N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213

Section 213’s six-year limitations period is not restarted when later paychecks merely reflect an earlier alleged wrong.

Heise II v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK) · filed 2021-11-17

Because Plaintiff first filed his suit in 2020, more than six years have passed and his claims should be time-barred. ... As a result, the continuing-violation doctrine did not toll the limitations period for Plaintiff’s claims.

Section 213(8)'s six-year limitations period applies to a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on fraud.

Paolucci v. Mauro · filed 2010-06-10(8)

We agree with Supreme Court that as plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duty is based on allegations of fraud, the six-year limitations period of CPLR 213 (8) applies (see IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d at 139; Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 119 [2003]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking equitable relief; claims seeking only money damages have a three-year period.

Weiss v. Waterhouse · filed 2007-11-20(1)

Here, because the plaintiff seeks only money damages, the three-year statute of limitations applies.

Section 213(1)'s six-year period for actions with no specified limitation does not apply to an action for damages based on a fiduciary obligation; that action has a three-year limitation period.

Dinerman v. Sutton · filed 1965-03-11(1)

Citing Geltman v. Levy (17 Misc 2d 525), he urges that the provision governing actions for which no limitation is specified applies. (CPLR 213, subd. 1 [6 years]; see CPLR 218, subd. [b]; cf. former Civ. Prac. Act, § 53 [10 years].) Plaintiff errs. Geltman holds that an action in equity against a trustee has no specified time limitation. However, it also holds that an action for damages based upon a fiduciary obligation is governed by the three-year statute.

Section 213(8)’s six-year/two-year limitations period applies to fraud-based breach of fiduciary duty and aiding-and-abetting claims.

Landow v. Wachovia Securities, LLC · filed 2013-08-12(8)

Since all of plaintiffs claims that defendants breached their fiduciary duty, or aided and abetted the breach of a fiduciary duty, to him are essentially fraud-based claims, they are subject to the same six (6)-year/two (2)-year limitations period applicable to his fraud claims.

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period when an allegation of fraud is essential to a breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Kerik v. Tacopina · filed 2014-12-03(8)

If “an allegation of fraud is essential to a breach of fiduciary duty claim,” courts in New York apply a “six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213(8).”

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim when an allegation of fraud is essential to the claim; failure to disclose a conflict of interest alone does not qualify.

Rohe v. Bertine, Hufnagel, Headley, Zeltner, Drummon & Dohn, LLP · filed 2016-02-01(8)

In addition to cases in which an equitable remedy is sought, a six-year statute of limitations also applies under CPLR 213(8) “where an allegation of fraud is essential to a breach of fiduciary duty claim.” IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 N.Y.3d 132, 879 N.Y.S.2d 355, 907 N.E.2d 268, 272 (2009). Neither the original nor the amended complaint in this action allege the elements of fraud, and "[t]he failure to disclose a conflict of interest does not transform a breach of fiduciary duty into a fraud.” Access Point Med., LLC v. Mandell, 106 A.D.3d 40, 963 N.Y.S.2d 44, 47 (2013). Therefore this alternative route to a six-year statute of limitations is not available to plaintiffs.

Section 213(4) limits recovery in a mortgage foreclosure action to installments that became due within six years before the action commenced when the debt was not validly accelerated.

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Limtcher · filed 2021-04-07(4)

Accordingly, the instant action is timely, but only with respect to those installments that accrued within six years of the date of commencement of the instant action ( see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cohen , 80 AD3d 753, 754; EMC Mtge. Corp. v Suarez , 49 AD3d 592, 593). Therefore, the plaintiff's recovery may not include any installments that became due more than six years prior to the commencement of the action, and the amount due must be recalculated to reflect that fact.

Section 213(4) bars recovery of mortgage installments that became due more than six years before a foreclosure action began, even if an earlier acceleration was revoked.

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Singer · filed 2021-03-31(4)

The plaintiff's voluntary discontinuance of the first action constituted an affirmative act revoking its prior acceleration of the mortgage debt as a matter of law ( see Freedom Mtge. Corp. v Engel , _____ NY3d at _____, 2021 NY Slip Op 01090, *7). However, because the plaintiff alleged that Joseph Singer failed to make the February 1, 2008 payment or any subsequent installments due thereafter on the note, and the subject action was not commenced until February 17, 2015, the Singers' proposed amendment to their answer to assert an affirmative defense that any unpaid installments of the mortgage which accrued before the six-year period prior to the commencement of the subject action were time-barred was not palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit ( see U.S. Bank N.A. v Atia , 178 AD3d at 749; Ditech Fin., LLC v Reiss , 175 AD3d 618, 619). Moreover, upon amendment, that branch of the Singers' cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss so much of the complaint as sought to recover unpaid installments of the mortgage which accrued more than six years prior to the commencement of the subject action should have been granted.

Section 213(4)’s six-year limitations period begins separately when each installment of a normal mortgage comes due.

Newgold v. Woodstock Development Corp. · filed 1966-07-07(4)

In the case of a normal installment mortgage, as each installment comes due a separate action may be brought to collect it and the Statute of Limitations begins to run on that installment at that time (Ziegler v. Elliott Camp Corp. [Von Sebo], 271 App. Div. 604).

Section 213(4) requires an action on a mortgage to be commenced within six years after the mortgagee becomes entitled to demand full payment.

Bergenfeld v. Midas Collections, Inc. · filed 1971-06-04(4)

An action upon a bond or note or upon a mortgage must be commenced within six years after the accrual of the cause of action. (CPLR 213, subd. 4.) The time period begins to run when the mortgagee is entitled to demand full payment.

A fraud action must be commenced within six years of accrual or two years after the fraud could have been discovered, whichever period is longer.

Klein v. H. N. Whitney, Goadby & Co. · filed 1971-11-22(9)

In other words, since it is the law of New York that a fraud action must be commenced within six years after accrual, of the claim or within two years after the fraud could have been discovered, provided that the two year period does not cut down the basic six year period, it follows that this action commenced on the last calendar day of 1970 was time-barred.

Section 213 starts the limitations period for each mortgage installment when that installment becomes due if the mortgage does not accelerate the entire debt.

Utica Mutual Insurance v. Knox · filed 1979-07-26

The mortgage does not contain a provision for acceleration of the entire amount due upon nonpayment of a single installment. Since it does not, as each installment comes due, a separate action may be brought to collect it. The Statute of Limitations begins to run on each installment from the date it becomes due (Newgold v Woodstock Dev. Corp., 26 AD2d 142, revd on other grounds 19 NY2d 894; First Nat. City-Trust Co. v Caserta, 29 Misc 2d 166).

Section 213(6)'s six-year limitations period for mortgage reformation does not begin to run when the mortgage was never recorded.

TD Bank, N.A. v. Prince · filed 2025-04-01(6)

Here, the lost note affidavit Plaintiff submitted from Jones established that neither the 2013 Gap Mortgage nor the 2013 CEMA were ever recorded. Consequently, the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR Section 213(6) has not started to run.

Section 213(1) gives declaratory judgment actions a six-year limitations period unless the underlying dispute could have been brought as a specific action with its own limitations period.

Walter v. Starbird-Veltidi · filed 2010-11-09(1)

A declaratory judgment action is governed by the six-year catch-all statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1), unless the nature of the underlying action reveals that the dispute could have been resolved through a specific action or proceeding for which there is a prescribed limitations period (see Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex., 87 NY2d 36, 41 [1995]; Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229 [1980]; Mirvish v Mott, 75 AD3d 269 [2010]; Yecies v Sullivan, 221 AD2d 433 [1995]).

Section 213(1)'s six-year period for declaratory judgment actions gives way when a shorter limitations period governs a claim that could resolve the underlying dispute.

Mirvish v. Mott · filed 2010-05-27(1)

Although declaratory judgment actions are typically governed by a six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213 (1), if the underlying dispute could have been resolved through an action or proceeding for which a specific, shorter limitations period governs, then such shorter period must be applied (Trager v Town of Clifton Park, 303 AD2d 875, 876 [2003]).

Section 213(1) governs the timeliness of a challenge to legislation.

New York State Psychiatric Ass'n v. New York State Department of Health · filed 2010-03-16(1)

Accordingly, the plaintiffs/petitioners timely challenged the 2008 legislation (see CPLR 213 [1]; American Ind. Paper Mills Supply Co., Inc. v County of Westchester, 16 AD3d 443 [2005]), have property rights in reimbursement at a 100% rate after March 31, 2007 (cf. Senape v Constantino, 936 F2d 687, 690 [1991]), and shall be entitled to reimbursement for claims arising between August 12, 2007, and April 11, 2008.

Section 213(1) governs the timeliness of declaratory relief challenging these property tax assessments.

Level 3 Communications, LLC v. DeBellis · filed 2010-01-19(1)

The causes of action seeking declaratory relief were timely interposed (see CPLR 213 [1]) and, under the circumstances of this case, Level 3 was not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to pursuing that relief (see Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 87 NY2d 136, 140 [1995]; Bankers Trust Corp. v New York City Dept. of Fin., 301 AD2d 321, 327-328 [2002], mod 1 NY3d 315 [2003]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of governmental action.

Rook Hill Sewerage Disposal Corp. v. Town of Thompson · filed 1966-12-30(1)

The present action is governed by CPLR 213 (subd. 1), limiting the action to six years. The action was, therefore, timely commenced.

CPLR 213(1) applies to declaratory judgment actions over marital status; its limitation period ordinarily begins when the parties first know their status is disputed.

Sorrentino v. Mierzwa · filed 1968-05-13(1)

Judgment reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, and judgment granted in favor of defendant declaring that (1) plaintiff, by reason of her gross laches,. is estopped from asserting her claim that she is the lawful widow of Alphonse G. Sorrentino, deceased, and (2) her cause of action is barred by the pertinent Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd. 1 [formerly Civ. Prac. Act, § 53]).

Section 213(1)’s six-year limitation does not apply to an action to declare a bigamous marriage void because Domestic Relations Law § 140(a) permits that action during the other party’s lifetime.

Zeitlan v. Zeitlan · filed 1969-03-17(1)

On this appeal, plaintiff for the first time contends that defendant’s counterclaim for a judgment declaring their marriage void, brought eight years after their marriage, is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd. 1), applicable to actions which have no specific statutory time limitations. We find no merit in that contention. ... Hence, the six-year Statute of Limitations does not apply or bar this counterclaim.

Section 213(1)'s six-year limitations period applies to a declaratory judgment challenge to an ordinance based on lack of authority.

Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Hitt · filed 1972-03-29(1)

An action seeking declaratory judgment would therefore be governed by the time limitation expressed in CPLR 213 (subd. 1).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for declaratory judgment actions.

Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown · filed 1988-06-13

The six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to declaratory judgment actions should have been applied (CPLR 213) and, accordingly, it was error to dismiss the action as time barred.

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to an action seeking a determination of contractual rights.

Karedes v. Colella · filed 2002-04-18(2)

Here, the relief sought is a determination of petitioner’s contractual rights and is governed by the six-year statute of limitations found in CPLR 213 (2) (see, Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229).

Section 213(1) generally gives declaratory judgment actions six years, but a shorter limitations period applies when the underlying dispute could have been brought through an action or proceeding governed by that period.

Trager v. Town of Clifton Park · filed 2003-03-13(1)

Although declaratory judgment actions are typically governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]), if the underlying dispute could have been resolved through an action or proceeding for which a specific, shorter limitations period governs, then such shorter period must be applied (see e.g. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d 194, 200-201 [1994]; Marsh v New York State & Local Employees’ Retirement Sys., 291 AD2d 713, 713-714 [2002]).

Subdivision 1 generally provides a six-year limitations period for declaratory judgment actions, subject to a specific shorter period governing the underlying dispute.

Fritzhand v. Discover Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2005-06-30(1)

Although declaratory judgment actions are typically governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]), if the underlying dispute could have been resolved through an action or proceeding for which a specific, shorter limitations period governs, then such shorter period must be applied.

CPLR 213(1) does not impose a flat six-year limitations period on declaratory judgment actions.

Brady v. Murray · filed 2006-06-08(1)

Contrary to defendants’ claim, the statute of limitations for a declaratory judgment action is not a flat six years under CPLR 213 (1) (see Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229-230 [1980]).

Section 213(1)'s six-year period for declaratory judgment actions does not extend the deadline for a claim that could have been brought in another form with a shorter limitations period.

Town of Olive v. City of New York · filed 2009-06-18(1)

While a declaratory judgment action typically enjoys a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]; Trager v Town of Clifton Park, 303 AD2d 875, 876-877 [2003]), if a claim “could have been made in a form other than an action for a declaratory judgment and the limitations period for an action in that form has already expired, the time for asserting the claim cannot be extended through the simple expedient of denominating the action one for declaratory relief’ (New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d 194, 201 [1994]; see Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229-230 [1980]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for declaratory and related injunctive claims when no proceeding with a specific limitations period can resolve them.

Stein v. Garfield Regency Condominium · filed 2009-09-15(1)

Since the plaintiffs commenced this action in January 2007, which is less than six years after the dispute first arose, the action is timely (see CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(1)’s six-year period for declaratory judgments does not extend a claim when the limitations period for an available action seeking other relief has expired.

Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art · filed 2010-03-03(1)

While a claim for declaratory judgment without a prescribed limitations period usually enjoys a six-year limitations period under CPLR 213(1), in cases like this where a claim “could have been made in a form other than an action for a declaratory judgment [i.e., an action for conversion or replevin] and the limitations period for an action in that form has already expired, the time for asserting the claim cannot be extended through the simple expedient of denominating the action one for declaratory relief.”

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year limitations period for a declaratory judgment action when no other proceeding with a specific limitations period can resolve the parties’ rights.

Town of Huntington v. County of Suffolk · filed 2010-10-19(1)

Instead, in order to determine the applicable statute of limitations, the court must determine whether the “rights of the parties sought to be stabilized in the action for declaratory relief are, or have been, open to resolution through a form of proceeding for which a specific limitation period is statutorily provided,” and, in the event no other form of proceeding exists, the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) should be applied (Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d at 229-230; see Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801, 815 [2003], cert denied 540 US 1017 [2003]; Matter of Jones v Amicone, 27 AD3d 465, 469 [2006]).

A declaratory judgment claim that could be brought as contract reformation is subject to the six-year limitations period for reformation.

Akhunov v. 771620 Equities Corp. · filed 2010-11-16(6)

Here, the cause of action for declaratory relief could have been brought as a cause of action for reformation of a contract, which carries a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [6]). Since the cause of action for declaratory relief was commenced more than six years after the date upon which a cause of action for reformation of the parties’ contract would have accrued (see Taintor v Taintor, 50 AD3d 887, 888 [2008]), the declaratory judgment cause of action is time-barred (see Tornheim v Tornheim, 67 AD3d at 777).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for a declaratory judgment action based on a breach of contract.

Arkport Staff United v. Arkport Central School District · filed 2010-12-30(2)

The statute of limitations “applicable to a declaratory judgment action depends upon the nature of the substance of the underlying claim . . . Since the plaintiffs’ underlying claim is an action on the contract,” i.e., the CBA, CPLR 213 (2) applies (Aloi, 81 AD2d at 875-876). The instant action was commenced within six years of the alleged breach of the CBA and thus is timely.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for declaratory judgment claims challenging the constitutionality or substance of a legislative enactment when an article 78 proceeding is unavailable.

South Liberty Partners, L.P. v. Town of Haverstraw · filed 2011-03-15(1)

Thus, the plaintiffs’ claims challenging these sections of the Code of the Town of Haverstraw are subject to the six-year statute of limitations period set forth in CPLR 213 (1) (see Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d at 229-230; American Ind. Paper Mills Supply Co., Inc. v County of Westchester, 16 AD3d 443 [2005]).

Section 213(1) generally gives declaratory judgment actions six years, but a more specific limitations period controls when one applies.

Dandomar Co. v. Town of Pleasant Valley Town Board · filed 2011-05-31(1)

Moreover, while declaratory judgment actions are normally governed by a six-year limitations period (see CPLR 213 [1]; Stein v Garfield Regency Condominium, 65 AD3d 1126 [2009]), the one-year period of Highway Law § 205 (2), as the more specific statute, controls (see Matter of Brusco v Braun, 84 NY2d at 681).

Section 213(1)'s six-year limitations period governs a declaratory judgment claim challenging agency regulations as inconsistent with a statute.

GREECE TOWN MALL, LP v. MULLEN, DENNIS M. · filed 2011-09-30(1)

That cause of action is governed by the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213 (1) (see Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229-230), and thus the court erred to the extent that it concluded that the first cause of action is time- barred.

CPLR 213 (1) gives a declaratory judgment action challenging regulations as inconsistent with a statute a six-year limitations period.

Greece Town Mall, LP v. Mullen · filed 2011-09-30(1)

That cause of action is governed by the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213 (1) (see Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229-230 [1980]), and thus the court erred to the extent that it concluded that the first cause of action is time-barred.

Section 213(1) generally gives declaratory judgment actions six years, but a shorter limitations period applies when the claim could have been brought in another form.

Kreamer v. Town of Oxford · filed 2012-01-19(1)

A six-year limitations period generally governs declaratory judgment actions (see CPLR 213 [1]), but it is well settled that if such a claim could have been properly made in another form, then the shorter limitations period applies; “ ‘the time for asserting the claim cannot be extended through the simple expedient of denominating the action one for declaratory relief ” (Matter of Town of Olive v City of New York, 63 AD3d 1416, 1418 [2009], quoting New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d 194, 201 [1994]; see Trager v Town of Clifton Park, 303 AD2d 875, 876 [2003]).

Section 213(1) gives a declaratory judgment action founded on the public trust doctrine a six-year limitations period.

Shapiro v. Town of Ramapo · filed 2012-08-22(1)

As the petitioners correctly contend, a declaratory judgment action is the proper vehicle for resolving the first cause of action, founded upon the public trust doctrine, and the cause of action is governed by the six-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 213 (1) (see Matter of Jones v Amicone, 27 AD3d 465, 469-470 [2006]; see generally Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229 [1980]; Matter of Dandomar Co., LLC v Town of Pleasant Val. Town Bd., 86 AD3d 83, 90-91 [2011]).

Section 213(1)’s six-year period does not apply to a declaratory judgment action that could have been brought through a proceeding with its own statutory limitations period.

Gress v. Brown · filed 2012-12-13(1)

If a declaratory judgment action could have been commenced by an alternative proceeding “for which a specific limitation period is statutorily provided, then that period” applies instead of CPLR 213 (l)’s six-year catchall provision (id. at 230).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for this declaratory judgment action concerning ownership of corporate shares.

Zwarycz v. Marnia Construction, Inc. · filed 2013-01-16(1)

Since the applicable statute of limitations is six years (see CPLR 213 [1]), this action, commenced in September 2009, is timely.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for a declaratory judgment action challenging a zoning ordinance.

Atlas Henrietta, LLC v. Town of Henrietta Zoning Board of Appeals · filed 2013-02-19(1)

Declaratory judgment actions are subject to the six-year limitations period contained in CPLR 213 (1).

Section 213(1) bars a declaratory challenge brought approximately 15 years after a discrete administrative determination; the determination does not create continuing harm that extends the limitations period.

Mary K. v. Levy · filed 2013-08-21(1)

Even if the Board’s determination requiring the plaintiff to register under SORA could be challenged in an action for declaratory relief, the second and third causes of action are untimely, as they were asserted approximately 15 years after the challenged determination was rendered (see CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(1) generally provides a six-year limitations period for declaratory judgment actions, but the period depends on whether the underlying claim could have been brought in another form.

Thrun v. Cuomo · filed 2013-12-05(1)

Although declaratory judgment actions are typically governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]), “a court must look to the underlying claim and the nature of the relief sought and determine whether such claim could have been properly made in another form” (Matter of Capital Dist. Regional Off-Track Betting Corp. v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 97 AD3d 1044, 1045 [2012]; see Gress v Brown, 20 NY3d 957, 959 [2012]; Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 231 [1980]; Spinney at Pond View, LLC v Town Bd. of the Town of Schodack, 99 AD3d 1088, 1088-1089 [2012]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for declaratory judgment actions, but a shorter period applies when the claim could have been brought in another form.

BRISTOL HOMEOWNERS ENVIRONMENTAL PR v. TOWN OF SOUTH BRISTOL · filed 2014-11-14(1)

Although a six-year limitations period governs declaratory judgment actions (see CPLR 213 [1]), it is well settled that if such claim could have been brought in another form, then the shorter limitations period applies (see Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229-230).

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year limitations period for a declaratory judgment action when no other proceeding with a specific statutory limitations period can resolve the claim.

Town of Hempstead v. AJM Capital II, LLC · filed 2015-07-01(1)

The instant action could not have been brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (see CPLR 7803), or as any other form of proceeding for which a specific limitations period is provided. Therefore, the six-year limitations period is applicable (see CPLR 213 [1]; Town of Huntington v County of Suffolk, 79 AD3d 207, 216-217 [2010]; Stein v Garfield Regency Condominium, 65 AD3d 1126, 1127-1128 [2009]).

Section 213(1) generally gives an action for a declaratory judgment a six-year limitations period.

Matter of Kassab v. Kasab · filed 2016-03-23(1)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly determined that the seventh cause of action, which sought declaratory relief, was time-barred. “An action for a declaratory judgment is generally governed by a six-year limitations period” (Town of Hempstead v AJM Capital II, LLC, 130 AD3d 607, 608 [2015]; see CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(1)’s six-year limitations period applies to a declaratory action challenging the constitutionality of a village code provision.

Westhampton Beach Associates, LLC v. Incorporated Village of Westhampton Beach · filed 2017-06-07(1)

Thus, contrary to the Village defendants’ contention, the residual six-year statute of limitations {see CPLR 213 [1]), ... is applicable to the cause of action for declaratory relief.

Section 213(1) generally provides six years for a declaratory judgment action, but a shorter limitations period applies when the claims could have been brought in another proceeding with a specific deadline.

Save the View Now Ex Rel. Guterman v. Brooklyn Bridge Park Corp. · filed 2017-12-27(1)

An action for a declaratory judgment is generally governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]). However, where a declaratory judgment action involves claims that could have been made in another proceeding for which a specific limitation period is provided, the action is subject to the shorter limitations period (see Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229-230 [1980]; Town of Hempstead v AJM Capital II, LLC, 130 AD3d 607, 608 [2015]).

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year limitations period for declaratory claims when no more specific limitations period governs.

Village of Islandia v. County of Suffolk · filed 2018-06-06(1)

Accordingly, since the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR 213(1) applies, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination denying those branches of the defendants' motion which were to dismiss the plaintiff's remaining causes of action as time-barred.

Section 213(1) ordinarily gives declaratory judgment actions six years, but the limitation period for another available form of proceeding governs when that form could have resolved the underlying claim.

Lakeview Outlets Inc. v. Town of Malta · filed 2018-11-29(1)

"Although declaratory judgment actions are typically governed by a six-year statute of limitations, a court must look to the underlying claim and the nature of the relief sought and determine whether such claim could have been properly made in another form" ( Thrun v Cuomo , 112 AD3d 1038, 1040 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 22 NY3d 865 [2014]; see CPLR 213 [1]; Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. , 8 NY3d 186, 194 [2007]; Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany , 70 NY2d 193, 202 [1987]). ... Having determined that plaintiff's claims are subject to a four-month statute of limitations, we have no trouble concluding that they are time-barred.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for declaratory judgment claims when the parties' rights could not have been resolved in an article 78 proceeding.

Matter of Grocholski Cady Rd., LLC v. Smith · filed 2019-03-15(1)

Thus, because an article 78 proceeding was not a "proper vehicle" for plaintiff's private claims for declaratory relief against defendant , the four-month "limitations period set forth in CPLR 217 [1] is not applicable to [such claims] and the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) applies instead" (East Suffolk Dev. Corp. v Town Bd. of Town of Riverhead, 59 AD3d 661, 662 [2d Dept 2009]; see Kamhi v Town of Yorktown, 141 AD2d 607, 609 [2d Dept 1988], affd 74 NY2d 423 [1989]; Lacks, 201 AD2d at 311).

Section 213(1)'s six-year period for declaratory judgment actions gives way when the underlying dispute could have been brought in a proceeding with a shorter limitations period.

Doyle v. Goodnow Flow Assn., Inc. · filed 2021-04-29(1)

In contrast to the six-year statute of limitations for declaratory judgment actions ( see CPLR 213 [1]), CPLR article 78 proceedings must be commenced within four months after a challenged determination becomes final and binding ( see CPLR 217 [1]; Matter of School Adm'rs Assn. of N.Y. v New York State Dept. of Civ. Serv. , 124 AD3d 1174, 1176 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 904 [2015]; Matter of Town of Olive v City of New York , 63 AD3d at 1418).

CPLR 213(1) gives a declaratory action over school district boundary lines a six-year limitations period.

Castaldi v. Syosset Cent. Sch. Dist. · filed 2022-03-02(1)

The Supreme Court also properly denied the Oyster Bay District's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the action was time-barred, since this action was governed by the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213(1), rather than the four-month statute of limitations applicable to proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78 ( see Village of Islandia v County of Suffolk , 162 AD3d 715, 717).

Section 213 gives breach of contract claims a six-year limitations period, which cannot be avoided by seeking declaratory judgment on the same claim.

GB Lodging, LLC v. Rodriguez · filed 2022-03-18

New York’s statute of limitations for breach of contract actions is six years. ... Plaintiffs cannot circumvent the statute of limitations by bringing their claims as an action for declaratory judgment.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for declaratory judgment claims unless a specific statutory limitations period applies.

Mandour v. Rafalsky · filed 2024-04-01(1)

The CPLR does not prescribe a specific statute of limitations for a declaratory judgment claim. Ordinarily, the catch-all six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213 (1) applies unless "the rights of parties sought to be stabilized in a declaratory judgment action are, or have been, open to resolution through a particular procedural route for which a specific limitation period is statutorily provided." (Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of the City of El Paso, Tex., 87 NY2d 36, 41 [1995] [citation omitted].) Therefore, "[...]." (Id. at 40 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].) An attorney is not prohibited from contracting with a client on matters unrelated to the provision of legal services.

Section 213(1) generally gives declaratory judgment actions six years, but a shorter limitations period applies when the claim could have been brought in a proceeding governed by that shorter period.

Morton v. New York City Bd. of Educ. Retirement Sys. · filed 2024-07-17(1)

'An action for a declaratory judgment is generally governed by a six-year statute of limitations'" ( id. at 779, quoting Save the View Now v Brooklyn Bridge Park Corp. , 156 AD3d 928, 931; see CPLR 213[1]). "'However, where a declaratory judgment [or other] action involves claims that could have been made in another proceeding for which a specific limitation period is provided, the action is subject to the shorter limitations period'" ( Kogut v Village of Chestnut Ridge , 214 AD3d at 779, quoting Save the View Now v Brooklyn Bridge Park Corp. , 156 AD3d at 931).

Section 213(1)'s six-year period for declaratory judgment actions yields when the underlying dispute could be brought in a proceeding with a shorter limitations period.

Grossbarth v. New York State Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection · filed 2024-10-17(1)

"Although declaratory judgment actions are typically governed by a six-year statute of limitations, if the underlying dispute could have been resolved through an action or proceeding for which a specific, shorter limitations period governs, then such shorter period must be applied" ( Doyle v Goodnow Flow Assn., Inc. , 193 AD3d 1309, 1310 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 37 NY3d 911 [2021]; see CPLR 213 [1]; accord Smith v State of New York , 201 AD3d 1225, 1227 [3d Dept 2022]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for a declaratory judgment action seeking prospective relief against allegedly unlawful state expenditures.

Cannabis Impact Prevention Coalition, LLC v. New York State Cannabis Control Bd. · filed 2025-02-21(1)

Rather, the statute of limitations for this declaratory judgment action is six (6) years (See CPLR § 213 (1); see Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki , supra. at 815).

A declaratory judgment action generally has a six-year limitations period, but a shorter period applies if the claims could have been brought in a proceeding governed by that period.

Kinsella v. Long Is. Power Auth. · filed 2025-03-12(1)

An action for a declaratory judgment is generally governed by a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[1]). However, where a declaratory judgment action involves "claims that could have been made in another proceeding for which a specific limitation period is provided, the action is subject to the shorter limitations period" ( Save the View Now v Brooklyn Bridge Park Corp. , 156 AD3d 928, 931; see P & N Tiffany Props., Inc. v Village of Tuckahoe , 33 AD3d 61, 63).

Section 213(1)'s six-year period for declaratory actions gives way when the underlying dispute is subject to a shorter limitations period.

Arrigo v. DiNapoli · filed 2025-05-15(1)

"Although declaratory judgment actions are typically governed by a six-year statute of limitations, if the underlying dispute could have been resolved through an action or proceeding for which a specific, shorter limitations period governs, then such shorter period must be applied" ( Spinney at Pond View, LLC v Town Bd. of the Town of Schodack , 99 AD3d 1088, 1088-1089 [3d Dept 2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see CPLR 213 [1]; Smith v State of New York , 201 AD3d 1225, 1227 [3d Dept 2022]).

Section 213(1) ordinarily gives declaratory judgment claims a six-year limitations period unless a specific limitations period applies to the underlying claim.

Gammon Collection Inc. v. Athena Art Fin. Corp. · filed 2025-06-02(1)

Ordinarily, the catch-all six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213 (1) applies unless “the rights of parties sought to be stabilized in a declaratory judgment action are, or have been, open to resolution through a particular procedural route for which a specific limitation period is statutorily provided.”

Section 213(1)'s six-year limitation does not automatically apply to a declaratory judgment action when a specific statutory limitation period governs the underlying dispute.

Matter of North E. Expansion Dev., Corp. v. Assessor, Vil. of Cambridge · filed 2025-07-17(1)

To the extent petitioner is arguing on appeal that this proceeding is governed by the six-year statute of limitations as it is seeking a declaratory judgment, declaratory judgment actions are not all "automatically or necessarily" governed by "the six-year catch-all limitation [*2]of CPLR 213 (1)" ( Solnick v Whalen , 49 NY2d 224, 229 [1980]).

Section 213(1) generally gives a plaintiff six years from accrual to bring an action for a declaratory judgment.

Weaver v. Krakoviak · filed 2026-02-18(1)

"An action for a declaratory judgment is generally governed by a six-year statute of limitations and is time-barred if commenced more than six years after it accrues" ( Trump Vil. Section 4, Inc. v Young , 217 AD3d 711, 714 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 213[1]). Here, the third cause of action accrued when the subject mortgage was recorded on September 10, 2008. Since this action was not commenced until 2022, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the third cause of action was time-barred insofar as asserted against each of them ( see generally Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Green , 227 AD3d 842, 843; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Parker , 180 AD3d 1026, 1029).

CPLR 213(1)'s six-year period for a declaratory ownership claim begins when the claimant receives definitive notice repudiating the claimed interest.

Cinquemani v. Money Source, Inc. · filed 2026-04-08(1)

The applicable six-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until the plaintiff received definitive notice repudiating his interest in the defendant (see Mehdizadeh v Mehbisar, Inc., 173 AD3d 851, 852; Wasay v Alvi, 148 AD3d 1089, 1090). The defendant failed to establish that it definitively repudiated the plaintiff's alleged interest in it prior to 2017—six years before the commencement of this action (see CPLR 213[1]; Lurie v Lurie, 226 AD3d 997, 999; Zwarycz v Marnia Constr., Inc., 102 AD3d at 776).

Section 213(1) sets the limitations period for a declaratory relief claim challenging a water board’s general authority to set rates.

Matter of Town of Carmel v. New York City Water Bd. · filed 2026-06-10(1)

To the extent that the first cause of action sought declaratory relief, that claim is untimely ( see CPLR 213[1]; Morton v New York City Bd. of Educ. Retirement Sys. , 229 AD3d 619, 620).

Section 213(1)’s six-year period does not govern a declaratory judgment action when a more specific limitations period applies to the underlying dispute.

459 West 43rd Street Corp. v. New York State Division of Housing & Community Renewal · filed 1989-07-27(1)

Supreme Court denied appellant’s motion, finding that the action was governed by the six-year period of limitation applicable to declaratory judgment actions (CPLR 213 [1]). This ruling was erroneous and contrary to the holdings in Press v County of Monroe (50 NY2d 695 [1980]) and Solnick v Whalen (49 NY2d 224 [1980]).

Section 213(1)'s catch-all limitation period does not govern a declaratory judgment action when a specific statutory limitation period governs the underlying claim.

Vigilant Insurance Co. of America v. Housing Authority of El Paso · filed 1994-07-21(1)

In that event there is a limitation specifically prescribed by law and the catch-all provision of CPLR 213 (subd 1) is not applicable. ... While plaintiffs remain within the Statute of Limitations for an action on the bearer bonds and, therefore, can maintain a declaratory judgment action seeking to have their rights adjudicated at this time, claims they possess with respect to interest payments dating from 1983 may not be viable.

Section 213(1)'s six-year period does not govern a declaratory judgment claim that is reviewable as an article 78 proceeding subject to a shorter limitations period.

Aubin v. State · filed 2000-06-30(1)

The next issue the court will address is whether: (1) the 60-day Statute of Limitations applicable to article 78 proceedings against the respondent Adirondack Park Agency (Executive Law § 818); or (2) the four-month Statute of Limitations applicable to article 78 proceedings generally (CPLR 217); or (3) the six-year Statute of Limitations for CPLR article 30 declaratory judgment actions (CPLR 213 [1]) should be invoked and applied relative to the summons, notice of petition and complaint-petition, and the amended summons, amended notice of petition, and amended complaint-petition filed herein. ... This court holds and determines that all of the article 78 causes of action should be governed by the 60-day Statute of Limitations created by Executive Law § 818 because the Adirondack Park Agency was clearly the lead State agency in the administrative approval of this land acquisition.

Section 213(1)'s six-year limitation does not bar enforcement of a continuing spousal support obligation.

Campas v. Campas · filed 1969-10-20(1)

If the Commissioner of Social 'Services were attempting to recover a money judgment for the costs of public assistance supplied to the petitioner pursuant to section 104 of the Social Services Law, the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd. 1) would undoubtedly apply (Trussell v. Kostiw, supra, p. 62). The liability here sought to be enforced is a continuing liability and the wife’s right to be supported by her husband m’ay not be contracted away nor waived by her nor prejudiced regardless of how long she waits before asserting it (General Obligations Law, § 5-311; McMains v. McMains, supra, p. 288).

Section 213’s six-year limit does not bar an application for judgment on support arrears when the underlying support proceeding was already commenced.

Arlene W. v. Robert W. · filed 1972-07-20

Respondent’s contention that the application is barred by the six-year period of limitation contained in CPLR 213 is without merit. ... Under the foregoing requirements, the Statute of Limitations has no applicability to petitioner’s present request for judgment. The “action” in which petitioner’s rights and respondent’s obligations were judicially determined was “commenced” in 1955 when she brought the proceeding in Children’s Court.

Section 213’s six-year period does not govern arrears under a court order for support; those arrears are judgment debts subject to a twenty-year period.

In re the Estate of Haggart · filed 1972-09-07

A separation agreement being a contract, the courts very wisely applied the six-year Statute of Limitations. ... The effect of a provision of a court order for support is to fix the obligation of a husband for the support of his wife and children and this constitutes a judgment debt. It is, therefore, the opinion of this court that the 20-year statute applies, and the claimant may present evidence as to her proof of claim from May 3, 1952 until the decedent died on June 27, 1965.

Section 213(2) permits damages for breaches of a continuing contractual obligation that occurred within six years before the action commenced.

Makarchuk v. Makarchuk · filed 2009-02-06(2)

Contrary to the further contention of defendant, this action is not time-barred. Plaintiff is seeking to enforce a continuing obligation under a contract, and she therefore may seek damages for those breaches that have occurred within the six years prior to the commencement of the action (see CPLR 213 [2]; see generally Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596, 598 [1985]; Matter of Volpe v Volpe, 16 AD3d 1176, 1178 [2005]).

Section 213(2) bars claims for contract breaches that accrued more than six years before the action began, even when later breaches of the same continuing duty remain actionable.

Westchester County Correction Officers Benevolent Ass'n v. County of Westchester · filed 2009-09-22(2)

While a new breach occurred for statute of limitations purposes each time that the County failed to make an allegedly required payment to Papp and Parker (see CSEA Empl. Benefit Fund v Warwick Val. Cent. School Dist., 36 AD3d at 584), so much of the causes of action asserted by Papp and Parker as accrued more than six years prior to the commencement of the instant action must be dismissed as time-barred (see State of New York v CSRI Ltd. Partnership, 289 AD2d 394, 395 [2001]; Scheg v Agway, Inc., 229 AD2d 963 [1996]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period, and a reimbursement claim against a guarantor accrues when the guarantor pays the lender.

State v. Sferrazza · filed 1981-11-19(2)

Turning to the substantive issue, we restate our position that a cause of action for reimbursement accrues upon payment by the guarantor (State of New York Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v Robbins, 76 AD2d 951). ... Accordingly, since plaintiff paid the lender on April 17,1974, thereby invoking the six-year Statute of Limitations, its action commenced on September 27, 1979 was timely.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for an ordinary breach-of-contract claim.

Dack v. Shanman · filed 1964-02-07(2)

Regardless of the statute of limitations applicable as between plaintiffs and defendant Tager, the cross-complaint states an ordinary cause of action for breach of contract to which the New York six-year statute of limitations (C.P.A. §48(1); CPLR § 213 (2)) applies.

Section 213’s six-year limitation period runs from the breach when an agreement creates a single liability rather than a continuing duty to make periodic payments.

Jones v. Jones · filed 1965-06-29

There was only one liability under this agreement and only one breach. The statute began to run from the time of the breach. There was no continuing duty to make any periodic payments.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for express or implied breach of warranty claims that accrued before the Uniform Commercial Code took effect.

Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. · filed 1967-08-04(1)

Therefore, the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd. 1) applies here to a breach of warranty, express or implied.

Section 213 sets a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract actions.

Lewis v. Lewis · filed 1969-04-10

The period within which an action for breach of contract must be brought is six years. (CPLR 213.)

Section 213(2) gives a breach-of-contract claim six years from the breach; absent fraud, later discovery does not extend the period.

French Evangelical Church v. Borst · filed 1965-03-04(2)

As the complaint charges breaches of contract, the six-year Statute of Limitations applies (CPLR 213, subd. 2). As to the first cause of action, suit is well within this period and the claim that suit is barred is without foundation. It is otherwise as to the second cause of action. There the breach occurred in 1953. ... As no question or claim of fraud is involved, the date of plaintiff’s discovery of the prior liens has no legal significance.

Section 213(2) gives six years to bring a contract warranty claim, measured from completion of the contract rather than discovery of the breach.

Cecala v. Title Guarantee Co. · filed 1965-04-19(2)

The “third” cause of action, which alleges a breach of express warranty based on the first abstract of title, dated March 9, 1956, is barred by the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd. 2) since the cause of action set forth therein was not commenced within six years from the date (March 9,1956) the cause of action accrued. ... It appears clear that the Statute of Limitations commences upon the completion of a contract, and not upon discovery of the alleged breach of a contract.

Section 213(2) supplies the analogous six-year limitations period for a seaman’s maintenance-and-cure claim based on an implied contractual obligation.

Izquierdo v. Cities Service Oil Co. (Pa.) · filed 1965-07-16(2)

The claim for maintenance and cure is based on an implied “contractual obligation arising out of the nature of the employment.” ... The analogous stat-o ute of limitation therefore is CPLR § 213 par. 2. Accordingly that claim is not barred and would save the unseaworthiness claim even if the latter were asserted beyond the limitation period.

Section 213(2)'s six-year period applies to a contract claim when the contract imposes a duty beyond ordinary care; a claim based only on ordinary negligence is subject to the three-year property damage period.

D'Amico v. D. W. Winkelman Co. · filed 1966-06-22(2)

If the contractual obligations here add nothing to defendant’s ordinary common-law duty of due care, then the three-year statute will govern; if a greater duty is imposed as a result of the contract, then, the six-year statute will be applied, even though the breach of that duty may rest upon a tortious act. ... Here the express language of the contract between the State and Winkelman clearly indicated that no independent, separate, unqualified or greater duty was imposed on defendant creating a right of action beyond the existing one for ordinary negligence.

Section 213’s six-year limitations period applies to a contract claim against a lawyer for a title examination.

Fladerer v. Needleman · filed 1968-07-22

It is clear enough that third-party plaintiff’s standard causes of action, in contract and in negligence-malpractice against her lawyer, the third-party defendant, are barred by the six-year and the three-year Statutes of Limitation, respectively (CPLB. 213, 214); and that she can succeed only if she can demonstrate an implied agreement of indemnity subsisting between the lawyer and herself.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period for contractual obligations does not apply when the essence of the claim is negligence causing property damage.

Alyssa Originals, Inc. v. Finkelstein · filed 1964-10-26(2)

Its position, however, is that the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd. 2), relating to actions “upon a contractual obligation or liability express or implied,” is applicable. With this contention we disagree. ... Accordingly, we hold that the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd. 4), governing actions “to recover damages for an injury to property ”, is applicable; and that the defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on that ground should have been granted.

Section 213’s six-year limitations period for breach of warranty of quality and fitness begins at the time of sale.

Munn v. Security Controls, Inc. · filed 1965-04-08

Appellant moved to dismiss the second cause upon the ground, among others, that it was barred by the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213). It was error to deny the motion. A cause of action for breach of warranty of quality and fitness accrues at the time of sale and may not be “stretched by implication into a specific promise enforcible ” at some future date beyond the period of six years.

Section 213(2)'s six-year limitations period governs an indemnity claim based on quasi-contract principles.

Hansen v. City of New York · filed 1964-09-09(2)

The action for indemnity is based upon principles of a quasi contract and is governed by the six-year period of limitations (see Rieger v. Frankstram Realties, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 243; CPLR 213, subd. 2) as distinguished from the “ action to recover damages for a personal injury”.

Section 213's six-year contract limitations period gives an insured six years from the accident to demand arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim against MVAIC.

In Re the Arbitration Between De Luca & Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. · filed 1966-02-24

In sum, then, the contract Statute of Limitations applies and, in a case such as the present, the insured person has six years from the date of the accident within which to demand arbitration of his claim against MVAIC.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract claims.

Bethlehem Fabricators, Inc. v. British Overseas Airways Corporation · filed 1970-11-25(2)

Second, since we find that recovery is based upon a contract between the parties, the period of limitation is six years rather than three. New York CPLR § 213(2).

Section 213(2)'s six-year period for contract actions does not apply when the alleged contract creates no new duty and the claim sounds in tort.

Chapman v. Johnson · filed 1972-04-13(2)

The oral contract alleged by plaintiff does not establish any new duty incumbent on the defendant which would invoke the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to contract actions (CPLR 213, subd. 2).

CPLR 213(2) gives six years to bring a contract action against a collecting bank that pays out check proceeds on forged indorsements.

Forman v. First National Bank of Woodridge · filed 1971-02-24(2)

The second ground urged by the defendant is that the action is in contract and must be dismissed since it was not commenced within six years of its inception (CPLR 213, subd. 2). The defendant is correct in this contention.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitation period for actions based on express or implied contractual obligations, including these pre-Uniform Commercial Code auction claims.

Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. · filed 1971-11-05(2)

The applicable period of limitations for both actions is six years, as defined in CPLR 213 (subd. 2), which governs the instant lawsuits since the auctions occurred before the effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code and relates to an action based upon a contractual obligation express or implied. Accordingly, these actions are not barred by a statutory limitation.

Section 213’s six-year limitations period applies to a third-party claim based on breach of warranty.

Wegorzewski v. Macrose Lumber & Trim Co. · filed 1972-06-15

Accordingly, the six-year Statute of Limitations applies to the claim of the third-party plaintiff’s claim for breach of warranty against the third-party defendant, and since the sale and accident in question occurred more than 10 years prior to the service of summons in this third-party action, such third-party suit must be dismissed.

Section 213(2) requires a breach-of-contract claim to be brought within six years of the breach.

International Railways of Central America v. United Brands Co. · filed 1973-05-08(2)

Since the terminal date for breach of the main contract is held to be January 1, 1963, any actionable breach must have occurred before that date and within the applicable New York six-year statute of limitations. CPLR § 213(2).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to contract claims for unpaid royalties; the composer-publisher relationship does not, by itself, defer accrual until discovery.

Nolan v. Sam Fox Publishing Co. · filed 1974-07-08(2)

Because he treated this case as one for breach of contract, Chief Judge Edelstein applied a six-year statute of limitations so as to cut off all liability for any payments allegedly owed from before' 1957. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 213, subd. 2. Inasmuch as we discern no basis for disturbing the district court’s finding that there was no fraud, this statute of limitations applicable to actions in contract must therefore be the applicable statute unless we accept one of the other theories offered by the plaintiff Nolan to support his position that this six-year limitation provision should not be invoked here. ... Thus, exploitation of the copyright not being at issue here, the cases cited by Nolan are inapposite.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for an indemnity claim, which accrues when the judgment is actually paid.

Emil v. James Felt & Co. · filed 1974-06-04(2)

However, the complaint is based upon a cause of action sounding in indemnity and as such, is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (see Hansen v. City of New York, 43 Misc 2d 1048; Rieger v. Frankstram Realties, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 243; CPLR 213, subd. 2). Since the cause of action did not accrue until 1972 when actual payment of the judgment was made (Musco v. Conte, 22 A D 2d 121; Satta v. City of New York, 272 App. Div. 782), clearly, this action which was instituted in 1973 is not time-barred.

Section 213(2) bars an insurer’s subrogation claim when the insured’s own claim is time-barred.

Seven Sixty Travel, Inc. v. American Motorists Insurance · filed 1979-02-20(2)

Where, as here, the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 2)- has long since expired as to Travel’s action against the third-party defendants, it has also run against its insurer’s claim in subrogation.

For fraud, subsection 213(8) uses a six-year period from the fraud or two years from discovery, whichever is later, with discovery when the plaintiff could with reasonable diligence have found it.

Axelrod v. CBS PUBLICATIONS · filed 1982-05-27(8)

The applicable statute of limitations under New York law is six years from commission of the fraud or two years from discovery whichever is longer. ... The statutory limit for institution of suit under New York law is six years from date of the fraudulent act or two years from discovery of the fraud, whichever is later. ... We think that the test for timely knowledge under the doctrine of equitable estoppel is similar to that set forth with regard to fraud in CPLR § 213(8) — "could with reasonable diligence have discovered it."

Section 213(9)'s discovery accrual rule applies only to actions alleging actual fraud.

Zipperer v. Siegel · filed 1965-11-12(9)

But, inasmuch as they do not allege fraud in their complaint against the bank, plaintiffs gain no advantage from the discovery accrual rule just made specifically applicable only to actions for actual fraud (CPLR 213, subd. 9, as added by L. 1965, ch. 248, eff. Sept. 1, 1965; see, also, Guild v. Hopkins, 271 App. Div. 234; De Vito v. New York Cent. System, 22 A D 2d 600; 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prac., par. 206.02).

Section 213(9) measures the time to bring a fraud action from when the plaintiff discovered the fraud or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence.

Town Board of Fallsburgh v. National Surety Corp. · filed 1967-01-30(9)

Furthermore, under CPLB 213 (subd. 9) where an action is based upon fraud, the time within which the action must be commenced shall be computed from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom he claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it, and it is contended by movant that the fraud of defendants which induced plaintiff to become a party to the agreement of May 12,1960 was not discovered until long after that agreement was entered into. Although more specific information as to time of discovery would be helpful, in view of said contention, the date of the agreement and the six-year statutory period, it cannot be said, on this motion and at this stage, that the amended pleading is palpably insuEcient, immaterial or unnecessary.

Section 213(9) allows a fraud claim to accrue when the plaintiff discovered the fraud or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence.

Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg · filed 1970-01-20(9)

Plaintiff need not show affirmative acts of concealment by defendants; only that plaintiff remained in ignorance of the fraud without any fault or want of due diligence or care on his part. See Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F.Supp. 1174, 1187 n. 28 (S.D.N.Y.1969) ; C.P.L.R. § 213(9). Plaintiff’s allegations, if believed, suffice to gain for him the benefits of either this equitable tolling doctrine or this special accrual rule for at least the one month necessary to make his first cause of action timely.

Section 213(9) governs the timeliness of an action for fraud and deceit.

Skrine v. Staiman · filed 1968-06-24(9)

Further, the action was timely (CPLR 213, subd. 9).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period applies to a bankruptcy trustee’s fraudulent conveyance claim based on usurious payments, even when the debtor’s own claim to recover usurious interest is time barred.

Phillip J. McNellis Trustee of Donald S. Potter, Bankrupt, Individually and D/B/A Potter Real Estate Co. v. Raym · filed 1970-01-13(6)

The trustee contends that the trial judge applied the wrong statute of limitations, and that the proper period is the six years provided by CPLR 213(6) for actions based on fraud or mistake. ... We agree with appellant that a six-year limitation period is the appropriate one, and that the actions tied to the usury theory should not have been dismissed.

Section 213(6)'s six-year limitations period does not govern an action to recover payments on usurious loans.

McNellis v. Raymond · filed 1969-07-14(6)

The trustee’s claim that, as with the fraudulent conveyance cause of action,7 N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law §§ 273-276, 278 (McKinney 1945), and the six year statute of limitations carried with it pursuant to N.Y. CPLR § 213(6) (McKinney 1963), should control the instant usury cause of action, is rejected as contrary to the clear intent of the New York usury statutes pursuant to which the trustee’s instant cause of action is asserted.

Section 213(9), read with § 203(f), requires a fraud action within six years after accrual or two years after discovery, whichever is later.

Hoff Research & Development Laboratories, Inc. v. Philippine National Bank and Philippine National Bank, New York Agency · filed 1970-06-04(9)

Hoff Research, therefore, should have brought its fraud suit within either six years after its accrual or two years after its discovery. Since for present purposes the parties assume these dates to be 1962 and 1965, respectively, the 1969 action was barred.

Section 213(9), read with section 203(f), requires a fraud action to be brought within six years of the fraud or two years of actual or reasonably discoverable discovery, whichever is longer.

Rickel v. Levy · filed 1974-02-15(9)

These two sections taken together have been interpreted to mean that fraud actions must be commenced within six years from commission of the fraud or two years from discovery, whichever is longer. ... We therefore find that the plaintiff’s claims are barréd by the time limitations set forth in N.Y. CPLR § 213(9) and that summary judgment must be granted to the defendants dismissing the complaint.

Section 213(9)’s six-year period does not apply to claims that are essentially for malpractice rather than fraud.

Dobbins v. Clifford · filed 1972-04-19(9)

Plaintiff contends that insofar as they allege fraud, the applicable Statute of Limitations is six years. (CPLR 213, subd. 9.) However, the causes of action are essentially for malpractice and not fraud and, therefore, are bound by the malpractice Statute of Limitations.

Section 213 supplies a six-year limitation period for a Rule 10b-5 private damages action when money damages would make the plaintiff whole.

Gilbert v. Meyer · filed 1973-06-28

Since this Court has already demonstrated that money damages will suffice to render plaintiff whole if he were to' succeed on the merits of this action, this case falls squarely within the holding of the Second Circuit in Klein v. Bower, supra, and, thus, plaintiff’s 10b-5 private damage action is barred by the six-year limitation period in N.Y. C.P. L.R. § 213.

Section 213(9)'s fraud discovery rule does not establish notice of an earlier misrepresentation as a matter of law merely because the plaintiff learned of later financial trouble.

Friedlander v. Feinberg · filed 1974-01-22(9)

Even though this action is premised upon defendants’ alleged misstatements in the 1959 prospectus regarding the financial condition of the Zeckendorf companies at that time, it requires an inferential leap which this Court is not prepared to make at this time to hold that as a matter of law knowledge in 1963-65 of the poor financial condition of the Zeckendorf companies during that period is sufficient knowledge to have put Mr. Cohen on notice that the financial condition of the Zeckendorf companies as of 1959-60 was misrepresented in the prospectus.

Section 213(8) bars a fraud-in-the-inducement defense and counterclaim when the defendant had information about the alleged fraud at the time of the agreement and raised the claim too late.

Alexandre v. Davis · filed 1976-01-19(8)

Moreover, in the light of the information in defendant’s possession at the time the agreement was signed, his first affirmative defense and counterclaim, sounding in fraud in the inducement, is time-barred (CPLR 213, subd 8; Nusbaum v Nusbaum, 280 App Div 315, supra).

Section 213(8) imposes a six-year limitations period for fraud claims.

Quinn v. Hoover & Strong, Inc. · filed 1983-09-23(8)

The alleged fraudulent acts were committed in 1946, and the six-year limitations period has long expired (CPLR 213, subd 8); the facts were discovered in 1977, and the two-year period computed from such discovery expired in 1979 (CPLR 203, subd [f]).

For an action based on fraud, whether the plaintiff could with reasonable diligence have discovered the fraud is a question for the trier of fact when earlier knowledge is not conclusively established.

Maharam v. Maharam · filed 1986-12-30(8)

Where, as here, it does not conclusively appear that the plaintiff had knowledge of facts from which fraud could reasonably be inferred, the complaint should not be dismissed, and the question of when plaintiff "could with reasonable diligence have discovered [the fraud]” (CPLR 213 [8]) should be left for the trier of fact.

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for actions based on fraud.

Moll v. US Life Title Ins. Co. of New York · filed 1987-02-17(8)

In so doing, this Court first rejects § 213(8), governing actions based upon fraud — the provision proposed by plaintiffs — for reasons identical to those denoted by the Third Circuit in Malley-Duff, supra, 792 F.2d at 351.

Subsection 213(8) imposes a six-year limitations period for actions sounding in fraudulent conveyance of real property.

Modin Associates Inc. v. City of New York · filed 1988-01-11(8)

Since the action can best be characterized as one sounding in the fraudulent conveyance of real property, the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (8) applies.

Subsection 213(8) gives fraud claims six years from the alleged misrepresentations, subject to the later two-year discovery period in CPLR 203(f).

Bassile v. Covenant House · filed 1991-08-12(8)

Fraud claims must be brought within six years of the alleged misrepresentations (CPLR 213 [8]), or two years after the injured party learned of the fraud (CPLR 203 [f]), whichever is later.

For fraud claims, CPLR 213(8) applies a six-year limitation period and requires dismissal when the plaintiff could have discovered the fraud more than two years before suit.

Rosen v. Morben Properties, Inc. · filed 1996-01-16(8)

Assuming that a valid personal cause of action was stated, the claim referred to representations made in 1972, some 19 years before this action was commenced, and was clearly untimely (see, CPLR 213 [8]; Quadrozzi Concrete Corp. v Mastroianni, 56 AD2d 353).

Section 213(8) applies a six-year limitations period to fraud claims, with the discovery date relevant to whether the claim is timely.

National States Electric Corp. v. City of New York · filed 1996-03-25(8)

However, even assuming, arguendo, that the counterclaim may be properly characterized as one sounding in fraud, a question of fact exists as to the date that the City did or should have discovered the alleged fraud (see, CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213(8) gives constructive fraudulent conveyance claims a six-year limitations period that begins when the conveyance occurs.

Bobash, Inc. v. Festinger · filed 2008-12-02(8)

A cause of action based on constructive fraud in New York is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [8]), and such a cause of action arises at the time the fraudulent conveyance occurs (see Ehrler v Cataffo, 42 AD3d 424 [2007]; Island Holding v O’Brien, 6 AD3d 498, 500 [2004]; Wall St. Assoc. v Brodsky, 257 AD2d 526, 530 [1999]).

Section 213(8) can bar a proposed claim to set aside a fraudulent conveyance as untimely.

Home v. Jelks · filed 2009-04-07(8)

Moreover, Green Tree demonstrated that the cause of action sought by the plaintiff in the proposed amendment to the complaint is time-barred (see CPLR 213 [8]; Bobash, Inc. v Festinger, 57 AD3d 464 [2008]; Ehrler v Cataffo, 42 AD3d 424, 425 [2007]; Island Holding v O’Brien, 6 AD3d 498, 500 [2004]).

Section 213(1) gives constructive fraudulent conveyance claims a six-year limitations period that begins when the conveyance is made.

Citicorp Trust Bank v. Makkas · filed 2009-11-24(1)

Constructive fraud claims predicated upon Debtor and Creditor Law §§ 273 and 273-a, are governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1), and arise at the time that the alleged fraudulent conveyance is made (see Ehrler v Cataffo, 42 AD3d 424, 425 [2007]; Metzger v Yuenger Woodworking Corp., 33 AD3d 678, 679 [2006]; Wall St. Assoc. v Brodsky, 257 AD2d 526, 530 [1999]).

Section 213(8) imposes a six-year limitations period on claims of fraud and fraudulent conveyance.

Martinez v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2016-04-04(8)

Claims of fraud and fraudulent conveyance are subject to a six-year statute of limitations. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8). All of Martinez’s state law claims are time-barred, as Martinez expressly concedes in her Opposition.

Section 213 gives fraudulent conveyance claims six years from the alleged conveyance.

Acacia Invs., B.S.C.(C) v. West End Equity I, Ltd. · filed 2020-02-18

The statute of limitations for fraudulent conveyance claims is the later of (1) six years from the alleged fraudulent conveyance or (2) years from inquiry notice of the alleged fraudulent conveyance (CPLR 213; CPLR 203[g]; Avalon LLC v Coronet Props. Co. , 306 AD2d 62 [1st Dept 2003]).

Section 213(1) gives a constructive fraudulent conveyance claim six years from the fraud or conveyance to be brought.

Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP v. Marcus & Cinelli LLP · filed 2024-05-14(1)

We reject the argument by Marcus and the firm that the fraudulent conveyance claims are time-barred. A claim for constructive fraud is governed by a six-year statute of limitations, and arises at the time the fraud or conveyance occurs (CPLR 213[1]; see Jaliman v D.H. Blair & Co., Inc., 105 AD3d 646, 647 [1st Dept 2013]).

Section 213(1)'s six-year limitations period bars untimely fraudulent conveyance claims unless they relate back to earlier claims.

G & Y Maintenance Corp. v. 540 W. 48th St. Corp. · filed 2025-01-30(1)

Neither party disputes that those claims are barred by the six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213[1]) unless the relation-back doctrine applies ( see Wall St. Assoc. v Brodsk y, 257 AD2d 526, 530 [1st Dept 1999]). We reject plaintiff's argument that it satisfied the requirements of the relation-back doctrine under CPLR 203(c) ( see Buran v Coupal , 87 NY2d 173, 178 [1995]).

Section 213(1) sets a six-year period for enforcing a lien when no specific limitations period applies, including enforcement of state income-tax liens.

In re Lacaille · filed 1964-10-21(1)

Section 53 of the Civil Practice Act is thus made applicable to the State, and it is the governing provision herein, since there is no specific Statute of Limitations relating to the enforcement of liens. As has been noted hereinbefore (when I was considering the matter of the Statute of Limitations as to the claim of the respondent Master) that section allowed 10 years within which to commence an action to enforce the lien, and, as also heretofore pointed out, the time limit is now six years (CPLR 213, subd. 1). The Statute of Limitations has thus run on the first three of the State’s tax liens.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitation period for an injunction action when no other period is prescribed by law.

State v. New York Movers Tariff Bureau, Inc. · filed 1965-10-14(1)

And the six-year limitation contained in CPLB 213 (subd. 1) is the successor of the 10-year limitation contained in section 53 of the Civil Practice Act (governing suits where no other period is specifically prescribed by law) and it is applicable to an action for an injunction (People v. Minuse, 273 App. Div. 457, 458; Capita v. Port Washington Yacht Club, 11 Misc 2d 987).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period does not govern an action to establish a present interest in real property created by a grant.

Yager Pontiac, Inc. v. Fred A. Danker & Sons, Inc. · filed 1972-01-24

The court having determined that the letter of December 31, 1948 was a grant of a present interest in real property, this action is not governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213), as alleged by the defendants.

Section 213’s six-year limitation does not apply to an action to recover a chattel because CPLR 214 provides the applicable limitation.

Kean v. Harkness · filed 1972-02-15

The original first cause is barred by the Statute of Limitations as one to recover a chattel (CPLR 214); plaintiff’s ingenious claim that the papers sued for are not property, being without value, and ... that, therefore, a six-year limitation applies (“where not otherwise provided for ” [CPLR 213]), will not hold water.

Section 213’s six-year limitation for actions not otherwise provided for does not apply to an action to recover a chattel, which is governed by CPLR 214.

Kean v. Harkness · filed 1972-04-06

The original first cause is barred by the Statute of Limitations as one to recover a chattel (CPLR 214), plaintiff’s ingenious claim that the papers sued for are not property, being without value, and that, therefore, a six-year limitation applies (“where not otherwise provided for” [CPLR 213]), will not hold water.

Section 213(1) governs the time to seek apportionment of liability; that time had not expired after the underlying trial and appeal.

Caucci v. Fesko · filed 1973-07-30(1)

We need not be concerned with the question of retroactivity (cf. Welborn v. De Leonardis, N. Y. L. J., July 6, 1972, p. 2 col. 4), the time to obtain apportionment has not expired (CPLR 213, subd. 1), and the apportionment principles apply to cases in the normal appellate process even where the judgment antedates Dow (Liebman v. County of Westchester, 71 Misc 2d 997, 1001, revd. on other grounds 41 A D 2d 756).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period for this claim against a decedent’s estate began when letters testamentary were issued to the executrix.

In re the Estate of Cudahy · filed 1966-03-25

The court holds, therefore, that the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to this claim began to run on the date of issuance of letters testamentary to the petitioner on September 27, 1965.

Section 213(1) sets a six-year limitations period for a distributee’s proceeding to compel an estate administrator to account.

In re the Estate of Cirello · filed 1966-07-13(1)

The 10-year Statute of Limitations applied to the right of a distributee to maintain a proceeding in the Surrogate’s Court against an administrator for an accounting ... which was shortened to six years by CPLR 213 (subd. 1), added from section 53 of the Civil Practice Act without change of substance.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for compelling a fiduciary accounting; the period begins only when the fiduciary clearly repudiates the obligation and makes that repudiation known to the beneficiaries.

In re the Estate of Barabash · filed 1972-07-06(1)

If a repudiation is found, the governing Statute of Limitations is six years (CPLR 213, subd. 1). ... We conclude, therefore that the Statute of Limitations never commenced to run and that that defense is unavailable to the respondent.

Section 213(1)’s residual limitations period covers a constructive-trust claim based on a confidential relationship, even if the pleading includes unnecessary allegations of actual fraud.

Rickerman v. Rickerman · filed 1970-06-30(1)

However, the action brought is not based on actual fraud but rather seeks to impose a constructive trust to prevent unjust enrichment under cover of a confidential relationship. ... Thus the trial court correctly determined that the ten-year residual Statute of Limitations (Civ. Prae. Act, § 53; now CPLR 213, subd. 1 [six years — but see CPLR 218, subd. (b)]) applied (Scheuer v. Scheuer, 308 N. Y. 447).

Section 213(1) subjects an action to impose a constructive trust to a six-year limitations period, and dismissal for untimeliness is improper when the complaint does not identify the dates of demand or refusal to perform.

Savage v. Savage · filed 1978-05-25(1)

An action to impose a constructive trust is subject to the six-year residual Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subd 1; Motyl v Motyl, 35 AD2d 1051; Rickerman v Riekerman, 34 AD2d 1069). The only issue is when that period begins to run. ... Therefore, we conclude that since the amended complaint is silent as to the dates of demands by plaintiff for the conveyance or the dates of refusal to perform by the defendants in response to any demand, it was error to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground of untimeliness.

Section 213(1) does not require a spouse to bring a constructive trust claim within six years of acquiring marital property when the marital relationship and later conduct prevent that limitations defense.

Zuch v. Zuch · filed 1986-06-05(1)

We also disagree with the trial court’s determination that it was necessary for the wife to seek to impress a constructive trust within six years after the parties acquired the marital residence.

Section 213(1) gives an action to impose a constructive trust six years from the wrongful act giving rise to restitution, regardless of when the fraud is discovered.

Kaufman v. Cohen · filed 2003-05-27(1)

An action to impose a constructive trust is governed by the six-year statute of limitations provided by CPLR 213 (1), which commences to run upon occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution, and not from the time when the facts constituting the fraud are discovered (Mazzone v Mazzone, 269 AD2d 574, 574-575 [2000]; Matter of Sakow, 219 AD2d 479, 482 [1995]).

For a constructive trust claim, the six-year limitations period runs from acquisition if the trustee acquired the property wrongfully, or from breach or repudiation if the trustee acquired it lawfully.

Bolla v. Bolla · filed 2005-12-01(1)

The time that the statute of limitations commences to run for the constructive trustee’s failure to honor his promise depends upon whether the constructive trustee wrongfully acquired the property or whether he acquired the property lawfully and thereafter repudiated his promise to transfer the property.

Section 213(1) gives a claim to impose a constructive trust six years from the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution.

Abakporo v. Abakporo · filed 2022-02-02(1)

A cause of action to impose a constructive trust is governed by a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[1]), which begins to run at the time of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution ( see Saddharma Cakra Buddhist Assn., Inc. v Sheng Chien Chen , 179 AD3d 728, 729-730; Mannino v Passalacqua , 172 AD3d 1190, 1194; Vitarelle v Vitarelle , 65 AD3d 1034, 1035).

Section 213(1) gives a constructive trust claim six years from the allegedly wrongful act that creates a duty of restitution.

Davidoff v. Hershfield · filed 2024-12-24(1)

"A cause of action for a constructive trust is governed by the six-year statute of limitations provided by CPLR 213(1), which begins to run upon the occurrence of the allegedly wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution" ( Tornheim v Tornheim , 67 AD3d 775, 776). Here, the defendants satisfied their prima facie burden of demonstrating that the time within which to assert the unjust enrichment and constructive trust causes of action expired prior to the commencement of this action.

Section 213(2)’s six-year limitations period does not apply to a bailment claim grounded in negligence, even when the bailment arose in contract.

Tischler Roofing & Sheet Metal Works Co. v. Sicolo Garage, Inc. · filed 1970-10-13(2)

This action to recover for breach of contract of bailment of plaintiff’s automobile is governed by the three-year negligence statute (CPLR 214, subd. 4) and not the six-year “contractual obligation or liability” statute (CPLR 213, subd. 2). While the bailment transaction arose in contract, the obligation or liability is the common-law duty of due care and the grounds of recovery are defendants’ negligence.

Section 213(2)’s six-year period does not guide maritime laches when the alleged contract imposed only a duty to exercise due care.

Hartford Fire Insurance v. Callanan Marine Corp. · filed 1973-01-07(2)

Nonetheless the Court believes that third-party defendant’s duty under the contract was no more than to exercise due care while towing the barges, and that third-party plaintiff in order to recover would have to establish the failure to exercise such care. Accordingly the Court believes that the statute of limitations for negligence actions is the one to be considered as a guide on the question of laches.

Section 213(2)'s six-year period for contract actions does not apply to Regulation T and Exchange Act § 7(c) claims based on duties imposed by law rather than agreement.

Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. Burchfield · filed 1973-11-29(2)

The only other New York provision which might apply, in addition to the two mentioned in Klein, is § 213(2) relating to general (non-UCC) actions on contracts. ... If any illegality or wrong is done under Regulation T, it is solely because Regulation T makes it illegal or wrong. We deal with a malum prohibitum, not a breach of agreement. ... While the question is novel and not entirely free from doubt, we hold that the applicable New York limitations statute for a claim stated under Regulation T and § 7(c) is CPLR § 214(2) relating to liabilities imposed by statute.

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to contract claims seeking recovery for damages to property or pecuniary interests.

Drab v. Baum · filed 1985-11-25(2)

To the extent that the action sounds in breach of contract and seeks recovery for damages to property or pecuniary interests, the six-year contract Statute of Limitations applies (see, Sinopoli v Cocozza, 105 AD2d 743; Video Corp. v Flatto Assoc., 58 NY2d 1026, 1028).

Section 213’s six-year periods for contract and fraud claims do not apply when the essence of the claim is negligence or malpractice.

Johnson v. Gold · filed 1979-09-28(2), (8)

Since the retainer of defendant occurred in 1973, plaintiff attempts to categorize this action which he commenced in 1978 as one either in contract or fraud so as to obtain the benefit of the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213, subds 2, 8). ... Viewed in that light the wrong complained of, although arising from plaintiff’s retainer of defendant, essentially consists of a claim that defendant failed to use due care and thus is cognizable in either negligence or malpractice both of which actions are limited by a three-year statute (CPLR 214, subds 4, 6).

Section 213’s six-year period for contract actions does not apply when recovery requires proof of gross negligence or willful misconduct and the plaintiff seeks tort damages.

Columbe v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 1984-06-07

Plaintiffs argue that the action is governed by the six-year limitation period applicable to contract actions (CPLR 213), but do not specify the nature of the breach other than to assert that defendants failed to provide proper service. ... Since plaintiffs must demonstrate gross negligence or willful misconduct in order to recover, and are seeking tort damages (recovery of consequential damages for apparent loss of profits), the three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to negligence actions applies and serves to bar this action (Zuckerbrod v New York Tel. Co., 87 AD2d 574, 575).