000], lv dismissed 95 NY2d 958 [2000]; Hoffman , 206 AD2d at 740-741), the proposed rescission cause of action accrued at the time the deed was executed in 2012 ( see Van Dussen-Storto Motor Inn , Inc. , 63 AD2d at 250).

Section 213’s six-year limit for contract actions does not conclusively govern maritime indemnity claims; federal laches governs their timeliness.

Celeste v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc. · filed 1974-07-11

Finally we note that once judgment has been entered and paid, the continued viability of the cause of action for indemnity will not be conclusively governed by our six-year Statute of Limitations applicable in contract actions, but by Federal laches — there not being a specific period of limitation under Federal law governing such actions.

CPLR 213’s six-year limitations period does not govern strict products liability claims; the three-year tort limitations period applies.

Simmons v. Albany Boys Club, Inc. · filed 1974-11-12

Defendant Klarsfeld sets out two affirmative defenses, the one alleging that the second cause of action in plaintiff’s complaint is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations provided in CPLR 213 and the other that the second cause of action is barred by the four-year Statute of Limitations provided by section 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code. ... Accordingly, I conclude that there is now a cause of action for strict products liability as distinguished from and separate from a cause of action for breach of warranty and that the normal three-year statute for torts governs the former while the four-year statute controls the latter. ... Plaintiff’s motion to strike the affirmative defenses interposed by the defendants is granted, to the extent that they relate to the cause of action for strict product liability.

Section 213’s six-year limitations period applies to a transaction in which services predominate and goods are incidental.

Joseph P. Suchy, Inc. v. Stuerzel · filed 1975-05-02

The essence of the contractual relationship between the plaintiff and defendants is one in which service predominates and the furnishing of a casket was but an incidental feature of the transaction. ... The six-year Statute of Limitations applies to such a transaction (CPLR 213).

Subsection 2 gives actions based on services rendered a six-year limitations period.

Rappaport v. Blank · filed 1978-12-14(2)

An action based upon services rendered is governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 2). Defendant Leo Blank asserts that the action in chief was commenced on June 8, 1977. Therefore, the six-year Statute of Limitations bars any claim for services allegedly rendered prior to June 8, 1971.

Section 213 gives service and construction contracts a six year limitations period.

Insurance Co. of North America v. ABB Power Generation, Inc. · filed 1996-05-21

Service contracts, including construction contracts, are governed by N.Y. CPLR § 213 (McKinney 1990), under which there is a six year proscriptive period.

Section 213(2) generally provides six years for breach of contract claims, but a contract governed by UCC Article 2 has a four-year limitations period.

Axiom Investment Advisors, LLC ex rel. Gildor Management, LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG · filed 2017-02-13(2)

Although breach of contract claims generally are subject to a six-year statute of limitations under New York law, the limitations period is four years where, as here, the contract is governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”).

Section 213(1) governs whether an action for a declaratory judgment was timely commenced.

Overmyer v. Eliot Realty · filed 1975-06-06(1)

Further, plaintiff has presented a "justiciable controversy” in an action for declaratory judgment (CPLR 3001) which has been timely commenced (CPLR 213, ...subd 1; cf. CPLR 213, subd 9; see ...).

A fraud claim is untimely when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged fraud years before commencing the action.

Garlick v. Tarenzi · filed 1989-07-31[8]

Since, as a matter of law, it has been established that the plaintiffs knew, or should have known, that the defendant claimed to be the owner of the property as early as 1976, and since, as a matter of law, the defendant’s claim in this respect should have revealed his alleged "fraud” to the plaintiffs, we conclude that the cause of action asserted in the complaint in the present action was not timely interposed (see, CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [f]; Modin Assocs. v City of New York, 136 AD2d 530, 531).

Section 213 requires an action on this claim to be commenced within six years of the breach.

Pomerantz v. Pomerantz · filed 1997-02-24

Finally, the plaintiffs action was commenced within six years of the breach and was, therefore, timely (see, CPLR 213; Matter of Equitable Life Assur. Socy. v Branch, 32 AD2d 959).

Section 213(2) gives an insured six years to sue for breach of an insurer’s contractual duty to defend; where refusals to defend continue through an appeal, the action accrues upon the final refusal and breach.

Colpan Realty Corp. v. Great American Insurance · filed 1975-10-06(2)

An action upon a contractual obligation must be commenced within six years. (CPLR 213, subd 2.) This action predicated upon the breach by defendant of its contractual obligation to defend its insured comes within the purview of CPLR 213 (subd 2). ... When the appeal was terminated by dismissal on January 19, 1972 the refusals became final and the last breach occurred. This action has been instituted within six years of such final refusal and breach and is therefore timely.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims, which does not begin until the fiduciary openly repudiates the obligation or the account is judicially settled.

In re Baird · filed 2009-01-15(1)

Although petitioner is correct that a six-year limitations period is applicable, claims alleging a breach of fiduciary duty do not accrue “until there is either an open repudiation of the fiduciary obligation or a judicial settlement of the . . . account” (Matter of Winne, 232 AD2d 956, 958 [1996]; see CPLR 213 [1]; Matter of Barabash, 31 NY2d 76, 80 [1972]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims; a claim for an insurer’s failure to defend accrues when the underlying action terminates.

Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Ins. Co. · filed 2018-12-11

New York law imposes a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims. ... Ghaly makes clear that, under New York law, a claim for failure to defend accrues when the underlying action terminates. Liberty Mutual's action is therefore timely.

Section 213 gives a claim to reform a lease for mutual mistake six years from when the mistake is committed, regardless of when it is discovered.

Nichols v. Regent Properties Inc. · filed 1975-10-21

Special Term properly granted defendants’ cross motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ third cause of action for reformation of a lease based upon an alleged mutual mistake on the ground that it is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213). ... With limited exceptions not here applicable, the general rule is that the Statute of Limitations begins to run when the mistake is committed, not when it is discovered.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for an action when no other period is specifically prescribed by law.

Interco Realty Corp. v. Perkins · filed 1975-10-31

Therefore, CPLR 213, which provides that an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law must be commenced within six years from the date of accrual, is applicable as Special Term held. Here defendant Perkins’ challenge, as embodied in her proposed affirmative defense and counterclaim was therefore timely, it being within six years of the recording date of the challenged deeds, the first of which was March 18, 1969.

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year limitations period when no other limitations period is specifically provided.

Koerner v. State of New York · filed 1984-06-29(1)

Because such a time limitation was prescribed, plaintiffs could not avail themselves of the six-year period provided by CPLR 213 (subd 1), which is applicable only when no other period is specifically provided.

Section 213(1) sets a six-year limitation period for actions with no specifically prescribed limitation.

Stern v. BSL Development Corp. · filed 1990-07-03(1)

We agree with the Supreme Court that plaintiff’s claim is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations for "an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law” (CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on actions with no other limitations period specifically prescribed, including equitable deed reformation claims.

United States v. Schmitt · filed 1998-03-31(1)

A cause of action for reformation of a deed is subject to the six year limitations set forth in the omnibus provision of CPLR 213(1) (“an action of which no limitations is specifically prescribed by law”).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for actions for which no other limitations period is specifically provided by law.

PSINet, Inc. v. Cisco Systems Capital Corp. (In Re PSINet, Inc.) · filed 2001-12-18(1)

The Court holds that the applicable statute of limitations is not that of CPLR § 214(3), relating to an action to recover a chattel, but rather CPLR § 213(1), relating to actions for which no other limitations period has been specifically provided by law.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for contractual indemnification actions.

EMC Mortgage LLC v. Pulte Mortgage LLC · filed 2020-02-20

Because New York’s statute of limitations period for indemnification actions is six years, see CPLR § 213; McDermott, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 646, none of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable New York statute of limitations.

Section 213(2) gives a plaintiff six years from the principal’s default to bring an action on a guaranty.

40th St. Tenants Corp. v. Eshaghian · filed 2025-04-09(2)

An action on a guaranty is subject to a six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [2]). The six-year statute of limitations does not commence until the principal, here Tenant, is in default. Tenant stopped paying rent in June 2020 but nonetheless continued to occupy the premises until July 27, 2021. Plaintiff sent a demand letter to Defendant on April 15, 2021 and subsequently commenced this action on July 27, 2021. Here, the action was plainly commenced within the statute of limitations. Defendant’s sixth affirmative defense is therefore dismissed.

Section 213’s six-year limitation bars a claim for attorney fees that accrued more than six years before the action began.

Shaad v. Hutchinson's Boat Works, Inc. · filed 1975-12-10

If it accrued on any date of significance here prior to May 30, 1962, it is barred by CPLR 213.

Section 213(1)’s six-year period does not apply to a constructive-fraud claim when the claimed injury stems from professional malpractice.

Naetzker v. Brocton Central School District · filed 1975-12-12(1)

Nor is there merit to appellant’s contention that the Architects were guilty of gross misconduct tantamount to constructive fraud and, therefore, the six-year period of limitation provided in CPLR 213 (subd 1) applies.

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud claims.

Simcuski v. Saeli · filed 1978-05-04(8)

Recovery of damages in such case is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations under CPLR 213 (subd 8).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract claims, and section 213(8) applies a six-year period to fraud claims subject to the discovery rule.

Woyciesjes v. Schering-Plough Corp. · filed 1989-06-02(2), (8)

Those accrual dates render untimely plaintiff’s action commenced nine years later in January 1983. That is true whether defendant’s allegations are deemed to sound in malpractice or breach of contract (see, CPLR 213 [2]; 214 [6]). It does not avail plaintiff to couch his allegations in terms of fraud because that cause of action is also time barred (CPLR 203 [f]; 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for claims based on fraud.

Dornberger v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 1997-03-27(8)

Accordingly, we conclude that the proper limitations period for Plaintiffs claims under these statutes is the six-year period applicable to fraud claims under New York law.

Section 213(8) requires a fraud action to be commenced within six years of the fraud or two years after it could reasonably have been discovered, whichever is longer.

Moreau v. Archdiocese of New York · filed 1999-05-10(8)

A cause of action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years of the commission of the fraud, or two years from the date the fraud could reasonably have been discovered, whichever is longer (see, CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]; Baratta v ABF Real Estate Co., 215 AD2d 518; Piedra v Vanover, 174 AD2d 191).

Section 213(8) gives fraud claims six years from the fraud’s commission or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered, whichever is later.

Julian v. Carroll · filed 2000-03-27(8)

The Statute of Limitations for a fraud cause of action is six years from the date of commission of the fraud (here 1991) or two years from the date the fraud was or could reasonably have been discovered, whichever is later (see, Hillman v City of New York, 263 AD2d 529; Shannon v Gordon, 249 AD2d 291; CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]).

For a fraud claim, the limitations period runs two years from when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraud.

Wender v. Gilberg Agency · filed 2000-10-12(8)

The limitations period on the fraud claim is two years measured from the date that Wender discovered, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, the restriction against Balberg’s selling of non-Northwestern policies (CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud claims.

Anthoine v. Lord · filed 2001-06-21(8)

Assuming that plaintiffs, underwriting members of insurance syndicates, have causes of action against defendants, counsel to the syndicates, sounding in fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice and statutory deceptive acts and practices, based on defendants’ concealment from plaintiffs of their enormous exposure to asbestos and pollution liabilities, any such causes of action accrued in 1991, at the latest, and are barred by either a three- or six-year limitations period (CPLR 213 [8]; 214 [2], [6]).

Section 213(8) applies a six-year limitations period to a fraud claim when the claimant had sufficient facts to put them on notice of the alleged misrepresentation.

M & T Mortgage Corp. v. Holland · filed 2001-10-29(8)

The court properly determined that the appellant’s counterclaim alleging fraud was time-barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations. The appellant had knowledge of sufficient facts at the time of the alleged misrepresentation to put him on notice of any potential claims based on fraud (see, CPLR 213 [8]; Neuhs v Ingersoll Rand Co., 115 AD2d 187; Bevilacqua v Bevilacqua, 233 AD2d 471).

Section 213(8) permits the fraud limitations period to run until two years after the plaintiff discovers the fraud.

New York Health & Racquet Club, Inc. v. NIA/Kornreich Ltd. Liability Co. · filed 2002-01-24(8)

In addition, since the fraud alleged by plaintiff is not extrinsic to the contract to procure and monitor proper marine insurance, it may not be utilized to convert the action to one for fraud (see, Morgan Knitting Mills v Reeves Bros., 243 AD2d 422) and thus to extend the running of the statutory period until two years from the time of plaintiffs discovery of the fraud (see, CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]).

Section 213(8) requires an actual fraud claim to be commenced within six years of the fraud or two years after it could reasonably have been discovered, whichever is later.

Mazella v. Markowitz · filed 2003-03-17(8)

A cause of action based upon actual fraud must be commenced within six years of the commission of the fraud, or two years from the date the fraud could reasonably have been discovered, whichever is later (see Julian v Carroll, 270 AD2d 457 [2000]; CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]).

Section 213(8) gives fraud claims six years from the fraud or two years from discovery, whichever is later.

Hoffenberg v. Hoffman & Pollok · filed 2003-12-31(8)

As explained in the October 23 Opinion, under these statutes, "the statute of limitations for a claim of fraud is six years from the commission of the fraud or two years from the time of discovery, whichever is later." Hoffenberg I, at 535.

For fraud claims, Section 213(8) allows six years from the wrong or two years from when the fraud could reasonably have been discovered, whichever is later.

Siler v. Lutheran Social Services of Metropolitan New York · filed 2004-09-13(8)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action sounding in fraud is six years from the date of the wrong, or two years from the date the fraud could reasonably have been discovered; whichever is later (CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]; Moreau v Archdiocese of N.Y., 261 AD2d 456 [1999]; Baratta v ABF Real Estate Co., 215 AD2d 518, 519 [1995]).

Section 213(8) gives fraud claims the later of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was discovered, or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

Gelmac Quality Feeds, Inc. v. Ronning · filed 2005-11-10(8)

In any event, we further conclude that the proposed cause of action is time-barred because the alleged fraudulent inducement occurred more than six years before plaintiff sought leave to amend the complaint and more than two years after plaintiff had all the necessary facts to have discovered the alleged fraud with the exercise of reasonable diligence (see Rattner v York, 174 AD2d 718, 721 [1991]; see also Hellman v Hoenig & Co., 244 AD2d 529 [1997], lv denied 92 NY2d 814 [1998]; cf. Rice v Heilbronner, 272 AD2d 957 [2000]; see generally CPLR 213 [8]; Trepuk v Frank, 44 NY2d 723, 724-725 [1978]).

For fraud claims, Section 213(8) requires commencement within six years after accrual or within two years after discovery or when the fraud could reasonably have been discovered.

Transaero, Inc. v. Biri Associates Corp. · filed 2007-04-17(8)

On this record, the Supreme Court properly determined that the complaint was time-barred (see CPLR 213 [8]). The alleged fraud occurred in 1996, almost nine years prior to the commencement of the lawsuit. Moreover, the defendants produced sworn statements by Youngwall conclusively establishing that the plaintiff either discovered or reasonably could have discovered the alleged fraud in 2001, approximately four years before this action was commenced, and certainly had actual knowledge of the alleged fraud by April 2003, when the plaintiff commenced an action against the alleged architect of the scheme, Robert Costello.

Section 213(8) gives fraud claims the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was discovered or reasonably could have been discovered.

Durazinski v. Chandler · filed 2007-06-07(8)

The gravamen of the complaint is that the conveyance was fraudulently made by defendant and it is, therefore, governed by a statute of limitations which is the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff, or the person under whom the plaintiff claims, discovered the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it (see CPLR 213 [8]; Maio v Gardino, 267 AD2d 816, 818 [1999]).

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff the later of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered to bring a fraud claim.

Sabbatini v. Galati · filed 2007-09-25(8)

Thus, the plaintiff had the later of six years from the date his cause of action accrued or two years from the time he discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have discovered, the fraud in order to commence the original action (see CPLR 213 [8]; Liberty Co. v Boyle, 272 AD2d 380, 381 [2000]; Leone v Sabbatino, 235 AD2d 460, 461 [1997]; Bernstein v La Rue, 120 AD2d 476, 478 [1986]).

Section 213(8) bars a fraud claim brought more than six years after the alleged fraud when the plaintiff also had reason to discover it more than two years before filing.

Spinale v. Tag's Pride Produce Corp. · filed 2007-10-30(8)

Moreover, dismissal was appropriate as the action was commenced in November 2005, more than six years after the alleged fraudulent inducement to sell stock in July 1999, and it conclusively appears that plaintiff could no longer reasonably believe that defendant was trustworthy or had his best interests in mind by January 2003, at the latest, when the parties signed their first settlement agreement involving the matters that eventually became the subject of the 2004 release (CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud-based deed reformation claim six years from the fraud or two years from when it could reasonably have been discovered, whichever is longer.

Von Blomberg v. Garis · filed 2007-10-30(8)

A cause of action based upon actual fraud must be commenced within six years of the commission of the fraud, or two years from the date the fraud could reasonably have been discovered, whichever is longer (see CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]; Siler v Lutheran Social Servs. of Metro. N.Y., 10 AD3d 646, 648 [2004]; Lefkowitz v Appelbaum, 258 AD2d 563 [1999]; Baratta v ABF Real Estate Co., 215 AD2d 518, 519 [1995]). A claim for reformation of a deed predicated upon fraud is governed by the same statute of limitations as an action sounding in fraud (see Kurtish v Goldberg, 253 AD2d 740, 741 [1998]).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim six years from the fraud or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered, whichever is later.

DeLuca v. DeLuca · filed 2008-02-26(8)

A cause of action based on fraud must be commenced within six years from the time of the fraud, or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered or with reasonable diligence could have been discovered, whichever is later (see CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]; Saphir Intl., SA v UBS PaineWebber Inc., 25 AD3d 315 [2006]).

Section 213(8) requires a fraud action to be commenced within six years of the fraudulent act or within two years after the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Rite Aid Corp. v. Grass · filed 2008-02-28(8)

A cause of action in fraud must be commenced within six years of the date of the fraudulent act, or within two years of the date the fraud was, or with reasonable diligence could have been, discovered (CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) bars a fraud claim filed more than six years after the alleged fraud and more than two years after its discovery.

Prichard v. 164 Ludlow Corp. · filed 2008-03-18(8)

Plaintiffs entered into the contract to purchase shares in the corporation, i.e., they completed the act that the alleged fraudulent statements had induced, on September 9, 1997. Accordingly, they had six years from that date, i.e., until September 9, 2003, to commence their action. The action was not commenced until May 13, 2005. Even assuming the fraud was not discovered until “late 1999,” as alleged in the complaint, the claim was time-barred because the action was commenced more than two years from “late 1999.”

Section 213(8) bars fraud claims brought after its limitations period expires.

Esbe Holdings, Inc. v. Vanquish Acquisition Partners, LLC · filed 2008-04-10(8)

The court correctly found that plaintiffs’ fraud claims related to the Phoenix LP investment and restructuring, the November 1997 subscriptions agreements, and Tech, Phoenix Cruise Lines, and Molifor were time-barred (CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213 starts the limitations period for rescission based on mistake when the mistake or actionable wrong occurs; a fraud claim is timely within six years of the fraud or two years after the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Prand Corp. v. County of Suffolk · filed 2009-05-05(6), (8)

A cause of action for rescission based on mistake runs from the date of the alleged mistake or actionable wrong (see CPLR 213 [6]; Zavaglia v Gardner, 245 AD2d 446 [1997]). ... A cause of action alleging fraud is timely if it is commenced either within six years from the time of the fraud, or within two years after the plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence could have discovered, the fraud (see CPLR 213 [8]; Pericon v Ruck, 56 AD3d 635, 636 [2008]; Oggioni v Oggioni, 46 AD3d 646, 648 [2007]; Town of Poughkeepsie v Espie, 41 AD3d 701, 705 [2007]; Shannon v Gordon, 249 AD2d 291, 292 [1998]).

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff six years from the fraud or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered, whichever is longer, to bring a fraud claim.

Chung v. Wang · filed 2010-12-07(8)

Rather, the cause of action alleging tortious interference with contract is governed by the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214 (4) (see Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp., 81 NY2d 90, 92 [1993]), while a cause of action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years from the time of the fraud or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered, or with reasonable diligence, could have been discovered, whichever is longer (see CPLR 213 [8]; Pericon v Ruck, 56 AD3d 635, 636 [2008]).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claimant the longer of six years from the fraud or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Cohen v. Cohen · filed 2011-03-29(8)

Under New York law, the statute of limitations for a fraud claim is the greater of (a) six years from the commission of the fraud or (b) “two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213[8]; id. § 203(g).

A fraud claim must be brought within the later of six years from accrual or two years from when reasonable diligence could have discovered the fraud.

McCormick v. Favreau · filed 2011-03-31(8)

A cause of action for fraud must be commenced within “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” (CPLR 213 [8]; see Durazinski v Chandler, 41 AD3d 918, 919 [2007]).

Section 213(8) sets the limitations period applicable to fraud counterclaims.

ROSA, MICHAEL ROSS, ROSS, RONALD C. v · filed 2011-06-10(8)

We further conclude, however, that those parts of the counterclaims sounding in fraud are time-barred (see CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from discovery or reasonable discoverability.

Carbon Capital Management, LLC v. American Express Co. · filed 2011-10-25(8)

An action alleging fraud must be commenced within “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” (CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8)’s two-year discovery period does not extend a fraud claim when the plaintiff learned of the alleged fraud more than two years before filing; the six-year period then controls.

Dowlings, Inc. v. Homestead Dairies, Inc. · filed 2011-10-27(8)

Mitiguy acknowledged receipt of this e-mail, and was thus shown to be aware of the consultant’s allegations of fraud, but the action was not commenced until more than two years later. We therefore agree with Supreme Court’s application of the six-year limitations period of CPLR 213 (8), and find that plaintiffs claim was appropriately limited.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim a six-year limitations period from the alleged fraud, or two years from discovery or when due diligence would have revealed it, whichever is longer.

Clement v. United Homes, LLC · filed 2012-12-27(8)

Under New York law, plaintiffs cause of action in fraud must be commenced within two years from the time the fraud was discovered, or with the exercise of due diligence, should have been discovered, or six years from the date the alleged fraud was committed, whichever is longer.

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim within six years of the fraud or two years after the plaintiff discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have discovered, it, whichever is later.

Gander Mountain Co. v. Islip U-Slip LLC · filed 2013-02-11(8)

Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8), the applicable limitations period is “six years from the commission of the fraud or two years from the time the plaintiff discovered, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, the fraud, whichever is later.” ... Accordingly, plaintiffs second and third cause of action are dismissed as untimely.

Section 213 allows a New York common law fraud claim within the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

New York District Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Forde · filed 2013-03-26(8)

The statute of limitations for common law fraud in New York is “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213. ... Because Plaintiffs filed this action on August 5, 2011, exactly two years after this discovery, they have filed their action in the nick of time, and this claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 213(8) gives a common law fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Cohen v. S.A.C. Trading Corp. · filed 2013-04-03(8)

More precisely, the New York statute of limitations for a common law fraud claim is “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the greater of six years from accrual or two years from discovery of the fraud.

Bohn v. 176 W. 87th St. Owners Corp. · filed 2013-05-23(8)

In any event, the fraud claim is barred by the statute of limitations, which is the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud (CPLR 213 [8]). Plaintiffs cause of action accrued some time before 2003, when he was involved in the various administrative proceedings and before he sold his apartment. To the extent he may later have discovered improprieties in connection with the authorization letters, that discovery preceded the commencement of this action by more than two years.

Section 213(8), together with CPLR 203(g), gives a fraud-based claim six years from the fraudulent act or two years from discovery, whichever is later.

Faison v. Lewis · filed 2013-05-29(8)

The statute of limitations for a fraud-based cause of action requires that the action be commenced within six years after the allegedly fraudulent act or within two years after discovery, whichever is later (CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]; Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527 [2009]; Vilsack v Meyer, 96 AD3d at 828).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from discovery of the fraud, including when reasonable diligence would have discovered it.

Squitieri v. Trapani · filed 2013-06-05(8)

Under the circumstances presented here, the greater limitations period was six years from the date the cause of action accrued. The instant action was commenced in 2011, approximately nine years after the events alleged to have occurred in 2002, which underly the causes of action alleging fraud. The plaintiffs contention that she was unable, with reasonable diligence, to discover the alleged fraud until 2010 was not supported by any allegations in the complaint, and the plaintiff did not make such a showing in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claimant the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

De Sole v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC · filed 2013-09-30(8)

As noted above, under New York law, the statute of limitations for fraud claims is “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff ... discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

Section 213(8) bars a fraud claim filed more than six years after the fraud and more than two years after it could have been discovered through reasonable diligence.

Lim v. Kolk · filed 2013-11-19(8)

Accordingly, the cause of action for fraud, brought more than two years from the date the alleged fraud could have been discovered and more than six years after the actual fraud occurred, is time barred (see CPLR 213 [8]; Gutkin v Siegal, 85 AD3d 687, 687-688 [1st Dept 2011]).

Section 213(8) bars a fraud claim based on conduct approximately eight and a half years before the action.

Mizuno v. Barak · filed 2014-01-29(8)

That conduct was committed approximately 8V2 years prior to the subject action, so as to bar the plaintiffs claims alleging violation of Judiciary Law § 487 (see CPLR 214 [2]; Lefkowitz v Appelbaum, 258 AD2d 563 [1999]), fraud (see CPLR 213 [8]; Lefkowitz v Appelbaum, 258 AD2d 563 [1999]), and legal malpractice (see CPLR 214 [6]; Squitieri v Trapani, 107 AD3d 688 [2013]).

Section 213(8) sets a six-year limitations period for fraudulent inducement claims.

Twersky v. Yeshiva University · filed 2014-01-29(8)

This claim is subject to a six-year statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claimant the later of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Apt v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc. · filed 2014-03-11(8)

Thus, the action, commenced in January 2012, more than six years later, is untimely.

Section 213(8) sets the limitations period for fraud claims.

Riverbay Corp. v. Thyssenkrupp Northern Elevator Corp. · filed 2014-04-10(8)

In any case, the fraud claim, which is premised on the allegation that defendants misrepresented that the subject elevators were suitable for their intended purpose and were the equivalent of the machines specified in the parties’ April 2001 elevator modernization contract, is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [8]).

A fraud claim must be brought within six years of the fraud or within two years after the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered it.

Williams-Guillaume v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2015-07-29(8)

A cause of action alleging fraud must be commenced within six years of the fraud or within two years from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it (see CPLR 213 [8]; Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527, 532 [2009]).

Section 213(8) gives fraud claims the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was discovered or could reasonably have been discovered.

Martin Hilti Family Trust v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC · filed 2015-09-30(8)

As noted above, under New York law the statute of limitations for fraud claims is “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff ... discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8). Here, it is undisputed that—prior to the filing of Hilti’s Complaint—more- than six years had elapsed since the commission of the alleged fraud. The timeliness of Hilti’s claims thus turns on when Hilti discovered or should have discovered the alleged fraud.

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff alleging fraud the greater of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or could with reasonable diligence have been discovered.

Cannariato v. Cannariato · filed 2016-02-03(8)

An action alleging fraud must be commenced within “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” (CPLR 213 [8]; ...).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud claims and a two-year discovery rule.

D. Penguin Bros. Ltd. v. National Black United Fund, Inc. · filed 2016-03-03(8)

Those claims accrued more than six years before the complaint was filed, on May 6, 2013, and, in light of plaintiffs’ admission that they discovered the thefts on or after February 3, 2011, are not saved by the statute’s two-year discovery rule.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably could have discovered, the fraud.

Cusimano v. Schnurr · filed 2016-03-15(8)

The statute of limitations for claims based on fraud is the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time plaintiff discovers the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it (CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) gives fraud claims the longer of six years from accrual or two years from discovery.

NYAHSA Services, Inc., Self-Insurance Trust v. People Care Incorporated · filed 2016-07-07(8)

As each of these claims sound in fraud, defendant was entitled to use the greater of the six-year statute of limitations or the two-year discovery exception set forth in CPLR 213 (8) (see Fromer v Yogel, 50 F Supp 2d 227, 242 [SDNY 1999]; 14 Bruckner LLC v 14 Bruckner Blvd. Realty Corp., 78 AD3d 431, 431-432 [2010]).

CPLR 213 (8) gives a plaintiff the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when reasonable diligence could have uncovered the fraud to bring a fraud claim.

Aozora Bank, Ltd. v. Credit Suisse Group · filed 2016-11-03(8)

Under CPLR 213 (8), a fraud claim must be brought within the longer of “six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff. . . could with reasonable diligence have discovered [the fraud].” Aozora concedes that this action was commenced more than six years after the cause of action accrued, i.e., when Aozora purchased the notes. Thus, to be timely, the action must have been brought within two years from the time Aozora discovered the alleged fraud, or from when it could have discovered it in the exercise of reasonable diligence.

Section 213(8) bars claims brought more than six years after accrual and more than two years after the plaintiff had constructive knowledge of the alleged fraud.

Hamrick v. Guralnick · filed 2017-01-19(8)

Since plaintiffs commenced this action more than six years after the date of their investments and more than two years after they had constructive knowledge of the alleged fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty, these claims are time-barred (CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) requires a fraud action to be commenced within six years of the fraud or within two years after the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered it.

LARKE, III, JIMMIE v. MOORE, TINA MCCARY · filed 2017-05-05(8)

It is well established that “a fraud-based action must be commenced within six years of the fraud or within two years from the time the plaintiff[s] discovered the fraud or ‘could with reasonable diligence have discovered it’ ” (Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527, 532, quoting CPLR 213 [8]; see also CPLR 203 [g]).

Section 213(8) allows six years from accrual or two years from actual or imputed discovery to bring a common law fraud claim; allegations that the defendant concealed the fraud can permit tolling at the pleading stage.

Wiedis v. Dreambuilder Investments, LLC · filed 2017-07-18(8)

Under New York law, the statute .of limitations for common law fraud is six years from accrual or two years from actual or imputed discovery. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8). ... Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs’, the allegations in the Complaint permit tolling at this stage.

Section 213(8) applies to common law fraud claims, which must be brought within six years of the fraud or two years after the fraud could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

Potente v. Citibank, N.A. · filed 2017-10-17(8)

Under the New York C.P.L.R., a plaintiff must bring a claim for fraud within six years from the date of the alleged fraud, or two years from the time the plaintiff could have discovered the fraud with reasonable diligence. ... At that point, they were on notice, and had "discovered" the alleged fraud, and had to bring an action for fraud before December of 2015.

Section 213(8) gives fraud in the inducement and aiding and abetting fraud claims the longer of six years or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Belair Care Ctr., Inc. v. Cool Insuring Agency, Inc. · filed 2019-01-03(8)

The fraud in the inducement and the aiding and abetting fraud claims are subject to the greater of a six-year statute of limitations period or two years from when the alleged fraudulent activity was discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence ( see CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claimant the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Piller v. Princeton Realty Assoc. LLC · filed 2019-06-06(8)

The statute of limitations for fraud claims is "the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it" (CPLR 213 [8]). ... These fraud claims were untimely because, with reasonable diligence, plaintiff could have discovered the misrepresentations years before he did so, and the six-year statute of limitations ran well before this action was filed in 2016.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud plaintiff the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Airport Mart, Inc. v. Dunkin' Donuts Franchising LLC · filed 2019-09-16(8)

Pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 213(8), the time within which “an action based upon fraud . . . must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.”

Section 213(8) gives an action based on fraud the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Hanspal v. Epstein · filed 2019-09-20(8)

In New York, the statute of limitations for “an action based upon fraud . . . shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. §213(8) (McKinney). ... Accordingly, any conspiracy to commit fraud claim arising from Defendants’ purchase of the Property in May 2018 is well within the six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Van Buskirk v. The United Group of Companies, Inc. · filed 2020-01-02(8)

According to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8), the statute of limitations for fraud is the greater of either six years from when the cause of action accrued or two years from the time a plaintiff discovered the fraud or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from discovery of the fraud.

De Rothschild v. Serlin · filed 2021-03-08(8)

Under New York law, Plaintiff’s fraud claim accrued in 2012, when the last alleged fraudulent act took place. Accordingly, under an accrual theory, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s fraud claims expired in 2018 – six years after the date of the last alleged fraudulent act in 2012. Alternatively, under a discovery theory, Plaintiff’s fraud claims expired in January 2016 – two years after de Rothschild learned that Serlin had dissolved Conundrum and diverted its assets to Eagle.

CPLR 213(8) gives fraud claims the longer of six years from the fraud or two years from when reasonable diligence could have uncovered it; a defendant seeking dismissal must show no factual issue under either period.

Sabourin v. Chodos · filed 2021-05-27(8)

The limitations period for fraud is the greater of six years from the date of the fraud or two years from the time when, with reasonable diligence, the plaintiff could have uncovered the fraud (CPLR 213[8]; see Cusimano v Schnurr , 137 AD3d 527, 531 [1st Dept 2016]). In order to prevail, the defendant must show that there is no issue of fact under either prong.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Scherban v. Lynch · filed 2021-06-23(8)

Under New York law, actions based on fraud have a limitations period of the “greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim within the longer of six years after accrual or two years after the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Guzzone v. Zazza · filed 2021-06-29(8)

Under New York law, the statute of limitations is the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff discovers the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. See NY CPLR § 213(8). ... She filed her Complaint within two years of that date, and her claim is therefore not time-barred under New York Law.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claimant the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was discovered or reasonably could have been discovered.

Meyer v. Seidel · filed 2021-08-16(8)

For Plaintiff’s fraud claim, the statute of limitation lapses within the greater of six years from when the cause of action arose or two years from the time Plaintiff discovered the fraud or reasonably could have discovered it. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8); Aviles, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 275.

Section 213(8) allows fraud claims, including fraudulent inducement, to be brought within six years of the fraud or two years of discovery, whichever is longer.

Brady v. IGS Realty Co. L.P. · filed 2021-09-22(8)

In New York, the statute of limitations for fraud claims, including fraud in the inducement, begins running “six years from commission of the fraud or two years from discovery, whichever is longer.” Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 746 (2d Cir. 1979); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8). ... Because Brady filed his complaint in October 2019, both claims are time-barred under New York law.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim six years from the alleged fraud or two years from its discovery, whichever is later.

Kim v. NRT N.Y. LLC · filed 2021-10-05(8)

As to the balance of the complaint, the motion court properly determined that the claims purported to have arisen in the period after the arbitration award are barred by the express terms of the parties' 2010 agreement, and by the statute of limitations (CPLR 213[8]; AXA Equit. Life Ins. Co. v Malen , 117 AD3d 645, 645 [1st Dept 2014]). Although plaintiff does not assert a specific claim for fraudulent inducement or rescission, the complaint alleges that the July 28, 2010 agreement purporting to settle the parties' dispute over commissions arising from their 2008 agreement "is null and void." The time to raise such a claim, however, expired six years after July 28, 2010, that is, July 28, 2016, which is greater than the alternative measure of two years from discovery of the alleged fraud, as the issue was raised in the 2013 Kings County action that was referred to arbitration ( id. ).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from discovery of the fraud.

Meimaris v. Royce · filed 2021-11-08(8)

Under New York law, a claim based on fraud must be commenced within “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8); Cohen v. S.A.C. Trading Corp., 711 F.3d 353, 361 (2d Cir. 2013).

Section 213(8) gives fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims the longer of six years from injury or two years from when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered the claim.

MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc. · filed 2021-09-29(8)

(3) their New York fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are subject to a limitations period that is the greater of (a) six years from the date when plaintiff was injured by relying on the alleged misrepresentation, or (b) two years ... from when plaintiffs discovered or could with reasonable diligence have discovered their claims.

Section 213(8) requires a fraud action to be brought within the greater of six years after accrual or two years after the fraud was discovered or reasonably could have been discovered.

Murray v. Stone · filed 2023-03-30(8)

Fraud claims must be commenced within "the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it" (CPLR 213[8]).

For fraud claims, the limitations period is the greater of six years from accrual or two years after discovery, or when discovery could reasonably have occurred.

McKenzie-Morris v. V.P. Records Retail Outlet, Inc. · filed 2023-08-13(8)

In New York, the statute of limitations for a fraud claim is the “greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8). And the emails in which Chastan made what Plaintiff casts as misrepresentations about the relationship between VP Records and GPL were sent in July and October of 2008. TAC Ex. K. That is obviously far more than six years before Plaintiff commenced her suit in 2022, meaning that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations unless she could not “with reasonable diligence have discovered” the fraud she alleges until two years before 2022. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claimant six years from the fraud or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered, whichever is longer.

Bennett v. Bennett · filed 2024-01-11(8)

An action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years of the time of the fraud or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have been discovered, whichever is longer ( see CPLR 213 [8]; Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d 220, 229 [2015]; Craven v Rigas , 85 AD3d 1524, 1526 [3d Dept 2011], lv dismissed 17 NY3d 932 [2011]). ... Given the issues of fact as to when plaintiff's claims accrued, defendants' motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds was also properly denied.

Section 213(8) requires a fraud claim to be brought within the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraud.

Cardregistry, Inc. v. Collectors Universe, Inc. · filed 2024-03-22(8)

Under New York law, a fraud claim must be commenced either “six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it[,]” whichever time is greater. ... Here too, Plaintiff’s inquiry notice arose at the time Plaintiff repeatedly received information that the Card’s PSA 10 grade was likely inauthentic between January and June 2016. ... Based on the factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, “a person of ordinary intelligence would [have] consider[ed] it probable that fraud had occurred” by June 18, 2016.

Section 213(8) generally gives fraud claims six years to be filed, with a possible two-year period after actual or constructive discovery of the misconduct.

Lateral Inv. Mgt., LLC v. Marcum, LLP · filed 2024-10-29(8)

By contrast, claims alleging fraud and breach of fiduciary duty based on fraud - if not deemed to be malpractice claims governed by CPLR 214(6)- are generally subject to a six-year statute of limitations, and potentially longer (two years after the plaintiffs actual or constructive discovery of the misconduct) in the case of fraud (CPLR 213(8); Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 119 [I st Dept 2003] [noting the statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty claims "based on allegations of actual fraud" is six years]; see also Monteleone v Monteleone, 162 AD3d 761, 763 [2d Dept 2018]).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

Orion HealthCorp, Inc. v. Parmar · filed 2024-12-06(8)

The parties appear to be in agreement that the accrual date for the Counterclaims was triggered on January 30, 2017, which was the closing date of the “Merger”. Thus, Parmar Entities’ time to bring the Counterclaim for fraud in the inducement/fraudulent misrepresentation expired on January 30, 2023.

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from discovery or reasonable discoverability.

Aguasvivas v. Mountain Val. Indem. Co. · filed 2025-02-13(8)

Similarly, the statute of limitations for a cause of action for fraud is governed by CPLR § 213(8) and it is six years from accrual, two years after discovery of the fraud, or 2 years from when in the exercise of reasonable diligence, such fraud could have been discovered [ id . "an action based upon fraud; the time within which the action must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with [*5]reasonable diligence have discovered it."]).

Section 213(8) allows a fraud claim within six years of accrual or two years of when reasonable diligence could have uncovered the fraud.

Harbinger Capital Partners II, LP v. Apollo Global Mgt., LLC · filed 2025-03-18(8)

The claims were not asserted within six years of their accrual between 2004 and 2010 when plaintiffs acquired the Apollo Funds' interest in Sky Terra. Nor were they asserted within two years of the time when plaintiffs could with reasonable diligence have discovered the alleged misconduct ( see generally CPLR 213[8]; Aozora Bank, Ltd. v Credit Suisse Group , 144 AD3d 437, 438-439 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the later of six years from accrual or two years from actual or reasonably diligent discovery.

Zhang v. Weseley · filed 2025-03-19(8)

A fraudulent misrepresentation claim based on Defendant Weseley’s circa July 23, 2014 representation to Plaintiff that she would regain her vision within a couple of months should have been filed on or about July 23, 2020.

Section 213(8) gives a fraudulent misrepresentation claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably could have discovered, the fraud.

Canfield Funding, LLC v. Focalpointe Group, LLC · filed 2025-07-25(8)

A claim for fraudulent misrepresentation is governed by CPLR 213 (8), which sets forth a statute of limitations that is the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it ( see Boardman v Kennedy , 105 AD3d 1375, 1376 [4th Dept 2013]).

Section 213(8) requires a fraud claim to be brought within six years of accrual or within two years after the fraud was or could reasonably have been discovered.

Franco v. Farr · filed 2025-09-10(8)

A cause of action based on fraud must be commenced within six years from the date the cause of action accrued or within two years from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it ( see CPLR 213[8]; Lipszyc v Lipszyc , 221 AD3d 992, 994).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the longer of six years from accrual or two years from when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraud; available public records can give notice of a conveyance.

Castaldo v. 1848 Realty, Inc. · filed 2025-09-10(8)

The statute of limitations for actions based upon fraud is "the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it" (CPLR 213[8]; see Kotlyarsky v Abrazi , 188 AD3d 853, 854; Abele Tractor & Equip. Co., Inc. v Balfour , 133 AD3d 1171, 1171). ... Public records available to the plaintiff since 2014 gave notice of the conveyances.

Section 213(8) requires a fraud claim to be brought within six years of accrual or two years after the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Manjarrez v. Trust Bank, N.A. · filed 2025-09-26(8)

Under New York state law, fraud claims must be asserted within six (6) years from the date of the cause of action or two (2) years from the time that the fraud was discovered or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (McKinney 2022).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud claim the later of six years from accrual or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered.

Ganesh · filed 2025-11-10(8)

The limitations period in New York for claims of fraud is generally six years. Cohen, 711 F.3d at 361 & n.3 (noting that under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8), the limitations period is “ the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” ).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud plaintiff six years from accrual or two years from discovery; inquiry notice can start the discovery period.

BH 336 Partners LLC v. Sentinel Real Estate Corp. · filed 2026-01-22(8)

Except for the buildings purchased by EZ Wadsworth and BH 336, the contract of sale for each building was executed on or before August 26, 2016, more than six years — including the days tolled as a result of the 2020 COVID-related executive orders — before plaintiffs brought this action on August 9, 2023 ( see CPLR 213[8]). The time-barred plaintiffs also cannot rely on their lack of awareness of the fraud to take advantage of the two-year discovery period under CPLR 213(8), as they were placed on inquiry notice no later than June 20, 2019, when the Office of the New York Attorney General forwarded their attorneys a copy of a complaint in People v David Drumheller .

Section 213(8) gives a plaintiff six years from the fraud or two years from when the fraud was or reasonably could have been discovered, whichever is later. A factual dispute about discovery can prevent dismissal as time-barred.

Yakobson v. IGAL Ocean, LLC · filed 2026-06-24(8)

Here, the defendants demonstrated that the allegedly fraudulent conveyances occurred more than six years prior to the commencement of this action and, thus, met their initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to interpose the fifth and sixth causes of action expired prior to the commencement of this action. Nonetheless, the plaintiff raised a question of fact as to whether she possessed knowledge of facts from which the fraud could have been discovered with reasonable diligence within two years prior to the commencement of this action ( see Sargiss v Magarelli , 12 NY3d at 532; Lipszyc v Lipszyc , 221 AD3d at 994; Cammarato v 16 Admiral Perry Plaza, LLC , 216 AD3d 903, 905).

Section 213(8) gives a fraud plaintiff the longer of six years from accrual or two years from actual or reasonably possible discovery of the fraud to sue.

RamiroAviles v. S&P Global, Inc. · filed 2019-03-28(8)

New York law provides that a fraud action must be commenced within "the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff ... discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud claims under New York law.

Lew Lieberbaum & Co., Inc. v. Randle · filed 2000-02-08(8)

For example, a claim for fraud under New York State law is governed by a six-year statute of limitations. N.Y. CPLR § 213(8). It is possible to infer from the scant evidence in the record before this Court that the arbitration panel found that the Randles had presented a timely claim for fraud under New York State law, and decided the case in their favor on that ground or on some other timely cause of action.

Section 213(8) supplies the limitations period for fraud actions; expiration of that period can require dismissal when indispensable parties were not timely joined.

Fagan v. Nowitz · filed 2009-09-22(8)

Accordingly, considering each of the five factors enumerated in CPLR 1001 (b), and given our conclusion that the entities are indispensable parties (see Nowitz v Nowitz, 37 AD3d 788 [2007]), and in light of the fact that the applicable statute of limitations has expired (see CPLR 213 [8]), the action must be dismissed (see Matter of Red Hook/Gowanus Chamber of Commerce v New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals, 49 AD3d 749, 752 [2008]; Nixon v Barrow, 239 AD2d 326 [1997]).

Section 213(2) bars claims for unpaid compensation under an employment agreement that accrued more than six years before the action was filed.

Schappert v. Hall · filed 1975-12-12(2)

However, the defense of limitation of time is conclusively established as to claims accruing more than six years prior to the institution of this action on January 30, 1975 (CPLR 213, subd 2).

The six-year limitation applies to an employer's action against an employee for money received in breach of employment duties because the claim sounds in contract.

Western Electric Co. v. Brenner · filed 1977-02-17

To be determined on this appeal is the Statute of Limitations appropriate to an action brought by an employer against an employee for money allegedly received by the latter in violation of his duty of loyalty to the former. ... The answer to the question posited is, in a word, yes. Contract, not tort, forms the basis of plaintiff’s causes of action.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for an action based on an implied contract when no other limitation is prescribed.

Blum v. Good Humor Corp. · filed 1977-05-23

Since the cause of action for contribution is based upon the fiction of an implied contract to ameliorate any inequity which results when a tort-feasor pays more than his share pf the common liability (see Johnson v Harvey, 84 NY 363), the six-year Statute of Limitations relating to implied contract is applicable (see CPLR 213).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions generally.

American Trading Co. v. Fish · filed 1977-06-09(2)

In our view, the appropriate Statute of Limitations with respect to defendant’s guarantee should be the six-year period applicable to contracts generally under CPLR 213 (subd 2).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to contractual breach-of-warranty claims.

Strenk v. Rausch Equipment Corp. · filed 1977-07-12(2)

Therefore, the only cause of action remaining to plaintiff is one based on a contractual theory of breach of warranty wherein the six-year Statute of Limitations would apply (CPLR 213, subd 2).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract claims in New York.

Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Long Island Rail Road · filed 1978-04-10(2)

The federal statute having been found inapplicable, the next question is whether the six-year statute of limitations applicable to contract claims in New York, N.Y. CPLR § 213(2), would in any event bar enforcement, as plaintiff also contends. Applying the New York statute presents less difficulty. Under N.Y. CPLR § 203(c), the statute of limitations on a counterclaim is tolled as of the date the action is commenced. Since plaintiff’s action was filed on February 13, 1976, the relevant six-year period reaches back to February 13, 1970, not August 13, 1970 as plaintiff claims. If the claim set forth in the counterclaim accrued during that period, then it is timely. ... The earliest date of accrual of defendant’s claim for breach of the reimbursement agreement was therefore October 2, 1970 — well within the six-year period of limitations.

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract actions a six-year time limit.

Rochester Atlas Wrecking Co. v. E. J. Del Monte Corp. · filed 1978-04-14(2)

The fourth affirmative defense pleading the Statute of Limitations is without merit. Plaintiffs action for breach of contract was timely commenced (CPLR 213, subd 2).

Section 213 requires breach of contract actions to be commenced within six years.

Cooper v. Edinbergh · filed 1978-10-31

Thus, the second cause of action, expressly pleaded in terms of breach of contract, is clearly barred by CPLR 213.

Section 213(2) requires a breach of contract action to be commenced within six years.

American Home Assurance Co. v. Scarsdale National Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1978-10-16(2)

The action for breach of contract must normally be commenced within six years (CPLR 213, subd 2), unless it is a contract for sale (Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-725).

Section 213 allows a contract action of this kind to be commenced within six years after accrual.

Hechter v. New York Life Insurance · filed 1978-12-06

In sum, under today’s decision, a cause of action against a bank for collecting an instrument over a forged indorsement is not time-barred if it is styled in contract and commenced within six years of accrual (CPLR 213).

Section 213 gives contractual actions a six-year limitations period.

State v. Fenton · filed 1979-03-01

In an action arising from a contractual obligation, the Statute of Limitations is six years (CPLR 213; Matter of Cromwell Towers Redevelopment Co. v City of Yonkers, 41 NY2d 1).

Section 213(2) gives contract actions a six-year limitations period.

Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Long Island Rail Road Company · filed 1979-03-13(2)

The six-year statute of limitations was therefore applicable to Long Island’s counterclaim.

Section 213(1) requires constructive trust actions to be commenced within six years, with the limitation period running from the commission of the wrong rather than its discovery.

Goldrick v. Goldrick · filed 1979-05-22(1)

As to the defense of Statute of Limitations in a constructive trust case, the basic applicable statute is CPLR 213 (subd 1) which states that such action must be commenced within six years.

Section 213(2) gives contract actions a six-year limitations period, barring arrears that accrued more than six years before suit.

Galyn v. Schwartz · filed 1980-12-092

Obligations under a separation agreement which accrued prior to six years before the commencement of an action for the recovery of arrears are barred by the six-year contract Statute of Limitations. (Morris v Morris, 74 AD2d 490; see CPLR 213, subd 2.)