N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213

Section 213(1) gives a declaratory judgment action challenging legislative zoning action a six-year limitations period.

Litz v. Town Board of Guilderland · filed 1993-10-28(1)

The six-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 213 (1) applies to a declaratory judgment action challenging zoning action by a legislative body (see, Matter of Williamsville Southeast Amherst Homeowners Assn. v Sharpe, 77 AD2d 812).

Section 213(1) requires actions to be commenced within six years.

New York City Off Track Betting Corp. v. State of New York Racing & Wagering Board · filed 1994-02-24(1)

Therefore, even if this proceeding is deemed a declaratory judgment action, plaintiffs’ first two causes of action attacking the regulation are barred by the Statute of Limitations because this action was commenced more than six years after August 1, 1983, the effective date of 9 NYCRR 5204.15 (c) (1) (see, CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on actions to recover upon a contractual obligation or liability.

National Westminster Bank USA v. Petito · filed 1994-03-03(2)

Accordingly, the order appealed from correctly granted Mr. Petito’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the Bank’s complaint as barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]) and denied the Bank’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 213 requires a foreclosure action based on an accelerated mortgage debt to be commenced within six years.

Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Mebane · filed 1994-10-31(4)

Therefore, the six-year Statute of Limitations began to run at that time (see, CPLR 213 [4]; see also, Thompson v Willson, 183 Misc 949, 952, affd 269 App Div 829; Duval v Skouras, 181 Misc 651, 655, affd 267 App Div 811).

Section 213 generally requires a contract action to be commenced within six years.

Niagara University v. Trautman, King, Markwart Associates, P. C. · filed 1994-11-16

Because the action was commenced more than six years after defendant received final payment, plaintiffs causes of action for negligence and breach of contract are barred by the applicable Statutes of Limitations (see, CPLR 213, 214; City of Niagara Falls v Rudolph, 97 AD2d 971).

Section 213(1) gives a six-year limitations period for an action to recover funds, measured here from the plaintiff's eighteenth birthday.

Lupo v. Republic National Bank · filed 1995-05-08(1)

However, since she commenced the action more than six years after her 18th birthday, the complaint, insofar as it is asserted against the defendant William Lupo, was properly dismissed as time-barred (see, CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213 bars an action brought more than six years after the claim accrues.

Glasser v. Kashinsky · filed 1995-06-26

We further conclude that under the facts of this case, the plaintiff’s cause of action did not accrue until 1993, when the plaintiff obtained a judgment and execution thereof returned unsatisfied (see, Buttles v Smith, 281 NY 226). Accordingly, the action was not time-barred pursuant to CPLR 213.

Subdivisions (2) and (8) provide six-year limitations periods for contract and fraud actions, subject to subdivision (8)'s discovery rule.

J.J. Cassone Bakery, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. · filed 1996-02-01(2), (8)

The causes of action asserted herein are timely, as the four-month Statute of Limitations (CPLR 217) to review the PSC determination is inapplicable. (CPLR 213 [2], [8].)

Section 213(4) requires an action on a mortgage of real property to be commenced within six years after the claim accrues.

Zuckerman v. 234-6 W. 22 St. Corp. · filed 1996-02-14(4)

CPLR 213 (4) provides that an action upon a mortgage of real property must be instituted within six years of the accrual of the claim. Here that period commenced June 1, 1988, the due date for repayment of the mortgage debt.

A fraud claim must be commenced within six years after the plaintiff discovered the fraud or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence.

In re the Arbitration between Prudential Securities Inc. & Pesce · filed 1996-03-11(8)

CPLR 213 (8) provides that a cause of action for fraud must be commenced within six years from the time the plaintiff discovered the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.

Section 213 gives contract claims a six-year limitations period.

County of Rockland v. Homicki · filed 1996-05-13

We agree with the Supreme Court that the respondent’s claims under a collective bargaining agreement to recover salary which arose less than six years prior to the commencement of his grievance are not barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213).

Section 213(1) applies a six-year limitations period to an action seeking to set aside trust provisions that place assets beyond a creditor's reach.

State v. Cetero · filed 1996-11-07(1)

Whether viewed as an attempt to collect upon a liability imposed under Mental Hygiene Law article 43 (see, Mental Hygiene Law § 43.07 [c]) or, alternatively, as an attempt to merely set aside two provisions in the trust agreement that, in violation of the cited statutory provisions, would place the trust assets beyond the State’s reach (see, CPLR 213 [1]), it is clear that the six-year Statute of Limitations applies.

Section 213 bars the constructive trust and fraud counterclaims because they were brought after the applicable limitations periods had run.

Bevilacqua v. Bevilacqua · filed 1996-11-25(1), (8)

The defendant’s counterclaims, interposed in 1995, which seek the imposition of a constructive trust over the property are time barred as the home was purchased in 1985 (see, CPLR 213 [1]; see also, Matter of Wallace, 191 AD2d 638; Mattera v Mattera, 125 AD2d 555). The defendant’s counterclaims sounding in fraud, concerning the title to the real property, are also time barred (see, CPLR 213 [8]; 203 [g]) as the defendant was apprised of sufficient facts at the time of her husband’s death to put her on notice of her potential claims based on fraud (see, Neuhs v Ingersoll Rand Co., 115 AD2d 187).

Section 213(2) gives six years to commence an action upon a contractual obligation.

DiPietro v. City of New Rochelle · filed 1997-03-10[2]

The court properly concluded that the plaintiff’s causes of action to recover damages for negligence and breach of contract were barred by the three-year and the six-year Statutes of Limitations, respectively, since these causes of action accrued at the time of the conveyance of the property from the City to the plaintiff, approximately 12 years before the plaintiff interposed his claims (see, CPLR 213 [2]; 214 [4]; Hanbridge v Hunt, 183 AD2d 700, 702; Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402; Tal-Spons Corp. v Nurnberg, 213 AD2d 395, 396).

Section 213 requires actions subject to its six-year limitations period to be commenced within six years.

Rothman v. Baldari · filed 1997-04-07

Seven of the eight loan agreements upon which the plaintiffs seek to recover were made more than six years prior to commencement of the action. ... Accordingly, the action to recover damages pursuant to these loan agreements is untimely (see, CPLR 213).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for an action to recover on a promissory note, beginning the day after maturity.

Scionti v. Reid · filed 1997-04-21

The plaintiff’s cause of action to recover on the note accrued, and the six-year Statute of Limitations began to run, on the day after maturity (see, UCC 3-122 [1] [a]; CPLR 213; Park Assocs. v Crescent Park Assocs., 159 AD2d 460).

Section 213 requires actions of this kind to be commenced within six years of taking title to the property.

Nasca v. Jon-Lar Homes, Inc. · filed 1997-04-25

Because plaintiffs failed to commence this action within six years of taking title to the property, the action is time-barred and was properly dismissed by Town Court (see, CPLR 213; Calamel v Ridge View Realty Corp., 115 AD2d 279, appeal dismissed 67 NY2d 799).

Section 213(2) requires an action on a contractual obligation or liability to be commenced within six years.

Held v. Kaufman · filed 1997-04-28(2)

Finally, to the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant Ivan Kaufman had never acknowledged the plaintiff’s claim (as the plaintiff represented Kaufman had done in his complaint), but rather expressly rejected it in 1988, the defendants correctly noted that the instant action, commenced in 1995, was barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) requires an action on a contractual obligation to be commenced within six years.

Hertz v. Schiller · filed 1997-05-15[2]

Accordingly, as the action was not properly commenced by the filing of a summons and complaint until January 1994, which was more than two months after the six-year Statute of Limitations period had expired (CPLR 213 [2]), it was untimely and should have been dismissed.

Subdivisions (1) and (2) allow covered claims to be commenced within six years after accrual.

Guglielmo v. Unanue · filed 1997-11-20[1], [2]

As plaintiff commenced this action in August 1989, less than three years after he bought the property, timely claims could exist (see, CPLR 213 [1], [2]; 214 [4]).

Section 213 requires actions for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract to be commenced within six years.

Northridge Ltd. Partnership v. Spence · filed 1998-01-20

The causes of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract were untimely (see, CPLR 213; Dolgoff Holophase v E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 212 AD2d 661).

When no specific limitation period applies, an action must be commenced within six years of accruing.

Stankavich v. Town of Duanesburg Planning Board · filed 1998-01-22(1)

Every action must be commenced within the time specified in the CPLR or other applicable statute, and, if no limitation is specified, it must be commenced within six years of the accrual of the cause of action (CPLR 201, 213 [1]). Our review of CPLR article 2 discloses that, at best, petitioners’ claim is governed by CPLR 213 (1) unless we determine that it could have been resolved through a form of action or proceeding for which a specific limitation period is statutorily provided (see, Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193, 202; Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229).

Section 213(2) gives a six-year limitations period running from accrual of the cause of action.

Mundaca Investment Corp. v. Rivizzigno · filed 1998-02-04(2)

The Statute of Limitations on a note is six years after the cause of action accrues (see, CPLR 213 [2]). “ ‘[A] cause of action accrues for the purpose of setting the [Statute of Limitations] in motion as soon as the creditor, by his own act and in spite of the debtor, can make the [note] payable’ ” (Knapp v Greene, 79 Hun 264, 267).

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period when no limitation period is specifically prescribed by law.

In re Manasen · filed 1998-02-04(1)

CPLR 213 (1) prescribes a six-year Statute of Limitations where, as here, there is no limitation period “specifically prescribed by law”.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for contract implied in law, money had and received, and appropriation of personal property claims.

Brewer v. State · filed 1998-03-12

The six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 applies to a cause of action for a contract implied in law (Gold Sun Shipping v Ionian Transp., 245 AD2d 420 [2d Dept, Dec. 15, 1997]), money had and received (Board of Educ. v Jones, 205 AD2d 486), and appropriation of personal property (Williamsburg Candy & Tobacco v State of New York, 106 Misc 2d 728).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to actions upon contractual obligations, express or implied.

Bruchman v. Standard Chartered Bank, PLC · filed 1998-03-17(2)

As the liability at issue in this claim would have existed even if § 4-103(5) had not been enacted, the Court follows Aetna and finds that the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR § 213(2), rather than the three year period under CPLR § 214, applies to Zaloom’s claims under U.C.C. § 4-103(5).

Subdivision (2) supplies the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations for this application.

L. F. O'Connell Associates, Inc. v. State · filed 1998-03-17(2)

Although the six-month period to serve and file a claim or to serve a notice of intention has lapsed (Court of Claims Act § 10 [4]), this application was filed within the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]) so the court has jurisdiction to grant relief under Court of Claims Act § 10 (6), and has considered the factors listed therein.

Section 213 requires an action to recover damages for breach of an employment contract to be commenced within six years.

Ehman v. Ail Systems, Inc. · filed 1998-12-14

Therefore, this action for breach of an alleged employment contract, commenced on April 11, 1997, was time-barred (see, CPLR 213).

Section 213(2) gives contract actions a six-year limitations period.

Varo, Inc. v. Alvis PLC · filed 1999-05-20(2)

Thus, the action sounds in contract and, under CPLR 213 (2), the applicable Statute of Limitations is six years.

Section 213 supplies a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract actions.

Mancino v. Levin · filed 2000-01-24

In addition, the plaintiff’s causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract are not time-barred (see, CPLR 213), as previously found by the Supreme Court in a prior order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.

Section 213(1) requires unjust-enrichment actions to be commenced within six years of accrual.

Chanler v. Roberts · filed 2000-09-21(1)

Plaintiffs’ action to recover real estate commissions on a theory of unjust enrichment, not having been commenced within six years of the accrual of the claims, is time-barred (see, CPLR 213 [1]; compare, e.g., Whalen v Gerzof, 76 NY2d 914).

Section 213(1) supplies the limitations period for claims commenced within two years after discovery of the alleged breach.

Gross v. Stern · filed 2000-10-16(1)

The claims are not time-barred since the plaintiff commenced this action within two years of her discovery of the alleged breach (see, CPLR 213 [1]; 203 [g]).

Section 213 bars the plaintiffs’ fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims under the applicable Statute of Limitations.

Goldberg v. Schuman · filed 2001-12-04

On the merits, the court correctly concluded that plaintiffs claims against defendants for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty were barred by the Statute of Limitations pursuant to CPLR 203 (g) and 213.

Section 213(2) gives contract claims a six-year limitations period.

Sam v. Church of St. Mark · filed 2002-04-22(2)

Measured from either date, the plaintiff’s first cause of action is clearly time barred (see CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) requires an action upon a contractual obligation to be commenced within six years.

Rusiniak's Service, Inc. v. McMahon Agency, Inc. · filed 2002-05-03(2)

Plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action against defendant insurance agent is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]; Chase Scientific Research v NIA Group, 96 NY2d 20, 30-31; see also Santiago v 1370 Broadway Assoc., 96 NY2d 765, 766).

Section 213(2) requires a breach of contract action to be commenced within six years.

Cattaraugus Central School Board of Education v. Siracuse · filed 2002-10-01(2)

Defendant and third-party defendant established that the action, commenced more than six years after completion of the construction work, is untimely (see CPLR 213 [2]; Cabrini Med. Ctr. v Desina, 64 NY2d 1059, 1061).

Section 213(1) requires the action to be commenced within six years.

Weingard v. O'Donnell · filed 2002-11-12[1]

The plaintiff failed to rebut the defendants’ prima facie showing that this action was commenced long after the expiration of the applicable six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562; Mazzone v Mazzone, 269 AD2d 574).

Section 213(6) requires an action for reformation based on mistake to be brought within six years.

Amalgamated Dwellings, Inc. v. Hillman Housing Corp. · filed 2002-11-14(6)

Similarly, the cause of action for reformation is time-barred, since, if it was a mistake to convey the entire area only to defendant, any such mistake occurred in 1949 when the deed was made (CPLR 213 [6]; see Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v Five Star Mgt., 258 AD2d 15, 20).

Section 213 requires covered actions to be commenced within six years after accrual.

Livadiotakis v. Tzitzikalakis · filed 2003-02-03

Accordingly, the action was commenced more than six years after the causes of action accrued and more than two years after the plaintiffs discovered any alleged fraud.

Section 213’s six-year limitations period does not apply to submitting a QDRO because submission is not commencement of an action.

Duhamel v. Duhamel · filed 2004-02-11

The submission of a QDRO to the court, however, is not the equivalent of the commencement of an “action.”

Section 213(2) applies a six-year statute of limitations to the remaining breach of contract counterclaim.

Homeowners Ass'n of Victoria Woods, III, Inc. v. Incarnato · filed 2004-02-11(2)

The remainder of the breach of contract counterclaim is barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) requires contract actions to be commenced within six years after the alleged breach.

Fabozzi v. Coppa · filed 2004-03-29(2)

The causes of action alleging breach of contract are time-barred because the action was commenced more than six years after the alleged breach (see CPLR 213 [2]; Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402 [1993]).

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year statute of limitations for the accounting cause of action at issue.

Lazides v. Kouzounas · filed 2004-05-17(1)

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court properly dismissed his cause of action for an accounting, related to his one-half interest in property formerly owned by the subject partnership, as time-barred pursuant to the applicable six-year statute of limitations (see Partnership Law § 74; CPLR 213 [1]; Green v Albert, 199 AD2d 465, 466 [1993]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for applicable actions.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 2004-10-14

As a result, plaintiff was entitled to rely on the six-year statute (CPLR 213; see 1303 Webster Ave. Realty Corp. v Great Am. Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 63 NY2d 227, 231 [1984]; United Tech. Corp. v American Home Assur. Co., 989 F Supp 128, 158 [D Conn 1997]; Port of Seattle v Lexington Ins. Co., 111 Wash App 901, 915-919, 48 P 3d 334, 341-343 [2002]; see also Guadagno v Colonial Coop. Ins. Co., 101 AD2d 947 [1984]; Conte v Yorkshire Ins. Co., 5 Misc 2d 670 [1957]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year statute of limitations for actions to impose a constructive trust.

Eickler v. Pecora · filed 2004-11-29(1)

An action to impose a constructive trust is governed by the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213 (1) (see Jakacic v Jakacic, 279 AD2d 551, 552 [2001]; Mazzone v Mazzone, 269 AD2d 574 [2000]; Lucci v Lucci, 227 AD2d 387, 389 [1996]; Mattera v Mattera, 125 AD2d 555, 556-557 [1986]). Here, the deed transferring the property was dated November 1, 1993, and the action was commenced on October 21, 1999. Accordingly, this action was timely commenced.

Section 213 requires payments to have been made within six years before commencement of the action.

Mathias & Carr, Inc. v. Mangini · filed 2004-12-14

The action was properly dismissed as against Mangini since plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that said defendant made payments within six years of the commencement of the action (CPLR 213).

Section 213 applies a six-year limitation period to this contract action, running from the alleged breach.

Boone Associates, L.P. v. Leibovitz · filed 2004-12-21

Thus, the court properly concluded that the action was untimely, having been commenced more than six years after the alleged breach and subsequent to the expiration of the applicable limitation period (CPLR 213).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for actions on a contractual obligation.

Volpe v. Volpe · filed 2005-03-18(2)

The court properly determined that respondent’s claim for breach of contract, with respect to the provision that respondent is entitled to live rent-free in a building owned by petitioner, is barred by the statute of limitations inasmuch as respondent vacated her apartment in that building in 1976 (see CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 provides a six-year statute of limitations period for covered actions.

Chen v. Street Beat Sportswear, Inc. · filed 2005-04-06

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract was timely filed under the six-year statute of limitations period set forth in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213.

Section 213 requires actions subject to its six-year limitations period to be commenced within six years.

UMLIC VP, LLC v. Mellace · filed 2005-06-27

Since the plaintiff failed to timely commence this action within the applicable six-year limitations period (see CPLR 213), the Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint (see Clayton Natl., Inc. v Guldi, 307 AD2d 982 [2003]; Arbisser v Gelbelman, 286 AD2d 693 [2001]).

Section 213(1) gives six years to bring an action on a contract, obligation or liability, express or implied.

Sterling v. Sterling · filed 2005-08-11[1]

Nor do we find that either the statute of limitations or the statute of frauds requires a dismissal of the complaint. Supreme Court determined that the dissolution of the partnership was in April 1999, years after the commencement of this action (see CPLR 213 [1]; Partnership Law § 74; Sagus Mar. Corp. v Rynne & Co., 207 AD2d 701, 702 [1994]).

Section 213 requires actions covered by it to be commenced within six years.

Shariff v. Murray · filed 2006-10-10

The Supreme Court properly dismissed the amended verified complaint insofar as asserted against NY Pride as time-barred (see Perez v Paramount Communications, 92 NY2d 749 [1999]; Mazzone v Mazzone, 269 AD2d 574 [2000]; Liberty Co. v Boyle, 272 AD2d 380 [2000]; CPLR 213).

Section 213 supplies six-year limitations periods for fraud, contractual obligations, and claims governed by New York’s residual limitations period, subject to shorter periods when another rule applies.

Malmsteen v. BERDON, LLP · filed 2007-03-20(1), (2), and (8)

The statute of limitations for fraud is six years from the date the fraud occurred. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8); ... However, a Court will not apply the six-year statute of limitations if the claim of fraud is merely incidental to another claim with a shorter limitations period. ... The statute of limitations for a cause of action based on a breach of contract is six years from the date of the breach. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2) (“action upon a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied” governed by six-year limitations period); ... However, only breaches (that is, transfers in contravention of contractual terms) occurring within six years from the date this lawsuit was filed, or after January 28, 1999, are within the limitations period. ... A claim of unjust enrichment is governed by a six-year statute of limitations under New York’s residual limitations period statute. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1); ... However, if the unjust enrichment claim is merely incidental to or duplicative of another claim with a shorter limitations period, the Court will not allow a plaintiff to avail himself of the longer limitations period.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period, measured here from the defendant’s first open repudiation of the plaintiffs’ interest.

Maric Piping, Inc. v. Maric · filed 2007-09-11(1)

The plaintiffs’ claim for the imposition of a constructive trust was not time-barred, because the defendant Rajko Marie first openly repudiated any interest that the plaintiffs Frank Marie and Marie Piping, Inc., might have had in the real property at issue in December 1998, less than six years before the plaintiffs commenced the instant action (see CPLR 213 [1]; Jakacic v Jakacic, 279 AD2d 551, 552 [2001]).

Section 213(2) gives a six-year limitations period for an action on a contractual obligation or liability.

Tahari v. Narkis · filed 2023-05-23(2)

Under this interpretation, because the debt was owed in full as of April 18, 2015, this action would be timely, as it was commenced on January 29, 2021, before the six-year limitations period expired (CPLR 213[2]).

Section 213 bars contract claims brought outside its six-year limitations period.

Trujillo v. Collado · filed 2023-06-21

Further, as Trujillo correctly contends, so much of the third-party complaint as sought to recover damages for breach of contract predicated upon Trujillo's alleged failure to repay loans made to him by Collado beginning in 1998, for which Collado demanded repayment in May 2013, was time-barred ( see CPLR 213; Matter of Hollis , 180 AD3d 680, 682; Pugni v Giannini , 163 AD3d 1018; see generally Swift v New York Med. Coll. , 25 AD3d 686, 687).

CPLR 213(4)(b) estops a defendant in a mortgage cancellation action from asserting that the limitations period has not expired because the instrument was not validly accelerated, unless a prior action was dismissed based on an express judicial determination that it was not validly accelerated.

Caprotti v. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. · filed 2023-10-26(4)(b)

In an action seeking to cancel and discharge a mortgage, "a defendant shall be estopped from asserting that the period allowed by the applicable statute of limitation[s] for the commencement of an action upon the instrument has not expired because the instrument was not validly accelerated prior to, or by way of commencement of a prior action, unless the prior action was dismissed based on an expressed judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated" (CPLR 213 [4] [b]).

Section 213's six-year limitations period does not govern this insurance contract action because the policy's two-year limitations period applies.

1840 Concourse Associates, LP v. Praetorian Insurance · filed 2011-11-22

In this action for breach of contract based on a commercial property policy issued by defendant insurer to plaintiff property owner, defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that plaintiff commenced this action after expiration of the two-year limitations period contained in the policy (see Gilbert Frank Corp. v Federal Ins. Co., 70 NY2d 966, 967-968 [1988]). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the action was governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (id.).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limit for breach-of-contract claims, and § 213(8) requires fraud claims to be filed within six years of accrual or two years after the fraud could reasonably have been discovered.

Pang v. Synlyco, Ltd. · filed 2011-11-22

The cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract is barred by the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]). ... The cause of action to recover damages for fraud is time-barred inasmuch as the action was not commenced within six years of the date on which the cause of action accrued or within two years after the time the plaintiff could with reasonable diligence have discovered the fraud (see CPLR 213 [8]; Prand Corp. v County of Suffolk, 62 AD3d 681, 683 [2009]; Pericon v Ruck, 56 AD3d 635, 636 [2008]).

Section 213 sets the limitation period for actions based on contractual obligations, while the parties may agree in writing to a shorter period.

Timberline Electric Supply Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America · filed 1979-11-02

Although the period of limitation for an action based on a contractual obligation is- set by statute (CPLR 213), the parties may by written agreement establish a shorter period.

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach of contract actions, but an applicable shorter contractual period governs instead.

Viti v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America · filed 2011-08-31(2)

I thus reject plaintiffs contention that the limitations period for his claims under the First and Second Causes of Action are governed by CPLR 213(2), which sets a six year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions.

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims, which an agreement may shorten to a reasonable period.

Watkins v. Allstate Ins. Co. · filed 2017-09-29(2)

Although CPLR 213 (2) provides that a cause of action for breach of contract must be commenced within six years after the cause of action has accrued, "an agreement which modifies the Statute of Limitations by specifying a shorter, but reasonable, period within which to commence an action is enforceable" ( John J. Kassner & Co. v City of New York, 46 NY2d 544, [*2] 551 [1979]; see also Vaccaro v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 116 AD3d 839 , 840 [2014]; Blanar v State Farm Ins. Co. , 34 AD3d 1333 [2006]; Notaro v Allstate Ins. Co. , 17 Misc 3d 136 [A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52283[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]).

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year limitation when no other form of proceeding exists to resolve the claims in a declaratory judgment action.

Solnick v. Whalen · filed 1980-01-08(1)

If no other form of proceeding exists for the resolution of the claims tendered in the declaratory judgment action, the six-year limitation of CPLR 213 (subd 1) will then be applicable.

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year catch-all limitations period when no other specific statutory limitation period governs.

Bonar v. Shaffer · filed 1988-05-03(1)

If that examination reveals that the rights of the parties sought to be stabilized in the action for declaratory relief are, or have been, open to resolution through a form of proceeding for which a specific limitation period is statutorily provided, then that period limits the time for commencement of the declaratory judgment action. In that event there is a limitation specifically prescribed by law and the catch-all provision of CPLR 213 (subd 1) is not applicable.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for causes of action with no other prescribed limitation, including constructive fraud.

Marine Midland Bank, N. A. v. Stanton · filed 1990-05-11[1]

A cause of action for constructive fraud would indeed be barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations since it would have accrued at the time the alleged fraud was committed on March 25, 1980 (CPLR 213 [1]; Dybowski v Dybowska, 146 AD2d 604).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year catch-all limitations period for actions for which no limitation is prescribed by law, but it does not govern these § 612(d) claims.

Goldstein v. Time Warner New York City Cable Group · filed 1998-04-24(1)

The Court notes Gruberg’s attempts to characterize the § 612(d) action as “equitable” in nature, and thus create an entitlement to the more generous limitations period available under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1). ... That effort, while not entirely without merit, is ultimately unavailing.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for a declaratory judgment claim challenging the substance of an ordinance.

McCarthy v. Zoning Board of Appeals · filed 2001-05-24

Petitioner’s second declaratory judgment cause of action is directed at the substance of a portion of the ordinance, not the procedures followed in its enactment, and the six-year Statute of Limitations found in CPLR 213 applies (see, Matter of Frontier Ins. Co. v Town Bd., 252 AD2d 928, 930).

Section 213(4) gives a lender six years to commence a mortgage foreclosure action.

Daldan, Inc. v. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. · filed 2020-11-18(4)

An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[4]).

Section 213(2) requires an action upon an implied contractual obligation to be brought within six years.

Sessa v. State · filed 1976-10-19(2)

Pursuant to CPLR 213 (subd 2) an action upon an implied contractual obligation must be brought within six years. ... Even if this court had found by implication, a retrospective construction of chapter 280 of the Laws of 1976, nevertheless, the motion, of necessity, would have to be denied as to Leonard Sessa since more than six years had passed after the accrual of the claim and before the motion was made.

Section 213(2) requires an action on a contractual obligation or liability to be commenced within six years.

Rosenblatt v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd. · filed 2006-08-31(2)

Finally, the district court correctly concluded that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs claims regarding the 1992-1996 sales since plaintiff did not commence the present action until 2004. See N.Y. CPLR § 213(2) (stating that an action upon a contractual obligation or liability must be commenced within six years); see also ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 360 (2d Cir.1997) (“[I]n New York it is well settled that the statute of limitation for breach of contract begins to run from the day the contract was breached, not from the day the breach was discovered, or should have been discovered.”); see also T & N PLC v. Fred S. James & Co. of New York, 29 F.3d 57, 60 (2d Cir.1994) (stating that “neither knowledge of the breach nor cognizable damages are required to start the statute of limitations running at breach.”).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitation period for actions alleging breach of contract.

Mitchell v. United Parcel Service, Inc., and Department Store and Wholesale Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union 177 · filed 1980-03-03(2)

We hold that New York’s six year limitation period for contractual breaches, § 213(2), is applicable to LMRA § 301 actions by employees alleging wrongful discharge by the employer and breach of the fair representation duty by the union — regardless of whether the discharge was upheld by an arbitral panel or became final short of arbitration.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions, but it does not apply when the alleged contract merely restates a statutory duty.

European American Bank v. Cain · filed 1981-02-23

While rather farfetched and of doubtful success, a breach of contract claim is thus technically pleaded here. However, it adds nothing to plaintiff’s case. Essentially the alleged contract was one to perform a duty already imposed upon Pepe Motors by statute and administrative regulation. The only purpose served by the plaintiff pleading the contract and its breach is to avoid the Statute of Limitations. It does not change the essence of the action which, manifestly has its genesis in the statutory scheme concerning certificates of registration for automobile titles. ... Where, as here, the alleged contractual obligations add nothing to the defendant’s pre-existing common-law or statutory duty, the shorter period of limitation is applicable (State of New York v City of Binghamton, 72 AD2d 870, 871-872; D’Amico v Winkelman Co., 51 Misc 2d 205; Blessington v McCrory Stores Corp., 305 NY 140; Edwards v State of New York, 95 Misc 2d 516; Union Bank of Switzerland v HS Equities, 423 F Supp 927, 929). We conclude, therefore, that this action, commenced more than three years after the breach of duty, is time barred and that Pepe Motors’ cross motion to dismiss should have been granted.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions.

Aloi v. Board of Education · filed 1981-05-18(2)

Since the plaintiffs’ underlying claim is an action on the contract, the six-year period contained in CPLR 213 (subd 2) is applicable (see Cromer v County of Nassau, 77 AD2d 610).

Section 213(2) gives six years for contract claims arising from obligations under a contract, measured here from project completion.

N. R. S. Construction Corp. v. Board of Education · filed 1981-06-22(2)

Under either theory the board’s claim accrued on the date of completion of the project which was the subject of the architectural contract between the parties and the consequent termination of their professional relationship thereunder (Sosnow v Paul, 36 NY2d 780). ... This record presents a vigorously disputed question of fact as to whether the board’s claim against the architect was interposed within six years of the date of completion of the project, the board contending that although begun in 1966, to date the project has not been completed. ... Since the date of completion of the plaintiff’s general construction duties under its contract is the subject of the board’s second counterclaim, it is our view that determination of the Statute of Limitations issue, turning as it does upon the related question of the date of full completion of the project, should also await trial.

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on actions to impress constructive trusts.

Mann v. Mann · filed 1980-08-04(1)

It is well settled that the Statute of Limitations applicable to actions to impress constructive trusts is CPLR 213 (subd 1), which prescribes a six-year limitation.

Section 213(2) requires actions on express or implied contractual obligations to be commenced within six years.

Crawford v. Cantor · filed 1981-06-30(2)

CPLR 213 provides in pertinent part: “The following actions must be commenced within six years: *** 2. an action upon a contractual obligation or liability express or iinplied”. Each of the four causes of action alleged in the complaint: (1) for damages based on breach of express contract, (2) to impress constructive trust based on breach of express contract, (3) to impress constructive trust or damages based on breach of contract, and (4) for declaratory relief, is governed by the six-year limitation provided by CPLR 213.

Section 213 imposes a six-year limitations period on contract actions.

In re the Arbitration between South Colonie Central School District & South Colonie Teachers' Ass'n · filed 1982-01-07

Initially, it appears clear that the portion of the claim for the years 1972-1973 and 1973-1974, having accrued more than six years, prior to the demand for arbitration, is time barred under CPLR 213 which governs contract causes of actions.

Section 213 allows six years to commence an action to recover a debt.

Capital Properties Co. v. Public Service Commission · filed 1982-12-09

Section 118 of the Public Service Law is, therefore, inapplicable on the question of recovery of the unpaid bill but rather CPLR 213 applies to limit the period of time to six years during which an action may be commenced to recover the debt.

Section 213(2) requires contract actions to be commenced within six years after the claim accrues.

AB v. Jacq. Pierot, Jr., & Sons, Inc. · filed 1983-03-18(2)

Under New York CPLR § 213(2) (McKinney 1972) a contract action must be commenced within six years of the date on which the underlying claim accrued. ... A claim accrues when the potential plaintiff is first able to maintain the cause of action in question.

Subsection 2 applies a six-year limitations period to contract-based claims for property or pecuniary damages recoverable in contract.

Video Corp. of America v. Frederick Flatto Associates, Inc. · filed 1983-03-23(2)

an action for failure to exercise due care in the performance of a contract insofar as it seeks recovery for damages to property or pecuniary interests recoverable in a contract action is governed by the six-year contract Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 2).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitation period for contract actions.

Imperial Outfitters to Large Men, Inc. v. Genesco, Inc. · filed 1983-06-30(2)

Since the electricity overcharges date back to July, 1973, recovery is not barred by the six-year contractual Statute of Limitations. (CPLR 213, subd 2.)

Section 213(2) requires contract claims based on negligent performance to be brought within six years, accruing no later than final payment.

City of Niagara Falls v. Rudolph · filed 1983-11-04(2)

We agree with Special Term that plaintiff’s claims based on the negligent performance of the heating, ventilating and air-conditioning contract are governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 2) (see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assoc., 43 NY2d 389) and accrued no later than the date of final payment, March 11, 1975.

Section 213(2) requires an action upon a contractual obligation to be commenced within six years.

Ngoc Dung Thi Tran v. Citibank N.A. · filed 1983-11-28(2)

In New York, an action upon a contractual obligation must be commenced within six years. CPLR § 213(2).

Section 213(8) supplies a six-year limitations period for a fraud claim.

Martin v. Edwards Laboratories · filed 1983-12-01(8)

It was also made more than six years after the claimed fraud (CPLR 213, subd 8) and, because the original complaint did not sufficiently state circumstances constituting fraud (CPLR 3016, subd [b]) to give adequate notice of the claimed fraudulent transaction, is not saved by the relation back provision of CPLR 203 (subd [e]) (cf. Caffaro v Trayna, 35 NY2d 245, 251, supra).

The six-year limitation for money actions in CPLR 213(2) does not bar State recoupment of Medicaid overpayments carried out wholly within an administrative process.

Cortlandt Nursing Home v. Axelrod · filed 1984-02-02(subd 2)

Special Term, therefore, erred in holding that CPLR 213 (subd 2) imposed a six-year limitation of time within which the State could seek recovery of overpayment by recoupment, and that portion of each judgment which granted so much of the petitions as sought a declaration that the Department of Health’s actions were illegal must be reversed.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions on contractual obligations.

1303 Webster Avenue Realty Corp. v. Great American Surplus Lines Insurance · filed 1984-10-23(2)

The inclusion of. an express period of limitations, even though erroneous, precludes a determination that the insurer intended to waive any but the general statutory six-year period with respect to actions upon a contractual obligation (CPLR 213, subd 2).

Section 213(8) requires fraud actions to be commenced within six years, measured from accrual or from discovery when the fraud was discovered later.

Levinger v. Shepard Niles Crane and Hoist Corp. · filed 1985-02-28(8)

“The combined effect of CPLR 213(8) and 203(f) thus is ‘two separately-timed and alternative limitations periods in the case of a delayed discovery: six years from accrual or two years from discovery whichever is longer.’ ” ... The proxy statement was issued February 27, 1971, more than six years before the action was commenced on March 24, 1977, the six-year statute of limitation had expired by the latter date and this action is thus time-barred.

Section 213(1)'s six-year limitation applies to a declaratory judgment action when no other proceeding provides a limitation period, but it does not bar a continuing constitutional attack involving continuing harm.

Amerada Hess Corp. v. Acampora · filed 1985-03-04(1)

“If no other form of proceeding exists for the resolution of the claims tendered in the declaratory judgment action, the six-year limitation of CPLR 213 (subd 1) will then be applicable.” ... However, “no period of limitation at all is applicable to an action for a declaratory judgment * * * in cases involving a continuing harm, such as the application of an invalid statute” (1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 213.02). ... In view of the aforenoted principle set forth in Dowsey v Village of Kensington (supra) and MacEwen v City of New Rochelle (supra), it is clear that the Statute of Limitations does not bar the constitutional attack raised in the instant declaratory judgment action.

C.P.L.R. § 213(2) generally provides a six year limitations period for breach of contract actions, but a hybrid labor suit may instead be governed by a borrowed six month period.

Legutko v. Local 816, International Brotherhood of Teamsters · filed 1985-03-29(2)

There is a great deal to be said for the proposition that suits for breach of a union constitution under 29 U.S.C. § 185 should ordinarily be governed in New York by the six year limitation of CPLR § 213(2). ... The instant suit differs radically from an ordinary suit for breach of contract. ... For the above reasons, we hold that the instant suit against the union local under 29 U.S.C. § 185 for breach of the international union constitution in respect to contract ratification voting procedures, is governed by a six month limitation borrowed from 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).

Subsection 213(2) bars contract claims brought more than six years after they accrued.

BWA Corp. v. Alltrans Express U.S.A., Inc. · filed 1985-08-15(2)

Finally, as plaintiff concedes, the six-year contract Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]) applies and bars its claims for electrical costs prior to July 6, 1977 (six years prior to the commencement of the action) and its action is limited to costs arising after that date.

Section 213(2) requires an action arising out of a contractual obligation to be commenced within six years.

Bologna v. NMU Pension Trust of NMU Pension & Welfare Plan · filed 1987-02-27(2)

In New York, an action arising out of a contractual obligation must be commenced within six years. CPLR § 213(2) (McKinney 1987 Supp.).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to actions based on contract.

Severin v. Rouse · filed 1987-03-19(2)

The court in determining the amount of overcharges for which petitioner is liable to the respondents will apply the six-year Statute of Limitations for an action based on a contract since a lease agreement is both a contract and a conveyance of an estate or interest in real property.

Section 213(1) gives declaratory judgment actions a six-year statute of limitations.

Brentwood Union Free School District v. State · filed 1987-06-10(1)

However, as already stated, a declaratory judgment action, which is governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [1]), is, in the opinion of this court, the appropriate method for a challenge to the State defendants’ implementation of the statute (Matter of Morgenthau v Erlbaum, supra, at 150; cf., Press v County of Monroe, 50 NY2d 695).

Section 213 gives breach of contract claims a six-year limitations period.

Thompson v. Whitestone Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1987-06-22(2)

The plaintiffs’ first cause of action, characterized as one to recover damages for breach of contract, has a six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) requires contract actions to be commenced within six years.

Vogelsang v. McQuestion · filed 1987-07-10(2)

The court hastens to add that the foregoing interpretation of article 22 does not impermissibly extend the Statute of Limitations applying to contract actions beyond the six-year period under CPLR 213 (2).

Section 213(4) requires actions on a bond or note secured by a mortgage, and actions on a mortgage of real property, to be commenced within six years.

Baur v. Amrhein · filed 1988-01-28(4)

Therefore, since defendant is an arm of the State, it is governed by the Statute of Limitations. CPLR 213 (4) provides that an action upon a bond or note, the payment of which is secured by a mortgage on real property, or upon a bond or note and mortgage so secured, or upon a mortgage of real property must be commenced within six years (note also, Social Services Law § 106 [2] [c]).

CPLR 213(1)'s six-year catchall limitation does not govern a declaratory judgment action when the underlying dispute is subject to a different statutorily prescribed limitation period.

Association for Improvement in Mohegan, Inc. v. Town of Cortlandt · filed 1988-02-22(1)

If it is determined that the underlying dispute can be or could have been resolved through a form of action or proceeding for which a specific limitation period is statutorily provided, that limitation period governs the declaratory judgment action rather than the catchall six-year limitation set forth in CPLR 213 (1) (see, Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193, 202).

Section 213(2) gives six years to bring an action upon an express or implied contractual obligation or liability.

Huebner v. Caldwell & Cook, Inc. · filed 1988-03-08(2)

Actions based on contract law are governed by CPLR 213 (2). This section provides that "an action upon a contractual obligation or liability express or implied,” has a six-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 213(4) imposes a six-year limit on an action to foreclose a mortgage lien.

Corrado v. Petrone · filed 1988-04-04(4)

Therefore, whether the mortgage was given to secure a loan made in 1967 or a later loan made in 1970, it is clear that an action to foreclose the mortgage lien is now time barred (CPLR 213 [4]; see, Lovell v Jimal Holding Corp., 127 AD2d 747, 749; Martin v Stoddard, 127 NY 61, 63; 38 NY Jur, Mortgages and Deeds of Trust, § 299, at 588, citing Ernst v Schaack, 297 NY 566; First Natl. City Trust Co. v Caserta, 29 Misc 2d 166).

Section 213(2) requires actions arising from a breach of contract to be commenced within six years, and involuntary payments do not revive debts barred by that period.

Jacobs v. Patterson · filed 1988-09-19(2)

We find that no reasonable view of the evidence supports the plaintiffs contention that payments directed by the payroll deduction order included any payment toward arrears so as to revive the defendant’s obligation to pay those arrears which were otherwise time barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations for causes of action arising from a breach of contract (see, CPLR 213 [2]; see also, Jacobs v Patterson, 112 AD2d 402).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to contract actions seeking property or pecuniary damages for failure to exercise due care in performing a contract.

Bloom v. Kernan · filed 1989-01-19(2)

"[A]n action for failure to exercise due care in the performance of a contract insofar as it seeks recovery for damages to property or pecuniary interests recoverable in a contract action is governed by the six-year contract Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 2)” (Video Corp. v Flatto Assocs., supra, at 1028).

For a contract claim underlying a declaratory judgment action, section 213(2) gives six years to commence the action, running from the breach.

Gandhi v. Nayak · filed 1989-03-28[2]

Since this is a declaratory judgment action, we find that the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]), applicable to the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, which underlies the instant action, controls the time in which this action must be commenced (Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229-230 [1980]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for actions seeking a partnership accounting.

Schwartz v. Associates · filed 1989-04-04(1)

Since there is a six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to actions for a partnership accounting, and plaintiff did not commence this action until January 1986, which was more than 10 years after the date of dissolution, her action is time barred (CPLR 213 [1]; and see, La Russo v Paladino, 109 NYS2d 627 [Sup Ct, Kings County, 1951], affd 280 App Div 988 [1952], lv denied 281 App Div 753 [1953]).

Section 213(2) requires an action on a contractual obligation to be commenced within six years.

Berardi Construction Corp. v. Manshul Construction Corp. · filed 1989-04-27(2)

The breach of contract cause of action, which accrued on completion of the work (Phillips Constr. Co. v City of New York, 61 NY2d 949, rearg denied 62 NY2d 646), is barred by a six-year Statute of Limitations. (CPLR 213 [2].)

Section 213(2) gives contract actions a six-year statute of limitations.

Insurance of North America v. New York Casualty Insurance · filed 1989-12-20(2)

Accordingly, this action is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to contract actions (see, CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions.

Feldman v. Teitelbaum · filed 1990-04-16(2)

The first cause of action is essentially one for specific performance of a contract to sell the plaintiff a part of the appellant’s ownership interest in the defendant corporation. Accordingly, it is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]; Lituchy v Guinan Lithographic Co., 60 AD2d 622).

Section 213(2) requires an action on a contract to be commenced within six years.

Park Terrace Gardens, Inc. v. Bevona · filed 1990-05-29(2)

Since the agreements contain no time limitations for the grievance of wage claims—which are, in any event, continuing violations in this case—the sole applicable time bar is the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2) for the commencement of contract actions.

The six-year limitations period does not automatically govern every declaratory judgment action; a specific statutory period controls when the underlying claim is subject to one.

Emunim v. Town of Fallsburg · filed 1991-07-01(1)

Kahal’s argument that such a declaratory judgment action is governed either by those cases which hold that an equity action to "clear a cloud on title” may be brought at any time or by the "catch-all” six-year limitation of CPLR 213 (1) is without merit.

Section 213 gives breach of contract actions a six-year limitations period.

Simcoe & Erie General Insurance v. Chemical Bank · filed 1991-07-15

Therefore, the six-year period set forth in CPLR § 213 governs this action.

CPLR 213 generally requires fraud actions and actions without a specifically prescribed limitation to be commenced within six years, subject to the fraud discovery rule.

Piedra v. Vanover · filed 1992-01-13(1), (8)

Under CPLR 213 (8), a cause of action based upon actual fraud must generally be commenced within six years of the commission of the fraud. ... In addition, even if we were to assume that the plaintiff’s action did not involve fraud, it would still be time-barred. CPLR 213 (1) provides that an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law must be commenced within six years of the accrual of the cause of action. Thus, assuming an action founded on "forgery” has no Statute of Limitations prescribed by law, it would, by virtue of CPLR 213 (1), have a six-year Statute of Limitations, and the plaintiff’s action would be time-barred.

Section 213(8) bars a fraud claim brought more than six years after the agreement was executed.

Pommer v. Trustco Bank · filed 1992-05-07(8)

Here, there is no serious dispute that plaintiffs action was not commenced within six years after the execution of the agreement (see, CPLR 213 [8]; Pacchiana v Pacchiana, supra, at 721).

Section 213(2) gives contract actions a six-year limitations period measured from accrual.

Nassau Chapter Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. County of Nassau · filed 1992-05-12(2)

A declaratory judgment action which seeks judgment construing the plaintiff’s rights under a CBA is an action on the contract governed by the six-year limitation period set forth in CPLR 213 (2) (see, Matter of Hertz v Rozzi, supra; Aloi v Board of Educ., supra; Cromer v County of Nassau, supra).

Subsection 213(4) imposes a six-year limitation period on actions involving bonds or notes secured by mortgages and actions upon mortgages or interests in them.

Gower v. Weinberg · filed 1992-06-04(4)

Clearly, the action is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (4), applicable to "an action upon a bond or note, the payment of which is secured by a mortgage upon real property, or upon a bond or note and mortgage so secured, or upon a mortgage of real property, or any interest therein” (see, Saliani v Amrhein, 141 Misc 2d 501, 502-503; Baur v Amrhein, 138 Misc 2d 926, 930-931).

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract actions a six-year limitations period.

CBS Inc. v. Arcane Visuals Ltd. · filed 1993-03-08(2)

Furthermore, to the extent that the second counterclaim is for breach of contract, that claim has a six-year Statute of Limitations. (CPLR 213 [2].) That time period has not run here.

CPLR 213(8) gives fraud actions a six-year limitation period.

Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America v. Handel · filed 1993-04-27(8)

Defendants’ argument that Guardian’s causes of action based upon the Judiciary Law are time barred is without merit. The six-year limitation for fraud actions (CPLR 213 [8]) is controlling, and not the three-year period for actions upon a statute imposing a penalty or forfeiture (CPLR 214 [2]).

Section 213(2) requires contract actions to be commenced within six years, subject to equitable estoppel when misrepresentation induced a plaintiff to delay filing.

Lipp v. Edison · filed 1993-07-28(2)

For purposes of Con Edison’s motion, the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to contract actions (CPLR 213 [2]) will be applied. ... Based on the record before the court, this limitations period has expired regarding plaintiff’s overcharge claim for the period April 1981 through December 1984. ... However, plaintiff correctly points out that "a defendant may be estopped to plead the Statute of Limitations where plaintiff was induced by fraud, misrepresentation or deception to refrain from filing a timely action [citations omitted]”.

Section 213(6) requires an action based on mistake to be commenced within six years.

Lopata v. Lopata · filed 1993-09-21[6]

We also find that defendant’s defense and counterclaim for reformation based upon mistake were properly dismissed as barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [6]; see, Metcalf v Metcalf, 196 Misc 842, affd 276 App Div 1068).

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on actions for money had and received.

Emunim v. Town of Fallsburg · filed 1993-12-10(2)

Unlike a declaratory judgment action, an action for money had and received is governed by a specific limitations period. "Such an action is based, in theory, upon a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied in law and in fact, and. is controlled only by the six-year Statute of Limitations” set forth at CPLR 213 (2) (Matter of First Natl. City Bank v City of New York, 36 NY2d 87, 93 [1975] [emphasis added]).

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on actions based on contractual obligations.

Continental Cas. Co. v. Stronghold Ins. Co., Ltd. · filed 1994-10-26(2)

CPLR 213(2) states that the statute of limitations on an action on a contractual obligation in New York is six years.

Subsection (2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract actions.

Barnett v. International Business MacHines Corp. · filed 1995-05-08(2)

The Court of Appeals in Miles was apparently referring to the six year statute of limitations for breach of contract contained in CPLR 213(2). ... For all of the foregoing reasons, the statute of limitations to be applied to § 1132 claims is the statute of limitations for contract actions under state law.

Section 213(2) requires contract actions to be commenced within six years of the breach.

Netzer v. Continuity Graphic Associates, Inc. · filed 1997-04-07(2)

A contract action must be commenced within six years of the breach. N.Y. CPLR 213(2).

Section 213(2) bars an action on a contractual obligation brought more than six years after it accrues.

Town of Brookhaven v. MIC Property & Casualty Insurance · filed 1997-12-08(2)

This action, brought more than six years after that date, is, therefore, barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]; American Trading Co. v Fish, 42 NY2d 20; Village of Herkimer v American Sur. Co., 18 AD2d 94), and the appellant’s motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it should have been granted.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions based on a contractual obligation.

CKC of New York, Inc. v. Kleiman · filed 1998-11-02(2)

Here, the property owners are challenging the Village’s tax levy based upon a contract entered into between the Village and the property owners and, under such circumstances, we conclude that the six-year Statute of Limitations applies (see, Matter of Troy Towers Redevelopment Co. v City of Troy, 51 AD2d 173, affd 41 NY2d 816; CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 requires fraud actions to be commenced within six years, measured from when the fraud was discovered or could reasonably have been discovered.

Meridien International Bank Ltd. v. Government of the Republic of Liberia · filed 1998-11-05

Counterclaims One and Two seek reeission of the Credit Agreement and Guaranty based upon Meridieris alleged fraud in procuring those contracts. ... As these counterclaims are based upon fraud, the statute of limitations is governed by N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 213 which provides that the: “aetion[] must be commenced within six years: ... [when the action is] based upon fraud; the time within which the action must be commenced shall be computed from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom he claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.”

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions.

Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse · filed 1998-12-01(2)

Since PW prepared the Schedules K-l through 1988, and the Ackerman complaint was filed in April 1990, the claims would be timely under either the six-year Statute of Limitations for contract actions (CPLR 213 [2]) or the three-year Statute of Limitations for actions involving injury to property (CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions, running from the breach.

Sitkiewicz v. County of Sullivan · filed 1998-12-17(2)

The determinative issue on this appeal is whether plaintiffs complaint, alleging defendant’s breach of a July 1987 contract, is time barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]). ... A breach of contract cause of action accrues at the time of breach (see, Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402; Kassner & Co. v City of New York, 46 NY2d 544, 550). ... Thus, this cause of action is untimely.

Section 213(2) requires contract actions to be brought within six years of accrual.

Yatter v. William Morris Agency, Inc. · filed 1998-12-29(2)

With respect to the breach of contract claim, which must be brought within six years of accrual (CPLR 213 [2]), we agree with plaintiffs contention that this cause of action accrued on the date of the closing of the transaction that gives rise to this litigation (see, Rachmani Corp. v 9 E. 96th St. Apt. Corp., 211 AD2d 262), and that therefore this cause of action is not time-barred.

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year statute of limitations on contract actions.

BioCore, Inc. v. Khosrowshahi · filed 1999-01-05(2)

New York has a six-year statute of limitations for all contracts. N.Y.S. CPLR § 213(2).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud based claims, including negligent misrepresentation claims that also state fraud.

Fromer v. Yogel · filed 1999-03-23(8)

Based on my review of these and other authorities, I hold that Plaintiffs’ sixth claim is timely under the six-year statute of limitations provided in CPLR § 213(8). This holding is limited to those instances where negligent misrepresentation is alleged according to facts that also state a cause of action for fraud.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions.

New York & Presbyterian Hospital v. Tishman Construction Co. · filed 1999-03-23

Rather, it is subject to the six-year statute for contract actions (CPLR 213).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions based on contract.

1700 York Associates v. Kaskel · filed 1999-04-05(2)

Since respondent admits that he continues to keep the animals in question, the applicable Statute of Limitations, whether six years based on a contract (CPLR 213 [2]), or a shorter period, has not run.

Section 213(2) gives actions upon a contractual obligation a six-year limitations period.

Esposito v. Alcamo Supply & Contracting Corp. · filed 1999-05-10[2]

Further, this cause of action, which accrued in 1993, is not time-barred (see, CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(4) requires a foreclosure action to be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues.

Rols Capital Co. v. Beeten · filed 1999-09-13[4]

Furthermore, the six-year Statute of Limitations bars the commencement of a new action against the respondents (see, CPLR 213 [4]), since the plaintiff’s cause of action for foreclosure accrued on May 28, 1987.

Section 213(2) requires an action upon a contractual obligation to be commenced within six years.

Niagara Recycling, Inc. v. Sevenson Environmental Services, Inc. · filed 1999-10-01(2)

Supreme Court properly dismissed the action as time-barred (see, CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract actions a six-year limitations period measured from the breach, regardless of when damage is felt.

Rabouin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 1999-11-09(2)

The Statute of Limitations on an action for breach of contract is six years, measured from the date of the breach, regardless of when the damage is felt.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract actions.

Gebhardt v. Allspect, Inc. · filed 2000-05-16(2)

The six-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for breach of contract set forth in N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 213(2) will be applied.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions.

International Fidelity Insurance v. County of Rockland · filed 2000-05-18

Thus, the only possible limitations periods applicable to the claim would be either the six-year period specified in the New York statute of limitations on contract actions, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213, or the limitations period prescribed by ¶ 13.7 of the Construction Contract, which is incorporated by reference into the Takeover Agreement. ... Alternatively, the six-year statute of limitations would apply to the claims for IFIC-caused delay damages. Since the earliest date of default alleged by anyone in this action is August 4, 1994, claims based on IFIC-caused delay — -which were interposed in May of 1997 — -are timely.

Section 213(2) gives New York contract actions a six-year statute of limitations.

Abernathy-Thomas Engineering Co. v. Pall Corp. · filed 2000-06-27(2)

The statute of limitations on contract actions in New York is six years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2) (McKinney 1990).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract actions under New York law.

Tevdorachvili v. Chase Manhattan Bank · filed 2000-07-07(2)

New York law would govern that claim, and the statute of limitations for breach of contract under New York law is six years.

Section 213 gives declaratory judgment actions a six-year limitation period.

Caputo v. County of Suffolk · filed 2000-08-07

The first cause of action was timely commenced within the six-year limitation period applicable to declaratory judgment actions (see, CPLR 213; Janiak v Town of Greenville, 203 AD2d 329, 331; Kamhi v Town of Yorktown, 141 AD2d 607, 608, affd 74 NY2d 423).

Section 213(1) gives an action to rescind a contract a six-year statute of limitations.

Rubin v. Rubin · filed 2000-08-21(1)

An action to rescind a contract is governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract actions.

Highland Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Rust Environment & Infrastructure of New York, Inc. · filed 2001-03-19

Therefore, under either the three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to malpractice actions (see, CPLR 214 [6]) or the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to breach of contract actions (see, CPLR 213), the action was untimely.

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract actions a six-year limitations period.

Chase Scientific Research, Inc. v. Nia Group, Inc. · filed 2001-03-22(2)

Thus, in both cases we conclude that the actions against defendant agents and brokers are governed not by CPLR 214 (6), but by the limitations periods applicable to negligence actions (CPLR 214 [4]) and breach of contract actions (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract actions a six-year limitations period.

Young v. Woodcrest Club · filed 2001-07-23(2)

Therefore, on the facts as before the Court at the present time the statute of limitations applying to contracts, that is six years, would not expire until October 1, 2001. Since this suit was commenced considerably before that period, that is May 10, 2000, they are well within the statute. Although there do not appear to be any cases directly on point, this is clearly a breach of contract case in which the six-year statute would apply. On the record now before this Court, the statute would begin to run no sooner than the date of the plaintiffs’ resignation.

CPLR 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims, running from the breach.

Lamendola v. Mossa · filed 2001-10-30[2]

A cause of action for breach of contract accrues and the Statute of Limitations commences to run when the contract is breached (see, Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399). Knowledge of the occurrence of the wrong on the part of plaintiff is not necessary to start the Statute of Limitations running in a breach of contract action (see, Varga v Credit Suisse, 5 AD2d 289, 292, affd 5 NY2d 865). The allegations of negligence against defendants in the performance of their contractual obligations are governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]; National Life Ins. Co. v Hall & Co., 67 NY2d 1021), which began to run from the date plaintiff requested defendants to obtain the additional insurance and defendants’ alleged failure to take steps to procure said insurance (see, Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp., 81 NY2d 90; Brownstein v Travelers Cos., 235 AD2d 811; T&N plc v James & Co., 29 F3d 57 [2d Cir 1994]).

Section 213(4) provides a six-year limitations period for mortgage foreclosure actions, running from specified payment, demand, or acceleration events.

Saini v. Cinelli Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2001-12-13(4)

The Statute of Limitations in a mortgage foreclosure action begins to run six years from the due date for each unpaid installment or the time the mortgagee is entitled to demand full payment, or when the mortgage has been accelerated by a demand or an action is brought (see, Serapilio v Staszak, 255 AD2d 824; Loiacono v Goldberg, 240 AD2d 476, 477; Pagano v Smith, 201 AD2d 632, 633). ... Accordingly, since neither the court-appointed receiver’s payment of rents and profits to plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest nor the listing of the debt in the bankruptcy proceeding extended or renewed the Statute of Limitations, plaintiffs’ foreclosure action — commenced in October 1999 — should have been dismissed as untimely (see, CPLR 213 [4]).

Section 213 applies a six-year statute of limitations to contract actions.

Long Island Lighting Co. v. Ambro · filed 2002-01-22

The Supreme Court properly concluded that enforcement of the stipulation was barred either by the six-year statute of limitations which governs contract actions (see, Insurance Co. of N. Am. v New York Cas. Ins. Co., 156 AD2d 1018, 1019; Werner v Werner, 176 Misc 2d 299, 302-303; 75 NY Jur 2d, Limitations and Laches § 148; see also Meth v Kolker, 39 AD2d 651, affd 33 NY2d 780; CPLR 213), or under the equitable doctrine of laches.

Section 213(4) sets a six-year limitation period for mortgage foreclosure actions, but the Federal Government is not subject to state statutes of limitation.

United States v. Lyons · filed 2002-03-07(4)

We are also unpersuaded by defendant’s argument that New York’s six-year statute of limitations governing foreclosure should be held to bar this action (see, CPLR 213 [4]). The Federal Government is not subject to state statutes of limitation (see, e.g., United States v Summerlin, 310 US 414, 416; Matter of Feinberg, 18 NY2d 499, 504), and defendant’s citation to Farmers Home Admin. v Muirhead (42 F3d 964, cert denied 516 US 806) is unavailing.