N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213

Section 213 provides six-year limitation periods for constructive trust and forgery claims.

In re the Estate of Lupoli · filed 1997-03-17[1], [8]

In any event, the objections seeking imposition of a constructive trust were time-barred, as they were brought long after the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to such claims had expired, regardless of whether the cause of action is deemed to have accrued at the time the property was transferred, i.e., 1965 and 1967, or 1976, when the corporation to which the property was transferred was dissolved (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Sitkowski v Petzing, 175 AD2d 801; Scheuer v Scheuer, 308 NY 447; Mattera v Mattera, 125 AD2d 555, 556-557; Augustine v Szwed, 77 AD2d 298, 300-301; Bey Constr. Co. v Yablonski, 76 AD2d 875).

Section 213(2) gives contract claims a six-year limitations period.

Estate of Re v. Kornstein Veisz & Wexler · filed 1997-04-02(2)

Under the logic of the Santulli line of authority, then, however plaintiffs’ claims are characterized — as breach of fiduciary duty, malpractice, or breach of contract — plaintiffs filed their complaint within the six year limitations period then applicable.

Subdivision 1 applies a six-year limitation period to the plaintiff’s claim for alimony arrears before the application was commenced.

Zaid v. Zaid · filed 1997-04-28(1)

The Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff was entitled to alimony arrears for the six years prior to the commencement of her application and for those arrears which had accrued during the pendency of the application (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Domestic Relations Law § 244-a; Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596; Beige v Beige, 226 AD2d 412).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to actions based on a contractual obligation.

Carollo v. Cement & Concrete Workers District Council Pension Plan · filed 1997-05-19(2)

In the absence of a statutorily prescribed limitations period, the court applies the most analogous state statute of limitations, see Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S., 478, 483-84, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1794-95, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980), in this case, the six-year limitation period set forth in Rule 213 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. 213; Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conf. Pension and Retirement Fund, 698 F.2d 593, 598 (2d Cir.1983). That section has two subsections: § 213(2), applying to actions upon a “contractual obligation,” and § 213(1), applying to “actions for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law.” The Second Circuit in Miles did not specify which governs. For the reasons stated in Barnett v. International Business Machines Corp., 885 F.Supp. 581. (S.D.N.Y.1995), this court considers § 213(2), which applies to a contractual liability, to be more appropriate.

Section 213(2) bars an action upon a guaranty after six years.

Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Horten · filed 1997-05-19(2)

We thus conclude that Orix’s cause of action against the Guarantors is barred by the six-year limitations period of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2).

Section 213 requires actions on express or implied contractual obligations to be commenced within six years.

Carranza v. Prinz · filed 1997-06-02(2)

CPLR 213 provides that an action upon a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied, is to be commenced within six years (see, CPLR 213 [2]), and a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract accrues when the breach occurs (see, Goicoechea v Law Offs. of Stephen R. Kihl, 234 AD2d 507; Garden City Imaging Ctr. v Lawrence & Walsh, 234 AD2d 414; see also, Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402; Tal-Spons Corp. v Nurnberg, 213 AD2d 395, 396).

Section 213 gives DSS six years to commence an action on the implied contract to repay public assistance.

In re the Estate of Bustamante · filed 1997-07-15

Since the agreement is in the nature of an implied contract, CPLR 213 then affords DSS six. years to commence the action.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for an action for injunctive relief.

City of New York v. Delafield 246 Corp. · filed 1997-07-24(1)

In any event, this action was commenced within six months of the City’s February 1989 demand that Delafield Associates fulfill its obligations under the agreements. Accordingly, this action for injunctive relief is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations in CPLR 213 (1) (supra, at 439), and was timely asserted.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period, but it does not govern a goods-sold-and-delivered claim subject to UCC 2-725.

Eurogen, Inc. v. Censor · filed 1997-09-30(2)

Plaintiff’s attempt to recast its claim for goods sold and delivered as one based on dishonored checks and notes, and thereby bring into play the six-year limitations period of CPLR 213 (2) instead of the four-year period of UCC 2-725, was properly rejected by the motion court for lack of merit.

Section 213(1) requires this type of action to be commenced within six years.

Koslowski v. Koslowski · filed 1997-12-01(1)

Accordingly, the plaintiffs demand for an accounting is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, Matter of Barabash, 31 NY2d 76; Matter of Behr, 191 AD2d 431; NJ Stat Annot § 2A:14-1; CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(2) requires actions upon a contractual obligation to be commenced within six years.

Gonzalez v. Anchor Bank Corp. · filed 1997-12-16(2)

Since defendant bank was no longer subject to article 6 of the Banking Law inasmuch as it was chartered as a Federal mutual savings bank in 1980, plaintiff may not avail himself of the 20-year Statute of Limitations prescribed in Banking Law § 239 (7) (see, Banking Law § 2 [4]; § 229 [1]), and his action, whether characterized as one for recovery by a depositor of money paid upon an unauthorized signature (see, Banking Law § 676) or one for money had and received, is governed by the six-year period of limitations applicable to actions upon a contractual obligation (CPLR 213 [2]; see, Hechter v New York Life Ins. Co., 46 NY2d 34, 39-40; Schreibman v Chase Manhattan Bank, 15 AD2d 769, 770-771). Thus, inasmuch as any cause of action on plaintiff’s behalf accrued on March 29, 1985, the date of the bank’s allegedly improper payment and not on the subsequent date when he received knowledge of defendant’s alleged breach (see, Bollag v National City Bank, 225 App Div 218; Wakulaw v State Bank, 214 App Div 673, 677), the complaint was properly dismissed as time-barred.

Section 213(1) requires a constructive trust claim to be brought within six years.

Fiore v. Fiore · filed 1998-02-02(1)

which is governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Loengard v Santa Fe Indus., 70 NY2d 262; Lucci v Lucci, 227 AD2d 387; Matter of Wallace, 191 AD2d 638).

Section 213 requires certain contract actions not governed by the UCC to be commenced within six years.

Kenneth E. Raine, as Trustee Under a Trust Agreement (1954) v. Rko General, Inc. Turner Entertainment Co., Rko Pictures, · filed 1998-02-27

The parties agree that New York law applies, and that a six-year limitations period applies to claims for breach of contract that are not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213 (McKinney 1990). Raine concedes that his claims are not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. ... Thus, any of Raine’s claims which accrued before June 9,1988 are time-barred.

Section 213 gives contract actions a six-year limitations period.

Werner v. Werner · filed 1998-03-11

In sum, the instant action is not so much a “matrimonial”, as a contract action, for which the Statute of Limitations is six years (CPLR 213).

Section 213 imposes a six-year limitations period for an action on a lease obligation.

833 Northern Corp. v. Tashlik & Associates, P. C. · filed 1998-03-30

The Statute of Limitations for an action upon a lease obligation is six years (see, CPLR 213; Parker v Town of Clarkstown, 217 AD2d 607). Since this action was commenced on April 1, 1997, we agree with the defendant that those portions of the first and third causes of action which sought additional rent under the terms of the lease prior to April 1, 1991, are barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract claims a six-year limitations period.

Cooper v. Parsky · filed 1998-04-02(2)

By the same token, since the rights and obligations of the Coopers and the Voters were defined by the Voting Agreement, and that agreement expressly provided that the Voters could be held liable for acts of gross negligence or willful misconduct, allegations of such malfeasance may properly be viewed as stating a claim for breach of contract, which is governed by the six-year statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2).

Section 213(1) and (2) impose a six-year limitations period on the contract and equitable claims at issue.

Held v. Kaufman · filed 1998-04-07[1], [2]

We agree with the Appellate Division that plaintiffs second and third causes of action, for breach of contract and for a constructive trust based on a breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment, both of which arise out of defendants’ refusal to honor the alleged 1982 agreement, should be dismissed. Plaintiffs affidavit admits that Ivan Kaufman disavowed the agreement as early as 1988. Thus, these two claims, asserted in an action commenced seven years later, are time barred (see, CPLR 213 [1], [2]).

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period for the claim at issue.

Donaldson Acoustics, Inc. v. New York Institute of Technology · filed 1998-04-13(2)

In making this threshold determination, “the courts must apply the same period of limitations in arbitration that would govern if an action were brought on the claim being arbitrated” (Matter of Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v Luckie, supra, at 206-207). Here, the applicable period of limitations is six years (see, CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 requires rescission, reformation, and fraud claims to be brought within the applicable six-year period, measured under the rules stated in the relevant subsection.

Goldberg v. Manufacturers Life Insurance · filed 1998-04-21(6), (8)

A cause of action for rescission or reformation based on mistake is governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [6]; Matter of Wallace v 600 Partners Co., 86 NY2d 543, 547), a period that begins to run from the time that the alleged error was committed; here, that would be in 1988 with the purchase of the policy.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for the legal malpractice actions described here.

Dowd v. Law Plan Hyatt Legal Services · filed 1998-04-27(2)

The legal malpractice actions in this case, commenced prior to the' recent amendments to CPLR 214 (6) (L 1996, ch 623, § 2), are governed by a six-year limitations period (see, CPLR 213 [2]; Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 78 NY2d 700; Sears Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assocs., 43 NY2d 389, 396; see also, Ruffolo v Garbarini & Scher, 239 AD2d 8; Romeo v Schmidt, 244 AD2d 860).

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on the contractual tap-in-fee claim.

Bennett Road Sewer Co. v. Town Board of Town of Camillus · filed 1998-04-29(2)

Because that claim is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]), the court should have limited plaintiff to tap-in fees for the six years prior to the commencement of this action.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year statute of limitations for claims subject to its catch-all provision.

Village of Hoosick Falls v. Allard · filed 1998-04-30(1)

Initially, we agree with Supreme Court’s conclusion that the first, second and fifth causes of action were time barred, applying even the catch-all six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (1).

Section 213 requires an action to be commenced within six years of accrual.

Key Bank v. Del Norte, Inc. · filed 1998-06-04

In seeking to exclude or remove another’s interest in property upon the ground that full payment of the mortgage obligation was made, petitioner was required to commence this proceeding within the six-year Statute of Limitations period (see, Orange & Rockland Utils, v Philwold Estates, 70 AD2d 338, 341-342, mod 52 NY2d 253).

Section 213(2) requires an action upon a contractual obligation to be commenced within six years.

Kandilaris v. Lindover · filed 1998-06-09(2)

In this action by plaintiff to be indemnified for loss sustained as a result of being held liable as guarantor of promissory notes made by defendant’s decedent, the IAS Court properly dismissed the action as barred by a six-year limitations period (CPLR 213 [2]) that began to run when plaintiffs property was sold at auction in satisfaction of her liability (see, State of New York v Stewart’s Ice Cream Co., 64 NY2d 83, 88-89), and not, as plaintiff argues, when her appellate remedies were exhausted.

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on the plaintiff's causes of action to recover damages for fraud and impose a constructive trust.

Satler v. Merlis · filed 1998-07-20[1]

She admitted that she was aware from the time of the purchase of the condominium in 1988 that her name was not on the title. Accordingly, the six-year Statute of Limitations on her causes of action to recover damages for fraud and to impose a constructive trust had run before she commenced the instant action in 1996 (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Starkey v Starkey, 192 AD2d 844; Dybowski v Dybowska, 146 AD2d 604).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for contract claims.

Kailash C. Pani, M.D., and Kailash C. Pani, M.D., P.C. v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield · filed 1998-07-24

Under New York law, the statute of limitations is three years for tort claims and six years for contract claims. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 213, 214 (McKinney’s 1990).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for applicable New York claims.

Manginaro v. Welfare Fund of Local 771, IATSE · filed 1998-07-27

Accordingly, I will apply the six-year statute of limitations of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213 to plaintiffs’ benefits claims.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions based on a contractual obligation or liability.

Martin v. Canale · filed 1998-07-30(2)

In our view, plaintiffs legal malpractice action, commenced prior to the amendment to CPLR 214 (6) (L 1996, ch 623, § 2), is governed by a six-year limitations period (see, CPLR 213 [2]; Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh, supra; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assocs., 43 NY2d 389).

Section 213 generally requires actions to be commenced within six years, including equitable claims and fraud claims subject to its accrual and discovery rules.

Freiman v. Freiman · filed 1998-08-20(1), (8)

Thus, defendant’s 1997 claim of mutual mistake in the execution of the 1985 contract is time barred (CPLR 213 [1], [2]). ... Defendant’s fraud claim is also untimely since (a) it was not commenced within six years after the commission of the fraud, (b) defendant could have discovered the purported fraud within a reasonable time after the marriage (Pacchiana v Pacchiana, supra; CPLR 213 [8]), and (c) defendant’s conclusory, unsubstantiated statement that she discovered the fraud in October 1995, 21 months prior to her assertion of fraud, is an insufficient basis to establish actual, timely discovery of the fraud (see, CPLR 203 [g]; Garguilio v Garguilio, 201 AD2d 617, 618; Cucchiaro v Cucchiaro, 165 Misc 2d 134, 138-139; see also, Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp., 81 NY2d 90, 94).

Section 213 requires actions for breach of contract and unjust enrichment to be commenced within six years after accrual.

L & L Plumbing & Heating v. DePalo · filed 1998-08-24

The plaintiff’s causes of action to recover damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment had to be asserted within six years after their accrual (see, CPLR 213; Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection v Gateway State Bank, 239 AD2d 826).

Section 213 generally provides a six-year limitations period that begins when the claimant has the legal right to obtain payment in court.

Continental Insurance v. Right · filed 1998-09-21

Generally, a demand for arbitration is subject to a six-year Statute of Limitation (see, CPLR 213), which begins to run “when all of the facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred so that the party would be entitled to obtain relief in court” (Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169, 175). Stated another way, “a claimant’s cause of action does not accrue until it possesses the legal right to be paid and to enforce its right to payment in court” (City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 668).

Section 213(2) requires contract claims to be commenced within six years of accrual.

Metropolis Seaport Associates, L.P. v. South Street Seaport Corp. · filed 1998-09-22(2)

As to the timeliness of plaintiff’s individual causes for breach and reformation, those contract claims were timely interposed, contrary to defendants’ arguments, since they are governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]; Tursi v St. Joseph’s Sanatorium, 133 AD2d 910, 911-912), and accrued upon delivery of the subject lease at the closing on December 23, 1988 (see, 219 Broadway Corp. v Alexander’s, Inc., 46 NY2d 506, 511).

Section 213(4) provides a six-year limitations period for actions on a promissory note.

Fulgenzi v. Rink · filed 1998-09-28(4)

Thus, it is clear that the action on the promissory note was timely commenced within the six-year Statute of Limitations period generally applicable to actions upon a note (see, CPLR 213 [4]) and the only question to be determined is the amount due the plaintiff (see generally, Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v Campcore, Inc., 81 NY2d 138, 141; see also, Pagano v Smith, 201 AD2d 632, 633; cf., Khoury v Alger, 174 AD2d 918).

Section 213(1) sets a six-year limitations period for constructive fraud claims.

Lippe v. Bairnco Corp. · filed 1998-10-13(1)

The constructive fraud claims are governed by a six year statute of limitations. See CPLR § 213(1); ... The constructive fraud claims, with the exception of claims under § 273-a, run from the date of the allegedly fraudulent transfer.

Section 213(2) supplies a general six-year limitations period that yields to a more specific limitations period.

A.C. Legnetto Construction, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance · filed 1998-10-15(2)

Thus, the more specific limitations period provided in State Finance Law § 137 (4) (b) must prevail over the more general period provided in CPLR 213 (2).

For mortgage foreclosure, the six-year limitations period begins when the mortgagee is entitled to demand full payment.

Serapilio v. Staszak · filed 1998-11-19(4)

Plaintiffs correctly assert that CPLR 213 (4) requires a foreclosure action to be commenced within six years of the time the mortgagee is entitled to demand full payment; however, defendant as the mortgagee herein is not yet entitled to demand full payment. By its own terms, the mortgage is governed by the dictates of the Social Services Law. Social Services Law § 106 (2) (c) provides that the mortgagee may begin foreclosure proceedings “upon the death of the [mortgagor] or his [or her] receiving institutional care”. As plaintiffs have neither died nor been institutionalized, defendant is prohibited from commencing foreclosure proceedings on their property. Hence, not only has the Statute of Limitations not run on a potential foreclosure action, it has not yet begun to run.

Section 213(1) requires actions with no specifically prescribed limitation period to be commenced within six years.

Rivera v. Rivera · filed 1998-11-23[1]

A review of the record demonstrates that the presently-asserted claim for child support arrears is time-barred (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596, 598; Zaid v Zaid, 238 AD2d 581; Miller v Miller, 156 AD2d 164; cf., Dox v Tynon, 90 NY2d 166).

Section 213 applies six-year limitations periods to fraud and fiduciary-duty claims under subsections (8) and (2), measured from the applicable accrual date.

Chambi v. Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler · filed 1999-01-19(8), (2)

Whatever the merits of plaintiff’s claims against Strickon, his allegedly fraudulent acts occurred in 1981, and any cause of action against him for fraud is time-barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [8]). ... To the extent plaintiff claims that Strickon and his law firm breached their fiduciary duty as escrow agents for the stock, such claim accrued, at the latest, in 1984, when the stock was transferred to Weinstein, and became time-barred six years later (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(1) gives constructive fraud claims a six-year limitations period, accruing when the fraud or conveyance occurs.

Wall Street Associates v. Brodsky · filed 1999-01-28(1)

New York law provides that a claim for constructive fraud is governed by the six-year limitation set out in CPLR 213 (1), and that such a claim arises at the time the fraud or conveyance occurs (Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v Pappadio, 606 F Supp 631, 632).

Section 213 requires actions to be commenced within six years after the claim accrues.

Salvation Army v. New York Community Trust · filed 1999-03-04

Petitioner’s present challenge to the termination of those distributions, brought considerably more than six years from its repudiation as a beneficiary, is, accordingly, time-barred (see, CPLR 213; Matter of Barabash, 31 NY2d 76) and was correctly dismissed by the Surrogate.

Section 213(1) applies a six-year limitations period to the declaratory judgment claim challenging the ordinance.

Ernalex Construction Realty Corp. v. City of Glen Cove · filed 1998-12-07(1)

The Supreme Court therefore erroneously determined that the second cause of action was untimely (see, CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(2) gives contract actions a six-year limitations period.

Mishalove v. Goldfarb · filed 1999-04-13(2)

Accordingly plaintiffs action for breach of an alleged employment agreement, commenced on April 15, 1997, was barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations period for contract actions (CPLR 213 [2]).

C.P.L.R. § 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for actions with no other prescribed period.

Gonyon v. Transtate Insurance · filed 1999-05-17(1)

The Supreme Court properly determined that the six-year Statute of Limitations applies (see, CPLR 213 [1]), and that the plaintiff was entitled to commence an action for a judgment declaring the rights and responsibilities of the parties (see, Tepedino v Zurich-Am. Ins. Group, 220 AD2d 579; Costa v Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 204 AD2d 591; Insurance Law § 3420; Fabian v MVAIC, 111 AD2d 366, 367).

Section 213(1) applies a six-year limitations period to equitable actions generally.

Fandy Corp. v. Chen · filed 1999-06-07(1)

The plaintiffs causes of action based on constructive fraud and negligent misrepresentation are covered by the six-year Statute of Limitations governing equitable actions in general (see, CPLR 213 [1]; ...).

Section 213(2) bars claims accruing more than six years before the action was commenced.

Jacobs v. Macy's East, Inc. · filed 1999-06-28(2)

In addition, all claims for moneys due arising out of alleged improper deductions made before August 8, 1990, are time-barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (Labor Law § 198 [3]; CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for this declaratory judgment action.

Boyce v. Rinehart · filed 1999-07-08

We agree with the parties that the applicable Statute of Limitations for this declaratory judgment action is the six-year provision of CPLR 213.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for this contract-based action.

Santiago v. 1370 Broadway Associates, L.P. · filed 1999-09-16

The applicable Statute of Limitations here is six years (CPLR 213), based upon the contractual relationship between the parties in this third-party action (National Life Ins. Co. v Hall & Co., 67 NY2d 1021; see, AJ Contr. Co. v Trident Mgrs., 234 AD2d 195).

Section 213 provides six-year limitation periods for commercial bribery, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment claims.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Freed · filed 1999-10-01(1), (2)

The Statute of Limitations for the commercial bribery, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment causes of action is six years (see, CPLR 213 [1], [2]).

Section 213 provides six-year limitation periods for actions on contractual obligations and fraud, with fraud claims subject to a two-year discovery period.

Heritage v. Mance · filed 1999-10-14(1), (2), and (8)

Although the complaint is inartfully drafted, its essential theory appears to be that the March 5, 1980 contract is unconscionable and was induced by fraud. Therefore, the action would appear to be governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213, applicable to “an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law” (CPLR 213 [1]), “an action upon a contractual obligation or liability” (CPLR 213 [2]) or “an action based upon fraud” (CPLR 213 [8]). Measured from the date of the parties’ March 5, 1980 agreement, the six-year limitations period would have run in March 1986, more than 11 years prior to the commencement of this action.

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on a breach of contract claim.

Di Siena v. Di Siena · filed 1999-11-10(2)

Since plaintiffs divorce was finalized in 1978, more than six years prior to the commencement of this action, the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]) would bar plaintiffs breach of contract claim concerning the mother’s alleged promise to reconvey the shares after the divorce.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for the contract claim described here.

Pilewski v. Solymosy · filed 1999-11-18

It is clear that, as of January 1996, when plaintiff commenced his legal malpractice action against Brody & Fabiani, a contract claim was viable under the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213, but a tort claim was barred under the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214.

Section 213(2) requires an action upon a contractual obligation or liability to be commenced within six years.

Rittner v. City University of New York · filed 1999-12-02(2)

The motion court properly determined that appellant’s claim is time-barred pursuant to CPLR 213 (2).

Section 213 sets a six-year limitations period for covered actions.

New York State Higher Education Services Corp. v. Barry · filed 1999-12-02

Nor is this action barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations set out in CPLR 213. As this Court has previously observed, Congress, by enacting 20 USC § 1091 a (a) (2), has preempted State limitation periods in suits where, as here, the guaranty agency seeks repayment of student loans (see, State of New York Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v Starr, 179 AD2d 992, 993-994).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year statute of limitations for the action to which it applies.

Stamp v. Schenk · filed 1999-12-30[2]

Even assuming the applicability of a six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]), we conclude that the third cause of action is time-barred because the action was not commenced until September 1998.

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on equitable actions.

Spataro v. Spataro · filed 2000-01-18(1)

We further note that under the six-year Statute of Limitations for equitable actions set forth in CPLR 213 (1), the defendant is now time-barred from commencing a plenary action (see, Riley v Riley, 179 AD2d 750).

Section 213(2) bars contract claims brought more than six years after they accrue.

Yang v. Lehman Bros. · filed 2000-02-03(2)

Based on plaintiffs judicial admissions, the court properly determined that his causes of action to recover bonus compensation to which he was allegedly entitled were barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, Matter of Union Indem. Ins. Co., 89 NY2d 94; Walsh v Pyramid Co., 228 AD2d 259; see also, CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(1) gives constructive trust actions a six-year limitations period that runs from the wrongful act creating the duty to make restitution.

Mazzone v. Mazzone · filed 2000-02-28(1)

An action to impose a constructive trust is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations provided by CPLR 213 (1), which “ ‘commences to run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act ... giving rise to a duty of restitution and not from the time the facts constituting the fraud are discovered’ ” (Mattera v Mattera, 125 AD2d 555, 556-557).

CPLR 213 imposes a six-year statute of limitations on the State's action to recover fraudulently obtained unemployment benefits.

In re the Claim of Barr · filed 2000-03-02

To the contrary, the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 controls (see, People v Duggan, 30 AD2d 736).

Section 213 provides six-year limitation periods for indemnity and fraud claims.

Eastern States Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. · filed 2000-03-03(2), (8)

The relevant Statute of Limitations for the various causes of action range from one year for the intentional torts (see, CPLR 215 [3]) to six years for the indemnity and fraud claims. (See, CPLR 213 [2], [8].) Because the various claims accrued more than six years before the actions were commenced, there is no need to evaluate the Statute of Limitations for each particular claim.

Section 213(4) requires an action on a mortgage debt to be commenced within six years.

Citibank, N. A. v. McGlone · filed 2000-03-21(4)

Without the benefit of the tolling provision of CPLR 306-b, plaintiffs cause of action on a mortgage defaulted in 1990 was clearly time-barred by 1998 (CPLR 213 [4]).

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on a proceeding seeking an accounting from a fiduciary.

In re the Estate of Rodken · filed 2000-03-30(1)

Where, as here, a petitioner seeks an accounting from a fiduciary, the proceeding is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) (see, Matter of Winne, 232 AD2d 956, 957; Matter of Behr, 191 AD2d 431).

For a constructive trust claim, CPLR 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period that starts when the wrongful conduct or event creating a duty to make restitution occurs.

Maric Piping, Inc. v. Maric · filed 2000-04-10(1)

The equitable claim for the imposition of a constructive trust is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (1) (see, Krauss v Iliescu, 259 AD2d 468), which begins to run at the time of the wrongful conduct or event giving rise to a duty of restitution (see, Dybowski v Dybowska, 146 AD2d 604; Kitchner v Kitchner, 100 AD2d 954).

Section 213 requires an action to recover money loaned to be commenced within six years of accrual unless the limitations period is tolled.

Skiadas v. Terovolas · filed 2000-04-10

Pursuant to CPLR 213, an action to recover money loaned must be commenced within six years of the accrual date unless the statute is tolled. In this case, the accrual dates were the dates upon which the individual loans were made.

Section 213 requires this action to be commenced within six years after the attorney-client relationship ends.

Walker v. Danziger & Markhoff, L. L. P. · filed 2000-04-17

The Supreme Court properly dismissed the action as time-barred since it was commenced more than six years after the cessation of the attorney-client relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants (see, CPLR 213; Goicoechea v Law Offs, of Stephen R. Kihl, 234 AD2d 507; Tal-Spoons Corp. v Nurnberg, 213 AD2d 395).

Section 213(4) requires mortgage foreclosure actions to be commenced within six years.

Torsoe Bros. Construction Corp. v. McKenzie · filed 2000-04-24(4)

When the interval between the prior order dated September 13, 1994, and the date on which the prior judgment was returned as unsatisfied is subtracted from the period separating Guiliano’s original default on the guarantee from the commencement of this action, it is clear that this action was commenced in a timely manner against the McKenzies (see, CPLR 213 [4]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for declaratory judgment actions seeking judicial salary parity.

Nelson v. Lippman · filed 2000-04-27(1)

We have previously held that the appropriate Statute of Limitations in declaratory judgment actions for judicial salary parity is six years, as provided by CPLR 213 (1) (see, Davis v Rosenblatt, 159 AD2d 163, 169, appeal dismissed 77 NY2d 823, 834, 79 NY2d 822, lv denied 79 NY2d 757, 758; see also, Dickinson v Crosson, supra, at 52; Deutsch v Crosson, 171 AD2d 837, 838-839, lv denied 78 NY2d 857).

Section 213(8) gives constructive fraud claims a six-year limitations period, running from the fraudulent conveyance.

Liberty Co. v. Boyle · filed 2000-05-08(8)

A cause of action based on constructive fraud in New York is governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [8]), and such a cause of action arises at the time the fraudulent conveyance occurs (see, Wall St. Assocs. v Brodsky, 257 AD2d 526, 530).

Subsection (1) provides a six-year limitations period when no other prescribed limitations period applies.

Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Town Board of Town of Guilderland · filed 2000-05-11(1)

Thus, even applying the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1), petitioners’ claim, measured from April 1991, is time barred.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for an action on a contractual obligation.

State v. Sella · filed 2000-07-31(2)

In view of the six-year Statute of Limitations which governs here, plaintiff had to commence this action by sometime after July 7, 2000. (See, CPLR 213 [2].)

CPLR 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for challenging a legislative enactment in a declaratory judgment action.

Federation of Mental Health Centers, Inc. v. DeBuono · filed 2000-08-10(1)

A legislative enactment must be challenged in an action for a declaratory judgment (see, Matter of Ames Volkswagen v State Tax Commn., 47 NY2d 345, 348) with its six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [1]), while a quasi-legislative act of an administrative agency requires CPLR article 78 review (see, New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d 194, 204) which has a four-month limitations period (see, CPLR 217).

Section 213 requires an action to be commenced within six years.

Loscalzo v. Lupinacci · filed 2000-08-14

Since the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to the existence of an indemnification agreement, and since the plaintiff made payment to the New York State Department of Taxation within six years of commencing an action, the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the complaint as time-barred (see, CPLR 213).

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period that begins to run, at the earliest, on the date of the judgment for a claim requiring an unsatisfied judgment.

Grace v. Rosenstock · filed 2000-08-25(1)

Because "[t]he existence of an unsatisfied judgment is an essential element of [§273 a]," Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Frybergh v. Weissman, 145 A.D.2d 531, 531, 536 N.Y.S.2d 465, 466 (2d Dept. 1988), the limitations period, which is six years, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. §213(1) (McKinney 1990), begins to run, at the earliest, on the date of the judgment, see Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d at 21.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for actions by receivers of failed financial institutions and their assignees to recover assets.

CDS Recoveries, L. L. C. v. Davis · filed 2000-11-02(4)

Turning to the “catch-all” six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1), we note that CPLR 213 (4), which contains the same limitations period, is the appropriate provision herein since it applies to actions commenced by receivers of failed financial institutions and their assignees to recover assets and begins to run from the date of the appointment of the receiver (see, Federal Fin. Co. v Levine, 248 AD2d 25, 27).

Section 213 supplies a six-year limitations period for these fraud based causes of action, measured from the initial alleged breach.

Welwart v. Dataware Electronics Corp. · filed 2000-11-20

The complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213, since the causes of action are, essentially, based upon the alleged fraud of the defendants in depriving the plaintiff of shares of stock and diverting the profits of the corporation. ... Since the applicable limitations period of six years has expired, the plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period measured from the event that triggers the claim.

In re the Estate of Allen · filed 2000-12-18(1)

The event which triggered the running of the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [1]) was Allen’s 1998 refusal to sell a portion of the Stock Account so that Bass could satisfy the specific bequests as the Supreme Court had directed in its order entered February 20, 1998.

Section 213(1) requires an action seeking a declaration that legislation is unconstitutional to be commenced within six years.

Schulz v. New York State Legislature · filed 2000-12-21[1]

Moreover, petitioners’ 1998 request for a declaration that Chapter 682 — enacted in 1985 — is unconstitutional is untimely (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 230; Matter of Frontier Ins. Co. v Town Bd. of Town of Thompson, 252 AD2d 928, 930), and is barred on the ground of laches as well, as Supreme Court so held (see, Matter of Schulz v State of New York, 81 NY2d 336, 345-349).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period when no other limitations period applies.

Shavit v. Shavit · filed 2000-12-21(1)

As such, the general six-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 213 (1), rather than the 20-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 211 (e), applies.

The six-year limitations period applies to equitable constructive trust claims and begins when the wrongful conduct or event giving rise to restitution occurs.

Jakacic v. Jakacic · filed 2001-01-22(1)

The equitable claim for the imposition of a constructive trust is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (1), which begins to run at the time of the wrongful conduct or event giving rise to a duty of restitution (see, Lucci v Lucci, 227 AD2d 387, 389).

Section 213(4) imposes a six-year limitations period on a foreclosure action after the mortgage debt is accelerated.

EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Patella · filed 2001-01-29[4]

Although a lender may revoke its election to accelerate the mortgage, the dismissal of the prior foreclosure action by the court did not constitute an affirmative act by the lender revoking its election to accelerate, and the record is barren of any affirmative act of revocation occurring during the six-year Statute of Limitations period subsequent to the initiation of the prior action (see, Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Mebane, supra, at 894). Consequently, this foreclosure action is time-barred (see, CPLR 213 [4]).

Section 213(8) bars a fraud action brought more than six years after the fraud when the plaintiff had information necessary to discover it within that period.

American Federal Group, Ltd. v. Union Chelsea National Bank · filed 2001-01-30(8)

The alleged fraud occurred in March 1988 when defendant paid the check, and the summons and complaint were filed more than six years later in August 1994. In April 1988, plaintiffs received defendant’s statement of account ... enclosing the allegedly fraudulent check, and thus, at that time, had the information necessary to discover the alleged fraud within the six-year limitations period. The action was therefore time-barred under CPLR 213 (8), and 203 (g).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for the breach of fiduciary duty claim described here.

Posner v. Posner · filed 2001-02-08(1)

As the gravamen of the claim is breach of fiduciary duty, the IAS Court correctly applied the six-year limitations period applicable to such a claim (CPLR 213 [1]; see, Unibell Anesthesia v Guardian Life Ins. Co., 239 AD2d 248; Fava v Kaufman, 124 AD2d 42).

Section 213(2) requires actions for account stated, quantum meruit, and breach of contract to be commenced within six years.

Lord Day & Lord, Barrett, Smith v. Broadwall Management, Inc. · filed 2001-03-16(2)

The Statute of Limitations for the account stated, quantum meruit and breach of contract causes of action is six years (CPLR 213 [2]; Stewart v Stuart, 262 AD2d 396 [2d Dept 1999]; Moors v Hall, 143 AD2d 336, 339-340 [2d Dept 1988]).

Section 213 provides six-year limitations periods for misrepresentation, contract, and fraud claims.

Santiago v. 1370 Broadway Associates, LP · filed 2001-03-22(1), (2), and (8)

That a breach of contract claim against insurance agents and brokers would be governed by the six-year statute (CPLR 213 [2]) does not, however, resolve this appeal because Herbert, in its third-party complaint, has not asserted a breach of contract claim against Essential. ... Fraud (CPLR 213 [8]) and misrepresentation (CPLR 213 [1]) have six-year limitations periods; negligence has a three-year limitations period (CPLR 214 [4]).

CPLR 213(4) provides a six-year limitations period for mortgage foreclosure actions, subject to applicable tolling.

Mercury Capital Corp. v. Shepherds Beach, Inc. · filed 2001-03-26(4)

Thus, the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (4) was tolled pursuant to CPLR 204 (a) only from January 27, 1994, to May 31, 1995. Since this foreclosure action was not commenced until August 19, 1999, it was not timely.

Section 213 imposes a six-year limitations period on dissolution or accounting actions.

Lord Day & Lord v. Socialist Republic of Vietnam · filed 2001-03-27

Such a cause of action accrues when the corporation ceases to operate, Van Suetendael v. Van Suetendael, 293 N.Y. 233, 235, 56 N.E.2d 563 (N.Y.1944) and is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (CPLR § 213).

The six-year limitations period does not apply to a declaratory challenge to a zoning variance when a 30-day special proceeding deadline governs.

Sirianno v. New York RSA No. 3 Cellular Partnership · filed 2001-06-08(1)

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [1]) does not apply to that cause of action.

Section 213 imposes a six-year limitations period, and a partial payment can restart that period.

Saljanin v. Vuksanaj · filed 2001-06-25

Contrary to the appellants’ contentions, this action was not barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213; Scionti v Reid, 238 AD2d 496; Park Assocs. v Crescent Park Assocs., 159 AD2d 460). Although the subject note matured on December 31, 1990, and this action was not commenced until July 24,1997, a partial payment on the note was made in April 1992, which started the Statute of Limitations running anew (see, Roth v Michelson, 55 NY2d 278, 281; see also, Brooklyn Bank v Barnaby, 197 NY 210).

Section 213 imposes a six-year limitation period on actions based on contractual obligations and actions for which no specific limitation period is prescribed.

Duhamel v. Duhamel · filed 2001-06-28(1), (2)

While this Court concludes that the entry of the QDRO is governed by CPLR 213’s six-year limitation period, a limitation period does not begin to run until a cause of action or claim has accrued.

Section 213(7) provides a six-year statute of limitations for claims involving diversion or misappropriation of corporate assets and breach of fiduciary duty.

Toscano v. Toscano · filed 2001-07-23(7)

Pursuant to CPLR 213 (7), a six-year Statute of Limitations was applicable (see, Rupert v Tigue, 259 AD2d 946; Blake v Blake, 225 AD2d 337; Tobias v Tobias, 192 AD2d 438).

Section 213's limitations period had expired for the plaintiff's claim for reimbursement of employment-related expenses.

McCoy v. Nulux, Inc. · filed 2001-07-30

Furthermore, the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff’s claim for reimbursement of certain employment-related expenses, on the ground that the Statute of Limitations had run (see, CPLR 213).

Section 213(4) requires mortgage foreclosure actions to be commenced within six years after the debt is accelerated.

Arbisser v. Gelbelman · filed 2001-09-17[4]

Once the mortgage debt was accelerated, all sums became immediately due and payable, and the Statute of Limitations began to run (see, EMC Mtge. Corp. v Patella, 279 AD2d 604; Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Mebane, 208 AD2d 892). ... Accordingly, the six-year Statute of Limitations had already expired when Action No. 1 was commenced in July 1997, and the complaint in Action No. 1 is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant (see, CPLR 213 [4]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for commercial bribery, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Freed · filed 2001-11-09[1], [2]

There is a six-year Statute of Limitations for the causes of action for commercial bribery, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment (see, CPLR 213 [1], [2]) and a three-year Statute of Limitations for the cause of action for tortious interference with contract (see, CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 213 requires covered actions, including certain corporate waste and accounting claims, to be commenced within six years.

Golden Pacific Bancorp, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Defendant-Counter · filed 2001-12-07(1), (7)

The statute of limitations in New York for claims of unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, corporate waste, and for an accounting is generally six years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 213(1), (7) (McKinney 1990) ... Under New York law, the limitations period for claims arising out of a fiduciary relationship does not commence “until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been otherwise terminated.” ... Bancorp’s lawsuit — filed on October 31, 1995 — is thus timely under the six-year statute of limitations that began on November 1, 1995, when the fiduciary relationship ended.

Section 213(2) gives breach of contract claims a six-year limitations period that begins when the breach occurs.

Soskel v. Handler · filed 2001-12-10(2)

With respect to plaintiffs second cause of action based upon breach of contract, the statute of limitations is six years (CPLR 213 [2]). A claim for breach of contract accrues upon the breach (see Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for an action for indemnity.

State v. Ackley · filed 2001-12-20[2]

An action for indemnity is governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations (see, State of New York v Stewart’s Ice Cream Co., 64 NY2d 83, 86; State of New York v Speonk Fuel, 273 AD2d 681, 682; see also, CPLR 213 [2]; 23 NY Jur 2d, Contribution, Indemnity, and Subrogation, § 113, at 237).

Section 213(2) bars a breach of contract action commenced more than six years after the alleged breach.

Besicorp, Ltd. v. Kahn · filed 2002-01-10(2)

Giving every favorable inference to the allegations in the complaint (see, Metz v Coopers & Lybrand, 210 AD2d 624, 626), the alleged breach would have occurred more than six years prior to the commencement of this action in September 1999. Thus, it is time barred (see, CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(1) gives rescission actions a six-year statute of limitations.

In re the Estate of Neidich · filed 2002-01-28(1)

Actions for rescission are governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see, CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contractual claims, accruing here when the contractor completed its work.

Amedeo Hotels Ltd. Partnership v. Zwicker Electric Co. · filed 2002-02-26(2)

The IAS court correctly granted Zwicker’s motion to dismiss the complaint as barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to contractual claims (CPLR 213 [2]), which commenced to run upon the completion of Zwicker’s work in or about 1980.

Section 213 supplies the applicable statute of limitations for the debt action, which barred the claim when no sufficient written acknowledgment took it out of the limitations period.

Artisan Stainless Specialties, Inc. v. Broadway Equities · filed 2002-05-13

The defendant’s motion to dismiss, on the ground that this action was time barred pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations, should have been granted. In response to the defendant’s showing that it made no payments towards the loan since October 1991, the plaintiff merely offered the bare conclusory allegations of its principal that the defendant had continuously acknowledged the loan, together with, inter alia, copies of the defendant’s tax returns from 1990 through 1998. The tax returns do not show the existence of a loan by the plaintiff and/or any money due it. Even together with the bare allegations of the plaintiffs principal, the tax returns were insufficient to fulfill the requirement of a written acknowledgment of the loans claimed by the plaintiff so as to take the action out of the operation of the statute of limitations (see CPLR 213; General Obligations Law § 17-101; cf. Manchester v Braedner, 107 NY 346; Anonymous v Anonymous, 172 AD2d 285).

Section 213(8) gives fraud claims a six-year statute of limitations.

Von Hoffmann v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 2002-05-21(8)

Under New York law, the statute of limitations for a claim of fraud is six years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (McKinney 1990).

Section 213(2) supplies a six-year limitations period for the claim at issue.

Janian v. Barnes · filed 2002-05-23(2)

Plaintiffs’ claim accrued, at the earliest, on September 17, 1996, when defendant agreed to purchase the property. Ownership was not disputed until much later, and plaintiffs commenced this action in February 2000, well within the six-year limitations period (see, CPLR 213 [2]; Maio v Gardino, 184 AD2d 872, 873).

CPLR 213(2) provides a six-year statute of limitations for an action upon a contractual obligation.

Pomaro v. Quality Sheet Metal, Inc. · filed 2002-06-10(2)

Nevertheless, we conclude that the Supreme Court correctly granted the motion of the Weiss defendants to dismiss the second cause of action insofar as asserted against them, since that cause of action is barred by the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]). It is well-settled that the statute of limitations on a demand note “begins to run from the date of its execution” (Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v Wickwire, 81 NY2d 138, 143).

CPLR 213 subjects accounting and breach of contract claims to six-year limitation periods.

Cohen v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. · filed 2002-06-20(1), (2)

Therefore, plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is time-barred (CPLR 213 [2]; Rachmani Corp. v 9 E. 96th St. Apt. Corp., 211 AD2d 262, 267), as is his claim for an accounting (CPLR 213 [1]; Matter of Barabash, 37 AD2d 931, 932, revd on other grounds 31 NY2d 76).

Section 213(2) requires an action for breach of contract to be commenced within six years.

La Belle v. Joint Venture of Herkert & La Belle · filed 2002-06-20(2)

As plaintiffs’ action was commenced in July 1999 for defendants’ breach of contract occurring in October 1990, the action is untimely (see, CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for contract actions, subject to an exception for UCC article 2.

Alice A. Baker, Inc. v. Norton · filed 2002-07-09(2)

CPLR 213 (2) sets forth that the statute of limitations on contract actions is six years except as provided in article 2 of the UCC. As a contract for the sale of goods, a motor vehicle retail installment contract falls within the UCC exception and the applicable statute of limitations is four years (UCC 2-725 [1]).

CPLR 213(1) applies a six-year statute of limitations to actions enforcing equitable distribution rights under a divorce judgment.

In re the Estate of Paternostro · filed 2002-09-12(1)

Similarly, that portion of her claim seeking to enforce the equitable distribution of marital property pursuant to the divorce judgment would also be governed by a six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213 (1).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period that begins when the defendant first repudiates the alleged agreement.

Cilibrasi v. Gagliardotto · filed 2002-09-30(1)

Furthermore, the action, which was commenced in October 2000, was not time-barred since the six-year statute of limitations applicable in this case did not start to run until May 2000, when the defendant, in a letter threatening the plaintiff with eviction, first repudiated any alleged agreement to convey to the plaintiff her interest in the subject property (see CPLR 213 [1]; Maric Piping v Maric, 271 AD2d 507, 508).

Section 213(2) requires contract claims to be commenced within six years.

Hussey v. Joseph N. Leggio Agency, Inc. · filed 2002-11-14(2)

Thus, all of plaintiffs claims for unpaid commissions arose after April 1995 and were commenced within the six-year limitation period (see CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on an action to recover on a note, beginning on the execution date for a demand note.

Shelley v. Dixon Equities · filed 2002-12-23(2)

An action to recover on a note is subject to a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]). Further, the statute of limitations on an action to recover on a demand note begins to run upon the date of its execution (see Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v Campcore, Inc., 81 NY2d 138, 143; Pomaro v Quality Sheet Metal, 295 AD2d 416, 418).

Section 213(2)'s six-year limitations period bars a fee claim against defendants served after it expires unless relation back applies.

Day v. Broadwall Management Corp. · filed 2003-01-07(2)

Since service on the estate and the surviving principal (respondents) was made after the statute of limitations had run (CPLR 213 [2]; cf. Stewart v Stuart, 262 AD2d 396, lv denied 94 NY2d 753), the action must be dismissed as against them unless they were “united in interest” with the corporation within the meaning of CPLR 203 (c).

Subsection 213(8) allows fraud actions to be commenced within six years of accrual or within two years after discovery or reasonable discoverability of the fraud, whichever is longer.

Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald · filed 2003-01-16(8)

However, while plaintiff contends that he did not actually discover the alleged fraud until he received the expert handwriting report in November 1997, it is clear from the July 18, 1990 letter to his mother that plaintiff, at that time, “possessed sufficient information to prompt an inquiry that would have led to the discovery of the alleged fraud within six years of its commission” (Hoffman v Cannone, 206 AD2d 740, 741).

Section 213(2) and (8) provide six-year limitation periods for specified contract and fraud claims.

Requa v. Coopers & Lybrand · filed 2003-03-04(2), (8)

Any causes of action that plaintiffs may have against defendant sounding in malpractice, fraud, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, based on defendant’s alleged failure to conduct an audit, accrued in July 1993, at the latest, and were thus time-barred when plaintiffs’ action was commenced in September 2000 (see CPLR 213 [2], [8]; 214 [6]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims.

David B. Nelson, M.D., P.C. v. Stroh · filed 2003-03-10(2)

Therefore, to the extent that Dr. Stroh’s second amended answer and counterclaims alleged breach of contract for the manner in which the joint venture calculated his commission for that year, it was not barred by the six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213).

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud claims.

HSA RESIDENTIAL MORTG. SERVICES OF TX v. Casuccio · filed 2003-03-15(8)

Furthermore, all of the claims asserted are not barred by the statute of limitations-fraud (six years); negligent misrepresentation (six year); and aiding and abetting (six years).

Section 213(2) allows six years to bring a contract claim; here, that period ran from the landlord’s demand for rents the association was required to turn over.

R.V.R. Realty, LLC v. Tenants Alliance · filed 2003-05-22(2)

Accordingly, the action is timely since it was brought within six years of the landlord’s demand (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) imposes a six-year limitations period on contract claims, barring claims for payments made outside that period.

Gannett Suburban Newspapers v. El-Kam Realty Co. · filed 2003-06-09(2)

However, since this claim is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]), Gannett’s claim with respect to any payments made before April 1995 is time-barred.

Section 213 gives an actual fraud claim six years from when the fraud occurred.

Avalon LLC v. Coronet Properties Co. · filed 2003-06-10

The limitation period for actual fraud is either six years from when the fraud took place (CPLR 213) or two years from the date of discovery (CPLR 203 [g]). Any fraud happened in April 1994, so the six-year limitation period expired in April 2000, prior to commencement of this action.

CPLR 213 (1) gives a declaratory judgment action a six-year limitations period when article 78 cannot provide the requested relief.

Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki · filed 2003-06-12(1)

Accordingly, the article 78 statute of limitations does not apply. That being so, plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action falls within the residuary six-year statute of limitations period under CPLR 213 (1) ( see Vigilant Ins. Co. v Housing Auth., 87 NY2d 36, 42 [1995]; see also Solnick, 49 NY2d at 230; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3001:18, at 446).

The six-year limitations period accrues as each premium installment becomes due, rather than when the policy expires.

Commissioners of the State Insurance Fund v. Photocircuits Corp. · filed 2003-10-03(2)

Thus, contrary to defendant’s contention, the statute of limitations did not accrue upon the expiration of the policy period. Defendant cites no case law, and the court fails to locate any case law in support of defendant’s contention that the six-year statute of limitations accrued at the expiration of the policy under these circumstances. Furthermore, to hold otherwise would contradict the “nature of a retrospective premium endorsement under which the amount owed is generally not determined until some time after the policy expires” (American Ins. Co. v Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 554 NW2d 182, 187 [1996], supra). Since plaintiffs action is based on the amounts claimed to be due as set forth in the retrospective accounting billed beginning in February 1998, plaintiffs action is timely.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period that bars recovery of money had and received accruing more than six years before the action.

North Salem Central School District v. Mahopac Central School District · filed 2003-11-10

With regard to Carmel, although the Supreme Court improperly applied the doctrine of laches to dismiss the complaint (see Matter of Ecumenical Task Force of Niagara Frontier v Love Canal Area Revitalization Agency, 179 AD2d 261, 265 [1992]), a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213; Matter of First Natl. City Bank v City of N.Y. Fin. Admin., supra; Board of Educ. of Sachem Cent. School Dist. at Holbrook v Jones, 205 AD2d 486, 487 [1994]), bars the recovery against that defendant of money had and received before August 14, 1994.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law.

People v. Delgado · filed 2003-11-17(1)

We hold that such actions are governed by CPLR 213 (1) which provides for a six-year statute of limitations for “an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law.”

CPLR 213(1) provides a six-year catch-all limitations period for declaratory judgment claims against a governmental body or officer when no more specific statutory limitation applies.

Teytelman v. Wing · filed 2003-12-08(1)

It is well settled that where a proceeding in the form of a declaratory judgment action is commenced against a governmental body or officer, the six-year catch-all limitations period provided in CPLR 213 (1) is applicable unless the claim could have been made in another form to which a specific limitation period is statutorily provided.

Section 213(7) provides a six-year limitations period for claims by or on behalf of a corporation.

JSC Foreign Economic Ass'n Technostroyex-Port v. International Development & Trade Services, Inc. · filed 2003-12-20(7)

Moreover, the six-year statute of limitations provided in § 213(7) expressly applies to claims “by or on behalf of a corporation.”

Section 213(1) establishes a six-year limitations period for the child support arrears at issue.

Eberhardt v. Monroe County Child Support Enforcement Unit · filed 2003-12-31(1)

The arrearages arose under a divorce decree entered in March 1987, prior to the effective date of CPLR 211 (e), and are thus subject to the six-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 213 (1) (see Shavit v Shavit, 279 AD2d 180, 183 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 719 [2001]; Thurmond v Thurmond, 155 AD2d 527, 530 [1989]; see also Matter of Dox v Tynon, 90 NY2d 166, 176 [1997]).

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year limitations period for claims covered by its rule.

Matter of Coordinated Tit. Ins. Cases · filed 2004-01-08(1)

At this point in the litigation, with all claims intact, the court finds the General Business Law § 349 claim to have sufficient lineage with the common-law fraud claim to obtain coverage under CPLR 213 (1).

Section 213(2) requires claims for injury to property to be brought within six years.

Rachel Bridge Corp. v. Dishi · filed 2004-02-24[2]

Tenant’s counterclaim for damages based on landlord’s failure to deliver the agreed demise (see Carnegie Hall, 238 App Div at 519), assuming it was not compromised by his acceptance of the smaller leasehold for a lower rent, is time-barred, since it was interposed more than six years after tenant learned that the agreed demise could not be delivered (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 imposes a six-year limitation period for rescission actions and does not toll that period for prenuptial agreement claims during marriage.

DeMille v. DeMille · filed 2004-03-08

Moreover, as this Court has held previously there is no legal support for a tolling of the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213 for prenuptial agreements during the life of a marriage (see Matter of Neidich, supra; Rubin v Rubin, supra).

CPLR 213(2) allows contract claims to be brought for breaches occurring within six years before the action begins.

Manhattanville College v. James John Romeo Consulting Engineer, P.C. · filed 2004-03-22(2)

However, the plaintiffs claims against Peco for breach of the maintenance contract are timely with respect to any alleged breaches that occurred not more than six years prior to the commencement of this action (see CPLR 213 [2]; Rosenblatt & Co. v Davidge Data Sys. Corp., 295 AD2d 168, 169 [2002]).

Section 213(4) requires an action to foreclose a mortgage to be commenced within six years.

Rack v. Rushefsky · filed 2004-03-29(4)

The appellant made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the respondents failed to bring an action to foreclose the subject mortgage within the applicable six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [4]; Albin v Pearson, 266 AD2d 487 [1999]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for the claim at issue.

Witherbee Court Associates v. Greene · filed 2004-05-17(2)

Since the applicable statute of limitations is six years (see CPLR 213 [2]; Sprague v Luna Park Co-op, 83 AD2d 877, 878 [1981]), the defendant’s claim is not restricted to the eight-month period for which the plaintiff seeks rental arrears.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim seeking equitable relief.

Bello v. New England Fin. · filed 2004-05-20(1)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is dependent upon the relief requested. If Plaintiff, in the complaint, alleges an equitable claim, then the applicable statute of limitation is six (6) years. CPLR 213 (1).

The section requires actions subject to it to be commenced within six years.

Boyce v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 2004-06-01(2)

As such, the action is subject to a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period, which begins to run when demand notes are made.

Comerica Bank, N.A. v. Benedict · filed 2004-06-01

Since the underlying notes were payable on demand, the statute of limitations started to run on December 15,1992, when the notes were made (see Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v Campcore, Inc., 81 NY2d 138, 143 [1993]; Shelley v Dixon Equities, 300 AD2d 566 [2002]).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for repayment of a demand loan, running from the date the obligation was created.

Cognetta v. Valencia Developers, Inc. · filed 2004-06-07(2)

The six-year statute of limitations on Dana’s cause of action for repayment thus began to run on the date the obligation was created (see CPLR 213 [2]; Comerica Bank, N.A. v Benedict, 8 AD3d 221 [2004]; Phoenix Acquisition Corp. v Campcore, Inc., 81 NY2d 138, 143 [1993]; Shelley v Dixon Equities, 300 AD2d 566 [2002]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for a plenary action to enforce an FMRA order.

Sciarra v. 531 East 83rd Street Owners Corp. · filed 2004-06-22(1)

The IAS court correctly held that a plenary action to enforce an FMRA order is governed by the six-year limitations period in CPLR 213 (1) (cf. Math v Estate of Goldman, 272 AD2d 108 [2000]).

Section 213 permits fraud and constructive trust claims to be commenced within six years of the relevant transaction or transfer.

Fade v. Pugliani/Fade · filed 2004-06-28(1), (8)

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the former husband’s claim for damages sounding in fraud, which was premised on the sale of the marital residence at a price below fair market value, pursuant to a transaction that was not at arm’s length, was timely commenced within six years of the transaction (see CPLR 213 [8]; Murphy v Murphy, 212 AD2d 583, 585 [1995]). His alternative claim for imposition of a constructive trust upon the proceeds of the sale, which was premised upon an alleged wrongful transfer to Thomas, was timely commenced within six years of the transfer (see CPLR 213 [1]; Maric Piping v Maric, 271 AD2d 507, 508 [2000]; Spataro v Spataro, 268 AD2d 467, 468 [2000]; Krauss v Iliescu, 259 AD2d 468, 469 [1999]).

Section 213(2) requires covered actions to be commenced within six years.

Commissioners of State Insurance Fund v. Trio Asbestos Removal Corp. · filed 2004-07-06(2)

We agree with the defendant that the fact that the amount of the premiums due was estimated, and subject to an audit and adjustment, did not serve to extend the statute of limitations to recover unpaid estimated premiums. “[P]ursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 92, premiums for any policy period shall be paid into the State Insurance Fund in three installments, which are payable when due regardless of any subsequent adjustment based upon the insured’s loss record” (Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v J.D.G.S. Corp., 253 AD2d 368, 368-369 [1998]). Each final audit statement of the actual premium due, however, is subject to a new limitations period for any balance due above the amount of the estimated premium. “Where recovery is sought on an obligation payable by installments, the Statute of Limitations runs against each installment from the time it becomes due” (75 NY Jur 2d Limitations and Laches § 87). Here, the final installment of estimated premiums for each policy period was due six months after the beginning of the period, that is, on May 13 in 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. Therefore the plaintiffs claims for unpaid estimated premiums for the policy periods of November 13, 1993, to November 12, 1994, November 13, 1994, to November 12, 1995, and November 13, 1995, to November 12, 1996, should have been dismissed as barred by the six-year statute of limitations.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year statute of limitations for the claim at issue.

Holbrook v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp. · filed 2004-10-01(2)

Supreme Court properly concluded that the first cause of action is not barred by the statute of limitations, which the court further properly determined to be six years in accordance with CPLR 213 (2) (see Yatter v William Morris Agency, 256 AD2d 260, 260-261 [1998]; Feldman v Teitelbaum, 160 AD2d 832, 833 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 705 [1990]; Nusca v Fodera, 129 AD2d 568, 569 [1987]; Rossi v Oristian, 50 AD2d 44 [1975]).

Section 213(1) applies a six-year limitations period when the relief sought is equitable in nature.

Klein v. Gutman · filed 2004-11-08(1)

Where the relief sought is equitable in nature, the six-year statute of limitations period of CPLR 213 (1) applies.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period when no more specific statutory limitations period applies.

Martin Goldman, LLC v. Yonkers Industrial Development Agency · filed 2004-11-29(1)

Consequently, the six-year limitations period provided in CPLR 213 (1) applies.

Section 213 imposes a six-year limitations period on the claim asserted here.

Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel, LLP v. Metropolitan 919 3rd Avenue, LLC · filed 2004-12-14

Thus, since the claim asserted for a credit is untimely under the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR 213, I declare that plaintiff is not entitled to the requested credit.

Section 213(7) gives a six-year limitations period for an action by or on behalf of a corporation against a present or former director, officer, or stockholder for an accounting, waste, or injury to property.

Spitzer v. Schussel · filed 2005-01-20(7)

Alternatively, the court holds that a six-year statute of limitations is mandated by the plain language of CPLR 213 (7). That statute provides that a six-year limitations period applies to “an action by or on behalf of a corporation against a present or former director, officer or stockholder for an accounting . . . or to recover damages for waste or for an injury to property” (emphasis added). This court concludes that an action by the Attorney General under the N-PCL is one “on behalf of” a corporation and thus falls within the ambit of CPLR 213 (7).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to an action upon a contract.

Sullivan v. Troser Management, Inc. · filed 2005-02-04[2]

The six-year statute of limitations for an action upon a contract began to run on December 31, 1991, the date of the first alleged breach (see CPLR 213 [2]; Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 403 [1993]).

Section 213 imposes a six-year limitations period on an action to collect on a promissory note.

Barash v. Siler · filed 2005-03-09

A six-year statute of limitations applies to Barash’s action to collect on the promissory note. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213.

CPLR 213(1) provides a six-year limitation period for declaratory judgment actions when no specific limitation period applies.

American Independent Paper Mills Supply Co. v. County of Westchester · filed 2005-03-14(1)

If no specific limitation period is provided, the declaratory judgment action is governed by the catch-all six-year period set forth in CPLR 213 (1).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for actions on a judgment or decree and on most contractual obligations.

Cooley v. CNYE Realty Corp. · filed 2005-03-17(1), (2)

The applicable limitations period of six years expired long ago, whether the 1985 order is viewed as an agreement (see CPLR 213 [2]; Long Is. Light. Co. v Ambro, 290 AD2d 508, 509 [2002]) or as an order (see CPLR 213 [1]; Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596, 598 [1985]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for indemnity and restitution actions arising out of unjust enrichment.

New York v. Hickey's Carting, Inc. · filed 2005-03-30(1)-(2)

The applicable state statute of limitations for indemnity and restitution actions arising out of claims for unjust enrichment is six years. CPLR 213(l)-(2); ... The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suffers the loss giving rise to the action for indemnity ... or, in the case of an action for restitution, upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to the duty to repay.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an action to impose a constructive trust, running from the defendants’ alleged repudiation of the agreement.

Pate v. Pate · filed 2005-04-04(1)

The plaintiffs cause of action to impose a constructive trust is governed by the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR 213 (1), which started to run from the date the defendants allegedly repudiated the agreement to transfer the subject property.