N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213

Section 213 gives actions to recover support arrears a six-year limitations period unless the arrearages have been reduced to a judgment.

Welch v. Welch · filed 1987-05-18

An action to recover support arrears claimed pursuant to a divorce judgment is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213), unless the arrearages have been reduced to a judgment.

CPLR 213(1) gives constructive trust actions a six-year limitations period running from the wrongful act, while CPLR 213(8) measures fraud claims from discovery or when fraud could reasonably have been discovered.

Mattera v. Mattera · filed 1986-12-22(1), (8)

An action to impress a constructive trust is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations period provided under CPLR 213 (1), that "commences to run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution and not from the time the facts constituting the fraud are discovered” (Boronow v Boronow, 111 AD2d 735, 737; see, Kitchner v Kitchner, 100 AD2d 954). ... CPLR 213 (8) provides that the six-year Statute of Limitations for fraud "shall be computed from the time the plaintiff * * * discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” .

Section 213(1) applies a six-year limitations period to alimony arrears unless they have been reduced to a judgment.

Petritis v. Petritis · filed 1987-06-15(1)

The application for alimony arrearages is governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations unless the arrearages have been reduced by further proceedings to judgment (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596; Welch v Welch, 130 AD2d 656; Story v Brady, 114 AD2d 1026).

Section 213 imposes a six-year limitations period on the common-law action for necessaries described by the court.

Hafner v. Security Pacific National Bank · filed 1987-06-15

The common-law action for necessaries based upon a marital obligation arising out of an implied contract is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213.

CPLR 213(8) supplies a six-year limitations period for actions based on fraud.

State v. Danny's Franchise Systems, Inc. · filed 1987-06-22[8]

Thus, the six-year Statute of Limitations should be applied to actions brought by the Attorney-General to enforce the provisions of the Franchise Sales Act.

CPLR 213(1) gives arrearage claims a six-year limitations period.

Curtis v. Curtis · filed 1987-07-23(1)

An application for arrearages is governed by the residual six-year limitations period of CPLR 213 (1) (Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596). Accordingly, Supreme Court erred in including arrearages which had accrued prior to January 28, 1980 in its order.

Section 213(1) gives equitable claims a six-year statute of limitations.

Loengard v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. · filed 1987-09-15(1)

Thus, we conclude that the claim based on the breach of fiduciary duty described in the second certified question is an equitable claim governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [1]; see, Scheuer v Scheuer, 308 NY 447; Augustine v Szwed, 77 AD2d 298 [Simons, J.]; Dolmetta v Uintah Natl. Corp., 712 F2d 15 [2d Cir]; 1 Weinstein-KornMiller, NY Civ Prac If 213.01, at 2-129; Siegel, NY Prac § 36 [1978]).

Section 213(2) bars breach of contract claims brought more than six years after the acts giving rise to the breach.

Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Schiferle · filed 1987-11-10(2)

Since the action was commenced in 1985, these counterclaims were barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(8) gives fraud actions a six year limitations period running from discovery or when the fraud could reasonably have been discovered.

Kronfeld v. Advest, Inc. · filed 1987-12-23(8)

The New York statute of limitations for fraud provides for a six-year period which "shall be computed from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom he claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” N.Y. CPLR § 213(8) (McKinney 1987).

Section 213’s six-year limitations period applies to unjust enrichment and implied-in-fact contractual claims, limiting recovery to claims accrued within six years.

Rodgers v. Roulette Records, Inc. · filed 1988-01-11

Nonetheless, plaintiff may only recover for such unjust enrichment or implied-in-fact contractual duty which has accrued within the past six years since these causes of action are covered by the general six-year statute of limitations, CPLR 213.

Section 213(2) requires an action to be commenced within six years.

In re the Estate of Friedgood · filed 1988-02-16(2)

We find that the court properly held the subject claim to be barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [2]). The cause of action accrued on August 9, 1978, the day after which the note became due (see, UCC 3-122 [1] [a]). Since the claimant failed to commence the instant proceeding on or before August 9, 1984, his claim was properly dismissed as untimely.

Section 213 provides an alternative six-year statute of limitations measured from accrual.

Zola v. Gordon · filed 1988-05-04

Section 203(f) must be read in conjunction with N.Y. CPLR § 213, which provides an alternative statute of limitations of six years from accrual.

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for this action.

State of New York Higher Education Services Corp. v. Langus · filed 1988-05-05(2)

Since plaintiff commenced this action well beyond the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]), the issue becomes whether this limitations period was tolled due to defendant’s absence from the State.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitation period for actions without a specifically prescribed limitation and for contract actions.

Shah v. State · filed 1988-05-31(1), (2)

Based in part on the Court of Appeals discussion in Baker (supra), we hold that, pending legislative action, the appropriate limitation period for an action against an employer in this context is also six years, pursuant to either CPLR 213 (1), for the reasons given by the court, or CPLR 213 (2), which applies to contract actions.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for the plaintiff’s action.

Inforna v. Sir Formal of Massapequa, Inc. · filed 1988-06-06(2)

While the appellant is correct in contending that the six-year Statute of Limitations applies to the plaintiff’s action (see, CPLR 213 [2]), the Supreme Court properly found that CPLR 206 (a) (1) also applies; hence, the plaintiff’s claim accrued not upon the date of execution of the escrow agreement, but long after that date when he first became aware of the facts which entitled him to demand compliance with the terms of that agreement (see, e.g., Bernstein v La Rue, 120 AD2d 476, lv dismissed 70 NY2d 746).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions on a contractual obligation.

Allied International Bancorp, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. · filed 1988-06-14(2)

Indeed, since Video, where the action is for failure to exercise due care in the performance of a contract and seeks recovery for damages to property or pecuniary interests, the applicability of the six-year statute is treated as a given without discussion of the nature of the services involved.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period, but it does not govern a proceeding to review Medicaid reimbursement rates when the four-month period applies.

Fahey v. Axelrod · filed 1988-06-16(1)

The assertion that the applicable Statute of Limitations is the six years provided for in CPLR 213 (1) is also rejected. Whether denominated a CPLR article 78 proceeding or an action for a declaratory judgment, the four-month Statute of Limitations will apply in a proceeding to review Medicaid reimbursement rates (see, Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 232-233).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an action seeking a permanent injunction to remove an obstruction interfering with an affirmative easement.

Spiegel v. Ferraro · filed 1988-07-05(1)

An action for a permanent injunction to remove an obstruction which interferes with an affirmative easement is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 213 (1) (Filby v Brooks, 105 AD2d 826, 828, affd 66 NY2d 640).

Section 213 bars an action on ERP expenses incurred more than six years before the action was commenced.

Department of Housing Preservation & Development v. 849 St. Nicholas Equities · filed 1988-09-07

It is undisputed that the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213) applies to ERP expenses. ... The "statements of expenses” here fall into the latter category; the Statute of Limitations runs from the date of the underlying expenses, not the service of the "statement of expenses” ... These actions are barred to the extent that the expenses were incurred more than six years prior to the commencement of the actions.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year statute of limitations for enforcing a contract.

Davenport Neck Corp. v. Pasquerella · filed 1988-09-12(2)

The defendant’s relationship with the Davenport Club, Inc. ended in 1976. Since this action was commenced in 1984 and the six-year Statute of Limitations for enforcement of the subject agreement terminated in 1982 (CPLR 213 [2]), this action was properly dismissed (CPLR 3212).

Section 213(2) bars claims for services rendered more than six years before the action.

Moors v. Hall · filed 1988-09-12(2)

We note that the Supreme Court acted properly in sustaining the affirmative defense ... raised in the defendant’s answer that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover for the value of services rendered during the period of 1962 to 1976 because that claim is barred by the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) requires an action on a contractual obligation to be brought within six years.

Neeley v. Cuccia · filed 1988-10-03(2)

We further note that the order appealed from incorrectly awarded arrears in contravention of the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]; see, Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596; Story v Brady, 114 AD2d 1026).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitation period for an action for injunctive relief.

Leising v. Town of Clarence · filed 1988-11-15(1)

An action for injunctive relief is an appropriate vehicle to prevent continuing violations of a zoning ordinance (Little Joseph Realty v Town of Babylon, 41 NY2d 738, 744), and is governed by a six-year limitation period (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Filby v Brooks, 105 AD2d 826, affd 66 NY2d 640).

CPLR § 213(2) and (5) provide a six-year limitations period for actions for money had and received or misappropriation of public property.

State v. Mayflower Nursing Home · filed 1988-11-28(2), (5)

Its commencement of an action on July 25, 1985, was therefore timely under the six-year Statute of Limitations for either money had and received or misappropriation of public property (see, CPLR 213 [2], [5]).

Section 213(2) bars claims for child support arrears accruing more than six years before the claim is made.

Consentino v. Sweeney · filed 1988-10-31(2)

We do not agree, however, with the Supreme Court’s determination that the defendant waived his claim based on the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations merely because his opposing affirmation did not formally invoke the defense (see, CPLR 213 [2]; see also, Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596). Although the defendant did not raise the Statute of Limitations in his opposing papers, the plaintiffs application for arrears was not one in which the issues were framed through the use of formal pleadings, to which the rules governing the affirmative assertion of defenses would have application (cf., Matter of Augenblick v Town of Cortlandt, 66 NY2d 775, rearg denied 67 NY2d 647). In any event, the plaintiff was afforded ample opportunity to counter the Statute of Limitations argument, since the defense counsel raised the issue in. his closing comments after the hearing and subsequently reasserted the contention in his posttrial memorandum, to which the plaintiff replied without objecting to the inclusion of the issue in the case. We find that all claims for child support arrears accruing prior to June 14, 1979 are barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for common-law fraud and breach of contract claims.

Fantastic Enterprises, Inc. v. S.M.R. Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1988-12-01

The third and fourth causes of action, therefore, are governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations provided by CPLR 213.

Section 213 requires actions of this kind based on notes to be commenced within six years.

In re Lamb · filed 1988-12-23

We add only that the six-year Statute of Limitations period applies to this action, which is premised upon various notes signed by respondent Charles Vergo (CPLR 213).

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on an equitable constructive trust claim, running from the wrongful conduct or event giving rise to a duty of restitution.

Dybowski v. Dybowska · filed 1989-01-17(1)

The equitable claim for the imposition of a constructive trust is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (1) (see, Loengard v Santa Fe Indus., 70 NY2d 262, 267; Scheuer v Scheuer, 308 NY 447), which commences to run at the time of the wrongful conduct or event giving rise to a duty of restitution (see, Scheuer v Scheuer, 308 NY 447, supra; Kitchner v Kitchner, 100 AD2d 954; Bey Constr. Co. v Yablonski, 76 AD2d 875, 876).

Section 213 bars a claim based on an agreement allegedly breached in 1970 when the action is commenced outside the applicable six-year period.

Cassata v. Cassata · filed 1989-03-10

Plaintiffs entitlement to a one-half share of his brother’s interest in the corporation was based upon an agreement allegedly breached in 1970, and such claim was time barred (CPLR 213).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an action for which no other limitation is specifically prescribed by law.

Peirez v. Queens P.E.P. Associates Corp. · filed 1989-03-20[1]

We additionally note that the claim for the imposition of a constructive trust should have been dismissed in any event due to the expiration of the Statute of Limitations on that cause of action (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Bey Constr. Co. v Yablonski, 76 AD2d 875, 876).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for the covered claims.

Garcia v. Rivera · filed 1989-03-31(2)

However, the corresponding cross claims of defendants Fox and Sherwood which are governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations are not time barred (CPLR 213 [2]), nor are they superfluous (Doyle v Happy Tumbler Wash-O-Mat, 90 AD2d 366).

Section 213(1) provides a six year limitations period for claims for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law, and section 213(2) governs contract actions.

Banco De Desarrollo Agropecuario, S.A. v. Gibbs · filed 1989-04-06(1), (2)

The parties agree as to the relevant statutes of limitations. Count One, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty that does not allege any fraudulent intent, is governed by the six year statute of limitations set forth in N.Y. C.P.L.R. (“CPLR”) § 213(1). ... Count Two, an action for a constructive trust, is one for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law and thus, it is governed by the six year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR § 213(1). ... Consequently, for the purposes of this motion, the statute of limitations was tolled until the persons committing the wrongs no longer controlled BICL. ... Therefore, taking BICL’s allegations as true, this action, for purposes of this motion, was filed timely within all of the respective statutory time limits.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for an action to impress a constructive trust, running from the wrongful act or event creating a duty of restitution.

Kopelman v. Kopelman · filed 1989-04-11(1)

Finally, defendant briefly raises a statute of limitations ground for summary judgment. The parties agree that under New York law an action to impress a constructive trust is governed by the six year period provided under CPLR § 213(1). That six year period “runs from the occurrence of the wrongful act or event which creates a duty of restitution.”

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for a breach of contract action.

Bay Terrace Cooperative Section XII, Inc. v. Hornstein · filed 1989-05-01(2)

Therefore, the applicable Statute of Limitations was six years (see, CPLR 213 [2]), rather than the three-year period of limitations applicable to causes of action sounding in accountant malpractice (see, CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 213 gives declaratory judgment actions a six-year limitations period.

78 South First Street Housing Development Fund Corp. v. Crotty · filed 1989-05-16[1]

Inasmuch as the Statute of Limitations for a declaratory judgment action is six years (CPLR 213 [1]), the action is timely.

Section 213(1) requires an action alleging constructive fraud to be commenced within six years after the fraud is committed.

Eisenberg v. Feiner (In Re Ahead by a Length, Inc.) · filed 1989-05-26(1)

Where constructive fraud is alleged under New York law, the time within which the action must be commenced is six years from commission of the fraud. CPLR § 213(1) (McKinney Supp.1989); 1 J. Weinstein, H. Korn and A. Miller, New York Civil Practice, ¶ 213.25 at 2-177 (1988).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions founded on breach of contract.

Roldan v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1989-07-03(2)

The causes of action asserted by the plaintiff which are based upon (1) contractual indemnification, and (2) bad-faith refusal to settle, are governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to actions founded upon breach of contract (see, CPLR 213 [2]; Town of Poland v Transamerica Ins. Co., 53 AD2d 140, 143; see also, DiBlasi v Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 147 AD2d 93, supra).

Section 213(2) bars contract and negligence claims based on transactions occurring more than six years before commencement.

Flynn v. New York Life Insurance · filed 1989-07-12(2)

We conclude that plaintiffs’ contract and negligence claims are time barred except as such claims relate to transactions that occurred within six years prior to commencement (CPLR 213 [2]; see, Video Corp. v Flatto Assocs., 58 NY2d 1026, 1028).

Section 213 gives claims to set aside a fraudulent conveyance a six-year limitations period.

International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Allegis Corp. · filed 1989-08-02

Under New York law, a claim to set aside a fraudulent conveyance is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v Pappadio, 606 F Supp 631 [ED NY 1985]).

CPLR § 213 provides six-year limitation periods for fraud, aiding and abetting a fiduciary breach, and contract claims under subsections (8), (7), and (2).

Resnick v. Resnick · filed 1989-09-14(8), (7), and (2)

In New York, the limitations period for a claim based upon fraud is six (6) years under CPLR § 213(8). Aiding and abetting an officer or director of a corporation to breach his fiduciary duties also carries a six (6) year limitations period pursuant to CPLR § 213(7). See Dolmetta v. Uintah National Corp., 712 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir.1983). The claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is grounded in contract and likewise has a limitations period of six (6) years, pursuant to CPLR § 213(2).

Section 213 requires actions subject to its six-year limitations period to be commenced within six years after the claim accrues.

Towl v. Estate of Block · filed 1989-10-03

Since any such breach would have surely taken place by January 20, 1983, this cause of action would have had to be interposed at least prior to January 20, 1989. This lawsuit was commenced on January 31, 1989 which is over six years after any possible breach would have occurred (under our analysis supra).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for the fraud and negotiable instrument actions discussed by the court.

Union Bank of India v. Seven Seas Imports, Inc. · filed 1989-12-26

The Court, however, has already determined that New York law applies to the case, and thus New York’s six year statute of limitations on negotiable instrument actions applies. N.Y.Civ. Prac.L. & R. (“CPLR") 213. Since the earliest date on which this action could be said to accrue was August 23, 1984, plaintiff's action is well within that six year period.

Section 213 allows a fraud action to be brought within six years after accrual, subject to the alternative discovery period described with CPLR § 203(f).

Dymm v. Cahill · filed 1990-02-13

The applicable New York statute, the one prescribed for fraud, see Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 87 (2d Cir.1983), allows a plaintiff to sue within six years from the time the cause of action accrued, or within two years from the time the wrongdoing was discovered or with reasonable diligence should have been.

Section 213(2) gives contract actions a six-year limitations period, subject to tolling when a professional relationship continues after construction is completed.

Greater Johnstown City School District v. Cataldo & Waters · filed 1990-03-01(2)

We first consider whether the six-year Statute of Limitations governing contract actions (CPLR 213 [2]) bars plaintiff’s first cause of action (see, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Eneo Assocs., 43 NY2d 389, 395). ... This action was therefore timely and the Statute of Limitations defense to the contract action should have been dismissed.

Section 213(2) gives a six-year limitations period for claims involving property or pecuniary interests arising from a contractual relationship.

Sager v. DeRiggi · filed 1990-05-07(2)

It is now well settled that the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]) governs an action to recover damages to property or pecuniary interests where the obligations alleged to have been violated by the defendant, "whether verbalized as in tort for professional malpractice or as in contract for nonperformance of particular provisions of the contract, arose out of the contractual relationship of the parties” (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Eneo Assocs., 43 NY2d 389, 396; Video Corp. v Flatto Assocs., 58 NY2d 1026). Viewed within this perspective, the plaintiff’s first cause of action falls within the six-year Statute of Limitations and is not time barred.

Subsection 2 requires an action for breach of warranty of authority to be commenced within six years, with the period calculated under related provisions from discovery of the facts constituting lack of authority.

Group Health Inc. v. Blue Cross Ass'n · filed 1990-06-19(2)

CPLR § 213, subd. 2 provides that an action for breach of warranty of authority is to be commenced within six years, but it does not state within six years of what.

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year residual limitations period when no other limitations period applies.

Davis v. Rosenblatt · filed 1990-07-19(1)

Nonetheless, it is clear that the only appropriate limitation period is the six-year residuary Statute of Limitations provided by CPLR 213 (1). Applying this period to the claims of those plaintiffs who are former City Court Judges, only the claim of Syracuse plaintiff Mary M. Fahey, as executrix of the estate of James Fahey who left the Syracuse City Court Bench in October 1981, is time barred. This is because the Syracuse action (action No. 4) was not commenced until February 1988, approximately four months after the limitations period had run.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for actions on contracts for services.

Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority v. Eljo Products, Inc. · filed 1990-08-10[2]

There is a question of fact whether the parties’ contract is one for "services”, governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]), or one for the "sale” of goods, governed by the four-year Statute of Limitations (Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725 [1]; see, Farm Automation Corp. v Senter, 84 AD2d 757; Back O’Beyond v Telephonic Enters., 76 AD2d 897; 1 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-105:51 [3d ed]).

Section 213(2) requires an action to be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues.

New York State Higher Education Services Corp. v. Handler · filed 1990-12-13(2)

There is no dispute that this action was commenced more than six years after plaintiffs cause of action accrued (see, CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 requires actions based on fraud or breach of contract to be commenced within six years after accrual.

Hoosac Valley Farmers Exchange, Inc. v. AG Assets, Inc. · filed 1990-12-20

Since plaintiffs causes of action basically alleging, among other things, fraud and/or breach of contract had to be commenced at least within six years of their accrual (see, CPLR 213), a prima facie defense was presented and the burden shifted to plaintiff to rebut this presumption by establishing the applicability of CPLR 203 (b).

Subsection (2) provides a six-year Statute of Limitations for claims in quasi or implied contract.

Catlin v. Manilow · filed 1991-02-21(2)

We agree with the IAS court that the third cause of action stated a valid claim in quasi or implied contract, which is governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]), rather than the four-year Statute of Limitations (UCC 2-725 [1]), which defendants urge is applicable.

CPLR 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for an action arising from a contractual relationship, whether pleaded in tort or contract.

Canavan v. Steenburg · filed 1991-02-21(2)

Whether pleaded in tort for professional malpractice or in contract, "an action, such as this, * * * which has its genesis in the contractual relationship of the parties, is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (2)” (Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 164 AD2d 149, 151).

Section 213 provides a six-year statute of limitations for the specified causes of action.

Corcoran v. Haddon S. Fraser Associates, Ltd. · filed 1991-03-19

The court also properly found the seventh, eight, ninth, eleventh and thirteenth causes of action to be governed by a six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213; Loengard v Santa Fe Indus., 70 NY2d 262).

Section 213(8) requires a fraud action to be commenced within six years after accrual or within two years after the wrongdoing was or reasonably should have been discovered.

Flickinger v. Harold C. Brown & Co., Inc. · filed 1991-03-28(8)

The applicable statute requires plaintiff to commence such an action within six years from the time the cause of action accrued or within two years of the time the wrongdoing was, or with reasonable diligence should have been, discovered. CPLR 213(8); CPLR 203(f); Armstrong, 699 F.2d at 87. ... Thus, plaintiff’s action, by one day, was commenced within six years from the time the cause of action accrued, and is therefore timely under pre-Ceres law.

Section 213 provides a six year limitations period for an action to rescind a lease.

Poledar Realty, Inc. v. Christ · filed 1991-03-28

In 35 Park Ave. Corp. v Campagna (48 NY2d 813, 814 [1979]), the Court of Appeals held that a cause of action to rescind a lease is governed by the six year statute of limitations, which appears in CPLR 213. Since these leases were executed in 1958 and 1959, respectively, and the instant actions were not commenced until 1988, approximately thirty years later, we find that the second counterclaim of defendants for recision is barred (35 Park Ave. Corp. v Campagna, supra).

Section 213(2) requires an action on a contractual obligation to be commenced within six years.

Board of Managers of Yardarm Beach Condominium v. Vector Yardarm Corp. · filed 1991-04-16(2)

Any breach of contract claim by third-party plaintiff Vector against third-party defendant Specter is barred by the six year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213(2) requires an action seeking specific performance of a separation agreement's sale provision to be commenced within six years of the defendant's remarriage.

Dolan v. Ross · filed 1991-04-26(2)

The request for specific performance was not commenced within six years of defendant’s remarriage (see, CPLR 213 [2]; Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596), and plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was an owner in possession of the premises within ten years of the commencement of this action for a judgment declaring plaintiff’s right to recover an interest in the property.

Section 213(1) requires an action governed by it to be commenced within six years.

Milin Pharmacy, Inc. v. Cash Register Systems, Inc. · filed 1991-05-28(1)

The Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiffs cause of action sounding in negligent misrepresentation is governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations and that it was therefore timely interposed (see, CPLR 213 [1]; 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., 15 NY2d 48, 51-52; International Prods. Co. v Erie R. R. Co., 244 NY 331, cert denied 275 US 527; Pappas v Harrow Stores, 140 AD2d 501, 504).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period that does not begin for assets never collected or accounted for by a fiduciary.

In re the Estate of Zilkha · filed 1991-06-06(1)

Nor are petitioners barred, as claimed, by the running of the six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [1]), since the statute does not begin to run with respect to assets never collected or previously accounted for by a fiduciary.

Section 213's six-year limitations period governs declaratory judgment claims of this kind, and a continuing salary disparity does not start the period while the plaintiffs remain employed.

Burke v. Crosson · filed 1991-08-09(1)

It has been established that the applicable Statute of Limitations for cases of this nature is the six-year statute for declaratory judgments and that because the harm done by denying salary parity is a continuing one, the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run while the plaintiffs are still employed and the disparity has not been remedied.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year statute of limitations for this action.

Dillon v. Peretti · filed 1991-10-08(1)

As the instant action was commenced in September, 1989, the action, to which a six-year statute of limitations applies (CPLR 213 [1]) is clearly time-barred.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims.

Shigoto Far East Importers, Ltd. v. Republic National Bank · filed 1991-10-24(2)

This is a breach of contract claim to which the CPLR 213 (2) six-year statute of limitations period applies.

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for contractual claims.

In re the Arbitration between F.W. Woolworth Co., & Ad-Mat, Inc. · filed 1991-11-12(2)

As the contract is predominantly one for the provision of a service, the six year contractual statute of limitations found in CPLR 213 (2) controls, as opposed to the UCC four year statute of limitations.

CPLR 213(1) gives equitable actions a six-year statute of limitations.

Riley v. Riley · filed 1992-01-21(1)

Even if the husband had properly initiated this application through a plenary action, it would have been time-barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) governing equitable actions (see, Curry v Curry, 57 AD2d 604).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for applicable actions.

Osborne v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund · filed 1992-02-25

Therefore, this court is compelled to rule that the limitations period set forth in Miles governs this case, as well. Applying the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 to this complaint, which was filed in October, 1990, the court finds that plaintiff’s claim is timely.

Section 213 bars claims subject to its six-year limitation period when they are brought more than six years after accrual.

Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Power Authority · filed 1992-02-27

Thus, as the City concedes, any attempt by it to recoup from Crabhouse and Leisure, in indemnification, payments made on electricity bills prior to January 15, 1981 is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213).

Section 213(4) bars a claim after six years unless the statute of limitations is revived by an action attributable to the estate.

Flaum v. Birnbaum · filed 1992-03-13(4)

Thus, under the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (4), the claim was time barred in 1980 unless revived by some action attributable to the estate.

CPLR 213(1)'s six-year limitations period does not apply when a declaratory judgment claim is subject to a specific statutory limitations period.

Bitondo v. State · filed 1992-04-09(1)

Even assuming, arguendo, that a declaratory judgment action is an available vehicle for bringing these claims before a court, which itself is a questionable proposition (see, Walsh v Andorn, 33 NY2d 503, 507; City of Rochester v Vanderlinde Elec. Corp., 56 AD2d 185, 187-188), such does not, ipso facto, mean that these claims are accorded the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (1).

Section 213(2) gives contract actions a six-year limitations period.

Maio v. Gardino · filed 1992-06-11(2)

The contract cause of action was subject to a six-year statutory limit (see, CPLR 213 [2]) and was thus timely commenced by plaintiffs.

Section 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud claims.

Pinaud v. County of Suffolk · filed 1992-06-25(8)

The New York statute of limitations for prima facie tort is three years and for fraud it is six years. Schlotthauer v. Sanders, 153 A.D.2d 731, 545 N.Y.S.2d 197 (2d Dep’t 1989), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 709, 555 N.Y.S.2d 691, 554 N.E.2d 1279 (Ct.App.1990); CPLR §§ 213(8), 214(4). To the extent that the claim for prima facie tort is based on acts occurring after June 1988 and to the extent that the fraud claim is based on acts occurring after June 1985, they are not time-barred.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for actions without a shorter specifically prescribed period.

Jones v. Trane · filed 1992-10-19(1)

The argument fails, however, in view of the fact that the breach and violation of trust actions, with six-year Statutes of Limitation (CPLR 213 [1]), have been sustained.

The six-year limitations period for an accounting action began when the partnership dissolved, so the action had to be commenced within six years of June 21, 1982.

Mills v. O'Donnell · filed 1992-12-03(1)

Accordingly, plaintiff had six years from June 21, 1982 to commence an action for accounting and, therefore, this action is untimely.

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for covered actions.

Davis v. NMU Pension & Welfare Plan · filed 1992-12-22

I find that a six-year statute of limitations applies to this action and began to run on May 4, 1984 when Davis’ first application for pension benefits was denied after he retired. ... At first glance, the applicability to this action of New York’s six-year statute of limitations period under § 213 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) seems clear.

Section 213(8) imposes a six-year limitations period on fraud claims.

In re the Arbitration between Shearson Lehman Bros. & Rinzler · filed 1993-01-21(8)

Clearly, in the absence of an affidavit from Rinzler, the sworn representations of petitioners establish that Rinzler’s claims are all time barred: More than six years had passed from the last purchase of the Fund in 1983 before the New Jersey action began. (CPLR 213 [8].)

Section 213 requires this action to be commenced within six years.

Roberts v. Rubio · filed 1993-01-25

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s action is time-barred (see, CPLR 213; see also, 16 NY Jur 2d, Business Relationships, § 1500 [1992 Cum Supp]).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for actions for money had and received or unjust enrichment.

Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance v. Roosevelt · filed 1993-02-04(1)

The action is for money had and received or unjust enrichment, governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [1]; City of New York v New York Tel. Co., 108 AD2d 372, 376 [1st Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 65 NY2d 1052 [1985]).

Subsection (2) imposes a six-year limitations period on the claim.

Yerdon v. Yerdon · filed 1993-02-05(2)

Although petitioner sought child support arrears dating back to 1981, she acknowledges that the six-year Statute of Limitations applies in this case (see, CPLR 213 [2]; Tauber v Lebow, 65 NY2d 596, 598). Thus, petitioner’s claim for child support arrears for the period from 1981 to August 24, 1984 is time-barred.

Section 213(2) requires a breach of contract action to be commenced within six years of accrual.

Oren v. Dowd · filed 1993-02-08(2)

Contrary to the appellants’ contention, we also find that the cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract was interposed within six years (see, CPLR 213 [2]) of its accrual.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for actions under its catch-all rule, including constructive fraud claims.

Orr v. Kinderhill Corporation · filed 1993-03-16(1)

We agree with the district court that actions under section 273-a are governed by the six-year limitations period of CPLR § 213(1).

Section 213(1) sets a six-year limitations period for actions under Debtor & Creditor Law § 273-a.

Orr v. Kinderhill Corp. · filed 1993-03-16(1)

We agree with the district court that actions under section 273-a are governed by the six-year limitations period of CPLR § 213(1).

The six-year limitations period applies to equitable constructive trust claims and runs from the wrongful conduct or event creating a duty of restitution.

In re Wallace · filed 1993-03-22(1)

An equitable claim for the imposition of a constructive trust is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) (see, Dybowski v Dybowska, 146 AD2d 604), which runs from the time of the wrongful conduct or the event giving rise to a duty of restitution.

CPLR 213 provides a six-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract claims.

Katz v. Bach Realty, Inc. · filed 1993-04-01(1), (2)

The proposed counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty and unfair competition are not, as plaintiff argues, governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (4) for actions to recover damages to property, but by the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) for breach of fiduciary duty and in CPLR 213 (2) for breach of contract (see, Butler v Gibbons, 173 AD2d 352; Sachs v Cluett, Peabody & Co., 265 App Div 497, affd 291 NY 772).

Section 213(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on unjust enrichment and constructive trust claims, running from the wrongful act that gives rise to a duty of restitution.

Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v. 26 Adar N.B. Corp. · filed 1993-04-05(1)

The plaintiffs’ causes of action to recover damages for unjust enrichment and to impose a constructive trust are barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations found in CPLR 213 (1), which starts to run upon the occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution (see, Sitkowski v Petzing, 175 AD2d 801, 802; Dybowski v Dybowska, 146 AD2d 604, 605; Mattera v Mattera, 125 AD2d 555, 556).

Section 213 supplies a six-year limitations period for actions within its scope.

Zipes v. Zipes · filed 1993-04-08

It is the Husband’s contention that the Wife’s failure to attack either of the aforesaid postnuptial agreements within six years from the making thereof bars her two causes of action to declare them null and void upon the grounds specified above. This court agrees. The second and third counterclaims contained in the Wife’s answer are hereby dismissed. ... The Statute of Limitations was never tolled in this case.

Section 213(4) applies a six-year Statute of Limitations that can affect the continued viability of mortgage debt.

Reda v. Voges · filed 1993-04-12(4)

Moreover, the petitioner has validly raised a genuine issue with respect to the continued viability of part or all of the mortgage debt in view of the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [4]; see generally, Khoury v Alger, 174 AD2d 918; Matter of Rosevele Frocks v Sommers, 191 Misc 614).

Subsections 213(2) and 213(7) impose a six year limitations period on claims covered by them.

Tobias v. Tobias · filed 1993-04-22(2), (7)

However, it should be pointed out that plaintiff’s various claims are subject to the six year statute of limitations (CPLR 213 [2], [7]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for a partnership accounting claim.

Elghanayan v. Elghanayan · filed 1993-06-10

There is no dispute between the parties that the applicable limitations period for plaintiffs’ major claim, a partnership accounting, is six years (CPLR 213).

Section 213 provides six-year limitations periods for negligent misrepresentation and fraud claims, measured from accrual.

Asbeka Industries v. Travelers Indemnity Co. · filed 1993-08-17(1), (8)

Under New York law, a negligent misrepresentation claim is subject to the six-year limitations period of N.Y.Civ.Prac.L. & R. § 213(1) (McKinney 1990) [hereinafter CPLR § -]. ... Under New York law, a claim for fraud must either be brought within six years from the time that the cause of action accrued or within two years from the date that the plaintiff actually discovered the fraud or could have discovered the fraud with due diligence, whichever is longer. CPLR §§ 203(g), 213(8) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1993).

Subsection 213(4) bars enforcement of a lien after the applicable limitations period has passed.

Kappen v. D'Elia · filed 1993-10-12(4)

However, the appellant’s ability to enforce the lien has also long since passed (see, CPLR 213 [4]; Matter of Herman, 43 Misc 2d 309; Gower v Weinberg, 184 AD2d 844).

Section 213(1) applies a six-year limitations period when the underlying cause of action has no specific limitations period.

145 Kisco Ave. Corp. v. Dufner Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1993-11-29(1)

If the underlying cause of action does not fall within any specific limitations period, the six-year "catch all” provision of CPLR 213 (1) applies (see, Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224).

Section 213 imposes a six-year limitations period on fraud based claims and on actions to rescind or reform a contract or set aside a judgment based on fraud, subject to its discovery rule.

Green Point Savings Bank v. Dan's Supreme Supermarket, Inc. · filed 1993-12-13(6), (8)

Although the trial court properly dismissed the complaint against the defendant Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation for failure to state a cause of action, we further note that the causes of action against the Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, which are based on negligence, fraud, and mistake, were in any event barred by the applicable Statutes of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [6], [8]; 214 [6]; see also, Matter of Allen [First Wallstreet Settlement Corp.], 130 AD2d 824; Nichols v Regent Props., 49 AD2d 847; Metcalf v Metcalf, 196 Misc 842, affd 276 App Div 1068; cf., Northerly Corp. v Hermett Realty Corp., 15 AD2d 888; Hart v Blabey, 287 NY 257).

Section 213(1) bars an action commenced more than six years after the claim accrued unless equitable estoppel prevents the defendant from asserting the limitations defense.

Green v. Albert · filed 1993-12-27(1)

Thus, unless the defendant is equitably estopped from raising the Statute of Limitations, the plaintiff’s action, commenced over six years later, is time-barred (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Mills v O’Donnell, 188 AD2d 692; Schwartz v Lois Assocs., 149 AD2d 307, supra).

Section 213(8) applies a six-year statute of limitations to the fraud and mismanagement claim at issue.

In re the Arbitration between Goldberg & Galat · filed 1994-01-13(8)

The financial information sought by appellant in this proceeding is substantially similar to that requested in 1985, and to allow the proceeding with respect to the period prior to April 19, 1986 would in essence be to allow the appellant a chance to pursue a second, identical claim seven years later, after expiration of the applicable six year statute of limitations (see, CPLR 213 [8]).

Section 213 bars claims that are not brought within the applicable six-year limitations period.

Rothschild v. Industrial Test Equipment Co. · filed 1994-04-04

The Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the defendant’s first and second counterclaims since they were already time barred pursuant to CPLR 213 when the claim in the complaint was interposed (see, CPLR 203 [d]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for claims covered by its rules.

Janiak v. Town of Greenville · filed 1994-04-11

Since a CPLR article 78 proceeding is not a proper vehicle for challenging the legitimacy of Local Law No. 1, the limitations period set forth in CPLR 217 has no applicability to this case (see, Kamhi v Town of Yorktown, supra, at 609), and the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 applies instead (see, Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229-230).

Section 213(2) requires actions accruing under specified claims to be commenced within six years.

Corto v. Lefrak · filed 1994-04-12(2)

The record also reflects that the plaintiffs causes of action in the complaint, served on or about October 15, 1991, which accrued on September 21, 1985 when she was prohibited from removing the production property from the Kennedy Center pursuant to the writ of attachment, were also barred by the applicable statutes of limitations (i.e., CPLR 213 [2] [six years]; CPLR 214 [4] [three years]).

CPLR 213(8) provides a six-year limitations period for claims based on actual intent to defraud, read with a two-year discovery rule under CPLR 203(f [now g]).

Barristers Abstract Corp. v. Caulfield · filed 1994-04-18(8)

For a cause of action based upon a claim of actual intent to defraud pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law § 276, the six-year limitations period of CPLR 213 (8), as read in light of the two-year discovery rule set forth in CPLR 203 (f [now g]), is controlling (see, McGuinness v Standard Drywall Corp., 193 AD2d 518; Piedra v Vanover, 174 AD2d 191, 194).

Section 213(2) provides a six-year limitation period for breach of contract claims, while section 213(8) governs the limitation period for fraud claims.

Silver v. Silver · filed 1994-05-02(2), (8)

In addition, the allegations of pre-1985 breaches of the cohabitation provision of the 1975 separation agreement did not establish a cause of action sounding in fraud, and were therefore time-barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations governing breach of contract claims (see, CPLR 213 [2], [8]; 3013, 3016 [b]; DH Cattle Holdings Co. v Smith, 195 AD2d 202; Green v Dolphy Constr. Co., 187 AD2d 635, 636; East 15360 Corp. v Provident Loan Socy., 177 AD2d 280; Courageous Syndicate v People-to-People Sports Comm,., 141 AD2d 599; Kotick v Desai, 123 AD2d 744; Spellman v Columbia Manicure Mfg. Co., 111 AD2d 320).

CPLR 213(2) provides a six-year limitations period for an action to recover money loaned, subject to applicable tolling.

Prezioso v. Demchuck · filed 1994-05-23(2)

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, this action to enforce the loan agreement is not barred by the Statute of Limitations. Although the action was commenced more than six years (see, CPLR 213 [2]) after the plaintiff had demanded payment of the loan, the Statute of Limitations was tolled during a portion of that period because the defendant was in military service (see, Military Law § 308; Roberts v Schuh, 55 Misc 2d 996, 997). Excluding the tolled period, the action was timely commenced.

CPLR 213(1) supplies a six-year catch-all limitations period only when no other form of proceeding has a specific statutory limitations period.

New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. McBarnette · filed 1994-06-30(1)

Only if there is no other "form of proceeding for which a specific limitation period is statutorily provided” may the six-year catch-all limitations period provided in CPLR 213 (1) be invoked (49 NY2d, at 229-230).

Section 213(2) requires an action on a demand note to be commenced within six years from the day after the note's date, without a prior demand.

Mangno v. Mangno · filed 1994-07-15(2)

The Statute of Limitations on a demand note is six years from "the day following its date without any prior demand” (Environics, Inc. v Pratt, 50 AD2d 552, 553; see, CPLR 213 [2]; UCC 3-122).

Section 213(1) gives contract rescission claims a six-year limitations period.

Hoffman v. Cannone · filed 1994-07-21[1]

Supreme Court properly dismissed plaintiff’s second and third causes of action since a cause of action for rescission of a contract is governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, Bowes & Co. v American Druggists’ Ins. Co., 96 AD2d 1023, affd 61 NY2d 750; see also, CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213(1) requires an action for an accounting to be commenced within six years of the dissolution of the partnership.

Sagus Marine Corp. v. Donald G. Rynne & Co. · filed 1994-09-15

The legal consequences of a joint venture are equivalent to those of a partnership (Gramercy Equities Corp. v Dumont, 72 NY2d 560, 565; Pedersen v Manitowoc Co., 25 NY2d 412, 419) and an action for an accounting must be commenced within six years of the dissolution of the partnership (CPLR 213 [1]; Partnership Law § 74; Schwartz v Lois Assocs., 149 AD2d 307, 309).

Section 213(1) applies a six-year limitations period to claims for which no other statute of limitations applies.

Jimenez v. Shippy Realty Corp. · filed 1994-11-07(1)

The court is, however, not persuaded that a judgment creditor’s failure to satisfy a judgment is a continuing wrong without a limitation period (cf., 1 Weinstein-KornMiller, op. cit., Til] 213.01, 213.04; 75 NY Jur 2d, Limitations and Laches, § 204); rather, the claim is one that springs from equitable jurisdiction and is, therefore, governed by the omnibus six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [1]; 75 NY Jur 2d, op. cit., §§ 68-69).

Section 213(1) gives equitable actions a six-year limitations period.

Pacheco v. Alvia · filed 1994-11-14(1)

We find that the plaintiffs’ cause of action sounds in constructive fraud and is therefore governed by the six-year Statute of Limitations governing equitable actions in general (see, CPLR 213 [1]; see, 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., 15 NY2d 48; Quadrozzi Concrete Corp. v Mastroianni, 56 AD2d 353).

Section 213(2) requires an action on a contractual obligation to be commenced within six years.

Rotanelli v. Longo · filed 1994-12-19(2)

In addition, the action was timely commenced within six years of the defendant’s default on the loan (see, CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period, with each periodic installment accruing separately when it becomes due.

Snyder v. Madera Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 1995-01-17

Under CPLR 213, plaintiffs had six years from the time their cause of action accrued to institute the present action. Where a claim is founded upon a written instrument for the repayment of money, and payment is made in periodic installments, the courts generally follow a rule of separate accrual whereby the statute of limitations begins to run anew on each installment as it becomes due. ... Because a separate limitations period began to run each time a monthly installment became due, plaintiffs may recover only those installments due and owing for no more than six years immediately preceding commencement of the present action. Any installment due in excess of this six-year period is time-barred.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year catch-all limitations period only when no other form of proceeding has a specific statutory limitation period.

New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. Bane · filed 1995-01-17(1)

Only if there is no other 'form of proceeding for which a specific limitation period is statutorily provided’ may the six-year catch-all limitations period provided in CPLR 213 (1) be invoked (49 NY2d, at 229-230).

Section 213 sets a six-year limitation period for causes of action for fraud, rescission and duress.

Meyer v. Shearson Lehman Bros. · filed 1995-01-24

Nor did the IAS Court err in dismissing the fourth cause of action, seeking to set aside plaintiff’s 1979 settlement with Shearson, as barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations for causes of action for fraud, rescission and duress set forth in CPLR 213, since defendant Shearson presented prima facie proof establishing that the six-year Statute of Limitations had expired in July of 1985, more than six years before the commencement of the underlying action, and since the plaintiff failed to produce evidentiary proof establishing that the limitation period was tolled by its inability to discover Shear-son’s alleged fraud until 1992 (see, Watts v Exxon Corp., 188 AD2d 74).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract actions and actions with no specifically prescribed limitation period.

Westminister Properties, Ltd. v. Kass · filed 1995-02-01

Since the underlying misconduct alleged is a breach of contract, the six-year limitations period applicable to actions upon contract (CPLR 213 [2]) should apply.

Subsection 213(2) bars an action after six years from accrual.

Klein v. Conte · filed 1995-02-02(2)

In this action to recover the purchase price of 50% of the stock of a corporation that was to be paid through a differential in the weekly salaries paid by the corporation to the parties, plaintiff seller’s cause of action accrued one week after execution of the contract, plaintiff never having received any such weekly payments, and is thus barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 provides a six-year limitations period for actions on a promissory note, which may be extended by qualifying payments or acknowledgment of the debt.

Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Westreich · filed 1995-03-14

Plaintiffs action to recover on a promissory note, which was not commenced until 1993, was dismissed by the IAS Court as time barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213; UCC 3-122), because the demand note was executed in 1986. ... However, there was an issue of fact raised as to whether the periodic payments and borrowings against the loan, payments of interest, and repayments of principal took place within six years of the commencement of this action and might serve to extend the Statute of Limitations. Further, an issue of fact was raised as to whether defendant acknowledged her debt to plaintiff in a March 1992 financial statement, which would also extend the limitations period.

CPLR 213 [1] and [2] require covered actions to be commenced within six years.

Marinelli v. Dattoma · filed 1995-03-20[1], [2]

Those claims, having arisen in July of 1983, were properly dismissed as untimely (see, CPLR 213 [1], [2]; 214 [6]).

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year limitations period for an action with no limitation specifically prescribed by law and applies equally to actions and special proceedings.

Cullinan v. Ahern · filed 1995-06-09(1)

We agree with petitioners that that section applies equally to actions and special proceedings (see, CPLR 105 [b]; Siegel, NY Practice § 547, at 860 [2d ed]). We reject their contention, however, that the six-year catch-all provision "automatically or necessarily governs” the Election Law proceeding absent a statute specifically prescribing a period of limitation for a proceeding pursuant to Election Law § 16-114 (Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 229).

Section 213(2) gives contract actions a six-year limitations period.

Hauppauge Union Free School District v. Lawrence L. Smith Associates, P. C. · filed 1995-06-12(2)

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the branch of the plaintiff’s motion which is to dismiss the affirmative defense of the Statute of Limitations is denied, and that affirmative defense is reinstated. ... The Supreme Court erred in determining that "only one certificate of payment [i.e., the 1985 final payment certificate] was issued for the project.” ... Hence, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that Smith’s defense of the Statute of Limitations should be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for actions based on a contractual obligation or liability.

Mersten v. Ticor Title Guarantee · filed 1995-06-26(2)

Whether this action is based on negligence or breach of contract, it is barred by the applicable Statutes of Limitation (see, CPLR 213 [2]; 214 [4]; Green Point Sav. Bank v Dan’s Supreme Supermarket, 199 AD2d 304).

Section 213(2) sets a six-year limitations period for contract actions, and section 213(8) sets a six-year period for fraud actions measured from the alleged conduct.

Podraza v. Carriero · filed 1995-07-14(2), (8)

The applicable Statute of Limitations is six years (see, CPLR 213 [2]), and plaintiffs’ complaint was filed and served in August 1992. ... Dismissal of plaintiffs’ fraud causes of action was properly denied because there is as yet insufficient evidence to determine whether the fraud causes of action were commenced within six years of the alleged conduct constituting fraud (see, CPLR 213 [8]; Pommer v Trustco Bank, 183 AD2d 976, lv dismissed in part and denied in part 81 NY2d 758), or within two years of the discovery of such fraud (see, CPLR 203 [g]; Emord v Emord, 193 AD2d 775; K&E Trading & Shipping v Radmar Trading Corp., 174 AD2d 346).

Section 213 applies a six-year limitations period to this action.

Parker v. Town of Clarkstown · filed 1995-07-17

As the Supreme Court correctly concluded, this action is subject to a six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213).

Section 213(1) provides a six-year limitations period for constructive trust actions, running from the wrongful act that creates the duty of restitution.

Breslau v. Sakow · filed 1995-09-14(1)

It is well settled that the Statute of Limitations applicable in actions to impress constructive trusts can be found in CPLR 213 (subd 1), which prescribes a six-year period that commences to run upon occurrence of the wrongful act giving rise to a duty of restitution (Scheuer v Scheuer, 308 NY 447; Mann v Mann, 77 AD2d 866; Dolmetta v Uintah Nat. Corp., 712 F2d 15, 18) and not from the time when the facts constituting the fraud were discovered’ (Motyl v Motyl, 35 AD2d 1051, 1052; see, also, Muller v Muller, 116 Misc 2d 660, 664).” (Kitchner v Kitchner, 100 AD2d 954.)

Section 213(1) requires an action seeking declaratory relief to be commenced within six years of accrual.

Lake Anne Homeowners Ass'n v. Lake Anne Realty Corp. · filed 1995-10-16(1)

The plaintiffs claim was not interposed within 6 years of its accrual, and is time-barred irrespective of whether it is considered one for declaratory judgment {see, CPLR 213 [1]; Janiak v Town of Greenville, 203 AD2d 329; 145 Kisco Ave. Corp. v Dufner Enters., 198 AD2d 482; Amerada Hess Corp. v Acampora, 109 AD2d 719) or one for reformation of the leases {see, CPLR 213 [6], [2]; Matter of Wallace v 600 Partners Co., 205 AD2d 202; Lopata v Lopata, 196 AD2d 741; Arrathoon v East N. Y. Sav. Bank, 169 AD2d 804).

CPLR 213(1) is not automatically applicable when another statute lacks a limitations period; its applicability depends on the substance of the claim and relief sought.

Hartnett v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1995-10-26(1)

At the outset, we note that CPLR 213 (1) is not necessarily or automatically applicable simply because PESHA does not specify a limitations period.

Section 213(1) provides a six-year catch-all limitations period when no more specific statutory period applies.

VIGILANT INS v. Hous. Auth. · filed 1995-11-01(1)

Otherwise, the six-year catch-all Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (1) applies ( see , New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v McBarnette , supra , at 201; Solnick v Whalen , supra , at 230; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assocs. , supra , at 396; Press v County of Monroe , supra , at 701).

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year limitations period when no more specific statutory limitation period applies.

Vigilant Insurance of America v. Housing Authority of El Paso · filed 1995-11-01(1)

Because the bonds at issue are not secured by a mortgage upon real property, that prerequisite discounts its applicability. Without any other specific limitation periods being statutorily applicable to plaintiffs’ declaratory relief claims, the cow-catcher six-year period obtains (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, 230, supra). ... We conclude that the general six-year CPLR limitations period, as applied in this case, will only begin to run on the day after maturity of the bonds, July 2, 1997.

Section 213(6) imposes a six-year limitations period for a contract reformation claim, running from when the alleged error was made.

Wallace v. 600 Partners Co. · filed 1995-11-02(6)

At the outset, we note that tenant’s claim for reformation is time-barred. The six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213 (6) began to run in 1960, at the time the asserted "scrivener’s error” was allegedly committed.

Section 213's time bar cannot be applied to fireproofing claims without proof of when the building was rendered out of compliance with fire regulations.

Chemical Bank v. Stahl · filed 1996-01-23

Nor did the court err in failing to recognize defendant’s contention that the claims relating to the fireproofing were time-barred pursuant to CPLR 213, as no proof was offered regarding the specific point in time when the building was rendered out of compliance with fire regulations (see, Ely-Cruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402).

Section 213 requires actions subject to its rule to be commenced within six years.

DiPace v. Figueroa · filed 1996-01-25

Moreover, only two of the instances of alleged wrongdoing adverted to by DiPace as grounds for dissolution occurred within the applicable six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213): the sale, to Figueroa, of the building and land housing the business (which DiPace contends constitutes the usurpation of a corporate opportunity), and the adoption of a plan for an infusion of equity into the corporation (which DiPace claims was an attempt to dilute her holdings).

Section 213 limits recovery of alimony arrears to the six-year period before the proceeding is commenced.

Borell v. Merola · filed 1996-02-26

Accordingly, the Hearing Examiner should have awarded the former wife alimony arrears for the six-year period from 1987 until the commencement of this proceeding in 1993 (see, CPLR 213).

CPLR 213(4) provides a six-year limitations period that did not bar the claim because the right to demand repayment accrued when the petitioner ceased occupying the premises.

Drzewucki v. New York State Department of Social Services · filed 1996-03-11(4)

Pursuant to the terms of the mortgage, SCDSS’ right to demand repayment did not accrue until July 14, 1994, the date the petitioner ceased to occupy the mortgaged premises. Consequently, the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (4) did not bar the SCDSS’s claim for reimbursement.

Section 213(2) gives contract actions a six-year limitations period.

815 Park Avenue Owners, Inc. v. Fireman's Insurance of Washington · filed 1996-03-12(2)

The record indicates that the casualty loss occurred in late 1986, and the commencement of this action in July 1993 is not timely even under the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to contracts (CPLR 213 [2]).

Section 213 applies a six-year statute of limitations to an action for an accounting.

Dryden Hotel Associates v. Grimbilas · filed 1996-04-09

The separate action instituted in 1992 for an accounting of a partnership dissolved in 1975 was properly dismissed as barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213.

CPLR § 213(2) requires an action upon a contractual obligation to be commenced within six years.

Ghaly v. First American Title Insurance · filed 1996-06-17(2)

Since the plaintiffs’ cause of action against the defendant insurer for breach of contract was commenced within six years of that date, it was timely, and the Supreme Court erred in dismissing that cause of action (see, CPLR 213 [2]).

Subdivision (2) provides a six-year limitations period for commencing an action.

750 Old Country Road Realty Corp. v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1996-07-12(2)

Thus, the first cause of action was timely commenced within the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2) (see, State of New York v Stewart’s Ice Cream Co., 64 NY2d 83).

Section 213(2) requires contract actions to be commenced within six years.

Gasparek v. Gasparek · filed 1996-08-05(2)

The action was time-barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations for contract actions (see, CPLR 213 [2]; 206 [a]; Parker v Town of Clarkstown, 217 AD2d 607; Woodlaurel, Inc. v Wittman, 199 AD2d 497; see also, Lopez v Highmount Assocs., 101 AD2d 618, 618-619).

Section 213 requires fraud actions to be filed within six years of the fraud or within two years after discovery, whichever is longer.

Sauer v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1996-08-08

Under New York law, an action for fraud must be filed within six years of the commission of the fraud, or two years from when the fraud was, or should reasonably have been discovered, whichever is longer. CPLR §§ 213, 203(g).

Section 213 bars contract-based claims filed after the applicable six-year limitations period.

Middle Country Central School District v. J.F. O'Healy Construction Corp. · filed 1996-08-12

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213).

Section 213(1) applies a six-year limitations period to actions by a legislative body that are general in application, such as a zoning amendment.

Almor Associates v. Town of Skaneateles · filed 1996-09-27[1]

A six-year Statute of Limitations applies to actions by a legislative body that are general in application, such as a zoning amendment (see, Matter of Williamsville Southeast Amherst Homeowners Assn, v Sharpe, 77 AD2d 812; CPLR 213 [1]; see also, Matter of Litz v Town Bd., 197 AD2d 825, 828, n 4).

Section 213(8)'s six-year period does not begin only when the alleged breach is discovered.

Hammond v. Reichbach · filed 1996-10-17(8)

Plaintiff, who sues her former attorney for "breach of fiduciary duty”, argues that the applicable Statute of Limitations is the six-year period of CPLR 213 (8) and that it did not begin to run until she had discovered the alleged breach. That is simply not correct.

Section 213 applies a six-year limitations period to a breach of fiduciary duty claim, which accrues upon an open repudiation of the fiduciary obligation or judicial settlement of the account.

In re the Estate of Winne · filed 1996-10-31

We have consistently applied a six-year limitations period for the breach of a fiduciary relationship (see, Whalen v Gerzof, 154 AD2d 843, 847-848, mod 76 NY2d 914; Fava v Kaufman, 124 AD2d 42, 44) and agree with Surrogate’s Court that a claim wiil not be deemed to accrue until there is either an open repudiation of the fiduciary obligation or a judicial settlement of the conservator’s account (see, Matter of Seaman, 146 Misc 2d 563, 565).

Section 213(2) applies a six-year limitations period to claims for breach of warranty of habitability.

Yokley v. Henry-Clark Associates · filed 1996-11-07(2)

The plaintiff’s fifth cause of action which states a claim for breach of warranty of habitability is governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213 [2]; Sprague v Luna Park Coop., 83 AD2d 877).

Section 213(1) applies a six-year limitations period to an action seeking rescission of property provisions in a prenuptial agreement.

Anonymous v. Anonymous · filed 1996-11-12[1]

The Supreme Court properly determined that so much of the plaintiff wife’s first cause of action which was to rescind the provisions of the prenuptial agreement which allocated property is barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213 [1]; Scheuer v Scheuer, 308 NY 447; Dunning v Dunning, 300 NY 341; Pacchiana v Pacchiana, 94 AD2d 721) and it properly dismissed, as academic, the remaining branches of the defendant husband’s motion (see, Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707; Matter of Amnesty Am. v Jackson, 202 AD2d 416).

Section 213 requires covered actions to be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues.

Martin v. Broder · filed 1996-11-21

Plaintiff was unequivocally discharged as trial counsel in a negligence action by the attorney of record, defendant Sandvoss, on November 17, 1987, and any cause of action he might have had for breach of contract accrued on that date (see, ElyCruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399, 402-403). Therefore, the instant action, commenced on April 11, 1994, was untimely (CPLR 213).

Section 213 bars an action upon a contractual obligation when it is commenced more than six years after accrual.

Vanarthros v. St. Francis Hospital · filed 1996-12-16

To the extent that St. Francis sought leave to file a late cross claim for breach of contract based on the alleged failure of NES to procure any insurance for St. Francis, NMS, or Boyd, the Supreme Court properly determined that the cross claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213; ElyCruikshank Co. v Bank of Montreal, 81 NY2d 399,402).

Section 213(1) supplies a six-year catch-all limitations period for declaratory judgment actions when the CPLR provides no specific period.

Llana v. Town of Pittstown · filed 1996-12-26(1)

Because the CPLR contains no provision setting forth the Statute of Limitations applicable to declaratory judgment actions, the six-year catch-all Statute of Limitations applies (see, CPLR 213 [1]).

Section 213 supplies a six-year limitations period for non-fiduciary ERISA claims when no federal period applies.

DeVito Ex Rel. Estate of DeVito v. Pension Plan of Local 819 I.B.T. Pension Fund · filed 1997-01-07

The parties concede, see Defs.’ Mem. at 14; PL’s Reply Mem. at 15-16, and the Court agrees, that the six-year statute of limitations set forth in Section 213 of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules governs Plaintiffs non-fiduciary ERISA claims.

Section 213 requires actions subject to its six-year limitations periods to be commenced within six years.

DeFalco v. Cutaia · filed 1997-02-03

Moreover, both claims are barred by the respective Statutes of Limitations (see, CPLR 213; ...).

Section 213(2) requires these causes of action to be commenced within six years.

Barclays Bank of New York, N.A. v. Tank Specialists, Inc. · filed 1997-02-24(2)

These causes of action were timely interposed within the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2) (see, State of New York v Stewart’s Ice Cream Co., 64 NY2d 83).