N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213

Section 213 provides a six-year statute of limitations for the action.

Education Resources Institute, Inc. v. Piazza · filed 2005-04-18

Thus, under New York choice-of-law rules, the Ohio statute is therefore inapplicable to this action which is governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (see Tanges, supra; cf. Blatz v Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 274 AD2d 491 [2000]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for claims covered by the applicable subdivisions.

Amendola v. Kendzia · filed 2005-04-29(1), (8)

The pertinent inquiry, however, is not when the alleged agreement was made, but rather when the alleged agreement or promise and accompanying fiduciary obligation was breached. The individual plaintiffs have failed to identify any plausible accrual date prior to November 18, 1996, which, as far as this record reveals, is the earliest date upon which the alleged breach of contract and alleged breach of fiduciary duty occurred, and is also the date on which the alleged fraud was perpetrated against Kendzia. Such date was within six years of the commencement of the action, thus rendering timely the first through fourth counterclaims.

Section 213(1) applies a six-year statute of limitations to an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law.

New York City Housing Authority v. Pretto · filed 2005-05-05(1)

CPLR 213 (1) provides that a six-year statute of limitations applies in any “action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law.” The court rejects this argument as well.

Section 213 applies a six-year limitations period to actions for money had and received and unjust enrichment.

Onanuga v. Pfizer, Inc. · filed 2005-05-10

The counterclaims for money had and received and for unjust enrichment are both governed by a six-year statute of limitations. See N.Y. CPLR § 213 (McKinneys 2004); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Branch, 32 A.D.2d 959, 960, 302 N.Y.S.2d 958 (2d Dep’t 1969); Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection of the State of New York v. Gateway State Bank, 239 A.D.2d 826, 827, 658 N.Y.S.2d 705 (3d Dep’t 1997).

Section 213(2) requires an action on a contractual obligation or liability to be commenced within six years.

Fairbrook Leasing, Inc. v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc. · filed 2005-05-19(2)

New York law requires that “an action upon a contractual obligation or liability” be commenced within six years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2) (2002). ... Mesaba was still receiving aircraft and paying rent in October 2001 pursuant to an agreement made between the parties; this action commenced one year later, well within the six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period when the relief sought is equitable.

Bouley v. Bouley · filed 2005-06-10(1)

If the relief sought is equitable, the six-year period set forth in CPLR 213 (1) applies, but if only money damages are sought, the three-year period set forth in CPLR 214 applies.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty and imposition of a constructive trust, while section 213(8) applies a six-year or discovery-based period to fraud claims.

In re the Estate of Piccillo · filed 2005-06-10(1), (8)

A cause of action for fraud must be commenced within six years of the fraud or two years from the time at which the fraud was or could have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence, whichever is greater (see CPLR 213 [8]). ... Generally, there is a six-year statute of limitations applicable to a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and the imposition of a constructive trust upon property (see CPLR 213 [1]; Dombek v Reiman, 298 AD2d 876, 876-877 [2002]; Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Freed, 288 AD2d 818, 818-819 [2001]; Peering v Karin, 285 AD2d 977, 978 [2001]), and such causes of action accrue at the time of the alleged wrongful conduct or the event allegedly giving rise to the duty of restitution (see Dombek, 298 AD2d at 876; Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 288 AD2d at 819).

Section 213(1) requires actions subject to its six-year limitations period to be commenced within six years.

Catanzano v. Warren Rosen & Co. · filed 2005-06-21(1)

Inasmuch as the representations that allegedly induced plaintiffs purchase of the purportedly nonconforming insurance coverage were made no later than 1990 and this action was not commenced until 2002, plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation and Insurance Law § 2123 claims were time-barred (see CPLR 213 [1]; Fandy Corp. v Lung-Fong Chen, 262 AD2d 352 [1999]; and see CPLR 214 [2]; Goldberg v Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 242 AD2d 175, 180 [1998], lv dismissed in part and, denied in part 92 NY2d 1000 [1998]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for claims subject to that provision.

Brasseur v. Speranza · filed 2005-08-18(2)

Nor were plaintiffs’ first and second causes, which accrued on November 18, 1999, subject to dismissal as untimely, the complaint having been interposed within the applicable six-year period (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year statute of limitations on the applicable action at law.

B.N. Realty Associates v. Lichtenstein · filed 2005-09-20(2)

To the extent Lichtenstein asserts the laches defense on the basis of BNRA’s delay in commencing this action at law (which was timely under the applicable six-year statute of limitations [CPLR 213 (2)]), the defense of laches is unavailable (see Matter of American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 15 AD3d 268 [2005], citing Republic Ins. Co. v Real Dev. Co., 161 AD2d 189, 190 [1990]).

Section 213 requires actions subject to its six-year limitations period to be commenced within six years.

IG Second Generation Partners, LP v. Kaygreen Realty Co. · filed 2005-10-03

In addition, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the plaintiffs’ third cause of action, which is for unpaid rent since the commencement of the renewal term, was not time-barred, inasmuch as the instant action was commenced less than six years after the first payment of rent became due following the commencement of the renewal term (see CPLR 213; Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex., 87 NY2d 36, 45 [1995]; Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v Campcore, Inc., 81 NY2d 138 [1993]).

Section 213(2) gives actions based on contractual obligations a six-year limitations period.

Rodriguez v. Central Parking System of New York, Inc. · filed 2005-10-18(2)

Accordingly, given that the complaint and bill of particulars request only contract damages and disclaim any theory of negligence, the claim raised is properly subject to a six-year limitations period.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims.

Abf Capital v. Osley · filed 2005-07-11

New York’s stat- ute is six years, whereas California’s statute of limitations is four years.

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on claims for unpaid compensation.

Feingold v. Hankin · filed 2005-08-09(2)

... Feingold were claiming that he should have received higher compensation while working for WCC, his claim would be barred, for any year prior to 1996, by the six-year Statute of Limitations. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2).

Section 213(2) and (8) require breach of contract and fraud actions to be commenced within six years.

Lucas-Plaza Housing Development Corp. v. Corey · filed 2005-11-10[2], [8]

The IAS court properly granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the action as untimely because the alleged misconduct occurred in 1992 and plaintiffs did not commence this action, asserting causes for breach of contract and fraud, governed by six-year limitations periods (CPLR 213 [2], [8]), until October 2003.

Section 213 generally requires covered actions to be commenced within six years.

Burrowes v. Combs · filed 2006-01-10

With the exception of plaintiff’s tortious interference with contract claim, all present causes of action stem from the alleged 1996 incident, and are therefore barred by the applicable statutes of limitations (see CPLR 213, 214 [3]).

Section 213(1) bars a claim after six years from accrual.

Elliott v. Qwest Communications Corp. · filed 2006-01-12(1)

Thus, this claim is barred by the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213 sets six-year limitation periods for specified claims and generally measures them from when the wrongful conduct or fraud occurs.

Mills v. Everest Reinsurance Co. · filed 2006-01-23(1), (6), and (8)

A claim for rescission is governed by a six-year statute of limitations, which accrues at the time of the wrongful conduct. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1); see also Kaufman v. Cohen, 307 A.D.2d 113, 760 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1st Dep’t 2003). The allegedly wrongful conduct in this case occurred when the contract was formed.

Section 213 requires covered actions to be commenced within six years.

Tars Uluslararasi Dis Ticaret Turizm ve Sanayi Ltd. v. Leonard · filed 2006-02-28

Because the second interest-only payment under the note accrued within the six-year statute of limitations period (CPLR 213), the court properly awarded such payment.

Section 213(2) gives claims based on breach of contract a six-year limitations period.

Long v. Sowande · filed 2006-03-07(2)

Inasmuch as the applicable statutory period is six years (see CPLR 213 [2]; Baratta v Kozlowski, 94 AD2d 454, 463 [1983]), the cross claim is timely.

The six-year catch-all limitations period in CPLR 213(1) governs a declaratory judgment action when no other form of proceeding has a specifically prescribed limitations period.

Jones v. Amicone · filed 2006-03-07(1)

As such, the second cause of action is separate and distinct from the first cause of action challenging the SEQRA determination and the six-year catch-all limitations period of CPLR 213 (1) is applicable (see Solnick v Whalen, supra; Martin Goldman, LLC v Yonkers Indus. Dev. Agency, 12 AD3d 646, 647-648 [2004]; Matter of Dreves v New York Power Auth., 131 AD2d 182, 187 [1987]).

Section 213's six-year catchall limitations period does not apply when another law specifically prescribes the limitations period.

McGovern v. Levittown Fire District · filed 2006-03-14

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, his claims based upon alleged violations of Civil Service Law § 71 and Workers’ Compensation Law § 120 were not subject to the six-year catchall limitations period found in CPLR 213 as the limitations periods for those claims are specifically prescribed by law (see CPLR 213).

Sections 213(1) and 213(2) apply a six-year limitations period to declaratory judgment and indemnification claims, accruing when the claimant pays the loss.

Union Turnpike Associates, LLC v. Getty Realty Corp. · filed 2006-03-28(1), (2)

The plaintiffs demand for recoupment of cleanup costs expended by it and other related damages constitutes relief in the nature of indemnification, governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]; State of New York v Stewart’s Ice Cream Co., 64 NY2d 83 [1984]; Barclays Bank of N.Y. v Tank Specialists, 236 AD2d 570 [1997]; 145 Kisco Ave. Corp. v Dufner Enters., 198 AD2d 482 [1993]). Moreover, the demand for a declaratory judgment, which sounds in indemnification for past cleanup costs, is also governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]; 145 Kisco Ave. Corp. v Dufner Enters., supra). The six-year limitations period began to run when the plaintiff suffered a loss by paying the debt for which it alleges the defendant should be held responsible, and a new, separate cause of action accrues each time a payment is made (see State of New York v Speonk Fuel, Inc., 3 NY3d 720, 724 [2004]; State of New York v Stewart’s Ice Cream Co., supra at 88).

CPLR 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions upon contractual obligations or liabilities.

Alleviation Supplies Inc. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car · filed 2006-04-10(2)

While an action to recover first-party benefits owed under a policy of insurance containing the Mandatory Personal Injury Protection Endorsement is properly viewed as a breach of contract governed by the six-year statute of limitations contained in CPLR 213 (2) ... there is no logical reason to view an action against a self-insurer as a breach of contract action, in that the self-insurer’s liability derives solely from statute and regulations promulgated pursuant to statute.

Section 213(7) provides a six-year statute of limitations for shareholder derivative claims.

Skorr v. Skorr Steel Co. · filed 2006-05-02(7)

Although, upon reargument, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the six-year statute of limitations was applicable to the petitioner’s shareholder derivative claims, the Supreme Court reached the same result (see CPLR 213 [7]; Toscano v Toscano, 285 AD2d 590, 591 [2001]).

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year catch-all limitations period when no more specific statutory limitations period governs.

P & N Tiffany Properties, Inc. v. Village of Tuckahoe · filed 2006-06-13(1)

If the dispute can be, or could have been, resolved through a form of action or proceeding for which a specific statute of limitations is furnished by statute, then that limitations period will govern the action, regardless of the form in which it is presented (see Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d at 229-230, supra). Otherwise, the six-year “catch-all” provision of CPLR 213 (1) will apply (see American Ind. Paper Mills Supply Co., Inc. v County of Westchester, 16 AD3d 443 [2005]).

Section 213(8) sets a six-year limitations period for fraud claims.

Rubin v. Valicenti Advisory Services, Inc. · filed 2006-06-16(8)

Here, the statutes of limitations applicable to Rubin’s claims for professional malpractice and breach of contract are three years, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6) (McKinney 2003), and the statute of limitations applicable to a claim of fraud is six years, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (McKinney 2003).

Section 213 gives fraud claims a six-year statute of limitations.

Lambert v. Sklar · filed 2006-06-20

Accordingly, the appellant’s cause of action to recover damages for fraud, which is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213), was not time-barred since this same claim was timely asserted in the prior action.

Section 213(5) provides a six-year limitations period for the action at issue.

State v. Seventh Regiment Fund · filed 2006-06-21(5)

As this action was commenced later that year, the statute of limitations of six years (CPLR 213 [5]) had not run when the action was commenced. Thus, that defense is not meritorious.

Section 213(2) bars an action seeking rent that accrued more than six years before the action was commenced.

Stark v. City of New York · filed 2006-07-11(2)

The defendant sustained its initial burden of demonstrating its entitlement to summary judgment by presenting evidence that the first cause of action to the extent that it accrued more than six years before this action was commenced was time-barred (see 833 N. Corp. v Tashlik & Assoc., 248 AD2d 664, 665 [1998]; Parker v Town of Clarkstown, 217 AD2d 607 [1995]; CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law.

Green v. City of New York · filed 2006-07-17

However, there is an exception under § 214(2) for N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213, which prescribes six years for "an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law.”

Section 213(4) sets a six-year limitations period for an action to foreclose a mortgage.

Buywise Holding, LLC v. Harris · filed 2006-07-25(4)

Further, the defendant failed to bring an action to foreclose the subject mortgage within the applicable six-year statute of limitations (see RPAPL 1501 [4]; CPLR 213 [4]; see e.g. Rack v Rushefsky, 5 AD3d 753 [2004]; Albin v Pearson, 266 AD2d 487 [1999]), and there is no basis for tolling or abating the statute of limitations.

Section 213 requires claims covered by its six-year limitations period to be commenced within six years.

Mancini v. Hardscrabble Commons Associates · filed 2006-07-25

In response to the respondents’ prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law that the breach of fiduciary duty claims in Action No. 2 are barred by the statute of limitations, the appellants raised triable issues of fact as to whether some of the conduct complained of occurred within six years of the commencement of that action (see CPLR 213; Northridge Ltd. Partnership v Spence, 246 AD2d 582 [1998]).

Section 213 requires contract actions to be commenced within six years.

Hirt v. Equitable Retirement Plan for Employees · filed 2006-09-12

Under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, an action under a contract — for employee benefit plans, in effect, are contracts- — -must be commenced within six years.

Section 213(4) requires a mortgage foreclosure action to be commenced within six years after default.

LePore v. Shaheen · filed 2006-09-29(4)

Plaintiff established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence establishing that more than six years had elapsed since he defaulted on the mortgage. Plaintiff thereby established that a mortgage foreclosure action commenced by defendant would be time-barred (see id.; Phalen-Sobolevsky v Mullin, 26 AD3d 806 [2006]; Corrado v Petrone, 139 AD2d 483 [1988]), and defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).

Section 213(1) applies a six-year limitations period to constructive fraud claims, accruing when the fraud or conveyance occurs.

Metzger v. Yuenger Woodworking Corp. · filed 2006-10-10(1)

Claims based on constructive fraud, such as those recognized by Debtor and Creditor Law §§ 273 and 273-a, are governed by the six-year statue of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1), and such claims arise at the time of the fraud or conveyance (see Wall St. Assoc. v Brodsky, 257 AD2d 526, 530 [1999]; Avalon LLC v Coronet Props. Co., 306 AD2d 62 [2003]).

Section 213 provides a six-year statute of limitations for contract claims.

In Re J.P. Morgan Chase Cash Balance Litigation · filed 2006-10-30

Taking the Plaintiffs allegations as true, there are issues of fact with respect to when the Plaintiffs were notified about the effect on their retirement benefit as a result of the cash balance conversion and whether the statute of limitations was triggered upon receipt of this notice. Thus, construing the facts in their favor as I must on a motion to dismiss, the statute of limitations was not triggered until 2001, since it was then (and after) that any named plaintiff left the employment of JPMC. Given that the initial complaint in this matter was filed in January 2006, well within the six-year statute of limitations, the motion to dismiss will not be granted on this basis as to any of the claims.

Section 213(2) supplies a six-year statute of limitations for the breach of contract claim.

Da Silva v. Savo · filed 2006-12-19(2)

Moreover, the defendants failed to establish that the breach of contract claim which the plaintiff seeks to arbitrate is wholly or partially barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]; Sullivan v Troser Mgt., Inc., 15 AD3d 1011 [2005]; Fade v Pugliani/Fade, 8 AD3d 612 [2004]; Cognetta v Valencia Devs., Inc., 8 AD3d 318 [2004]; Knoll v Datek Sec. Corp., 2 AD3d 594 [2003]; Leising v Multiple R Dev., 249 AD2d 920 [1998]; Scrofani v Fred-Rick Holding Corp., 201 AD2d 639 [1994]).

Section 213(1) gives constructive trust actions a six-year limitations period that begins when the acts underlying the claim occur.

McGovern v. Solomon · filed 2006-12-26(1)

The parties do not dispute that under New York law, “[a]n action for constructive trust is an equitable action governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations in CLPR 213(1).” Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Def.Mem.”) at 1. ... Accordingly, it is plain that, in the instant case, the statute of limitations for actions for constructive trust began to run as of the latest of the Solomon Group Transfers, and that, as a consequence, any action relating to the Solomon Group Transfers was wholly time-barred no later than September 1, 2005.

Section 213(1) gives constructive trust actions a six-year limitations period that starts when the wrongful act creating the restitution duty occurs.

Soscia v. Soscia · filed 2006-12-26(1)

“An action to impose a constructive trust is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations provided by CPLR 213 (1), which ‘ “commences to run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution and not from the time the facts constituting the fraud are discovered” ’ ” (Mazzone v Mazzone, 269 AD2d 574, 574-575 [2000], quoting Mattera v Mattera, 125 AD2d 555, 556-557 [1986]; see Jakacic v Jakacic, 279 AD2d 551, 552 [2001]). Here, the action was commenced more than six years after the allegedly wrongful transfer of the property by the deed dated January 4, 1988.

Section 213(1) requires an action to rescind a prenuptial agreement to be commenced within six years.

Katz v. Katz · filed 2007-02-13(1)

Upon his motion for summary judgment, the husband made a prima facie showing that the fourth cause of action, seeking rescission of the parties’ prenuptial agreement, was time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]; DeMille v DeMille, 5 AD3d 428, 429 [2004]; Anonymous v Anonymous, 233 AD2d 350, 351 [1996]).

Section 213(1) applies a six-year limitations period, and the claims accrued when the Bank foreclosed on the accounts.

Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. HSBC Bank USA · filed 2007-02-15(1)

It is uncontested each of these claims is subject to a six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [1]; see Gonzalez v Anchor Bank Corp., 245 AD2d 132 [1997] [money had and received]; Natimir Rest. Supply v London 62 Co., 140 AD2d 261, 262 [1988] [unjust enrichment]; Matter of Sakow, 219 AD2d 479, 482 [1995] [constructive trust]; Matter of Barabash, 31 NY2d 76, 80 [1972] [accounting]). ... Plaintiffs claims accrued on February 25, 1998, after the bankruptcy stay was lifted and the Bank foreclosed on all of Herkimer’s accounts, without paying the State its tax proceeds. The Bank’s act was a violation of the State’s rights. ICSp as subrogee of the State, filed this complaint on February 19, 2004, within six years of the Bank’s foreclosure of the wholesaler’s accounts. Thus, the contested claims are timely.

Section 213(2) bars an action commenced nearly 12 years after its cause of action accrued.

Steele v. Watson · filed 2007-02-15(2)

Any possible cause of action accrued when bail was exonerated upon plaintiffs son’s plea of guilty, nearly 12 years before plaintiffs commencement of the action, and is time-barred (CPLR 213 [2]; 214 [3]).

Section 213(1) supplies a residuary six-year limitations period when the action is not governed by a shorter limitations period.

Walton v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 2007-02-20(1)

Whether petitioners' constitutional claims are subject to the four-month statute of limitations period under CPLR article 78 or the residuary six-year limitations period of CPLR 213 (1) turns on whether the parties' rights could have been resolved in an article 78 proceeding ( Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229-230 [1980]; New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d 194, 200-201 [1994]).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for contract actions.

Guzman v. 188-190 HDFC · filed 2007-02-20(2)

Since stipulations of settlement are essentially contracts (see Hotel Cameron, Inc. v Purcell, 35 AD3d 153, 155 [1st Dept 2006]; Sharp v Stavisky, 221 AD2d 216 [1995]), the applicable statute of limitations is six years (CPLR 213 [2]) measured from April 30, 1989 when, assuming Guzman complied with the stipulation, she was entitled to purchase the shares and appellant failed to issue them to her, i.e., omitted performance of an obligation under the stipulation (see Beller v William Penn Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 8 AD3d 310 [2004]; Stalis v Sugar Cr. Stores, 295 AD2d 939 [2002]; State of New York v Fenton, 68 AD2d 951 [1979]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year statute of limitations for actions based on contractual obligations or liabilities, including fundamentally contractual no-fault benefit claims.

Mandarino v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance · filed 2007-02-27(2)

Although the terms of the insurance policy may be mandated by various provisions of the Insurance Law, this does not alter the fact that the dispute is fundamentally contractual in nature and not a creature of statute. Accordingly, the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2) applies to this action, and the Appellate Term properly affirmed so much of the Civil Court’s order denying that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred (see Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas. Co., supra).

Section 213(2) gives six years to bring a contractual uninsured motorist benefits claim against a self-insured vehicle owner.

ELRAC, Inc. v. Suero · filed 2007-03-06(2)

The respondents’ claim for uninsured motorist benefits against a self-insured vehicle owner, while statutorily mandated, remains “contractual rather than statutory in nature” (Matter of Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth. v Evans, 95 AD2d 470, 472 [1983]; cf. Matter of De Luca [Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp.], 17 NY2d 76, 79 [1966]) and, as such, is subject to the six-year statute of limitations (see Matter of New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. [Degorter], 133 Misc 2d 93, 97 [1986]).

Section 213(2) generally applies a six-year limitations period to breach-of-contract claims, except when UCC article 2 provides otherwise.

Wuhu Import & Export Corp. v. Capstone Capital, LLC · filed 2007-04-12[2]

A six-year statute generally governs breach-of-contract claims “except as provided in . . . article 2 of the uniform commercial code.” (CPLR 213 [2].)

Subsection 2 sets a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims, running from the breach even if damage occurs later or the plaintiff is unaware of it.

Continental Casualty Co. v. Employers Insurance Co. of Wausau · filed 2007-05-08(2)

As to defendant Keasbey, the applicable statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years (CPLR 213 [2]). The time begins to run at the time of the breach, even if no damage occurs until subsequently or the plaintiff is not aware that the breach occurred (Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402, 403 [1993]).

Section 213 requires covered actions to be commenced within six years.

Fils-Aime v. Ryder TRS, Inc. · filed 2007-05-22

Because Cornell’s decision not to indemnify VerMilyea related to a nonacademic matter, VerMilyea properly and timely commenced a plenary third-party action against Cornell University seeking declaratory relief (see CPLR 213; Tedeschi v Wagner Coll., 49 NY2d 652 [1980]).

Section 213(4) gives six years to sue on a bond or note secured by a mortgage on real property, running from when the lender may first foreclose.

CDR Créances v. Euro-American Lodging Corp. · filed 2007-05-22[4]

There is no dispute that the statute of limitations period applicable to an action on a bond or note, the payment of which is secured by mortgage upon real property, is six years. (CPLR 213 [4].) Further, it is well established that the six-year period begins to run when the lender first has the right to foreclose on the mortgage, that is, the day after the maturity date of the underlying debt “unless the mortgage debt is accelerated” in which case “the entire amount is due and the Statute of Limitations begins to run on the entire mortgage debt.” (Loiacono v Goldberg, 240 AD2d 476, 477 [1997], citing Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn, v Mebane, 208 AD2d 892, 894 [1994].)

Section 213(1) applies a six-year limitations period when the relief sought for breach of fiduciary duty is equitable in nature.

Wiesenthal v. Wiesenthal · filed 2007-05-29(1)

A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is governed by a six-year statute of limitations where the relief sought is equitable in nature (see CPLR 213 [1]), or by a three-year statute of limitations where the only relief sought is money damages (see CPLR 214 [4]; Klein v Gutman, 12 AD3d 417 [2004]; Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113 [2003]; Dignelli v Berman, 293 AD2d 565 [2002]).

Section 213 sets six-year limitation periods for specified claims, including constructive-trust claims under subsection (1) and contract claims under subsection (2).

Morando v. Morando · filed 2007-06-12(1), (2)

A cause of action to impose a constructive trust or equitable hen is subject to a six-year limitations period (see CPLR 213 [1]; ...). ... Accordingly, any claims that accrued before the plaintiff became the father’s guardian in 1996 are time-barred by the six-year limitations period prescribed by CPLR 213 (2).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for claims without a more specific limitations period.

Town of Poughkeepsie v. Espie · filed 2007-06-19(1)

Accordingly, the six-year catch-all limitations period of CPLR 213 governs this claim (see CPLR 213 [1]; see generally National States Elec. Corp. v City of New York, 225 AD2d 745, 747 [1996]).

Section 213(8) gives constructive fraud claims a six-year limitations period running from the fraudulent conveyance.

Ehrler v. Cataffo · filed 2007-07-10[8]

A cause of action based on constructive fraud in New York is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [8]), and such a cause of action arises at the time the fraudulent conveyance occurs (see Island Holding v O’Brien, 6 AD3d 498, 500 [2004]; Wall St. Assoc. v Brodsky, 257 AD2d 526, 530 [1999]).

Section 213(2) and (8) impose a six-year limitations period that can bar counterclaims.

Harrington v. Gage · filed 2007-09-28(2), (8)

Contrary to the contention of defendant on her cross appeal, the court properly granted those parts of plaintiffs’ cross motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the first three counterclaims inasmuch as they are barred by the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2], [8]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for claims for extra and disputed construction work and delay damages.

JCH Delta Contracting, Inc. v. City of New York · filed 2007-10-11

Defendant issued a certificate of substantial completion for the construction project in January 1996, and plaintiff did not commence the action until 2005, well beyond the six-year statute of limitations for such claims (CPLR 213; see Phillips Constr. Co. v City of New York, 61 NY2d 949 [1984]).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to a claim for reformation.

Fresh Del Monte Produce N.V. v. Eastbrook Caribe A.V.V. · filed 2007-10-25(2)

Accordingly, the claim for reformation, which is covered by a six-year statute of limitations, is time-barred (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(1) provides a residual six-year limitations period that applies to the fourth and eighth causes of action in this proceeding.

People v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach · filed 2007-11-21(1)

Finally, we are of the view that the three-year statute of limitations provided for in CPLR 214 (2) applies to petitioner’s fifth, sixth and ninth causes of action pursuant to General Business Law §§ 349 and 350-d (see e.g. Morelli v Weider Nutrition Group, 275 AD2d 607, 608 [2000]), whereas the residual six-year limitations period of CPLR 213 (1) applies to petitioner’s fourth and eighth causes of action (see State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d 83, 89 [1975]).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud and conversion claims.

Ingrami v. Rovner · filed 2007-11-27(8)

Contrary to the appellant’s claim, the fraud and conversion causes of action are governed by the six-year statute of limitations contained in CPLR 213 (8) (see Petrou v Ehmer Intl. Foods, 167 AD2d 338, 339 [1990]; see also Klein v Gutman, 12 AD3d 417 [2004]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for property damage claims grounded in breach of a construction contract.

Felice v. American A.W.S. Corp. · filed 2007-12-04

Thus the court correctly concluded that these claims are governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213) and, under the facts of this case, those claims were timely asserted (cf. Anderson v Nottingham Vil. Homeowner’s Assn., Inc., 37 AD3d 1195 [2007]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for a breach of contract claim arising from a contract predominantly for labor and services.

Gibraltar Management Co. v. Grand Entrance Gates, Ltd. · filed 2007-12-18(2)

The plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action is therefore governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2) ... and is not time-barred.

Section 213(1) sets a six-year limitations period for claims based on breached affirmative deed covenants.

Rivemont Farms, LLC v. Northeast Solite Corp. · filed 2007-12-20(1)

As the limitations period for such breaches is six years (see CPLR 213 [1]) and that period expired ... long ago, a claim by defendant for breach of those covenants now would be time-barred (see Castle Assoc. v Schwartz, 63 AD2d 481, 491-492 [1978]).

CPLR 213 sets a six-year maximum period for commencing a contract action.

Albany Medical Center v. Preferred Life Insurance · filed 2008-01-31

The fundamental flaw in this argument, however, is that the six-year statute of limitations established by CPLR 213 is not the minimum period to sue on a contract; rather, six years is the maximum period in which suit can be commenced.

CPLR 213(7) provides a six-year limitations period for a fraud claim.

Benyo v. Sikorjak · filed 2008-04-29(7)

Furthermore, this cause of action is not time-barred since it was asserted in 2006 and is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [7]; ...).

Section 213 applies a six-year limitations period to challenges to prenuptial agreements.

Brody v. Brody · filed 2008-05-06

By expressly providing that Domestic Relations Law § 250 “shall not apply to any agreement that was barred under the civil practice law and rules in effect immediately prior to such effective date” (L 2007, ch 226, § 2), then the prenuptial agreement before me, executed on January 26, 2001, is more than six years old on the effective date of this statute and is time-barred by the provisions of CPLR 213.

Section 213 sets a six-year limitations period for fraud and breach of contract claims.

Lunn v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 2008-06-30

The statutes of limitations for fraud and breach of contract claims (the only claims Lunn expressly asserted in his appellate brief)2 are six years under both New Jersey law, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1; Azze v. Hanover Ins. Co., 765 A.2d 1093, 1097 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), and New York law, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213; both states allow the application of a discovery rule to postpone accrual of a claim, see Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Group, Inc., 460 F.3d 494, 512-13 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying New Jersey law); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8).

Section 213(1)’s six-year period does not apply to a claim that could be resolved in a CPLR article 78 proceeding; the four-month period applies instead.

New York Coalition for Quality Assisted Living, Inc. v. Novello · filed 2008-07-17(1)

“Whether [those] claims are subject to the four-month statute of limitations period under CPLR article 78 or the residuary six-year limitations period of CPLR 213 (1) turns on whether the parties’ rights could have been resolved in an article 78 proceeding” ... Inasmuch as plaintiffs challenges to the DAL, an interpretive statement that is merely explanatory, could be resolved in a CPLR article 78 proceeding, a four-month statute of limitations is applicable (see Matter of Elcor Health Servs. v Novello, 100 NY2d 273, 279-280 [2003]; see also New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d at 203-204; Federation of Mental Health Ctrs. v DeBuono, 275 AD2d 557, 559-560 [2000]).

Section 213(5)’s six-year limitations period does not bar a claim when an effective acknowledgment of the debt restarts the period before suit.

Jeffrey L. Rosenberg & Associates, LLC v. Lajaunie · filed 2008-09-16(5)

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the first three causes of action are not barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [5]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for an insurance contract dispute seeking policy reformation and payment of benefits.

Bloom v. St. Paul Travelers Companies, Inc. · filed 2008-12-23(2)

The applicable statute of limitations is thus the six-year period set forth in CPLR 213 (2) (see Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 37 AD3d 775 [2007]; Matter of ELRAC Inc., v Suero, 38 AD3d 544 [2007]).

Section 213(2) gives a party six years from accrual to bring a breach-of-contract claim.

Clearmont Property, LLC v. Eisner · filed 2009-01-22(2)

The six-year contractual statute of limitations period expired on November 14, 2006 (see CPLR 213 [2]), nearly one year before this action was commenced.

CPLR 213 (1) provides a six-year limitations period for a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of a legislative local law.

East Suffolk Development Corp. v. Town Board of Riverhead · filed 2009-02-24(1)

As a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 is not a proper vehicle for challenging the legitimacy of the local law, the limitations period set forth in CPLR 217 is not applicable to this case (see Kamhi v Town ofYorktown, 141 AD2d 607, 609 [1988], affd 74 NY2d 423 [1989]), and the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) applies instead (see Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229-230 [1980]).

Section 213(2) bars a contract claim brought more than six years after it accrues.

166 Archer Avenue Co. v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 2009-02-26(2)

Since plaintiffs claim for construction costs accrued no later than 1994, this action commenced in 2007 was untimely (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(1) gives a breach of fiduciary duty claim a six-year limitations period when the relief sought is equitable; incidental equitable relief does not qualify.

IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. · filed 2009-03-26(1)

Where, however, the relief sought is equitable in nature, the six-year limitations period of CPLR 213 (1) applies (Loengard, 70 NY2d at 266-267). ... Here, IDT primarily seeks damages—in the amount of “hundreds of millions of dollars”—and the equitable relief it seeks, including the disgorgement of profits, is incidental to that relief.

Under CPLR 213(2), a claim accruing at the closing of a real-property sale is subject to a six-year limitations period.

Gold Coast Homes at Evert Street, Inc. v. Cannuscio · filed 2009-05-12(2)

Accordingly, any claim of the plaintiff accrued at the time of the 1998 closing, and this action, therefore, also was barred by the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for a claim to enforce an equitable distribution award that has not been reduced to a money judgment.

Patricia A.M. v. Eugene W.M. · filed 2009-05-28(1)

Because Ms. M. seeks to enforce a judgment for equitable distribution, which has not been reduced to a money judgment, she cannot rely upon CPLR 211. Therefore, her claim is governed by the six-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 213 (1) for “an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law.”

CPLR 213 imposes a six-year limitations period on claims for unpaid shareholder distributions, beginning when the claimant ceases to own shares.

Recine v. Soil Solutions, Inc. · filed 2009-06-02

Pursuant to CPLR 213, the plaintiffs causes of action are barred by a six-year limitations period since the plaintiff only had a right to be paid distributions from the corporation while he was a shareholder. Once the plaintiff ceased to own shares in SSI, the limitations period for the alleged failure to pay distributions to the plaintiff began to run.

CPLR 213 (1) gives six years to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a municipal resolution.

Highland Hall Apartments, LLC v. New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal · filed 2009-10-06(1)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have determined that insofar as declaratory and injunctive relief was sought against the City and the tenants, this proceeding is governed by the six-year catch-all limitations period of CPLR 213 (1) and was timely interposed.

CPLR 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for the Attorney General’s common-law fraud claims seeking damages or restitution.

People v. Nationwide Asset Services, Inc. · filed 2009-10-09(1)

Second, to the extent that the Attorney General proceeds on a theory of common-law fraud in quest of damages or restitution for past wrongs of respondents, the claim is controlled by residual limitations period of CPLR 213 (1) ... The petition makes clear that the instant claims all accrued since January 2005, well within that six-year period.

A plaintiff seeking to apply section 213(2)'s six-year limitations period must raise a triable issue that it governs despite a two-year period in the insurance policy.

Thomas Hamilton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2009-12-08(2)

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the action was governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2).

Section 213(8) generally gives fraud claims six years, but the longer period does not apply when a plaintiff merely adds a scienter allegation to a claim governed by a shorter period.

RUSO v. Morrison · filed 2010-02-04(8)

The statute of limitations for a fraud claim asserted under New York law is generally six years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8). An exception applies when the plaintiff merely adds a scienter allegation to a claim governed by a shorter limitations period in order to make use of the longer statute of limitations for a fraud claim. ... Here, plaintiffs allegations of scienter are not merely incidental to the overarching fraud allegations. ... The claim is based on allegations of intentional misrepresentations made by the defendant in order to convince the plaintiff to transfer his money into the defendant’s bank account. Therefore, the exception does not apply and the fraud claim was timely under the six year statute of limitations since it accrued no earlier than the first interaction between Ruso and Morrison in or around May 2003.

Section 213(2) requires a breach-of-contract action to be commenced within six years after accrual.

EMD Construction Corp. v. New York City Department of Housing Preservation & Development · filed 2010-02-16(2)

Additionally, the causes of action set forth in the complaint were not interposed within six years after their accrual in accordance with the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2) (see D & L Assoc., Inc. v New York City School Constr. Auth., 69 AD3d 435 [2010]).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period bars claims brought more than six years after they accrued.

Baxter v. Columbia University · filed 2010-04-22

The applicable six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213) has long since expired on all of plaintiffs claims, whether as to breach of contract, fraud or deceptive business practices, since plaintiff did not commence this action until more than 13 years after he last attended Columbia.

Section 213 sets a six-year limitations period for breach of contract, fraud, and fraud-based breach of fiduciary duty claims.

Pike v. New York Life Insurance · filed 2010-04-27(2), (8)

Their causes of action sounding in breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent inducement are all governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2], [8]), as was their breach of fiduciary duty cause of action, which was based on allegations of fraud (see CPLR 213 [8]; Klein v Gutman, 12 AD3d 417, 419 [2004]; Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113 [2003]).

CPLR 213 provides a six-year limitations period for claims that an employer fraudulently induced a person to accept employment.

Beesmer v. Besicorp Development, Inc. · filed 2010-04-29

The statute of limitations applicable to such claims is six years (see CPLR 213). Since each plaintiff accepted defendants’ offers of employment at least seven years before the commencement of this action, Supreme Court correctly determined that such claims are time-barred.

CPLR 213(1) gives a claim for injunctive relief concerning an easement a six-year limitations period; each later demand for access and denial gives rise to a new claim.

Foti v. Noftsier · filed 2010-04-30(1)

Although plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief based on the year 2000 demand would be barred by the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]; Rahabi, 81 AD2d at 439), each subsequent demand and denial would give rise to a new cause of action for injunctive relief (see Filby, 105 AD2d at 828).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach of contract and account stated claims.

Velocity Investments, LLC v. McCaffrey · filed 2011-02-02(2)

The statute of limitations on a cause of action for breach of contract is six years. (CPLR 213 [2].) ... The statute of limitations on an action for account stated is six years.

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year limitations period for a Civil Service Law § 209-a(1)(c) claim when no other limitations period applies.

Frisenda v. INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF MALVERNE · filed 2011-03-31(1)

Given the absence of any claim that falls within the parameters of Section 217 and the absence of any other limitations period for a claim under Section 209-a(l)(c), the six-year statute of limitations should apply. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1).

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on a plenary action to enforce a fair market rent appeal order.

Obispo v. 423 Madison Avenue L.L.C. · filed 2011-03-31(1)

The motion court correctly found that this plenary action to enforce a fair market rent appeal (FMRA) order is barred by the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [1]; see also Sciarra v 531 E. 83rd St. Owners Corp., 8 AD3d 159, 160 [2004]).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period applies to actions challenging the legality of contracts, but does not govern challenges to government project approval subject to the four-month article 78 period.

Tribeca Community Ass'n v. New York City Department of Sanitation · filed 2011-04-14

Petitioners are challenging the City respondents’ approval of the project after land use and environmental reviews, not the City respondents’ execution of the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the four-month statute of limitations (see CPLR 217 [1]), rather than the six-year statute of limitations applicable to actions challenging the legality of contracts (see CPLR 213), applies.

Section 213(2) generally gives contract claims a six-year limitations period.

Picture Patents, LLC v. Aeropostale, Inc. · filed 2011-04-18(2)

Under New York law, contract claims are generally subject to a six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213’s six-year limitations period does not bar a claim unless the defendant establishes that it accrued more than six years before the action began.

Fleetwood Agency, Inc. v. Verde Electric Corp. · filed 2011-06-14

Here, the defendant failed to meet its prima facie burden of establishing that the causes of action alleged in the complaint accrued more than six years prior to the commencement of the action (see CPLR 213; Coombs v Jervier, 74 AD3d 724 [2010]; Erdheim v Gelfman, 303 AD2d 714 [2003]).

Section 213(2) bars claims for contract breaches that occurred more than six years before the action began.

Nuevo El Barrio Rehabilitación de Vivienda y Economía, Inc. v. Moreight Realty Corp. · filed 2011-08-18(2)

Plaintiff may not raise any breaches that occurred more than six years before it commenced this action (see CPLR 213 [2]), and it lacks standing to assert claims under the LDA because it is neither a party thereto nor a third-party beneficiary thereof (see Mendel v Henry Phipps Plaza W., Inc., 16 AD3d 112, 113 [2005], affd 6 NY3d 783 [2006]).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to an action alleging breach of a student loan agreement.

Education Resources Institute, Inc. v. Hawkins · filed 2011-10-11(2)

Defendant failed to establish prima facie that this action alleging breach of a student loan agreement is barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [2]; see Benn v Benn, 82 AD3d 548 [2011]).

Section 213(2) bars breach-of-contract claims based on breaches occurring more than six years before the action was filed.

Kosowsky v. Willard Mountain, Inc. · filed 2011-12-01(2)

As to the merits of this claim, plaintiffs’ cause of action for breach of contract is time-barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations to the extent that the alleged breaches occurred before February 23, 2004 (see CPLR 213 [2]; Bulova Watch Co. v Celotex Corp., 46 NY2d 606, 611 [1979]; Stalis v Sugar Cr. Stores, 295 AD2d 939, 941 [2002]).

Section 213(2) bars a breach-of-contract claim brought more than six years after the alleged breach.

MAKARCHUK, ARDA v. MAKARCHUK, EDWARD · filed 2012-01-31(2)

Initially, we agree with the court that defendant’s contention that he was excused from his obligations under the agreement based on that alleged breach by plaintiff “is essentially a claim based on a breach of contract, which occurred in 1975 and thus is barred by the six year statute of limitations” (see generally CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment claims.

CB RICHARD ELLIS-BUFFALO, LLC v. KUNVARJI HOTELS, INC. · filed 2012-04-20

Pursuant to CPLR 213, a six-year limitations period applies to the causes of action premised upon breach of contract (see Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402-403), quantum meruit (see Erdheim v Gelfman, 303 AD2d 714, 714, lv denied 100 NY2d 514), and unjust enrichment (see Sirico v F.G.G. Prods., Inc., 71 AD3d 429, 434).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims.

Gilman v. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. · filed 2012-06-15(2)

This language does not clearly select a limitations period other than the applicable New York statute of limitations. Thus, New York’s six-year statute of limitations applies.

Section 213(1)'s limitations period permits an action commenced in November 2009 on causes of action that accrued in March 2006.

A.F. Rockland Plumbing Supply Corp. v. Hudson Shore Associated Ltd. Partnership · filed 2012-06-20(1)

Here, the complaint alleges that the causes of action accrued in March 2006, and this action was commenced in November 2009, within the relevant limitations period (see CPLR 213 [1]).

CPLR 213 gives a landlord six years to bring a claim for credits it failed to provide, including SCRIE credits.

20 Plaza Housing Corp. v. 20 Plaza East Realty · filed 2012-08-30

A claim based upon a landlord’s failure to provide a credit is limited by the six-year limitation period in CPLR 213 (cf. Matter of 100 William Co. v Aetna Ins. Co., 163 AD2d 170, 171 [1st Dept 1990] [as to the lease’s operating expense rate escalation clause]; Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel, LLP v Metropolitan 919 3rd Ave., LLC, 6 Misc 3d 796, 799-801 [Sup Ct, NY County 2004] [as to rent escalation rider]).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims, including those asserted in an SCPA 2103 proceeding.

In re Rokeach · filed 2012-12-19(2)

Accordingly, to the extent the petition alleges that the 1986 agreement was breached by the transfer which occurred in 2000, any such cause of action is barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to actions alleging breach of contract (see CPLR 213 [2]; Goco v Ramnani, 65 AD3d 664, 665 [2009]; see also Matter of Kraus, 208 AD2d 728, 729 [1994]).

CPLR 213 provides a six-year limitations period for a judicial accounting claim, measured from accrual.

R.J. Hyland, Inc. v. Love Family Sports, LLC · filed 2013-01-30

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, that cause of action was not barred by the statute of limitations, as the action was commenced within six years of the date the cause of action accrued (see CPLR 213; Bernstein v La Rue, 120 AD2d 476, 477 [1986]).

Section 213(2) gives a plaintiff six years to bring an action to enforce a contractual obligation, measured from the breach.

BLD Productions, LLC v. Remote Productions, Inc. · filed 2013-01-30(2)

In New York, an action to enforce a contractual obligation is subject to a six-year limitations period. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2). ... Even assuming the contract was formed in 2001, plaintiff plausibly alleged that defendants’ obligation to perform continued through March 2004, within the six-year limitation period.

Section 213(1)-(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract and other actions not assigned a different period.

Nguyen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA · filed 2013-02-22(1)-(2)

New York’s limitations period for breach of contract and other actions not specified by statute is six years. ... Because the suit was not brought within six years of the closure, Nguyen’s claims are time-barred under New York law.

Section 213(8)’s six-year limitations period does not govern a quiet-title action based on an allegedly forged deed; the ten-year period under CPLR 212(a) applies.

Fan-Dorf Properties, Inc. v. Classic Brownstones Unlimited, LLC · filed 2013-02-28(8)

Thus, this action is governed by the 10 year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 212 (a) rather than the 6 year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213 (8), requiring denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims.

La Russo v. St. George's University School of Medicine · filed 2013-03-28(2)

The statute of limitations for breach of contract and negligence claims under New York law is six and three years, respectively. See CPLR 213(2), 214(5).

CPLR 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach of contract and account stated claims, with an account stated claim accruing on the date of the last transaction in the account.

Elie International, Inc. v. Macy's West Inc. · filed 2013-05-07(2)

Thus, the breach of contract claim brought in 2011 is barred by the six-year statute of limitations CPLR 213 (2). ... Since the date of the last transaction in the account is February 15, 2003, the statute of limitations on the account stated claim ran no later than February 15, 2009.

Section 213(2) gives six years to bring a breach-of-contract claim; when a demand is required, the period is measured from when the right to make that demand arises.

U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Dexia Real Estate Capital Markets · filed 2013-06-06(2)

Breach of contract claims are subject to a six year statute of limitations. ... Thus, under the terms of the PSA and MLPA, while a breach of the Representations could have existed in October 2006, the Trust was not entitled to demand cure or repurchase until July 2011.

Section 213(2)'s six-year limitations period applies to a remediation indemnity claim when the plaintiff fulfills a debt or obligation owed by the defendant.

82-11 Queens Boulevard Realty, Corp. v. Sunoco, Inc. (R & M) · filed 2013-06-25(2)

To recover under the six-year remediation statute of limitations, the Plaintiff must show that a debt or obligation was owed by Sunoco which the Plaintiff fulfilled.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for the indemnification claims at issue.

Constructamax, Inc. v. Weber · filed 2013-08-21(2)

Here, the defendant failed to meet its prima facie burden of establishing that the indemnification causes of action accrued more than six years prior to the commencement of the action (see CPLR 213 [2]; Fleetwood Agency, Inc. v Verde Elec. Corp., 85 AD3d at 850; see generally State of New York v Speonk Fuel, Inc., 3 NY3d 720, 723 [2004]; McDermott v City of New York, 50 NY2d 211, 217 [1980]; Union Turnpike Assoc., LLC v Getty Realty Corp., 27 AD3d 725, 727 [2006]).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud claims.

McDonnell v. Bradley · filed 2013-08-21(8)

Since the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded his first cause of action as one to recover damages for fraud, the first cause of action was subject to the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR 213 (8), rather than the three-year statute of limitations applied by the Supreme Court (see Sargiss v Magarelli, 12 NY3d 527, 532 [2009]; Vilsack v Meyer, 96 AD3d 827, 828 [2012]).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims, including claims for failure to procure insurance.

Wright v. Emigrant Savings Bank · filed 2013-12-03(2)

The court also properly denied Riverbay’s motion to amend the answer to add the breach of contract cross claim against Seven Seas due to Seven Seas’ failure to procure insurance for Rivebay’s benefit, as the breach of contract claim is barred by the six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [2]).

CPLR 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on contract causes of action.

ACE Securities Corp. v. DB Structured Products, Inc. · filed 2013-12-19(2)

This action is barred by the six-year statute of limitations on contract causes of action (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) gives breach-of-contract claims a six-year limitations period.

Clarex Ltd. v. Natixis Securities Americas LLC · filed 2013-12-20(2)

Ordinarily, the breach-of-contract claim relating to the 5,000 Warrants would, therefore, have expired on February 11, 2006, well before Clarex filed their present Complaint (on October 24, 2012).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for these constructive trust and unjust enrichment claims; a factual dispute over when they accrued can prevent summary judgment.

Massey v. Byrne · filed 2013-12-24(1)

Triable issues of fact also exist whether the constructive trust and unjust enrichment claims are barred by the six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [1]). Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise, at the very least, triable issues of fact whether the claim accrued only in August 2007, when his and Byrne’s relationship ended and Byrne denied him the one-half share of the property at issue, or when Byrne initially acquired the property (see Tornheim v Tornheim, 67 AD3d 775, 776 [2d Dept 2009]; Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 127 [1st Dept 2003]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for an action to recover funds allegedly wrongfully distributed from a bank account.

BURTON, L.D. v. MANUFACTURERS AND TRADERS TRUST COM · filed 2013-12-27(2)

Plaintiff’s action, which is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]; Gonzalez, 245 AD2d at 132-133; see also Hechter v New York Life Ins. Co., 46 NY2d 34, 39-40) is therefore untimely.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contract disputes.

Cameron v. LR Credit 22, LLC · filed 2014-02-24(2)

Under New York’s six-year statute of limitations for contract disputes, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2), the lawsuit would have been timely.

Section 213(2) gives a claim for intentional breach of contract a six-year limitations period.

New York State Workers' Compensation Board v. SGRisk, LLC · filed 2014-04-03(2)

Accordingly, the portion of the complaint alleging breach of contract through intentional conduct is subject to a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]), rendering the intentional portion of that cause of action timely.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for a real estate brokerage commission claim.

George Tsunis Real Estate, Inc. v. Benedict · filed 2014-04-30

The defendants made a prima facie showing that the applicable six-year statute of limitations expired before the plaintiff commenced this action (see CPLR 213; Fade v Pugliani/Fade, 8 AD3d 612, 613 [2004]).

CPLR 213 (1) provides a six-year limitations period for New York common-law copyright infringement claims because no limitations period is specifically prescribed for them.

Capitol Records, LLC v. Harrison Greenwich, LLC · filed 2014-05-29(1)

Hence, where, as here, the CPLR does not provide a statute of limitations for common-law copyright infringement claims, the most faithful reading of the CPLR calls for the application of the six-year limitations period under CPLR 213 (1).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an accounting claim based on a fiduciary duty to account for money or property.

McDonald v. Edelman & Edelman, P.C. · filed 2014-06-19(1)

It has to do with whether defendants owe plaintiff a fiduciary duty to account for money or property allegedly belonging to him, and is therefore governed by the “residual” six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) (see Hartnett v New York City Tr. Auth., 86 NY2d 438, 443 [1995]; Bouley v Bouley, 19 AD3d 1049, 1051 [4th Dept 2005]).

Section 213(2) allows breach of contract claims based on breaches within the six-year limitations period.

New York Workers' Compensation Board v. Madden · filed 2014-07-03(2)

Accordingly, the breach of contract cause of action is timely to the extent that it addresses breaches occurring after May 2, 2005, i.e., within the six-year statutory limitations period (see CPLR 213 [2]).

CPLR 213(1)'s six-year catchall period does not apply when a claim is governed by a specifically prescribed limitations period, such as the one- or three-year periods applicable to these tort claims.

HevRealtyUSA · filed 2014-10-23(1)

In asserting such claim, plaintiff contends that she is entitled to the benefit of the catchall provision set forth in CPLR 213 (1), which provides that, in the case of "an action for which no limitation [period] is specifically prescribed by law," such action shall be commenced within six years. We disagree. ... With respect to the balance of plaintiff's claims against defendants, a review of the complaint reveals that the causes of action set forth therein sound in either intentional tort, tortious interference with business relations or negligence and, therefore, are governed by either a one- or three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [4], [5]; 215).

Section 213’s six-year period does not apply to an unjust enrichment claim challenging governmental assessments when the claim could have been brought in an article 78 proceeding.

Northern Electric Power Co. v. Hudson River-Black River Regulating District · filed 2014-11-26(1)

However, for the reasons that follow, we agree with defendant’s contention that Supreme Court erred in applying a six-year statute of limitations because, even though plaintiffs have now labeled their cause of action as one for unjust enrichment, they could have raised their claim for refunds in a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging each annual assessment, for which the applicable statute of limitations is four months (see CPLR 217 [1]).

Section 213(7)’s six-year limitations period applies to quasi-derivative claims allowed to proceed in an appraisal proceeding after a merger.

Zelouf International Corp. v. Zelouf · filed 2014-12-22(7)

This court holds that CPLR 213 (7) applies because, as discussed in the court’s prior decisions, the allowance of the merger was predicated on Nahal being able to assert her derivative claims in the instant proceeding. Hence, whatever derivative claims were not time-barred in the derivative action should not be deemed time-barred in this action. Since the derivative action was commenced in December 2009, Nahal is entitled to maintain derivative claims as far back as December 2003, six years beforehand.

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on breach of contract claims and related claims for declaratory relief.

K-Bay Plaza, LLC v. Kmart Corp. · filed 2014-12-30(2)

Plaintiff landlord's causes of action for breach of contract and declaratory relief are barred by the six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213[2]; Goldman Copeland Assoc. v Goodstein Bros. & Co. , 268 AD2d 370, 371 [1st Dept 2000], lv dismissed 95 NY2d 825 [2000], 96 NY2d 796 [2001]; Solnick v Whalen , 49 NY2d 224, 229-230 [1980]; Fucile v L.C.R. Dev., Ltd. , 102 AD3d 915, 916-918 [2d Dept 2013]).

Section 213(1) gives a constructive trust claim six years from the wrongful conduct or breach that gives rise to it.

THOMAS, JOSEPH M., MTR. OF · filed 2015-01-02(1)

Affording the pleadings the most liberal construction, we conclude that the statute of limitations began to run with respect to the NGR property sometime between 1989 and 1992, which is when the promised payments for the property were due and owing. The six-year statute of limitations thus expired, at the latest, in 1998, which is 15 years before this proceeding was commenced.

CPLR 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims and factually indistinguishable unjust-enrichment claims.

Mosab Construction Corp. v. Prospect Park Yeshiva, Inc. · filed 2015-01-21(2)

In their motion, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint, the defendants established, prima facie, that the breach of contract cause of action was time-barred since it was not interposed within six years after its accrual in accordance with the statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2) (see Paonessa v C & L Bldr./Dev., Inc., 50 AD3d 1334, 1335 [2008]; see also Phillips Constr. Co. v City of New York, 61 NY2d 949, 951 [1984]). The defendants also established, prima facie, that the cause of action to recover damages for unjust enrichment, which is factually indistinguishable from the breach of contract cause of action, was also barred by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2) (see Chi Kee Pang v Synlyco, Ltd., 89 AD3d 976, 977 [2011]; EMD Constr. Corp. v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 70 AD3d 893, 894 [2010]).

Section 213(8) allows six years from accrual to bring a fraud claim.

Kanterakis v. Kanterakis · filed 2015-02-18(8)

The fraud causes of action were timely interposed within six years of that accrual date (see CPLR 213 [8]).

A standby agreement tolls the six-year period for enforcing promissory notes, and consolidating the senior debt does not restart that period if the original debt remains outstanding.

Bechard v. Monty's Bay Recreation, Inc. · filed 2015-06-04(2)

We agree with plaintiff that the plain language of the CEMA does not support Supreme Court’s conclusion that the CEMA extinguished the 1992 note and thereby recommenced the running of the statute of limitations.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for these declaratory judgment challenges to condominium rules.

Gabriel v. Board of Managers of the Gallery House Condominium · filed 2015-07-09(1)

Plaintiffs’ challenges to defendant Board’s 2005 house rules, including its prohibition on subletting, and its 2007 rental and guest policy are barred by the six-year statute of limitations for commencing a declaratory judgment action (see CPLR 213 [1]; Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801, 815 [2003], cert denied 540 US 1017 [2003]).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period bars claims for injunctive relief and breach of contract brought more than six years after the underlying transaction.

Beesmer v. Besicorp Development, Inc. · filed 2015-07-30(1)

This action, however, was not commenced until 2008, and we agree with Supreme Court that, pursuant to the six-year statute of limitations applicable to claims for injunctive relief and breach of contract, the claims related to the April 2000 liquidation of Besicorp Ltd. are time-barred (see CPLR 213 [1]; Maya NY, LLC v Hagler, 106 AD3d 583, 585 [2013]; Foti v Noftsier, 72 AD3d 1605, 1607 [2010]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for claims arising from contractual obligations.

Moezinia v. Ashkenazi · filed 2016-02-24(2)

Since the causes of action in the plaintiff’s amended complaint were time-barred (see CPLR 213 [2]), the Supreme Court should have awarded judgment in ABS’s favor dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it.

A party arguing that a proposed breach of agency agreement claim is time-barred must account for section 213’s six-year limitations period.

Commonwealth Land Title Insurance v. Sienna Abstract, LLC · filed 2016-02-24

In addition, the defendants failed to explain why the proposed cause of action should be subject to a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214) rather than a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213). Accordingly, the defendants failed to establish that the proposed cause of action was in fact time-barred as of the date that the motion for leave to amend was made (see Vastola v Maer, 48 AD2d 561, 565 [1975], affd 39 NY2d 1019 [1976]), and we need not consider whether the “relation back” doctrine under CPLR 203 (f) is applicable.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract and unjust enrichment claims in New York.

Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Bank of America Corp. · filed 2016-03-28(2)

Breach-of-contract and unjust enrichment claims are subject to a six-year statute of limitations in New York.

Section 213(4) gives a mortgage foreclosure action six years to be commenced; an action filed within six years after the renewed limitations period begins is timely.

PSP-NC, LLC v. Raudkivi · filed 2016-04-06(4)

Since this action was commenced less than six years later, in July of 2012, this action is not time-barred.

CPLR 213 (2) gives a plaintiff six years to sue to recover a loan installment payable on demand.

Shah v. Exxis, Inc. · filed 2016-04-20(2)

Thus, pursuant to CPLR 213 (2), the plaintiffs had six years within which to commence an action to recover the initial $250,000 installment (see Vitale v Giaimo, 103 AD3d at 838; Seattle Pac. Indus., Inc. v Golden Val. Realty Assoc., 54 AD3d at 931-932; Cognetta v Valencia Devs., Inc., 8 AD3d at 319).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and fraud claims.

Lama v. Malik · filed 2016-06-21

See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213; § 214(3). Without equitable tolling, Plaintiffs claims for unjust ... and fraud as of May 14, 2007 are timely, and Plaintiffs claim for conversion is time-barred and hereby dismissed.

Section 213(2) requires an action on an express or implied contractual obligation or liability to be commenced within six years.

Zakeni Ltd. v. Spyr, Inc. · filed 2016-08-24(2)

Under New York law, an action upon a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied, must be commenced within six years.

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on contract claims for unpaid wages and other compensation.

Waheed v. Habib Bank Ltd. · filed 2016-10-11(2)

Accordingly, this 2015 action for unpaid wages and other compensation is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations, whether the claim is based in contract ( see CPLR 213[2]; Mishalove v Goldfarb , 260 AD2d 219 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 815 [1999]) or the provisions of the Labor Law ( see Labor Law § 198[3]).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period bars royalty contract claims brought more than six years after payment was due when no open, mutual account delays accrual.

Case v. Clivilles · filed 2016-10-24

Thus, the standard statute of limitations applies to- Case’s claims. Case waited more than six years after the payments were due to initiate this action for the royalties due between 2003 and July 1, 2005. Therefore, Clivilles and the Cole- Trusts are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract claims for royalties due before July 1,2005.

CPLR 213 provides a six-year limitations period for contract and fraud actions, which a written agreement may shorten.

D & S Restoration, Inc. v. Wenger Construction Co. · filed 2016-10-27

In this instance, the documentary evidence demonstrates, and there is no dispute, that the parties’ written agreement shortened the limitations period from the statutorily prescribed six years for an action on a contract or based on fraud (CPLR 213) to one year. ... The court therefore finds that the one-year limitations period is enforceable, and may be invoked as a defense in this matter.

Section 213(2) bars a breach of contract claim brought more than six years after it accrues.

Keles v. Hultin · filed 2016-11-23(2)

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s remaining cause of action alleging breach of contract accrued, at the latest, in 1998, and that this cause of action, interposed in 2012 when this action was commenced, was therefore barred by the statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]; Guarino v North Country Mtge. Banking Corp., 79 AD3d 805, 806 [2010]).

CPLR 213 sets a six-year limitations period for actions to recover a debt and foreclose the mortgages securing it.

Maidman Family Parking, LP v. Wallace Industries, Inc. · filed 2016-12-01

Despite the default, plaintiff did not commence this action to recover the debt owed and to foreclose upon the mortgages until July 2, 2015, well beyond the six-year limitations period (see CPLR 213).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to claims under a separation agreement incorporated but not merged into a divorce judgment.

Allard v. Allard · filed 2016-12-08(2)

A separation agreement, incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce, is an independent contract legally binding on the parties (see Merl v Merl, 67 NY2d 359, 362 [1986]; Kleila v Kleila, 50 NY2d 277, 283 [1980]; Mills v Mills, 22 AD3d 1003, 1003 [2005]; Hoyt v Hoyt, 307 AD2d 621, 622 [2003]), and is thus subject to the six-year statute of limitations applied to contract claims (see CPLR 213 [2]; Merl v Merl, 67 NY2d at 362; Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596 [1985]; Chayes v Chayes, 28 AD3d 355, 356-357 [2006]).

Section 213(2) limits breach of contract claims to those that accrued within six years before the action commenced.

Accredited Aides Plus, Inc. v. Program Risk Management, Inc. · filed 2017-01-05(2)

Although plaintiffs adequately pleaded the elements necessary for breach of contract claims as alleged against PRM and PRMCS (see Hyman v Schwartz, 127 AD3d 1281, 1283 [2015]; New York State Workers' Compensation Bd. v SGRisk, LLC, 116 AD3d 1148, 1153 [2014]), we limit the claims to those that accrued within the six-year limitations period before this action was commenced (see CPLR 213 [2]; Kosowsky v Willard Mtn., Inc., 90 AD3d 1127, 1131 [2011]; see also New York State Workers' Compensation Bd. v SGRisk, LLC, 116 AD3d at 1153).